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CONFIDENTIAL

(16233)

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS⁽¹⁾

PART 48

January to March 1942

(¹) Now includes Persia.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 48.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1942.

CHAPTER I.—PALESTINE.

[E 1673/6/31]

No. 1.

The Present Position of World Jewry with particular reference to Eastern Europe.

(Prepared by the Foreign Research and Press Section of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)

IT has been reliably estimated that the Jewish population of the world at the end of 1938 was approximately 17 million. This figure had been reached after a remarkable expansion during the preceding century and a half; estimates, necessarily of a speculative kind, of the world's Jewish population in 1800 give a total of only some two and a half million. Also, and especially since 1880, there have been striking changes in the territorial distribution of this population. In 1880, no less than 75 per cent. of the Jews in the world lived in Eastern Europe, and only 3.5 per cent. in countries outside Europe and the Near East; in 1938 the former percentage had fallen to 46, while the latter had risen to 32.3. The mass migration from Tsarist Russia to the United States, which was the main factor in this redistribution, had three main causes: (1) the overcrowding of the occupations which Jews were permitted to enter in those provinces of Western Russia—known as the Pale of Settlement—to which they were confined by Tsarist law; (2) the economic opportunities open to Jewish settlers in the United States, the growing knowledge of these in Eastern Europe, and the frequency with which successful immigrants invited other members of their families to join them; and (3) the series of pogroms in Russia which began in 1881. Emigration was enormously accelerated by these anti-Semitic outbreaks, and reached its height in the period 1900-14, when 2 million Jews left Eastern Europe, nearly three-quarters of them for the United States.

2. This movement, stopped by the war of 1914-18, recovered its impetus in 1921, and was then abruptly checked for a second time by the passage, in the United States and elsewhere, of restrictive immigration laws. During the years 1921-39, the overcrowding of the traditional Jewish occupations in Eastern Europe became increasingly serious, and was much more so by the new factor of Gentile competition, while at the same time economic developments were taking place which undermined the capacity of many of those occupations to provide employment. Those Jews who attempted to adapt themselves to changing circumstances were thwarted by restrictions of various kinds, arising in part from the persistence of anti-Semitic feeling. And emigration was no longer possible on a sufficiently large scale either to relieve the deepening poverty of the Jewish populations in Eastern Europe or to relax inter-communal tension. The resulting situation has been described by a Jewish writer as "a frozen stampede."

3. In 1938, more than three-quarters of the Jews in the world were concentrated in three areas: (1) the United States of America, with 4,700,000; (2) the U.S.S.R., with 3,200,000; and (3) Eastern Europe excluding the U.S.S.R.,

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i.e., an area including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, the Ruthene and Slovak districts of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania, with 5 million. It is with the third of these great concentrations that this paper is mainly concerned, but something must be said of the first and second also.

4. The Jews, as a result of their dispersion and of their exclusion from landholding in many countries over long periods, are the most highly urbanised of all peoples. This peculiarity and the characteristics arising from it have been maintained in spite of the great Jewish migration of recent times. The great majority of American Jews live in the large cities; New York alone has over 2 million, and there are more than a quarter of a million in both Chicago and Philadelphia. As in other countries, this concentration has led to a conspicuously high Jewish representation in certain professions and trades, which in turn has provided material for anti-Semitic propaganda. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency towards assimilation; the children of immigrants cease to speak Yiddish and move out of the crowded Jewish quarters, while the frequency of intermarriage with Gentiles appears to increase with each generation. The slowing down of immigration will, if it is not reversed, remove the most powerful brake on this process of assimilation. Already, although Jewish community life is highly organised and finds expression in a flourishing periodical and newspaper press, the drive towards Americanisation is far stronger than the cross-current of Jewish nationalism. There is, however, a widespread interest in the Zionist movement and the progress of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. And it is primarily to the United States that all Jewish organisations which are planning for further development in Palestine, for Jewish colonisation in other countries or for the reconstruction of Jewish life in Europe, will turn for financial and political support.

5. In Russia, before 1917, the Jews had been characteristically concentrated in small-scale urban enterprise, they therefore suffered disproportionately from the economic revolution of 1918-21. At the same time, however, they were freed from their previous confinement to the Western provinces, and were able to seek new opportunities in Moscow and Leningrad, which have since become the largest centres of Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. Gradually the Jews adapted themselves to the Soviet economy, putting their urban habits and aptitudes to new uses, until in 1939 nearly half of the occupied Jews in the Soviet Union were employed by the State in official, clerical, technical and professional positions. In addition, over 20 per cent. were working in factories. At the same time the Jews were becoming increasingly assimilated. Their religion was actively discouraged, contact with Jewish organisations outside the U.S.S.R. was entirely severed, the number of Yiddish schools declined and the proportion of mixed marriages increased. Incitement to anti-Semitism was made a criminal offence. Thus, in the U.S.S.R., as in the United States, the Jew enjoys full equality as an individual with his fellow-citizens; he is less free, however, to determine the forms of his communal organisation, he is precluded from participation in the international life of Jewry, and his specifically Jewish consciousness appears to have a smaller chance of survival.

6. In the parts of Eastern Europe enumerated in paragraph 3 above, the Jewish situation varies from region to region. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently uniform to admit of a general description which, despite an inevitable crudity, need not be misleading. The Jewish communities in these countries, in spite of a certain amount of erosion through individual assimilation, which has had greater effects in Hungary than elsewhere, have retained their identity as a distinct element in the population. They constitute from 4 to 14 per cent. of the total population, concentrated however in the towns, in many of which half or even three-quarters of the inhabitants are Jewish. On these solid masses orthodox Judaism has retained its hold, so that their way of life is in several aspects different from that of their Christian neighbours. The great majority of the Jews in this region still wear distinctive clothing, live in exclusively Jewish districts and habitually speak Yiddish. It was here, and in the neighbouring districts of White Russia and the Ukraine, that the Zionist movement, during its formative period, found its most substantial popular support and the bulk of its leadership. Not only the Zionists but almost all the politically conscious Jews of this area are in some sense Jewish Nationalists. Their relations with the ruling majorities, between 1919 and 1939, were further complicated by the efforts which they had previously made to learn the languages and assimilate the cultures of the Russian, German and Austrian Empires. In other ways, too, they have suffered from the instability of frontiers in this region; thus in such disputed districts as Transylvania or Vilna, where they were naturally unwilling to commit themselves

definitively to one claimant or the other, their neutrality caused both to distrust them.

7. To these causes of friction between the Jews and their neighbours in Eastern Europe must be added the restriction of economic opportunity, arising from the increase of population on the land, the lack of adequate quantities of capital for industrialisation and the absence of facilities for emigration. The intensely competitive atmosphere to which these conditions gave rise was favourable to the growth of anti-Semitism, which undoubtedly played an important part in the progressive elimination of the Jews from various economic sectors. It would not be easy, however, to determine how far this process was due to deliberate anti-Jewish action, and how far to the incidental effects of unplanned economic change or of measures adopted without regard to the Jews. Thus the movement, in the new States, to "nationalise" the civil service and the culturally important professions was a natural consequence of the desire of newly independent peoples for national self-expression; but in its application to the professions this policy struck harder at the Jews than at the ruling peoples of the earlier imperial régimes. At the same time other Jewish occupations were threatened by the measures which the new States took to increase their strength and prosperity. These included the formation of peasant co-operatives, which deprived many Jewish traders of their livelihood, and the establishment by the State or by State-subsidised enterprises of large factories, which ousted many Jewish artisans from their markets. That the Jews should suffer, in a period of economic development, from their concentration in primitive forms of industry and commerce was inevitable. They might reasonably have expected, however, that after a period of dislocation they would be reabsorbed in the new economic institutions. That this did not occur was due to factors already mentioned—nationalist feeling in combination with the intense competition arising from poverty.

8. In spite of the presence, in many parts of this region, of small numbers of conspicuously wealthy Jews, the average Jewish income was below the average for the non-Jewish urban population, and the poorest districts in the towns were usually the Jewish quarters. The poverty of the Jewish communities in the years immediately preceding the present war was illustrated by the fact that, in the larger Polish cities, between 30 and 50 per cent. of their members were obliged to apply for communal relief. The relative decline of the Jewish population, which before 1939 was taking place throughout the region to an extent which could not be wholly accounted for by emigration, may also be attributable to impoverishment and the fading of economic prospects.⁽¹⁾

9. In all the countries under discussion an attempt was made after the war of 1914-18 to secure certain rights for the Jewish population by means of minorities treaties between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and all the States in the area, except Latvia and Lithuania, whose Governments made declarations embodying the same principles. These rights included civic and political equality for individuals and a measure of cultural autonomy for national minorities (the Jews of Hungary, however, subsequently renounced the designation of a national minority). The machinery for enforcing the stipulations of these treaties was inadequate, and the resentment to which they gave rise in the minds of the Governments upon which they were imposed must be balanced against their positive effects, but they probably did succeed in preventing certain forms of discrimination and of compulsory assimilation. On the other hand, they had little relevance to the economic and social crisis through which East European Jewry was passing, and they were obviously incapable of creating that willingness to make concessions for the sake of collaboration without which harmony between a national majority and national minorities in a single State is not possible.

10. It follows from the preceding paragraphs that the heart of the Jewish problem in Europe is to be found not in Germany, but in the belt of countries lying between Germany and the U.S.S.R.; that the problem existed before the conquest of power in Germany by a National Socialist Government, and, indeed, was inherited by the successor States of the Empires destroyed by the war of 1914-18; and that it will not be solved by the defeat of Germany and the libera-

(1) NOTE.—This relative decline, however, was insignificant by comparison with that which was simultaneously taking place in Germany. In that country the Jewish population was recorded as having fallen from 500,000 in 1933 to 230,000 in 1939, figures which mask an even steeper decline, since the earlier one is based on religion and the later on "race"; emigration played a relatively large part in this process, but by the latter year the Jewish birthrate was coming to a standstill.

tion of her Eastern victims. The main elements in the problem may be briefly summarised. On the one hand, it is apparent that the Jews in Eastern Europe are, as they are not in Britain or in Germany, a visibly distinct and numerically significant community with claims to national and cultural autonomy. On the other hand, it is clear that the principal ingredients of anti-Jewish feeling, in this region and in modern times, are intense national self-consciousness and economic discontent. It is the purpose of the remaining paragraphs of this paper to enquire, in the light of these conclusions, whether any of the policies advanced as solutions for this problem are, in fact, both practicable and likely to lead to the desired result.

11. A solution advocated by important political groups, for the most part belonging to the Right wing, in the States of Eastern Europe, and by an increasing number of Jews, is large-scale Jewish emigration. The non-Jewish exponents of this policy claim that their economic difficulties would be substantially relieved by the removal of a "surplus" population, and that the departure of the Jews would simplify the task of developing authentically national cultures among recently emancipated peoples. To the former contention the Jews reply that their communities have been established in Eastern Europe for at least 800 years, and that, if there is, in fact, a "surplus" population in that region, it cannot reasonably be identified with the Jewish minority; and a former Polish Premier has pointed out that, since the economically active population of Poland grows at the rate of roughly 300,000 a year, even the total elimination of the Jews would do no more than provide a breathing-space of about six years. The argument from the necessity of pure national cultures is one which does not apply to the Jews alone; and the Jews are, owing to the absence of any neighbouring State with an irredentist claim to their allegiance, less dangerous than any other substantial minority in the region to the political unity of the States in which they live. If this doctrine were to find expression after the present war in a comprehensive scheme for disentangling the populations of Eastern Europe, it might be necessary to make provision for the resettlement of the 5 million Jews whose future would thereby be called in question; but, if less drastic measures were adopted, the expulsion of the Jews alone would scarcely be practicable.

12. Apart from an investigation made by the Polish Government in 1937 into the possibilities of settlement in Madagascar, the results of which were unpromising, and from a certain interest shown at Geneva by Polish and Roumanian delegates in the development of Palestine, the Governments concerned have not devoted much attention to the problem of where Jewish emigrants are to go. On this point the Jewish advocates of emigration have naturally been more explicit. The country to which most of them turn is Palestine. The radical New Zionist Organisation, which demands that both Palestine and Trans-jordan shall be placed under Jewish sovereignty and opened to unrestricted Jewish immigration, is prepared to negotiate with the future Governments of Eastern Europe for the "evacuation" of the area by the Jews. The official Zionist Organisation, while it is not willing to take any action which would imply a readiness to abandon Jewish positions in Eastern Europe, and which might have dangerous repercussions on other sections of the diaspora, is also formulating proposals for the transfer to Palestine of from 1 to 3 million Jews. Zionism has a substantial following in Poland and in neighbouring countries. The obstacles to the realisation of its aims are to be found in the limited absorptive capacity of Palestine, in the resistance of the Arabs, and in the requirements of British policy in the Near East. These factors make it in the highest degree unlikely that the Jewish National Home in Palestine, however great its moral and cultural value to Jewry, will ever absorb an appreciable proportion of the 5 million impoverished and under-privileged Jews of Eastern Europe.

13. If Zionism does not offer a solution to this aspect of the Jewish problem, other projects for emigration seem at present to be even less hopeful. Groups of Jews who believe in the necessity for the territorial concentration of their people, but who realise the economic and political limitations of Palestine, are searching for an empty territory which is nevertheless suitable for white settlers and controlled by a Government which can be persuaded to permit extensive Jewish colonisation. Others hope that the United States, the other American republics and the British Dominions will, in the near future, relax their restrictions on immigration. Either of these policies, if the requisite consent could be obtained, might ease the situation in Eastern Europe fairly rapidly, though the success of the former would also depend upon financial support on an exceedingly large scale. But it seems at present so unlikely that the interested Governments

will consent to measures of this kind that it would be unwise to rely upon them as a major factor in the post-war life of Jewry.

14. In antithesis to emigration stands the proposal that the Jews, while remaining in their country of origin, should, as far and as rapidly as possible, assimilate themselves to the surrounding population. The assimilation of Jews is a process which began with the dispersion and, though checked since 1933, has never completely ceased. It was greatly accelerated in Western Europe during the nineteenth century, but has so far had little effect in the East European communities, except in districts which formerly belonged to the Habsburg Empire. It is marked, in its early stages, by the adoption of the language of the majority, by the abandonment of distinctive dress and by modification in the ritual and customs of Judaism; in its later stages it may lead to baptism and to intermarriage with Gentiles. The objection to its adoption as a policy is that it either involves compulsion, as it did in the U.S.S.R., or else is too slow to have any bearing on immediate problems. The difficulty in forcing the pace of assimilation from within the Jewish community is increased by the fact that assimilationist leaders are by their very nature incapable of influencing the orthodox or nationalistic Jewish masses. Their policy, furthermore, has received a serious set-back from the recent history of German Jewry, which, in spite of the high degree of assimilation to which it had attained, was about halved by a fanatical anti-Semitic movement. The theory that the Jews are racially alien from their neighbours has certainly introduced the possibility that a Jew may be regarded as a greater danger to national unity after assimilation than before. But considerations of this kind are likely to have less weight with the majority of Poles or Roumanians than the self-evident distinctness of their Jewish fellow-citizens has had hitherto. And there can be little doubt that assimilation in external characteristics alone would, if it could be brought about on a sufficient scale, remove an important cause of inter-communal friction.

15. If the majority of the Jews are to remain in their homelands and to preserve their essential Jewish characteristics, the most hopeful approach to the problems both of Jewish poverty and of Jewish-Gentile relations would appear to be through measures designed to improve the general economic situation of the region. Discussion of the character of such measures is outside the scope of this paper, but it seems reasonable to suppose that, given a reasonable measure of financial assistance and commercial co-operation from the Western Powers, the peasant States of Eastern Europe would be in a position to improve the standard of life of their peoples. If that process were once initiated, anti-Jewish feeling would lose the stimulus which it formerly derived from desperate competition in a contracting economy, and the realisation might grow that national prosperity would be hindered and not advanced by the impoverishment of an important section of the population. The Jews themselves would be compelled, in these circumstances, to contribute to the improvement in their economic and social position by continuing and extending the efforts they have already begun to make to adapt themselves to changing economic conditions by means of vocational training or re-training. This would incidentally accelerate at the same time the process of superficial assimilation.

16. It is not probable, even in conditions of economic expansion, that the demand for the limitation of the Jewish share in certain conspicuous occupations would be abandoned, and its persistence would confront those Jewish leaders who were working for collaboration with a difficult decision. On the one hand they would recognise the benefit which their own people would derive from a substantial occupational restratification, and the possibility of using an agreement on the restriction of their entry into certain occupations as an occasion for securing entry into others previously closed to them. On the other hand, they, and still more their followers, would recoil from the associations of the "numerus clausus" and from any measure which infringed the principle of individual equality.

17. Attention should be drawn to one possible situation in which this and other obstacles to co-operation between the Jews and their fellow-citizens, in Poland at least, might be expected to diminish in importance. This is the formation of a Government by the workers' and peasants' parties. For the Polish Jewish Socialist party, commonly known as the Bund, is the only Jewish party in Eastern Europe which has at the same time a large following and a programme based upon Jewish-Gentile co-operation for the achievement of common objectives. Elsewhere, and in other circumstances in Poland, the absence of the habit of co-operation will inevitably delay the growth of harmonious relations.

18. The preceding paragraphs have left out of account the possible effects of the present war on the position of the Jews in Eastern Europe. It is not easy

to foresee what may be the outcome of a period of intense anti-Semitic propaganda, or, on the other hand, of common suffering and resistance to a common enemy. Nor can the lasting economic effects of the wholesale dispossession of Jews and the imposition of a system of autarky upon the ghettos be assessed as yet. But it is possible to point to two ways in which the dimensions of the Jewish problem in its East European form may be reduced as a result of the war. In the first place, the population of the German-occupied territories may be considerably diminished, and the Jewish population will certainly show a relative decline. Secondly, any westward extension of the frontiers of the Soviet Union would automatically transfer a number of Jewish communities from the third to the second of the sections of world Jewry listed in paragraph 3 above.

*Foreign Research and Press Service,
Balliol College, Oxford,
December 24, 1941.*

[E 29/6/31]

No. 2.

*A List of the more Important Jewish Organisations.—(Received in
Foreign Office, January 2, 1942.)*

NOTE.—This list includes only those organisations which are attempting, or might attempt, to exercise a political influence. And it excludes bodies, such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle, whose activities have been suspended or brought under the control of anti-Semitic Governments as a result of the war. Jewish organisations in Palestine are dealt with, at greater length, in a separate paper.

A.—British Organisations.

1. *The Board of Deputies of British Jews.*—Represents synagogues and a few secular institutions. Is generally recognised as the official voice of the Anglo-Jewish community. Its present president is a Zionist, Professor S. Brodetsky.

2. *The Anglo-Jewish Association.*—Established with the aim of furthering the welfare of Jews in Eastern Europe and elsewhere; supports schools in various countries, mainly in Asia. President, Mr. Leonard Stein.

3. *The Joint Foreign Committee.*—Consists of ten members of the Board of Deputies and four of the Anglo-Jewish Association; the presidents of these bodies are its joint chairmen. It is through this body that the Anglo-Jewish community normally acts when it desires to bring its influence to bear on the treatment of Jewish problems in foreign countries. Secretary, Mr. A. G. Brotman.

B.—Zionist Organisations.

4. *The Jewish Agency for Palestine.*—Is recognised in the Mandate for Palestine as "a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such . . . matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine." Under the constitution of this body non-Zionists were to have parity of representation with Zionists, but in practice its policy is indistinguishable from that of the World Zionist Organisation. The greater part of its executive is in Jerusalem, but there is always at least one member in England, i.e., Professor Brodetsky.

5. *The World Zionist Organisation.*—The supreme authority in the Zionist movement, the Zionist Congress, assembles in normal times every two years. Its members are elected in part by national Zionist Federations, in part by party associations. The constituent bodies which are represented in Great Britain are the following:—

(i) *The Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland.*—By far the most important of the constituent bodies in this country, the others being small fractions. Publishes the *Zionist Review*.

(ii) *Mizrachi Federation of Great Britain and Ireland.*—The religious wing of Zionism. President, the Chief Rabbi.

(iii) *Jewish Socialist Labour Party of Great Britain.*—Affiliated to the World Zionist Organisation on the one hand; on the other, to the British Labour party and the Labour and Socialist International.

(iv) *Jewish State Party.*—Advocates the extreme Zionist programme of a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan. The *London Jewish Chronicle*, although a non-party organ, expresses views which are similar to those of this group.

In addition, there is now a *Council of Continental Zionists*, formed in 1941 by exiles from various countries now in England. President, Dr. I. Schwarzbart (Poland).

6. *The World Jewish Congress.*—In principle this body is not exclusively Zionist, but it has been accurately described as "a holding company for Zionism." Since the outbreak of war has moved its headquarters from Geneva to London, but is strongest in the United States. Chairman of British section, Rev. M. L. Perlzweig.

7. *The New Zionist Organisation.*—A dissident body of extreme Zionists, which demands the rapid creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan. Formed by members of the earlier Revisionist party, who left the Zionist Organisation in 1935 because they disapproved of the more moderate policy of the latter, and of the domination of Zionist congresses by the Labour party. Leader in England, Mr. A. Abrahams. Publishes the *London Jewish Standard*.

C.—Other International Organisations.

8. *Agudas Israel.*—Established in 1912 for the "co-ordination of orthodox Jewish effort throughout the world." Represents religious and traditional Jewry. Chairman of British section, Mr. H. A. Goodman.

9. *The Jewish Colonisation Association (I.C.A.).*—Exists to promote the emigration of Jews from countries in which they are subjected to discriminatory treatment, and to establish Jewish colonies, especially in South America. President, Mr. L. G. Montefiore.

10. *The Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Colonisation.*—The object of this numerically insignificant body is to establish a concentrated Jewish settlement on a large scale in an empty territory. It is not committed in principle to any particular country, but its leader, Dr. I. Steinberg, is at present in Australia, trying to secure support for a settlement in the empty north-west of the Commonwealth.

11. *Joint British Committee for the Reconstruction of East European Jewry (Ort-Oze).*—The more important of the two organisations represented in Britain by this committee, Ort, has as its object the vocational training of Jews in Eastern Europe both for agriculture and for various trades. The president of the British Committee is Lord Rothschild.

D.—Organisations in the United States.

12. *The American Jewish Committee.*—Formed in 1911 to organise the influence of American Jewry in support of Jewish rights in all countries. Has formed a "Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems."

13. *The American Jewish Congress.*—Constituted in 1917 with objects similar to those of the committee, but on a more democratic basis and under Zionist leadership. Has also established an "Institute of Jewish Affairs," in preparation for the peace settlement.

14. *The Jewish Labour Committee.*—Represents the Jewish trade unions, Jewish Labour parties and the Jewish section of the Socialist party, in so far as they deal with Jewish affairs.

15. *B'nai B'rith.*—The most important Jewish friendly society, which aims at uniting Jews of various political and religious views in common activity largely of a philanthropic kind.

16. *The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc. (J.D.C.).*—The most important Jewish relief organisation in the world. Had an extensive organisation in Europe, and was working in German-occupied territories until the entry of the United States into the war.

E.—Polish Organisations.

17. *The Polish Jewish Representation in Palestine.*—This organisation of Jewish exiles from Poland contains representatives of Zionist parties and of the Agudas Israel, but not of the New Zionist Organisation or of the Polish Jewish Socialist party (Bund). It co-operated with the Jewish representative on the recently-dissolved Polish National Council in London, Dr. I. Schwarzbart (himself a Zionist).

18. *The Council of Polish Jews in Great Britain.*—Apparently includes Zionists, New Zionists and Agudists.

19. *The Polish Jewish Socialist Party (Bund)* has established an office in New York, where a number of its leaders are now assembled. The Bund claims to have been the largest Jewish party in Poland immediately before the war, and it certainly won substantial victories over the other Jewish parties in Warsaw and elsewhere in the local elections of 1938–39.

FOREIGN RESEARCH PRESS SERVICE,
Balliol College, Oxford.

December 17, 1941.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 258/204/93]

No. 3.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 12, 1942.)

(No. 349.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 14, 1941.

A MONTH has elapsed since I wrote my last despatch (No. 317 of the 11th November) describing current events in this country, and I am glad to be able to inform you that the improvement in the internal situation, which I was then able to describe, has been maintained.

2. Nuri Said's Government has continued to suppress activities prejudicial to the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance and the effect of their action has, on the whole, been satisfactory. Thirty to forty more troublesome men have been interned in Fao, where there are now some 170 inmates. The murderer of Captain Jeffreys in Nasiriyah in early June has been convicted and sentenced to death, the mutessarif and commandant of police in charge at the time have both been dismissed, and ten people from the town have been sent to Fao. The trial by court-martial of Saiyid Alwan-al-Yasiri, for presiding over the illegal meeting of Parliament which set aside the Regent last April, began on the 25th November; and Muhammad Hassan Haidar, who summoned Deputies to the meeting in his capacity as deputy chairman, was also arrested for trial after the Chamber had agreed to suspend his parliamentary immunity. The trials of Rashid Ali, his Cabinet colleagues and the five generals who took part in his insurrection are also proceeding before the Military Court at Al Rashid. No sentences have yet been passed.

3. On the 6th November twenty officers of the Iraqi army were arrested, including four who had played a prominent part in Kirkuk during Rashid Ali's rebellion, and an officer who had formerly been Director of Propaganda in the time of Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet was placed on pension. I understand that the Prime Minister has so far arrested or dismissed about eighty officers.

4. The Prime Minister has initiated his plan of reducing the establishment of the army by making the third battalion of each brigade into a cadre only; he has also made a beginning in certain areas with the abolition of conscription. The Speech from the Throne contained no mention of any specific plan, but, on the contrary, referred to the steps to be taken to strengthen the army. The Prime Minister's intention is therefore seen to be the creation of a smaller but more efficient army.

5. The murder of Fakhri Nashashibi outside his hotel in Bagdad on the 9th November showed that further action against Palestinian political fugitives in Iraq was necessary. Two Palestinians with bad records (one a relative of the Mufti) were arrested and are awaiting trial, and a number of other Palestinians were rounded up and packed off to their own country.

6. The Education Department in the Mosul Liwa still contains many undesirable teachers and the Liwa Education Director is a man with a long record of anti-British conduct. I hope soon to persuade the Prime Minister to remove him and dismiss a number of subordinates.

7. More authority has been given to the remaining British officers in the police headquarters in Bagdad. Major Cones, the chief inspecting officer, will now be given a considerable say in appointments and promotions in addition to other new powers, and Major Wilkins has been put in executive control of the C.I.D. and Passport and Residence Sections of the Police.

8. Parliament was adjourned on the 30th November after having sat for one month. The reason for the adjournment was that the Government have not yet completed the budget (for 1942–43), which is always the principal business of the annual session. So far, the session has not been eventful, but there were points in the proceedings which are worth noting. The Chamber's reply to the Speech from the Throne expressed gratitude to the Regent for the restoration of the constitutional life of the country and appreciation of the personal sacrifices made by His Highness in saving the country from the hazardous situation into which it had been brought by wicked men and foreign intrigues. The reply also urged that Iraq's pledges to her Allies should be fulfilled in the letter and the spirit. This is the first occasion on which a resolution has been passed by the Chamber upholding the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance in such a manner.

9. Three laws were passed dealing with the steady and continuous rise in the cost of living. The first provided special high cost-of-living allowances free of income tax to all State employees with salaries under I.D. 21 a month; the second authorised similar allowances to State pensioners; and the third gave the Government powers to take steps to deal with attempts to corner essential commodities. Another important economic measure was the Exchange Control Law which came into force on the 24th November. This prohibits all dealings in foreign exchange except through banks licensed by the Minister of Finance. It does not apply to dealings in currencies within the "sterling area." With the enactment of this law Iraq secured readmission into the "sterling area."

10. The Chamber showed its independence by rejecting four ordinances enacted by Jamil Madfai's Government and by refusing to accept the Senate's adverse vote on a draft law amending the Expropriation Law of 1934. In each instance action was taken on the recommendation of the Chamber's own committees and without a lead from the Government.

11. The Prime Minister made a speech of some interest in the Senate on the 16th November, in which he defended the existing democratic institutions in Iraq and declared his wish to strengthen the authority of the Iraqi Parliament. He foreshadowed amendments to the Electoral Law designed to bring about a better representation of all classes of the people. Nuri Said put forward a similar project to Parliament in 1939 without result, and it does not appear likely that the Government will introduce legislation of this kind during the current session.

12. The cost of living continues to rise in spite of all that the Government has been able to do to check it. Supplies of essential goods are not lacking, but speculation is rife and wholesale and retail prices are adjusted to war news rather than to any calculation of supply and demand. The outbreak of war with Japan sent the prices of piece-goods and food-stuffs up with a bound and wheat touched the record figure of I.D. 24 a ton, which is about four times the average for pre-war prices. The poor are being hard hit and exceptionally cold weather is adding to their suffering. In the circumstances, discontent is inevitable and our detractors hasten to put all the blame on the British Government. The employment by the British forces of a very large number of labourers and craftsmen is a considerable palliative to the present economic distress of the poorer classes, but I fear that, unless the Government succeed in forcing down the prices of food and clothing, discontent may create a serious situation.

13. The Regent paid an official visit to Basra between the 3rd December and 6th December. His Highness took with him the young King Feisal and the Amir Zaid. The little King is truly popular everywhere, and the party received a cordial welcome wherever they went.

14. A new mutessarif, Hissam al Din Juma, has been sent to Mosul. In spite of some dubious points in his record, he has good qualities, and in the present circumstances was probably the best available man to send there. There has been no further trouble with the Yezidis and the Shammar have remained quiet.

15. With encouragement from the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires, the Ministry of Education have arranged for a series of cultural lectures to be given by Egyptian professors now in Government service in Iraq. The opening lecture was attended by the Regent and speeches welcoming the occasion as a further step towards closer cultural collaboration between Egypt and Iraq were delivered by the Iraqi Minister of Education and the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires. The press were unanimous in their applause, and the Prime Minister in a subsequent interview expressed his gratitude for Egypt's help to the Arab cause. He pointed out that history showed that cultural collaboration had always been the prelude to the establishment of political collaboration between all nations which had achieved national unity. The next event in what the press are calling the season of Iraqi-Egyptian cultural collaboration will be the annual meeting of the Arab Medical Congress, which will be held in Cairo at the end of December.

16. The situation in the Kurdish districts in Iraq remains normal. Early in December a young Avromani from Persia visited the embassy with a letter signed by a number of Avromani chieftains authorising him to consult the ambassador about their situation. He was asked to tell the chieftains that in their own interests they should seek an understanding on reasonable terms with the Persian Government. He was frankly warned that the Persian Kurds should expect no support from the British for their revolt, but at the same time he was assured that His Majesty's Government took a friendly interest in the Kurds and would try to help them if they behaved sensibly.

17. The Iraqi Government formally broke off diplomatic relations with France and Japan in the middle of November. The French and Japanese Legation staffs have not yet left the country.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran and Jedda; the Minister of State, Cairo; His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan; the Governor-General of India; the Commander-in-chief, India; General Headquarters, Middle East; the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; the Political Agent, Koweit, and to His Majesty's Consuls at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 204/204/93]

No. 4.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 18, 1942.)

(No. 351.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 19, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul, in which he gives an account of events in his consular district from the beginning of April to the end of October.

2. It will be seen that during the months of April and May, in particular, Mr. Finch was confronted with a variety of difficult situations, the successful handling of which testifies to his resourcefulness and devotion to duty.

3. I trust, therefore, that you will authorise me to convey to Mr. Finch your appreciation of the excellent work done by him at a time when, without any contact with the outside world, he was daily called upon to meet situations of heavy responsibility and often of personal danger.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Consul Finch to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis.

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir,

Mosul, November 30, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on events in this consular district during the period April-October, 1941, which I regret is greatly overdue.

I have, &c.

J. P. G. FINCH.

(Confidential.)

Report on Events in Mosul District, April-October 1941.

Prelude.

1. On the night of 3rd or 4th April, 1941 (records are now destroyed), Tahsin Ali, Mutessarif of Mosul, was removed more or less under duress to Bagdad by order of Rashid Ali, and was replaced by Brigadier Qasim Maqsud, of the Iraq army, previously stationed at Kirkuk, as acting mutessarif and District Commander at Mosul. The real military commander, Colonel Abdur Razzaq Hussein, had gone to Bagdad for a horse show, and was prevented from returning.

2. During the same night in which Tahsin Ali was removed, I received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador instructing me to convey his Excellency's personal greetings to the mutessarif and to inform him that the Regent was forming a Government at Basra which would have the full support of His Majesty's Government. Early in the morning, when I requested an interview with the mutessarif, I was met with evasive answers, and finally went to the mutessarifiyah, demanded an interview on the spot, and was told that the mutessarif had "gone to Bagdad." I was then met with evasion when I enquired who was acting during his absence, but was finally told that Brigadier

Qasim Maqsd was in charge. It was then necessary to decide how far the ambassador's message was for "the mutessarif" (as worded) and how far for Tahsin Ali. Obviously, the personal greeting was for Tahsin Ali, but, in view of the decisive effect that a firm, independent attitude by the District Commander at Mosul had had at the time of Bekir Sidqi's assassination in 1937, I judged that a statement of His Majesty's Government's attitude might have a good effect on whoever was in charge here, and that the statement must be made immediately, before any opposing influences got to work. To communicate with Bagdad by telephone was impossible; the lines were blocked by the Government. Telegrams were subject to inordinate delay and mutilation. Therefore, I interviewed Qasim Maqsd, and gave him the second part of the ambassador's message. He replied that he was under the orders of Bagdad, and could "make no answer." I said that I did not require an answer; I was merely telling him something I considered it important for him to know. Qasim Maqsd was not a man of sufficient character to take the independent line I had hoped for, but throughout April and May he was, by all evidence, a very unhappy man, inwardly convinced that Rashid Ali had aroused an opponent whom he could not withstand. Differences of opinion among his own officers, latent opposition among the notables of Mosul, and lack of sympathy among the tribes of the north were primarily responsible for Qasim Maqsd's conviction.

3. During the remainder of the month instructions were received concerning the possible rapid evacuation of British women and children and concentration and/or evacuation of the males. Until the occupation of Syria and Persia by friendly forces Mosul was awkwardly placed for evacuation, except to Bagdad. It is hemmed round with frontiers. The Turkish frontier is an inhospitable one in this region, and the road to it presents difficulties. The road to the Persian frontier lies through mountainous country unsuitable for women and children in time of disorder. Syria meant internment for British males of military age, but internment might be preferable to danger to life and limb in Iraq. The most satisfactory route seemed via Baiji and the pipe-line to Transjordan. For evacuation of women and children, it was decided to use the railway via Syria and Turkey to Palestine; for any general evacuation, the pipe-line to Transjordan. It was fortunate that in the event the latter route was not used, except for the evacuation by air of the B.O.D. Company's women and children, for attacks on the pumping stations broke out at the very outset of hostilities.

4. Experience proved that voluntary evacuation and local secrecy, to avoid causing alarm, are objects that cannot together be attained. The poorer British subjects will not move without good reason given, and the better-to-do in Mosul, whose morale was excellent, did not see any reason to stir, in the sultry calm that prevailed in April, until I had strained to the breaking-point my instructions on the subject of secrecy.

Evacuation.

5. Between 11 A.M. and noon on Tuesday, the 29th April, His Majesty's Ambassador's telegram was received, containing instructions that British women and children should leave Iraq, but not via Bagdad, and that assistance in this sense should be given to an American family in Mosul. The north-bound Taurus express left Mosul that day at 2.30 P.M. Most of the English women and children were got on board, thanks to the helpful attitude of the French and Turkish Consuls; certain of them, owing to delay caused by the Iraqi passport authorities, had to chase the train in cars as far as Tel Hugenah. This left four British families and one American, who for various reasons—mainly passport complications—could not, or would not, go by that day's train. The wives and children of the scattered British Indians and British subjects of local denizenship were mostly of local origin, and were not of a kind to be launched without their menfolk on a journey through foreign territory. Although a number of the men were later rounded up and interned in the consulate, these local families remained unharmed in the town through the subsequent troubles.

6. It was not until between 1 and 2 P.M. on the 29th April that His Majesty's Ambassador's decision could be telephoned to the B.O.D. Company at Qaiyarah. The authorities had practically monopolised the telephones, and all calls were made with great difficulty. The B.O.D. Company had independent arrangements for evacuating their women and children.

7. At about 7 P.M. on Wednesday, the 30th April, another telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador arrived, announcing that males in Bagdad were being concentrated. Although Mosul town was quiet, and the only unwholesome signs

were police control of movement on the roads and great difficulty in communications (it proved impossible to get through to Qaiyarah or Ain Zalah that evening), it was decided to collect everyone in the consulate and the British houses in its immediate vicinity, to ask the authorities for a police cordon round the area, and to broach with them the question of providing a safe-conduct to the frontier, if and when this should be asked for. All available British and Americans were accordingly brought into the concentration area, and at 9 P.M. I interviewed Brigadier Qasim Maqsd. The interview was friendly; he immediately provided the police cordon, and promised, after demanding a certain amount of explanation, to give police escort to the Syrian or Transjordan frontier if required. At first he wished to limit this to the Syrian frontier, but I insisted on leaving open the alternative of sending a convoy via Baiji and the Haifa pipe-line, and he finally agreed. It had been necessary, before approaching Qasim Maqsd, to decide how far we should take the authorities into our confidence and how far endeavour to present them with a *fait accompli*. It was decided that, since they had our communications so readily at their mercy and were already watching them, and since the supreme danger in Mosul itself was likely to be mob violence, we would do better to demand their co-operation and emphasise their responsibility.

8. On Thursday, the 1st May, there was another north-bound Taurus express, but by this time I judged that, rather than send the remaining women and children away by that route, it would be better to send the whole British and American communities of Mosul and the B.O.D. by motor convoy direct to Transjordan, leaving behind only those males whose presence was indispensable. By this time there was only one means of telephoning to Qaiyarah or Ain Zalah: to obtain communication by order of the District Commander. During that morning I was able, by speaking from the Iraq air force headquarters in the hearing of an officer, to ring up Qaiyarah and Ain Zalah, inform them of our intention, and ask them to assemble all but the indispensable to join the Mosul convoy at Qaiyarah. In return, I learnt that the B.O.D. women and children had been safely got away from Qaiyarah (there were only males at Ain Zalah) by car to K. 3 pumping station; but that a number of males, and much of the required transport, had accompanied them thither, and were not expected back at Qaiyarah until the evening of the 1st May.

9. In the course of April a desert track had been reconnoitred linking Qaiyarah with Ain Zalah via Adaiyah (Sheet 137/L: S.E., square 21), thus short-circuiting Mosul; and another from Mosul to Adaiyah enabling Qaiyarah or Ain Zalah to be reached without using the main exits of the town. The former of these tracks proved very useful during the critical days.

10. During the evening of the 1st May arrived the last telegram that we were destined to receive from His Majesty's Embassy. This stated that relations with Iraq were extremely strained, and instructed me to hand over my consulate to my Turkish colleague if subsequently instructed to do so, but to take no initiative in this matter unless I received such instructions. On receipt of this message (which was answered by the conventional acknowledgments to Bagdad and to the Foreign Office) I fixed 9.30 A.M. on the following morning for the departure of the evacuation convoy, and obtained Qasim Maqsd's promise of a police escort to the frontier.

11. But at 9.30 on Friday, the 2nd May, events elsewhere had overtaken us. When the police escort arrived, it was found to have instructions to go only as far as Qaiyarah. I accordingly went with Mr. Ditchburn, Land Settlement Officer, to see Qasim Maqsd. He informed us that the situation had changed since his promise of the previous evening, that relations between His Majesty's Government and Iraq had been severed, that His Majesty's Ambassador had left the British Embassy (whither, he could not say), and that all British subjects were to be held as prisoners at the Ghazlani (Tank Hill) Camp. I questioned the truth of his statement about the departure of His Majesty's Ambassador, stating that it was customary, when diplomatic relations were severed, for a representative to hand over his affairs to a neutral colleague and to instruct his consuls to do the same; that I had received no such instructions, though they might be on their way to me; that I expected my consular privileges to be recognised. Qasim Maqsd replied that, while other British subjects must remain, he would recognise me as consul for twelve hours, by which he meant that within that time I might leave the country. I declined to leave unless so instructed by my ambassador. Before we could protest against the intention to intern civilians in a military barracks, Qasim Maqsd was called to the telephone to speak with Bagdad, and he returned to say that orders had been changed; we

were to be interned for the time being in the consulate. We had scarcely returned to the consulate to report on these new developments when a military guard arrived and was posted round the building. All cars assembled for the convoy, which could be accommodated inside, were withdrawn into the compound. Between forty and fifty persons were now in the consulate.

Qaiyarah and Ain Zalah.

12. While the foregoing events were taking place in Mosul the following occurred in the out-stations of the B.O.D. Company:—

13. On receipt of my telephone message on the 29th April, the Fields Manager at Qaiyarah got into communication with Kirkuk and Haifa and set in motion the company's evacuation plan for women and children. Three Iraq Petroleum Company aeroplanes were to pick them up at Qaiyarah aerodrome (2 miles from the camp) on the morning of the 1st May. The discovery on the evening of the 30th April that all telephone communication outside Qaiyarah had been cut put the company's officials on their guard, and they decided to move their convoy out of Qaiyarah camp that night, to camp in the desert a certain distance away and return early next morning to the aerodrome, which lies out of sight of the camp. Scarcely had they moved out when the police sent a man to the camp and posted him in the telephone exchange, so it was evident that all movement was being watched. Calculating that they would watch Qaiyarah aerodrome and might interfere with the movement of the aeroplanes on the morrow, the company's official in charge at Qaiyarah camp sent out one messenger to the convoy, warning them not to return to the aerodrome, but to proceed to K. 3 (Haditha), and another—a wireless operator—to K. 2 (Baiji) to tell K. 3, out of hearing of the Qaiyarah police, to keep the aeroplanes there. The convoy accordingly proceeded to K. 3 by desert track via Hatra and Dhuwaisan. Because of patches of boggy ground, they did not reach K. 3 until 5-20 p.m. on the 1st May; but the aircraft located the convoy during the day, landed on the desert, and took off the first batch of women and children. Two more plane-loads were flown off that evening after arrival at K. 3, and the last lot were taken off on the following morning, the 2nd May.

14. Meanwhile, in Qaiyarah events were as follows: The company wireless staff had put a set into operation in a building apart from the main exchange, in which police were posted. They were thus able to pick up news of the safe arrival of the party at K. 3. Telephone communication with Mosul and Ain Zalah was officially disallowed; wireless communication with Ain Zalah was complicated by the fact that the operator at the latter station was not an Englishman, and it was not considered desirable to discuss certain matters by that means. I was able (paragraph 8) by direct approach to Qasim Maqsood to put through calls to Qaiyarah and Ain Zalah, and Ain Zalah managed by similar invocation of authority to put through a direct call to Qaiyarah. As a result of this exchange of information, all but two of the foreign staff at Ain Zalah were sent to Qaiyarah by the Adaiyah route, and a wise decision was made to send Mr. Maxwell, the company's accountant, to Mosul to draw funds to pay the wages of the labourers for April. Both at Qaiyarah and Ain Zalah they were showing signs of restlessness. Mr. Maxwell effected this mission, and returned to Qaiyarah with a large amount of cash during the early afternoon.

15. On the 2nd May the local staffs, both at Qaiyarah and Ain Zalah, picked up news from the Bagdad broadcast of the outbreak of fighting at Habbaniyah. This caused great fear among the Christian clerks, and increased the restlessness of the labourers, but strenuous efforts on the part of the remaining foreign staff at both camps, and the assistance of Sheikh Mishan at Qaiyarah, ensured that no incident occurred. Mr. Maxwell managed to slip out of Qaiyarah camp for Ain Zalah with the pay, and, thanks to the use of the Adaiyah track, he was not intercepted at Mosul. His arrival at Ain Zalah at 6 p.m. saved what was becoming an increasingly ugly situation for Messrs. Wade and McQuaid, the two company officers remaining there. The police had already arrived on the scene and instructed them to quit the camp and proceed to Mosul for internment, and their argument that the coolies, if they saw them departing before pay arrived, would probably set upon them and cause a riot, though it did not move the police, appealed to the common sense of the Mudir Nahiyah of Zummar long enough for the pay car to be sighted on the road. The labour was paid, and Messrs. Maxwell, Wade and McQuaid were brought in to the Mosul Consulate late on the evening of the 2nd May.

16. The Assistant Commandant of the Mosul Police arrived during the afternoon of the 2nd May at Qaiyarah and removed the foreign staff of the B.O.D.

and Mr. Giles, Permanent Way Inspector of the Iraq Railways at Qaiyarah station. They were brought into the consulate a few hours before the party from Ain Zalah.

17. Having seen off the last aeroplane from K. 3 on the morning of the 2nd May, the B.O.D. desert party prepared to return to Qaiyarah. But, before they set off, K. 3 station picked up the news that K. 2 had been occupied, and all communications eastward of K. 3 appeared to be broken. Next they learnt that, to the westward, H. 3 had been attacked and that Rutbah had been surrounded and the tanks fired. Later came a signal from Qaiyarah that so far (2 p.m.) no "visitors" had arrived. They therefore decided to make for Qaiyarah via Dhuwaisan and Hatra. K. 3 and Haditha village lie on the right bank of the Euphrates; it was therefore necessary to cross the river by the Blondin ferry to get to Qaiyarah. Just as the last of the convoy had crossed, a message was telephoned over from K. 3 that Qaiyarah had been occupied. The fields manager, Mr. Heseldin, recrossed to K. 3 to get further and fuller information and to obtain money; the remainder, under cover of the hills on the left bank, debated the possibility of making for Syria. At this juncture (5 p.m.) K. 3 was occupied by police, and Mr. Heseldin and the K. 3 staff were taken prisoners to Haditha. The party on the opposite bank understood what had gone wrong when they tried to telephone K. 3 from the ferry. To get to Syria now via the Tripoli pipe-line or the Anah-Abu Kemal route was now impossible, for both meant recrossing to the right bank. It was decided that before risking a journey to Syria through uncertain tribal country on the left bank it would be better to return to the neighbourhood of Qaiyarah and get under cover of the friendly Shammar with whom the company had always worked. This course would also enable them to get into contact with the rest of the company's staff, if they were still at Qaiyarah, and, if things went well, to pick up clothing and money.

18. They spent the night in the desert 76 miles from K. 3, and continued at dawn of the 3rd May to Hibbarah, some 23 miles west of Qaiyarah. Here they halted and sent in their Shammar guide to find Sheikh Mishan. The guide returned in the evening to say that he had been unable to speak to the sheikh and that Qaiyarah camp had been evacuated. So they camped for the night at Hibbarah.

19. On the morning of the 4th May the Shammar sent them an invitation to come to their tents at Jawan, which they accepted. When they reached Jawan news of events in Qaiyarah and Mosul imparted by the Shammar determined them to make for Syria; but as soon as this intention transpired the Shammar created difficulties, and it is possible that the tribesmen did not intend to let them out of their hands. In the afternoon, just as the party, having spent most of the day in negotiations and messages to and from Sheikh Mishan, were preparing to accept the inevitable and go to Qaiyarah under Shammar protection, two car-loads of police arrived, headed by the Mudir of the Shorah (Hammam Ali) Nahiyah, the party were arrested at revolver-point, and the Shammar were driven off by the police. For a moment it looked as if the police and tribesmen were going to have a fight.

20. The party were taken to Mosul in the charge of the Mudir Nahiyah. On arrival in the evening they were driven round the main streets of the town and halted opposite the principal coffee-houses for display to the assembled populace. At 3 o'clock that afternoon (the 4th May) the first British air raid had taken place over Mosul, and it is thought that this was staged to produce a counterblast. Some of the populace were persuaded that these were British prisoners of war. There was a great deal of hand-clapping, some shouting and some spitting, but no dangerous demonstration. The C.I.D. police officer, Amin Zaki, rode in the front car, insisted on the inside light being turned on to display the occupants, and made hand-clapping motions to show the crowd what they were expected to do. At about 7 p.m. the party were brought to the British Consulate.

21. The adventures of the desert convoy have been treated somewhat lengthily because (a) they show the stages by which direct action by the authorities spread over the outlying parts of North-West Iraq and down the pipe-lines on the 2nd May and the following days, and how the Mosul evacuation convoy that was to have left the consulate on the 2nd May would probably have fared had it ever left; (b) they are those of an unarmed party at large in tribal territory during the first three days of hostilities; (c) they indicate the parts played by the Shammar, the Mudir Nahiyah of Shorah (Tewfiq Shabib, brother of Colonel Kamil Shabib of the "Golden Square"), and Police Officer Amin Zaki. Another of Tewfiq Shabib's exploits is recounted in paragraph 54. He has since been suspended from duty for five years. Amin Zaki has been stollenbosched to Zibar.

Arbil.

22. Mr. Gallagher, of the Irrigation Department, who was drilling a water well near Arbil, was recalled to Bagdad by his department a few days before the outbreak of trouble. The party of British and Indian surveyors working on an irrigation project at Bekhmeh, north-east of Arbil, were taken by the authorities to Kirkuk for internment.

Internment.

23. On Friday, the 2nd May, all cyphers, secret documents and confidential archives were destroyed. During the day I tried to get telephone communication with the acting mutessarif (Qasim Maqsud) and with my consular colleagues, but was refused all communication.

24. Our numbers were swelled by the arrivals of the B.O.D. parties mentioned above, and by various British subjects, Indian employees of the railways, &c., who were rounded up and brought into the consulate on the first days of the month. In no cases were the wives and families of these persons brought in, and a few, though not all, local Indian Moslem males were left undisturbed in Mosul throughout the rebellion. In spite of the formidable number thus gathered in the precincts, it was not thought advisable to refuse admittance, since it was felt that they might otherwise be ill-treated or confined in a military area, subject to bombardment, or else that, if we made difficulties, we might all be moved to some place where we might have very much less control over our living amenities, rationing and sanitation. In two cases, however, we objected. The first was an ex-British subject who had taken Iraqi nationality. The authorities declared that they had cancelled his naturalisation, and that he therefore reverted to his British nationality (an error we believed to be a product of genuine imbecility). We resisted his entry for twenty-four hours, after which we ceded under protest, lest he be maltreated. The second was an Indian family, one of whose members was clearly suffering from throat trouble of an infectious sort.

25. Our muster-roll at its maximum reached 99, of whom 17 were Americans, 1 French, 5 Lebanese, 1 Polish, the remainder British. There were 8 women and 19 children. With the pro-consul (Iraqi), one cavass, a gatekeeper and my personal servants, this made over 100 souls.

26. Three of the Americans had at first been interned at Kirkuk with the staff of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Later they had been allowed to remain under surveillance in a hotel in Kirkuk, where they were allowed the use of their wireless receiver. They had finally secured a promise from the Mutessarif of Kirkuk, Dr. Faik Shakir, that they could leave the country via Tel Kotchek. On arrival at Mosul on the 28th May they were detained and brought into this consulate. They brought us three weeks' world news, and the first tidings of the capture of Fellujah and the British advance on Bagdad. Only those who have been deprived of information against their will for three weeks will realise what this surge of news meant.

27. We had some good organisers among us, and the problems of messing, sanitation, water supply, washing and laundering were successfully solved. The general morale of the community was exceedingly high; so high, in fact, that the principal anxiety was lest some exuberance should produce an incident. Such a misfortune did not occur. The question of defence was considered, and certain measures were decided on in case of need. We bore in mind that possibility that the collapse of the rebellion might lead to anarchy before any friendly troops could arrive, in which case a mob attack on the consulate was an event for which a deplorable precedent in 1939 existed. We were not in a position to do more than sell our lives dearly rather than cheaply, if we had to sell them; but this we were determined to do.

28. During the first few days contact at the gate with servants and clerks outside was possible, and people were allowed to send for bedding, clothes, cooking stoves, stores, &c. Later there was more restriction, any servant allowed out was forbidden to return, and the sole comer and goer was the ration contractor. We did not lack funds, as supplies of cash had been drawn by the consulate and several individuals on the eve of the rebellion, and the B.O.D. in particular had provided several thousand dinars.

29. My position as consul was in very important respects completely in abeyance, as far as its recognition by the authorities was concerned, but I endeavoured to maintain it where possible. A certain number of written representations were made; these were sent by me, or under cover of a letter by me, over my official seal and signature, addressed to "the acting mutessarif,"

who *de facto* was Qasim Maqsud. No written, but some oral, replies were received through the officer of the guard. One piece of consular business they found it to their interest to maintain. Some I.D. 1,200 were due to Iraqis in the form of deposits for Palestine visas. A number of depositors were brought from time to time to the consulate to claim repayment. This gave me a slight hold. Deposits were repaid (by cheque) against the customary formalities, and I let it be understood that these refunds might in certain circumstances cease. None of the cheques were paid by the bank until after the armistice.

30. The French Consul secured the release on the 7th May of one Frenchman and three Lebanese of the B.O.D. staff. The Americans repeatedly demanded in writing that they should be released, and be allowed to communicate with their minister and to leave the country. No attention was paid to their demand for communication with their minister. At first it seemed that they would be allowed to leave, for on the 5th May the senior of them was permitted to go out and take their passports to the French and Turkish Consulates to apply for visas. It was thus that my colleagues learnt authentically of the situation in the consulate, and that my French colleague learnt of the internment of his *ressortissants*. I had been unable to communicate this. The French and Turkish Consuls made representations to Brigadier Qasim Maqsud and to their legations in Bagdad concerning the inhumanity of confining so many people in a restricted space. I should add that the attitude of M. Cassin and M. Guvenir during the evacuation, the internment and afterwards was consistently friendly and helpful. The Persian Consul was friendly, but did not have the same occasions for being of assistance. All consulates were kept under close police supervision.

31. From the 18th May onwards certain inmates were "released." That is to say, their families were instructed to apply for them, and their removal from the consulate was ordered. Two or three who so departed were Indians, who were not further molested. The pro-consul, who was removed on this pretext much against his will and my own objections, was very shortly arrested, and his father was made to sign a bond of I.D. 200 that his son would sever all connexion with the consulate.

32. The American representations came to nothing. No reason was given, and it was not until after the armistice that we learnt what must have been the cause: the sheltering of British subjects by the United States Minister in Bagdad.

33. On the morning of the 3rd May the officer of the military guard informed me that the flag must be lowered, as its display might be a provocation to the populace. Knowing the evil reputation of the Mosul mob, and the fact that, if it suited them, the authorities had only to breathe a hint and in half an hour a crowd could be got to attack the consulate and "overcome" any guard, it was judged prudent to swallow this affront under protest, and the flag was lowered. It was laid flat on the roof during the first air raids for the information of the Royal Air Force. The consideration mentioned above underlay our acceptance of a number of humiliations during the month, and should be borne in mind throughout the narrative; there were women and children in the building.

34. Next the surrender of my wireless set was demanded. I pointed out that it was only a receiver; nevertheless, it was demanded and surrendered. Then the telephone instruments were removed.

35. The managers of the Eastern and Ottoman banks were informed that they must hand over their keys and duties. They requested and obtained written instructions, and were taken off (in the back of a pick-up), under escort of two soldiers, to Brigadier Qasim Maqsud, in whose presence they handed over their keys to their senior local staff.

36. On the 6th May Rais Awali Yunis Ali demanded the keys of the B.O.D. Company's safes from Mr. Maxwell. Six keys were given, for which a receipt was taken. Messrs. Maxwell, Rooke and Bennett were taken to Qaiyarah that day by this officer, to hand over the camp. They observed that on the 6th May the Shammar guards were still on duty and that the camp appeared intact. On the 7th May, before they returned to the consulate, they saw the Shammar removed and the Iraqi army installed in the camp. It is clear from this and other evidence that the considerable destruction and looting that took place at Qaiyarah were primarily done by the military.

37. At noon on the 3rd May a party of police arrived and searched the consulate and the personal effects of all persons therein. They did not appear to be interested in money (of which a very considerable sum was stored in one safe). The object of this perquisition seems to have been arms, ammunition, means of communication, and motor vehicles. All objects in these categories which were observed were taken. The confiscated articles were made over after

elaborate listing to a military officer who had joined the party during the proceedings.

38. A compact and useful little radio, packed up among the clothes of one of the inmates, escaped notice. This set became very useful, for it was our last link with the world of reliable news. The local press had already begun to pour out a stream of "stop press" handbills of the Iraq army's fantastic communiqués concerning the fighting at Habbaniyah. I persuaded the owner to hand the set over to me and to keep a discreet silence as to its existence. It was concealed in a waterproof bag in a bath-room, and the room was used at appropriate night hours behind locked doors as a listening-post to Palestine and the B.B.C. The news, and the fact that I was getting it, were disclosed to only a small number of discreet persons, because (1) we had reason to suspect that the sentries pumped the semi-Iraqi British subjects in our midst, and probably also the servants, (2) not everybody in a community of a hundred can be counted on for discretion.

39. The listening-post did not last beyond the 8th May, when a second and more severe search was made, this time by military officers. This search was undoubtedly for means of communication. Several raids by the R.A.F. had now occurred, and the more ignorant Iraqis were developing a groundless notion that we possessed means of signalling to aircraft or to Habbaniyah. The more sensible probably wanted to make quite sure that we had not; it may be that by the 8th May they had word of the impending arrival on the 10th May of the first German aircraft, and were particularly anxious that we should not be able to communicate news of this. The radio in the bath-room was discovered and impounded, together with the electrical set of my gramophone (which they affected to believe was a transmitter), and all binoculars. Even typewriters were demanded (why was never clear), but this was at the time successfully resisted. Towards the end of May, however, it was revived, and all typewriters were taken. From the 8th May until the arrival of the I.P.C. Americans on the 28th May we had no news of the outside world beyond what we could see from our windows.

40. At 6 P.M. on the 9th May an officer arrived with orders that all were to be removed to an undisclosed destination outside the Mosul liwa. All were ordered to prepare one piece of luggage, to take not more than I.D. 5 per person and to be ready in two hours' time. At 8 o'clock two army lorries appeared, and the first persons were already being put aboard when counter-orders arrived cancelling the proposed move. We never discovered what lay behind this order and counter-order. The inadequate road transport supplied suggests that we were intended to be taken in batches to the railway station and that the destination was probably Baghdad. Perhaps there was an idea that quarters would be wanted for the Germans and Italians.

41. When the projected move was announced, I requested communication with the Turkish Consul. My intention was to try and make some arrangement for the custody of the consulate. The Turkish Consul was informed of my wish to see him, but when he arrived at the consulate he was not allowed to approach.

42. On the 24th May I was requested by the officer of the guard to hand over my office keys. This I refused.

43. The restrictions on our liberty increased as the month wore on. Efforts were mainly directed to preventing contact with the outside. The first phase was the period from the 2nd-9th May, culminating in the false alarm of the move. The officers of the guard treated us reasonably, and messages were allowed to be sent out concerning commissions in town. The second phase was probably due to raids by the R.A.F., the arrival of the Axis missions and the reverses suffered by the Iraqis at Habbaniyah and elsewhere. The local news-sheets that we obtained and the astonishing war news confided to us by the Army Intelligence Officer, Yunis Rafiq, indicated the extent to which the population were being fed on lies about Iraqi military successes. The removal of our radio sets was due in part to a fear that a receiver might be, or be made to be, a transmitter; but more, I think, to a fear that we should find means of spreading in the town the more correct news of the B.B.C. The military were not, in fact, at all sure of themselves. Brigadier Qasim Maqsood's defeatism has been mentioned in paragraph 2. Enthusiasm for the "war" (at a distance)—as distinct from enthusiasm for an opportunity of helping themselves to British property from such treasure troves as Qaiyarah and lording it over the civil population, which affected officers of all ranks from Qasim Maqsood downwards—was mainly confined to the younger officers of the effendi class.

44. From the 10th May until just before the end we were subjected to increasing restriction. The gate was locked. No visitors were allowed. The

officers of the guard were of a much less pleasant type, and sometimes behaved very arbitrarily. The rations were minutely searched. Every joint of meat was slit open, and every loaf of bread; packets of cigarettes were opened, the labels of tinned goods were torn off. The guard seemed to have an obsession about paper that must have meant fear of messages. The climax was reached when an order of toilet paper was received, and the sheets were unpacked to the bitter end and festooned all over the garden before delivery.

45. The restrictions that caused most friction were connected with air raids. The first British aircraft appeared on the afternoon of the 4th May at 3 P.M. and dropped bombs on the Ghazlani camp area. It was met with a fusillade of indiscriminate rifle and machine-gun fire from every soldier, policeman or civilian with a weapon, whether in or out of range. As bullets flew right and left round the consulate, we decided that we must discipline our community to some form of A.R.P., lest somebody be caught at a window or on the roof by a stray bullet—perhaps by an ostensibly stray bullet. This idea was then taken up by our guards, not with a view to our safety, but to prevent us signalling to aircraft and seeing what damage was done. The consulate commands a good view of the railway station, barracks and aerodrome. The roofs and balconies were forbidden, everyone was made to assemble in the inner rooms of the ground floor, no one was supposed to be seen at windows, and the guard came in and patrolled the courtyard and roof during raids. The restrictions on the use of the roof and balconies were then extended to cover all times, raid or no raid. Attempts were made to confine us to the basement during raids, but these were successfully resisted. All this was submitted to for fear of an incident, or an "accident," or an incitement of the mob.

46. It proved impossible to get the officers to stick to consistent rules; each had a new idea and each was given to changing his mind. The flicker of a kitchen oil-stove was seen from the outside at dusk during a raid; the officer was found assaulting the servants for alleged signalling. The most troublesome officer, Lieutenant Hasseeb-al-Sherbati, made a vague but vehement accusation that people had been seen peering from forbidden windows. This was, to the best of our knowledge, untrue and we declined to make enquiry unless some particulars were given. He refused to give particulars and in revenge confined everybody for one and a half hours in a very restricted space during the next raid, and kept the rations waiting for two or three hours in the sun, dust and flies. Since the armistice I have had an official enquiry from the mutessarif concerning this officer's conduct and have stated my opinion.

47. The truth is that petty oppressions of this kind gave a spice to an otherwise boring and nerve-trying existence by giving us something to outwit. They also convinced us of the bad morale of the rebels, and the fear in which they stood of the R.A.F. They turned the authorities' attention from more serious inflictions; and of course they failed in their object. We saw all we wanted to. The air-raid siren was badly managed, and when British aircraft made surprise attacks on the aerodrome the really important events had taken place, and been seen, in an incredibly short space of time, before the siren went and we were herded to our confinement to gloat over our observations. Our fear that the Germans would take a hand in our custody was not realised; they were otherwise engaged.

48. It is unnecessary to describe more than certain of the air activity. The first German aircraft arrived at 7.30 A.M. on the 10th May. Two Ju. 90 four-engined troop-carriers flew in from the west and circled over the town. They were the only Axis aircraft seen to arrive with their original markings. Subsequent arrivals were painted over with Iraqi markings, though in some cases the Italian white cross was left on the tail with Iraqi markings on the wings. The Germans were met with the same fusillade as had greeted our machines, and the first landed while firing was in progress. But recognition and the protests of the occupants caused the "cease fire" whistle to be blown everywhere, and by the time the second machine came in all was quiet. After this there was no more indiscriminate firing from the town for the rest of the rebellion. The troop-carriers had been put under cover before two R.A.F. bombers appeared three-quarters of an hour later to bomb the Ghazlani barracks but not, unfortunately, the hangars of the aerodrome.

49. On the 11th two Heinkel 111's appeared, and from this time on there was a constant trickle of incoming and outgoing enemy aircraft, mainly Heinkel 111, Messerschmitt 110, and (on the 28th May) about twelve CR 42's. Machines took off more or less regularly at dawn, presumably to patrol and to raid Habbaniyah. Slipways were made on the east side of the airfield, and machines

were put under cover of the trees between the airfield and the river. It was impossible to tell in the various comings and goings how many Axis aircraft were brought to Mosul; fifteen at a time was the maximum we counted. About fifty Germans and about twelve Italians seem to have been quartered in Mosul. The townspeople were impressed by (a) the segregation of Germans from Italians—the Germans mixed more in the town, and frequented the shops and coffee-houses; (b) the wolf-like appetites of the Germans for such common local necessities as bread and raisins. Dr. Grobba and his mission are believed to have passed through Mosul on their outward journey; they certainly spent from the 29th–31st May here on their homeward retirement. From statements made to the French Consul by Dr. Hans Ulrich von Granow (? Gronau), the German Counsellor, when he applied for Syrian visas, they were trying to organise continued resistance based on Mosul, and were highly disgusted with the Iraqis for preparing to capitulate without consulting them. They left by road for Tel Kotchek on the afternoon of the 31st May, and the scramble of their departure was duly noted by the public. Thirty-four Italians left by Tel Kotchek that day.

50. The Iraqi Air Force took the air very little. A number of the Hawker-Audax machines in the station were not airworthy, and a Northrop which came in from the Bagdad direction shortly after the arrival of the Germans on the 10th May was almost immediately machine-gunned and grounded by the R.A.F. Most of the Hawker machines spent the month dispersed on the ground round the airfield, and most were found to have bullet and splinter holes when subsequently inspected. One Iraqi Audax was destroyed on the aerodrome by the R.A.F.

51. Altogether the Axis lost eight machines in Mosul. Two (Messerschmitts) were bombed and put out of action on the west side of the field on the 16th May; one (Heinkel) was blown to pieces by a lucky bomb dropped by a Valentia in the trees near the river on the night of the 14th May; and two (one Heinkel and one [? Italian]) were machine-gunned and set on fire on the east side of the field on the 22nd May by two Hurricanes, one of which was hit during the raid and crashed in the Shorah Nahiyah. Of the remainder, a Messerschmitt 110 was put out of action by a bad landing, and this machine, together with another Messerschmitt 110 evidently unserviceable, was burnt on the airfield by the departing Germans on the morning of the 31st May. The eighth machine, a Heinkel 111, was abandoned in an unserviceable condition in the hangars. Apart from this highly successful work, and the destruction of a refuelling lorry, not much damage was done by air raids in Mosul. A good many bombs were wasted on the partly abandoned Ghazlani camp.

52. On the 14th May at about 7.30 p.m. three Blenheim aircraft, flying quite low in formation, dropped three bombs intended for the railway. The first two fell in the station yard, though not on the tracks, did slight damage and caused one or two casualties; the third was very wide of the mark, and fell at the Bab-el-Sinjar crossroads at the western end of Nineveh Street just outside a coffee-shop where a number of people were assembled. Thirty-two persons were killed, and about the same number injured. The town siren failed to give any alarm until after the bombs had dropped. This incident caused a number of inhabitants to vacate houses in the south-west side of the town.

53. The station was at the time a very justifiable target. On the 13th May two trains of French war material arrived from Syria, carrying one battery of 75-mm. field guns, 10,000 rifles, 250 automatic arms, and 460 tons of munitions and lorries, loaded at Rayak and Baalbek. This material was feverishly dispersed in various parts of the town and in quarries round it. Another munition train arrived from Syria on the 24th or 25th May. On the morning of the latter day we saw two of a battery of four 155-mm. howitzers of old pattern being drawn from the station. The material was supervised at Tel Kotchek by M. Renouhardt, a German member of the Armistice Commission, and the emissary who came to Iraq to negotiate for the deliveries was a Levantine mongrel called Milaucène (*alias* Mulhausen, no doubt). Two French officers, Donne and Robert, came to negotiate for wheat and petrol to be supplied to Syria.

54. Two British aircraft were lost in the district. One, a Blenheim, was hit by rifle or machine-gun fire while attacking Mosul aerodrome on the 10th May, and is reported to have come down in the Makhmur qadha of the Arbil liwa south of Guweir. The Mudir Nahiyah of Shorah, Tewfiq Shabib (see paragraph 21), exceeded his duties by taking charge at Guweir (outside his district) of the two occupants who were taken prisoner, and brought them into Mosul. The third occupant was killed. His body was brought to the Dominican Fathers, and their building was at once surrounded by an angry crowd, out to mutilate the body,

and police protection had to be given. The Fathers buried him in the crypt of their church. The other, a Hurricane, was likewise hit over Mosul aerodrome and came down near Shorah on the 22nd May (see paragraph 51), the pilot being killed. He was buried in the British Cemetery at Bab el Sinjar by the Iraqis. On the 13th May a British aircraft was intercepted and chased by a German machine within sight of the town. It dived low across the Tigris, and appeared from the town to be coming down on the far bank, but escaped. The hooligan element of the town immediately set out across the bridge, armed with sticks and knives. Read in conjunction with the incident at the Dominican church, this shows the temper of the Mosul mob.

55. About the 29th May we noticed a change in the demeanour of our Iraqi warders. Restrictions were still maintained, but rumours of the flight of the Rashidists and the advance of the British forces began to filter in, and the troops treated us with more consideration. A southbound train which left on the evening of the 28th returned at 5.45 a.m. on the 29th with its engine in reverse, clearly indicating that an interruption in the railway had occurred between here and Bagdad. On the morning of the 31st many Axis aircraft took off and did not return, and we saw the burning of unserviceable machines on the aerodrome. At 6.45 p.m. on the 1st June the Commandant of Police (Kamil Yahya) arrived and informed us that an armistice had been signed, that we were free, but that, since there were insufficient police and troops in the town to ensure our safety (there had been many desertions to Syria), he begged that we would all remain in the consulate or its immediate vicinity. I accordingly caused everyone to remain quartered in the consulate, and only to go out after reference to me and the provision of an escort. The military guard had been withdrawn and a small protective guard of police had been placed at the gate. On the morning of the 3rd June British aircraft arrived, bringing a battalion of Gurkhas to occupy the aerodrome, and the majority of the British and American community were ferried to Habbaniyah by the returning aircraft. Throughout the first half of June such Englishmen as remained lived in or near the consulate, and went about their business by arrangement, keeping to the main streets. A skeleton B.O.D. staff visited Qaiyarah and Ain Zalah to take over and report, but not to reside there. Sullen and angry looks could be seen in the town, and it was evident that strong doses of Axis propaganda and a feeling of having been baulked of an opportunity to triumph and run wild, were having effect. The final efforts of the Germans had been to sow the beliefs that they were soon to return in irresistible force, and that the British were out to wreak sanguinary vengeance on all who got in their way.

56. Seeing that the Mosul rabble bears an evil reputation in a country where no such element bears a good one, and that disorders occurred in Bagdad and Basra, credit must be given to the authorities here for having allowed none to happen in Mosul either during or following the rebellion. On the 31st May Brigadier Qasim Maqsud fled to Kirkuk, where he was apprehended. He conformed to Rashid Ali's orders, and for the rest seems to have concentrated on appropriating a considerable sum of money and some British property, and preventing disorder. Although a great deal of British property was stolen, and in particular the B.O.D. camp at Qaiyarah was systematically stripped by the military, there was no riotous looting. Claims to the value of just under I.D. 33,500 have been received at this consulate, about I.D. 10,660 from individuals, the remainder from the B.O.D. Company. The articles confiscated at the consulate were for the most part returned in June (some from Qasim Maqsud's own baggage). Some credit for the maintenance of order in the critical days after Qasim Maqsud's departure and before the return of the rightful mutessarif, Tahsin Ali, must be given to the Commandant of Police, Kamil Yahya (who, all the same, is reputed to have profited by the thefts in May), and to a handful of the better citizens of Mosul, chief of whom were Salim Namiq (Qaimmaqam of Mosul) and Khair-ud-din Al Umari (President of the Municipality).

Aftermath.

57. It was not to be expected that the glow of this conflagration would be soon extinguished. Propaganda had been too long at work, money had been handed out and the Germans had made use of their time here to plant agents. Propaganda was actively carried on from Syria both during and after the rebellion. On the 19th May the Special Service Officer at Kamishlieh reported to his superior at Hassatcheh that Sheikh Daham al Hadi, chief of the Syrian Shammar, was touring his tribe to instruct them to leave for Iraq on the

22nd May. What prevented them is not known, unless it was that they sensed the coming collapse. On the night of the 31st May Dr. Grobba stopped for two hours at Tel Kotchek to interview Sheikh Wadban. As late as the 29th June M. Renouhardt and Major Meyer-Ricks, of the Armistice Commission, interviewed Sheikh Daham at Hassatcheh and offered him money and arms to intimidate Sheikh Sofouq with tales of German successes and of the Germans' imminent return to Iraq via Russia and Persia, and to harass the British on the Iraq frontier. A description of this interview and of the French S.S.O.'s attitude towards it is given as an annex to this report.⁽¹⁾

58. The expulsion of the Italian Legation, British penetration into Syria and Persia, the shifting of the war from the Near East to Russia, the removal from Mosul of a number of anti-British individuals, the arrival of increasingly large British forces, and the healing of time have progressively driven this sullen hostility underground. With the usual reservations always applicable to such a backward area, the town and countryside are now normal for anyone to go about, and you will not see the black looks of last June. As late as August there were instances of stones being thrown at British military transport by children undoubtedly encouraged by their parents and elders; that is no longer (November) the case. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to say that the sentiments of this mercurial population are fundamentally satisfactory. Nationalism, which has for long been staple food in the schools, the army and the coffee-shops, does not need the stimulant of Nazi propaganda to dispose people of limited vision to be no more than outwardly friendly towards a Power that is in important respects in occupation. Any important German success in Asia could very quickly alter things. And there are still Nazi sympathisers here.

59. It was a very long time before anything was done to remove the C.I.D. police inspector, Amin Zaki, whose occult influence opposed a proper clean-up of undesirables. He was defended by the mutessarif, Tahsin Ali, and only after the latter's departure was transferred to Zibar, where it is hoped that he can do no harm. The Director of Education, who in no circumstances ought to be a man of totalitarian leanings, is still Yusif Zainal; and, if Tahsin Ali did not remove him as mutessarif, it is to be feared that he will not do so as Minister of Education, unless pressure is applied. The aggressive local secretary of the Young Men's Moslem Association, Bashir Sakkal, still teaches in the Faisaliah School, although the association's premises have been closed. The Faisaliah School, managed by the Awqaf, is an undesirable institution as at present constituted.

60. The Iraqi army is a difficult problem. The military experience gained by many of the officers in May consisted of swaggering about and having their own way for a month, moving from barracks into town in case they were bombed, driving about in cars of British subjects and living in the loot of Qaiyarah. The collapse of what was essentially an army rebellion has left a sense of frustration which seeks an outlet. The Yezidi situation in September seemed to offer an opportunity, more especially as that situation is closely bound up with the intrigues of the Shammar sheikhs, who had undue influence with Tahsin Ali. Had it not been for timely action prompted from British agencies, there would in all likelihood have been another punitive expedition of the deplorable type that has occurred in the past when the Iraqi army has acted against minorities. The Iraqi District Commander at Mosul, Brigadier Abdur Razzaq Hussein, is a pleasant and well-meaning officer, and not the only one; but the wrong spirit has for so long resided in army circles that it must be a work of time before it can be exorcised.

61. The police have suffered from a precipitate change of commandants. One of Tahsin Ali's first acts on his return to Mosul was to dismiss Kamil Yahya, who, being a Moslawi, remained resident in the town. Opinions are divided as to whether Kamil Yahya was a good or a bad commandant, but it is likely that the presence on the spot of a dismissed commandant, in a country where the out-of-office of to-day is so often the in-office of to-morrow, has had a cramping effect on the work of the police and his successor. His dismissal had the effect of shutting his mouth concerning the whereabouts of a great deal of the loot taken in May, about which he probably knows a good deal. The British forces have had much trouble to get proper police co-operation in checking considerable thefts of material that occurred when they first arrived.

62. The mutessarif, Tahsin Ali, suffered from having been here too often, as mutessarif or as police commandant, and having too many old friends at a

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

time when a good deal of impartial firmness was needed. It is not doubted that his sentiments are friendly and he possesses a bluff exterior that is one of a mutessarif's assets; but beneath that exterior he is too pliant, and his attitude during the threatened Yezidi trouble showed that he is not a level-headed administrator. His elevation to Cabinet rank in October leaves the way open for a successor who will have a considerable task.

63. The countryside has got into possession of more and better arms. Deserting soldiers at the end of May are reported to have returned to villages with army rifles and ammunition. It would be interesting to know where some of the French arms brought in in May have gone. About 300 Lebel rifles were issued in the early autumn by the acting mutessarif to certain villages, for the classic reason of dealing with the wild pig, who admittedly do cause much destruction; but there are arguments against the wisdom of this. The customary apprehensions have been current among the Christian and Yezidi population, who are apt to exaggerate their fears, but no serious incident has occurred. The presence of British forces in the liwa has assisted towards this.

64. The British forces have brought some welcome money into the area. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to prevent too much of this going into the pockets of property owners, sheikhs and contractors, and too little into those of the poorer classes who are faced with the inevitable rise in the cost of living. It is to be hoped that measures to import stocks of essential commodities, and to control their distribution and sale, will be effective; otherwise there will be distress, and our ill-wishers will father yet another grievance on to us.

65. Such is the debit side of the account. On the credit side there is no doubt that the fomentation and discharge of the sore that has been infecting this district for several years has cleared the way for better relations. Things are better than they were nine months ago, and this not only because we have scored a success in Iraq and introduced our armed forces. We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that those in Mosul and Northern Iraq who are not time-serving, mercenary and parochial in outlook are greatly outnumbered by those who are, and that the only thing that really succeeds here is success.

J. P. G. FINCH.

[E 661/44/93]

No. 5.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 11.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of an Order of Conviction passed by the Military Tribunal, Bagdad, against the organisers of the *coup d'Etat* of April 1941 on the 6th January, 1942.

Bagdad, January 15, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Order of Conviction passed by the Military Tribunal, Bagdad, against the Organisers of the Coup d'Etat of April.

(Summary of Translation.)

THE Military Tribunal was convened at Al Rashid Camp on the 6th January, 1942, constituted as follows:—

President—

Al Aqid Mustafa Raghib;

Members—

Magistrate Abdulaziz al Khaiyat,

Magistrate Khalil Amin,

Al Aqid Muhammad Ali Said,

Rais Awwal Abdullah Rif'at al Na'asani;

authorised to adjudicate in the name of His Majesty the King of Iraq.

[24085]

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The Public Prosecutor, Saiyid Hamdi Sadr-ud-Din, referred to the tribunal the case of the accused Rashid Ali al Gilani and companions and asked for their trial and conviction as follows:—

Rashid Ali al Gilani
Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali
Yunis al Sabawi
Al Fariq Amin Zaki Sulaiman
Al Aqid Salah-ud-Din al Sabbagh
Al Aqid Fahmi Said
Al Aqid Mahmud Salman

Under section 80 (i) of the B.P.C.;

and
Naji Shaukat
Siddiq Shanshal
Muhammad Hassan Salman

Under clause (ii) of the same section;

on the charge of having organised a gang, resisted with arms the enforcement of laws, and used force to suppress and change the legitimate Government.

The tribunal conducted the trial of the above-mentioned individuals in their absence, owing to their failure to answer the tribunal's summons to appear before it for trial, notwithstanding the fact that the summons had been served upon them through the Iraqi Broadcasting Station and the Iraqi press, and notwithstanding the fact that a date was determined for them to appear in accordance with the Supplement to the Martial Administration Ordinance.

In conducting the trial of the above accused individuals in their absence, the tribunal examined all the official documents of evidence brought against them, and also the text of the Speech from the Throne made by His Highness the Regent and of the letter of resignation of Saiyid Nuri al Said, Foreign Minister in Rashid Ali's constitutional Cabinet, and the speech of Saiyid Jamil al Midfai, head of the Cabinet formed on the 2nd June, 1941. The tribunal also heard the evidence of a considerable number of witnesses well acquainted with the attitude and conduct of the accused, namely:—

Saiyid Jamil al Midfai,
Saiyid Ali Jaudat al Aiyubi,
Saiyid Taufiq al Suwaidi,
Saiyid Muhammad al Sadr,
Saiyid Sadiq al Bassam,
Saiyid Salih Jabr,
Saiyid Tahsin 'Ali,
Saiyid Umar Nadhmi,

Saiyid Arshad al Umari,
Al Zaim Nur-ud-Din Mahmud,
Saiyid Husam-ud-Din Jum'ah,
Saiyid Jalal Khalid,
Saiyid Khalid al Zahawi,
Saiyid Abdullah Auni,
Saiyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh,
Sheikh Salih Bashayan,

and others.

As a result, the tribunal finds as follows:—

A section of the accused, consisting of the military commanders Salah-ud-Din al Sabbagh, Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Kamil Shabib, had for a considerable time past neglected their original military duties and engaged in activities, not of their concern, harmful to the country's interests. These activities consisted of frequent interference with Government and State affairs, inspired by selfish ambitions and base objects and desire for empty fame and for the retention of their positions. They exploited their position and their military powers for the furtherance of these personal aims. In their desire to strengthen their influence, they promoted the spirit of disaffection among members of their retinue and other officers and members of the armed forces. Instead of preparing the defence of the country, they exposed the country to danger, brought about crisis after crisis and the fall of Cabinet after Cabinet. They even went as far as to interfere with the higher affairs of the State, showing no respect for the throne. The more loyal statesmen and leading personalities in the country administered advice and counsel to them and tried to dissuade them from these activities; the more persistently they continued in this course, the more conceited they grew and the more they persisted in their violation of the Constitution and their forceful opposition to the enforcement of laws. Persisting in their criminal conduct, they repeatedly threatened the throne, the Government and leading personalities by mobilising the army, until at last they came to control the supreme authority. This meant that the Constitution and other laws fell into suspense and that power fell into the hands of a gang whose members illegally dominated the situation and threatened with death those who differed from them in opinion or declined to associate themselves with their conduct. The activities of this gang grew in violence during the Cabinet of

Rashid Ali, its members taking advantage of the fact that their ideas and their activities were closely similar to his. Rashid Ali should have taken steps to put a limit to the activities of these individuals either by administering sound advice and counsel to them or by causing legal punishment to be inflicted upon them for their various illegal acts. Instead of so doing, however, Rashid Ali exploited the attitude of this gang to realise his material aims and avenge himself upon his political opponents. Accordingly, he encouraged the military commanders in their conduct, expressed his approbation of their acts and joined hands with them both morally and materially. His conduct thus aggravated the already critical situation and exposed the country and the State to danger and brought them upon the verge of collapse. Then there joined hands with Rashid Ali a group of foreign criminals and foreign spies, aliens expelled from their original homes and charlatans who have no connexion with this country, who helped him to realise his base aims while seeking to realise their own base ambitions, being persons with no zeal for the interests of this country and with material gain as their sole object. The young Iraqi Government being bound by certain pledges with certain Powers, especially Great Britain, with whom she has a treaty of friendship, Rashid Ali rebelled against the application of the provisions of the said treaty, as a result of which the allies of Iraq, particularly Britain, became suspicious of Rashid and his supporters, especially so on account of Rashid's openly hostile attitude towards Great Britain. Later, Rashid Ali acted in a manner which led to the conclusion that he contemplated violating the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and that he was inclined to favour the Axis Powers. Rashid Ali also cultivated the friendship of the Italian Minister in Bagdad, who had become a channel for sowing dissension among the people of the country, poisoning Iraqi public opinion and promoting pro-Axis sympathies among the people. Rashid Ali also refused to acquiesce in the proposal of his Cabinet colleagues for the severance of relations with Italy, one of the Axis Powers. Not content with all this, Rashid Ali proceeded to enlarge his gang by enlisting in it seekers of State appointments, ambitious individuals, lovers of empty fame and false advocates of the national cause—persons skilled in the art of propaganda and dissimulation and deceit, such as Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali and Yunis al Sabawi. The first-mentioned (Ali Mahmud) held a seat of lecturer at one of the high schools, where he got in touch with students, poisoning their minds, changing their convictions, making open expressions of anti-British feelings, and urging them to continue their support of Rashid Ali and to go on strike unless Rashid Ali's demands and aims were met and satisfied. The second-mentioned, Yunis al Sabawi, acted as go-between between the army commanders and Rashid Ali. He adopted the same line of conduct with reference to the army as that by Ali Mahmud with reference to school students, making anti-British propaganda among officers and urging them to support Rashid Ali and uphold him in his unconstitutional conduct.

Then Prime Minister Rashid Ali, contrary to the opinion of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues, sent one of the members of his gang, namely, Naji Shaukat, to Turkey, where he entered into secret communication with the German Ambassador, von Papen, and conducted with him negotiations contrary to the interests of Iraq without the permission of the higher authorities. This led to complaints by democratic Powers friends of Iraq, namely, America, Britain and Turkey, who eventually called upon the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to state the nature of Iraq's attitude towards the democratic Powers. This in turn led the Foreign Minister in Rashid Ali's Cabinet to invite the Prime Minister's attention to the Nazi propaganda conducted in the country during his premiership and to the resultant straining of relations between his Government and the Allied British Government. Saiyid Nuri al Said subsequently tendered his resignation. Thus no small number of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet were opposed to his conduct as above. They actually protested against his acts and called upon him to make a statement in the Chamber of Deputies reassuring the Allied Government of Great Britain that his Government was prepared to carry out the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Rashid Ali procrastinated over the making of such statement in the Chamber. Relations became more strained between Rashid Ali and the majority of his Cabinet colleagues and also between him and the Royal Palace. As a result, the machinery of State was paralysed, State work was suspended and legislation was held up, until in the end the majority of the members of the Cabinet found it necessary to tender their resignation rather than continue co-operation with Rashid Ali. The latter would not relinquish power. Instead, by threats, through the rebel army commanders, he compelled His Highness the Regent to issue Royal iradahs appointing new Ministers to replace those who had resigned. Among these new

Ministers were Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali and Yunis al Sabawi, who neither have the country's interest at heart nor possess the qualifications requisite in Cabinet Ministers, and are entirely given to agitation and the use of explosive bombs as sole means for the attainment of their base aims. This Cabinet was short-lived and was formed contrary to the Constitution and to the wishes of His Highness the Regent.

[Here the indictment goes on to relate, in terms now familiar to all, subsequent events from the flight of the Regent to Diwaniyah down to the formation by Rashid Ali of his unconstitutional Cabinet on the 12th April, 1941.]

This unconstitutional Cabinet continued in power until the 29th May, 1941. The British Government refused to recognise this unconstitutional Government of Rashid Ali, while Rashid Ali would not enable the British Government to act in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. As a result, Rashid Ali's gang brought about an armed clash between the Iraqi army and the British army, causing Iraq material and moral losses and losses in life and production, and also causing Iraq loss of reputation and moral standing abroad. Iraq in its entirety was shaken by the unjustifiable war of May 1941, which was absolutely uncalled for except as a means of satisfying the lust and ambitions of Rashid Ali and his gang of military commanders mentioned above. As a result of that war, children have been orphaned, women have been rendered widows, innocent persons have been killed and wounded, and no small number of people were thrown into jail for no cause other than their refusal to share Rashid Ali's views or participate in his acts. Rashid Ali also compelled many *alims*, mosque preachers and tribal chiefs to issue fatwas and statements and compose poems and draw up manifestos declaring constitutional his acts and those of his gang. Rashid Ali's unconstitutional Cabinet also restored relations with the Axis Powers, recalled to Iraq Dr. Grobba, the German Minister, noted for his harmful activities in this country, and introduced into the country an Axis air force, which it actually employed against our British ally, notwithstanding the fact that a constitutional Government of Iraq had decided to sever relations with Germany. The Cabinet also sent provisions from Iraq to Syria for delivery to the Axis Powers, receiving arms in return. Eventually, unable to continue armed resistance, Rashid Ali's gang fled the country, under cover of night, and made for the Persian frontier, after an unsuccessful attempt to carry away State funds with them. They left behind them a state of chaos in the whole country, and in particular in the capital. What strikes one as strange about this gang is that, although they had repeatedly declared that Great Britain wished unnecessarily to involve Iraq in the horrors of war, it was they who actually involved Iraq in an unnecessary war, inflicting on her wounds that would take long to heal.

When the news of this gang's despicable flight reached them, certain army commanders and other loyal persons decided that the interests of Iraq required the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of an armistice. By that time, the 30th May, 1941, Yunis al Sabawi had proclaimed himself Military Governor of Bagdad and decided to continue the hostilities and the rebel movement. However, he found no one in agreement with him, and he and the then Director of Propaganda, Siddiq Shanshal, were arrested by the Committee of Public Security and expelled from Iraq. Following the restoration of tranquillity and the conclusion of the armistice, His Highness the Regent returned to Bagdad on the 1st June, 1941, together with his loyal supporters and set up a constitutional Cabinet with Saiyid Jamil al Madfai as Prime Minister. With the formation of the Madfai Cabinet the acts of that gang came to an end.

In view of the foregoing facts and of the evidence given by all the above-mentioned witnesses, comprising a number of former Prime Ministers, the President of the Senate and a number of Senators, a number of former and present Cabinet Ministers, a number of senior State officials and Deputies, &c., and having regard to the official documents and records produced before the tribunal, apart from the fact that the conduct and acts of this gang are so publicly known that they amount to flagrant offence, the tribunal unanimously finds the following guilty under section 80 (i) of the Bagdad Penal Code:—

Rashid Ali al Gilani,
Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali,
Yunis al Sabawi,
Al Fariq Amin Zaki Sulaiman,
Al Aqid Salah-ud-Din al Sabbagh,
Al Aqid Fahmi Said,
Al Aqid Mahmud Salman.

The tribunal further finds the following guilty under section 80 (ii) of the Bagdad Penal Code:—

Naji Shaukat,
Muhammad Hassan Salman,
Siddiq Shanshal.

In regard to the remaining accused persons, the Public Prosecutor had asked that Naji al Suwaidi, Muhammad Ali Mahmud, Musa al Shabandar and Rauf al Bahrani shall be tried under section 80 (ii) of the Bagdad Penal Code, that Kamil Shabib shall be tried under section 80 (i), and Abdul Qadir al Gilani under section 255 of the same code.

When the summonses to appear for trial had been served upon them by radio and through the press, these remaining accused persons expressed themselves willing to appear for trial as soon as they could do so. As they have not been able to appear, as understood from official documents referred to this tribunal by the appropriate authorities, the tribunal has unanimously decided that their trial shall be deferred until such time as they shall be able to respond to the summonses of the tribunal.

The tribunal unanimously orders to be set free Muhammad Hassan Haidar, accused under section 155 of the Penal Procedure Code.

Judgment passed in default and delivered publicly this 6th day of January, 1942.

(Signed) President and Members of the Tribunal.

The Sentence.

The Military Tribunal was convened at Al Rashid Camp on the 6th January, 1942, constituted of the following:—

President—

Al Aqid Mustafa Raghib;

Members—

Magistrate Abdulaziz al Khaiyat,

Magistrate Khalil Amin,

Al Aqid Muhammad Ali Said,

Rais Awwal Abdullah Rif'at al Na'asani;

authorised to adjudicate in the name of His Majesty the King of Iraq, and passed judgment as follows:—

The Military Tribunal hereby unanimously sentences to death by hanging Rashid Ali al Gilani, Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali, Yunis al Sabawi, Al Fariq Amin Zaki Sulaiman, and Aqids Salah-ud-Din al Sabbagh, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman, under section 80 (i) of the Bagdad Penal Code. Whereas, however, the case of Al Fariq Amin Zaki Sulaiman calls for mercy and for the application of section 11 of the Bagdad Penal Code, as he had not acted independently, but under misguidance and instigation by others without appreciating the consequences of his acts, as shown by the evidence of witnesses and by the mental state of the accused, who repents his acts, and who had not participated in the greater part of the acts and meetings of the gang, the tribunal has decided to commute the death sentence in his case to one of penal servitude for life.

The tribunal hereby sentences Naji Shaukat to penal servitude for a term of fifteen years, Siddiq Shanshal to penal servitude for a term of five years, and Muhammad Hassan Salman to rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year, under section 80 (ii) of the Bagdad Penal Code.

The tribunal also orders that the properties of the above accused persons, already ordered by the tribunal to be attached, shall remain under attachment until the present judgment acquires finality, and that, when the judgment has acquired finality, the State Treasury shall be indemnified for all loss and damage sustained by it through the acts of the accused from the attached properties of the latter after the sale of these properties with the cognisance of the Government and in accordance with law, the amount of the loss and damage so sustained by the State Treasury to be assessed through a committee to be appointed for the purpose by the Government, and a trustee to be appointed by the Court of Sessions for the administration of the attached properties of the persons sentenced, in accordance with the procedure in force, pending the completion of all legal formalities concerning them.

The tribunal further orders that the above judgment shall be broadcast by radio and published in the local papers for the information of the fugitive convicts, as means of service on them in accordance with the Supplement to the Martial Administration Ordinance, in order that the time-limit for appeal laid down in the ordinance shall begin and to enable the convicted persons hitherto unarrested, namely, Rashid Ali, Naji Shaukat, Muhammad Hassan Salman and Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, to appeal against this judgment in accordance with the Supplement to the Martial Administration Ordinance.

The tribunal further orders that copy of the judgment shall be forwarded to the "Commander of the Forces" [*sic*] for service on the remaining persons convicted, namely, Amin Zaki, Mahmud Salman, Fahmi Said, Siddiq Shanshal, Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali, Yunis al Sabawi, through such legal channels as may be deemed advisable, in accordance with the Supplement to the Martial Administration Ordinance, in order that when they are so able to return to Iraq and appear before the tribunal.

Judgment issued in default, subject to appeal, and publicly read this 6th day of January, 1942.

(Signed) President and Members of the Tribunal.

[E 1460/204/93]

No. 6.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 19.)

Sir,

Bagdad, January 24, 1942.

PARLIAMENT reassembled on the 17th January after an adjournment of six weeks. At the first two meetings no business was done as a quorum was not present. The recess has passed quietly, and the principal matters of concern have been the cost of living, the trial of Rashid Ali and his associates, the interpretation of certain articles of the Organic Law and the review of Iraq's position in the war.

2. Prices of essential articles show little improvement. Maximum prices for matches, tea, coffee, sugar, wheat and barley and certain grades of cotton goods have been fixed by the Central Supply Board, but merchants are generally selling only low quality stocks at the fixed prices. The better quality is obtainable at a higher price by private arrangements. The price of the best quality wheat was fixed early in January at I.D. 40 a 'teghar, and the lowest quality (with 15 per cent. of dirt) at I.D. 34. The price of flour has, however, remained uncontrolled and has now exceeded I.D. 3 per 100 kilog. This is a very high price for the poor to pay. In Bagdad the mayor endeavoured to organise the sale of restricted quantities at a lower price. He was obliged, however, to give up the experiment as he found that without rationing it was impossible to prevent abuses. He is now trying to organise adequate supplies of controlled-price bread instead, but is confronted with the difficulty of having a stock of wheat only big enough to last until the end of February.

3. A British expert is now helping the Iraqi authorities to solve their supply and distribution problems, but so far as can be judged from the available information it will be impossible to find enough grain to feed the people in the towns unless a large quantity can be imported from abroad. Such supplies can only be obtained through the good offices of His Majesty's Government and I have in several telegrams represented to you, Sir, the gravity of the situation which will arise if wheat is not speedily made available for this country. The people in villages and settled tribal areas have, generally speaking, enough foodstuffs to keep them alive until the next harvest, but in the towns there are thousands of families who had not money enough to lay in supplies in advance for the winter and who are dependent for their daily bread on small purchases. The steady rise in the price of flour and all other foodstuffs has hit these people hard, and if adequate supplies within their means fail they will be faced with starvation.

4. The result of the trial by court-martial of Rashid Ali and his associates was published on the 8th January. Rashid Ali, Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali, Yunis Sabawi, Salahud Din Sabbagh, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman were sentenced to be hanged. Amin Zaki was also sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Naji Shaukat was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, Siddiq Shanshal to 5 years' imprisonment and Muhammad Hasan Salman to 1 year's imprisonment. The court also ordered the confiscation of the property of all the above-mentioned persons. The court further decided to postpone the hearing of the charges made against Naji Suwaidi, Mohammed Ali

Muhmud, Musa Shahbandar, Rauf Bahrani, Kamil Shabib and Abdul Qadir Gilani until such time as they should be able to appear before the court, the court having been satisfied that these persons had wished to respond to the court's summons to surrender themselves for trial, but had been prevented from doing so by circumstances outside their control.

5. As you are aware, the actual position of the accused persons is that Rashid Ali is in Berlin, Naji Shaukat and Muhammad Hasan Salman are in Turkey, while the remainder, with the exception of Salahud Din Sabbagh whose whereabouts are unknown, are on their way to Southern Rhodesia for internment.

6. On the 20th January the Iraqi Government made a formal written application for the surrender of all of the above-mentioned persons who are now in the hands of His Majesty's Government (except Abdul Qadir Gilani, who is charged with a minor offence). The Prime Minister informed me orally that the Cabinet resolution to take this step had been passed unanimously and that it had at the same time been resolved that if any of these men were acquitted after their return to Iraq they should be interned at Fao.

7. The Prime Minister confessed to me privately, however, that he was doubtful of the wisdom of giving full effect at once to the Cabinet's resolution, and I agreed with his view that it would be better to have back first those who had been sentenced and to let the others come later on if the situation continued to be favourable. I have, therefore, as you are already aware from my telegram No. 70, proposed that Ali Mahmud al Sheikh Ali, Yunis Sabawi, Amin Zaki Sulaiman, Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Siddiq Shanshal shall be surrendered as soon as possible, while the others are detained for a while in South Africa.

8. Since the announcement of the sentences I have made careful enquiries throughout the country into the state of public feeling regarding the handing over of the convicted men and the execution of their sentences. Reports show that there has been a considerable hardening of opinion against these men during the last month and that no serious trouble is expected as the result of such action.

9. In paragraph 10 of my despatch No. 349 of the 14th December, I mentioned the Prime Minister's declared wish to strengthen the authority of Parliament. During the recent parliamentary recess he has been examining possibilities of doing this within the framework of the Organic Law. The High Court (consisting of four senators and 4 judges) provided for in article 3 of the Organic Law has been called upon to reply to the following questions touching the interpretation of articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution:—

- (1) Would the addition of certain rights to the established rights of the King during the period of regency be an infringement of the King's prerogatives?
- (2) If the male descendants in direct line to his late Majesty King Faisal should cease, can a female descendant in the direct line become heir to the Throne? and, if not, would it be within the rights of the nation to settle this matter?
- (3) Would the creation of the post of Deputy or Assistant Minister, to be held by a Member of Parliament, be contrary to the Constitution?

10. The following decisions were given by the High Court:—

- (1) The grant of new rights to the King would not contravene article 22 of the Organic Law. This article forbids the modification of the King's prerogatives during a regency. The assignment of additional rights to the King would not be a modification within the meaning of this article.
- (2) A female cannot succeed to the Throne, and if, which God forbid, there should be no male heir to the Throne, the decision to be taken would rest with the nation under article 19.
- (3) The creation of the post of Deputy or Assistant Minister from among Members of Parliament is not lawful, for it would weaken the legislative power.

(The underlying idea of this somewhat ambiguous decision seems to be that if each Minister could appoint a deputy or assistant the influence of the Cabinet over the Senate and the Chamber would be much increased because of the powerful patronage which the Cabinet would thereby control within the two Houses.)

11. Questions concerning articles 55, 31 and 119 of the Organic Law have also been referred to the High Court for interpretation.

12. The Organic Law itself is meanwhile being studied by a special committee with a view to the elimination, by amendment, of the defects which

have been revealed by experience. The committee consists of twelve members, ex-ministers and judges, under the presidency of Jamil Madfai.

13. Reports which have reached me from political advisers and other sources show that there are still too many pro-Nazis and anti-British Iraqi civil officials and army officers at large in the northern liwas. Most of them appear to be inactive at present, but they represent a potentially hostile element, and I shall continue to make strong representations to the Prime Minister for their removal. I am also pressing for action against a number of undesirable teachers and officials who still remain undisturbed in the Ministry of Education and its various schools. It is impossible to deal with all those persons who showed hostility when Nazi influence was in the ascendant, but in spite of the fact that too many remain untouched, there is no doubt that the general political atmosphere in the country has greatly improved. Co-operation between the British and Iraqi forces is excellent, and social intercourse is encouraged by the higher command on each side. A joint Anglo-Iraqi survey of certain features of the desert area south of the Euphrates, between Jalal Tanf and Ramadi, is now being carried out, and the Mosul Municipality have given their new town hall for use as a service club for British troops.

14. The Prime Minister has been thinking a good deal lately about Iraq's position in the war. From the beginning he has had faith in an Allied victory, and has seen clearly that Iraq could expect few positive benefits from such a victory unless she played, in some measure, an active part in the fight against nazism. While those who believed in a Nazi victory favoured reinsurance with the Reich, Nuri Said has always inclined towards the building up of a substantial credit account with the Allies, on which Iraq could cash in when the time came for peace settlements. This was the basis of his early schemes for a token Iraqi force in the western desert, and though political and military opposition to such a project was too strong for him, he has never given up the hope of finding some way of improving Iraq's position at the peace conference by finding a part for her to play in the war. He quickly appreciated the importance for the Arab countries (especially Iraq, Syria and Palestine) of the Atlantic Charter, and more recently he has seen the opportunity which is offered by the twenty-six Power anti-Axis pact concluded at Washington at the beginning of the year. He has accordingly been sounding his colleagues and some of the senior politicians now out of office, with a view to obtaining their agreement to Iraq's adherence to this pact and the concurrent declaration of a state of war between Iraq and Italy and Germany. He no doubt feels that Iraq's ultimate claims to the rights and privileges recognised by the Atlantic Charter will thereby be strengthened. He may also hope that if Iraq signs the pact the United States may extend the Lease-Lend Act to her. He would like Saudi Arabia to take the same step at the same time, but he is awaiting the advice of His Majesty's Government before making any proposals to King Ibn Saud.

15. Iraq's position *vis-à-vis* Syria has also been under consideration, and, as you already know, the Prime Minister informed me about the middle of January that the Iraqi Government would be willing to recognise the Syrian and Lebanese Governments if the Free French authorities announced that the present arrangements are only temporary and that at the end of the war the Syrian and Lebanese will be free to choose what form of government shall be set up in their respective countries.

16. The French Minister, his family and the legation staff left Iraq at the end of December. The remainder of the Japanese Legation staff remained, pending a decision as to the route to be chosen for their repatriation and arrangements for the release of British diplomatists in Japanese hands. All Japanese property in Iraq was brought under official control soon after the Japanese declaration of war on the United States.

17. The Iraqi Government have under consideration a draft Treaty of Friendship with China. The Prime Minister informs me that this does not involve an exchange of diplomatic missions.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda, the Minister of State, Cairo; His Majesty's High Commissioner for Jerusalem and Transjordan; the Governor-General of India; the Commander-in-chief, India; General Headquarters, Middle East; the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; the Political Agent, Koweit; and to His Majesty's Consuls at Basra and Mosul and to the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

CHAPTER III.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 473/207/89]

No. 7.

Office of the Minister of State to the Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)

THE secretary to the Minister of State presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, and is directed to transmit herewith a copy of Political Report on Syria and the Lebanon (November 1941).

Cairo, January 7, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 7.

(Secret.)

Political Report on Syria and the Lebanon during the Month of November 1941.

1. General.

THE month of November passed smoothly. The chief events were the Proclamation of Lebanese Independence and the recognition of the Syrian Government by Greece, Belgium and Saudi Arabia.

The programme of *ravitaillement* has been continued with increasingly satisfactory results, both political and economic, and, though Axis propaganda has been insistently active, the prestige of the Allies' cause has been enhanced by recent events in Libya and Russia.

The chief cause of complaint against the British is the delay in settling accounts for damaged and commandeered property. Rent is paid in arrears, and this system of payment is attributed in some quarters to the Allies' lack of faith in their ability to protect the country against invasion.

2. Syrian Government.

Sheikh Taj sent a suitably grateful reply to the King's telegram of congratulation, and his position, which was considerably strengthened by this message, was further improved, later in the month, by recognition at the hands of Saudi Arabia: an event which correspondingly depressed the spirits of the National *bloc*—the Nationalists, in particular their Istiklal section, having always maintained that Ibn Saud was sympathetic to them. It cannot, however, be pretended that Sheikh Taj's Government is either popular or respected. In Damascus there has been much criticism of the new régime, Tewfiz Hayani, Governor of the city, offering his resignation, while Aleppo ignored General Catroux's appeal to co-operate with Taj, not considering itself represented in the Government and refusing to regard Hikmat Bey-el-Hiraki, Minister of Agriculture, as truly representative of Northern Syria. There has been dissension, moreover, within the Government itself. It has been complained both that the Ministers have little liberty, being forced to refer to the authority of the President instead of the Prime Minister, and that the President has found places within the Administration for far too many of his friends. Accusations of nepotism are for the most part a throwing of stones by dwellers in glass houses, and General Collet has continued to harmonise the relations between the President and his Ministers. Fayez-el-Khoury, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is taking into his Ministry many of the Nationalist elements, both those already in, and also from outside, the Administration. The situation is at the moment extremely fluid.

3. Damascus and the Hauran.

Although no actual disturbances have taken place this month in the Hauran, discontent persists as a result of the bad harvest, heavy debts, the inadequacy of Haurani representation in the new Government and the continuance of French control. The supporters of Emir Abdullah have aggravated the temper of the situation.

Delay in the payment of commandeered accommodation in Damascus itself continues to cause ill-feeling: though the situation has been improved by the decision to settle accounts monthly instead of quarterly in arrears, and by the appointment of a commission consisting of one British, one French and one

Syrian member to study the whole question of rents. In certain urgent cases payment has been made in advance.

Politically, interest has been focussed on the murder in Bagdad of Fakhri Nashashibi and the arrest on security grounds of the Tello Brothers and of Sharif Mouradi. Nashashibi's murder, which is recognised as a political Axis-inspired crime, has frightened many Allied partisans, their uneasiness being accentuated by the rumoured landing of a number of parachutists, whose arrival they regard as the opening of a terrorist campaign.

The Tello Brothers were charged with retaining arms, and Sharif Nouradi with harbouring of a German deserter from the Foreign Legion. In both cases papers were discovered indicating a close connexion with subversive organisations known to be under Axis influence. These arrests provoked many intercessions for clemency—mainly from those who knew themselves to be in danger of arrest.

Dissatisfaction with the Government is general, and the Nationalists are closing their ranks in order to show that they alone are fit to govern Syria.

4. Aleppo.

November has been a quiet month in this part of the country. There is strong opposition to Sheikh Taj's Government—the probability that Dr. Keyali will assume the governorship in place of Nebih Bey Martini being the first signs of co-operation with Damascus—but local interest has been mainly focussed upon domestic problems. The *ravitaillement* position has improved slightly, and the war news from Libya and Russia has raised Allied prestige. The Arabic journal *Al Ahali* was suspended, and the editor would have been arrested had he not been the victim of a heart attack from which he is not expected to recover. Further action was taken against pro-Axis activities, when Zafer Martini, leader of the *Action Populaire Syrienne*, was arrested.

The opening of the exchange control at Aleppo was warmly welcomed by the merchants, who still, however, agitate for an office competent to grant import and export licences. They complain that, as things are, they waste much time and money on journeys to Damascus.

Difficulties have arisen with the Turkish authorities over the use of the Bagdad railway for Allied and Syrian troops and war material. The Turks have suspended the despatch of uniformed troops through Syria, but have been sending them in civilian clothes.

M. Fauquenot's appointment to replace M. David as delegate has been generally welcomed. M. Fauquenot has been adviser to the Minister of the Interior in Damascus, and though he cherishes French interests, he fully appreciates the necessity for Allied co-operation.

5. Homs and Hama.

Although the nationalist notables, who have suffered the loss of both their wheat stocks and their dignity, have done their best to persuade the people that the *ravitaillement* programme is a failure, Colonel des Essars has the situation very well in hand. His energy, enterprise and personality are universally appreciated, and the decision not to transfer him to Aleppo was welcomed.

There have been a few border clashes with the Beni Khaled. Axis propaganda has been active and Allied posters have been defaced, but on the whole morale is high. An attempt has been made to distract the minds of the young from politics by means of organised sport.

6. Jezireh.

The interference by Skeikh Daham el Hadi of the Shammar with road work between Kamichle and Tel Kotchek has ended and serious warnings have been given to those responsible. But it is early yet to judge what ultimate results will attend the forcing of the turbulent and well-armed Agaidat to surrender over 350 rifles, to restore looted property, to deport their leaders and to fine those villages that are responsible for acts of brigandage on public roads. Government prestige has certainly been restored, but it can only be maintained by force of arms.

There have been tribal raids on the Iraqi frontier, and it is essential that the appropriate authorities of the two countries should take firm steps to prevent further outbreaks.

A race meeting organised at Deir ez Zor was well attended by Arabs as well as by British and French troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel Reyniers, a former delegate at Deir ez Zor, has been moved to Damascus.

7. Jebel Druze and the Druze Legion.

The disbandment of the Druze Legion, the formation of the new Groupement Druze and the future of the newly-formed Druze Regiment (Transjordan) have been the main topic of local interest throughout October. Members of the Druze Legion were given the choice of (i) Returning to civil life, (ii) Signing on with the Groupement Druze, (iii) Joining the Druze Regiment.

Intense interest was taken in the voting, but the effect politically of an election atmosphere was unfortunate. In the eyes of the Druze the British and French appeared as competitors, and there is little doubt that French propaganda was actively employed in the attempt to prevent members of the Legion from committing themselves to service with the British forces. A number of promises were made to strengthen the attractions of service with the Groupement—promises by which the French are likely to find themselves embarrassed when the time come to fulfil them.

The final figures were:—

Civil life	36
Groupement	632
Druze Regiment...	466

The new members of the Druze Regiment, in company with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, will cross the frontier shortly. A British liaison officer will remain at Soueida.

During the latter part of the month there has been little frontier trouble, but the rumour, earlier in the month, that a Druze from Mesamieh had been robbed with violence in Bosra Eski Sham caused a number of demonstrations against the Haurani. The situation was handled with tact by Colonel Olive and ultimately smoothed out. But Colonel Olive views the future with some apprehension, as he considers that serious trouble will arise if any more Druzes are killed in the Hauran.

8. The Alaouite State.

Captain Evans-Pritchard was appointed political officer at Latakia in the middle of the month. His first impressions of the general situation are favourable, but he reports that the Christian communities are nervous about the future, and hope for more definite assurances that their rights will be protected and that some European Power will retain sufficient control over the country to enforce their protection.

9. Lebanese Government.

On the 26th November General Catroux issued the Declaration of Lebanese Independence after the better part of a month had been spent in discussions between British and Free French authorities as to the exact form it should take. On the 1st December M. Alfred Naccache announced his Ministry, with Ahmed Bey Daouk as Premier:—

Ahmed Daouk (Sunni), Prime Minister and Finance.
Philippe Boulos (Greek Orthodox), Justice.
Sayed Ahmed Hussein (Shia), Interior.
Hamid Frangié (Maronite), Foreign Affairs.
Amin Said (Maronite), Public Works.
Hikmat Jumblatt (Druze), National Defence.
Wassef Izzedine (Sunni), Ravitaillement.
Ramiz Sarkis (Protestant), Education and Health.
Alfred Skaff (Greek Catholic), Commerce and Industry.
Ahmed el Assad (Shia), Agriculture and Posts and Telegraphs.

It cannot be pretended that this Ministry is truly representative of the Lebanese people, or that the Proclamation of Independence was regarded by them with any enthusiasm. The final declaration contained, owing to General de Gaulle's insistence, in addition to a reference to the much disliked 1936 treaty, a number of phrases suggesting a continuation of French control, while General Catroux, in his letter offering the presidency to M. Naccache, made an unwise reference to the desirability of eliminating parliamentary control in the new State. Moreover, General Catroux issued this letter without reference to the Maronite Patriarch, whom he had previously promised to consult. The Lebanese have thus been confirmed in their belief that the French intend to preserve a semi-mandatory position in the country.

The ceremony of the declaration of independence was not only unmarked by demonstrations of popular enthusiasm, but was boycotted by many leading Maronites, most of the Moslems and all such political leaders as were not already in the Government or were without hopes of being included in its successor. The man in the street regarded the proceedings with cynical indifference, whilst some of the less informed of the populace thought they were celebrating General Catroux's birthday.

The dissatisfied political elements are gathering round the Maronite Patriarch and have prepared a manifesto for presentation to the British, French and American Governments, demanding a genuine independence.

It is not improbable, however, that active resentment will subside as it has done in somewhat similar circumstances in the past.

10. Lebanon and Beirut.

Public security has been undisturbed throughout the month and the gradual weeding out of suspected enemy agents by the British Security Mission continues.

Arrangements have been concluded for the temporary accommodation in the Lebanon of about 1,300 non-combatant Greek refugees at present in Turkey who must be evacuated from that country. Thanks to the co-operation of the Australian military authorities, the American Red Cross and the local Greek community, a settlement has been established in a hill resort near Beirut.

General Catroux's tour of the South Lebanon was socially a success. It was widely advertised and the staging of the separate receptions was impressive. Their warmth, however, must be attributed less to any approval of his policy than to immemorial traditions of good manners combined with the anxiety of the notables to insure their position against an uncertain future with the arbiter of their immediate destinies.

In North Lebanon the general's reception was less friendly, particularly in the Bekaa, and it might even have been chilly had not the British intervened, the Political Officer having received private enquiries in advance as to the attitude that the inhabitants should adopt. There were nowhere any actual hostile demonstrations, but at Tripoli a large crowd neglected to applaud the general when he left the Serail. At Baalbek he was presented with a petition for the attachment of the Bekaa to Syria.

11. Propaganda.

Reports from many sources indicate that the propaganda machine for Syria and the Lebanon is not working as well as might be expected at this stage.

This was confirmed at the Inter-Allied Conference, over which General Collet presided early in December, and the causes were said to be (a) an insufficient distribution service, and (b) lack of propaganda material.

The distribution question is being gone into, and General Collet has suggested another method, to work either on its own or with the existing scheme.

The Deputy Director of Propaganda, Middle East, attended the conference, and is therefore aware of the position as regards material. In general, it would appear that Syria and the Lebanon's requirements were based on Palestine or Egypt, where propaganda has already been well drilled in and merely requires repeating. It is on those repetition figures that these accounts have been regarded. Such efforts as can be made have been made, but they are unfortunately very small.

12. Press.

Lebanese independence and the possible spread of the war to the Pacific have been the main subjects of the press. As regards the former, there have been no remarkable articles: all the press has expressed satisfaction at the proclamation of independence and with the various ministers appointed. There have been constant appeals for unity to the Lebanese, and especially to the youth of the country.

As regards the *ravitaillement* of the country, the tone of the press indicates faith in the Allies to carry out their promises. Even the recent rise in prices, particularly of meat and vegetables, has failed to produce those urgent demands for action which were common in the press a month ago.

13. Wheat.

The preliminary stage of the plan for importing wheat and subsequently freeing the market, which consisted in accumulating stocks in Syria and the Lebanon, was proceeded with. Several ships unloaded wheat at Haifa, Beirut and Tripoli, and considerable difficulty was experienced at first in finding

transport to forward the necessary tonnage to Syria, and also in finding storage space for the remainder in the neighbourhood of Beirut.

A vigorous propaganda campaign to explain the scheme was carried out by the press meetings at Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia, and the results were satisfactory; prices in the black market showed a notable fall.

Meanwhile, from the 5th November onwards, imported wheat had to be given out to the *ravitaillement* authorities for the feeding of the whole of the Lebanon and parts of Syria. In Syria, Damascus took 85 tons a day for the feeding of the town and its surrounding villages; no wheat was required in Aleppo and, owing to delays in transport, very little was drawn at Latakia. Arrangements worked smoothly and satisfactorily.

The reverse was the case in the Lebanon, where the Lebanese authorities not only withdrew very considerable quantities for which they had no authority, but failed to distribute fairly outside the towns. They had evidently undertaken a task for which they were wholly incompetent.

The Minister of State's plan for freeing the wheat market encountered vigorous opposition, notably a strong protest from General Catroux, who was induced, however, to withdraw it and to promise collaboration.

14. Relations with the Free French.

On the whole relations with the Free French have continued to improve. General Collet has insisted on the absolute necessity for Allied co-operation and the visit that Colonel Glubb paid him in Damascus was a great success. Colonel Glubb spent the night as the general's guest and was introduced to a number of French officials. It is hoped that this personal contact will allay the suspicions of the past.

[E 573/207/89]

No. 8.

Office of the Minister of State to the Foreign Office.—(Received January 26.)

THE Secretary to the Minister of State presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, and is directed to transmit herewith a copy of the Political Report on Syria and the Lebanon (December 1941).

Cairo, January 12, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Political Report on Syria and the Lebanon during the Month of December 1941.

1. General.

THE year has ended upon a note of growing confidence. Opportunity was taken of the Christmas and New Year festivities to develop a growing cordiality in our relations with the Free French, and this has reflected itself in a marked improvement in the attitude of the Free French in settling outstanding questions, especially that which related to recruitment for the Druze Regiment.

In spite of the disturbing news from the Far East, civilian morale has distinctly improved and confidence in the Allied cause appears to be steadily growing. This is due to the Allied victories in Libya and Russia and to the entry of the United States into the war, which was emphasised in a happy manner in these territories by the visit of Mr. William Bullitt. Mr. Bullitt's visit occasioned friendly statements from the President of Syria and the press, while the reported visit to Jerusalem of the Emir Abdullah to meet Mr. Bullitt called forth the angry condemnation of the "Free Arab Station" controlled by the Axis.

On the economic side there has been some nervousness of economic isolation resulting from the Far Eastern situation, but, in the Lebanon at least, the measures taken for the supply of wheat have reassured the public, although the plan has not yet succeeded in drawing forth from the wheat-producing districts the hidden stocks, and a deficiency in the harvest for 1941 will probably require additional attention in the New Year.

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2. Syria: Damascus.

Political interest in Syria has tended to diminish during the month owing to the departure of pilgrims and the annual holidays. The relationship between the President and the Prime Minister continues to be somewhat unhappy, and this, together with other difficulties and with the attempt by the Shahbandarist party to secure for themselves more numerous posts in the Administration, have provided the public with subjects for speculation and gossip.

An important administrative change took place when General Collet arranged for certain French services, hitherto directed from Beirut, to be directed from Damascus; these are the Special Service, the Sûreté and the Bedouin Control. This change is, on the whole, to be welcomed, since it enables French policy in Syria to be carried on without control from the Lebanon and will eventually facilitate the transfer of these services to the Syrian Government without serious dislocation.

3. Aleppo.

Public interest has centred round the enquiry into the charges of corruption and other irregularities which were brought against the Sûreté and which culminated in the arrest of a policeman and the Assistant Chief of the Sûreté. Unhappily, M. Dubecq, chosen by the French to conduct the enquiry, had been the head of this organisation for a number of years; he was not above suspicion himself and certainly was prejudiced. The new délégué appointed another investigator, but the French have lost much prestige over the affair. The results of the enquiry are not yet known.

M. David's replacement as délégué by M. Fauquenot has been welcomed by the Syrians, the French and the Turks. Though pro-French, he appreciates the necessity for Allied co-operation. He has approached his new duties with caution and an open mind which have earned him a good opinion locally.

Rumours of Turkish reinforcements on the frontier at Hatay and of the expropriation of Syrian property there have caused nervousness. Relations on the frontier have, however, been good. On two occasions members of the Imperial forces crossed the frontier inadvertently and were well treated by the Turks.

A conference of tribal chiefs which met at Aleppo to compose the feud between the Fedaan and the Wulda deferred the matter until next March, firstly, because many of the people concerned have migrated south; secondly, to allow time for passions to cool; though, thirdly, according to reports, because the Wulda have been purchasing arms with a view to meeting their rivals on more equal terms next time.

4. Homs and Hama.

The délégué has done much to improve local feeling towards the French and as a personality has won a degree of confidence amongst the richer and more educated people.

A friendly demonstration was made on the 28th December in honour of the délégué and the Political Officer after the service held in the Great Mosque and an atmosphere of Moslem cordiality towards the British was noteworthy. On New Year's Eve a dinner-party was given for him by local leaders, among whom were important members of the National Bloc and the Parti populaire syrien; their growing confidence in Allied victory is noteworthy and their trust in Mr. Churchill's statements in the Atlantic Charter appears to reconcile the general mood of political frustration.

The 13th Battalion, Foreign Legion, left on Christmas morning and a battalion of Senegalese is the only French unit left in the Homs-Hama area. Though there has been definite proof of trumped-up charges against the Australians during the month, their notoriety has been increased by two serious cases of theft and house-breaking.

5. Jezireh.

Administration and security are gradually improving. Preliminary arrangements, which promise well, have been made by the French and Iraqi authorities at Mosul regarding tribal disputes; British officers also assisted. One outstanding quarrel, between the Fedaan and Baggara tribes, has been settled through the arbitration of Sheikh Daham el Hadi.

A British officer of the Iraq Levies, with the assent of the French, has recruited 800 Assyrians. President Dodge, of the University of Beirut, has been acting as chairman of the League of Nations Board of Trustees in connexion with

the Assyrian settlement. He states that in the Khabbour district over 3,000 land title-deeds were completed and registered in the names of various families by the board before the end of the year. The board has now discharged its duties.

The shortage of indispensable medicines is still acute and the impossibility of treating the sick is having its effect upon public health.

Exceptionally severe climatic conditions towards the end of the month have, in some districts, killed 25 per cent. of the sheep.

6. Jebel Druze.

The Emir Hassan, after a prolonged visit to Egypt, returned to Soueida. His position was weakened by his absence, during which time General Catroux visited Damascus and discussed the drafts of new statutes to determine the relations between the Druze and Alaouite States and Syria. The Administrative Council met on the 24th December, and the Emir with great tactical skill overcame the Opposition, which had already addressed a petition to General Catroux calling for unconditional union with Syria. The Emir succeeded in obtaining a unanimous vote for his proposals—reapplication of the Statute of 1936 with certain modifications.

Recognition of the fighting spirit of the Druzes by the inclusion of Hikmet Bey Jumblat as Minister of Defence in the Lebanese Cabinet has caused considerable satisfaction, particularly since a Druze is his opposite number in the Syrian Government.

Following the departure of British troops, the last French unit has left the district, and only the Groupement Druze remains. The disbandment of the hated Gardes Mobiles by the French, principally by their absorption into the Groupement, has been a wise step. A certain atmosphere of regrettable rivalry existed between the French and British during the recruiting campaign for the Groupement Druze and the British unit, the Druze Regiment (Transjordan). Apart from the Christians, who were at first disturbed by this withdrawal of the troops, and the shopkeepers who have been hard hit, no one has been greatly affected by the change.

All reports tend to confirm Colonel Olive's personal popularity and it appears that the population, as a whole, is reconciled to a continuation of French influence.

7. Alaouite Territory.

The delay in proclaiming the terms of the new statute has made all the communities nervous. The Christians, more anxious than ever to prejudice the British and French against the Alaouites, are trying in a variety of small ways to stir up trouble. The Alaouites, who greatly outnumber both Christians and Orthodox Moslems, seem prepared to accept political unity with Syria, so long as safeguards are promised to ensure them a fair share of official salaried positions. On the other hand, the Orthodox Moslems would prefer complete union with Syria, and the Christians would accept any solution rather than this, but would prefer direct British rule. The French have claimed that the interests of the parties are so diverse as to necessitate the maintenance of their control.

The Area Liaison Officer has been contacting the Alaouites, who may prove an important factor in the event of active operations. The tribesmen have received him in the friendliest manner.

8. Lebanese Government.

The new Ministry produced an unexpectedly firm declaration of their determination to secure independent rights for their country. His Majesty's Government's recognition of Lebanese independence addressed to President Naccache on the 27th December gave great pleasure locally and strengthened the Government's position. However, the existing opposition, undoubtedly strengthened by General Catroux' unfortunate mention of the Treaty of 1936 in his declaration of Lebanese independence and by differences between the forms of the Syrian and Lebanese declarations, has not abated. The Free French have not eased the situation by their apparent disinclination to hand over those Government functions which have no connexion with the prosecution of the war.

Opposition is centred round the Maronite Patriarch, still piqued that he was over-ridden in the choice of the President. On the traditional Christmas Day visit he received about 700 representatives of all communities and, during this political manifestation, resolutions were passed calling for complete independence and for the prevention of all external arrangements without the prior consultation of the people.

9. *Beirut.*

The Hadfield-Spears Ambulance Unit left at the end of the month. Its departure is regretted in Beirut and many comments have been made on the excellence of its work—especially that of its travelling dispensaries in the Lebanon.

10. *Propaganda.*

There is practically no change in the situation as reported last month. Road conditions recently have largely hindered the distribution of such propaganda material as was available, and have immobilised the cinema van except for Southern Lebanon, where it is now working.

The success of the Wheat Plan and of the campaigns in Russia and Libya, together with the fact that famine no longer stares the people in the face, have converted many of the indifferent; and the provision of food in particular has served the purpose of refuting German propaganda, which continues to cry out that the British are starving the people of Syria and Lebanon. Such propaganda has now become a laughing-stock.

German propaganda is now being answered from Radio-Levant in Arabic.

One remark worthy of note was made by a reputable merchant of Homs to the Area Liaison Officer as follows: "We are interested to note that the British, unlike the Germans, do not find it necessary to use propaganda." However, the same officer has since reported that a number of excellent Allied posters have since arrived and the interest which they aroused in the district has been remarkable.

11. *The Press.*

The successful supplying of wheat to the country has taken precedence over all other matters in the Arabic press. Gratitude to the British, and to a lesser degree to the Free French, has been expressed by all papers in highly complimentary terms.

A possible uneasiness due to reports of German troop concentrations in Bulgaria has been dispelled by the apparent readiness of Turkey to meet any attack. Similarly, it has been hotly denied by all the press that Japan's entry into the war can in any way disrupt British supplies to the Near East. A great many articles on the Allied successes have appeared in all the papers.

The Proclamation of Lebanese Independence in November was followed in this month by complimentary articles on Free France and Great Britain, and by exhortations to the Government and the people to unite and be worthy of their independence.

Attempts by the Arabic *Al Nahar* to launch a campaign criticising the Ministerial Declaration have been thwarted by the censor.

There was during the month a shortage of paper, which threatens to assume somewhat serious proportions in the future.

12. *Security.*

The British Security Mission continues to arrest suspects, and in the Lebanon there have been a number of protests from prominent people. A committee composed of representatives of the IXth Army, the British Security Mission and Spears Mission has been formed to deal with protests of this kind; as a result, certain releases have been authorised. The knowledge that this committee exists has made a good impression.

Smuggling of arms, mostly rifles, continues. (The Persian army is said to have lost about 100,000 rifles and a great many machine guns to brigands and to tribesmen.) But liaison with Turkey and Iraq over the question of frontier control is gradually improving.

13. *Economic.*

The month was marked by the putting into effect on the 15th December of the Minister of State's plan for solving the wheat problem.

The original plan had been to free the market and to bring the plan into operation on the 3rd December, but notification was received on the evening of the 29th November that certain substantial changes had to be made in the shipping programme to Syria. This necessitated the postponing of the freeing of the market until the 15th December, on which date the Minister of State's plan actually came into force. A distribution of U.K.C.C. wheat having been made through the Lebanese and Syrian Ravitaillements to cover the period from the 5th to the 15th of the month, sales were heavy to start with in Beirut and increased almost daily, reaching a maximum of 2,495 tons on the 23rd December,

whilst in Damascus they never exceeded 485 tons per day. After the 23rd December sales dropped rapidly in Beirut, indicating that the market was saturated, it being found that on the average our wheat was being sold on the market only about £5 Syrian a ton above the price at which it was purchased.

Judging by these sales figures, it would appear that the wheat problem proper consisted of a real shortage of wheat in the Lebanon, but considerable difficulty has been caused by the apparent refusal of the authorities and merchants in Syria to make any attempt in the existing circumstances to buy wheat elsewhere than from the depots, and it has latterly been found necessary to limit daily sales outside Beirut whilst selling freely in Beirut in an endeavour to force them to help themselves.

With regard to domestic wheat, there is as yet no sign of its appearance in any considerable quantities on the local markets, and, although it is felt that a very large majority of the sales have found their way into the hands of genuine consumers, the hoarders are adopting a passive attitude and are sitting back, waiting to see what will happen. It is felt that the only real factor that may make them bring forth their stocks will be the clear signs of a good 1942 harvest, which, combined with the accumulation stocks of imported wheat, will, it is hoped, force out their hidden stores.

Some 20,000 tons of imported wheat have been received during the second half of December and our position is felt to be reasonably safe, provided that the firm policy of refusing to "spoon feed" the population is followed during the coming months, and that our export arrivals up to the promised total of 80,000 tons are forthcoming before the next harvest.

It was unfortunate that it was necessary to open just as Japan came into the war, and this fact has undoubtedly had a bad psychological effect on the market, but the high propaganda value of the Minister of State's plan amongst the masses is undeniable.

A steady rise in the price of everything except cereals (rice not included) has occurred. Nothing concrete has been done by the Governments to control prices, but a Tariff Commission is sitting and apparently finding it difficult to unify the attitude of the two State Governments in certain particulars. Military courts are still, though to a lesser extent, punishing profiteers under the present unsatisfactory laws, a state of affairs which arouses resentment. The export of raw silk and eggs was prohibited. Compensation to those whose property was damaged in the Syrian campaign has not yet been paid.

14. *Inter-Allied Relations.*

On the whole the atmosphere has steadily improved; there have been fewer sources of disagreement since the settlement of the question of Lebanese independence. Opportunity of expressing the warm sentiments which in reality exist on both sides was provided by the holidays.

Lieutenant-Colonel de Chevigné, head of the Cabinet militaire at the Grand Sérail, Beirut, left for Washington on the 20th December. This officer, whose intelligence and ability were unquestionable, had been allowed to acquire exceptional authority which had caused him to be disliked by some of the more experienced French officials and in particular by General Collet. He has been replaced by Colonel Antoine, who has expressed his desire for full collaboration with the British.

General Monclar, the délégué in Latakia, has shown his extreme sensitiveness over a few trivial matters, and the enquiry into the Sûreté at Aleppo, during which the British Security Mission arrested two of the witnesses, caused a certain impression of friction.

[E 280/279/89]

No. 9.

Mr. Eden to Sir E. Spears.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 6, 1942.

I ENCLOSE herein a copy of instructions which have been drawn up in consultation with the Secretary of State for War upon your appointment as the first of His Majesty's Ministers accredited to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics. These instructions are for your guidance, not only as His Majesty's Minister, but also as head of the Mission to the Free French in the territories under the supervision of the Minister of State.

[24085]

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2. I should like, however, to take this occasion to make two comments upon these instructions. It is understood, with reference to paragraph 2 of the enclosed instructions, that in your absence the senior diplomatic member of your staff will act as chargé d'affaires and as head of the civil branch in Syria and the Lebanon of the Mission to the Free French, that is to say, the economic and financial sections. On the other hand, the military section of the mission will be under the direction of the deputy head of the mission, who will at the same time be military attaché to the legations.

3. In the last paragraph reference is made to the agreements between the Minister of State and General de Gaulle of the 25th July, 1941. It may happen that the British military authorities may have to make wide demands upon the Free French as regards control in Syria and the Lebanon. It is suggested that, as a matter of tactics, it is preferable to base these demands, when made, upon an interpretation favourable to our wishes of the agreements of the 25th July (and therefore as being within the scope of what General de Gaulle has already accepted) rather than to make them as demands going outside these agreements and even conflicting with them, a course which would seem to require that General Catroux should obtain authorisation from General de Gaulle.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 9.

SINCE the recognition of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, His Majesty's Government have let it be known privately that it is their intention to establish legations at Damascus and Beirut. Conditions in those republics are, however, without exact parallel elsewhere and the following instructions to the first of His Majesty's representatives accredited to these States have been drawn up with a view to reconciling as effectively as possible the facts of independence and the continuation of Free French influence and responsibility with the paramount necessity of the maintenance of civil order and quiet in an area in which or from which British forces may be called upon to operate against the enemy. It is fully recognised that experience may require the modification of these instructions and that, as conditions change, alterations will become necessary.

2. Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will combine the posts of (a) His Majesty's Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and (b) head of the Mission to the Free French in the territories under the supervision of the Minister of State. The consular posts in Syria of Aleppo and Damascus, and in the Lebanon of Beirut, will be under the superintendence of His Majesty's Minister.

3. In his capacity of His Majesty's Minister, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will report direct to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and will receive instructions from him. Repetitions of all telegrams and copies of all correspondence will be sent to the Minister of State, so that he is kept fully informed.

4. In his capacity as head of the Mission to the Free French, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will continue to advise the British military authorities in Syria and Lebanon on day-to-day administrative questions and on all political questions affecting Syria and Lebanon, as well as on questions submitted to him by the British military authorities; and to bring to the notice of the British military authorities all matters which may directly or indirectly have military implications. This does not, of course, exclude direct consultation between the British General Officer Commanding and General Catroux on purely military matters, but Major-General Sir E. L. Spears should be kept informed on any occasion upon which he is not present. On all matters in which questions of principle or policy are involved, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will communicate direct with the Minister of State if they relate solely or predominantly to the problems with which Captain O. Lyttelton is empowered by his terms of reference to deal. These are for the territories under the supervision of the Minister of State:—

- "(1) Relations with the Free French.
- "(2) Propaganda and subversive warfare.
- "(3) Finance and economic warfare."

At the same time, in order to minimise delays in communication, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will repeat direct to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

all important telegrams addressed to the Minister of State. Similarly, telegrams of importance on these subjects addressed by the Secretary of State to the Minister of State will be repeated to General Spears. In particular, it should be borne in mind that, while General Catroux has full authority to negotiate and settle all current questions affecting Syria and the Lebanon, matters of major policy, such as the conclusion of treaties and questions affecting the whole Free French movement, must necessarily be referred to London, for consideration by General de Gaulle himself.

5. In his capacity of His Majesty's Minister to the Lebanese and Syrian Republics, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will recall that, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, General Catroux announced on the 8th June, 1941, that he was going into Syria to put an end to the mandatory régime. In accordance with this undertaking, General Catroux declared the independence of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics on the 27th September and the 26th November, 1941, and His Majesty's Government recognised the independence of these republics on the 28th October and the 27th December respectively as defined in those proclamations. The original intention of the Free French, as of His Majesty's Government, was that treaties should be negotiated to secure the full independence of these countries and the termination of the mandate. After their occupation, it became apparent, however, that the local population did not desire that this step should be taken at the present moment. Consequently, the present position in the two countries is that the mandate remains in force, except in so far as it has been modified by the declarations of independence made by General Catroux. In short, the position is analogous to that in Iraq between the signature of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1923 and the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations in 1932. The policy of His Majesty's Government, however, is to bring about the final termination of the mandate and the full independence of Syria and the Lebanon at the earliest possible moment, the measures which have been taken so far being steps in this direction. Moreover, although the legal position is as described above, it is in accordance with the policy of His Majesty's Government that as little public mention as possible should be made of the mandate.

6. Although present circumstances make it impossible to take any further steps for the time being, His Majesty's Government have made their point of view plain in the statement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 9th September, in which he made the following three points:—

- "(1) We are only in Syria in order to win the war.
- "(2) We do not propose that this process of creating an independent Syrian Government or Governments—because it may be that they will not be one Government—shall wait until the end of the war. We contemplate constantly increasing the Syrian share in the administration.
- "(3) There is no question of France maintaining the same position which she occupied in Syria before the war, but which the French Government had realised must come to an end. On the other hand, we recognise that, in so far as any European countries have influence in Syria, that of France will be pre-eminent."

7. This remains the settled policy of His Majesty's Government, and, in assuming the post of the first of His Majesty's Ministers accredited to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, it will be Major-General Sir E. L. Spears's duty to see the policy implemented. To take the points in turn. The overriding consideration for the period of the war must be the necessities of the war effort. It is due mainly to British arms that the Free French have entered Syria and that Syrian and Lebanese independence has been achieved. It will be mainly by their efforts that the position of the Syrian, Lebanese and Free French authorities will be maintained. His Majesty's Government will therefore expect that no measure be held up which is considered essential by the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, and which has the approval of the Minister of State. Moreover, where speed is of paramount importance in dealing with such matters, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears should conform to their wishes in any urgent matter vitally affecting our military position which the Minister of State has not himself thought fit to refer to His Majesty's Government for decision.

8. This principle has already been recognised by General de Gaulle in article 1 of the Supplementary Agreement concerning the Collaboration between British and Free French authorities in the Middle East signed on the 25th July, 1941. This article reads as follows:—

"General de Gaulle recognises that the British High Command in the Levant is empowered to take all measures of defence which it judges necessary to take against the common enemy."

"If it should happen that any of these measures should appear to be contrary to the interests of France in the Levant, the question would be submitted to the British Government and to General de Gaulle."

It should be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government do not consider the reservation in the second half of this article as in any way circumscribing the discretion of the British High Command to take essential action in an emergency. The reservation does, however, enable the Free French authorities, if they think fit, to submit any particular decision or action for review in London.

9. Within the framework of our essential military requirements, it should be possible for a large share of the administration of the newly created States of Syria and the Lebanon to be handed over to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, and the latter should be encouraged, in so far as this can be done without impairing efficiency, to employ native administrators, or such foreigners as they themselves may appoint. As a case in point, it is understood that some thousand French officials have remained in these two countries since the Syrian armistice, despite the fact that they have not rallied to the Free French cause. Both for reasons of military security and political policy, His Majesty's Government consider that this anomaly should be brought to an end as rapidly as possible and that our aim should be the elimination of French officials who have not both made a declaration of loyalty to the Free French movement and who are not sincerely carrying out such a declaration.

10. The needs of the military situation must remain the dominant responsibility of the British authorities. Nevertheless, Major-General Sir E. L. Spears will bear in mind that the Free French authorities should be encouraged to grant the republics an ever-increasing responsibility for their own administration. Before the war, the French—and since the war, both Vichy and later the Free French—have asserted and reasserted this principle. The Free French cannot therefore claim to exercise the same functions as they did before the republics were declared to be independent. It should, however, not be lost sight of that the policy of His Majesty's Government remains that, in so far as any European country has influence in Syria, the influence of France, as represented by the Free French movement, will be pre-eminent, and no legitimate pretext should be given to critics either in France, within the Axis or to ill-disposed Arabs, to contend that the United Kingdom has the least intention of substituting British authority for that of France in Syria and the Lebanon. The agreements of the 25th July, 1941, between the Minister of State and General de Gaulle had this object in mind, and the success of any operations in this area might well depend upon the scrupulous observance, in the spirit as well as in the letter, of these agreements both by ourselves and by the Free French authorities.

[E 904/207/89]

No. 10.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office, February 9.)

(No. 640. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 5, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. General.

THE absence of any new development during the week gives the impression of a lull in the political scene. There have been the usual comings and goings, but Nationalist politicians in Syria are waiting on events before committing themselves. This anxiety to see which way the cat will jump probably accounts in the main for their slowness to organise an effective opposition to the existing Syrian Government.

Jamil Mardam, however, has been displaying great political activity in Damascus since his return from Egypt. He is giving out that he has British backing, a claim which has pleased the Nationalist elements and worried the supporters of the present régime. He appears to be forming a group of former office-holders with the object of opposing the Cabinet. One of the first results has been greater unity among the present Government.

Popular interest continues to be centred on economic matters, principally the price of wheat and other food-stuffs, the commodity markets in general and the increase in rents. Bad weather and paucity of transport have added to supply difficulties, so that in some centres the "ravitaillement" problem has become acute.

As explained in last week's summary, it was found necessary to suspend, temporarily, sales of British wheat and envisage an urgent modification of the Wheat Plan. This has now been introduced. In effect it provides for controlled sales of flour at all the more important centres in Syria and the Lebanon. The quantities involved, which have still to be finally determined, will be on a scale sufficient to maintain the poorer class of the population. Distribution and sales will be under the control of U.K.C.C. personnel, assisted by the economic officers, and wherever possible in close liaison with the municipality or "ravitaillement" officials of the district. Every endeavour is being made to get the revised scheme working as soon as possible.

Wheat unfortunately is by no means the only commodity in which the speculative flair of the population is finding scope. Speculation in all kinds of merchandise still goes on apace; much of it is done on credit, goods being sold against short-term bills of exchange which are immediately discounted at the banks, and the money so obtained is straightway used to buy up more goods. To limit this practice, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban has stopped discounting bills, even from first-class customers, unless they are sure that they cover genuine, not speculative, business.

2. Syria: Damascus.

On 20th January the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave an interview to a journalist in order to get publicity for his plans for Syrian representation abroad. The Minister stated that war-time difficulties made it difficult to send representatives to far distant countries such as America and Great Britain. It was therefore proposed at the moment to send Ministers to Egypt and Saudi Arabia only and a consul-general to Jerusalem.

On 28th January the Central Committee of the Service de Ravitaillement met under the presidency of M. Boncennes (newly arrived from London to take charge of economic matters in the Levant for the Free French) and decided on certain steps to meet the situation, notably to order three meatless days a week and to enforce price control. Simultaneously, a regulation has appeared empowering gendarmerie tribunals to handle cases of price speculation, hoarding, &c., instead of the military tribunals.

A strike among the tramway employees for higher wages to meet the increased cost of living has been followed by the closing of the bazaars and a strike of university students as a protest against the price of bread and the uncertainty of future supplies. Although no disorders are yet reported, agitators will certainly seize the opportunity to arouse political passions. Urgent steps are being taken by ourselves, in conjunction with the French and Syrian authorities, to see that the necessary supplies of flour at reasonable prices are ensured for the poorer sections of the population.

The best rumour of the week in Damascus was to the effect that the British will pay each Syrian civil servant the sum of £Syr. 8 a month cost-of-living bonus with effect from the time of our arrival in Syria!

3. Aleppo.

It is reported that the more moderate Nationalists have come to the conclusion that they would be ready to work with the British, who could control prices and keep the country supplied with essential commodities, but not with the French, who are characterised as incapable and untrustworthy. The more extreme Nationalists, however, are not prepared to collaborate even with the British, much less with the French. On this issue there has been a split and the two factions no longer meet.

Sheikh Taj-ed-Din has been sounding his friends in Aleppo as to the advisability of his making a tour of the north. Most of the replies, it seems, were emphatic on the unwisdom of this course—the implication being that he would be likely to receive a bad reception. He is further reported to be trying to organise a party in the north favourable to himself and his Government and opposed to the local Nationalists.

Cold weather, snow and heavy rain have again been the rule in Aleppo district. This should be good for crops later on, but in the meantime there is much distress among the poorer classes of the population.

4. Jezireh.

Unconfirmed reports have been received of subversive movements in the Northern Jezireh amongst the Kurds. These are being investigated, but it does not appear that there is any collaboration with the Kurds of Iraq, where the tribes are quiet.

Enquiries are still proceeding into the protest, lodged by the Turkish Government to the British Embassy at Angora, that inadequate steps are taken to prevent or settle border raids by Syrian live-stock thieves. The Free French contend that a large number of the cases referred to have already been disposed of at the regular meetings between frontier officials, between whom relations are cordial. They point out correctly that there are frequent violations of the frontier by armed Turkish soldiers with the object of sheep stealing; at the same time, they are showing every willingness to co-operate with the Turks and try to limit these incidents to a minimum. It should be mentioned that on all frontier matters the French are extremely sensitive when it comes to direct contact between the British and officials on the other side, whether Turkish or Iraqi.

Shammar and Agaidat tribal disputes were settled at the conference held in Mosul (10th-19th January) between the French Délégué-Adjoint of Euphrates and Jezireh Provinces and the Mutessarif of Mosul. Judgment was given in accordance with tribal custom by arbiters and the result was a decision that both sides should "dig and bury" all claims for lives and loot. This decision follows the line of least resistance rather than the dictates of equity, but all parties appeared satisfied. For the moment, peace has been established and accepted by the tribal leaders, but portions of the Agaidat attempted to wreck a settlement by raiding during the conference. However, they incurred some casualties and, on their return, were caught and relieved of their arms and loot by French patrols. By the rules of the game, Government intervention against the raiders prevents the Shammar from taking reprisals, and it is hoped that the settlement arranged at Mosul will endure.

At Mosul cordial relations were established between French and Iraqi frontier authorities and arrangements were made for co-ordinated operations against locusts in the spring. The mutessarif is to return the délégué's visit in due course.

Another frontier conference to settle the dispute between the Jubur and Shammar of Zor has been postponed until 15th March at Deir-ez-Zor.

Very unusual weather has recently been experienced, the whole country along the northern frontier being covered in snow, which has since turned into mud, rendering motor transport impossible. It is no unusual thing, however, for roads in the Jezireh to be impassable during January and February, except for a few dry intervals.

As a result of news of the suspension of sales of British wheat on the coast, prices have risen to £Syr. 280 and even £Syr. 300 a ton, as against £Syr. 100 to £Syr. 150 six months ago. This is not in itself a bad thing for the area, as the population is largely agricultural and has made provision for its own wants. Further, with wheat at this price, there can be no inducement to smuggle it into Iraq or Turkey. The official price of wheat in Turkey is reported to be £Syr. 145 per ton and in the black market £Syr. 220.

5. Jebel Druze.

Little has taken place during the week, but it is noticeable that factions not of the Atrash following are becoming more vocal. One of these, a Nationalist Druze, has made a round of visits in Damascus, during which he lost no occasion of attacking the Atrashes, denying their right to speak for the whole of the Druzes and their sincerity in accepting the "union" of the Jebel with the Syrian Republic.

The budget of the Mohafazat does not permit of a salary increase to Government employees to meet the higher cost of living. As this increase has been given to employees in other districts, there is discontent in the Serail and among civil servants in the villages. The Mohafez is taking the matter up with Damascus.

6. Lebanon: Beirut.

Rumours have been circulating of a projected change in the form of the Lebanese Government, the existing Ministry of ten persons being replaced by a Ministry of five persons and a consultative Chamber of twenty-five. It seems probable that the idea was put out by the friends of M. Naccache as a possible means of placating the Maronite Patriarch. The latter, when sounded, is stated

to have agreed only on condition that he was allowed to have a preponderant voice in the choice of both the new Ministry and Chamber, and the project therefore seems to have been shelved. Apart from those who might have found places in the new Ministry or the Chamber, the public showed no enthusiasm for a project which would merely have increased the number of ineffective officials.

The Free French authorities have continued their arms-collecting activities in North Lebanon and have collected a fair number of arms, most of them of an obsolete and unserviceable type. They propose to start operations in Sidon, employing their usual tactics of billeting troops in private houses until the requisite number of arms is produced, a system which is always unpopular and unfair, though possibly as effective as any.

The trial of some forty merchants accused of having formed an illicit association for the import of rice commences in Beirut on 3rd February and some apprehension has already been expressed lest the military court shall show itself as intransigent as in past profiteering cases. There is, however, little doubt that some at least of the accusations are true.

7. Press and Propaganda.

Mr. Churchill's historic speech has been treated by both French and Arabic press in a most satisfactory manner. The discourse, showing a fearless and resolute statesman giving a clear and unbiased description of the war situation, came at an opportune moment, as it was successfully compared with the lengthy and practically pointless Hitlerian harangue later in the week.

Though the press seem to have been slightly nonplussed by our withdrawal in Libya, the Russian successes have in great measure made up the balance. The resistance of Malta has received high praise.

Noticeable among local affairs have been the frequent appeals of the Syrian press for the Rents Law to be finally settled.

Enemy broadcasts have again dealt mainly with "the hellish and diabolical schemes of the Jews" in all Arab countries, aided and abetted, of course, by "their friends the English." Rommel's success has been greeted by an outburst of praise, almost hysterical on the part of the Italians. Lavish promises continue to be made regarding the liberation of Arab countries when the Axis has won the war.

[E 1209/181/89]

No. 11.

Office of the Minister of State to the Foreign Office.—(Received February 23.)

Sir,

Cairo, February 3, 1942.

I AM directed by the Minister of State to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Eden, copies of the following documents:—

- (a) Two arrêtés signed by General Catroux on the 12th January revising the statutes for the Jebel Druze and Alaouite Territory.
- (b) Two letters addressed to General Catroux by the President of the Syrian Republic on the same date. The texts of these two letters were agreed in prior consultation between the two parties, and their object is to place on record certain assurances regarding the administration of the Jebel Druze and Alaouite Territory under the new régime. It is understood that there is no intention of publishing these letters.
- (c) A memorandum by the Spears Mission, Beirut, covering the above documents.⁽¹⁾
- (d) A translation of a speech made by the Syrian President at Damascus on the 20th January on the occasion of the publication of the two arrêtés.⁽¹⁾

2. The revision of the statutes was announced on the 20th January and the Syrian Government organised a ceremony at the Serail in Damascus to celebrate the so-called "reunion" of the Jebel Druze and Alaouite Territory with Syria. The Délégué, General Collet, and his staff, and the British Political Officer, Colonel Gardener, were present at the ceremony, as were the Consular Corps, and representatives of the Moslem and Christian religious authorities.

3. The proceedings took the form of four speeches, the gist of which was to express the pleasure of all Syrians to see the two territories reunited with Syria;

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

two of the speakers praised the wisdom of the Allies in permitting this reunion. The President himself, as will be seen from the text of his speech, regarded the occasion as an augury of a larger Arab Federation.

4. Celebrations were also held in the two territories affected, but as reported in Beirut telegram No. Spears 624 of the 28th January, no great public enthusiasm was aroused.

I am, &c.

H. L. d'A. HOPKINSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Arrêtés signed by General Catroux on January 12, 1942, revising the Statutes for the Jebel Druze and Alaouite Territory.

(1)

Le Mohafazat du Djebel Druze.

Article 1^{er}. La circonscription administrative actuellement dénommée "Territoire autonome du Djebel Druze" fait partie intégrante de l'Etat de Syrie; elle reçoit la désignation officielle de "Mohafazat du Djebel Druze."

Art. 2. Le Mohafazat du Djebel Druze bénéficie, au sein de la République syrienne, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Art. 3. Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le Mohafazat du Djebel Druze est régi par la constitution, les lois et règlements d'administration publique de la République syrienne.

Art. 4. Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, notamment l'arrêté 133/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939 et son annexe, ainsi que les textes d'application.

Les dispositions du présent arrêté et du règlement seront reprises en annexe du traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie, ainsi qu'il a déjà été fait en 1936.

Règlement organique du Mohafazat du Djebel Druze.

Article 1^{er}. Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le Mohafazat du Djebel Druze, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants.

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du Mohafazat sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis.

Art. 2. Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du Mohafazat.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières qui sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Art. 3. Le Conseil administratif est composé de neuf membres élus suivant le mode de scrutin en vigueur dans l'Etat, et de trois membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président de la République sur une liste de propositions établie par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les présidents des chambres de commerce et d'agriculture et d'autres notables du territoire.

Les membres du conseil sont élus ou nommés pour 4 ans. Le conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Art. 4. Le budget du Mohafazat comprend en recettes :

(1) Le produit de tous impôts d'Etat, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire du Mohafazat et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée;

(2) Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'Etat de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne;

(3) Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versées, soit par des Etats ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du Mohafazat comprend en dépenses :

(1) Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire;

(2) Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'Etat égale à 5 pour cent du total des recettes ordinaires du Mohafazat;

(3) Le service des emprunts contractés par le Mohafazat ou à son bénéfice;

(4) Le service des pensions.

Art. 5. Le projet de budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service, et soumis avant le 1^{er} octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans le délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'Etat et leur répercussion sur les recettes et les dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du Mohafazat.

Art. 6. Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre, pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse pas quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Art. 7. Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le Mohafazat et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

(2)

Le Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite.

Article 1^{er}. La circonscription administrative actuellement dénommée "Territoire autonome alaouite" fait partie intégrante de l'Etat de Syrie; elle reçoit la désignation officielle de "Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite."

Art. 2. Le Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite bénéficie, au sein de la République syrienne, d'un régime spécial administratif et financier dont les modalités sont définies dans le règlement ci-annexé.

Art. 3. Sous la réserve des dispositions de ce règlement, le Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite est régi par la constitution, les lois et règlements d'administration publique de la République syrienne.

Art. 4. Le présent arrêté et le règlement y annexé entreront en vigueur en lieu et place des textes régissant antérieurement ces matières, notamment l'arrêté 132/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939 et son annexe, l'arrêté 134/LR du 1^{er} juillet 1939, ainsi que les textes d'application.

Les dispositions du présent arrêté et du règlement seront reprises en annexe du traité à intervenir entre la France et la Syrie, ainsi qu'il a déjà été fait en 1936.

Règlement organique du Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite.

Article 1^{er}. Le régime spécial dont est doté, dans la République syrienne, le Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite dans ses limites actuelles, en matière administrative et financière, est réglé par les articles suivants.

Pour assurer l'application de ce régime, le Mohafez, nommé par le Président de la République, et le Conseil administratif du Mohafazat sont investis des pouvoirs spéciaux ci-après définis :

Art. 2. Le Président de la République nomme les magistrats. Il nomme, sur la présentation du Mohafez, les caïmakams et les chefs des services centraux du Mohafazat.

Le Mohafez, en vertu de la délégation permanente du Président de la République syrienne, nomme les autres fonctionnaires. Il nomme également les mudirs.

Le Mohafez exerce le pouvoir réglementaire pour les matières qui sont de sa compétence en vertu du présent règlement.

Art. 3. Le Conseil administratif est composé d'au moins treize membres élus suivant le mode de scrutin en vigueur dans l'Etat, et de quatre membres nommés. Ces derniers sont choisis par le Président de la République sur une liste de propositions établie par le Mohafez, sur laquelle sont portés les présidents des chambres de commerce et d'agriculture et d'autres notables du Mohafazat.

Les membres du conseil sont élus, ou nommés, pour quatre ans. Le conseil est renouvelable par moitié.

Art. 4. Le budget du Mohafazat comprend en recettes :

- (1) Le produit de tous impôts d'Etat, taxes et revenus de toute nature perçus sur le territoire et dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée;
- (2) Les sommes attribuées à titre de répartition de surplus de recettes figurant actuellement au compte de gestion, après défalcation des dépenses générales intéressant l'ensemble de l'Etat de Syrie et prises en charge par le budget général de la République syrienne;
- (3) Des fonds de concours ou des contributions qui lui sont versés, soit par des Etats ou collectivités publiques, soit par des particuliers.

Le budget du Mohafazat comprend en dépenses :

- (1) Toutes les dépenses des services publics sur son territoire;
- (2) Une contribution aux dépenses d'administration générale de l'Etat égale à 5 pour cent du total des recettes ordinaires du territoire;
- (3) Le service des emprunts contractés par le Mohafazat ou à son bénéfice;
- (4) Le service des pensions.

Art. 5. Le projet du budget est préparé par le Mohafez, assisté des chefs de service, et soumis avant le 1^{er} octobre à l'examen du Ministre des Finances.

Dans le délai d'un mois, celui-ci fait connaître ses observations sur l'application des lois et règlements généraux de l'Etat et leur répercussion sur les recettes et dépenses, ainsi que sur toutes mesures propres à assurer l'équilibre des finances du Mohafazat.

Art. 6. Le Mohafez convoque le Conseil administratif au plus tard le 15 novembre, pour examen du projet de budget. La durée de cette session ne dépasse pas quinze jours.

Le budget voté par le Conseil administratif est promulgué par le Président de la République avant l'ouverture de l'exercice.

Art. 7. Les projets d'emprunts et de concessions intéressant le Mohafazat et engageant ses finances sont préparés, présentés, délibérés, conclus et accordés dans les mêmes conditions que le budget.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Letters addressed to General Catroux by the President of the Syrian Republic,

(1)

Damas, le 12 janvier 1942.

Mon cher Général,

RECONNAISSANT la nécessité de tenir compte des contingences locales dans le Mohafazat du Djebel Alaouite, et me référant à votre arrêté No. 23 F.L. du 12 janvier 1942, je vous donne l'assurance de ne procéder qu'en accord avec votre Excellence au choix du Mohafez chargé par le Gouvernement syrien d'administrer ce Mohafazat.

En ce qui concerne le choix des fonctionnaires administratifs de cette circonscription, le recrutement en sera assuré parmi les ressortissants du Mohafazat, sauf lorsque le défaut reconnu de candidat professionnellement apte empêchera, dans l'intérêt public, d'appliquer cette règle.

Il demeure en outre entendu que le Conseil administratif du Mohafazat fonctionnera selon les modalités mises en vigueur sous le régime de l'arrêté No. 274/L.R. du 5 décembre 1936.

Je vous confirme d'autre part, en me référant à votre arrêté No. 22 F.L. du 12 janvier 1942 relatif au Djebel Druze, que le principe de l'unité de législation et de juridiction appliqué au Djebel Druze n'interrompra pas la pratique jusqu'ici suivie par les tribunaux de ce territoire de tenir compte, dans une large mesure, des coutumes et des usages locaux.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(2)

Damas, le 12 janvier 1942.

Mon cher Général,

JE vous confirme volontiers qu'en plein accord avec les termes de votre proclamation du 27 septembre 1941 au peuple syrien, je veillerai, en ma qualité de Président de la République syrienne, à maintenir en faveur des minorités compactes ou diffuses de Syrie le régime le plus libéral compatible avec l'unité de l'Etat de Syrie.

Ces principes se trouvent d'ailleurs inscrits dans la Constitution syrienne. Veuillez agréer, &c.

[E 787/207/89]

No. 12.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office, February 25.)

(No. 625. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, January 29, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. *General.*

THE main political event of the week was the promulgation, long delayed, of the Jebel Druze and Alouite statutes at Soueida and Latakia. This event was marked by official junketings and by popular apathy. The two enactments involve, in the main, a return to the unworkable statutes of 1936, which provide for the formal readmission of the two Mohafazats into the Syrian fold—a step welcomed by Nationalists, and at present agreed to, or at least acquiesced in, by local sentiment; the subject of enthusiasm by nobody except the supporters of the President, for whom the change represents a minor political triumph.

It is, however, shrewdly surmised by the populace that, no matter what may be the political events here during the war, the future status of the country will be finally determined by the outcome of the hostilities at present in progress and by the international situation which follows their suspension. Popular opinion is therefore that whatever happens now can be regarded as no more than provisional in its nature.

It follows that the main interest of the week has been concerned rather with economics than with politics, with wheat more than with constitutional reform. The evolution of the wheat plan has been passing through a critical phase.

It had originally been supposed that the importation and free sale of substantial quantities of wheat in the country, coupled with a removal of the restrictions upon the transport and sale of native wheat, together with a suitable manipulation of market prices, would suffice to unlock hoarders' stores and alike increase the supply and reduce the market price of the wheat available to the public. This calculation proved misleading, despite sales on a larger scale than originally intended.

By a fortnight ago it was apparent that, if the plan were going to succeed, it would be necessary either to import largely increased supplies or to restrict sales in such a manner as to hinder speculation on the present scale. The native wheat had not been extracted from the hoarders, and was not expected prior to the month of April. Largely increased imported supplies were not in sight and, as a consequence, a temporary restriction on sales pending a visit of Mr. Minotto to Cairo was held imperative. The effect of this restriction coincided with a baseless rumour that British subjects were being ordered to leave Turkey, and the two events provided a cause for considerable anxiety both in Aleppo, Damascus and elsewhere. Happily no actual shortage of bread followed (another indication of the largely speculative significance of the market in this commodity), and at present a temporary plan is in operation which it is hoped will serve the immediate purpose.

The essence of this plan is to sell in future not wheat but flour, in quantities allocated beforehand to each of the consuming districts and not promiscuously but only to licensed millers pledged to co-operate with the scheme and warned that their failure to do so will most certainly lead to the forfeiture of their right to participate in its benefits.

There is, under this scheme, no interference with a free wheat market, but there is a commercial control by the importers of imported wheat.

It is notable that, although the Ravitaillement Services are excluded from control, they nevertheless accept and approve the general idea.

2. *Syria: Damascus.*

Three different sources have reported that the apparently interminable dispute between the President, Taj-ed-Din, and the Prime Minister has at last drawn towards its close. The Prime Minister has, it would seem, failed in his endeavour to get the other members of the Government to resign with him and, being unwilling to resign alone, has given way with a good grace on most of his objections.

The Syrian Government is about to start negotiations for Syrian diplomatic representatives at Cairo and Jedda and a consular representative at Jerusalem.

The promulgation of the new Alaouite and Druze statutes formed the occasion of a ceremony at the Serail to celebrate the so-called "union" of these territories and Syria, at which Syrian, French and British authorities and notables were invited to assist. The ceremony was staged by the Government, whose view is that the grant of the new statutes forms a real concession by the French in the direction of Syrian independence and will reinforce the Ministry's position in the country.

The week has provided an unusual quantity of demonstrations. These were, however, more concerned with domestic grievances than with any which directly concerned ourselves. The students at the university considered that a strike was the appropriate method of showing their support for one rather than for another as head of the university. Another and more justifiable cause for demonstration was the recent Government concession to landlords allowing an increase in rents. This strike was successful in obtaining a promise from the Government to re-examine the regulations concerned and to offer an increase in the rates of pay for lower-grade civil servants. The Communists were alleged to have been concerned in the second demonstration.

Rumours stating that British subjects had been asked to leave Turkey had an unexpected result upon prices, merchants being afraid of a German attack and fearing the possibilities of confiscation, were eager to sell and an abrupt fall, instead of the expected rise, in the prices was the result of the rumour. This may perhaps be regarded as a sign that the Damascus merchants, for all the Axis propaganda, are not wholly ignorant of Axis methods of exploitation.

As has been indicated elsewhere in this summary, the wheat situation gave rise to anxiety. Arrivals of wheat were less than the issue and the suspension of sales to Damascus buyers, including the miller under contract to the municipality, created an unfavourable impression and gave rise to rumours that the Spears Mission had been purchasing wheat at enhanced prices in Damascus and the Jezireh.

3. Aleppo.

A deterioration in the general situation is noticeable since last month. German set-backs in Russia have produced the feeling that Hitler will try to move in this direction in the spring. At the same time, it is reported that signs are not lacking of a decline in Turkish morale, not among civilians only, but in army circles, and these reports have had an immediate repercussion in Northern Syria in the form of growing restiveness and lack of confidence. Economic distress has aggravated the problem.

Politically, no progress has been made. Aleppo leaders continue to stand aloof from the Government of Sheikh Taj and all its works. They are convinced that, owing to internal dissensions and lack of popular support, it is bound to fall sooner or later—probably sooner rather than later—and that the Free French will then be obliged to turn to men more truly representative of the nation's aspirations—men who will only accept office on the condition that they are given a real share in the government of the country.

Meanwhile, the more moderate Syrian Nationalists are quite openly sitting on the fence. Many of them would be willing to take part in a Government of the kind outlined above, but they prefer not to commit themselves until the future outlook is more certain. Their feeling is that, so long as there is a possibility that the Germans may one day come down through Turkey into Syria, they do not want to tie themselves up with the Allies. If this is true of the moderates, it is far more true of the extreme Nationalists, who, having nothing to hope from the Allies, still wish for an Axis victory. These elements are, however, conspicuously prudent. Of open activity on their part there is none and their secret activities are difficult to discover.

Efforts are being made to tighten up control of the Turco-Syrian frontier. As a first step patrols by British and French military units, customs guards, Gardes mobiles and Syrian gendarmes, each hitherto entirely independent, are being co-ordinated so as in future to supplement each other. In addition, proposals are on foot for the operation of frontier control officers at various points and for the posting of additional F.S. personnel along the frontier.

The enquiry into the death of Anwar Trabulsi, a teacher at the University of Damascus, who was shot in a doubtful hotel by a corporal of the Australian military police, is proceeding. The agitation aroused by this incident, which threatened at one time to take on political colour, has subsided.

The wheat situation has deteriorated sharply. The cessation of sales at Aleppo under the wheat plan has given everybody the impression that the plan

has broken down and that the Syrian merchants and the monopolists have been too clever for us. There has been no actual shortage of bread, but the price of wheat has risen to about £S. 500 a ton. Roads in the Jezireh are impassable and at present only small movements of wheat are taking place in the immediate vicinity of Aleppo. But for the fact that the army of occupation has brought work at remunerative rates to a large number of people, there would be great distress.

4. Homs and Hama.

The increase in propaganda favourable to the Axis, referred to in the previous summary, together with the economic problems of the district, raised several protests, including one signed by 250 people against the increase of house rents and also the threat of closing the *souks* in both Homs and Hama as a protest against the present rise in prices. The difficulties of the wheat situation have been accentuated by the severe losses of live-stock which have resulted from the cold weather, advantage of which was characteristically taken by the mukhtars of the villages, who charged the Bedouins enormous prices for the necessities which they were compelled to purchase for their flocks and themselves. The action of the mukhtars was the reason for a personal reprimand by the *délégué*. The difficulties attending the operation of the wheat plan referred to above in this summary were noticeable in this area, too.

5. Alaouite Territory.

The promulgation of the new statute was the subject of official rather than popular rejoicing. By the Sunni Moslems it is regarded with approval, by the Christians with indifference, the Alaouites, who form the bulk of the population, are not pleased, but, it is thought, are likely to wait on events without further protest.

A committee has been formed to deal with claims against damage to property by troops. It consists of the Unit Compensations Officer at Latakia, a nominee of the Services spéciaux, a nominee of the Mohafaz and the Political Officer of Spears Mission.

Two ships sank this week; one, the steamship *Amathus*, of 500 tons, sank in the mouth of the harbour and has completely blocked it. The other vessel, the steamship *Tiqra* (Palestinian), sank off Ras-el-Bassit Point with the loss of five lives. Both vessels carried cargoes of chrome, which have been lost.

6. Jebel Druze.

As in Latakia, the celebrations of the new statute were not enthusiastic. Since the Emir's support for the proceedings had been obtained, the festivities took place without a hitch except for the absence of prominent Nationalist speakers, who boycotted them not as a protest against the statute, but against the Taj-ed-Din Administration.

The Emir appears to have made an inept speech at the luncheon and created a bad impression from the balcony by having the speech read "by a man with a stronger voice." The impression which he gave was that he was going through the business with little enthusiasm, and possibly not enough grace.

The Political Officer reports that the cost of food is calculated by the authorities to be quite 50 per cent. higher than in Damascus. He attributes this to the transport charge of P.L. S. 3 per kilogramme, to packing charges, middlemen's profits and also to the few remaining shopkeepers, who sell at fixed prices by agreement. There is too little trade for them to consider competition worth while.

7. Lebanon: Beirut.

The following countries have so far recognised Lebanese independence: Great Britain, Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia and Syria. The Egyptian Government have not yet recognised the Lebanon, although their consul-general in Beirut states that they will shortly do so, and the Lebanese Government are apprehensive that pan-Arabists favouring Syrian unity will induce the Egyptian and Iraqi Governments not to recognise the Lebanon in its present form. The Syrian Government's recognition caused great pleasure, as did a visit paid to Beirut by the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who arranged with his Lebanese colleague for a fortnightly exchange of visits, in Beirut and Damascus alternately, with a view to exchanging ideas and to maintaining a common front.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs recently spoke frankly to General Catroux on the question of the transfer of powers from the French

Administration to the Lebanese Government consequent on the declaration of independence and seems satisfied with the undertaking he received in return that this matter would be speeded up. The Délégation générale, however, have not yet produced proposals on the subject.

The Najjadé party are showing activity in the Tripoli area, where they have recently appointed a leader and displayed notices calling on the population to support them. They intend also to extend their activities in the Bekaa. So far they have not demonstrated nor roused much interest.

The Free French forces have begun combing the North Lebanon for arms, but their operations have been hampered by the severe weather.

Izzedin Omari, the new chief of police, has now taken over his functions and is displaying much energy. His appointment seems to be generally welcomed, as he commands respect amongst both the police and the population, and it is hoped that the long-overdue clean-up of the police force will now be undertaken.

8. Press and Propaganda.

No particular local matters were chosen for special attention by the press this week. Comment on the new Syrian unity continues to be favourable. Allied military victories continue to have an excellent effect on the press, who jeer at the attempts of the Germans to explain away defeats in Russia. An Aleppo paper published a useful article purporting to prove that Hitler is waging a war to the death against Islam and Christianity.

The indiscriminate cutting-down of trees in the Lebanon has raised a storm of protest in the Arabic press, mainly directed against the Government.

Berlin and Bari seem to be confining themselves increasingly to war news, while leaving Arabic affairs in the hands of the "Free Arabs." The former stations went to great lengths at the beginning of the week to explain away the situation in Libya. At the end of the week Rommel's counter-attack was given full prominence.

The reattachment of the Jebel Druze and the Alaouites to Syria caused some caustic remarks from the "Free Arabs," who described the new Druze Deputies as a bunch of Anglophiles who intended to push British interests in the Syrian Government.

[E 904/207/89]

No. 13.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office March 2.)

(No. 660. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 12, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. General.

SIGNS are not lacking of a deterioration in the general situation in Syria. A restlessness is apparent among the populations of the larger towns, with a disposition to respond to the lead given by opponents of the existing régime. Members of the Government are uneasy about recent developments, especially the "wheat strikes," and are showing themselves correspondingly anxious to find means of gaining kudos in the eyes of the people. By contrast, in the Lebanon matters pursue their usual tenor, with public interest centred mainly on local political moves and commercial questions.

The basic cause for this Syrian *malaise* is undoubtedly the feeling that, with the spring, a new and critical phase in the course of the war is approaching. Our set-back in Libya and the Japanese expansion have darkened the horizon. Axis propaganda is very active, as is witnessed by renewed rumours that British subjects are being evacuated from Turkey, and by a deputation from Homs to see the President about a story, current there, that 15,000 German parachutists were arriving on 15th February.

In Syria anxiety has also flared up again over the supply of wheat. A general strike of shops and students was organised in Damascus, the bazaars closed in Hama, and threats of similar action were made in Aleppo, Latakia and Homs. The market price of wheat has risen generally to £S. 300 or more a ton, which is not in itself a bad thing provided it causes a steady flow from stocks into consumption.

To meet the situation, a revised wheat scheme, outlined in our last two summaries, is now in operation despite the difficulties in transport. The whole question, however, is very much to the fore in public consciousness and consequently at the mercy of sudden changes of opinion. Moreover, bread, its price and quantity, has always been a political matter, especially in Damascus. The situation therefore requires careful watching and frequent reconsideration of our policy.

Rising rents and the high cost of living generally, also continue to arouse public interest. Those with fixed salaries are naturally feeling the pinch most. But against these adverse factors must be set the benefits brought to the country by the British occupation and the many visible signs of development, notably roads. Unemployment has virtually ceased to exist in the Levant States and, were it not for the shortage of imported goods and the uncertainties of the future, Syria and the Lebanon would be experiencing an unprecedented boom.

The appointment of Major-General Sir Edward Spears, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Levant States, has been welcomed by the Governments concerned and by the press and population, and is regarded locally as a further step by His Majesty's Government towards the implementation of their independence.

2. Syria: Damascus.

Reports show that the intelligent public is considerably worried over German successes in Libya. It is becoming increasingly convinced that the Germans will be able to take the initiative in Russia once more in the spring and that a simultaneous attack is likely to be launched on Turkey and thus on Syria.

The general strike, following the strike of the Tramway Company employees, reported in our last summary, came to an end next day after the President of the Republic had issued an announcement stating that the price of bread had been reduced and would be guaranteed until the next harvest. This reduction was rendered possible by supplies furnished by the U.K.C.C., but no guarantee, such as that mentioned by the President, has been given. At the same time the Prime Minister summoned certain leading merchants and assured them that the Government was doing all it could to serve the country and that it would be most unfortunate for everybody if the population were to indulge in disorders and thereby provoke the intervention of the military.

Following the strike, the President and the Minister of the Interior made a point of putting their views before us. The President emphasised the damage that was being done to the Government by the failure to obtain recognition from the United States and from Iraq, both of whom were Britain's Allies.

The Minister of the Interior expressed the Government's dissatisfaction at the attitude of the French with regard to independence. No only did they refuse to make concessions of "form" to Syrian aspirations, but they were insisting on all French personnel employed by the Syrian Government being replaced by other Frenchmen when vacancies occurred. The general picture painted by the Minister of the Interior was far from cheerful: a population frightened of invasion and fearful of not being able to obtain food; a Government unable to win support by showing concessions wrung from the French.

3. Aleppo.

No reports from this area have yet been received.

4. Homs and Hama.

Signs of unrest are reported and renewed activity among the Nationalists. Several meetings have been held and visits paid by Nationalist leaders from other parts of the country. There are, however, indications that the parties concerned were not always in agreement with one another. The main cause of discontent has been the rise in the cost of living, and, in particular, the increase in the price of bread. There were threats of a disturbance in Homs, and the Souks at Hama were closed for two days.

The political officer has returned from a visit with the Délégué Adjoint to Palmyra, and reports that security among the tribes in that area is good. Possibly 50 per cent. of the live-stock was lost as a result of the recent cold weather.

5. Jezireh.

For reasons which remain to be explained, the Agaidat tribesmen who were deported as a result of the findings of the Mixed Commission on the troubles in

September last were suddenly released by order of the Ministry of the Interior. General Collet, when he heard of the matter, took the case up strongly with the Government, with the result that the men are being rearrested and sent back to their places of detention.

At the time of the withdrawal of Vichy forces from the Euphrates Valley the authority of the Government among the tribesmen temporarily broke down. As a result of the Agaidat Commission and subsequent collaboration between the local authorities, Syrian, French and British, the situation has been practically restored. Taxes are being paid and the natural tendencies of the population to brigandage are curbed. In the district depending on Rakka, however, which was twice pillaged, first by the town population and then by the tribesmen, the situation still leaves a good deal to be desired. The main officials have now been replaced and a new kaimakam and S.S. officer appointed, so that it is hoped the authority of the local administration will be sufficiently re-established. The fines imposed on the town and tribal villages, for complicity in the July pillaging, have only now been sanctioned by the Damascus Government.

The establishment of the Assyrian Settlement on the Khabbour under the auspices of the League of Nations was finally concluded on 31st January. The settlement will now have to look after their own affairs, under their local headmen, with the supervision of the Syrian Administrator of the Province and the French S.S. officer at Hassetché. A balance of some £S. 8,000 remains from the funds which will be spent on clinical work among the Assyrians.

6. *Jebel Druze.*

The intended move of a sheikh and his following back to their abandoned lands across the Transjordan frontier has brought to light again the dormant suspicions of the Free French officials over British policy. The sheikh in question has given out that he has British support in his proposed migration, from which the French assumed a British intrigue, but did not come forward to "have it out." Aside from this and other relatively unimportant misunderstandings with the French, the position in the Jebel is quiet.

7. *Alaouite Territory.*

There is nothing of importance to report from the Alaouite area. The French delegate has "protested" to the political officer against the unfortunate impression that was being created by the "news" that British subjects had been ordered to leave Turkey. In general, however, relations with the French have very much improved.

The registration of arms throughout the area continues. It remains to be seen how many of the rifles bought privately from French troops and those long possessed by the Alaouites will be declared, and it is clear that any attempt to disarm the tribes at the present time would meet with violent opposition.

8. *Lebanon: Beirut.*

The question of the nomination of a consultative chamber to assist the Lebanese Government has again been to the forefront, having apparently been promoted by the Free French authorities. The Maronite Patriarch refused to support the idea, and pressed for a legislative chamber, so that the project seems again to have been shelved.

The news that Nahas Pasha intends to hold elections in Egypt has excited Béchara-el-Khoury's "Constitutional party," who are intending to hold a gathering at the Maronite Patriarch's residence in the near future to press for the election of a President and a Government in the Lebanon. Their great desire is to close the Opposition ranks and to form as solid a front as possible on the arrival of His Majesty's Minister, in order to present Lebanese claims to complete independence. Public interest is not yet aroused to any great extent.

The Lebanese Government are much exercised at the failure of the Egyptian Government to recognise their independent State, after having recognised that of Syria. They have learnt that the Egyptian Consul-General at Beirut, when in Cairo recently, advised the Egyptian Government before recognising the Lebanon to ask the Iraqi Government why they had not recognised either Syria or the Lebanon; and they feel that this may be a pan-Arab manoeuvre designed to further the incorporation of the Lebanon in Syria.

The trial of the merchants accused of illicit association and profiteering in rice was concluded on 5th February, and all forty-two defendants received heavy fines totalling £S. 270,000. Although it is generally felt that they had deserved punishment, public opinion has been most unfavourably impressed by the manner

in which the French military court brushed aside the legally convincing defence they were able to put up, and the commercial community in particular have protested vigorously. The fact that the fines are paid to Mme. Catroux's charitable organisation, instead of into the Lebanese State coffers, has also aroused feeling. The matter has undoubtedly been badly handled by the Free French.

Some excitement is being aroused along the Lebanese coast by expropriations made for the Haifa-Tripoli railway line. Landowners are claiming that untold damage will be done to their estates, especially in places where the cultivable coastal belt is narrow, and fear that they will not be adequately compensated.

Arms collecting continues in the Tripoli district with satisfactory results, though most of the arms produced are unserviceable.

The initial results of selling flour instead of wheat to the population through the U.K.C.C. do not seem to have given much satisfaction, very numerous criticisms of the agents employed, and of the inadequate control exercised over them, having been received.

8. *Press and Propaganda.*

Great interest was aroused by the crisis in the Egyptian Government, the main theme of articles on the subject being that the resignation was in no way due to the turn of events in Libya. General satisfaction was expressed at the formation of the new Cabinet.

The Russian campaign is still given great prominence, but in a sober manner, without any trace of ridiculous claims or of wishful thinking.

Much attention has been given to the Turco-Bulgar question, the tenor of the press being that Turkey stands ready for any eventuality, and intends to keep her promises to the Allies.

The Syrian press is still appealing for a settlement of the rents question. Enemy wireless propaganda has been mainly directed as describing the pitiful lack of food in all Arab countries under British sway, and against the "Eternal Jew."

The enemy made diverse speculations as to the cause of the resignation of the Egyptian Cabinet, but all of them were put at the door of the British.

[E 1312/207/89]

No. 14.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office, March 11.)

(No. 670. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 19, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. *General.*

THERE are many signs of a renewal of political activity in Syria, possibly on a larger scale than has been since the occupation. During the past six months politicians have walked warily, being uncertain of the Allies' temper. Now they are reassured, and even those who dressed up as anti-British wolves a year ago feel they can appear again provided they disguise themselves as pro-British lambs.

The coming into power of the Wafdist party in Egypt has been greeted as a portent by the Nationalists. Since the British helped the majority party to power in Cairo, is not the time ripe, they wonder, for making a similar bid in Syria? On the other hand, Japanese major successes and the come-back staged by Rommel have cast renewed doubts on the ability of the Allies to win the war. Such speculations undoubtedly deter many Nationalist politicians from committing themselves by coming into the open as supporters of the British.

The possibility of a food shortage is still being exploited to the full as anti-British and disruptive propaganda by Axis-inspired sources.

2. *Syria: Damascus.*

The President of the Republic continues to evince in private signs of his anxiety over the political situation and to seek for reassurances of British support. It is probable also that he fears the recrudescence of political activity

in Syria will fortify the Iraq Government in its decision to withhold recognition. In an endeavour to consolidate his constitutional position in the eyes of the country, he is having all the Deputies of the last Chamber canvassed with a view to their signing a document stating that they are in favour of the present Government.

The Syrian Government is making approaches to the Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia with the object of effecting the exchange of diplomatic representatives. It is the Foreign Minister's intention, once the Egyptian Government have recognised the independence of the Lebanon, that the Syrian representative in Cairo should represent both Levant States.

The Free French authorities have been sounding leading Syrian personalities with the idea, purporting to originate from General de Gaulle, that they should organise financial help by the Syrians for the Free French cause. Not surprisingly, they have received the same rebuff as a recent similar move on their part in the Lebanon met with: that is, they have been referred to the Governments they have set up.

The wheat situation in Damascus during the week has been easier, with bread sold to the poor and middle classes at reduced prices under the revised scheme.

3. Aleppo.

The Nationalists have been encouraged by the accession to power of Nahas Pasha in Egypt and are putting about a rumour that in Syria, too, the policy will soon be tried of giving office to those hitherto classed as extremists. Saadallah Jabri has apparently been repeating the earlier report that Jamil Mardam, with the approval of Hashem Atassi, is likely to become Syrian Premier in the near future. As a result of these hopes it is probable, despite the unfavourable war news, that the Nationalists are keener to work with the Allies than at any time since the occupation.

M. Fauquenot, the *député*, on his return from a visit to Damascus, spoke of a new effort to end Aleppo's separation from the Government, but no suitable man has yet agreed to join Sheikh Taj-ed-Din. Even when anxious to co-operate, few politicians from Aleppo have shown up effectively among the more practised Damascenes.

The bank's restriction of credit has had the effect of checking the rise in prices other than wheat. The leading local banker declares that the bazaars can stand the mild crisis caused by this restriction and that no failures of importance are likely in view of the large profits that have so far been made during the war.

The more stringent mobilisation orders in Turkey are causing a number of Turkish subjects—especially Christians and Kurds—to try and cross into Syria to avoid being called up. It is reported that the matter is being adequately handled by the French S.S. officers on the frontier and that most of the men are being returned.

Frontier co-operation in general remains fairly good, but outstanding questions are the return of an alleged murderer to Turkey and the expropriation of Syrian property by the Turks in the Hatay. The first has been agreed to in principle by the French, and the second is the subject of discussion between the *député* and the Turkish Consul, who appear to work satisfactorily together.

4. Homs and Hama.

The most interesting development of the week has been the reaction of the Nationalists to the Egyptian situation. Renewed activity is supported by the hope that a similar change may be brought about in Syria. Hashem Atassi has sent a telegram of congratulation to the Wafdists.

Allied reverses in Lybia and the Far East, the cost of living and the strong feeling that military operations will take place in Syria in the spring combine to produce a tenseness in the political atmosphere.

In Hama there are signs that on the slightest provocation trouble will be engineered by the Moslem leaders against the recently appointed Christian *Mohafez*. The principal clans are each striving to get control of the municipality through the appointment of their candidate as President.

At the time of writing, riots in Homs and Hama are signalled with one death. The cause is said to be the purchases of wheat by Aleppo merchants at £S. 400 a ton.

Sections of the S'ba and Turki are reported to be trying to obtain grants of land from which they can derive a stable revenue. There seems to be an increasing tendency among the local tribes to become, in part at least, semi-sedentary.

5. Jezireh.

A clash occurred on 13th February between the Wulda and the Fed'an of Sheikh Mujhem-ibn-Muhaid in the vicinity of Meskenah. Details are not yet known of this breach of the truce between the two tribes, which was agreed to pending a meeting arranged for next month. The incident points again to the importance of not allowing raids to go unsettled. Troops have been despatched by the French authorities to prevent further fighting, and the latest news is that the outbreak is under control.

Except for this clash and a case of sheep-looting by the Sabkha, the situation is generally quiet throughout this difficult area of well-armed tribes, with their welter of blood feuds and their permanent desire to make war on their neighbours. In Jezireh independence without force is a chimera. Local levies and other forces are rated at their real value. But it is generally recognised that at any moment British troops, who form the bulwark of the present order, can be called into action to help suppress disorders.

During the week a company of the Foreign Legion from Aleppo toured portions of the Euphrates Valley with the object of showing the flag. The new French commander at Kameshlie is showing himself anxious to co-operate to the fullest extent with the British forces, and arrangements have been made for mixed British and French patrols to move about the countryside.

Confusion has arisen between Syrian and French high authorities over developments at Rakka, referred to in last week's Summary. Owing to the inordinate procrastination of the Syrian Government in sanctioning the fines resulting from the pillaging in July, the *député* adjoint referred the matter to General Catroux, who has issued orders, on security grounds, for an alternative set of fines to be collected immediately.

After many delays, credits have been received from Damascus for the purchase of seed totalling £S. 160,000, and frantic last-minute efforts are being made to take advantage of the loans, although the time for sowing wheat is practically over.

6. Alaouite Territory.

The political mosaic is taking the form of that which came into being after the 1936 Constitution, the main difference being that, whereas in 1936 the Alaouite leaders were almost unanimous in support of full political union with Syria, they are now, having tasted thereof, far less enthusiastic. The situation which is developing is that the French and the Alaouites find themselves once again the only friend the other has, and by virtue of their like feeling of distrust draw closer to one another. In the opinion of some good local observers, the French are beginning to play their old game of encouraging Alaouite aspirations towards autonomy.

7. Jebel Druze.

There are no new political developments to report, but the general atmosphere suggests that the new Syrian freedom has increased pan-Arab feeling in the Jebel. In particular, the Jewish question is a foremost topic of discussion among the Druze *intelligentsia*. Public interest is also concentrated on the rising cost of living, and it is perhaps unfortunate that no Government work, such as that in the Hauran, is taking place in the Jebel.

8. Tribal.

The Contrôle Bedouin estimate that the losses of live-stock among the Bedouin consequent upon the intense cold in the early part of the winter were most severe among the S'ba and the Fed'an, amounting overall to 50 per cent. or more, against 15-20 per cent. in normal years. The Roualla tribes were more fortunate in that they had started their winter migration about a month before the other large bedu groups, so that when the cold weather overtook them they had already reached their southern pastures.

9. Lebanon: Beirut.

On 14th February about sixty members of the Constitutional party visited the Maronite Patriarch in order to encourage him in his attitude of resistance to the present régime in the Lebanon and to constitute a solid front to work for the implementation of Lebanese independence. The Patriarch appears to have been flattered by the visit and showed his intention of maintaining the struggle for a truly independent Lebanon. The party agreed to form a working committee, the composition of which has not yet been decided.

While certain influential leaders like Riad-es-Solh and Musa Nammur continue to stand apart from this opposition *bloc*, chiefly through objection to the personality of Béchara-el-Khoury, who dominates it, there can be no doubt that this party represents the feelings of the great majority of thinking Lebanese, who are disgusted by the failure of the present Lebanese Government to obtain from the Free French any concessions to their independent State.

The Lebanese Government itself is beginning to show signs of disintegration, at least one prominent member of it having expressed the desire to resign. The incompetence and lack of character of most of its members has never been in doubt, and since its formation the Ministry has achieved nothing and has spent its time in bickering about trifles. Meanwhile, the Délégation générale have still produced no proposals for handing over to it even those internal powers which have no relation to the war effort, and the French délégué and conseillers continue, as in the past, to interfere in every administrative detail. M. Naccache, whose weakness is widely criticised, has made no attempt to protest against this state of affairs.

The news of the fall of Singapore, although generally expected, has caused depression amongst the volatile population, who are, however, more concerned with the possibility of a further advance in Libya and a German attack on Turkey.

10. Wheat.

The revised scheme, referred to in previous summaries, is now in operation. Controlled quantities of imported wheat are being distributed by the Ravitaillement Departments of the two States, under the supervision of the economic officers of the Spears Mission.

The price of free domestic wheat is quoted around £S. 400 in Damascus and Lebanon, rather lower in Aleppo, with a tendency to rise, but there is little buying being done. Measures to deal with profiteering, hoarding and price control have been framed by the Commission supérieure du Ravitaillement, and will pass to the States Governments for ratification and promulgation next week.

11. Gold.

Towards the end of January the price of gold in Syria and the Lebanon, which had hovered about £S. 32 to the sovereign for some time, suddenly rose to £S. 36, at which figure it has remained since. The cause of this rise was the sudden jump in the price of gold in Turkey, for reasons which are not clear. The Turkish price is said at present to be about the equivalent of £S. 47.

This sudden move has, as far as one can ascertain, led to the following operations: Gold is bought in Syria and smuggled into Turkey, largely, it is reported, through Kameshlie. It is sold in Turkey and the proceeds of the sale in Turkish paper pounds are smuggled back to Syria, where they are sold on the black market. The principal buyers of the paper money are believed to be the sheep dealers of Northern Syria, who use the Turkish pounds which they have acquired at relatively cheap rates to buy sheep in Turkey and smuggle them into this country.

This movement of gold towards Turkey appears to have assumed quite considerable proportions, and it is rather surprising that the price of Turkish paper pounds in Syria, though it has fallen, should not have fallen further. The only explanation can be that the demand on the part of the sheep dealers is in its turn very heavy too.

12. Press and Propaganda.

The papers have been almost entirely filled with news of the war, the main topic of comment being the much-discussed possibility of Russia having the power to meet a large-scale German offensive in the spring.

The inauguration of Radio Damascus was the subject of large head-lines in the press together with photographs of Generals Catroux and Collet and reports of the speeches that were made at the opening ceremony.

The battles of Singapore and the Straits of Dover have given enemy Arabic broadcasters a great opportunity to extol the military might of the Axis. The enemy was particularly gleeful over the Singapore situation, and recited with relish lists of sums said to have been laid out for the fortification of the island. In consequence, Arab affairs were hardly referred to, but the organ of the "Free Arabs" faithfully thumped out its old familiar strain—"Jewish Menace"—without, however, adding any new variations.

[E 1369/207/89]

No. 15.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office, March 11.)

(No. 680. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 26, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. General.

THE past week has witnessed a marked deterioration of the political situation in Syria as a result of politico-economic repercussions. The *malaise* which had been developing with the news of Allied reverses, and the stirring of renewed political activity in the country, became a semi-panic at Damascus and elsewhere in the provinces, centring around anxiety over the supply of wheat.

Faced with this sudden threat to its stability, the Government has applied to the British *deus ex machina* in the hope that substantially increased quantities of wheat will be made available. A closing in the ranks of the Ministers is also apparent, with a strengthening of the feeling among them that their position will not be tenable much longer unless the French concede some, if not all, of the changes required, in their opinion, to implement the promises of independence.

In contrast, the general situation in the Lebanon is quiet, although there are signs of possible political developments which are referred to later in the summary.

To summarise the economic situation briefly:—

The majority of the population has undoubtedly benefited by the British occupation. Unemployment no longer exists among the labouring classes, who are receiving higher wages than ever before and for whom cheap bread has been made available in the large towns. The agricultural population—and Syria is mainly an agricultural country—is assured of good markets. The trading community has reaped handsome profits, although the volume of goods is somewhat curtailed. On the other hand, the employee classes, whether Government or commercial, which form the majority of the politically conscious, find that their wages have not kept pace with the rise in the cost of living and are feeling the pinch severely.

There is no real shortage of wheat in the country, or of other staple food-stuffs, with the exception of some imported products. It is, however, the fear of shortage, coupled with the practised propensities of the population to speculate or hoard, that have caused the economic complications which are proving so embarrassing at the present time.

There is no doubt that the situation has been taken advantage of by political agitators and enemies of the present Government in Syria to spread dissatisfaction. But real evidence is lacking that any organised attempt has yet been made by the politicians of the Nationalist *bloc* to turn popular unrest into a means of overthrowing the Government. The Nationalists are, rather, waiting for a lead, and expectations are centred on the imminent return of Shukri Quwatli to Damascus. The reforming of the Nationalist front to oppose the present Government would appear to depend, in the first instance, on the line Shukri Quwatli has decided to take.

His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to the Lebanese and Syrian Governments asking that Mr. Hamilton should be recognised as chargé d'affaires pending the arrival of the Minister Designate, and suitable replies have been sent to Mr. Eden.

Bad weather has prevailed over the coast and hinterland, so that the main Beirut-Damascus and Damascus-Homs roads have been closed for three days at a time.

2. Syria: Damascus.

Although the normal purchases of bread at Damascus are assured under the new wheat scheme until the end of March at reasonable prices, fears of what may happen later, coupled with rumours of shortages in Aleppo, Homs and the Jezira, have bred a feeling of uncertainty amounting to panic. The situation has been aggravated by the inhabitants of the surrounding villages coming into Damascus to seek cheap bread. The result has been that the open market price for wheat has risen to as much as £S. 450 a ton. This in its turn has caused many families who normally mill their own bread to abandon this custom and try to buy bread in the shops. Thus bread queues are now a common sight, which further tends to breed alarm. A partial strike of shops took place on

21st February, and there were some disturbances by students, though these came to an end the next day.

During the week there has been marked political activity, especially among the Nationalists. Jamil Mardam is attempting to reunite the leaders of the old Nationalist bloc with a view to overthrowing the present Government. He argues that Sheikh Taj's régime is unconstitutional, and that recourse must either be had to recalling the 1936 Chamber or to new elections. In this view he claims he has the support of Nuri Said and of the British, who have given proof of their preference for "Nationalist" parties in Egypt. His efforts appear to have achieved a measure of success as certain "Moderates" are reported to have joined him.

There is expectancy over Shukri Quwatli's return and a demonstration of welcome is being prepared. General Catroux has enquired whether any steps can be taken to delay his return to the capital for the time being, and it is hoped this can be arranged.

It is interesting to note that Jamil Mardam appears ready to resume office, and that he deems it necessary to claim British protection. In September last many of the Nationalists were not so sure of Allied victory as to be ready to place themselves under the British ægis.

The President continues to seek support within the country, and has convoked the principal schoolmasters with a view to their preventing student strikes. In his capacity of Moslem sheikh he is reported to have approached various imams and ulemas seeking to persuade them to preach sermons in his favour.

General Collet, in his private talks with the political officer, has shown a characteristically realistic attitude to present problems. He appreciates the need to cease imports of wheat, but is doubtful whether in the existing hyper-excited state of public opinion sufficient grain will be forthcoming even if powers of requisition are resumed. Nevertheless, he is of the opinion that, if bread is reasonably cheap and assured, the Nationalists will be unable to create trouble designed to dislodge the present Government. He himself views the Nationalists with great suspicion, and considers their past record of anti-Allied conduct such as to cast great doubts on their present promises of friendship.

3. Aleppo.

Various events, both foreign and domestic, have contributed to public anxiety. The price of wheat has risen from £S. 340 to over £S. 400 a ton, and there have been small demonstrations and a mild panic at the time of the loss of Singapore. However, demonstrators were persuaded to disperse without any trouble arising and the shops have reopened. The situation remains rather tense, and annoyance is widely expressed over the better treatment given to the Damascenes, as evidenced by their much larger distribution of bread.

With regard to the prices of other commodities, the bank's restriction on credit has prevented a further general rise. Indeed, there has been talk of price reductions owing to nervousness about the immediate future of the Northern Area. Only one bankruptcy of any size has so far taken place.

Apart from inevitable digs at the unpopular administration, it is not thought that local politicians have tried to add to present difficulties. The délégué has put forward names of possible supporters of Sheikh Taj, but none of them is apparently prepared to help just now.

4. Homs and Hama.

On 17th February the bazaars in Homs and Hama were closed, also the schools, and demonstrations were held outside the serails. In Homs a Senegalese battalion was called out and the crowd dispersed, but at a later demonstration shots were fired on both sides, and one civilian was killed and two wounded. The shops remained closed for several days in both towns and minor demonstrations took place.

Here, as elsewhere, the original protests, it seems, were directed against the rich merchants and hoarders in the towns and the failure of the Government to take effective action—not against the Allies—but the demonstrations threatened increasingly to take on political colour, and there are indications that they were used with advantage by Axis sympathisers.

5. Jezireh.

It is reported that the tribal conference begun at Deir-ez-Zor on 15th February to settle past disputes between the Shammari and Jubur tribes was successfully concluded. Detailed reports are lacking from this region owing to the interruption of communications caused by bad weather.

6. Alaouite and Jebel Druze.

No events of political importance are reported during the week from either of these areas.

7. Lebanon; Beirut.

Political activity has been considerably greater in the Lebanon during the past week. The causes are various: dislike of the supine attitude of the President and his Administration, particularly his Prime Minister; disappointment at the lack of tangible proof of Lebanese independence and consequent increased suspicion of French good faith; growing desire for office on the part of politicians as yet denied it; repercussions of the advent to power of Nahas Pasha and the report of forthcoming elections in Egypt; dissatisfaction at recent changes in the personnel of the administration and at the working of the Ravitaillement.

The Constitutional party is busily engaged in extending its contacts, especially in Moslem circles, with a view to turning this situation to the advantage of its members. The party is at present advocating elections, on the grounds that only thus can a constitutional Government, truly representative of the people, be formed. The project is, however, far from obtaining general support amongst a population which still retains vivid memories of the corruption and ineffectiveness of past Chambers and the Governments elected by them.

The Najjadé party are also active. Their leader, Jamil Mikkawi, visited Ahmed Daouk on 20th February and asked him to resign on the grounds that he was not properly defending Moslem rights. He refused, and the leader left breathing fire and slaughter, which have not, so far, eventuated.

There are signs that the Free French themselves realise that the Government as at present constituted cannot remain in office much longer, and M. David, their delegate for the Lebanon, made a significant approach on 21st February to Salim Takla, the ablest member of the Constitutional party; but his appeals for their co-operation with the Free French were flatly refused.

M. Naccache himself seems unwilling to recognise the lack of stability of his own and his Government's position, and in an interview with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on 21st February showed a complacency unshared by most Lebanese regarding his relations with the French and the march of affairs generally. Possibly as a result of a hint he received on that occasion, he has now agreed to his Minister for Foreign Affairs approaching the Syrian Government with a view to the presentation to General Catroux of a joint Syro-Lebanese note asking for the handing over of the "intérêts communs," the point on which feeling is strongest.

Apart from the professional political class, the population show only lukewarm interest in the possibility of changes in the Lebanese political kaleidoscope, rather more interest in seeing some signs of their independence, and active interest in the cost of living. The constant increase in the latter is a source of irritation, but its effects are mitigated by the good money being earned throughout the Lebanon by the employment afforded in railway and defence works construction, and the situation on this head is much less serious in the Lebanon than in Syria. There was, however, some trouble in Tripoli due to a maladjustment in the method of wheat distribution to the poorer classes.

Arms collecting in the North Lebanon by the Free French authorities has continued without incident, though the number of arms collected is small.

8. Press and Propaganda.

The fast-moving events of the war in the Far East have monopolised the press for the past week, though, owing to the reverses suffered by the Allies, news has been almost entirely confined to Reuters and A.F.I. despatches. The fall of Singapore has been greatly deplored, and several articles have been devoted to praise of the Chinese, whose efforts in resisting the powerful Japanese war machine can now be appreciated. Another useful article attacked the profanation of mosques by the Germans in Libya.

It has not infrequently happened that articles appearing in the French and English press, speculating on the enemy's plans of attack, have had the effect of increasing the already nervous state of public opinion. Such a case occurred during the week in the Syrian edition of the *Palestine Post*. The article stated that the Germans will be very considerably reducing their armies on the Russian front in the spring, that they will leave the defence of that front largely to the Roumanians and Hungarians, and that an invasion of Britain, coupled with an attack on Turkey and eventually Syria, will be timed for the beginning of March.

The fact that such an article should be allowed to be published has been taken up with higher authority.

Local affairs centred mainly on economic matters, in which respect it may be noted that the press is making even louder appeals for action to be taken against speculators in essential food-stuffs. An Arabic paper urged that the death penalty be inflicted on particularly unscrupulous profiteers.

The enemy's broadcast propaganda dealt in great detail with the fall of Singapore, which was said to have had a shattering effect on British morale. A leaf appears to have been borrowed from Moscow's book, as alleged statements by Imperial prisoners in Libya are now frequent. Their revelations purport to show the breaking of morale among British troops and the growing disaffection of Australians and Indians. Great play has been made with the theme that a Syro-Lebanese army is to be conscripted to fight for the Allies, the latest and most startling supposition being that these troops are to be sent to the front in Southern Russia.

[E 1788/206/89]

No. 16.

Office of the Minister of State to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)

THE Secretary to the Minister of State presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, and is directed to transmit herewith a copy of a report of a talk between Mr. Hamilton and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Syrian Government.

Cairo, January 22, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Mr. Hamilton to the Minister of State (Cairo).

*Headquarters, Spears Mission,
Syria and the Lebanon,
January 16, 1942.*

Dear Minister of State,

I HAD a long talk yesterday with Faiz Bey El Khouri, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Syrian Government, at Damascus. The conversation ranged over a number of subjects and the general political situation prevailing inside the Ministry, which was one of tension, due to disputes between the President and the Prime Minister. I have already reported on these in my letter of the 12th January, enclosing a report by Colonel Gardener.

In reviewing the situation, the Foreign Minister said, and asked me to note it, that the Syrian Government, whilst prepared to collaborate with the Free French and ourselves during the war, were determined not to bind themselves to the French, whether Free or otherwise, in any way for the future. They would thus not discuss the possibility of a treaty now or at a later date with the Free French authorities. They had had twenty years' experience of French administration, and they were determined that, whatever ally they sought (and they realised that they could not stand alone without an ally), it would not be the French.

As regards their feelings towards Germany, they had seen, he said, how she treated occupied countries, and they had no wish to come under her influence. They would much prefer to be under a mandate of Great Britain rather than have "independence" at the hands of the Germans.

Yours sincerely,

J. A. DE C. HAMILTON.

[E 1564/207/89]

No. 17.

*General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office,
March 23.)*

(No. 692. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, March 5, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. General.

ALTHOUGH there have been no new developments of importance during the week, the political situation in Syria remains very unsettled. Public uneasiness over the course of the war, renewed activity among Nationalist politicians, doubts and indecision on the part of the Government, anxiety over the supply of wheat—these continue to be the dominant symptoms.

In Damascus, and in the provinces, things have been somewhat quieter. However, much political activity is going on behind the scenes, without, as yet, any apparent crystallisation. At the instigation of the Free French authorities, certain agitators who were ring-leaders in the recent strikes have been arrested.

Following conversations with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, General Catroux is examining what concessions of form to Syrian independence can be granted in order to strengthen the hand of the present Government. On the other hand, he maintains that a major contributory cause of the present unsatisfactory political situation is the current belief that the British are prepared to regard the Nationalists with a favourable eye, a belief that gains colour from the frequent contacts which, he alleges, take place between politicians of all parties and British officers. He is very insistent that steps should be taken to show the Nationalists that the British are at one with the Free French in supporting the present Government and possible methods of doing so are being examined.

As a result of a suggestion made to him in Bagdad, Shukri Quwatli has postponed his arrival for a week. The Free French feel strongly that his return to Damascus at the present juncture would be bound to give rise to serious demonstrations, with consequent repercussions on the delicate political situation. The wisdom of further delaying his return is now being discussed.

2. Economic.

Supplies of wheat under the revised scheme are going into consumption as intended, through the Ravitaillement organisations in the major towns. Some movements of private stocks are noted, for example into Aleppo, although very little wheat is coming on the market, as sellers' ideas of prices remain around £S. 400 a ton and upwards.

The Free French have agreed to consider British proposals for extracting wheat from hoarders with a view to providing the necessary extra supplies for controlled distribution to tide over the interval before the next harvest begins to come on the market. Possibilities of financial assistance to help the Government to purchase wheat are also being examined. Any such assistance would be conditioned on the enactment of necessary legislation designed to facilitate requisition and discourage hoarding, also on increased taxation to divert a part of the income now available for buying goods.

With the object of checking speculation in commodities, which had reached unsound proportions and was causing prices to boom, the banks readily accepted the suggestion that they should adopt a policy of credit restriction. It was agreed that as far as possible bills would only be discounted for genuine business, such as from importer to merchant or merchant to retailer, but not between merchants. Accordingly, a reduction of bank credit was begun towards the end of January, and it is satisfactory to note that it has already considerably embarrassed speculators, thereby inducing an appreciable fall in the price of the principal commodity concerned—cotton piece-goods.

One of the first steps of the Syrian Government when it came into power was to issue a decree sanctioning a general increase of rents. As a result, much popular feeling has been aroused in many parts of the country and deputations and counter-deputations have visited the President. At last the Government, yielding to popular clamour, have modified the law to the general satisfaction of tenants and so put an end to the general agitation on this score.

3. Syria: Damascus.

There is no change to report in the bread situation. Distribution of 100 tons a day, half to the poor at specially reduced prices and half in the form of

"middle class" bread, continues. There have been no further strikes, but anxiety is still general over future supplies.

General Catroux, alarmed at the situation in the capital and determined to investigate the specific charges of corruption preferred by Jamil Mardam against the Government, spent several days in Damascus. The conclusion he arrived at, expressed to the Political Officer, was that the accession to power of a Nationalist Government at the present time would constitute a danger to the Allied cause and that the best policy was to support the present régime energetically despite its shortcomings—a decision which is likely to gratify General Collet, who has until now been uncertain of his chief's attitude.

General Catroux further stated that he was satisfied that the charges against Taj-ed-Din were false, also the stories of renewed dissension between him and the Prime Minister.

For some time past the Damascus press has been attacking the Government for its failure to solve the bread and other economic problems. General Collet, considering this a Nationalist stratagem, convened all the journalists and explained to them that such attacks on the Government were really attacks on the Allies, who had made themselves responsible for the supply of wheat. Grain was plentiful in Syria and the apparent shortage, coupled with the high prices, was due to the Syrians themselves, whereas the Allies had made great sacrifices to bring in wheat. At the end of the meeting a note was distributed to the press which stressed the complete unity of the Allies and warned agitators and "certain politicians" that trouble-makers would be interned.

General Collet has expressed privately to our Political Officer his conviction that the present agitation is being directly exploited by the Germans. He would not go so far as to say that all the Nationalist leaders were in Axis pay, but, wittingly or unwittingly, they were profiting by the agitation. Once the wheat problem was solved, he went on, the Syrians would have no excuse whatever for agitation. If, however, strikes persisted, he could only conclude that Axis-inspired influences are at work and he would be obliged to arrest agitators, not only in Damascus, but throughout Syria.

4. Aleppo.

The wheat problem remains acute, with prices nominally about £S.400 a ton. Some 25 per cent. of the population are living on the 20 tons of cheap wheat provided under the wheat scheme daily. Most of the rest are living on their household stocks laid down, as is the custom, each summer. The few, who are without stocks and who are not classed as poor, are feeling the pinch; but there is little actual hardship and no disturbances took place during the week.

More activity of a political nature is reported than of recent months. In particular, the return of Shukri Quwatli is eagerly awaited. Efforts are being made to unite the Nationalist factions centred round the Jabris with the less extreme friends of Dr. Hassan Fouad, but an early end of their differences seems unlikely.

It is becoming apparent that there exists a considerable Communist organisation in the northern area, with ramifications throughout the villages. The members proclaim that their first aim is to fight against nazism, and there was a meeting of Communist sympathisers on 25th February in support of the struggle against the Axis Powers.

Along the Turkish frontier no fresh troubles have been reported. After many delays a first-degree frontier commission for the Azaz area was arranged and the French S.S. officers visited the Turkish Kaimakam to settle some outstanding questions.

5. Homs and Hama.

A great intensification of Nationalist activity is reported, together with an increase in pro-Axis talk and rumour. The imminent return of Shukri Quwatli from pilgrimage has aroused general expectations. A large sum is said to have been collected to finance demonstrations in the capital. Many private political meetings have been held, at which the understanding was apparently general that the British were in favour of a change in government, even at the expense of sacrificing the Free French. Some Nationalists have also been trying to get signatures among the Bedu Sheikhs to a petition demanding elections.

Among a shoal of rumours, the following best illustrate the atmosphere of these towns: General Catroux is to be replaced by a British High Commissioner; the Free French forces refused to fight in Libya and for this reason the British have ceased to give them funds, so that they are demanding £S.2 million from the Syrian Government; the British have discovered the corruption existing in

the Sûreté Générale and have arrested the chief officials; that Mr. Churchill has brought General de Gaulle before a military tribunal because it was discovered that the general was making arrangements to meet Marshal Pétain.

Although chronic unrest and disquiet are bound to recur, given the traditionally unruly and xenophobic temper of Homs and Hama, so long as the German threat hangs over Syria, the present effervescence is nevertheless disquieting.

Prices continue to rise. Wheat now costs approximately £S.470 a ton, and there have been many deputations to the Political Officer. There are indications that the unrest resulting from the high cost of living is being taken advantage of by anti-Allied propagandists.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The tribal conference which began at Deir-ez-Zor on 15th February succeeded, after six days of disputation, in settling the outstanding differences between the Shammar (Faddagha) of Iraq and the Jabour of Syria. Hostilities between these two tribes extending over several years are thus brought to an end, with the wiping off on both sides of all claims, a financial payment by the Shammar and bonds from the leading sheikhs that the peace will be kept.

At the time of the Mosul Conference over the Shammar of Iraq and Agaidat differences there was some doubt whether the settlement on the basis of "dig and bury" would hold, because of the rivalries between the leading Agaidat sheikhs. The recalcitrant sheikhs have now put their seals on the Mosul terms and there are thus grounds for expecting that these two important tribes will remain at peace for the time being.

The conference to settle the feud between the Feda'an and Wulda was resumed in Aleppo on 1st March. In the opinion of tribal experts—British, French and of the contestants themselves—the old basis of a commission of Syrian officials and notables would never be successful. It is now reported that, in fact, the court proved unworkable and was dissolved. Matters will accordingly be handled on Bedouin lines by tribal arbiters, which is the only method that promises to heal this deep-seated trouble. Meanwhile, the two tribes remain standing to arms, with French patrols preventing further clashes.

7. Alaouite Territory.

There are no political events of importance to record.

Unlike most of the rest of Syria, in this territory, even in peace-time, the peasantry do not produce enough food for their own needs, their crops consisting largely of tobacco and other exported produce. The population is numerous, backward and well armed. It is the more important therefore that there should not be a failure in supply. It is satisfactory to note that a new Ravitaillement organisation has been built up by the local administration and will start to function in the near future. Special measures have also been taken to see that wheat is available as and when required.

8. Jebel Druze.

Things have been quiet in the Jebel. A further movement is reported of Druzes, including a member of the Atrash family, to return to cultivate lands alleged to belong to them that are now in Transjordan. After enquiry, our Political Officer reports that agricultural experts consider the lands impossible to cultivate and that, therefore, no sanction for entry will be granted.

9. Lebanon.

There is a growing feeling of political malaise in the Lebanon. The causes are numerous and vary between the different communities, but certain fundamental anxieties are common to all.

In the first place, there is widespread disappointment at the lack of tangible signs of Lebanese independence and a conviction that the Free French authorities have no intention of abating any of their mandatory control. Secondly, there is a universal feeling that the present Lebanese Government are incapable of protecting Lebanese rights, and are wholly ineffective in all ways.

The position of the Lebanese Government is growing steadily weaker, and three of its Ministers are now contemplating resignation, including Hamid Bey Frangié, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These Ministers are thoroughly dissatisfied with the attitude of the President, whose attempts to keep all powers in his own hands preclude any proper administrative action. Like most of the population, moreover, they resent the failure of the French to hand over increased powers to the Government, and consider that stronger action than the President

is prepared to agree to should be taken to this end. In this view they are at one with the Opposition leaders.

Hamid Bey Frangé went to Damascus on the 26th February in order to try and induce the Syrian Government to co-operate with him in a joint demand to the Free French to hand over the "intérêts communs," but found the Syrian Government preoccupied with internal problems, and returned without broaching the project.

There has been some disorder in the Tripoli region as a protest against deficiencies in the arrangements for distributing rationed flour and the cost of living generally. Political agitators profited from public discontent to intrigue against the Government and Abdul Hamid Kerami, the influential separatist leader, has expressed the intention of appealing to the British authorities to intervene in the political sphere in order to change or modify the present Government.

The Moslem elements are particularly discontented on account of the failure of Ahmed Bey Daouk, the negligible Prime Minister, to protect Moslem interests, the influence which they allege the Jesuits possess over the President, and the unequal share of administrative posts held by Moslems. They are, however, disunited amongst themselves, and in some respects have totally different aims from the Constitutional party.

A public subscription opened in the Lebanon by the Free French authorities for the Free French "bons d'armement" has met with a complete lack of response, most of the subscriptions so far collected having been from French banks and companies, Lebanese contributors failing to respond.

Arms collection in the Tripoli area by the Free French is meeting with increasing resistance, and the methods employed of billeting troops on villages have led to a protest by three Lebanese Ministers to General Catroux.

10. Press and Propaganda.

There has been no marked press comment on the war, owing to the rather uneventful week as compared with previous momentous events. The most useful article was a description of Britain's steadfast resistance when she stood alone against the Axis, the conclusion being that with her powerful Allies she can now never be defeated. Saudi Arabia's break with Italy was greeted with joy by all the press, which hailed the rupture as a sign of the solidarity of Arab countries against the Axis.

Great satisfaction has been shown by the Syrian press at the final settlement of the rents question, which, according to one paper, "came as a pleasant surprise." Appeals, direct and indirect, for the settlement of the supplies question, and for suitable punishment of hoarders and profiteers, continue to be the order of the day.

The enemy's broadcast propaganda has been mainly on the old familiar lines—Jews, British oppression and treachery, and promises of the ultimate "liberation" of Arab countries. As might have been expected, the attempt on von Papen's life raised a storm of protest, mainly against the British, though Soviet Russia also came in for a share of blame.

[E 1733/207/89]

No. 18.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office, March 26.)

(No. 719. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, March 12, 1942.

1. General.

IN Syria the gathering politico-economic troubles described in recent summaries have not yet come to a head. Tension and uncertainty, however, continue to dominate the political atmosphere, although there are recently some signs of a momentary relaxation. In spite of internal dissension and lack of popular appeal, the Government is carrying on, and has even succeeded in winning certain concessions from the Free French. There are no indications yet that the politicians of the Nationalist *bloc* have sunk their differences and agreed on a concerted bid for political power in the immediate future.

The show of Allied firmness marked by the arrest of nine agitators in Damascus (five others could not be found) and General Collet's recent warning

to trouble-makers through the press, as also the arrival of New Zealand troops in Damascus, had as its immediate effect to sober the less responsible political elements. No disturbances took place in Damascus or the provinces. It is reported, however, from different parts of the country that the Nationalists, in general, are strongly resentful at the arrests, which included two lawyers. They are said to blame the French alone, despite the fact that the arrests were carried out jointly by the Free French and British authorities, and are thus avoiding attacks on the Allies on this score. But it is rumoured in Beirut that they are considering the organisation of a general strike in Damascus by way of protest. Rumours are still prevalent that the British are going to back a Nationalist return to power, on the lines of the Wafd's accession in Egypt.

Yielding to strong British pressure, General Catroux has reluctantly agreed that Shukri Quwatli should be allowed back into Syria without restraint and unconditionally. The Free French authorities retain their fear that his return will be made the occasion for serious demonstrations, which may be the signal for a countrywide attack on Sheikh Taj's Government; and General Catroux has indicated his determination to take action against Shukri Quwatli if he makes trouble after his return.

The food supply situation continues to give rise to general anxiety, although the poor in the main centres of population are receiving cheap bread or flour under the wheat scheme. Merchants' stocks of wheat remain off the market and prices are soaring in the neighbourhood of £S.450-500 a ton. Middle-class household stocks are beginning to run low and real hardship is growing, particularly in villages which are not wheat-producing and where distribution to the poor does not reach. On the other hand, signs are not lacking that a movement of wheat, especially from the Jezireh, to the centres of consumption is beginning. Again, it will not be long before early crops and spring vegetables arrive to supplement the people's diet.

Practical British proposals for dealing with wheat supplies during the period until July, as well as a concrete scheme for handling 1942's crop, have been put forward to the Free French and are now receiving urgent examination by the Comité supérieur du Ravitaillement, composed of British, French, Syrian and Lebanese representatives.

2. Syria: Damascus.

Great anxiety is still felt in Damascus over the wheat situation. Bread queues start forming at 3 A.M. and in them the wildest rumours circulate. Sugar and rice are not to be found on the markets and the price of food-stuffs in general continues to rise. Apart from minor incidents, however, in neighbouring villages, there have been no disturbances.

During the week the Prime Minister, Hassan-el-Hakim, fulfilled his oft-repeated threat to resign. The main reasons he gave were the failure of the Free French to take steps to implement the grant of independence and the refusal of the President to make certain changes in the personnel of the Cabinet and the Ravitaillement Department which he considers necessary to ensure efficiency. An additional, unstated reason is undoubtedly the virtual usurpation by the President of the functions of the Prime Minister, both as regards the Cabinet and the public.

Upon the Prime Minister's resignation, which has throughout been kept private, General Catroux immediately visited Damascus. In the discussions which followed, the question of concessions by the Free French received its first real airing. To the issue of passports by the Syrian Government, which had already been agreed to, was added the handing over, in principle, of the country's police, including, subject to safeguards, the Sûreté. The ownership of the Hejaz Railway is to revert to Syria, subject to an examination of the historical legal status, though the administration will remain with the D.H.P. for the duration of the war. The questions of "intérêts communs," control of the customs, Bedouin control and the issue of decrees by the Délégation générale were also touched upon without, so far as is known, any progress being made.

These concessions put the Prime Minister in a much better frame of mind, so that he agreed to withdraw his resignation. On the subject of Ravitaillement, General Catroux assured him that a new tariff applicable to both Syria and the Lebanon was being prepared, and also a new scheme for the control of wheat supplies. These measures would be promulgated in the near future and would require the vigorous support of the Syrian Government. Changes in the personnel of the Administration will be discussed later in the month, when General Catroux visits Damascus for this purpose.

[24085]

It is interesting to note that General Collet has always expressed himself in favour of making concessions of a wide nature to the independent Syria. Die-hard elements in the Délégation générale, however, whether from conviction or the fear of losing their posts, have obstructed matters, and it remains to be seen whether they will again be successful in emasculating the measures envisaged.

Abdul Ghaffar Pasha el Atrash, Minister of Defence and member of the leading Druze family, died in Damascus on 9th March.

3. Aleppo.

News of the arrests in Damascus and fears of further possible developments have apparently frightened Nationalist elements. Saadullah Jabri cancelled an engagement on 6th March, evidently feeling that it was more prudent to keep out of the limelight for the time being. Though a slight to Shukri Quwatli would excite Damascus, it is doubtful whether it would arouse much resentment in Aleppo. Yet local Nationalists are certainly in a position to raise dangerous feelings against Sheikh Taj's Government should a suitable occasion arise.

The Ministers of Interior and Supply have been spending some days in the north studying the wheat question. They propose, on their return to Damascus, to press the Government for an immediate credit for the purchase of wheat that is said to be available in the Jezireh, to tide over essential requirements until the new crop is available. They are opposed to anything resembling the employment of force, because the Government, which is admittedly weak, is in any case faced with the necessity of imposing higher taxation, and because they consider a show of force now would decrease its chances of controlling the new crop. According to their plan, it is necessary to buy wheat at about £S. 350 a ton for resale at £S. 135 to the poor and at £S. 320 to others. These proposals, which resemble the path of least resistance, will receive consideration at the same time as others by the Comité supérieur du Ravitaillement.

The people remained quiet through the week in the knowledge that the Government was paying attention to the wheat problem. Patience was sorely tried, however, when the bread of the poor appeared one day as a dark green mess. Abnormal adulteration was doubtless a cause and an enquiry is proceeding. There were peaceful but insistent demonstrations in some of the northern villages. Contrary to the statement made in last week's Summary, a good deal of actual hardship is now reported among the population of Aleppo.

Popular discontent with the Mohafez, President of the Municipality and head of the Ravitaillement, continues. Two petitions containing several hundred signatures will shortly be addressed to General Spears, asking for the removal of these three officials.

4. Homs and Hama.

The arrests in Damascus and General Collet's declaration published in the press have had a calming effect on a public subjected to the violent propaganda of the previous weeks. The shadow of the concentration camp seems to have hushed the over-confident assertions of the more vocal Nationalists. Hashim Bey el Atassi made an indirect enquiry through the Political Officer as to whether the British were supporting the present Government, or were considering its replacement by a Nationalist one with a view to uniting Palestine, Transjordan and Syria. At a meeting of Nationalist notables in Homs, Hashim Bey later advised caution and moderation, as demonstrations against the present régime were likely to be treated as pro-Axis movement by the military authorities.

Rising prices and the increase in the lists of those classed as "poor" continue to be major local problems, and a number of petitions have been presented against the cost of living. Distribution of flour by the American Red Cross, in addition to that under the wheat scheme, has had a settling effect.

5. Alaouite Territory.

There are no events of political importance to record. For the purpose of ensuring better co-ordination, a security committee has been formed, consisting of the B.S.M. and F.S.S. officers, the Inspector of the S.S., the Free French naval officer-in-charge, the chief of the Sûreté at Latakia and the Political Officer.

6. Euphrates, Jezireh and Jebel Druze.

No events of importance have occurred and detailed reports have not been received from these areas.

7. Lebanon.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs visited His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on 3rd March and developed at length his reasons for wishing to resign. These included his dissatisfaction with the Free French authorities, notably as regards their failure to hand over additional powers to the Lebanese Government and their continued interference in the Lebanese administration; his disappointment at finding the Syrian Government unprepared to join with him in a demand for the cession of the "intérêts communs"; and his disappointment at the inactivity and spinelessness of the Lebanese President and his ministerial colleagues. He pressed for guidance as to what we should like him to do, but could only be advised to consult his President and to await the return of General Spears.

On 6th March the Délégation générale informed the Lebanese Government of their willingness to hand over to them certain services, including the issue of passports, the Diplomatic Bureau, Antiquities, the Gardes mobiles, and the Posts and Telegraphs. Although a step in the right direction, these concessions are regarded in Lebanese circles as quite inadequate.

The Opposition party have now formed a "Working Committee," containing members of all religious communities, which is engaged in drawing up a memorandum of its desiderata for presentation to General Spears on his return. The committee is considerably more representative of public opinion than the present Lebanese Government, though there have been squabbles over membership and, so far, influential Moslem support has not been enlisted to any great extent. Most of its members are more or less pledged to work for an extension of British interests, at the expense of France, in the Lebanon, but this is not, of course, stated publicly. In spite of disagreements, the Opposition party remains the most coherent political group in the Lebanon.

It is reported that the Free French Délégué has been sounding Opposition leaders, such as M. Takla, apparently with a view to a possible reconstruction of the Naccache Government, but without any success as yet.

The Lebanese Government have been most disturbed by the report that the cover for the Lebanese note issue is to be handed over to the recently constituted "Caisse centrale de la France Libre" in London, on the grounds that they were not consulted and do not wish to see their currency tied to the Free French.

The political excitement in Damascus has had some repercussions in Beirut. General Collet's press communiqué and the arrests of political agitators have aroused adverse comment and it is said that the French authorities, by mentioning British support for their action, are endeavouring to escape the unpopularity which their own actions have caused. Lebanese Moslems resent the implied branding of the Nationalist bloc as pro-Axis at a time when their leaders have been at pains to stress their pro-British sentiments.

Arms collecting in North Lebanon has ceased, to the general relief, but General Catroux is understood to be contemplating the issue of a general proclamation demanding the surrender of all arms before 31st March under the threat of heavy punishment.

Initial difficulties in the distribution of wheat to the poor seem to have been smoothed out and the situation in this respect has improved. The prices of certain other commodities also seem to have fallen, in some cases no doubt as a result of the limitation of bank credit; but the cost of living continues to be a burning question in most circles.

8. Press and Propaganda.

The press has been mainly devoted to economic matters, especially questions of supply. The Syrian press is urgent in its appeals for a rapid settlement of the food problem, and several papers have launched campaigns urging the public to take part in the battle against speculation and hoarding by reporting culprits to the competent authorities.

The Russian campaign continues to be the centre of attraction in war commentaries, while no particular remarks on political subjects are to be noted. No local opinion was given on the British bombing of Paris, though Reuters and A.F.I. despatches on the subject were given full prominence. The bombardment raised a storm of fury from the enemy's broadcast speakers, who usually described it as an attempt to bolster up British morale. Radio Bari, however, interpreted the event as a proof of the growing Bolshevik power of Sir Stafford Cripps.

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA.

(A) General.

[E 60/21/34]

No. 19.

(1)

M. Maisky to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 4.)

Sir,

Soviet Embassy, London, January 1, 1942.

IN answer to the memorandum⁽¹⁾ on the Kurd affair in Persia which you were good enough to deliver to M. Molotov in Moscow on the 20th December, I am instructed by my Government to transmit the enclosed memorandum.

Accept, &c.

J. MAISKY.

Enclosure in (1).

Memorandum.

IN reference to the memorandum concerning the anxiety of Turkey regarding events in Persian Kurdistan delivered by Mr. Eden on the 20th December, 1941, to M. Molotov in Moscow, the reply is as follows:—

The information on the intention of the Kurds to organise an independent State and on the raids by Kurds on Turkish territory has only become known to the Soviet authorities from this memorandum which is based on particulars given by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In this respect it is necessary to remark that in that part of Persian territory where there are Soviet troops no such incidents have occurred, and, generally, the Soviet authorities have no connexion with such acts or intentions of the Kurds. Nothing is known to the Soviet Government about trouble among the Kurds which, it is alleged, has been created as a result of assistance given to them by Soviet troops in Persia, as is mentioned in the British memorandum. The assertion contained in another Turkish memorandum, to which reference is made, that Soviet troops in Persia render assistance to the various groups of Kurds in fomenting trouble, is untrue. On the contrary, the Soviet troops take all the necessary measures to confiscate the arms held by the Kurds which trickle in to them from regions where no Soviet troops are stationed. Immediately after the arrival of Soviet troops in Northern Persia they did their utmost to prevent any conflicts breaking out between the Kurds and the Persians, and so far, in those parts of Persia where Soviet troops are stationed, no conflicts or disturbances have occurred among the Kurds.

It is necessary also to point out that the Persian Government has not expressed any dissatisfaction with the behaviour of Soviet troops *vis-à-vis* Kurds, and has not submitted any complaints to the Soviet Ambassador in Persia. In this connexion it can perhaps be mentioned that, according to information received from the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran, the Persian Prime Minister, Forugi, on the 11th December, 1941, in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador, stated to the British Minister at Tehran that the British are supposed to support the Kurds who in a number of districts were taking an unfriendly attitude towards the Persians. However, there is no further information to hand on this matter. Thus, the Turkish Government should have no reason for anxiety on account of this alleged encouragement of the Kurd population in Persia by the Soviet troops with a view to creating disturbances there and still less have they any reason in this connexion to send their troops to the Turco-Persian frontier. From the above it is clear that there is no cause for estrangement in the relations of the Soviet Government with Turkey.

With regard to the visit made by certain Kurd public men to Baku, this visit had no political significance and was of a purely cultural nature.

The assumption expressed by the British Minister, Sir R. W. Bullard, that Soviet policy in those parts of Persia where Soviet troops are stationed was

⁽¹⁾ See No. (2).

being carried out by organisations on which the Soviet Ambassador had very little influence, is without foundation.

All the considerations set out above could be transmitted to the Turkish Government if it would be necessary in order to dispel their anxiety, but it should be pointed out that so far neither the Turkish Government nor the Persian Government have ever made any *démarche* to the Soviet Government on the question raised in the memorandum submitted by Mr. Eden.

January 1, 1942.

[E 85/21/34]

(2)

*Memorandum communicated to M. Molotov on December 20.**Turkish Anxiety about Developments in Persian Kurdistan.*

ON the 2nd December Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs communicated an aide-mémoire to His Majesty's Embassy complaining that the Kurds were aiming at establishing an independent Kurdish State, that they were being encouraged by the occupying forces in Persia, and that they were raiding into Turkish territory.

On the 5th December the Turkish Secretary-General spoke very earnestly about this subject and said that the Turkish Government might have to send troops to the Turkish side of the frontier.

Sir R. Bullard has spoken to his Soviet colleague and suggested that he should reassure his Turkish colleague. Sir R. Bullard thinks that one cause of suspicion may be a propaganda visit of Kurdish and other tribal leaders to Baku organised by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet Ambassador stated that this visit had been purely cultural, but admitted that he had not been informed about it in advance.

On the 11th December the Turkish Government communicated a second aide-mémoire complaining that communications with Tehran had been virtually severed by Kurdish activities, that Kurdish revolutionary elements were being definitely encouraged by the Soviet occupying forces, and that a dangerous state of disorder had resulted.

Although the Turkish Government's information is much exaggerated, there is a real danger that these developments may lead to estrangement between the Turks and the Russians and ourselves. It would therefore be helpful if the Soviet Government could do something to reassure the Turkish Government. According to Sir R. Bullard, the main difficulty is that Soviet political policy in the Soviet-occupied zone is run by an organisation over which the Soviet Minister at Tehran has little influence.

[E 595/14/34]

No. 20.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 7, 1942.)

(No. 211.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 20, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note made by the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation after an interview with His Majesty the Shah. Major-General Fraser received an invitation to call on the Shah with the Minister for War, but when they appeared together the Shah dismissed the Minister for War and had a private talk with the military attaché.

2. The Shah bears little resemblance to his father in character, but he shares with him a deep interest in the Persian army—an interest fostered by service in the army for two or three years. In my despatch No. 147 of the 9th October I reported that at my first audience with the Shah "the main feature of the conversation was His Majesty's preoccupation with the army and his illusions as to its value and to the rôle it could play in the present war." In a telegram based on the same interview I had reported that His Majesty talked quite seriously about helping us with an army of 300,000 or 400,000 men. In subsequent talks with myself and others the Shah has shown a keener sense of proportion, but the interest he takes in the army has always been obvious, and

in the interview recorded in the enclosure to the present despatch he has treated the subject with some wisdom. It will be remembered that the Cabinet objected to the provision about the Persian army in the original draft of the treaty of alliance, and asked that the rôle of the army should be limited to the maintenance of internal security; and that the Foreign Office, while they accepted the proposal, expressed surprise that the Persian Government could make the humiliating proposal that the Persian army should not defend its territory in case of a German invasion. A few days before the treaty was initialled the Minister for Foreign Affairs reopened the subject, and asked me what the Allies would be prepared to do (in the way of supplying arms and equipment) if the Persian Government accepted the original draft of the treaty: there were some members of the Cabinet who thought that the maintenance of internal security was a mean task for an army, and regretted their request for the limitation of the Persian army to that rôle. I said that it was late in the day to reopen this question, which had been settled in the way the Cabinet had desired, and that the conclusion of the treaty could certainly not be delayed while so difficult a question as equipment, &c., for the Persian army was discussed. In any case, I said, unless I could be assured that the request came from the Government I could not take any official notice of it. M. Soheily never referred to it again, and I now realise that he was speaking for the Shah, whose man he is, rather than for the Cabinet, who would hardly dare to insert in the treaty any provision which required the Persian army to take part in any circumstances in a foreign war. The Shah is wrong if he believes that his people share his opinion about the rôle of the army, but he is right in thinking that the morale of the army needs to be raised, even for the purpose of maintaining public security, and that it would not be raised unless the army felt that it had a part to play in the defence of Persia. Unfortunately, the morale of the army is so low that to raise it would require more than the prospect of helping to defend Persia against a foreign enemy, while general political considerations preclude the insertion of any such provision in the treaty.

3. The Shah mentioned to Major-General Fraser a point on which I was sure that he had strong feelings, though he had refrained, doubtless out of politeness, from mentioning it to me, viz., the fact that the British attacked Persia without warning. He had spoken to me with indignation on one occasion of the unheralded Russian attack, and I could see by the way in which he steered away from the subject that this ugly cap fitted His Majesty's Government also. It is well to remember that, however great the material gain we may obtain from the Allied occupation, the manner in which it was effected is not to be easily distinguished by Persians from the "treachery" of the attacks without warning effected by the Germans and the Japanese; and that consequently one of the moral arguments on which we build our case against the Axis and its associates carries little or no weight in this country.

4. All foreigners, whether official or not, who have an opportunity to talk with the Shah, come away with a good impression. Even the Soviet Ambassador seems to consider him a sensible young man. He has the merit which not all his Ministers share, of having decided definitely to side with the Allies whatever happens. With one or two exceptions, Persians who side with the Allies convey an impression that, if they have burnt their boats, they have retained, for use in an emergency, a small but serviceable dinghy.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister).

E. E. CROWE.

P.S.—I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Kuibyshev, and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.

E. E. C.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Interview with the Shah, December 8, 1941.

THE Shah said the treaty would be signed in a few days. He then hoped to bring about a much more intimate collaboration. They had been ineffective hitherto in presenting the treaty in a favourable light to the country, but they were not experts in propaganda. Would we help? He took exception to the recent *Times* article which had seemed to say that British diplomacy had been weak in

not forcing the treaty through more rapidly, and that the Persians were hanging back waiting on events in Russia. He thought that was the wrong line for us to take; it was a mistake for us to stress Persian hesitation; that was merely giving the Germans material for propaganda. Rather should we stress our community of interests, our interest in the preservation of Persian independence, our desire to see Persia strong.

Neutrality was not possible nowadays. Persia was throwing in her lot with us, and he would do his best to convince the country that that was in Persia's interest. He would try to give the country the clear policy that was so evidently needed. It was essential to restore morale in the army; to do that it was essential that the army should feel that it had a part to play in the defence of Persia and not merely to stand aside and look on if the Germans reached Persia. It must be inspired with a determination to defend Persia against the Axis. That was essential if morale was to be restored. And unless it was restored the army would be useless even for internal security. We could help by propaganda to the effect that although Persia now needed a small army in virtue of the alliance, it was essential that that army should be efficient not only for present needs, but with a view to expansion after the war. We could help, too, by suggesting in our propaganda that we appreciated the wisdom of the order to the Persian army to cease resistance as being in the best interest of Persia.

He much regretted the course events had taken. He felt sure that we could have had all we wanted in this country without launching a sudden attack and without bringing the Russians in if it had ever been made clear to his father what it was we wanted and that we meant to have it. His father "attendait un geste de votre part." To present a note at 4 A.M. and at the same time launch an unannounced attack was not what they had expected from us. But all that must be forgotten if we were to achieve anything now. (In spite of this praiseworthy sentiment, he reverted to it several times. It obviously rankles.)

He hoped that when the treaty was signed we would do something effective to convince the Kurds that we were entirely out of sympathy with their attempt to throw off the Persian yoke. He knew some Kurds had legitimate grievances and he had given orders that these should be redressed. But he still seemed to suspect that some encouragement was being given to the Kurds from the Iraqi side.

He referred vaguely once or twice to an "accord militaire." He has something in mind.

Comment.

I was impressed by the Shah, who struck me as being straightforward, reasonable and simple. He is obviously greatly feeling the humiliation of his army, with which he associates himself closely. There is something in what he says about the need to inspire the army with a determination to defend Persian soil if the enemy should reach it. It will lead, of course, to demands for certain equipment of which they are deficient, and I don't know whether it is in the power of the Shah and the Government to make such inspiration effective, but it would be of great value to us if we could rely on the Persian army to defend aerodromes, &c., against parachute troops.

The Shah says the signing of the treaty is going to make a great difference. The country will then be definitely committed. He was, I thought, a little pathetic in his appeal for help.

(Signed)

W. A. K. FRASER.

[E 198/163/34]

No. 21.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 10, 1942.)

(No. 202.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch, No. 51 of 30th November, 1941, from His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, reporting the internal situation at Tabriz.

Tehran, December 10, 1941.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 51. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, November 30, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the situation at Tabriz and in Azerbaijan continues to be outwardly quiet, although it is obvious that potential disturbance and discontent lie not far from the surface. The soothing and in parts misleading article published by the Minister of the Interior in the Tehran press on his return from this province probably shows his disquiet, while the Governor-General and the chief of gendarmerie have been absent together for over a week in the capital at a time when the local situation is certainly no easier.

2. Possibly the attention given to the Azerbaijanis and their problems in the Tehran and Istanbul press, after years of neglect and oppression, has helped to fan their smouldering grievances. It is difficult to describe any political movement as yet, but there are undoubtedly private meetings and discussions, threats are known to be uttered against the Tehran officials here, whom nobody imagines to be much changed from the corrupt and inefficient gang they were before (with the possible exception of the chief of police), stories of Turcophile parties are heard, accusations of Bolshevik machinations are put forward, Armenian intrigues are blamed and dire vengeance foretold. Over all hangs the question of how long the new and unloved Shah will last, and even more how long before the all-powerful German armies will arrive—with or without Turkish compliance or assistance—in the Caucasus and so bring better order here.

3. There are still minor incidents in the countryside, but it is difficult to know their seriousness or extent, since both Soviet and Persian authorities when questioned flatly deny them—unless they reflect wholly on the other party. The bandit Husseni Ghuli has not come in for pardon, as foretold to me by the Governor-General over a fortnight ago; the Russian general hinted to me then that his forces were shortly going to deal decisively with the man, but I am confidentially informed that he was parleying with Soviet officers in Miandoab one day last week. At Ahar, on the road to Ardebil, the newly-installed gendarmerie had their rifles taken away by a party of hectoring Russian officers (who spoke Azerbaijan Turkish), but when I spoke to General Novikoff about this apparent disregard of the agreement signed only recently in Tehran he vigorously denied the possibility of the affair, and I am left to surmise that it must have been Russo-Armenian officers acting without the knowledge or authority of their superiors, or else Persian adventurers in search of rifles and wearing Russian uniforms. A fight was reported ten days ago at the entrance to Tabriz between Armenian peasants and the gendarmes collecting taxes, in which two peasants were reported killed. Last week an affray was said to have occurred in a village near Mianeh, where the villagers refused to surrender the usual quota of wheat and produce to the landowner and gendarmes accompanying him. Whatever the denials, the fact remains that the local prison is full, and almost every time I go out I see wretched and ragged wights being hauled to gaol by the police. As I surmised in my last report, the greedy landowner "arbabs," who were the first to run away and hide in terror in August, are now returning when they hear that Persian gendarmerie have restored order in a district. A suitable bribe to the right official and they are given an escort of armed police to re-enter their villages, frighten their miserable tenants and exact even more than in former years. When I spoke of this to a leading official, he replied: "What do you expect? In spite of all promises, the police and gendarmerie are still receiving the same miserable salary as before—6 to 8 tomans (about 10s.) a month, on which to keep a wife and family, and as the official increment is not forthcoming they have to make a living wage in the same way as before." As I have told some leading Persians, there is little point in their complaining to me of insidious Bolshevik propaganda among the people, while some of them foment hatred and social unrest in this manner, just as their unprincipled merchants, by hoarding and profiteering in staple commodities, create bad feeling in the towns. But there is, of course, another side to the story, in that the inhabitants of certain villages are ready to refuse to give their dues either to the landowner or to the representatives of the Government itself, and, in fact, have in some places written bold letters to the Governor-General to say so, threatening armed resistance to any attempt to collect grain quotas or taxes. In some cases it is alleged that junior Russian officers have encouraged the attitude of revolt. The provincial Government's task is therefore not an easy one.

4. I have already reported stories of Russian intrigues among the Kurds of Azerbaijan. Recently more parties of such Kurds, somewhat deliberately flaunting their tribal costumes, have been entertained in Tabriz by Soviet political officers, taken to cinemas and theatres and shown Russian troops in barracks. The leading cicerones are two Soviet officers named Alieff and Miroslovoff, both obviously Moslems from Russian Azerbaijan. I have it on reliable authority that about nine Kurdish chieftains in the Saqqiz-Sauj Bulagh area had arranged to meet British officers a week ago at Bukan; someone told the Soviet Political Bureau, who immediately sent their officers to collect the chieftains, including two who had arrived early in Bukan. The Kurds were practically bundled into cars under a show of Soviet kindness and hospitality, and taken to Tabriz. Two were acquaintances of mine and tried to get into touch with me, feeling uncomfortable in such unwonted Communist intimacy, but were unable to do so. Within a day or two they were whisked off for a week's trip to see the wonders of Baku, and have not yet returned. In the old days the imperialist Russians used to try and cultivate the Kurds in the hope of support in case of need in Azerbaijan, but it is hard to see what hopes the Communist ideologists can have of such a completely individualist, fanatically tribal and bigotedly religious race of men. I rallied the Russian Acting G.O.C. mildly on this subject, and he replied stolidly that if the Soviet officers were moving among the Kurds (for once I was not met with a denial) it was solely in the interests of general law and order. Later on I learnt that the Russians had also taken some of the chiefs of the well-known Shahsavan tribe to Eastern Azerbaijan on the cultural visit to Baku. They must be very proud of something or other there, as a fortnight ago they collected a so-called representative group of eight Tabriz citizens, including a doctor, a journalist, a musician, and engineer and so on, and took them to Baku, whence they have only just returned. They even invited Government officials without consulting the Governor-General first, although they afterwards rectified this slip.

5. A few days ago the Turkish Consul-General told me that some of his community had learnt that they were marked down for death by gunmen hired by the local Soviet Political Bureau or Ogpu, and he was very nervous of the effect that such political murders would have on Turkish opinion. Although I saw the point, I did not altogether believe his fears, but only a few hours afterwards one of the victims was, in fact, found shot dead with six bullets in the street outside his house. This was a certain Yusef Ali Bey, a man aged 65, who had been a notable at Baku before 1917 and had fled from the Bolsheviks and lived for twenty years in Turkey and Persia. My Turkish colleague came to see me next day and was most apprehensive of what might happen in Angora if the further murders which he anticipated took place. Already he was being accused, he stated, of being too lenient towards the Russians in his reports, and even this one assassination would create a painful feeling.

6. Although I did not necessarily believe his statement that the shooting was definitely the work of the Ogpu, I knew that German agents in Angora were doing their best to spread atrocity stories against the Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan, and decided that, in case there were the slightest truth in the story, I had better speak to the Russian military commander. As Major-General Novikoff was away in Tiflis, I saw Major-General Khrashcheff and mentioned the danger of any imprudent activities on the part of the Soviet political officers here, as I had already done both in September and October when I noticed signs of undesirable zeal in that direction. I could not tell whether he already knew of the alleged political murder, but he received my remarks very fairly and said that it must be the work of *agents provocateurs*, adding that all his staff were animated only by their strict orders to avoid interference in internal affairs in Persia, to respect local feelings, and so on.

7. Of course, I accepted his comments, but personally I cannot persuade myself that the Ogpu is as harmless here as all that. In previous reports I have described their somewhat ridiculous goings-on, and at the theatre on the Soviet anniversary of the 7th November I had the opportunity of seeing the heads of the Politruk lined up on the stage, firing off speeches one after another, and a more sinister-looking lot it would take a William le Queux to describe. The most sinister is a Colonel Yarkoff, who appeared only about a month ago, and since then I have sensed a growing influence of this unhealthy political side over the whole Soviet staff and garrison. I feel that perhaps Major-General Novikoff is strong enough to resist it, but unfortunately he is often away (or ill), and Colonel Yarkoff has plenty of scope with the rest. I suspect that it was he who hindered the British official war correspondents early in the month from doing any useful

reporting or photographing here at Tabriz, and he who has lately hindered Major Proctor, our liaison officer, from establishing any contacts with Soviet officers under the rank of a major-general, which is absurd.

8. Persians often say to me in a shocked tone how much propaganda the Russians are doing, but they never seem to be able to give any precise details. However, this week appeared what everyone admitted a magnificent propaganda documentary film, dealing with life in Soviet Armenia. Some local Armenians have, of course, expressed a desire to go to the U.S.S.R. (at the time when tables were set in the street at one place for signatures), but I hear that the Soviet authorities have so far shown no hurry to accommodate them after all. I continue to hear of nervousness among many Armenians, who fear dire consequences if the Russian military forces suddenly leave Persia and leave them to the mercy of the local Moslems. The Turkish Consul-General professes to me to be in a fix over this problem, as most of his Turkish subjects here are Armenians who would rush to his consulate at the first sign of trouble or impending massacre, and he fears that the premises would be attacked by a murderous mob. His fears may be a little exaggerated, but are by no means groundless, as in the last war the local population did attack and massacre Armenians in the consulates in Tabriz—and probably would do so again. This applies equally to the British Consulate, which has no defences at all and is on the edge of the Armenian quarter. If the Russian troops should suddenly leave, the local police, as I have already reported, and as the chief of police himself confidentially admits, would be quite incapable of preserving public order, and it is to be hoped, therefore, that from a general standpoint some British troops could be sent here in time before the Soviet forces moved out. The alternative would most probably be massacres for a day or a couple of days, and then a Turkish military invasion of Western Azerbaijan, possibly as far as Tabriz with armoured cars, which could reach here in about nine hours from the frontier.

9. I learn that this season the sugar output at the Miandoab factory has amounted to only 1,135 tons instead of the normal production of 5,000 tons, which is a set-back to all in this district. As I wrote before, the Kurdish cultivators of sugar-beet were either so busy looting that they did not worry to lift the crop, or else they knew that transport was so scarce that they gave their beet to their cattle to eat. Only 7,000 tons of beet reached the factory instead of about 30,000 needed.

10. The Governor of Tabriz tells me that the Russian military authorities here have received orders from the Soviet Embassy in Tehran to release the 200 Persian officers shut up since last August, but that they decline for no given reason to carry them out. This consulate is continually approached by pathetic groups of wives and children to obtain the release of these officers, who are undoubtedly in bad and unsuitable quarters, are not permitted to receive food from their families and not now allowed to visit the local baths, since some junior officers escaped while doing so.

11. The Russian military authorities continue to occupy two of the four telegraph lines between Tabriz and Tehran, although obviously they can have little cause these days for doing so. Yet when I flew to Tehran last week they sent four telegrams about me by the Persian telegraph office instead of by their own (incidentally sending the cost afterwards to the consulate), and I am reliably informed that whenever General Novikoff himself wishes to telegraph to Tehran he uses the non-military wires. It took six days for a wire from this consulate to reach Moscow in September by military line, and nearly a fortnight for the reply to get here, marked "Immediate, re-repeated."

12. Among the goods at the Tabriz custom-house seized by the Russian authorities in September as being German property were twenty-six Swedish radio sets addressed to an Iraqi firm in Tehran. Although I have been trying continually to obtain the return of these goods since then, and orders have been given to that effect, no results have been achieved, and the local Russian Trade Commissioner admits that neither he nor anyone else knows where the wrongly-seized packages are. Similarly, nothing has been heard of the lorry seized from a British subject by the Red Army in August last.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 320/23/34]

No. 22.

Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps (Kuibyshev).

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 13, 1942.

DURING the course of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador this afternoon his Excellency said that I would remember speaking to him about a number of proposals for amendments to the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty and that I had written to him saying that I had heard that the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran had been instructed to agree to certain proposals for an exchange of letters which would accompany the treaty. M. Maisky had now, however, received information, which was no doubt in response to his original telegram, to say that the Soviet Government agreed with us that the treaty should now be signed without further amendments and that the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran had been instructed to join with Sir R. Bullard in pressing the Persian Government to agree to an early signature.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 354/26/65]

No. 23.

Mr. Eden to Sir S. Cripps (Kuibyshev).

(No. 21.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 15, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador called on the 15th January to inform me of his Government's view regarding the control of the Trans-Iranian Railway. The Soviet Government were unwilling to agree that Tehran should be the point of division between the British-controlled and the Soviet-controlled portions of the line. This arrangement would leave the Soviet authorities in control of the comparatively short section between Tehran and the Caspian. The Soviet Government maintained their view that Qum would be the best point of division. The Soviet Government understood that the British authorities might wish to have the use of the railway workshops at Tehran, and they would be prepared to allow the British authorities the full use of these workshops. M. Maisky thought that, with this arrangement regarding facilities for the British authorities to use the Tehran workshops, the Soviet Government's suggestion that Qum should be the division between the British and Soviet controlled sections of the line was reasonable and ought to be acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

2. I informed M. Maisky that I did not think his suggestion would be regarded as acceptable by the British authorities, but I would have it examined at once.

3. The Ambassador then said that he had instructions also to approach me on the question of priorities for goods entering Persia from the south. There had been some disagreement on this subject between the British and Soviet authorities at Tehran. The British authorities had maintained, on instructions from London, that Persian civil requirements should be given first priority, that goods for the Allied troops in Persia should take the second place, whereas transit goods for Soviet Russia should only be regarded as falling within a third category of priority. The Soviet representatives had contested these proposals and had argued that transit goods for Soviet Russia ought to have a higher place. The Soviet Government now wished to propose a compromise, whereby there should be two categories of priority for goods: the first category would consist of the most important Persian civil requirements, of military goods in transit to the Soviet Union, and of the goods required by the Allied troops in Persia; the second category would consist of other less important transit goods for the Soviet Union and other less important goods for Persia.

4. I informed M. Maisky in reply that I thought that the instructions sent to the British authorities in Tehran on this subject were being altered. We had some time ago reached the conclusion that the whole system of priorities by category was not entirely satisfactory, and that it would be better to replace it by a system based on percentages, whereby definite percentages would be allocated for essential Persian requirements, for goods in transit for the Soviet Union and for the military requirements of the Allied forces in Persia. I promised to let M. Maisky have full details of these latest proposals, and of the present position.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 9.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 21, 1942.

THE Persian Minister called on me to-day to give a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the suggestion that a third annex in the form of an exchange of notes containing certain assurances should be added to the treaty. Mr. Taqizadeh explained that there was no question of amending the text of the treaty itself and that the object of these assurances was only to elucidate certain points about which members of the Majlis felt that the treaty was not entirely clear. In view of their genuine efforts to secure the approval of the Majlis for the treaty, the Persian Government were disappointed that His Majesty's Government had hitherto shown an uncompromising attitude over these assurances, to which the Soviet Government had already agreed. They would be much embarrassed if they had to tell the Majlis that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to consider any of the suggestions which they had put forward, and the Minister begged that, as his Government had made every effort to co-operate loyally with us, we would agree to the assurances for which they asked.

2. I said that the treaty negotiations had already dragged on far too long and that I could not continue to be faced with repeated requests for further amendments. I made allowances for the fact that when the Soviet forces were withdrawing in South Russia the Persian Government had felt reluctant to commit themselves on the side of the Allies. But the danger of a German invasion of North Persia had been removed and with it the justification for delaying the treaty on this score. I also understood the Persian Government's anxiety that British and Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Persia after the war. But, since the treaty was the sheet-anchor of their security in this respect, I was at a loss to understand their continued reluctance to sign it.

3. As to the four proposed assurances, I explained to Mr. Taqizadeh that there was no longer any question of our agreeing to the original third assurance, but that I thought we could go some way to meet his Government's wishes on the other three. We had made certain proposals to the Soviet Government, but had not yet heard their reactions. I then told the Minister that, whether or not His Majesty's Government agreed to these assurances, he would be well-advised to tell his Government that it was really essential for them to sign the treaty without further delay. In view of the great authority enjoyed by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I could not believe that his Government could not secure the immediate agreement of the Majlis, and, for my part, I was not prepared to wait indefinitely.

4. Mr. Taqizadeh explained that his Government were somewhat disturbed at the absence of any reference to our intentions towards Persia in my recent speech dealing with my conversations at Moscow. I pointed out that, once the treaty was signed, we should be in a position to make information on matters of this sort available to the Persian Government, in the same way as we now kept our other Allies informed. At the same time, I could assure him that his Government need have no fear that anything was said at Moscow which was in any way prejudicial to their interests.

5. Finally, Mr. Taqizadeh said that his Government were much disturbed at recent developments in Persian Azerbaijan. He handed me a memorandum on the present position, of which a copy is enclosed. I emphasised that the Persian Government should discuss questions of this sort with the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran or through their own Ambassador in Moscow, since the Russians preferred that such matters should be put to them direct, and it was difficult for us to act as intermediaries. I promised to consider the memorandum, but urged the Minister to advise his Government not to delay signature of the treaty on account of these developments in Azerbaijan.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Memorandum communicated by the Persian Minister.

Some Facts deserving the Attention of the British Government.

THE Iranian Government are sincerely animated with goodwill and whole-hearted co-operation with the Allies in spite of the fact that the proceedings in connexion with various preliminary and necessary stages of the negotiations and passing of the Bill presented to Majliss and the conclusion of the treaty have perhaps appeared to have been rather protracted.

The Iranian Government have undoubtedly spared no effort to expedite as far as possible, within the constitutional and parliamentary rules of procedure, the obtaining of a free open vote, which they believe to be in the spirit of the policy and corresponding to the intentions of the British Government. They whole-heartedly wish to become a faithful Ally of the British nation and to join all other free nations who have the cause of international justice at heart. They, however, regret sincerely, and to be frank, are bitterly disappointed about, certain actions by the forces of one of the Powers with whom the alliance is projected and who are controlling some of the northern parts of the country. A series of unpleasant events (a few of which are given below) have taken place in the zone where the Russian armed forces are stationed, which are contrary to the expectations of the Iranian Government, who find them unjust and incompatible with the spirit of alliance, which should produce closer and friendlier relationship between the two nations:—

1. The Iranian Government complain that the Russians, in the part of the country where their armed forces are stationed, act in a manner absolutely contrary to the rights of Iran as an independent State. They have seized and are seizing all goods and merchandise belonging to Iranian people and lying in the northern customs houses. These goods have been and are being taken to Russia quite arbitrarily and without any compensation.

2. They import Russian goods into Iran without paying any attention to the customs boundary or payment of customs duties and other charges. These goods are then sold in the interior of the country to the merchants.

3. They have placed guards in the northern customs houses and do not allow even the goods belonging to the Iranian Government to be cleared and transported elsewhere.

4. They weaken the authority of the Iranian Government in those parts by preventing them from enforcing fully the laws of the country, as a result of which many people refuse to pay taxes, creating a serious loss in the income of the country which may possibly precipitate a financial crisis. They are actually interfering in the internal affairs of the country and are placing a limit on the number of the police force and gendarmerie, not allowing the policing forces of Iran to be despatched against brigands and law breakers, thus hindering the establishment of law and order.

5. They encourage the workmen of factories to strike, and when unpleasant incidents take place and crimes are committed, they prevent the guilty men from being arrested and prosecuted.

6. Their ostensibly irresponsible agents spread strong propaganda amongst the Iranians, arranging for some of the turbulent elements to travel to Baku, where they are trained for the purpose of actively engaging in dangerous propaganda and are sent back to Kurdish provinces, where they make open demonstrations in favour of the Soviet system mixed with separatist tendencies. In one instance a procession was arranged in the town of Rezaieh, when pictures of M. Stalin were demonstrated, though the last point in itself may appear to be harmless.

7. The latest information received by the Iranian Government is to the effect that the Kurds and so-called Assyrians in Rezaieh (who are, by the way, a handful of the rest of Nestorians, not exceeding 15,000 altogether, but nevertheless aspiring to revive the Empire of Assurbanepal!) have formed a committee, called the "Salvation Committee," and are threatening the officials of the Government in order that they may be forced to leave the province and to place the control of the country in their own hands. These unruly people have killed a number of persons, including the Chief of Police Intelligence, and have threatened the governor with assassination. In the district of Maku the Russian military authorities have sent a warning to the Government departments that

the present officials should leave and their places be taken by Turkish-speaking officials. Recently the pressure of the Kurds and the intrigues of their Russian protectors forced the Governor-General of Rezaieh and a number of Iranian officials to leave the city, and the Kurds of the surrounding districts are themselves contemplating the appointment of a governor-general and other governors. They have formed a committee, which includes also a few Russians, who are no doubt the leading spirits. The actions of this committee are all of a separatist nature.

8. They have opened the Persian frontier in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan to the free entry of people from the U.S.S.R. without the observance of frontier formalities, and are sending undesirable and destitute persons who may be a charge on them into Iran, thus creating misfortunes and a burden for the Iranian people.

9. In various districts of Mazanderan, in the Caspian Province of Iran, the unruly and criminal elements have run amok and have begun to commit all sorts of acts of violence. In the district of Khalkhal, in Azerbaijan, many bands are formed and have clashed with the Iranian gendarmerie. All these unpleasant happenings are mainly due to the fact that the Russians not only do not permit the Iranian forces to enter their so-called zone of "occupation," but they are bringing pressure on the authorities to reduce unduly to the extreme degree the number of police and gendarmerie stationed there.

10. The last but not least, and in fact the most important, breach of Iranian independence, integrity and national pride as well as weakening of the control of the country and the constitutional influence of the Central Government is that by Communist propaganda on the one hand, and the still more dangerous matter of separatist propaganda on the other hand, spread in the important provinces of Iran, which are historically the most ancient and most attached vital members of the body of Iran, the country finds itself seriously and gravely threatened with the possibility of the link with her most faithful people being weakened, and even severed, through artificial agitations. The pretexts, such as the inhabitants of certain parts of the country speaking another dialect, *i.e.*, Turkish or Kurdish, are no more plausible than a possible separatist movement started by agents of a foreign Government in Scotland and Wales on the ground that the Welsh or Scotch, who are, as we know, *true* Britons, speak in their own dialect between themselves. The Kurds, for instance, are, without a shadow of doubt, Iranians by race and language and there is no ground whatsoever to start an artificial movement of independence or irredentism among them.

Thus all the elements hostile to the integrity and independence and the national unity of Iran are obviously finding protection from the local agents and the forces of the "occupying" army in the north in their separatist and undesirable activities. All these activities no doubt can take place with impunity only on account of the above-mentioned facts, namely, the prevention of the Iranian policing force from being sent there.

These are the facts, and whoever perpetrates or encourages them cannot pretend a sincere friendship for the country with whom a closer friendship proposed to be promoted into an alliance exists.

The higher Russian authorities naturally may not accept responsibility of having a hand in such matters, but the plain fact is that all these unpleasant events are actually happening in their zone of "occupation," either by their troops stationed there or by the turbulent people encouraged by them or relying on their protection, and consequently the authority of the Central Government is being weakened in those parts by them. This state of affairs, whoever may be responsible for it, must certainly be stopped if a *true* friendship even more worthy than the formal alliance is to be consolidated between Iran and her close friends and neighbours, and if the spirit of the Atlantic Charter as it is understood in Iran should find application to the weak as well as to the strong.

It is a sincere hope of the Iranian Government that the British Government could see their way to use their friendly influence and good offices to help them in persuading the Soviet Government to apply a stricter control over their local agents and prevent similar direct and indirect interferences, which are no doubt of a nature that may disturb the friendship now happily established between the two nations.

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[E 493/23/34]

No. 25.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggallay (Kuibyshev).

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 22, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, when he told me that the Soviet Government had considered my suggestions in respect of the Persian Treaty, as set out in Sir O. Sargent's letter of 17th January, and they had asked his Excellency to say that they agreed with them. Instructions in this sense had been sent to the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran.

2. I thanked the Ambassador and said that I was grateful to the Soviet Government for thus changing their plans again to fall in with our ideas. I much hoped that we should now secure the signature of the treaty within a few days.

3. The Ambassador went on to say that he had received my memorandum about the situation in Persian Kurdistan and he had forwarded it to his Government. The Ambassador seemed somewhat concerned by the picture we had painted in the memorandum, and his Excellency said that he found it very difficult to believe that the local Soviet authorities could in fact be behaving in this way, in view of the assurances which he had previously received from his Government as a result of the representations which I had made to him. I said that I feared that the position was as depicted and it might be that the local authorities were showing rather too much zeal. Such things had been known to happen before in the history of more than one country. At the same time I wished the Soviet Government to know that I advised both the Turkish and the Persian Governments to speak to them direct in these matters. It was my view that better results could probably be obtained that way.

4. The Ambassador thanked me and said that he would let me have a reply in a few days.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 552/57/34]

No. 26.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 26, 1942.)

(No. 18.)

HIS Majesty's consul at Kermanshah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of Kermanshah Diary for the month of December 1941.

Kermanshah, December 31, 1941.

Enclosure in No. 26.

*Kermanshah Diary for the month of December 1941.**I.—Review of the General Situation.*

THE situation here further improved during the month of December. There has been less brigandage and the better state of security which has recently prevailed has enabled merchandise and produce to circulate fairly freely throughout the district and has also made it possible for farmers to plough and sow in districts which were considered unsafe last October and November.

2. In Kurdistan the situation has not changed appreciably during the past month; General Shahbakhti's very perfunctory effort—if it deserves to be called an effort—to negotiate with the Kurds yielded no results. The attack of the Kurds upon a British patrol on the 11th December and the Kurds' more threatening attitude towards the Persian garrison at Diwandere provided General Shahbakhti with an excuse for abandoning any pretence of negotiating and for attacking the Kurds. The latter were bombed on the 20th December, but this activity yielded little in the way of results and the situation is now much the same as it was at the end of November, except that the withdrawal of the Kurdish rebels from Diwandere towards Sakkiz has relieved the pressure upon Sanandaj (Senna).

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3. During the month of December the economic situation deteriorated; although wheat supplies are reported to be adequate for the needs of this district until next year's harvest is available, the sugar shortage has become more noticeable and supplies of many commodities are getting increasingly scarce.

4. During December there has been no appreciable change to record in the state of public feeling here. Discontent, caused by the increasing cost of living among other things, tended to increase feeling against the Allies, but this tendency was to some extent counteracted by the Russians' successes and by the British victory in Libya. The entry of the United States into the war on the side of the Allies caused a brief sensation, but the favourable effect which this momentous event might have been expected to exercise on local opinion was neutralised by Japan's spectacular successes in the Pacific. Public opinion here is unable to grasp the magnitude or the implications of the war and remains as pro-German as ever on the whole. British propaganda has not yet got into its stride, but a start has been made. Radio broadcasting and portable cinematograph equipment with abundant supplies of films and of illustrated (Persian) journals are long overdue and are still awaited.

II.—Recent Developments in Kurdistan.

5. December opened with the Kurdish rebels awaiting some sign from the Persian authorities that negotiations would take place and that their legitimate grievances would be listened to. Negotiations, properly speaking, were never attempted by General Shahbakhti and the latter's short visit to Sanandaj in November did nothing to give the Kurds grounds for thinking that their complaints would be examined. It was not surprising that, after they saw how the general attempted to play off the Galbaghi tribe against the rest of the Kurdish tribes and made no effort to negotiate, Kurdish rebel leaders decided to renew their pressure upon the Persian garrisons and to seek redress for their wrongs by fighting their oppressors. Early in December the rebels, under Mohammed Rashid, threatened the village of Diwandere, 40 miles north of Sanandaj (Senna). Even Senna itself might have been attacked had not the Officer Commanding British troops there made it clear to Mohammed Rashid that any advance upon Senna would be regarded as a threat to the local British garrison. While the Kurdish leaders hesitated in their uncertainty as to whether the Persian forces would receive the support—moral, if not material—which we were understood to be giving them, an unfortunate incident took place. This incident was the ambushing of a small British military patrol by a party of Kurds on the 11th December on the Diwandere-Senna road; as the attack took place after dusk it is not unlikely that the Kurds (for it seems fairly certain that they, and not Persians, were responsible for the attack) may have mistaken the lorries, &c., conveying our troops in the direction of Diwandere for a Persian military convoy. At any rate General Shahbakhti seems to have taken a serious view of this attack and determined that the Kurdish rebels should be crushed without further delay. On the 14th December he caused a proclamation to be published in the local newspaper, denouncing the Kurdish rebels and threatening to destroy them if they did not surrender. On the 16th December, 12,000 leaflets describing briefly the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the present situation in Kurdistan were handed to General Shahbakhti for distribution, especially in Kurdistan. On the 17th December the leaflets were dropped over various parts of Kurdistan. There are unconfirmed reports that, on the same day, bombs were also dropped. Owing to stormy weather, no bombers could take the air on the 18th and 19th December; on the 20th December, however, it is definitely known that bombs were dropped over rebel-occupied districts in Kurdistan.

6. No reports have been received, so far, describing the reactions of the Kurds to these bombing attacks, but it is to be feared that, if bombs were dropped upon the Kurds almost before the leaflets emanating from this consulate had time to flutter to the ground, the bombing will be regarded by the Kurds as having been British-inspired. Although they have so far been extremely pro-British and have to some extent been encouraged to believe that they will receive fair play in their dispute with the Persians through British intervention, it is not unlikely that Kurds—not only in Persia, but also their kinsmen and sympathisers across Persia's frontiers—will now feel that they have been betrayed by us and that a violent anti-British reaction may be produced.

7. There is no sign that the publication of the leaflets describing the attitude of His Majesty's Government has created better and more friendly feeling for us

in Persian circles here; indeed the reaction of General Shahbakhti was distinctly unsatisfactory and, instead of being grateful for this expression of British support for the Persian Government, he expressed disappointment that our leaflets did not go into greater detail and did not condemn the Kurds in more uncompromising language.

8. The end of the year finds the Persian army very satisfied at the relief of Diwandere and the Kurds dejected after having been driven out of Diwandere to the northwards towards Sakkiz.

In conclusion, the situation can only be described as unsatisfactory, as the state of prolonged disorder in Kurdistan has not been brought much nearer to an end; indeed, the Persians have so far made no progress in restoring their authority in the north and west of Kurdistan, and the rebels are still exercising some form of authority in those parts. It is doubtful whether the Persian military forces will make any serious attempts to drive the rebels out of Kurdistan before next April, as wintry conditions make operations extremely difficult and these conditions would probably favour the defending forces, *i.e.*, the Kurds.

III.—Persian Army and Gendarmerie.

9. General Shahbakhti received reinforcements during December from Tehran and these have been sent to strengthen Persian garrisons in Kurdistan. Morale of officers and men remains fairly low. Many cases have, however, been reported of Persian officers and men having made anti-British utterances; these boastings of "what the Persian soldiers will do to our troops when they get a chance" have been by no means isolated cases. Anti-British feeling continues to be strong among all ranks of the Persian army; there is, however, little likelihood that the Persians would dare to provoke a fight with our troops, for whom they have a wholesome respect. After the treaty with Persia confers upon the latter the status of an ally, it will be interesting to see how Persian officers and men will hide their feelings and to what extent social intercourse between British and Persian officers will follow. General Shahbakhti appears, on the surface, to be friendly, but, if these sentiments were sincere, it is certain that anti-British feeling among his officers and men would be far less general, for he has enough authority and prestige to influence the outlooks and opinions of all the troops under his command. It is obvious that he has made no attempt to create a more friendly feeling towards Britain, for, had he done so, the fact would soon be known.

10. The Gendarmerie is gradually gaining strength and many posts along the main road (which were abandoned two or three months ago) are now manned with large and comparatively keen bodies of Amniehs. It may be that, now that the weather is unpropitious for the activities of brigands and that the dangers of encounters with armed robbers are now more remote, service in the Gendarmerie has again become popular.

IV.—Persian Administration.

11. General Shahbakhti has continued to manage without a Civil or Military Governor in Kermanshah for several weeks and has dealt with administrative problems himself. It is now confirmed that the recently nominated Military Governor, Brigadier (Sartip) Afkhami, will not take over this post. Another candidate, *i.e.*, Amir-i-Kull Zanganeh, a former governor and one of Kermanshah's members in the Majlis, has been proposed for the post. In the absence of an Ustandar, Shahbakhti has been administering this province and, so rumour states, amassing quite a fortune while doing so.

12. The Persian Government departments are all hopelessly overstaffed and all officials and employees in them are invariably underpaid. To wield an axe and to remove unsuitable, unwanted employees is virtually impossible, it seems, for the Director of Finance here (an apparently able and honest official) has tried to do so and has bewailed the fact that, of the 800 men on his department's salary list, nearly half are utterly useless and ought to be pensioned off. He states that he recently put forward to the Ministry of Finance an ingenious suggestion for getting rid of the surplus staff, but that his proposals were rejected; as his ideas were worthy of a better fate they are briefly described hereunder:—

He suggested that each employee whose services were not required should be offered a large plot of ground as compensation for having to leave Government service; the ground should be provided from the thousands of square miles of Crown lands which are lying idle and unexploited throughout Persia. In this way all parties—the State, the Administration and the community as a whole—would stand to gain.

V.—Economic Situation.

13. *General Observations.*—The upward trend of all prices has continued during the past month and there are no signs here that the Persian Government is making a serious attempt to arrest this movement. Stocks of imported merchandise are rapidly dwindling here and in consequence prices are rising sharply from day to day. To quote two examples: (a) A German-made incandescent lamp, which could be bought here for 280 rials in July last, cost 360 rials in November and cannot now be obtained for less than 500 rials; (b) a lamp chimney-glass which cost 12 rials in July rose to 14 rials in October and now costs 18 rials. Even the inferior Tehran-made lamp-glasses, which cost 4-5 rials each in July last, have risen to the monstrous price of 9 rials. While price increases can be easily explained, if not justified, in the case of imported goods, the considerable rises in prices of locally-produced commodities and goods are inexcusable. The trouble is entirely due to the cupidity of most Persians, who are by nature profiteers and hoarders almost to a man. They will close their eyes to Persia's great need for wheat and will quite cheerfully smuggle wheat or other produce out of Persia in order to make large profits by selling on a market where prices are much higher. Never satisfied with a reasonable margin of profit, (say 8 to 10 per cent.) merchants expect a return of 25 per cent. or much more on their investments and commercial transactions; prices are bound to soar under such conditions unless energetic action is taken by the Government. Actually, nothing is being done here and this admittedly difficult problem is not receiving the urgent attention it deserves. If the question of price control is neglected it may cause serious discontent and this is certain to manifest itself in increased anti-British feeling; our troops will, not unnaturally, be regarded as having, by their entry into Persia, created the economic chaos which set in throughout Persia as from the time of their arrival. It seems important, therefore, that in our own interests, the above-mentioned situation should be brought to the notice of the Persian Government and that the latter should be urged to take immediate and drastic steps to check profiteering and to control prices as far as possible.

(a) *Wheat.*

14. The wheat situation is reported to be satisfactory at present and the snows and rains which have fallen during December should improve crop prospects for 1942. The beneficial December rains should result in stocks of wheat—hitherto hidden and hoarded in rural districts and held in reserve lest next year's crop should be poor—being brought into the towns for sale to the Wheat Monopoly Company. It is not quite certain whether wheat growers have held back the grain which they will require for spring sowing or whether they have already sold all wheat harvested by them last summer; there is, however, reason to believe that sufficient wheat has been held back by growers for autumn and spring sowings. No grain shortage should, therefore, occur in this district before the 1942 harvest becomes available, as local supplies are, according to statistics furnished by reliable Persian sources, expected to be sufficient for this district's requirements—provided that Tehran and other towns in Persia do not draw upon this district's reserves and provided also that unexpectedly large quantities of grain are not smuggled out of Persia into Iraq during the next few months.

(b) *Sugar.*

15. Local sugar supplies will be exhausted in 6 or 8 weeks; the production of the Shahabad Sugar Refinery (under 1,000 tons and not 1,200 tons as previously estimated) will, when made available for supplying the needs of this district, provide only 4 or 5 months' supply. By the month of June, therefore, there should remain no stocks locally, unless sugar is transferred to this district in the meantime from elsewhere in Persia or unless imported sugar can be obtained. Supplies from Ahwaz are expected to be sent here within the next month or so.

(c) *Rice.*

16. The situation has eased in recent weeks and sufficient supplies are now available for the public, but prices are now 60 to 80 per cent. above those of 3 or 4 months ago; best quality rice was 8.40 rials per batman in August, whereas it is now sold at 15 to 16 rials per batman. It may be added that owing to the enormous increase in the prices of rice and raughan (ghee) the consumption of rice (Persians' most popular food) has been reduced considerably.

(d) *Cotton and Woollen Goods.*

17. There is a shortage of most materials in the bazaars here and prices have risen considerably in consequence. Supplies from weaving centres in Persia, such as Isfahan, Tabriz, Shahi and Yezd, have been arriving in much reduced quantities, as a result chiefly of the increased demand in the places where the textiles were manufactured and also because of the difficulty in securing lorries for transporting merchandise to this part of Persia.

Stocks of imported woollen goods are rapidly nearing exhaustion and prices have risen by several hundred per cent., as further supplies may not reach Persia until after the end of war. Imported cotton goods (*e.g.*, white shirtings, mulls, "Italians" (for linings), prints, &c., which are much in demand here) are quite unobtainable. Although a few bales of Russian cotton goods have appeared in shops here, the quantity has been quite negligible and it has not affected local market prices.

(e) *Other Commodities.*

18. In general supplies are short, but not so short as to justify fears that within a few months the public will not have enough to eat or will not be able to get materials for its clothes. The price of fuel (wood) has, of course, risen steadily in recent weeks and is now at a record winter level, but, as it is normal for wood and charcoal to cost more in winter than at any other time of the year, complaints concerning this price increase are difficult to justify in view of the great demand for fuel and the smallness of supplies, especially as these have to be brought to the towns from remote country districts.

(f) *Wages and Salaries.*

19. There has been a general rise in wages and salaries in the past few months; not only have Persian Government employees had their wages increased by 40 to 100 per cent. (as compared with the salaries paid one year ago), but private employers of labour have also increased the wages of their workmen or employees recently, in view of the enormous rise in the cost of living, which has been continuing uninterruptedly during the past six or seven years.

VI.—British Propaganda Efforts in this District.

20. British propaganda activity in this district has been unavoidably restricted for many weeks past owing to lack of staff and also as the result of the failure of the responsible authorities to supply to this consulate sufficient propaganda material (in Persian) and to supply, above all, portable radio-broadcasting equipment, portable cinema apparatus and films for the same.

21. Despite these handicaps a modest start has been made in the up-hill task of trying to influence public opinion here. In order to make it possible for the public to hear the news broadcasts from London every evening, under cover instead of in the streets, a disused cinema has been rented and equipped with stoves. In this old cinema between 200 and 300 people gather every night to hear the news—which is preceded by a short programme of Persian music produced by gramophone records. The cinema provides, at the same time, convenient opportunities for distributing propaganda and publicity material and for exhibiting posters, war photographs, &c. It is hoped to make similar arrangements in Hamadan, Senna, Kerind, Kangavar and Malayyir, as there is no doubt that the Persian public appreciates these news broadcasts and the short programmes of music which precede them and, above all, the opportunities they afford of escaping from the cold streets to a place where one can linger in a warm atmosphere for an hour or so.

22. A small number of British Newsreel films (with Persian sound-tracks) arrived in Kermanshah on the 16th December and have been shown at the local cinema since that date. They will be shown at Hamadan during January 1942. A few more films are due to arrive soon, but the supply needs to be multiplied several times over in order to produce any appreciable effect upon Persians, the majority of whom seem to be still convinced that Germany will win the war. Spectacular films and radio broadcasts relaying loud music need to be provided in ever-growing volume if any impression is to be made on local public opinion. To this end portable battery-operated radio sets and travelling cinematograph units with all their necessary equipment should be provided for use in Persia in adequate numbers as soon as possible. As long as British propaganda activity is delayed, anti-British feeling will inevitably increase; this is bound to be the case

so long as the difficult economic situation is not remedied and the Persian public remains in ignorance of what the Allies have done to aid Persia in her present difficulties, which are popularly believed to be due to our presence here.

VII.—Material Aid to Russia via Persia.

23. Only a small percentage of the total flow of war materials, &c., which have been entering Russia via Persia during December have passed through Kermanshah, and it is satisfactory to note that the scores of lorries which were lying idle at Khanikin rail-head a month or so ago, awaiting the arrival of loads, have for the most part loaded up and left Khanikin for North Persia.

VIII.—German Efforts to trade with Persia.

24. There is good reason to suspect that pro-German Persians and Iraqis are continuing to trade with Germany via Turkey—or at least trying to do so. The method whereby the British blockade is avoided is simple: (a) The Persian exporter declares to the Persian and Iraqi Customs authorities that the goods he is exporting from Persia are destined for either Egypt, Palestine, United Kingdom or United States, via Iraq in transit; (b) the goods at the time they enter Iraq are marked "Via Iraq in Transit" and pay the small transit duty; but when once they are within Iraq the bales or boxes (while remaining unaltered as regards weights and markings) are prepared for export to Turkey and, in the place of the supposed United Kingdom consignee, a consignee in Istanbul or Izmir is substituted; (c) the goods are sent by rail to Turkey, where the consignee takes them over and redirects them to Germany.

25. Unless a close watch is kept upon all exports to Turkey from Iraq and Syria, there is the possibility that some merchandise will trickle into Turkey en route to Germany or Axis-controlled countries in Europe; it is believed, however, that the volume of this traffic is not likely to be large.

IX.—Reopening of a Russian Consulate at Kermanshah.

26. There has been no Soviet representative here since the end of 1937, when the Russian Consulate in Kermanshah was closed. It is reported that two officials of the Russian Embassy at Tehran are due here shortly and will make preliminary arrangements for the reopening of the Russian Consulate. Reactions in local Persian circles—official as well as private—at the presence in their midst of Soviet consular officials are certain to be unfavourable.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Kermanshah, December 31, 1941.

[E 556/163/34]

No. 27.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 26, 1942.)

(No. 221.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of political despatch No. 53 of the 14th December, 1941, from His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran regarding the internal situation at Tabriz and in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, December 30, 1941.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 53. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, December 14, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to report that public order at Tabriz remains good, but that in Azerbaijan there continue to be incidents indicating unrest and a kind of resentment of lawful authority, possibly due to the period when there was for a time no gendarmerie or other sign of administration, and when junior Russian

officers were telling the villagers that a new day had dawned, free of greedy landlords and oppressive Government taxation. At present the peasants in many places refuse to pay, or demur at paying, the octroi tax when they bring produce into any provincial town, refuse to give the landowners their share of the last harvest, and object to the presence of the new gendarmerie. At Sarab the latter sent a message to say that 2,000 peasants were gathering round the town and threatening trouble, but by chance two lorries full of Russian troops passed through on the way from Tabriz to Ardebil and this was enough to scatter them. At another village towards Ardebil the inhabitants are reported to have forcibly disarmed a party of five gendarmes.

2. As there are no Persian military forces in Azerbaijan, and as the Russian army of occupation has been much reduced, the Persian authorities were planning to increase their gendarmerie to about 4,000 men, but the Russians have now informed them that not more than 1,500 will be allowed. Colonel Basti tells me that the latter figure is barely enough for the province in normal times, allowing ten men to each rural post, and in disturbed times like the present is not sufficient to preserve order, let alone allow of a reserve to send quickly wherever needed. From Maragha comes a report that the bandit Hussein Ghuli, far from surrendering, is hovering round that town with a considerable following. If the Soviet forces were making a definite arrangement to keep order in Azerbaijan in every eventuality, one could understand their proposed limitation of the local gendarmerie, but this is by no means obvious, and, in fact, there are many Persians who think that, by their shadowy policy among the local peasantry generally, the Russians may be fomenting unrest and potential trouble for reasons of their own.

3. Similarly, the Soviet authorities here have told the Persian Governor of Tabriz that the city's police force must be reduced from its present figure of 20 officers and 400 men to one of 12 officers and 205 men, at a moment when the Police Chief, Sarhang Saif, was asking Tehran to increase the force to about 900 men. He says that 200 policemen are not enough to keep order in a town of 220,000 inhabitants, especially in present conditions when unemployment is bad, prices high, food not too plentiful, demagoguery rife and communist ideas not far below the surface. The robberies and pilferings so common in the autumn have now been put down by a firm round-up of all suspicious characters and known criminals, but the Soviet Political Bureau are apparently complaining that these include a lot of their agents and friends, and complain therefore that the Persian police are working against them! Last week they demanded the immediate dismissal of Sarhang Saif, but the governor replied that he could not dismiss him without authority from Tehran. I am reliably informed that the night before last a party of four armed civilians held up a couple of policemen on duty in the outskirts of the city and took away their rifles. Tabriz itself is undoubtedly full of illicit arms, chiefly army rifles thrown away or hidden by the defending forces who broke up at the approach of the Russian column on the 26th August. The price of a rifle has now risen from 1,200 to 3,000 rials. It scarcely seems the moment to reduce the police force of the largest (and certainly potentially the rowdiest) provincial city of Persia to such a small number as 205. As the authorities say, it takes 60 policemen on day and night reliefs to guard the prison alone. I fear that if the Soviet authorities enforce these unreasonable demands the Persian authorities, including the Governor-General, will decline responsibility for preserving public order, and the unpleasant experiences of last September, when the Russians refused to police the town themselves or to allow the local police to do so efficiently, will be repeated all over again, with knifings and pickpocketing in public in the daytime, and innumerable burglaries and citizens staying up sleepless at night.

4. During the absence from Tabriz of Major-General Novikoff and also of his assistant, Major-General Khrashchev, the Soviet Political Bureau, now under a certain Major Antonoff, seem to have been giving full rein to their ideas of how a temporarily-occupied province should be run. They made a descent on the printing office of the only respectable Tabriz newspaper, and also searched every room in the editor's private house because he printed some German news bulletins received from the Pars Press Agency at Tehran. The journal (which wrote in favour of the present Government in Tehran and in the interests of law and order generally) is now suspended, while two other irresponsible demagogic newspapers are free to print attacks on the present administration and a good deal of nonsense about the wrongs of the Azerbaijani populace and their historic rights to independence. The Persian authorities do not venture to curb them for fear of Russian resentment. The Soviet political officers also seized five British Movitone news-reels because one of them offended a junior

officer's sense of propriety by showing a scene in which Hitler saw off some troops to the front and received bouquets. The management of the cinema which showed such alleged Fascist propaganda was arrested and kept in prison for some days. I was not informed of the seizure of these British films, and when I suggested that I might see them projected to have an idea of the offending parts, was told that they had already been sent away from Tabriz. While the Russian OGPU or NKVD or Politruk, or whatever it likes to call itself, can furnish a pretext for its somewhat heavy-handed goings on, it hardly seems necessary to ransack a private house in order to stop news bulletins in a small newspaper, or to seize five films and clap two or three surprised individuals into gaol for a week because one film was slightly displeasing, and it seems clear that this is a Soviet method of cowering any independent attitude and probably of encouraging or clearing the way for their own local creatures. But it arouses much resentment and misgiving among the better-class Persians, official and non-official, and aids the present German radio campaign against the signing of the treaty. They point out that the only newspaper which was supporting the Tehran Government is stopped, while abusive anti-Government and irresponsible journals can continue—and ask why the Soviet political officers are doing the Nazis' work for them here.

5. I have mentioned before the publication here by the Soviet authorities of a newspaper in Azerbaijani Turkish called *Vatan*; of course they did not comply at all with the Persian press laws or even consult the local authorities, but in any case explained that the newspaper was for "their own people," whoever these may be. But now I am told that local Persian school-teachers are being circularised to subscribe to this paper (which merely by being in Turkish runs counter to the official educational policy, to say nothing of its communist contents), and junior Russian officers are bursting informally into the schools urging subscriptions, and then advising the teaching of Azerbaijani Turkish instead of the Persian language. These officers are probably of Russian Azerbaijan or of Armenian race, and in spite of all the pronouncements of higher policy and promises of non-interference are undoubtedly imbued with the idea of joining Russian and Persian Azerbaijan into one cultural, and later one political, unit. If I mildly protest to the head of the Soviet forces of occupation (a purely military personage, or apparently so) he can always disown these junior officers of another branch as exceeding their duties, or deny any knowledge of their particular activities. They will probably be curbed however for a short time, I have found, and then begin again with what after all is their job and their reason for existence. As the number of combatant troops here grows less, the preponderance of these political agents in uniform makes itself more evident, and really one is obliged to wonder what they all do here. Their latest achievement was the staging of a "Moscow Concert" in an occupied schoolroom, a harmless third-rate entertainment of the barn-storming type with conjurors, recitations, comic songs and the like. One of the performers (a so-called eccentric dancer) was a Scotsman named Campbell who has taken Soviet citizenship and State employment under the name of Karlin.

6. The party of Kurds who were taken on a cultural trip to Baku returned after about ten days. Two of the chieftains came to lunch with me one day before leaving for Sauj Bulagh, but showed no great enthusiasm for the wonders they had carefully been shown. What seemed to impress them was the fervour and well-guided mentality of the school children whom they were allowed to question. It is said that the Russians are now organising another free trip to Baku, for the ordinary residents of Tabriz who may wish to go.

7. Sugar is now distributed in Tabriz by ration cards at the rate of 1,200 grammes per month, under the control of the Persian authorities, to whom the Russians sell 6 tons per day. The Soviet organisation no longer deals with private merchants in Tabriz, but sells large amounts to individuals in the provinces without any reference to the Persian authorities. The latter have asked for details, so as to organise fair distribution in provincial centres and prevent hoarding (or so they pretend), but with no success. They hint that Russian distribution goes by favour, and is useful as a means of propaganda or persuasion, as what costs them about 3 rials per kilogram, can be and is given away, and then sold at 35 or even 50 rials in some towns by their protégés. Two respectable Kurdish acquaintances of mine from Mahabad were refused sugar by the Russian Trade Commissioner here because he said he had none available. When I heard that another merchant in that district had had 9 tons that same day, I tackled M. Agaronoff and he immediately agreed to let them have 2 tons each.

8. During the last fortnight it has been very difficult to interview Russian staff officers of any section, as all were away day after day on "exercises," even

in the bitterest frost and snow. Shortly before this there were continual blasting explosions for several days a mile or two outside Tabriz, and it may be that some scheme of local defence is being drawn up or practised.

9. It is curious to see that the Tehran press continues to print regularly obviously officially-inspired paragraphs about the Tehran-Tabriz railway line. They promise that rails will be laid as far as Mianeh by the end of this month, and yet it is clear to the most ignorant and untechnical traveller by road that the rails cannot even enter the Kufan Kuh Gorge, miles south of Mianeh, for many months, as there is an enormous bridge hardly begun as yet, to say nothing of tunnels still hardly pierced in the mountain side.

10. As a change from former conditions, as recently as this summer, when only the Germans could distribute propaganda in this district, over 6 cwt. of British propaganda of a score of varieties in Persian, English and French have been distributed in Tabriz by this consulate during the last fortnight. Letters of thanks have actually been received, and the consular staff repeatedly asked for more. This does not mean, however, that the educated classes have suddenly switched over to our side, as there have been some very long faces in the cafés this last fortnight at the distressing news of the German retreat from Rostov and gloom at the Nazi failure to reach the Caucasus this winter is confidently expected.

11. The Governor-General informs me that the police and gendarmerie have now received their increased pay for the last month. There is a story current that some of them (and other Government officials here) have said that as salaries have been raised to meet the higher cost of living, naturally the usual bribes, presents and other perquisites will have to be increased in proportion. Nobody appears to know where the money will come from for these increases in the present stagnant and uncertain condition of the country, and when I questioned the local Director of Finance about it the other day he seemed to treat it as a rueful kind of joke.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 563/14/34]

No. 28.

Sir R. Bullard to the Minister of Information.—(Received in Foreign Office, January 26.)

(No. 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 6, 1942.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 4th October last, I have the honour to transmit to you copies of a further report by the press attaché to this legation on the internal situation in Persia.

2. It will be noted that Miss Lambton stresses the general fear that dictatorship has not disappeared from Persia for ever. I do not myself consider that the existence in Persia of a dictatorship as such is a matter of the first concern to the average Persian; though, naturally, when this form of Government is pushed to such excesses as it was during the last years of the reign of Reza Shah, it does directly touch the life of every man and woman. In this connexion the comments of the military attaché to this legation seem particularly apposite. He observes:—

"Has anyone, however long their experience of Persia, ever known a so-called constitutional Government that had the confidence of the man in the street? Could anyone put up half a dozen names that would command such confidence? Persia is quite unfit, even in peace time, for constitutional Government, though she might carry on with the pretence of it stiffened by foreign advisers. Otherwise another dictatorship, either of the British minister or of someone supported by us."

3. I venture to quote also the comments of Mr. Squire, which seem to me to sum up the position in a few words:—

"I should say that the main preoccupation of all classes is the question of food supplies. This brings with it all sorts of reactions, according to class, e.g.: The very poor: Discontent with the Government for their inefficiency and corruptness in dealing with the situation. Those who listen to Berlin broadcasts and their dupes: Dislike of the British, who are, of

course, held responsible. Merchant classes: The determination to make what they can out of the present chaos, regardless of the distress they cause. The upper classes: Despair of the position to which the policy of the past Government has brought them, and fear of what the future may bring—food riots, bolshevisation, and so on. Next comes the fear of being dragged into the war, a fear general among all classes; and finally, among the less ignorant, intense dislike of Russia and of all idea of association with the Soviet régime."

4. Certainly among the propertied classes and those who have any direct stake in the prosperity of the country, this fear is deep-seated and universal; and it is strengthened by what appears to be the desire of the Soviet Government to weaken in every way the authority of the Central Government as a preliminary step to the creation of conditions favourable to the growth of the Communist idea, and to the eventual bolshevisation and incorporation in the Soviet Union of the fertile provinces of Northern Persia.

5. A copy of this despatch and enclosure is being sent to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office; the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department; His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and Angora; the Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo; His Majesty's Minister of State, Cairo; and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Report by the Press Attaché on the Internal Situation in Persia.

(No. 1.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch of the 4th October.

2. With the formation of the new Cabinet the situation has become somewhat clearer, though it is still far from crystallised. The reaction of the population to foreign affairs continues to be coloured by the complicated internal situation.

3. The new Cabinet, consisting, as it does, largely of persons who have held high office during recent years, is regarded, generally speaking, with resignation and apathy. The abdication raised high hopes of widespread changes, of democracy and freedom, which the people expected would fall into their laps for the asking, but their hopes were largely changed into resignation and despair when the new Government and the Majlis were found to be composed of the same persons who had held office during the latter years of the Pahlavi régime. It should, however, be noted in passing that those who criticised this state of affairs had no alternative to offer. The Government do not inspire the man in the street with confidence, and there is an unexpressed fear lest they may, at any moment, adopt once more dictatorial methods. No one feels secure that dictatorship has disappeared from Persia for good. Consequently, there is a general disinclination to come forward into the open. It is felt that there is no security that another dictator may not arise with the open or tacit support of the British Government, and, if this should happen, woe betide those who have striven for popular government and democratic reform. In view of the Atlantic Charter and the repeated declarations of British statesmen, this fear may seem groundless, to anyone living in the political security of a Western democracy, but, when viewed from a Persian background, taking into consideration British action in Persia and the interpretation put upon British inaction in that country during recent years, it takes on a rather different complexion, especially if it is remembered that Persia is bordered by Iraq and India, where, to the superficial observer, protestations of self-determination and democracy may seem somewhat hollow.

4. Various trends in public opinion may be observed. The older politicians, including the majority of the present Ministers, do not wish to declare themselves. This is partly due, no doubt, to the fear that if the Germans came back they would suffer for having shown themselves to be pro-British; but it can also be ascribed to a desire to retain their jobs, whichever way the wind may blow. It should be borne in mind, however, that, in seeking to avoid a clear-cut decision, they are perhaps carrying out the wishes of a large section of the people.

5. The majority of the Deputies in the Majlis would seem to be most concerned with the desire to retain their seats. There is a relatively strong old-fashioned element in the Majlis, and there are signs of its attempting to reassert itself. The main motive which actuates the Deputies, however, would seem to be personal interest in profit.

6. Outside the Majlis, in so far as opinion is politically conscious, the following trends can be observed: (i) An older group which is still influenced by the Islamic tradition and tends on the whole to be anti-totalitarian and pro-democratic in theory. Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that they prefer other people to be democrats, without necessarily being such themselves, because democrats tend to treat other people better than totalitarians. (ii) A group composed of relatively young men who are anti-Nazi, anti-Fascist, anti-clerical and inclined towards communism. These are not numerous, but they are one of the few groups which hold their opinions sincerely. They have no outstanding leader, and in political thinking would appear to be so much in advance of their own countrymen that it is, perhaps, unlikely that they will obtain a large following. They are disgusted with the present state of affairs, particularly with the fact that the Government has remained virtually unchanged. If conditions continue as at present, there is a chance that they will turn away from the democracies, for the reason that the entry into Persia of Great Britain, the leading belligerent democracy at that time, and Russia has brought no real democratic reform. They may gradually be forced to the conclusion that the only hope of achieving their aims is a general conflagration, upon the ruins of which they may be able to build a "new order" for Persia. (iii) There is a relatively numerous group of young men, many of them educated in Europe—doctors, teachers, lawyers and others—who are distressed at the present state of affairs, and recognise that Persia's future is in danger both from external and internal forces. They are not politically-minded, but events are forcing them to think about politics. This element is neither pro-English nor pro-German; they have no cohesion and no political plan. They prefer democracy to dictatorship, but do not know how to start tackling the problem before them. (iv) Amongst the older schoolboys and younger university students there is a marked pro-Nazi tendency. This is not surprising. German military successes have, after all, been striking and such as are likely to captivate the imagination of unthinking and unguided youth. They have, moreover, for some years been subjected to intensive German oral, written and visual propaganda.

7. In addition to the groups roughly outlined above, there is the mass of the people, some of them extremely poor, semi-literate or illiterate. Between these and the so-called upper classes there is a deep gulf, both in material means and in outlook. They have retained, to a considerable extent, their religious belief, which is being expressed more openly since the change of régime. Their poverty is acute. They are chiefly interested in questions of daily life, food and public order. In both respects conditions have been and are unsatisfactory. The responsibility for this, as for all evils which occur in Persia, is laid at the door of the British Government. Consequently, Great Britain is unpopular, and this is accompanied by a widespread tendency on the part of the people to look to Germany to save them from the ills of the present. This attitude seems to be fairly common throughout the country.

8. The question of the Anglo-Russian-Persian Treaty, while not at first arousing great interest among the general public, is being received with increasing opposition, partly as a result of the publicity given to it on the Berlin radio, the Majlis and local press. Many people object to it on the grounds that it is allying Persia too closely to the enemies of Germany, because, in the event of a German victory, which many consider likely, Persia would be in the soup. As conditions are at present she can plead, if the Germans come, that the superior force of the Anglo-Soviet armies made surrender necessary, but that it was an unwilling surrender. Others oppose the treaty for purely parochial reasons; internal conditions are bad, and therefore the treaty, regarded as a British measure, is viewed with disfavour. The only group who really welcome the treaty are the anti-Fascist group, who are quite clear where they stand and have no wish to retain a foot in either camp. The German attempt to rouse the nation against the treaty in the name of patriotism has had little general success.

9. The idea of an alliance with Russia is, moreover, distasteful. Russia is hated and feared and her policy towards Persia regarded with the greatest suspicion. This, of course, reflects on the position of Great Britain, because it was Great Britain who, according to the general belief, for some unaccountable reason, brought the Russians into the country, but there is a tendency for opposition on this score to become more vocal.

10. The attitude towards Turkey is not altogether free of suspicion as regards Turkey's intentions. There are some who fear that Turkey may seize upon the present time to push claims against Persia or even to attack her.

11. Internal conditions, as stated above, leave much to be desired. Public order, which under Reza Shah was excellent, has so deteriorated in some provincial districts that convoys have had to be instituted on the roads. The tribes, notably in Kurdistan and Fars, have also risen up, and, while not in armed revolt, resist the authority of the Central Government and withhold taxes. In some districts public order has been restored, in others it is still unsatisfactory. This is a matter of close concern to the people.

12. The second fundamental question is that of food supplies, which is also far from satisfactory. It is true that the food situation in the capital has improved, but in the provinces local shortages still occur. Until steps are taken to assure sufficient food supplies at low prices to the masses both in the town and country districts, the people will inevitably look to Germany to save them from their present plight.

I have, &c.,
A. K. S. LAMBTON.

[E 769/26/65]

No. 29.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggallay (Kuibyshev).

(No. 37.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 2, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador, when he came to see me this afternoon, handed me the enclosed memorandum on the organisation of the Persian railways. I told the Ambassador that for the moment I could only say that we would look into this question again. Our view was that the dividing point of the line should be at Tehran, and not at Qum, as desired by the Soviet Government. M. Maisky replied that the division of the line at Qum would have no practical disadvantages, since the management of the railway was under a joint Anglo-Soviet Board in Tehran. His Majesty's Government might fear, however, that the division of the line at Qum might be the first step in extending the Soviet sphere of influence in Persia. He could give me a most categorical assurance that his Government had nothing of the kind in mind. The Soviet Government were satisfied that the division of control at Qum was technically possible.

His Excellency earnestly hoped that we could meet his Government's wish. The matter might seem to us a small one, but it was "symbolic."

I am, &c.,
ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 29.

The Soviet Ambassador to Mr. Eden.

My dear Foreign Secretary,

February 2, 1942.

ON the instructions of my Government I submit to you the memorandum which contains their observations on the memorandum handed to me on the 17th January last on the organisation of the Persian railways, No. E 374/26/65. I shall be glad to receive your reply informing me of the concurrence of your Government to the views expressed in this memorandum.

Yours sincerely,
J. MAISKY.

Memorandum.

IN reply to Foreign Office Memorandum No. E 374/26/65 of the 17th January, 1942, on the question of organising the Persian railway, the following can be stated:—

The northern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway with the branch lines Tehran-Bandarshah, Tehran-Zinjan, Tabriz-Julfa, Tehran-Shakrud, situated in the zone where Soviet troops are stationed, must be under Soviet control. This question has already been settled with the British Government, the Soviet Government having received an official communication on this matter through the

British Minister at Tehran, Sir R. W. Bullard, to their Ambassador in Iran in September of last year. On the basis of this arrangement which had already been agreed to by the British Government, the Soviet Government was, and is still, carrying out all preparatory measures for the completion of the railway line between Zinjan and Tabriz. The Soviet Government is willing to supply all the necessary materials—rails, &c.—required for the construction of this line and, at a later stage, rolling-stock. In addition to this, in view of the expected increase in rail transport facilities, the Soviet Government will, in the near future, send to Iran the requisite number of Soviet railwaymen in order to help the Iranian authorities man the northern section of the railway line, and to exercise control over the railway.

The Soviet Government was guided by the following considerations in the selection of Qum as the dividing point of Soviet-British control of the railway: when the division of control of the line was effected it was understood that the northern section, which is situated in the zone where Soviet troops are stationed, would be under the control of the Soviet authorities; equally, the southern section of the railway, which is situated in the zone where British troops are stationed, would be under the control of the British authorities. With regard, however, to the section of the railway which lies between these two zones, it should be divided, as far as control is concerned, into two equal sections between the Soviet and British authorities respectively. In this connexion the Soviet side proposed Qum as the point of division between the two sides.

The section of the railway Tehran-Qum is served by the large railway shed at Tehran. At Qum there is a comparatively small railway shed with a turn-table. This, therefore, fully justifies the selection of Qum as the point of division of control between the northern and southern sections from the technical standpoint. With regard to the arguments put forward in the Foreign Office memorandum to the effect that the transfer and control of goods at such an important point will bring with it an increase in clerical work, it is considered that this difficulty can easily be overcome, and cannot be reckoned as a serious obstacle in the selection of this station as a point of division of control. The desire of the British authorities for their personnel to have direct access to the railway workshops at Tehran is accepted, and there is no objection to this proposal from the Soviet side.

So far as the length of the northern section of the railway is concerned, it should be pointed out that, although there are in fact 1,090 kilom. completed in the north, the Tehran-Shakrud line (which forms a part of the northern section), about 320 kilom. in length, is not a main line for the transit of goods, but is used only for local Iranian goods traffic. In view of this only the Tehran-Bandarshah and Tehran-Zinjan lines (the last not yet officially opened for use), which together amount to something like 770 kilom., could be considered as the transit main line, having a really great importance for the Allies at the present time.

Taking into account all the above, the Soviet Government expects that its proposals concerning the control of the Trans-Iranian Railway will meet with the approval of the British authorities, and that in the nearest future it will be possible to institute effective collaboration in establishing control and carrying out all the necessary measures connected with this railway.

*Soviet Embassy, London,
February 2, 1942.*

[E 796/796/34]

No. 30.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 15, 1942.

THERE have been several articles in the Persian press recently about the census and the population of Persia. One writer points out that the recent census of the thirty-five largest towns shows their population to be only 2,264,851, and he concludes that the total population of Persia can hardly exceed 10 million, whereas people had been led to think that it was between 15 and 18 million. This estimate was, in fact, current, and the late Shah even declared to the Egyptian Ambassador that the population would be found to be at least 20 million. In view of the forceful methods favoured by the late Shah, it might have been supposed that he would find means to inflate the figures of the census, but there is no ground to suppose that they were falsified.

2. The same writer points the high rate of illiteracy as revealed by the census, and quotes these figures:—

	Population.	Number of Illiterates.
Tehran	540,000	334,501
Tabriz	213,542	165,867
Kashan	44,114	38,718

3. Another writer reminds his readers that the heavy taxation of the late régime was, in fact, even heavier than was supposed, because it was spread over a much smaller body of people than the authorities counted upon.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad and Angora.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 797/163/34]

No. 31.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 19. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 56 of the 29th December, 1941, on the subject of the situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, January 16, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, December 29, 1941.

I HAVE the honour to report that the situation at Tabriz remains as before, quiet on the surface, but with a good deal of ferment underneath. Public opinion continues to be puzzled by the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the Kurds, which is probably much less Machiavellian than it appears to be, but in that case gives unnecessary grounds for suspicion. The local discontented and politically-minded elements are now forming various "parties," which distribute membership-cards to their adherents and hold semi-secret meetings in private houses to satisfy their innate Tabrizi passion for intrigue. The sense of most of them appears to be that Azerbaijan should be more democratic (a sop to the watchful Soviet political Cerberus!) and should be virtually separated from the decadent, tyrannical and unwanted Government of Tehran.

2. In the countryside the situation is still uneasy, and the gendarmerie authorities are obviously nervous, although, in my opinion, much of the trouble is due to their own sense of inefficiency—and also to a knowledge of their own unpopularity. About a fortnight ago a handful of individuals under one Mohamed Agha collected arms in Tabriz itself, and set out for the Ahar district gathering lawless adherents as they went. Any gendarmes whom they encountered on the way apparently handed over their rifles tamely without opposition, but at last the party came to a large village where the ordinary inhabitants seized and disarmed them, tied their hands behind them and then asked the authorities in Tabriz what they should do with them. In the Maragha district the bandit Hussein Ghuli, whom I have previously mentioned, was able to extort a large sum of money from the people of Binab, while (according to the Russians) the force of gendarmerie sent to protect them fled at the first exchange of shots. Hussein and his band of about 100 men then advanced to near Azarshahr, only 35 miles from Tabriz, where nervousness began to spread in the bazaars. The gendarmerie thereupon went out in force to the attack, but the bandit got away, with the loss of only two or three men and a few horses.

3. I mentioned in a previous report that this Hussein Ghuli was in touch with the Russian garrison at Miandoab, and the Governor-General here now informs me confidentially that, when he asked certain important Kurdish chieftains in that area why they did not deal firmly with this (non-Kurdish) bandit, they replied that the Soviet political authorities had practically forbidden

them to do so. At least six weeks ago General Novikoff told me he was going to round up Hussein Ghuli himself, but it seems that other ideas have prevailed.

4. Every day the streets of Tabriz see Kurds swaggering about in their tribal costumes (still theoretically illegal), armed with daggers, pistols and cartridge-belts, and sometimes carrying rifles or even tommy-guns. These they either picked up from the fleeing Persian armies in August, or have acquired by purchase in Tabriz itself under the eyes of the Persian authorities, who profess themselves unable to control them for fear of Soviet interference. This attitude probably arises also in part from a fear that any Kurd challenged might resist the police by shooting and that a Kurdish riot might then begin in the town. The Soviet authorities are undoubtedly to blame for this fear, whether it is justified or not. Anyone can see the hotel now used by the Russian military headquarters constantly visited by the turbaned Kurdish bravos, while the Russian Trade Commissioner's office (certainly not restricted only to trade matters) has a constant stream of Kurdish visitors. It is estimated that the Russians have sold (or in some cases given away) over 200 tons of sugar to selected Kurds, some of whom have even resold it in Tabriz instead of taking it to their own areas, as doubtless intended. Of course, the Soviet answer is that they wish to keep the Kurds peaceful and contented, but it does not inspire much confidence among the non-Kurdish population here to see their method of doing so. While wishing to restrict the numbers and arms of the police and gendarmerie, they should not allow the blatant arming of the most lawless section of the Azerbaijan population, and certainly not permit individual Kurds to walk about armed in Tabriz, giving the obvious impression of being special Soviet protégés.

5. Although Tabriz is reasonably quiet, the middle-class, and especially some of the larger merchants, are still nervous of trouble. I learn that some of the latter have decided against the hoarding of goods and food-stuffs which was going on, not for moral reasons, but because they fear possible popular resentment before long and the sacking of their stores. The threatened reduction of the police force here by the Russians also has its effect, and it is said that the exodus of the better-off families to Tehran and other parts of Persia has now begun again. There are a great many beggars on the Tabriz streets these days, and the authorities have opened a shelter for 250 of them; as in other countries, however, the intended inmates prefer soliciting alms in the cold, and it is seriously alleged that Russian political officers have been heard discussing their plight with these unfortunates and urging them to protest against it. Russian officers, in any case, visit local Persian factories, discuss conditions with the workers, photograph them, and in one instance got them to sign a joint statement about their joy at hearing of the Russian recapture of Rostov.

6. On the other hand, some employers are pleased with an agreement recently arrived at whereby local leather factories are to supply about 85 million rials' worth of leather to the Allied Governments, with hides and tanning materials to come from India. The deal was arranged by a M. Beloshapkin, of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, and includes one factory at Meshed also. It is hoped later to obtain large orders for army boots, of which local workshops can if necessary produce nearly 2,000 pairs a day. There are talks said to be going on also with the Russians for the sale of wool, and possibly of army cloth, if technicians can be brought here to replace the Germans who fled in August. The number of unemployed in the town is beginning to cause concern even to the selfish employer and propertied classes here, and the Governor-General is taking counsel with them for alleviating the position, if possible, during the bitter winter months at least.

7. It is not that the "proletariat" here are Communist-minded so far, but the authorities fear that the demagogues (who are believed by most people to be aided and abetted by the Russians) will gradually work upon them to cause unrest and later revolt against the established order. One of the largest new "parties" is called "Tuda Azerbaijan," *tuda* meaning people or populace, and its aim seems to be to interest the lower classes, who so far have never been touched by political ideas. Its newspaper, *Azerbaijan*, edited by a formerly down-at-heel ne'er-do-well, who was known for years as a Bolshevik sympathiser, prints twice-weekly cartoons of wretched peasants and farmers being beaten and bullied by hard-faced landlords, or drawings of rich capitalists cheating poor, ragged workers of a half-penny while handing out large banknotes to dancing-girls at a cabaret, and so on. The latest cartoon depicts a group of officials being driven out by a number of peasants and workers throwing brickbats and waving sticks. The party held a large meeting at the theatre this week to pass a resolution whereby the wide main thoroughfare of Tabriz had its name solemnly changed

from "Khiaban Pahlevi" (after the ex-Shah who created it) to "Khiaban Sattar Khan" for one section and "Khiaban Bagher Khan" for another, after two local Nationalist firebrands of the 1909 revolutionary days. Last week they held a meeting in a schoolroom at which Azerbaijan rights and Tehran wrongs were proclaimed, but the gathering then seems to have been taken over by some Russian political officers, who made speeches (in local Turkish) about the war against the Fascists, and ended with the despatch of a congratulatory telegram to Moscow.

8. The present policy of the Governor-General and local authorities appears to be to humour the malcontents to a certain extent, although this attitude is not altogether to the police liking. Moreover, the country landlords have been advised to abate their demands on the peasantry for the time being and, in cases where produce was stolen or disappeared during the autumn, to cut their losses rather than irritate the villagers further. This presumably means that the gendarmerie will not now be lent to landowners to collect forcibly their dues, as they have been during the last month or two—a mistaken policy, as I several times pointed out to the authorities, since the gendarmes were sure to behave in the same old merciless way to any villagers they found defenceless, and thus encourage armed resistance among the others. Three more cases are reported of gendarmerie posts being disarmed by peasant bands last week between Tabriz and the Karadagh area.

9. Incidentally, the Soviet authorities also have been advising the gendarmerie to treat the country-folk gently, since then they will have no trouble. The Governor-General's rejoinder was to ask how the gendarmerie were to treat the lawless bands who surrounded and disarmed them, and whether they should not send extra forces to cope with them. Of course, any such Russian advice is immediately suspect to the Persian mind, particularly as Soviet officers are repeatedly said to be carrying on propaganda and other forms of interference among the rural inhabitants. An officer named Bagaroff (probably a Russo-Armenian) is reported to be very active in the Ardebil area. At Ardebil itself the Soviet military commandant is stated definitely to have demanded the release from prison of certain individuals who he said were being punished by the Persian authorities solely because they had shown themselves friendly to the Russians at the time of the occupation in August. The local authorities protested that, on the contrary, all had been sentenced after proper trial for various acts of violence, but in the end they had to give way and release the prisoners. Even in Tabriz the Soviet town-commandant visited the gaol in exactly the same sense, but was persuaded that his information was incorrect and no prisoners were taken out.

10. The sugar-rationing coupon scheme is getting under way after many upsets. The seething and fighting mobs round the coupon-issuing offices rivalled those round the sugar-selling shops before. Suddenly a large number of spurious coupons were discovered in circulation, a printer's assistant having been unable to resist the temptation to print extra sheets and slip them under a door to a waiting accomplice. A black market in sugar-loaves at three or four times the official price is still flourishing, but illicit purchasers were sadly bitten one day recently when they arrived home to find that their cones, with genuine wrappers, were actually lumps of gypsum and cement. The bread situation is still very good, and about 5,000 tons of wheat have now been accumulated in the Tabriz silo. Although surpluses are reported from almost every district here, the Soviet authorities recently bought in 3,000 tons of wheat and flour and pressed the local authorities into buying it. Yet the various demagogues and trouble-makers in Tabriz are still fiercely resentful of any rumour that local wheat is going to Tehran or other parts of Persia, and even send unofficial deputations of busy-bodies to suspected areas to make sure that this is not happening.

11. Meanwhile, wheat is known to be slipping secretly in fair quantities over the frontier into Iraq, and perhaps to a less extent into Turkey. Locally-made matches are also being smuggled out by that way, and a shortage threatens. Until recently there were large stocks of German paper in this town, but these have now been heavily reduced—it is said by consignments to Hamadan and Kermanshah, where they were immediately bought up for despatch to Iraq, before the decree prohibiting such exports was hurriedly published.

12. The local authorities are at present saying that some form of popular demonstration with red banners is being staged for New Year's Day in Tabriz by the so-called democratic elements (with Russian connivance, it need hardly be added). They profess to be worried lest what they term the "Fascist" sympathisers may convert the demonstration into one against the Anglo-Russian-Persian Treaty, which is expected to be signed on that day, and so lead to a clash of some kind in the streets. I am not inclined to take this foreboding too seriously,

although it is quite possible that some of the self-important demagogues may have discussed such a meeting, but I intend to mention it deprecatingly to the Soviet authorities beforehand in case some of their misguided junior political officers have been transgressing again in this direction.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 919/122/34]

No. 32.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 24.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 6, 1942.

THE Persian Minister came to see me to-day at his own request.

2. I congratulated his Excellency on the signature of the treaty and expressed my appreciation of the part which he personally had played in bringing it about. I then mentioned to him that you had understood from a conversation with the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs that the Persian Prime Minister wished to resign and that there was a suggestion that M. Taqizadeh might be offered a post in the Persian Cabinet. I said that, while I would personally regret his Excellency's departure from London, I would like him to know that, if he were to decide to accept office in Tehran, the decision would be very welcome to His Majesty's Government. The Minister replied, however, that he himself hoped that M. Feroughi would remain in office.

3. In the course of our subsequent conversation I referred to the unblocking of Persian balances, which had already taken place, as an example of how outstanding problems between our two countries might be solved as a result of the treaty. His Excellency then referred to economic assistance. I suggested that the Persian Government could give us details of the sort of economic assistance of which Persia stood in need, in which event His Majesty's Government would certainly consider what could be done. But he must understand our difficulties, especially the limitations imposed by shipping shortages.

4. His Excellency thanked me and said that he would report what I had said to his Government. He also expressed his gratitude for the reply which I had given to Mr. Mander's Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons on the 4th February (see my telegram No. 187), containing an assurance of our intentions towards Persia. M. Taqizadeh said that he was sure that this assurance would have fully satisfied his Government.

5. His Excellency referred with some anxiety to the subject of Azerbaijan. I told the Minister that His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz had recently visited Rezaieh and had reported that the Soviet military authorities had restored order and that the general position had improved.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 1003/21/34]

No. 33.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggalay (Kuibyshev).

(No. 47.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 12, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador came to see me to-day, when he left with me the attached note from his Government in respect of the situation in Persian Azerbaijan. I asked the Ambassador to thank his Government for the full reply which they had sent to me. I also asked him to tell them that further information which had reached me confirmed that the situation had been exaggerated by the Persian authorities.

2. M. Maisky said that he felt sure this was so, and he hoped that we would not be too ready to believe Turkish and Persian complaints about the Soviet behaviour. They were, after all, prejudiced parties in these matters. I said that it was not a question of believing these reports, but that when I received such information I thought it only the part of an ally to pass it on. I should certainly expect the Soviet Government to do the same by me.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[24085]

H

Enclosure in No. 33.

The Soviet Ambassador to Mr. Eden.

Sir,

February 12, 1942.

ON the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the following reply to your letter of the 21st January, No. E 352/21/34:—

"The information which the British Government received from their representatives in Teheran and Ankara concerning events in Northern Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan is, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, somewhat inaccurate and exaggerated. It goes without saying that the Soviet Government is interested in maintaining public order and security in Iran, particularly so in those regions where Soviet forces are stationed. At the same time it is of the opinion that order should be maintained by the Iranian Government itself. The Soviet authorities are fully prepared to assist, and are actually assisting, the Iranian authorities to take the necessary measures in this connection.

"The Soviet Government has never objected to the numbers of the Iranian police and gendarmerie being increased when this has been found necessary, and when the Iranian Government has requested this to be done. With this aim in view the Soviet Government already at the beginning of January instructed its Ambassador to give favourable consideration to the wishes of the Iranian Government in this respect. Equally, the Soviet Government consented to the passage of Iranian military units through Iranian Azerbaijan and the Khurasan Province, in the numbers found necessary by the Iranian Government to destroy the bandit groups which have appeared in these districts, and for the restoration of good order there. This was carried out immediately the Iranian Government expressed their desire for such action. Apart from this, the Soviet Government ordered the Command of the Soviet troops in the aforementioned regions to assist the local Iranian authorities in ending the activities of the bandit and anti-Government groups, and in establishing public order there.

"The Soviet Ambassador in Iran, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, has twice called the attention of the Iranian Government to the necessity of taking urgent measures to effectively combat the rebels and to establish order and security in the regions affected by these internal troubles. The Soviet Ambassador, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, also conveyed a message to the Iranian Government that it was prepared to render any help the Iranian authorities required in this matter.

"As a result of these *démarches* of the Soviet Ambassador the required numbers of Iranian troops, police and gendarmerie were sent to the regions previously mentioned, and the Prime Minister of Iran, M. Furanghi, on behalf of the Iranian Government, through the Soviet Ambassador, expressed his thanks to the Soviet Government for their assistance in destroying the bandit groups and for all the measures they took in this connection.

"From the aforesaid it is quite clear that any information which differs from the above facts, and which may perhaps be based on incorrect and biased rumours, should not be considered as reliable. Of course all Hitlerite agents, especially in the region where the bandit groups are operating, are trying to paint a false picture, as for instance, in spreading provocative rumours that some of the Khans at the head of the bandit and rebellious movements in Khurasan are supposed to be English agents. It is the task of the Iranian authorities, with the help of the Soviet authorities on the spot, to dispel all such rumours, which certainly have only the one aim to stir up trouble amongst the population.

"With regard to the situation in Northern Kurdistan, the whole of the information at the disposal of the Soviet Government on this matter shows that events in this region were the sequence of troubles which occurred in the southern region of Kurdistan. The situation which developed in Rezaieh was created exclusively by the provocative attitude of the Governor of Rezaieh, Khupalluh, who was engaged in spreading false rumours and striving to stir up trouble between the various nationalities. All this created a great mistrust towards the local authorities among the local population of the town of Rezaieh. The presence of Khupalluh in Rezaieh became so harmful that the Iranian Government itself decided to relieve him of the governorship. After the departure of Khupalluh from Rezaieh, the whole situation entered upon a period of normalisation and the Soviet military forces stationed there helped considerably in effecting this. As a result part of the local population which had previously left for Tabriz has now returned to Rezaieh. In this case also, desiring to meet the wishes of the Iranian Government, the Soviet authorities not only put no obstacles in the way

of the Iranian police and gendarmerie being increased in Kurdistan, but, on the contrary, consented to the despatch to this region of gendarmerie and police according to the number required by the Iranian Government."

Accept, &c.

I. MAISKY.

[E 1178/35/34]

No. 34.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 26 E.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 22, 1942.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 E. of the 6th February, 1941, I have the honour to transmit to you, under separate cover, one copy of the Tableau Général issued by the Persian Customs Administration for the Persian year 1319 (the 21st March, 1940, to the 20th March, 1941). A memorandum prepared by the commercial secretary on the foreign trade of Persia during the period is enclosed herewith.

2. Commercial imports show a considerable increase, principally due to important imports from Germany and the resumption of trade with the U.S.S.R. Duty-free imports again show a considerable decrease, chiefly owing to much restricted requirements for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

3. Commercial exports also show an increase, owing to the very large purchases by Germany, whose share of the total exports amounted to 47.8 per cent. Oil shipments by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company show a decrease of 1,233,750 tons.

4. Copies of this despatch and of the Tableau Général are being sent to the Department of Overseas Trade and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Memorandum on Persia's Foreign Trade in the Year 1319 (March 21, 1940, to March 20, 1941).

FIGURES for the year, and for the previous year, were:—

	March 21, 1939, to March 20, 1940. (1,000 rials).	March 21, 1940, to March 20, 1941. (1,000 rials).
Imports—		
Commercial	612,164 (£7,929,584)	864,925 (£13,178,811)
Duty free	457,733 (£5,929,192)	153,788 (£2,343,264)
	1,069,897 (£13,858,776)	1,018,713 (£15,522,076)
Value of goods in transit	8,452 (£109,478)	3,839 (£58,505)
Value of goods re-exported	1,466 (£18,995)	838 (£12,780)
Value of goods transhipped	5,948 (£76,948)	11,727 (£178,692)
Total Imports	1,085,756 (£14,064,198)	1,035,120 (£15,772,054)
Exports—		
Commercial	803,888 (£10,413,059)	925,381 (£14,099,969)
Oil exports of A.I.O.C.	1,680,064 (£21,762,492)	1,313,591 (£20,015,103)
Caspian Fisheries.....	18,215 (£235,940)	14,503 (£220,991)
Total Exports	2,502,167 (£32,411,491)	2,253,475 (£34,336,063)

[24085]

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Trade balance of "commercial" imports and exports shows a favourable balance of 60,355,608 rials (£919,635). In the previous year the favourable balance was 191,724,251 rials (£2,483,475).

Official conversion rates were 77.20 rials to £1 in 1939-40 and 65.63 rials in 1940-41.

Imports (exclusive of duty-free imports).

Germany was the biggest exporter to Persia with a total of 370,630,604 rials (£5,647,270), or 41 per cent. of the total of commercial imports. The principal imports were: iron and steel ware, 65,829,800 rials; paper, 57,719,400 rials; cotton piece-goods, 51,270,200 rials; dyes and colours, 34,779,000 rials; machinery and electrical appliances, 33,699,400 rials; pharmaceutical specialties, 18,868,500 rials; iron, pig-iron and steel, 17,504,900 rials; woollens, 7,313,700 rials.

U.S.S.R. was the next biggest exporter, with a total of 83,730,000 rials (£1,275,800), 9 per cent. of the total imports. Principal imports were: cotton piece-goods, 33,325,600 rials; sugar, 9,875,200 rials; iron, pig-iron and steel, 5,919,600 rials; machinery, 3,382,200 rials, and worked wood, 3,774,000 rials.

Thanks to sugar, 59,193,000 rials, and tea, 18,758,900 rials, the Netherlands East Indies came third in the list of imports, with a total of 79,254,100 rials (£1,207,600).

India came next with a total of 78,259,800 rials (£1,192,400), due chiefly to imports of tea, 48,554,000 rials; wheat, 13,745,100 rials; and cement, 5,461,500 rials.

United States of America imports amounted to 72,505,400 rials (£1,104,700), comprising tyres and tubes, 17,443,600 rials; automobiles and lorries, 14,111,100 rials; iron, ore and steel, 14,494,500 rials; and iron and steel ware, 13,286,400 rials (including rails).

The United Kingdom share was 67,020,400 rials (£1,021,200), chiefly cotton piece-goods, 17,237,700 rials; iron and steel ware, 17,417,700 rials (including rails).

Imports from Japan amounted to 43,232,400 rials (£658,730), the bulk being cotton piece-goods, 24,615,400 rials, and explosives, 4,424,700 rials.

Imports (duty-free imports).

The total value of duty-free imports amounted to 153,788,426 rials (£2,343,260), of which 126,817,042 rials (£1,932,300) were imports of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose principal imports were iron, galvanised iron, boilers, tanks, tubes, &c., and machinery spare parts. The United Kingdom's share of the duty-free imports were 100,051,000 rials (£1,524,500). United States of America's free imports were 26,547,000 rials (£404,490), principally steel and ironware. Germany's share amounted to 9,123,000 rials (£139,000), mostly for the Persian Administrations and the match factory at Tabriz. India supplied goods to a value of 3,380,000 rials (£51,500), and Iraq 4,646,000 rials (£70,800).

Tables showing the values of "commercial" imports from the principal importing countries are attached.

Exports.

(A) Mineral Oils and Products.

Shipments of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company during the year 1319 were 7,032,330 tons valued at 1,313,591,268 rials (£20,015,100).

The principal countries of destination were:—

	Approximate tons.	1,000 rials.
(1) Great Britain and Ireland ...	3,272,380	597,812
(2) Union of South Africa ...	1,394,852	276,084
(3) India ...	716,655	127,050
(4) Egypt ...	414,135	81,371
(5) Australia ...	231,107	48,783
(6) Aden ...	186,424	33,670
(7) Ceylon ...	167,727	27,477
(8) Norway ...	155,952	26,239
(9) Italy ...	105,520	23,278
(10) Iraq ...	115,919	22,279

(B) Other exports.

The principal exports were:—

	Approximate Tons.	1,000 rials.
(1) Wool, raw and carded and hair ...	11,658	162,590
(2) Carpets ...	2,764	120,118
(3) Cotton ...	19,837	111,977
(4) Apricots ...	8,933	52,966
(5) Raisins ...	21,764	52,734
(6) Gums ...	4,317	42,437
(7) Almonds ...	4,739	34,997
(8) Lambskins (1,134,956 pieces)	...	31,171
(9) Opium ...	135	30,371
(10) Rice ...	37,700	25,264
(11) Tanned skins ...	1,589	22,968
(12) Casings ...	392	22,373

Germany was easily the biggest buyer of Persian produce, the total amounting to 67,405 tons valued at 442,883,260 rials (£6,748,180), a record figure, representing 47.8 per cent. of the total commercial exports. The principal exports were: wool, hair and carded wool, 2,860 tons valued at 99,471,240 rials; cotton, 11,369 tons, value 68,094,080 rials; carpets, 1,004 tons, value 56,253,570 rials; raisins, 20,785 tons, value 51,264,410 rials; apricots, 8,255 tons, value 49,369,460 rials; and tanned skins, 1,472 tons, of a value of 21,413,400 rials.

The United States is the next best customer, with a total of 124,135,358 rials (£1,891,440), or 13.4 per cent. of the total commercial exports. The principal products purchased in the States were: carpets, gums, wool, lambskins, casings and pistachios.

Exports to the U.S.S.R. amounted to 117,073,300 (£1,783,800), including wool, goat hair and carded wool, raw cotton, rice, live-stock and skins.

India's share of Persian produce amounted to 57,141,500 (£870,660), including almonds, spices, forage, wool, dates and gums.

Exports to the United Kingdom were restricted and only amounted to 20,981,000 (£319,700), chiefly lambskins, carpets, wool and goat hair, gum and forage.

Japan took little from Persia—gum and forage to a value of 5,667,000 rials out of a total of 5,750,700 rials (£87,600).

Imports from Principal Exporting Countries.

(Exclusive of duty-free goods.)

	March 21, 1939, to March 20, 1940. (1,000 rials).	March 21, 1940, to March 20, 1941. (1,000 rials).
I.—Total imports from—		
Germany ...	159,656	370,630
Japan ...	95,891	43,232
India ...	64,878	78,260
United Kingdom ...	47,164 ⁽¹⁾	67,020
United States ...	40,255	72,505
U.S.S.R. ...	7,180	83,730
II.—Cotton piece-goods—		
Total ...	103,123	127,099
Japan ...	83,616	24,615
Germany ...	8,231	51,270
United Kingdom ...	4,072	17,237
India ...	1,558	217
U.S.S.R.	33,325

⁽¹⁾ Included 40 kilog. of gold valued at 791,960 rials.

		March 21, 1939, to March 20, 1940.		March 21, 1940, to March 20, 1941.	
		(1,000 rials.)		(1,000 rials.)	
III.—Woollens—					
Total	12,861	11,188
Germany	7,402	7,314
United Kingdom	2,478	1,645
Belgium	1,365	426
Italy	303	912
France	643	277
Japan	415	420
IV.—Machinery—					
Total	35,875	47,541
Germany	20,735	33,699
United States	5,923	5,968
United Kingdom	3,463	2,106
France	1,201	90
Czechoslovakia	994	162
U.S.S.R.	759	3,382
V.—Rolling-stock—					
		No.		No.	
Germany	201	14,384	26	3,055
United Kingdom	83	1,517	16	1,496
United States	225	534
Switzerland	13	213
Sweden	10	78
Holland	1	15
		308	16,207	267	5,085
VI.—Motor lorries, buses, &c.—					
United States	89	1,441	280	6,334
U.S.S.R.	6	120	58	1,294
Germany	3	368	1	30
United Kingdom	1	20
		99	1,949	339	7,658
VII.—Complete cars—					
United States	409	6,834	505	7,973
Germany	25	624	217	6,158
United Kingdom	8	79	4	47
U.S.S.R.	1	1	6	125
Italy	1	11	3	35
France	1	32
Sweden	1	22
		446	7,603	735	14,338
VIII.—Motor cycles—					
Germany	321	978	355	979
United Kingdom	5	18	5	3
		326	996	360	982
IX.—Cycles, triicyles—					
United Kingdom	4,523	1,163	1,700	499
Germany	1,404	395	1,605	400
India	565	77	106	16
Japan	90	9	3	0.8
U.S.S.R.	33	8
Others	6	2	4	1.3
		6,621	1,654	3,418	917

		March 21, 1939, to March 20, 1940.		March 21, 1940, to March 20, 1941.	
		Tons.	(1,000 rials.)	Tons.	(1,000 rials.)
X.—Rails and accessories—					
Poland	14,932	13,670
Germany	4,257	3,773	308	816
Denmark	5	19
Belgium	10,153	9,791
United Kingdom	8,331	10,372
United States	5,910	6,777
U.S.S.R.	2
		19,195	17,462	24,702	27,757
XI.—Iron and steel worked metal including tools and nails—					
Total	49,602	85,182
Germany	30,570	65,015
United Kingdom	5,803	7,045
Czechoslovakia	4,206	824
United States	3,077	6,606
Belgium	1,637	1,357
U.S.S.R.	359	2,534
XII.—Sugar—					
Total	90,491	87,298
Belgium	28,303	4,211
Holland	22,455	2,348
Java	17,762	53,193
Egypt	16,301	11,602
U.S.S.R.	3,900	9,875
XIII.—Tea—					
Total	80,976	69,098
India	52,290	48,554
Java	24,384	18,759
Ceylon	2,028	1,256
Japan	1,807	452
China	18	73

[E 1245/122/34]

No. 35.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 33.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 1, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to enclose French translations of the speeches delivered, at the dinner held to celebrate the signature of the treaty of alliance, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister in Persian and by the Soviet Ambassador in Russian. A copy of my own speech is also enclosed, in English. Summaries were sent to you in my telegram No. 143 of the 31st January, 1942. (1)

2. The Prime Minister had suggested beforehand that my Soviet colleague and I should try to dissipate the anxiety caused by the reports that when the Secretary of State was in Moscow he made a deal with M. Stalin about Persia. He admitted that the clear wording of the treaty ought to suffice to dissipate the false reports, but pleaded the ignorance of the Persian public and (this to me alone) their suspicion of Russian motives as justification for his request. M. Smirnov was so fortunate as to discover a wide assurance given by M. Stalin in his last speech, and he quoted this; as for myself, I was able to convey an assurance based upon my conversations in Moscow.

3. It will have been noticed that the Prime Minister did his best to associate the United States with the alliance. When the signature of the Atlantic Charter was first announced I quoted the charter to the Prime Minister and the Minister

(1) Not printed.

[24085]

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for Foreign Affairs as affording an additional guarantee for the execution of British and Soviet undertakings towards Persia, and this obvious idea has been adopted by the Persian Government so firmly that they not only secured the insertion in the treaty of a reference to the charter, but they even suggested to the American Minister, as I reported in my telegram No. 57 of the 12th January, that the United States should adhere to the tripartite treaty of alliance. They are even expecting economic assistance from the United States, Mr. Bullitt having aroused their appetite by suggesting that Persia might be able to benefit by the provisions of the Lease and Lend Act.

4. The Prime Minister, in his desire that the draft treaty should be discussed fully, so that no one should be able to accuse him of having secured its passage under pressure, seemed annoyingly dilatory to His Majesty's Government and at times even "prevaricatory." Having, however, secured a sweeping majority for the treaty in the Majlis, he is supporting it strongly. This support is very valuable, for I doubt whether any other Persian statesman has the reputation for honesty and disinterestedness which M. Feroughi enjoys.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Kuibyshev, Bagdad, Cairo and Angora, and to the Secretary of the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, New Delhi.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1457/57/34]

No. 36.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 7.)

HIS Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of Kermanshah Diary for the month of January 1942.

Kermanshah, February 1, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 36.

(Confidential.)

Kermanshah Diary for January 1942.

(a) *General Observations.*

IN this district there have been few developments during the past month, which has passed very quietly. Very cold and snowy weather brought almost to a standstill Persian military activities; but minor operations were successfully carried out against some rebellious tribes, i.e., Kurds (Galbaghi, Sinjabi, &c.) and the Kakawand (near Harsin). At the same time there was a marked diminution in brigandage.

The Persian General Officer Commanding, General Shahbakhti, undoubtedly made further progress in the restoration of order during January; indeed, the situation is now almost normal, except in Kurdistan.

2. The Government's authority is now firmly established throughout the whole Kermanshah consular district except for some areas in Central Kurdistan, and efforts to bring these areas under control are likely to be made when the roads are free of snow and military movements can be carried out with greater facility.

3. The general state of feeling here, though still unfriendly, has tended to improve slightly, largely as a result of Allied successes in Russia and in North Africa. Fear and mistrust of Russia are growing, however, and if the Russians' activities in North and North-West Persia were less hostile to the Persians, there is every likelihood that Anglo-Persian relations would much improve.

(b) *Persian Administration.*

4. Amir-i-Kull Zanganeh, a well-known landowner and notable in this district, arrived here on the 25th January to take over the duties of Ustandar (Governor-General) of the Vth Ustan. On the same date Zein-ul-Abidine Qiami, a senior official in the Persian Ministry of the Interior, arrived here on appointment as Farmandar (Governor) of the Kermanshah Province.

5. Amir-i-Kull is an elderly easy-going man with little administrative experience or ability and possessing very little "drive." He is not a strong

character, and it is clear that he will show little independence of judgment, and will follow the advice of Qiami, an able, energetic official, so it seems.

6. Amir-i-Kull has made loud protestations of friendship and of his desire to collaborate with the British authorities in Persia, and it seems probable that he will be helpful; at the same time it is unlikely that he will be able to exercise much influence over the Persian General Officer Commanding here, who, though not actually unfriendly, can hardly be said to be whole-heartedly pro-British in his attitude.

7. Another important change in the local administration during January was the appointment of Colonel Artta as the chief of police in lieu of Colonel Jehangiri, who was removed from Kermanshah largely as a result of his insufficiently helpful attitude to the British authorities.

8. The Farmandar of Hamadan has also been changed recently, and the incumbent of that post is an official named Sayyid Majidi, regarding whom little is known at present.

(c) *Situation in Kurdistan.*

9. Both the Kurdish rebels and the Persian military authorities have found it impossible to be very active during January owing to heavy falls of snow and to the bitterly cold weather which prevailed here for several weeks, until the 25th January. The Persian military authorities, probably because they suspected or sensed an easing-off in the Kurdish rebels' liking for the struggle, decided to advance upon Diwanderre (40 miles north of Senna)—where the garrison was beleaguered—and, after a skirmish with the Kurds at Zagheh, near Diwanderre, about the 12th January, relieved their garrison. About thirty-four tribesmen were killed and 150 prisoners were taken; the Persian military authorities expressed the intention of shooting the prisoners as a warning to other Kurds. Lest there should be a wholesale massacre of the latter, this threat was reported to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, who took steps through the Persian Minister of War to prevent it.

10. It can hardly be doubted that, if large numbers of Kurds had been shot or hanged in cold blood as was originally suggested, the Kurdish rebels' hatred for the Persian administration would have been intensified and their determination to resist would have been strengthened. If the Persian military authorities cherished hopes of crushing Kurdish resistance by intimidating the Kurds as a result of wholesale shootings and hangings, it is almost certain that these hopes would have been doomed to disappointment. As the Persian authorities must surely realise the unlikelihood of breaking Kurdish resistance by resorting to "frightfulness," one is forced to the conclusion that either the threat to shoot the 150 Kurds was an idle one which it was not seriously intended to carry out, or that irresponsible Persian officers were contemplating action which might have produced serious consequences.

11. At a moment when the Russians are reliably reported to be encouraging the Kurds to hope that, with Soviet support, they will be able to secure redress from the Persian authorities or even some measure of autonomy, it would seem high time that the Persian authorities—in their own interests—made a serious attempt to seek a friendly settlement with the Kurds. To alienate Kurdish sympathies still further is the surest way of driving the Kurds into the arms of the Russians and to encourage the Kurds to turn to the latter for help which has been denied to them by the British military authorities.

12. A hint in the above sense was conveyed to the newly-arrived Ustandar (Governor-General), Amir-i-Kull, to-day, and he appeared much impressed with the soundness of the advice. It was emphasised that the opinion expressed by His Majesty's Consul was a purely personal one, and did not necessarily represent the views of His Majesty's Government. The Ustandar admitted that the Kurds had some cause for complaint, and that there was good reason to attempt a new approach to the Kurdish problem. As a sure means of placating the Kurds the suggestion was put forward by His Majesty's Consul that conscription (of which the Kurds strongly disapprove) might be suspended—at least temporarily—in Kurdistan. This suggestion aroused no unfavourable comment, and it is not unlikely that the new Ustandar, who is making a series of tours in his Ustan on assuming office and expects to visit Kurdistan shortly, will make some efforts to act upon the advice given to him. Indeed, he expressed the desire to discuss with His Majesty's Consul the Kurdish problem and to obtain his views thereon and suggestions for solving it.

13. At the moment the roads in Central Kurdistan are blocked with 4 to 10 feet of snow, and no military or guerrilla operations on a large scale can be attempted with any certainty of success. Sakkiz (75 miles north-west of

Senna) is still occupied by rebel Kurds, and rumours from Kurdish or alarmist Persian sources that the Russians have moved so far south as that town are regarded as untrue by competent judges of the situation. It is practically certain, however, that a Soviet detachment has for some time past been stationed in Sauj Bulagh, 120 miles north-west of Senna. The Persian military authorities are known to be anxious to reoccupy Sakkiz, but, as explained above, there is still too much snow on the roads to make an advance to that area possible, and, in any case, it is likely that Hama (Mohammad) Rashid Waina and other Kurdish rebel leaders would oppose the occupation of Sakkiz if and when attempted.

14. General Shahbakhti, General Officer Commanding here, has appointed Saifullah Khan Ardelan as Farmandar of Sakkiz, but this appointment is obviously premature. He has also appointed as Farmandar of Merivan Mahmud Khan Kanisanan, who will be responsible to him for the maintenance of order in that area. It is difficult to judge how far this appointment should be regarded as indicating that the Persian Government's authority has been restored in the Merivan and Avroman districts. Actually, there is no confirmation that Persian military and civil authorities have re-established themselves in that area; if that is the case, the appointment of Mahmud Khan as Farmandar of Merivan is little more than a piece of window-dressing designed to foster the belief that conditions in Kurdistan are improving and becoming normal once again.

(d) *Tribal Notes.*

15. As the tribal situation in Kurdistan has been dealt with in the previous section of this diary, there is little of much importance to report regarding tribal affairs in the rest of this consular district.

16. The Kalhur tribe is quiet, and it is to be hoped that the calm will not be disturbed as a result of the rivalries of the two principal claimants to its headship, Amir Makhsus Ghobadian and Kerim Davudian.

17. Pressure brought to bear recently upon the Kakawand tribe has also yielded good results, and the tribesmen have surrendered and agreed to hand over their arms and most of the property—chiefly cattle and sheep—looted by them from their neighbours.

18. It would, however, be a mistake to conclude from the above undoubted successes that all the tribesmen in this district have now handed over to the Persian military authorities the arms which they managed to collect in September and October 1941. Exact figures showing the totals of all arms, &c., collected are not available, but it would be unwise to assume that, as a result of recent tribal surrenders, the tribesmen in this area are completely disarmed, determined to keep the peace and willing to respect and obey the Persian Government's authorities. It is probable that, while a large percentage of the tribesmen's arms has been surrendered, many hundreds of rifles—perhaps even 2,000 or 3,000—are still in their hands; it would be too much to expect the tribesmen to give up all their rifles, which will certainly provide the wherewithal for a good and profitable "shooting" season later on.

(e) *Economic Situation.*

19. During January prices of all commodities and goods continued to rise sharply, and, despite representations made to the President of the Municipality and to the chief of police by the British municipal authorities and by this consulate—urging the need for immediate and drastic action to combat profiteering and hoarding and to control prices—the situation further deteriorated.

20. At his first interview with the newly arrived Ustandar His Majesty's Consul referred to the serious effect of the recent rise in most prices on the living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the local population, and emphasised the fact that, as earlier representations had yielded no results, the time to take immediate and energetic measures to reduce prices and to punish profiteers was long overdue. Although it is only one week since the Ustandar arrived, a beginning in the uphill task has been made and a slight fall in prices of a few commodities has been brought about. The local population is, however, still too apathetic to collaborate with the local authorities and the latter can hardly be expected to make such headway as long as the townsfolk hesitate to denounce profiteers and do nothing to help Government officials in their efforts to check the rise in the cost of living here.

21. The wheat situation is now regarded as satisfactory and local stocks are known to be large enough to meet the needs of this district until mid-July, when the 1942 crop becomes available. Incidentally, the 1942 wheat crops in the

Kermanshah district are likely to be about 30 per cent. below the average in volume.

22. Sugar stocks are getting very low and unless further consignments reach Kermanshah before the 10th March, local supplies will by then be exhausted.

23. The local authorities are encouraging farmers to plant, during the late winter and the early spring, maize, rice and peas; crops of the above will be a valuable addition to the country's food stocks if wheat supplies run short.

24. Supplies of matches in this district have dwindled to almost vanishing point, and cigarettes, too, are getting scarce; in consequence, speculation in the above articles is going on despite the fact that prices for them are "fixed" by the Persian Government.

25. Imported cotton piece-goods are now almost unobtainable and even locally produced cotton goods are obtainable only with great difficulty as the local authorities are eking out supplies by reducing the amount of the materials made available for sale to the public.

(f) *Tripartite Treaty: Local Reactions.*

26. The treaty negotiations, as described in the Tehran press, aroused not a little interest and owing to the anti-British attitude of the majority of the population, comment was generally unfavourable at first. As the meaning of the treaty became generally known and the population gradually became reassured that the treaty did not provide for the calling-up of Persians to serve in the Allied armies, comment on the treaty became less unfavourable and it was regarded as a necessary evil which Persia could not possibly avoid.

27. There is absolutely no trace of enthusiasm, however, and any functions held to celebrate the occasion of the signature of the treaty are likely to be a fiasco. Indeed, despite the fact that General Shahbakhti was informed a month ago that it was considered fitting that the signature of the treaty should be made the occasion for celebrations, he has made no move. Nor has the Ustandar. Neither the British military authorities nor this consulate have taken the initiative. As the signature of the treaty has revoked no enthusiasm, and the arrival of a Soviet consular colleague upon the scene will strike yet another discordant note here, it is proposed to await a less unfavourable occasion for giving a large party.

(g) *British Propaganda and State of Local Feeling.*

28. During the past month there have been no noteworthy developments as far as British propaganda in this district is concerned. British news-reels and films with Persian sound-tracks are still awaited. Travelling cinematograph units which were expected to be in commission by the end of 1941 have not yet arrived. The numbers of battery-operated radio sets (with loud-speakers) available in this district are still inadequate. Suitable posters and publicity material are still arriving in a quite insufficient volume; indeed, Persians might well imagine, when considering our propaganda efforts in Persia, that Britain is indifferent as to what Persians think about the Allies' war efforts and is not trying to influence local opinion here.

29. Steps are doubtless being taken to provide the material, the equipment, the funds and the staff for carrying on propaganda on a suitable scale here, but in the meantime the campaign here is "hanging fire" and our half-hearted methods are arousing in British circles unfavourable comment and criticism.

(h) *Opening of Soviet Consulate, Kermanshah.*

30. With reference to paragraph 26 of Kermanshah Diary for December 1941, M. Viatcheslav Chvetsov, the Consul of the U.S.S.R. arrived here on the 21st January, since which date he has been looking for a house in which to establish his consulate. He has not yet made a formal call on His Majesty's Consul. As neither he nor the two Russian members of the consulate's staff speak any language but Russian, it is difficult to imagine how the Soviet's consulate propose to maintain contact with Persians in general and the local and British authorities here. As Soviet interests here are non-existent, it may make no difference whether the members of the staff of the Soviet consulate are able to talk Persian and/or English, or not.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL, *Consul.*

*British Consulate, Kermanshah,
February 1, 1942.*

[E 1478/262/34]

No. 37.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 35. Secret.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 5, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum in which His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah expresses the fear lest the non-Moslem minorities in Persia should suffer, after the retirement of the foreign troops from Persia, for their friendly and helpful attitude towards His Majesty's forces. I may quote a relevant passage from my telegram No. 45 dated the 9th January, in which I reported on the attitude of the Apostolic delegate in Tehran:—

"He was, however, concerned for the fate of the Christians, especially in Azerbaijan, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Rightly or wrongly, the Moslems accused the Christians of helping the invader and were already threatening vengeance.

"I admitted that His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz had similar apprehensions."

2. Emigration to British territories is not feasible except in a very few cases, and we must face the fact that when the Allies withdraw from Persia large numbers of non-Moslems who have incurred the enmity of their Moslem compatriots for their real or fancied support of the invaders will be left behind among a hostile population. The massacre of the Assyrians in Iraq may serve as a warning of what might possibly happen here on a large scale if no steps were taken to prevent it. It is suggested to me that as the many Jews and Christians we employed during the last war came to no harm afterwards, the present apprehensions are baseless; but I do not think the analogy holds, for although the Persian Government seemed to believe during the last war that the Germans would win, there was not that anti-British feeling among the Persians that there undoubtedly is now in many districts, especially in Kermanshah and Hamadan. The Russians are also widely hated. The vanity of the Persian Moslems, especially the military class, has been severely wounded, and it would be the natural thing for them to take revenge upon the non-Moslem minorities.

3. It seems probable that the Persian Government will wish to stand high in world opinion during the early years after the present war, and that they will consequently do all they can to prevent any occurrence which would stamp Persia as incompletely civilised. Moreover, they will retain a dread of Russia which should prevent any victimisation of any persons who may have been useful to the Soviet forces during the occupation, and will try to avoid in general any act which might be used as a pretext for Soviet intervention.

4. For a considerable number of years Persia was almost immune from criticism in the press of foreign countries: the slightest unfavourable reflection on anything Persian called forth a protest from the Shah, and out of deference to his susceptibilities, and fear lest his irritation should react unfavourably upon their interests, foreign Governments tried to induce the press to refrain from publishing anything about Persia that was unflattering. However necessary this may have been to protect foreign interests in Persia, it certainly encouraged Riza Shah in his obstinacy and his indifference to the effect of his policy upon his people, since it silenced the one voice which might have exposed defects and expressed grievances. It is to be supposed that the foreign press will not be held in check in regard to Persia after the war, and that any threat to the non-Moslem population from vengeful Moslems will be widely reported and discussed. This should act as a serious deterrent, by its effect upon the Persian Government.

5. After the drafting of this despatch had reached this point I had an opportunity to mention to the Prime Minister the possibility that Moslems in Persia might be feeling revengeful towards the non-Moslems. M. Feroughi, while he professed to believe that the Moslems "would never do such things, not being savage like the Arabs," said that non-Moslem foreigners tended to show a preference for Christians and Jews in Persia and that this might arouse feelings of jealousy. He instanced the Belgians who used to manage the Persian customs; they seemed to prefer Armenians; and he suggested that perhaps the British military authorities might be showing a similar preference—a feeling no longer justified, now that Persian Moslems are acquainted with foreign languages. I did not suggest to M. Feroughi that perhaps the greater energy and capacity for work and general reliability of the Armenian and Jew caused them to be preferred

above the Persian, but thanked him for a promise he gave me to keep the matter in mind.

6. I am, therefore, of the opinion that circumstances will encourage the Persian Government to keep the peace between the various races and religions, and I think that they will have the power as well as the desire to do so. I am, however, arranging for the possibility of inter-communal strife to be mentioned to various Persians of influence, so that the governing class may be aware of the danger, such as it is.

7. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah, and copies, with copies of the enclosure, to the Government of India, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad and Kuibyshev and to His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Memorandum.

(Secret.)

SINCE the entry of Anglo-Russian forces into Persia large numbers of Persian Christians and Jews have volunteered and have given their services as interpreters, labourers, works foremen, &c.; in many ways they have done useful work which has been very helpful. At a time when most of the population of Persia has been unfriendly and pro-German in sentiment, the friendly attitude of the non-Moslem minorities in Persia has contrasted very strikingly with that shown by the Persian Moslems, who form, of course, the overwhelming majority of the population.

2. There is abundant evidence that the Moslem majority views with much disfavour the efforts made by the Christians and Jews here to collaborate with and to assist the British military authorities. It has been reported to me several times that Moslems have warned pro-British Christians and Jews here of the fate which awaits them and their women-folk "when the Germans come into Persia and drive the Anglo-Russian forces out of the country." Many reports have reached this consulate of Christians and Jews having been threatened by Moslems in the town with death "after the cursed British troops have been defeated."

3. There has, of course, existed for many years past among Moslems in Persia a deep-seated feeling of jealousy or envy at the comparatively greater wealth and higher standard of education and comfort enjoyed by the "minorities" living in their midst. During the past few years many efforts have been made by the Persian Government to reduce as far as possible the influence and wealth of the non-Moslem minorities established in Persia. It is unnecessary to quote many examples or facts in support of this statement; it suffices to mention the dismissal of most Jews and Christians from posts in Government Departments and also from service with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the closing of schools which Christian and Jewish communities had for many decades previously maintained at their own expense for their children.

4. Unfair discrimination against the "minorities" in Persia has been the policy of the Persian Government for many years past, and it is not surprising that the Moslems in Persia—backward and lazy for the most part—have welcomed this form of Government activity and actively collaborated in "downing" the Christians and Jews in every possible way and at every possible opportunity.

5. In view of the jealousy and hatred which Moslems feel towards the "minorities" in Persia, there is, I think, reason to fear that most Christians and Jews—whether they have actively assisted the Allied forces or not—will run the risk of being savagely ill-treated by the Moslem majority after the withdrawal of our troops from Persia unless measures are taken to forestall and to deal with the danger.

6. Fears as to what may happen after our withdrawal have been expressed to me by a few people here, and enquiries have been made as to whether facilities might be granted them to leave Persia for India or for British colonies and Dominions if, after the war, their lives were endangered by serious outbreaks of "anti-minority" feeling on the part of the Moslems here. As far as possible I have allayed fears and minimised the likelihood of the dangers which they have conjured up; that the danger is wholly imaginary it would be most unwise to assume, in my opinion, for anti-British feeling, already strong, is by no means

on the decrease, and may later on develop into a feeling of greater hostility towards the "minorities" who—almost to a man—have rallied to the support of the Allies in Persia.

7. In view of the above observations, it would appear necessary to bear in mind the possibility that, later on, many thousands of pro-British Persians may ask for sanctuary in India or elsewhere in the British Empire. Two applications from would-be emigrants to India have been recommended to this consulate by the British military authorities; in both cases the applicants are Christian Persians who are now serving as interpreters with our troops and, fearing that they will be victimised by Moslems for that reason, they have enquired whether facilities can be given to them to emigrate to India after the British forces have left Persia. These are two cases typical of many similar others which are likely to arise in the near future.

8. I should, therefore, be grateful to learn whether His Majesty's Government has considered the possibility of protecting the "minorities" in Persia, in the event of the lives of the latter being threatened by Persian Moslems later on or when the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia eventually takes place.

9. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to General Officer Commanding, 6th Indian Division, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, Political Adviser, Kermanshah, for their information.

VAUGHAN RUSSELL, *Consul.*

Kermanshah, January 20, 1942.

[E 1479/163/34]

No. 38.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 36.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz No. 1 of the 12th January and Tehran letter No. 263 of the 5th February, 1942, to His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz respecting the attitude of Turkish Consuls at Tabriz and Rezaieh.

Tehran, February 5, 1942.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, January 12, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that since the beginning of the year Tabriz has passed through another period of anxiety, and comparative equanimity has hardly yet been restored; some people are reported to be still leaving, and few or none return from their self-imposed exile of four months now in Tehran and elsewhere. More than one leading official here is or recently has been admittedly on the brink of throwing up the sponge, in spite of the extra income which everyone knows that most Government employees are making perhaps even more rapaciously than before. It is indeed hard at times to decide which is the more ingrained feature of the Persian middle-class character—plain cowardice or scarcely veiled dishonesty and corruption, and one is sometimes tempted pessimistically to think that the continuance of Persian rule in this outlying province depends at times on which is the stronger factor of the two.

2. For some weeks past there have been stories of unrest in the Karadagh district, spiced with tales of Soviet intrigues among the tribesmen and incitation to revolt—as if the Karadaghis had not always been among the foremost to take advantage of any turmoil or weakness of proper government. On the 6th January, however, stories came through from fugitives that a force of about 2,000 armed tribesmen had attacked and looted the frontier post at Julfa, while the Soviet authorities looked on indifferently, and that they were marching in force on Marand, where they had already summoned the gendarmerie post to surrender, prior to making an attack on Tabriz itself. Wild rumours began to circulate that Marand had been sacked and burnt, and that there were no gendarmes available to resist the rebels. It was then that people here again talked of leaving

for Tehran, especially as it was said that the rebel leaders were Bolshevik agents, that the Soviet authorities would do nothing to check them, and that the Persian authorities would not venture to do so.

3. The next day I called upon the newly arrived Soviet Consul-General to see what he thought of the situation. He admitted that the rebels at Julfa had professed Soviet sympathies and had declared they were taking over on behalf of a new Soviet republic in Persia, but stated that these pretensions had been cold-shouldered by the Russian authorities on the frontier. It seemed clear, however, that the latter had not raised a finger to preserve order on what is their main line of communication with Tabriz. I protested to my Soviet colleague that surely his Government could not coolly watch armed rebel bands seizing towns and villages on the Julfa-Tabriz road and driving out the lawful police authorities. He must know that everyone in Tabriz accused Soviet policy of inciting and encouraging these disorders among the tribesmen and peasants. If the Soviet authorities were unwilling to take steps to restore order along this road, at least he should advise the Persian authorities here what to do, as I felt they were too nervous to do anything which they feared might not please the Russians so near to the frontier. M. Koulagenkov had hardly been here long enough to form opinions of his own, and gave me what obviously were the Soviet Political Bureau's answers, saying that those people who were accused of fomenting trouble in the villages were not Russians, but *agents provocateurs* in disguise, that the unrest was caused largely by greedy landlords going to extort money and produce from the peasantry, that the Persian authorities made trouble by persecuting those villagers who had been sympathetic or helpful to the Soviet forces of occupation (my despatch No. 56 of the 29th December last, paragraph 9, mentions the Persian version of this accusation), and that, if the local authorities really wished to put down disorder, they could easily do so. I again mentioned, however, their diffidence and timidity, and stressed what I termed our joint need for law and order in this important part of Persia, where British tanks and military supplies were due to pass shortly. I also took the opportunity of getting in a few digs at the Soviet Political Bureau's methods in this province, in flagrant contradiction with the policy enunciated by M. Stalin and the Soviet diplomats generally. To my surprise he admitted that the "military" (meaning doubtless the Politbureau or OGPU in uniform, whose existence is never openly acknowledged as such) had undoubtedly made some mistakes here, but he himself hoped to put things right.

4. Later I saw various Persian officials, and, when they sounded me for my opinion, told them to take strong measures. I learnt that the gendarmerie commandant was away at Rezaieh or Maku, unable to return because of snow and bad roads, and that there were only fifty gendarmes in reserve at Tabriz for sending against the rebels. Luckily these had just received arms from Tehran, after much delay. Actually some fifty gendarmes had already been sent to the threatened town of Marand, where the tribesmen were hanging about a few miles away. It later transpired that the latter were only about 300 in number, that a band of thirty or so had sufficed to seize the police barracks and customs-house at Julfa without any opposition being offered, and that only a few were armed with modern rifles, for which they had little ammunition. They were led by a refugee named Ismailoff, who was literate to the extent of being able to write Turkish in Russian characters, and that was all. Before this second force of fifty gendarmes arrived, they had dispersed and returned to their villages, and the inference in Persian official circles is that the Soviet authorities merely told them to be off—for the time being. They seized a few rifles and several thousand rials at Julfa, which have not been recovered.

5. I heard afterwards that the Soviet authorities here stressed their wish that the Persian gendarmerie should not use uncalled-for violence against the rebels. Such Communist tender-heartedness, strangely at variance with what is related of their own methods in the Caucasus, Turkestan and Sinkiang in the past, has its own meaning, of course, for the Persians. Although I try to deprecate stories of deliberate Soviet and Communist intrigue among the peasantry, I am now convinced that the Russians are, in fact, trying to make the country people at least sympathetic to them. Unfortunately, their ignorant and mass-propaganda fed agents or emissaries know of only one line of approach, the class-warfare one, and the results may soon be distinctly unpleasant unless some sensible corrective is administered by wiser Soviet counsels. But the unrepentant and persistent offenders of the Politbureau, as was shown in various parts of Asia, not to mention many parts of Europe, go their own irresponsible way, whatever the smooth foreign commissars may be saying to the contrary to

foreign diplomats in Moscow, and so it is here. I have good reason to believe that this Soviet political clique in Tabriz definitely resent my presence here, as it seems to necessitate more subterfuge than would otherwise be used, and even an occasional stoppage of activities for a short while when some clumsy apprentice of theirs blunders too crassly. For some months now no Russian authority, civil or military, has visited this consulate, however often I may call to see them, although they cannot possibly accuse me of working against them in any way. Now that a Soviet Consul-General has been appointed here, speaking French and with a certain amount of knowledge of the world outside, relations may be a little less one-sided.

6. I have mentioned in previous reports the manner in which Kurds swagger about carrying arms in Tabriz. Local opinion has averred for some time that these arms were supplied freely on the demand by the Soviet authorities, but I was loath to believe this, because the Russians always seemed so short of arms themselves and keen to pick up stray Persian army rifles. But I am assured on official authority that a few weeks ago a party of Kurds left here with a Russian lorry containing 100 rifles for the Sauj Bulagh district, and that the Soviet authorities sent word to the Persian gendarmerie along the route that they were not to be examined or interfered with. The Soviet Consul-General has formally denied to me this story, but unfortunately spoilt the effect by adding that the Major Nabieff whom I had named as accompanying the consignment (I had done nothing of the sort and had never heard of the officer) could be proved never to have left barracks in Tabriz that day. I have learnt from a different and really reliable source that the Soviet political officers here actually presented a new army pistol, complete with ammunition, as a mark of esteem to the 6-year-old son of a Kurdish chieftain whom I knew. One of the Soviet political officers I was talking to at a party last autumn about hunting and shooting in this part of the world confessed that he was of Kurdish origin (doubtless from the Erivan-Mount Ararat region), and I know he occasionally visits the Kurdish area near Sauj Bulagh, and also interviews Kurds in Tabriz.

7. As I think I have said before, it may be that the Soviet forces still do not feel too sure of their Turkish neighbours and wish to use the Kurds against them if necessary. My Turkish colleague professes to have felt a certain coolness lately in the Russian attitude here towards him, but he is already so anti-Russian at heart that I attach no great importance to his feelings. Besides this, the Soviet authorities have openly told me that the Turkish Consulate is "working" very hard these days, leaving me to guess what at. I only know that my Turkish colleague has two vice-consuls and two Turkish secretaries, although his community is only about thirty all told, and mostly uncherished Armenians at that; yet he let out that he was asking for still another vice-consul from Angora to cope with the work. Whenever I see him his brain teems with scare-mongering stories of the bazaar type, which I realise have been fed to him by his hosts of Armenian spies and informers here. He says that the Russians are continually sending along stool-pigeons to him offering their services as Turkish spies, but that luckily he has means of knowing days beforehand that they are coming. He told an English traveller who visited him the other day that the Russians are killing off people in Tabriz almost daily, and that he is continually protesting to them officially, both of which statements are completely and flagrantly untrue. He pretends to be a very deep and knowing servant of his country's interests and professes great admiration for any particularly deceitful or machiavellian piece of work, yet if conversed with for long enough and worked up properly will betray himself and his opinions in the most extraordinary way. Although he professes to me to be now pro-English, I am entirely convinced—and so is almost every European who meets him—that he is a thorough German sympathiser and admirer of the Nazis.

8. In fact, I am sometimes inclined to wonder, although I have perhaps no right to do so, whether some of the unrest in this province is not being stirred up by the Turkish Consulates here and at Rezaieh, and that the Russians are more truthful than one might think in saying that *agents provocateurs* are working disguised as Russians. Any Armenian or Azerbaijani would do for the work, with a knowledge of the Turkish dialect spoken here and a little red in his buttonhole. The Persian rural police would not dare to arrest such an individual, and the Russians would learn about him too late. My Turkish colleague expresses the utmost scorn for the present Persian régime and says it has no right to govern this country. During an astonishing outburst the other day he told me: "Mark my words, one day I shall be the Governor of this place, and then you will see what kind of administration they will get." It is not the

first time I have sensed this kind of idea, though never so baldly expressed. He has just been for a week's visit to the new Turkish Ambassador in Tehran, and is in close touch with Angora. One might be tempted to wonder whether Turkey has really hopes of annexing Azerbaijan, unless my colleague was talking complete nonsense, and whether Germany has promised this province as a gift in case of a Nazi break-through to the Caucasus in the spring with Turkish connivance or assistance.

9. M. Ramazanoglou always seems to have a good repertory of the more malicious rumours floating round the bazaar here, the latest one being that, if the Russian forces should push the Nazis back to the German frontier, the British would then make terms with the enemy rather than allow Europe to be invaded by the Bolsheviks. This kind of talk, of course, easily goes back to the Soviet authorities here via their Armenian toadies and informers, as it is no doubt meant to do.

10. There has been a little less "democratic" movement going on in Tabriz lately, partly perhaps because of the bitter cold in all meeting-places, and because quarrels have apparently broken out among some of the self-important and self-seeking leaders. Their newspaper *Azerbaijan* no longer fulminates so loudly in favour of Azerbaijan rights and independence, culture, language, justice, &c., but argues in favour of the poor and oppressed, against hoarding and the dangers of the continual increase in prices here. The other newspaper, *Shahin*, also cries out about the poverty rife here, the indifference of the rich, the scandal of the sugar rationing, the unbridled corruption in every branch of public life, with scurrilous attacks on the ex-Shah (including the princes and princesses) and his dishonest and cruel administration, especially the gendarmerie.

11. One awkward question has been brought to light in the shape of a fund of 8 million rials raised a few years ago in Tabriz from a small tax on bread, and intended for the needs of the town and its poor. The money had somehow disappeared to Tehran, but such a noise has been made that the authorities there have promised to send it back, together with a grant of 4 million rials more for helping and finding work for the unemployed here. Unfortunately, even if these promises are fulfilled, no one expects any but a small percentage of the proper sums to reach their real end, so terrible is the speculation and corruption from top to bottom of the Administration. However, funds are to be advanced to factory owners to enable them to employ more weavers and spinners and leather workers, and there may be some left over for unspecified public works. One might have thought that the wealthy factory owners could have raised funds in the ordinary way through the National Bank of Persia if necessary, but no doubt the much-reviled Administration and officialdom wish to gain a little appreciation and applause in this manner, apart from the fact that the said owners show no such public spirit or sympathy with the unemployed whatever. At present their nerves are on edge with the thought that bolshevism may spread or is spreading here, that the Soviet intends gradually to undermine and then, in spite of all denials, take over this province of Persia; and that, in any case, there will be an appalling clash in the Caucasus in the coming spring from which everyone here, and especially themselves, will suffer. Disquieting stories are coming from Rezaieh regarding an incipient reign of terror caused by a so-called committee of Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Assyrian roughs, led by an ex-chauffeur, whose idea is said to be to drive out the Tehran Administration and establish a workers' and peasants' soviet under Russian auspices. There have been several murders both of officials, gendarmes and private citizens, and it is learnt that large numbers of middle-class residents, including Government officials, are leaving the town and district and coming to Tabriz because of their fear of the worsening situation there.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

Sir R. Bullard to Consul Cook.

(No. 263. Confidential.)

Dear Cook,

Tehran, February 5, 1942.

YOUR despatch No. 1 of the 12th January, paragraphs 8 and 9.

The Turkish Ambassador recently complained to me that the Turkish Consul at Rezaieh seemed to be alarmist and subject to something very like persecution mania, and for that and other reasons I was certain that he would not approve

of the attitude which you attribute to the Turkish Consul in Tabriz. I therefore told him in confidence of the remark which M. Ramazanoglou made to you (middle of paragraph 8) and of his weakness for malicious rumours. The ambassador said he was greatly obliged, as it confirmed fears which he had already formed about M. Ramazanoglou. He said that he had recently written to him very stiffly, saying that it was impossible to come to any conclusion from the despatches from Tabriz what the situation was, the most alarmist reports being mixed up with the blandest optimism; and he showed me in confidence a telegram written in even stiffer terms which he had sent to Tabriz a few days before. The telegram instructed the consul to keep in mind the declared policy of the Turkish Government in regard to Persia and not on any account to indulge in any activity or to take any initiative in the affairs of the country, but to adhere faithfully to the rôle of impartial observer and reporter.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Foreign Office and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora and Kuibyshev.

Yours sincerely,

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1646/163/34]

No. 39.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 50.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch to Tehran No. 2 of the 28th January, 1942, on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, February 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, January 28, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your telegram No. 3, I have paid a visit to Rezaieh to see whether the situation there was as bad as described in rumours current during the last few weeks in Tabriz, where about 1,000 refugees had arrived because of the alleged lack of security in the town and district west of Lake Urumia.

2. Various telegrams sent by me during the first half of the month will have described reports that a Terrorist Committee formed of mixed Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Armenian and Assyrian elements was in virtual control of the town of Urumia, that many officials were leaving because they had been threatened or (as they pretend) because they could not carry on usefully in the face of such difficulties and lack of authority, that robberies and killings were rife in the town, and that hundreds of middle-class landowners, merchants and professional men were abandoning their properties and callings and were flocking to Tabriz, with a most disquieting effect on the already nervous population here.

3. Before leaving Tabriz I called on the Soviet Consul-General to inform him of my departure next day, and to discuss the rumours of disorder in Rezaieh. He said he thought that there was much exaggeration going on, that the Persian authorities there could keep order if they really wished, and that if there were disorders these were possibly caused by Fascist agents-provocateurs. This last argument I heard later from the Russian authorities in Rezaieh, and feel sure that it emanates from the Politruk department in order to hide up or excuse their own misdoings, especially when things get somewhat out of hand, on the same lines presumably as the accusations of sabotage in the famous wreckers' trials in Moscow a few years ago. I did not stress all that I had heard from various sources about the Rezaieh position, especially the charges of Soviet interference and obstruction, but gave him to understand that my journey had been planned for sometime and that I wished to know whether the rumours were false, adding that my visit might perhaps encourage the timid Persian officials to keep better law and order—in the interests of Soviet and British policy alike.

M. Koulagenkoff professed to welcome my going, and said that his people had already decided to help the local authorities in Rezaieh to keep order.

4. It is a fact that the Soviet forces there did begin on that day and the next to patrol the town and generally take the situation in hand. I did not arrive in Rezaieh on the 18th January as planned, owing to a blizzard and heavy snowstorms which forced me back before reaching Marand. By the time I got there, on the 20th January, everyone admitted that the state of the town was much easier, that the nightly robberies had stopped and that the terrorist elements had apparently ceased their activities and were lying low.

5. On the next day I called first on the Farmandar, who was left acting as Ustandar when General Cupal departed so hurriedly the week before. I found an elderly man of 68 with a quavering voice and feeble gait, a reputed opium-smoker but undoubtedly intelligent and in no mind to quit his post with the rest. In fact, he expressed himself as anxious to be properly appointed as Acting Governor-General by Tehran as soon as possible, instead of being left to carry on without proper authority. In the course of a long conversation I found the general position much as it was at Tabriz a few months ago, with the same story of a collapse of administrative discipline, helplessness and incompetence among the police and gendarmerie, nervousness of the Russians and critical misgivings at their non-co-operation on the one hand and their meddling and alleged disruptive tactics on the other, lack of social or civic sense among the middle-class population, and a readiness of the undesirable elements in town and country to take advantage of the unpopular Tehran administrations's obvious weakness and lack of direction.

6. The Farmandar said that while General Cupal had had difficulties with the Soviet authorities, he himself had little to complain of from them, but he did wish they would leave him to maintain law and order without interference. Only recently they had told him that the local police force must be reduced from 117 men to a figure of 54 only. He had demurred, pointing out that there were too few police already in view of the disturbed state of the district, but had thought best to dismiss fifteen men to begin with. Rezaieh had one hundred gendarmes, but only forty-six had had rifles until this week, when forty-four more arms arrived; such a force was completely unable to maintain security along the main roads and in the country districts and, in fact, had ceased thinking of doing so. Officers and men flatly refused to carry out their duties outside the town, and threatened to resign rather than do so. As a result, Government influence outside Rezaieh itself was practically nil; the landowners dared not visit their villages to collect their wheat and other dues, and so refused to pay the legal tax of 3 per cent. themselves. Any man of property in the countryside was liable to be robbed and (as had happened) murdered, while discontented elements, sometimes Armenian or Assyrian, had more or less set up independent village rule. In the town itself conditions were not much better. There had been a meeting in a principal mosque at which a crowd had resolved that the present Administration should be deposed, a committee of five appointed to govern the town, and a person named Sheikh Taha set up as Governor-General in place of General Cupal, who had fled. (Nothing more had come of this, however.) Hardly any taxes were being paid, except on small controlled commodities like opium and cigarettes. The peasants who brought produce into the town either refused to pay octroi-tax at the entrance, or paid what they thought fit, and the officials and police there were too nervous to deal with them. The leading local firm of distillers and wine-sellers openly refused to pay any excise-tax or put any tax-banderolles on their bottles, and had threatened an exciseman with a revolver when he called. On the other hand, there was a semi-secret committee who held meetings in a house near the governorate (and the Russian headquarters, too, incidentally), and who seemed to be developing some terrorist power over certain elements of the town's population, especially Armenians and Assyrians. Their activities, and still more their rumoured and supposed activities, had been largely responsible for the exodus of officials and well-to-do merchants, as everyone was convinced that they were known to the Soviet authorities and had their approval and support. This committee contained some sinister individuals and was enlisting the support of others by threats and fear, while it was supposed to be maintaining itself by the nightly robberies and burglaries which took place in the town, without the police daring to interfere. I heard about this committee both from the refugees in Tabriz and from every individual I met in Rezaieh, and no amount of questioning or incredulity on my part would shake anyone's belief in, and knowledge of, its existence, or of its being definitely in touch with the Russians. I also mentioned it to the Soviet Colonel Commandant in Rezaieh

during my interview with him; as usual he at first denied any knowledge of such a body, and then said it must be a Fascist organisation and would be dealt with. Next day, according to confidential information received by the Farmandar, the Russians told the committee that it had to disperse.

7. Before dealing with other problems, it would be well to describe the poor quality of the local police. My first impressions of them in Rezaieh were most unfavourable. They slouched along the pavements in twos or threes, hands in pockets, with a hang-dog look, mostly unshaven and unkempt, a few with black boots and leggings, some with khaki puttees and shoes, and one I saw with heel-less slippers and white socks as part of his uniform. The population take little or no notice of them at all. One I saw on duty at a principal crossing smoking a pipe, while a few yards away the main avenue was blocked with donkeys, whose owners had turned the spot into a standing market for wood and other produce. I saw no police officers at all in the streets, because they were all too nervous to venture out. The chief of police had not been outside for a fortnight before my arrival and lived in one room with two policemen on guard outside. Everyone says that the bulk of the policemen in Rezaieh are known to be inveterate opium-smokers and to be worthless as public guardians. The Farmandar admitted that they still only receive 120 rials a month (less than £1) as pay, although they were officially promised 240 rials months ago. The Tehran authorities promised to send more money, but have not done so. At Dilman (Shahpur) I found that policemen were getting 170 rials instead of 240. The gendarmerie are not in much better condition. Nobody seems to expect them to fight or resist wrong-doers unless they outnumber the attackers, and they will not go into the countryside, where they are supposed to be. Their chief in Rezaieh is also a characterless heavy opium-smoker. No good can be done until both corps are reorganised and properly trained, regularly paid a living wage and taught some notion of their duties. At present they are half-paid, but do not earn even that, and use the disturbed state of the town and countryside as an excuse for their sloth instead of the reverse. One really cannot altogether blame the Russians for not actively co-operating with such a nondescript and slovenly lot of individuals.

8. Although it appears that for some time the town had not been patrolled by police, when I arrived armed Soviet guards were patrolling the streets both at night and in the daytime, and everyone admitted that order was perfectly restored. One of the chief causes of police timidity was an attack by supposed villagers or Kurds about ten days before on a tax collector's post at the chief entrance of the town, in which two police and two tax-gatherers were killed and one gendarme wounded. The assailants robbed their victims before killing them, and the police say they were overcome because their rifle bullets jammed in the barrels, so rubbishy were their cartridges. The police also say their headquarters were attacked a few days afterwards in the main square of the town, but I heard on good authority that a single shot went off outside and that the police inside began blazing away through the windows in all directions.

9. At the same time that the Soviet authorities decided to patrol the town themselves, they also pointed out a number of individuals inside the town and at a village nearby as suspected of the murderous attack mentioned above, and the Persian gendarmerie arrested these. This laudable act is, however, completely overshadowed in local eyes by the alleged interference of the Russians in demanding the release of certain criminals whom the gendarmerie had arrested on their own initiative for the murder of a rich man in a village. The most has been made of this story locally and in Tabriz, and doubtless it has been spread by now in Tehran. I found out (from a good Persian source) that actually two suspects were arrested and brought to Rezaieh (the Russians say at their instigation), but, owing to the dilatoriness of Persian justice, nearly two months elapsed without their even being charged. The Russians then told the Governor-General that either they should be sentenced or else set free, so he instructed the Public Prosecutor to begin proceedings immediately. No witnesses, however, could be found willing to testify against the accused, and so they were set free. That same evening the Director of Public Security was killed in public in the town, and it was, of course, alleged by everyone that the released criminals were responsible, and the Russians naturally doubly so. There is another story of the same kind which seems to have more foundation, in which a certain well-known thief named Jelal was arrested by the police in the town, but was almost immediately released by order of some junior Soviet officers. When the Russian Commandant was questioned about this by the Farmandar he pretended to have no knowledge of the affair.

10. It was ostensibly these and similar set-backs that made General Cupal abandon his post and leave for Tehran. The truth appears to be, however, that he got himself into an impossible position by his bullying and insulting methods at the beginning of his tenure, going so far as to abuse Kurds in public and knock off their turbans. He seems also to have been unnecessarily stiff and tactless with the Russians, who probably made things no easier for him, until he was forced out of the place. During the last week or two he was obviously afraid of his life, having received threatening letters and messages, and was never without a strong guard, even taking two cars-full of police when he visited the telegraph office, only a hundred yards or so from his official quarters. If Tehran is to retain control of Rezaieh and its frontier area, it must send better men, not necessarily military officers, but proved administrators with both courage and discretion, to handle the various tribes and races, as well as to rub along with the Soviet authorities on the spot.

11. I called on the Soviet Commandant on the first afternoon of my visit, and found him with a young civilian who turned out to be the new Soviet Vice-Consul at Rezaieh, not yet officially appointed to the post. The commandant is a cavalry colonel, probably a very good soldier, but I should say not a particularly clever administrator. The young vice-consul, who acted as interpreter, made most of the running at the interview, although he cannot have been long in the place. We did a lot more preliminary fencing than is usual even for a Russian interview, until they at last asked my views on the local Rezaieh situation. I told the commandant that I realised that the Persian Administration left a lot to be desired, but that the flight of 1,000 inhabitants to Tabriz was a somewhat doubtful advertisement for the Anglo-Soviet position in the country, and that while my post was at Tabriz on one of the main lines of communication between the U.S.S.R. and British supplies, I could not but be deeply interested in the state of the country flanking this line, and so on. I mentioned the murders and robberies which were undoubtedly taking place, and touched on the existence of subversive committees in the town and district. The commandant and vice-consul replied in the now usual way about provocative acts and Fascist instigation, and even accused some of those who had fled Rezaieh without their families, of having done so expressly to injure the Soviet! I merely mentioned the unsatisfactory position of the local administration, its lack of sufficient competent forces to keep law and order, its timidity and confusion which complete Soviet aloofness would do nothing to cure, and suggested that a certain amount of moral support was called for, although I well knew that the Russian authorities insisted on not interfering in the internal affairs of the country. Our interview was very polite and friendly throughout, and yet I felt that the commandant was somewhat nervous about my visit, which had undoubtedly been notified to him some days beforehand. On the following day I heard that he sent for the Farmandar and questioned him repeatedly about his conversation with me; at the end he said that it had been decided that the local authorities might have seventy-two police after all.

12. What I did not mention to the Russian Commandant, partly because I am becoming diffident of harping on the same theme, and partly because I feel that no protests by me in Tabriz will remedy matters, was the evidence I found at Rezaieh, just as I have been finding at Tabriz, of the activities of the political officers, Politruk, N.K.V.D., or whatever the organisation may be called. While it must be said that the Persians, particularly the official and propertied classes, are only too ready to scent signs of Bolshevik and Communist activity among the masses, my enquiries convince me that there is too much done in this regard by certain Soviet authorities, either from misplaced ideological zeal or because they cannot see anything amiss in doing so in another country, especially when they find conditions lending themselves so well for the purpose. There is no Persian medical organisation whatever in the country districts, and Soviet medical officers visit the villages with professional skill—and talk about how much better off and more cared for the peasants are in the U.S.S.R. Other officers in uniform visit the schools and give glowing descriptions of Soviet institutions, besides telling the pupils to insist on being taught in Azerbaijan Turkish instead of useless Persian. Such activities have an upsetting effect on the Persian teachers as much as or more than on the pupils. The masters (as I heard from one of them who spoke good English and I think did not exaggerate) do not know where they stand, or whether it is of any use continuing with a proper programme. Discipline is bad, both between headmasters and assistants, and between teachers and the pupils, who are getting out of hand. From most of the villages the Government teachers have been driven out, or so they say, by the peasants,

particularly in the Armenian and Assyrian districts. They are idle in the town, and Tehran, they state, takes no notice of their telegraphic appeals for advice and assistance. The local director of education is known to have all packed ready for flight, which increases the general nervousness. Similarly, I heard of a Soviet agricultural expert who visits the villages without the knowledge or assistance of the Persian agricultural officials, who have a Government farm-school near Rezaieh. I met one of these local officials who had been trained in America, and who said he would be very glad himself to co-operate with the Russian agronomer and do together with him the best for the peasants in the coming season. The impression I got, however, was that the Russian is interested as much in gradual propaganda as in agriculture. It is difficult to see how to check these political activities, the Soviet mentality being what it is, and the state of this part of Persia being so favourable a soil at the present moment for their ideas. The peasants, whether Kurd, Armenian, Assyrian or ordinary Moslem, have been for years so browbeaten by the Persian officials and gendarmerie, and so fleeced and ground down by the landowner and middle-class element that when they now see the Government incapable of keeping order or administering the countryside, and find the landowner too frightened to stay among them or even visit them, they are ready to take matters into their own hands in an ignorant way and do without gendarmes, officials or landowners. The Russian officers who visit them, of course, are not likely to insist on restoring the social and economic *status quo*, and from all accounts are only too ready to suggest that the peasants should own their land and the product of their toil, and even form village committees to govern themselves for the time being. There may be nothing politically subversive about this in their opinion; they are doing what a religious missionary would presumably do if he found the forces and prestige of a heathen theocracy temporarily broken down, but it is doubtful whether they are not playing a dangerous game for all concerned in this part of the world, especially when their own Soviet Government repeatedly asserts its intention of not infringing the rights and the integrity of Persia.

13. It was interesting to learn from one landowner at Rezaieh that the minority of good and humane proprietors, who had not ill-used their peasants but had lent them money in times of need and taken an interest in their lives and welfare, were not being victimised now; on the contrary, the villagers, in some cases, stuck by them as an island in a surrounding sea of troubles. I have heard the same thing in the Tabriz district, and it seems to show that Bolshevik ideas would not have so very much scope if the Persian administrative stables could be properly cleansed and decent humane officials found instead of the corrupt and mostly unfeeling bureaucrats who hitherto have infested this area.

14. As regards the position of the peasants this year in the Rezaieh Province, I learnt from reliable sources that they have sown at least one-quarter short during the autumn sowings, and need advice about spring crops now if the next harvest is not to suffer. But their landowners have gone, there will be no money forthcoming for loans as before, the Government agricultural officials will not venture into the villages because the roads and conditions generally are so unsafe, and amid the turmoil and uncertainty the peasants have little or no confidence in the near future or even in the prospect of reaping the next crop. It may not be forgotten that little over twenty years ago these people saw their farms and crops ravaged year after year by warring Turks, Russians, Kurds and other Azerbaijanis, and it is not too fanciful for them to picture the same state of things over again. It will be a tragedy, however, if there is a crop-failure in the famous plain of Rezaieh, which has been described as the most fertile spot in all Asia, if this can be avoided by a little energetic action now.

15. The remedy for the present state of Rezaieh and its province is not easy to suggest or provide, but it will not be made easier by Tehran's leaving things to second or third-rate representatives or letting them go by default. As far as I could ascertain, there is no movement there for political autonomy, cultural independence, democratic rights and so forth, as in the more sophisticated and demagogic milieu of Tabriz; peace and order and tolerable government is all that the people I met asked for. The Soviet authorities must first be persuaded to allow efficient competent gendarmerie to preserve order along the main roads and in the non-Kurdish areas, and to allow the landowners and minor officials to return with safety to the villages, however galling or ideologically undesirable this may seem to their unwanted and unnecessary interfering political officers. The Persian gendarmes must be chosen from a different type, preferably from the country areas instead of from the towns, as at present. The police must be better trained and paid, and made more self-respecting than the shabby

nondescripts who serve little or no purpose as things are. The higher officials should be better chosen and given more responsibility, with less bureaucracy and centralisation among the lower officials. In the country districts there will have to be more freedom and less bullying, whatever the bureaucrats trained on the ex-Shah's lines may think. The Farmandar of Rezaieh told me that the need for local bakshidars, or sub-governors of country districts, has been seen and discussed and agreed to by the Tehran authorities, but there are difficulties in getting the scheme under way. Two such sub-governors have been appointed in the Salmas district, but when an attempt was made to appoint one in a Kurdish area the usual Kurdish intertribal jealousy immediately displayed itself, and various chiefs came to Rezaieh to say that on no account could that nominee control or present their particular tribes. Thus, on the one hand no Kurd may be acceptable, and on the other no non-Kurd will think of accepting such a post until authority is restored and a posse of gendarmes sent with him to maintain it, neither of which conditions is feasible at present. At Sanj Bulagh (which is in the Rezaieh Ustan) the Kurdish notable, Chazi Mohamed, continues to keep order, with the nominal approval of the Tehran Government, by means of a force of mounted men, and sanction has been given to the adoption of this arrangement among the Mamash tribes under Amir Azad, further west, but although the Farmandar has sent a message to the latter he has obtained no response as yet.

16. I would add a few odd impressions which may appear disjointed, but may have some bearing on what is written above. Along the roads every gendarmerie post outside the town is a ransacked ruin, with even windows and door-frames torn out, and I saw no gendarmes except in Khoi, Dilman and Rezaieh, where there are police also. The two largest official buildings in the main square of Rezaieh still show every window smashed from a bomb which fell five months ago. There are only three doctors left in that town of 50,000 inhabitants as against twenty-five before the Russian entry. Some of the twenty-two missing were military doctors who left with the fleeing troops, and the others have recently fled out of fright, including some employed at the Government hospital. It is only too true what the Russian commandant said, that some of the leading men in Rezaieh went away to Tabriz during the last fortnight or three weeks leaving their wives and children behind to the supposed danger, partly out of a herd-like panic and partly probably because it was cheaper to leave them there. There are several Jews in Rezaieh, one of whom had his house burgled and the contents removed in carts, without any interference from anyone. One Persian official asked for an appointment to see me at the inn where I stayed, and, when I fixed 7 P.M., declined to come until next day, saying that no inhabitant of any standing went out of doors after 6 P.M. I myself went about after that hour and found it was true, although there was no curfew and although perfect order had admittedly been restored some days before by Soviet patrols. In the village of Burashan, near Rezaieh, a well-to-do villager was recently shot and killed by people on his own roof when he went out to see what was happening; he was followed by his wife, his son and the daughter of a neighbour, all of whom were killed one after another; the assailants then ransacked the house, forcing another son to show where any money or valuables were. This sounds like a Kurdish exploit, but there are such a number of desperados of various races reported in the district that identification is almost impossible. Many of the notorious "refugees" from the Caucasus are here as well as at Tabriz, and some Armenians are said to have come from Erivan. It is also stated that many of the Assyrians who had to flee in 1918 to Iraq are now profiting by the absence of frontier guards and returning to their old villages, where they must fend for themselves as best they can for a time. The Assyrian (Chaldean) bishop whom I met during my stay, however, doubted this story, but, as practically all the refugee Assyrians whom we installed in Iraq after the war were Nestorians, he may not have come across them yet.

17. One afternoon during my visit I went out shooting near an Assyrian village and met some of the villagers. They seemed just as nervous as anyone else, and two who had been in Canada pressed me to help them to get back, one asking to join the British army. Several respectable Assyrians in the town itself told me that, if the Russians should be forced to leave suddenly for any reason, a terrible fate would befall themselves and the Armenians from the Kurds and ordinary Moslem inhabitants. This is most probably true; the wretched Christian communities have been bullied and persecuted for years by the ex-Shah's minions on principle, and it is perhaps not surprising that some of them are included in the "committees" of alleged trouble-makers or trouble-seekers, now that the hated Government is itself in difficulties in this province. It will be remembered that thousands of Assyrians were massacred or driven

from this small area in the last war, and some of their ruined villages and fields have never been rebuilt or recovered. As it is, I was assured that many Christian villagers have now been forced to come to the town, where they have no means of livelihood except gradually to sell off their cattle and stock at ruinous prices.

18. In conclusion, it may be stated that the news of the arrival of a British Consul at Rezaieh—the first seen for several years—went round like wildfire, and from all accounts created a surprising impression, especially at the present juncture. Everyone who met my munshi, whom I took with me, repeated, whether truthfully or not, that the whole town had taken heart again for the time being. This is partly because of tales describing the wonderful state of order and prosperity obtaining in the British zone in the south, and partly (as I think) because of the general feeling of being neglected by their own Government, to say nothing of being abandoned and deserted by their own pusillanimous officials. I was careful in every quarter not to give any impression that I had come to criticise or spy on the Russians, whom I always spoke well of. Every reasonable person there admitted that the Soviet troops and officers behaved well, did not obtrude unduly on the life of the place, and paid for all supplies very much more promptly and generously than the Persian military ever did—testimonials which it is a pity the Soviet political officer clique manages so unnecessarily to offset. On all sides the hope was expressed that the British Government would send a vice-consul or other representative to stay at Rezaieh—a hope which I did not encourage.

19. The somewhat sombre picture of conditions drawn above might not be complete unless I added a note on the disquieting ravages which opium-smoking is causing, particularly in this part of Persia, although it is said to be bad enough in most of the others. Time after time one is told of the prevalence of opium-smoking among all classes in the Rezaieh Province, but especially among officials and police in the towns, and even among the women. Persians themselves point to it as the real reason for their present low standard of courage, efficiency or moral principles, and their degeneration from the level of even a century or two ago, adding that the next generation produced from such drug-steeped stock will be even worse. The town of Maku is reported to be a particularly bad spot, where the middle-class residents no longer get any pleasure from smoking the drug, but now inject themselves with morphia or sniff cocaine—which they seem to procure with ease. European Governments have in some cases countered this menace, but it seems somewhat hopeless for the present type of Persian Administration to do so. I am told that an official position in the Economic Section of the Ministry of Finance which controls the sale and supply of opium is one of the most remunerative of all, because of the "squeeze" between the official price and the price which numberless addicts will pay.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 1647/163/34]

No. 40.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 51.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 4 of the 9th February on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, February 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, February 9, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that conditions in Tabriz and district have improved during the last ten days since the signing of the treaty, and as far as public order and security are concerned there are grounds for hoping that they may soon return to normal. But life in general will not return to normal until some parts of the Persian Administration are recast and reformed, and until

the middle-class and official elements shed some of their craven fears, which seems unlikely.

2. A fortnight ago the situation round Sarab, a small town between Tabriz and Ardebil, was bad, peasants and tribesmen from the surrounding areas having disarmed or driven out the gendarmerie, robbed or threatened the landowners, and even carried off some of their women and children into the countryside. The Governor-General of Tabriz said quite openly to the Soviet authorities and to myself that this was only the logical outcome of the underhand Russian political officers' intrigues which had been going on for some time in the Sarab district, notably from an individual named Bagaroff, moving continually between Tabriz and Ardebil. He was known by the gendarmerie to have incited the inhabitants against the landowners, and to have organised peasant "committees" in various places. The rioters and malcontents consequently believed themselves to be acting under Russian protection, and the gendarmerie felt powerless to act against them. The Soviet Consul-General of course denied this imputation, but told me he was sending three Soviet officers with the Persian gendarmes who were going to Sarab to restore order, so that these might help to calm down the inhabitants. One of the officers sent turned out to be Bagaroff.

3. On the 1st February the bazaar community of Tabriz was shaken by the exploits of three gangsters with revolvers who held up a well-known merchant in his office in a large caravanserai, robbed him, forbade him to leave within a certain time, and calmly escaped. Immediately a number of merchants packed their bags and prepared to leave for Tehran. Others formed a delegation to the Ustandar to protest against the insecurity prevailing in the town. I am glad to say that he had a few well-chosen words to say to them about their own cowardice in letting such a hold-up occur in a busy part of the bazaar, without anyone daring to interfere or stop the criminals or even cry for help until it was all well over.

4. Although conditions in Rezaieh are reported to continue quiet, the hundreds of Rezaïotes who fled here some weeks ago refuse to return. Some say the lull is a temporary one, and others say they will not return because of the danger of the German attack through Turkey scheduled for the spring, in which Rezaieh will feel the first shattering blow.

5. The situation in Kurdish Azerbaijan remains quiet, although there is reported to be fighting at Saqqiz, not far away to the south, between the Government forces under Sartip Amin and the Kurds under Mohamed Rashid. My impression is that the Kurds in the Sauj Bulagh area are not anxious to be caught between the Persian forces and the Soviet army, which would presumably react quickly if the situation got out of hand so near its occupied zone. Moreover, some of the Kurdish chieftains do not seem to be so happy as they were with the present undefined position, in which Persian Government is almost completely absent in their tribal areas, while Russian political officers, full of apparent human kindness and subversive Communist ideas, flit about continually among their henchmen in town and village. I have been in touch with Amir Asad, chieftain of the Debukri tribes, who declares that he is going shortly to the Saqqiz area to try and make peace with General Shahbakhti's forces on behalf of the Kurds. He is willing to organise a force of mounted Kurdish police to keep order in the Sauj-Bulagh-Baneh area under the nominal auspices of the Tehran Government; the latter are believed to have approved in theory—but have not provided—the monthly subsidy first required. There is now a Farmandar at Sauj Bulagh, who seems surprisingly enough acceptable to the Kurds there, but he is as timid as the rest. Amir Asad says that they might even allow the gendarmerie to return there, but not of the former cruel, corrupt and rapacious type; unfortunately there is no other, until the service has been reorganised from top to bottom, especially as regards the officers.

6. The Kurdish chieftains probably realise that any idea of independence is impossible; they would, however, like to have Kurdish officials in their own districts, as in Northern Iraq, not far away. I asked whether Azerbaijani officials appointed by Tehran would not be suitable; the reply was that such might be more sympathetic in some ways, but would probably work for local interests and not properly serve those of the Central Government. On the other hand, a Tehran official of the usual type would neglect or ride roughshod over Azerbaijani interests and susceptibilities and use his authority to line his own pockets as quickly as possible. As I have said before, there seems to be no official patriotism towards Persia as a whole any more.

7. The Kurds no longer walk about in Tabriz armed with pistols and rifles, and this must be due to local Soviet intervention, following the complaints of the

Governor-General and the chief of police, who would not have dared to check the practice on their own initiative. Enquiries I have made in Kurdish circles seems to show that the Soviet authorities did not furnish arms and ammunition to the Kurds as alleged by all the Persian officials; the arms were bought freely in Tabriz by private Kurds, but in order to get them safely to their own district past the Persian police posts along the road they applied for a Soviet officer to escort the car or lorry concerned, and it appears that the Russians did kindly provide the officer. This doubtless explains the story described in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 1.

8. The Russian political officers who frequently visit Sauj Bulagh and district (which is apparently not in the Soviet occupied zone) are named Alieff, Nabieff and Salim. They are said to have promised a printing press to someone in Sauj Bulagh. In Miandoab they are reported to be in close touch with the Farmandar, a Kurd named Mehdi, who although appointed by the Governor-General at Tabriz is alleged to sport a portrait of Bakhiroff, President of the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, in his office. Certain Kurds from Sauj Bulagh, doubtless in order to obtain preferential Russian sugar and cotton goods from the Soviet agency in Tabriz, or perhaps for more mischievous but equally petty and selfish reasons, actually applied for Soviet citizenship to the consulate-general here recently. Far from being repulsed, their applications were received and officially considered (as I know for a fact), although they can have no possible ties with the U.S.S.R. whatever. Disillusion came when they were told that their wives and grown-up children must also say whether they wished equally to become Soviet citizens, and they seem to have sheered off from the idea. Incidentally the Soviet Consulate-General has been receiving an average of thirty applications per day (sometimes as many as fifty) for Soviet citizenship from nominal Persian subjects, but largely including nondescripts who formerly belonged to the Caucasus and drifted here between 1928 and 1935—the so-called "muhajirs" or refugees. It is possible that some will be accepted and return to Soviet territory, and I do not imagine that the local Persian authorities will express or feel any regrets at losing such a detested and mostly undesirable element.

9. The demagogic movement in favour of Azerbaijan autonomy and democracy in general on which I was reporting in Tabriz a month or two ago seems to have faded out almost completely. It is possible that the Russian political bureau realised on what unreliable and broken reeds they were basing their surreptitious hopes—as I half-facetiously warned them at the time. Instead the city is now invested with several so-called "committees," one of which styles itself "Committee for the Protection of the Proletariat of Azerbaijan." About a week ago it was learnt to be summoning landowners or employers to appear before it to decide on complaints brought against them by aggrieved members of the said proletariat. One such unwilling defendant ventured to inform the police, who made enquiries and found that the leading light was a Soviet citizen named Ismailoff. Before arresting the "committee" the chief of police saw the Soviet Consul-General, who is said to have asked him to delay action while he made enquiries. After a few days my colleague asked for a further delay for enquiries, and there the matter still rests. It must be getting tiresome for him continually to have to deny or cover up the stupidities and intrigues of another department over whom he has no control and of whose goings-on he probably has little knowledge until they are pointed out to him by the Governor-General or myself.

10. I am told that the old man who was recently Deputy for Sauj Bulagh and its district has now resigned and returned to his village, so that the area is unrepresented in the Tehran Majlis, and its problems not made known to the Central Government. This is probably all the more true because the Sauj Bulagh area is normally under Rezaieh, where administration is practically broken down and communications at present non-existent, so that the Governor-General of Tabriz is having to do most of the work piecemeal as it arises, possibly without reporting on that district to Tehran. One Kurdish chieftain has suggested that Sauj Bulagh should be attached to the Kermanshah Province, so as to prevent Russian political officers from interfering there as they do at present. A new Deputy would certainly seem advisable.

11. The cost of living here is causing anxiety, and imported goods which cannot be easily replaced are soaring in price. It is well known that certain merchants have bought up and hoarded stocks, but no one expects the Administration to take any steps in the matter. Fortunately supplies of bread and sugar are sufficient, but rice is dear and cotton piece-goods excessively so.

The fringe of the unemployment problem is being touched by relief works, from which labourers receive 6 rials per day.

12. When I mentioned to the Governor-General of Tabriz that in Rezaieh the policemen were still only receiving the miserable and inadequate pay of 120 rials a month instead of the 240 rials to which they were now entitled, he said he felt practically sure that the authorities there had received the full amount for the proper pay rolls. It seems difficult, even allowing for the incredibly corrupt Administration in these parts, to suppose that the whole of the bonus has vanished so far into higher officials' pockets, and yet it is not impossible. I have heard that the recent Chief of Gendarmerie in Azerbaijan, who practically deserted his post when conditions became too difficult for his timid and disappointing personality, left for Tehran with a whole lorry-load of miscellaneous stuff, supposed to be contraband acquired in the Rezaieh area with money squeezed out of the district (perhaps the gendarmes' extra pay). I myself saw this loaded lorry outside his office on the evening he left, and wondered what it was, since everyone knew he had not brought his family or furniture here when he came a few months ago. However, he is related to someone in the Ministry, and will doubtless immediately receive another good post. Another case is where a detachment of gendarmes were known to have seized twenty-five rifles in one village, but the arms were never handed in. When enquiries were made, it was found that the gendarmes had sold the rifles back again to peasants or tribesmen and pocketed the money. After all, how can a man keep a wife and family on 4 rials, or 6d., a day? There must be plenty of similar cases, and it is useless for the Persian Government to complain about the dangerous number of rifles stolen or unaccounted for while such conditions obtain among the guardians of public order. Until the whole of the corrupt officers are changed, however, it is of little use expecting the wretched half-starved gendarmes to be more honest or efficient.

13. I am informed by the Soviet authorities that Persian troops are to be allowed to return to Ardebil, and the Governor-General tells me that Tabriz and Rezaieh also will shortly have Persian garrisons. This will undoubtedly lead to an increase in public confidence locally.

14. A party was held at this consulate on the evening of the 3rd February to celebrate the signature of the treaty. Invitations were sent to seventeen leading Persian officials and notables, thirteen Soviet officials and military officers, and ten others, including American, Polish, Free French, Turkish and Iraqi representatives and the small British community. Only one out of the seven Soviet military officers invited attended the party, without their sending any explanations at the time, but the Political Commissar came two days later to say that they had some work to do. I feel sure that their unexpected and noticeable absence (for which the Political Commissar was almost certainly responsible) caused some surprise to the Persians and other foreigners present, but the atmosphere of the party was very friendly and even cordial throughout.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 1887/163/34]

No. 41.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 61.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of despatch No. 5 from His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, dated the 20th February, 1942, on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, February 27, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 5. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, February 20, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that the situation in the Tabriz district remains disturbed, but on a minor scale compared with a month or two ago. Apart from the fighting on the Kurdistan border, there have been no large outbreaks

of banditry in the last fortnight, although plenty of bandits are in being in most parts of Azerbaijan. In Tabriz itself the position is still unsatisfactory because of the continual armed burglaries and killings, which arouse or sustain the feeling of trepidation or almost panic among all classes except the poorest, who have nothing to lose. While these burglaries are probably less numerous than before the Russian entry, it is the bold and ruthless nature of the house-breakers which causes alarm. Before it was the houses of unpopular officials and rich upstart merchants which suffered, and police complacency or connivance in the robberies was often hinted at or taken for granted, but now no respectable family feels safe from the ruffianly strangers who swarm in the town and are invariably saddled with every crime or misdeed, while it is now Soviet complacency, if not connivance, which is suspected by all.

2. These strangers are mostly the "muhajirs" or refugees from the U.S.S.R. who were kept well in hand by the authorities in recent years and mostly forced to live in out of the way villages, but are now able to defy all regulations and have come to the town in search of work, money and a less down-trodden existence. They all speak Russian, of course, and some hob-nob with the Soviet troops, especially with those from the Caucasus. Their presence is highly resented by all classes of society here, although they cannot all be criminals. While Persians in general now take their own greater liberties and freedom from fear and restraint for granted, they apparently hate to see these shared by what they consider as undesirable intruders—and this extends also to the Armenians and Assyrians, who are expected to remain ground down and unprivileged as before, and among whom any attempt at self-expression or self-assertion in these unsettled times is regarded as alarming and revolutionary, and as certainly connected with sinister Soviet influences.

3. My last despatch mentioned the sudden appearance in Tabriz of a number of "committees" or clubs, some of a "proletarian" label. These at present form the chief topic of conversation and theme for apprehension, although most of them are probably harmless. One particular one in the Armenian quarter is stated by everyone to be nothing but a collection of Kurdish, Azerbaijani and Armenian undesirables, living on robberies and blackmail, and prepared to sell protection to any wrongdoer who will join. All these clubs are issuing prospectuses and invitations to all and sundry, and the somewhat backward working-men here are puzzled how to deal with all the alluring offers of social reform, not to mention social evenings, some of which clash with one another. One deputation of mild-mannered workers from a leather factory who visited the Governor-General here to ask for better wages and hours had great difficulty in presenting their case owing to the wrangling of various "committee" officials who claimed quite gratuitously to be representing them. Needless to say, the Persian public accuses the Soviet Political Bureau of backing these proletarian growths, although such "anjumans" are nothing new in Tabriz history in times of stress. The police aver they have watched uniformed Russian officers coming out of one club, while the Soviet Consul-General firmly denies any Russian connexion whatever. I am told on good authority that the newly-joined members of this club were told to try and keep the whole matter secret from the British Consul. It is really extraordinary (and perhaps somewhat unfortunate) that this consulate is widely regarded here as a kind of George from outside keeping the poisonous revolutionary (*i.e.*, Bolshevik) dragon in some sort of order. If any such hyperbole were called for, a more suitable simile would perhaps be the unfortunate Hercules and the hydra, since as fast as the Soviet "Politruk" are dissuaded or publicised out of one form of unwarranted or undesirable activity, their meddling and often stupid energies seem to spring up in some other similar sphere.

4. I have mentioned how one of these "proletarian" clubs had set itself up as a kind of court to hear cases of complaints brought by workmen against employers. Last week, when a band of six housebreakers were brought to the police court to be tried, a group of so-called "committee-men" rose and asked noisily why the accused had been arrested and why they should be tried. Presumably they expected to overawe the police (as they do in smaller places) and obtain their fellows' release, but this time the police were strong enough to arrest them in addition for contempt of court. But it is small incidents like these which make the middle-class and law-abiding citizens nervous.

5. The bandit Hussein Ghuli, who was disturbing the Maragha district two months ago until driven into the mountains, recently came to Maragha and asked for a free pardon, which was granted. The chief of gendarmerie there even appointed him as an officer in their ranks, but shots were heard in the middle

of the night and he ran away. The Persian officials say that they know this was arranged by the Russian political service, who secretly support the bandit and did not want him to surrender. Only a few days later, however, Hussein Ghuli again appeared and this time took up his post as gendarmerie officer. Within a few days loud complaints began to come from the surrounding villages, saying that the new uniformed guardian of law and order was fleecing and robbing them worse than he did as a brigand before. The Governor-General of Tabriz has hurriedly demanded that he should be transferred to this town for appointment to some other province, but it is expected that he will take to the mountains again instead.

6. In the Kurdish districts of Azerbaijan there are disputes going on among the various chieftains. Amir Asad, in particular, is trying to have Mejid, the Kurdish Farmandar of Miandoab, removed from office and his own nominees appointed, but the Governor-General is standing firm. There is no news from the Saqqiz area (no longer in Azerbaijan), where General Mahmoud Amin was recently killed. Last week a Persian officer arrived here saying that he had escaped from the Kurds after being taken prisoner in that fight. His story was that a body of 500 Kurds in Saqqiz sent word to General Amin in Diwan Dere that they were ready to make terms and surrender. Amin impetuously pushed on there without making sure of the facts or asking for hostages or a surrender of arms beforehand, and actually arrived in the town at about 4 A.M. one dark night. Firing began and the general rushed forward shouting: "I am Amin, cease firing." Instead, he and about fifteen officers were killed, the rest being captured. The Kurds next day began executing officers, but after seven had been shot, the leader, Mohamed Rashid, is said to have intervened and saved the others. The escaped officer says that the Kurdish rebels numbered between 2,000 and 3,000.

7. Two Soviet soldiers patrolling the railway line near Julfa were attacked about ten days ago, one being killed and the other wounded. This is a most unusual incident, and may be the work of Karadaghi tribesmen from the hills, keen to get rifles. A well-known bandit named Mohamed Tagi was recently killed by the Persian gendarmes near Ardebil. The Soviet authorities have allowed Persian troops to return to garrison the latter town, but so far none have come to Rezaieh or Tabriz, although the Governor-General has twice been informed that forces have actually left Tehran for this province. The Russian Consul-General here is very non-committal on this subject and says that he has heard nothing of such troops coming here, which seems to indicate that the Soviet authorities are not in favour of their coming. My Soviet colleague seems a reasonable and sensible man, well disposed towards this consulate, but at present somewhat overweighted by the military and military-political elements here. He takes his work very seriously, and after six weeks says that he needs another month in order to size up the situation before he can take a day or two off and visit the neighbouring districts. He says that, in his opinion, the Persian gendarmerie are not making a real effort to restore or preserve order in Azerbaijan, hinting that they are interested in the continuance of disorder—which is just the accusation made by the Persians against the Soviet political branch here. On the other hand, he was complaining a few days ago (not for the first time) that the gendarmerie were being culpably ruthless in their treatment of certain troubled areas. According to the Governor-General, he was referring to the tracking down by the gendarmes of a gang of murderers who had killed eight members of one family in the Ahar district and cut all their bodies into little pieces before throwing them down a mountain-side. As a matter of fact, M. Koulagenkov is probably partially right in both of his conflicting statements, but they are almost certainly put into his mouth by the scheming and opportunist Politruk, which fact takes away a good deal of their weight.

8. There has lately been an unfortunate polemic going on between certain Tehran newspapers (including *Ittilat*, *Kushish* and *Pareham*) and Azerbaijan ideologists which does no good by bitter and exaggerated accusations of separatism, and may do harm, both by causing local resentment and by spreading unjustified alarm in Tehran and other parts of Persia regarding the situation here. It is true that some months ago one or two Azerbaijan journals and a few short-lived societies here made some over-enthusiastic claims for the use of the local dialect instead of Persian, and for a larger local share in the administration of this part of Persia, but not enough to justify the charges of separatism, malevolence and wilful disorder now made in Tehran. It is said that lately Tabriz newspapers have been stopped in the post on the way to Tehran, and that the Government has been preventing their sale or circulation there. Responsible

circles in the capital should remember that there are many people here interested in presenting as dark a picture as possible, and also far too many poor-spirited Tabrizis of the upper classes idling away their time as voluntary exiles in Tehran, anxious to excuse their refusal to return to this district by spreading exaggerated descriptions of conditions here. It would be a very good thing if the Persian Government would force the majority of these people to come back, and thus stop the exodus which still continues. Rightly or wrongly it is said that in Tehran life is so comparatively care-free, and pleasures still so gay, that one can forget there that there is a war on or a foreign occupation of parts of the country—which apparently acts as a powerful attraction on the neurotic and characterless middle-class women who have remained here so far.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 203/19/34]

No. 42.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 10, 1942.)

(No. 209.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period the 9th to 15th December, 1941, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, December 17, 1941.

Enclosure in No. 42.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the Period
December 9-15, 1941.*

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

ON the 14th December the Prime Minister explained the foreign policy of the Government to Parliament. He began with a statement, on the whole fair and reasonable, of the arguments by which Great Britain and Russia might justify their attack on Persia which had brought about the situation with which the Government was now faced. Lines of communication through Persia and the right to take military measures for the protection of their territories lying adjacent to Persia the Allies would insist on having. If Persia did not collaborate, she would forfeit the friendly feelings of the Allies. He gave a fair outline of the terms of the treaty, acknowledged the economic help in the form of wheat and sugar that the Allies had already given, and left it to his hearers to infer that the continuance of this help depended on the acceptance of the treaty.

The Prime Minister referred to relations with Turkey and to articles which had recently appeared in the Turkish press concerning the alleged oppression of so-called Turkish minorities in Persia (see Summary No. 26, paragraph 21). He had been assured by the Turkish Government that the views expressed in those articles were the personal views of the writer and did not represent the views of the Turkish Government.

It is too early yet to say what impression was made by the speech on the Parliament or the public. It was followed by a vote of confidence in the Government.

2. Further delay in the signature of the treaty has been caused by difficulties in getting the Russians to agree to the Persian translation and in reconciling the Russian text with the British. All three texts are to be authentic. Russian successes against the Germans have undoubtedly lessened the opposition to the treaty.

3. The Ministry of Commerce has been amalgamated with the Ministry of Industry and Mines.

4. The Persian Government has prohibited the export from Persia of all goods of foreign origin.

Internal Situation.

5. Reports from consuls generally indicate a slight improvement in the food situation, no increase in disorder, except in Kurdistan, and in Fars an improvement in security. Nasir Khan and the Qashgai are watching events, and particularly the effect of British neutrality in Kurdistan.

Kurdish Situation.

6. The situation in Kurdistan has become tense. Mohamed Rashid, apparently appreciating that it was time to take action before General Shahbakhti's negotiations or intrigues effected disruption in his following, is threatening to seize the village of Diwan Darreh, where there is a garrison of about 400 Persian troops, and to advance to Bijar. In present circumstances it seems unlikely that he will attack Senneh, where there is a garrison of British troops, since much of the support that he has among Kurds is based on his claim that he has British sympathy in his attempt to establish a Persian Kurdistan free from Persian authority. Consequently, the attack on a patrol of the 6th Indian Division, which resulted in the death of an Indian officer and an Indian soldier, may have been a mistake. Details have not been received, but it is reported that the assailants were from the Qalbaghi tribe. The possibility that this attack may have been put up by persons interested in embroiling British troops with the Kurds may be deserving of consideration.

7. The Persian military authorities are not anxious to go to war with the Kurds, and the Government is genuinely desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement. A commission has been approved to investigate Kurdish grievances and to consider the restitution of lands of which the owners have been legally dispossessed. It is probable that the Government would also agree to appoint Kurdish Governors, but they must be of their own choosing, and there must be the outward semblance at least of Persian Government authority.

8. The situation is further complicated by Russian dealings with Kurdish chiefs (see Summary No. 28, paragraph 24). There is no indication that these have as their object the restoration of Government authority among the Kurds. Rather are they interpreted as evidence of Russian encouragement of Kurdish aspirations.

9. His Majesty's Minister has authorised His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah to give the maximum publicity to a statement that British policy does not support Mohamed Rashid, but is to encourage the Persian Government to redress legitimate grievances while restoring their own authority in Kurdistan.

Persian Army.

10. The following arms have been lost by the Persian forces since the invasion:—

Rifles: Over 100,000.
L.M.G.: Nearly 2,000.
M.M.G.: About 600.
Mtn. guns: 60.
Field guns 105: 72.

The guns are presumably in the hands of British and Russian forces, but a considerable number of the rifles and machine guns must be in the hands of tribes and brigands. This is a cause of great anxiety in the Persian General Staff regarding internal security in the spring.

Russian Affairs.

11. The Soviet military authorities have agreed to release the Persian officers and n.c.os. whom they have been holding as prisoners. Twenty-nine officers and a number of n.c.os. have already been released. The total number of officer prisoners is believed to be about 250.

12. The Soviet military authorities have demanded a considerable reduction in the number of armed men—police and gendarmerie—which they had previously agreed to allow in the Russian-occupied zone. For example, the number of armed police in Tabriz is to be reduced from 400 to 205 men, and the gendarmerie in Azerbaijan from 4,000 to 1,500.

13. The Russians have exported from Pahlevi large quantities of iron in various forms which was alleged to belong to German firms. The amount is said to exceed 1,000 tons.

Yugoslav Interests.

14. A further party of forty Yugoslavs is to leave Tehran on the 16th December to join the Yugoslav forces in Mideast (see Summary No. 28, paragraph 36).

Tehran, December 15, 1941.

[E 557/19/34]

No. 43.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 26, 1942.)

(No. 222.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the period the 16th to 29th December, 1941, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, December 30, 1941.

Enclosure in No. 43

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the Period
December 16 to 29, 1941.*

Persian Affairs.

THE treaty was presented to the Majlis on the 21st and published in the press on the 22nd. It is early yet to assess public sentiment, but it can be said that its reception has not been altogether unfavourable. There was some vigorous criticism in a secret session of Parliament, but at the next session on the 28th, when the Bill had its first reading, opinion seemed to be rather more favourable than adverse. Some of the local newspapers have presented fair arguments for its acceptance.

It will be read in the Majlis a second time during the coming week, and informed opinion considers that it will be approved.

2. In the provinces, as far as available information goes, the treaty has provoked little comment. Bread and sugar remain the chief interest of the people.

3. In private conversations with members of the legation staff the Shah has emphasised his complete loyalty to the terms of the treaty. Persia is now definitely on the side of the Allies, and he would use his influence to persuade the people that collaboration was in the best interests of the country, both as regards the present and the future. He does not like the wording of the last sentence of article 3 (2) (a), which limits the rôle of Persian forces to the maintenance of internal security. He considers that for the restoration of morale it is essential that the Persian army should be inspired with a determination to defend Persian soil if the Germans should ever reach it. Last-minute endeavours were made by the Government for an alteration in the wording of this paragraph to give the Persian army a less humble rôle.

The Shah associates himself closely with his army, feels deeply the humiliation it has suffered, and is really anxious for the restoration of its prestige and morale.

4. The Shah's popularity is increasing, and he impresses Europeans who meet him as a reasonable, unaffected and simple man with the interests of his people at heart.

5. The Persian Government has prohibited the export of cotton and leather goods produced in local factories.

Appointments.

6. Muhammad Hussein Jahanbani to be Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior.

Ardalan (33) (27) to be Governor of Isfahan.

Hassan Zandi to be consul-general of Persia at Baku.

(The first figures refer to Military Attaché's, the second to Foreign Office, Personalities.)

Internal Situation.

7. *Kurdistan.*—The Chief of the General Staff claims that successful military action was taken against Muhammad Rashid and the Kurds who were threatening Diwandarreh, resulting in appreciable Kurdish casualties and the withdrawal of Muhammad Rashid. It is not clear whether there has been any real fighting between Kurds and Persian troops. Air action by leaflets and bombs was taken; a column did move to the relief of Diwandarreh; and Muhammad Rashid has withdrawn some distance. It is also reported that the Qalbaghi, who were previously said to have come to terms, have again sued for peace. The General Staff now speak of reoccupying Sagiz and Baneh.

8. Impartial reports state that even among the Kurds as far north as Lake Urmia it is commonly said that Muhammad Rashid has the support of the British. There, however, he commands little support. Two chiefs, Mohammed Riza and Mohammed Shirif, are reported to have announced that they were drawing pay for the upkeep of 300 horsemen from the British.

9. Some of the Kurdish chiefs who were invited to Baku by the Soviet authorities have returned, and on their return paraded the streets of Rezaieh with red flags and pictures of Stalin. Kurds appear in the streets of Tabriz and other towns carrying arms without interference by the Persian authorities, who fear to risk Russian displeasure. Both in Tehran and Azerbaijan Persian authorities express much anxiety about Russian policy towards the Kurds. His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, however, considers those fears to be exaggerated.

10. There have been no reports during the last fortnight of serious disturbances to internal security. A minor operation was carried out by Persian forces, assisted by some Mamasenni tribesmen, against the Buvair Ahmadi, which resulted in the capture of some robbers. Nasir Qashgai is reported to be advancing to Larestan with a Qashgai force to relieve a Persian garrison which has been isolated for some time and to collect arms for the Persian Government. He is subsequently to endeavour to collect arms in Dashti.

11. Reports that Ganawah was threatened by a force of tribesmen turned out to be without foundation.

Persian Forces.

12. The Persian General Staff has drawn up an establishment for a reorganised army of five divisions, with a strength of 80,500, including recruits, and a general reserve of 19,000. According to their statement, the army is greatly deficient in the minimum requirements of motor transport for mobility and maintenance. Indeed, it is deficient in all services.

13. The state of morale is still low. The army is suffering not only from the collapse of its prestige, but also from a lack of incentive and a lack of direction. The Chief of the General Staff is a forcible personality, and he has around him some intelligent and honest officers, but demoralisation has gone so far that, at best, it will be some time before morale is restored. That will only be done by setting before it some goal that makes an appeal to its interest.

Appointments.

14. Brigadier Key Kavoussi to command the 14th (Kerman) Division.

Brigadier Ghulam Ali Ghadar to be Military Governor of Tehran.

Brigadier Farajollah Aghevli (6) (25) to be head of the gendarmerie, vice Brigadier Zahidi (303) (217), who resigned when General Ahmadi (21) (6) became Minister of the Interior.

Brigadier Khosrow Panah to be Director of Recruiting, vice Brigadier Farajollah Aghevli (see above).

(The first figure refers to Military Attaché's, the second to Foreign Office, Personalities.)

15. The Persian Government have agreed, as a result of a joint representation by the British Minister and the Soviet Ambassador, to sell 100,000 rifles, 800 light machine guns, 400 medium machine guns, all of 7·92-mm. calibre. All these will go to Russia with the exception of 25 per cent. of the automatic weapons

British Affairs.

16. His Majesty's Minister has gone to Moscow by air with His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

17. A Public Relations and Propaganda Bureau is now in process of organisation as a part of His Majesty's Legation.

American Affairs.

18. General Wheeler and Colonel Gillies arrived in Tehran on the 18th, bringing much goodwill and, it is said, a call on large financial resources. They were here mainly interested in plans for the acceleration of the transit of munitions and aircraft to Russia. They visited the Caspian ports and found the Russians nearly as difficult of approach as do the British. They left on the 28th by train for Ahwaz.

Polish Affairs.

19. General Sikorski, accompanied by General Klimecki and General Anders, returned from Russia on the 16th December. He was very well satisfied with his mission. The Poles in Russia are to be concentrated in Trans-Caspia and there trained and equipped, with the exception of 25,000 who are to be evacuated through Persia to Mideast and Great Britain. After certain conferences in Tehran regarding arrangements for the evacuation of these Poles, General Sikorski left for Cairo and General Anders for Russia. A Polish mission under Colonel Machnowski, who has already arrived, is to come to Persia from Mideast to assist with the evacuation.

Russian Affairs.

20. The local Soviet authorities are insisting that the operation of the railway from Qum northwards should be under their control. The serious objections to this are obvious. The matter has been referred to London and Moscow. In this, as in other matters, co-operation with the local Soviet authorities is difficult, largely owing to the restrictive orders issued to them by Moscow and the very small scope of the initiative allowed to them.

21. The first consignment of tanks destined for Russia to arrive by the Trans-Persian route—twenty light British tanks—was handed over to the Russians at Zinjan on the 21st December. Two British officers and five British n.c.os. remained at Zinjan until the 27th as instructors with the Russians, who themselves decided that instruction was unnecessary beyond that date.

22. The Soviet authorities continue to release batches of Persian officer prisoners.

23. The port of Bandar Shah (Bandar Caspian) is being dredged by the Russians. They anticipate that by February there will be a 13-ft. channel to the jetties.

24. Various new consular posts are being opened in Persia by the Soviet authorities. The old consulate-general at Meshed has been reopened and consuls also been appointed to Bushire, Ahwaz and Kermanshah.

Tehran, December 29, 1941.

[E 565/19/34]

No. 44.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 8.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period the 30th December, 1941, to the 5th January, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, January 6, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 44.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the Period December 30, 1941, to January 5, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

THE treaty has passed the first reading in the Majlis. There has been criticism, but on the whole there appears to be a feeling of relief to find on consideration that the terms are not so bad as rumour had led the public to anticipate. There has even been some effective defence of the treaty in the Majlis and in the press. There is an increasing tendency to consider its potential advantages to the State or the individual, and there are indications of a more favourable sentiment towards the British. This is perhaps strengthened by the deep distrust of Russia, which finds increasing justification in Russian political actions in northern provinces, more especially in Azerbaijan. The decrease in hostile feeling is also largely due to the retreat of the Germans in Russia and the consequent damage to the legend of German invincibility. The three months for which Germans on leaving Persia had paid advance rent for their houses and advance wages to their servants have passed, and the impression created by this—to Persians—convincing action has been followed by a corresponding depression among their sympathisers.

Appointments.

2.—(i) Ali Mansour (164) (120) has been appointed Governor-General of Khorassan in place of Pakravan (208) (154). Ali Mansour was Prime Minister in August of 1941. He is considered by some to be pro-German, but is of too colourless a character to have any strong political convictions. It is not likely that the Russians would accept him as Governor of Khorassan unless satisfied of his innocuousness.

(ii) Mohamed Qaraguzlou to be Governor ("Farmandar") of Bandar Abbas.

(iii) Ali Asghar Itisam, now Governor of Maragheh, to be Governor of Khoi.

(iv) Ismail Bahadur (54) (—) to be Governor of Maragheh.

(v) Rahmatullah Hushmand to be head of the Municipality and Governor of Bushire.

(The first figures refer to Military Attaché's and second to Foreign Office Personalities.)

3. The economic situation shows little improvement. The cost of living goes up; prices of imported goods, in particular, are soaring in spite of the prohibition on export. There are still local shortages of wheat and sugar, due in part to lack of transport, which in its turn is due to lack of tyres, of which there is a critical shortage.

Internal Security.

4. Generally the improvement in internal security seems to be maintained. There are no reports of disturbances except from the Kermanshah Province, where Lurs, principally Kakavand and Ahmadvand, have been robbing, but, as far as reports go, not on a serious scale.

5. It is reported from Shiraz that Jahrum (D.S. 17H, 3230), where there is a small garrison of Amnieh, is being attacked by local rebels led by one named Zaighami. A battalion of infantry, with two armoured cars and a field gun, has moved from Shiraz to restore the situation. It is possible that some Qashgais are assisting the rebels. There is no further information of Naser Qashgai's operations in Larestan, but the Persian authorities seem to be fairly confident of his good faith at present.

6. There seems to be little change in the position in Kurdistan. Their brief success has hardened the attitude of the Persian military authorities, who, anxious to re-establish their prestige, now talk less of peace by negotiation. This bellicosity is, however, likely to be tempered by more moderate counsels as the Government is aware that there is more at stake than the defeat of the rebel leader, Mohamed Rashid. If, however, he could be induced to return to Iraq the situation would be greatly simplified and the way would then be clearer for

a reasonable settlement, which might be reached with the help of influential Kurds in Tehran.

7. The "official" Order of Battle of the Persian army, as given by the War Office, is attached as an appendix. Many of the units exist in little more than name as a justification for paying the officers, and all are considerably under strength. A reorganisation is intended (see Summary No. 31/1941, paragraph 12).

8. The reorganisation of the Amnieh has been delayed by the resignation of General Zahidi, who drew up the scheme (see Summary No. 29/1941, paragraph 12).

Russian Affairs.

Political.

9. There are accumulating reasons for suspecting that the Soviet political authorities are carrying out a purge of their enemies in Persia. A number of murders have been committed, a few in Tehran, more in Azerbaijan, of Caucasian refugees and known Turkish agents. A serious attempt was made to murder General Vigornitsky, a harmless old White Russian who considered himself the local representative of the heirs of the Tsars. Babayan, the head of the Armenian Dashnak party in Tehran, has recently disappeared. Other White Russians have disappeared and there is considerable anxiety in the community.

10. It is reported from a reliable source that the Kurds and Azerbaijani notables who visited Baku were told by Bakhiroff, President of the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, that they were not to regard the visit as having any political significance and that Azerbaijan would be evacuated after the war. On the other hand, the Turkish Consul at Tabriz has stated that his information is that the Kurds were told that their hopes would soon be realised and the Azerbaijanis that the frontier between Soviet and Persian Azerbaijan no longer existed. It is not impossible that both stories are correct, for Soviet official pronouncements are often at variance with the words and actions of subordinate political officials.

11. It is difficult, in the face of evidence that comes from Azerbaijan, to absolve the Soviet political authorities from the charge of encouraging anti-Government elements in the province. Of the two principal newspapers published in Tabriz, one strongly anti-Government and advocating autonomy for Azerbaijan, the other supporting the Persian Government, the former has increased to a bi-weekly issue, while the latter has been suppressed by the Soviet authorities, and its offices raided for publishing alleged "Fascist" propaganda. An extract from the former is attached as an appendix: it gives an idea of the colour of the newspaper. The Soviet authorities themselves also publish a newspaper in Tabriz, in Azerbaijan Turki, needless to say without having asked the permission of the Persian authorities. Junior political officers distribute this paper to tea-houses and schools, although the higher Soviet authorities maintain that the paper is published solely for their own people. An indication of its temper is given in the extract given in the appendix (Appendix "B"/2).

12. A society calling itself "Nijat" (Freedom) has been formed in Urumieh which includes Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians. Its aims are obvious from its name. The local Turkish Consul has reported somewhat alarmingly to his ambassador on the activities of this society.

13. Having regard to the activities referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the Soviet insistence on the reduction of police and Amnieh mentioned in Summary No. 30/1941, paragraph 12, does not seem consistent with a desire to see lawful authority established in the province.

14. Four British news-reels that were being shown in Tabriz were confiscated by the Soviet authorities and the proprietor of the cinema concerned imprisoned. The reason is supposed to have been because Hitler was shown in some form other than that of a monster.

Russian Troops.

15. A reliable informant, who has recently visited Meshed, reports that there were ninety aircraft on the aerodrome. From the activity he saw he judged that the aerodrome was being used as a training school.

16. The same informant reports a strong Russian garrison at Semnan, where there was the headquarters of some formation, not many troops in evidence at Meshed, the headquarters and greater part of an infantry regiment at Kuchan. All the troops he saw in North-Eastern Persia were better clothed and more soldierly than those he had recently seen on a tour in North-Western Persia.

17. The road from Meshed to the frontier at Bajgiran is being repaired by the Russians. From the frontier towards Meshed the first 40 miles are now in good repair. The remainder (some 44 miles) to Meshed is in bad condition. From Bajgiran to Askhabad there is a first-class road, mostly tarmac.

Notice.—As Intelligence in Persia is now well covered by C.I.C.I., the distribution of this Summary will in future be limited to:—

His Majesty's Minister, Tehran; D.M.I., War Office, London; D.M.I., India; Headquarters Force, Iraq, Bagdad; C.I.C.I., Bagdad.

Tehran, January 5, 1942.

Appendix "A."

Order of Battle of the Persian Army.

Authority: Persian Ministry of War, given early December 1941.

1st Division, Tehran.

General Officer Commanding: Brigadier-General Hajeb Ali Razmara.

1st Infantry Regiment (Pahlevi Guard) (Major Nasrollah Mir-Jahangiri). Tehran.

2nd Infantry Regiment (Iron Guard) (Major Ali Akbar Karkhordar). Tehran.

3rd Infantry Regiment (Bahador Guard) (Lieutenant-Colonel Qahhargoli Shahrokhshahi). Tehran.

20th Infantry Regiment (Major Mostafa Rahimi). Tehran.

1st Fortifications Regiment (Major Yusof Razavi). Tehran.

1st Cavalry Regiment (Pahlevi Guard) (Major Hamid Shirvani). Tehran.

3rd Cavalry Regiment (Attack Guard) (Lieutenant-Colonel Pasha Parviz). Tehran.

2nd Artillery Regiment (105-mm. Field) (Colonel Bahman Bahramsoltani). Tehran.

4th Mountain Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Gharib). Tehran.

20th Field Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Kianuri). Tehran.

Tank Battalion (Captain Hosein Jevanshir). Tehran.

Mixed Regiment of Kojur (Major Hasan Namvar). Tehran.

Armoured Squadron (Captain Naser Ansari). Tehran.

2nd Division, Tehran.

General Officer Commanding: Division-General Ali Asghar Naqdi.

5th Infantry Regiment (Rezapur) (Colonel Asadollah Naqdi). Tehran.

6th Infantry Regiment (Naderi) (Lieutenant-Colonel Kazem Hajivaziri). Tehran.

7th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Vali). Tehran.

21st Infantry Regiment (Major Mahmud Afshar). Tehran.

Communications Regiment (Major Ali Asghar Piazkari). Tehran.

2nd Cavalry Regiment (Fawzieh Guard) (Major Ebrahim Mo'ezzi). Tehran.

4th Cavalry Regiment (Fateh) (Major Mokhtar Pahlevan). Tehran.

1st Artillery Regiment (105-mm. Field) (Major Ata'ollah Kiani). Tehran.

3rd Mountain Artillery Regiment (Major Gholam Hosein Vafa). Tehran.

Mixed Regiment of Sari (Colonel Mohammad Reza Shahandeh). Tehran.

Tank Battalion (Captain Mohammad Fazeli). Tehran.

Armoured Car Squadron (Major Majid E'tema Moqaddam). Tehran.

5th (Kurdistan) Division, Senneh.

General Officer Commanding: Brigadier-General Mahmud Amin.

22nd Infantry Regiment (Mozaffar) (Colonel Hosein Ali Rasti). Senneh.

23rd Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Nasrollah Yazdani (at present in Senneh; will later join appropriate garrison)). (Fort Shahpur.

24th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Gholam Reza Tashgari).
Baneh.⁽¹⁾
14th Cavalry Regiment (Major Abdollah Mas'udi). Senneh.
6th Artillery Regiment (Major Mohammad Ali Piruzan). Senneh.
Independent Battalion of Engineers (Lieutenant-Colonel Seyid
Jalaleddin Tabatabai). Senneh.

7th (Fars) Division. Shiraz.

General Officer Commanding: Brigadier-General Ali Akbar Siahpush.
12th Infantry Regiment (Salahshur) (Colonel Soleiman Gilanshah).
Shiraz.
34th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Najafqoli Abbasi). Shiraz.
25th Independent Infantry Battalion (Lurestan). Lar.
26th Independent Infantry Battalion (Bushire) (Captain Baha-ed-Din
Tabarsi). Bushire.
8th Cavalry Regiment (Abbasi) (Major Azizollah Pishdad). Shiraz.
19th Cavalry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Seyid Nasrollah Majlesi).
Shiraz.
9th Artillery Regiment (Major Fazlollah Amanpur). Shiraz.
Independent Battalion of Engineers (Lieutenant-Colonel Morteza
Zahedi). Shiraz.

8th (Mokran) Division. Khwash.

General Officer Commanding: Brigadier-General Mohammad Meimand.
15th Infantry Regiment (Zaboli) (Major Qodratollah Dabirsiaqi).
Zahedan.
3rd Mixed Independent Battalion (Major Ebrahim Mansuridara).
Chahbahar.
11th Camel Regiment (Khosrovi) (Lieutenant-Colonel Seyid
Ne'matollah Saremi). Khwash.
18th Camel Regiment (Major Ali Enshal). Iranshahr.
10th Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmud Eshqi). Khwash.
Independent Battalion of Engineers (Major Hosein Farkhondehpei).
Khwash.

12th (Kermanshah) Division. Kermanshah.

Officer Commanding: Colonel Ebrahim Arfa.
38th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Seyid Nasrollah Aftasi). Kermanshah.
13th Infantry Regiment (Major Gholam Ali Dormishian). Kermanshah.
21st Cavalry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Nasrollah Modabber).
Kermanshah.
Artillery Battalion (Major Abdol Hamid Dolatabadi). Kermanshah.
Battalion of Engineers. Kermanshah.

15th (Isfahan) Division.

General Officer Commanding: Division-General Hadi Shagaqi.
37th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmud Jahanbaglu).
Isfahan.
20th Cavalry Regiment (Major Haji Ansari). Isfahan.
Artillery Battalion (Major Ali Asghar Manuchehri). Isfahan.

14th (Kerman) Division. Kerman.

General Officer Commanding: Brigadier-General Ruhollah Keikavausi.
16th Infantry Regiment (Razmju) (Lieutenant-Colonel Seyid Sadeq
Azizi). Kerman.
Independent Infantry Battalion (Major Mohammad Kazem Kawusi).
Bandar Abbas.
25th Independent Camel Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Zariv).
Rudbar.
12th Independent Cavalry Battalion (Captain Abolhasam Mirhoseini).
Kerman.

(1) No Persian troops at Baneh; paper organisation only.

16th (Khorramabad) Division. Khorramabad.

Officer Commanding: Colonel Fazlollah Homayuni.
19th Infantry Regiment. Dizful.
18th Infantry Regiment (Sepah Guard) (Lieutenant-Colonel Reza
Satrab). Khorramabad.⁽²⁾
13th Cavalry Regiment (Major Taqi Montazemi). Khorramabad.
Mountain Battery. Khorramabad.

Independent (Khuzistan) Brigade. Ahwaz.

Officer Commanding: Colonel Hosein Atapur.
30th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Hadi Navisi). Ahwaz.
9th Cavalry Regiment (Major Ziaollah Partovi). Ahwaz.
Mountain Battery. Ahwaz.

Independent (Birjand) Brigade. Birjand.

Officer Commanding: Colonel Ali Akbar Sha'ri.
33rd Infantry Regiment (Colonel Jalaj-ed-Din Mo'ezzi). Zabol.
15th Cavalry Regiment. Birjand.
22nd Cavalry Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Seyid Baqer Shahbal).
Zabol.

Independent Mechanised Brigade. Tehran.

General Officer Commanding: Brigadier-General Seyid Mahmud Mir Jalali.
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (Major Ali Asghar Mozayyani).
Tehran.
Artillery Regiment (105-mm. Long) (Colonel Yahya Khalvati). Tehran.
Anti-Aircraft Independent Battalion (Major Abdol Hosein Bahrami).
Tehran.

Many of the above units exist in little more than name. All are probably considerably below strength. The army will probably be reorganised shortly into five divisions with a central reserve.

Tehran, January 5, 1942.

Appendix "B."

1. *Extract from Newspaper Azerbaijan, dated December 11, 1941.*

What has caused the misfortunes of Azerbaijan? Strangers have taken advantage of our sincerity and simplicity to stir up strife and enmity among us, and have hindered all progress. It is time to wake up, to put away enmity and cease being a tool in the hands of others, who have always tried to destroy the Azerbaijanis, because they realised that, if Moslems, Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians and others were to unite, they would form a nation famous throughout East and West. We call specially upon the Kurds and Shahsevanis, the brave tribes of purer origin, to realise that they are Azerbaijanis and to join us in unity and friendship.

2. *Extract from Vatan Yolinda, a Red Army Newspaper Published at Tabriz, dated December 17, 1941.*

Letter from Urmia.

Dear Red Army,

Your releasing a nation from misery and disaster is better than a matter of conscience (i.e., than a quibble over ideology?). We Kurds, one of the oldest and noblest of races, have been oppressed by our enemies, and for some years have had no pleasure in life. In a fertile district like Kurdistan poor villagers, farmers and workers could not find bread—where were the crops going? The Fascists regarded Kurds and Azerbaijanis as the lowest of men, calling the former cruel savages and the latter Turki asses.

(2) Probably at Kermanshah.

On the 27th August the Red army came and, after killing a few Fascists, released thousands of oppressed patriots. That date is one written in ineffaceable letters in Kurdish hearts. Dear Red Army, there is a voice crying in Kurdistan and saying: "Please carry out your good deeds to the end and complete our freedom, so that as long as the world lasts the Kurds may be your brothers."

RAHMAN ZABIHI,
A Kurd of Sanj Bulagh.

Tehran, January 5, 1942.

[E 794/19/34]

No. 45.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 16.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period the 6th January to the 13th January, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, January 13, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 45.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the Period
January 6 to January 13, 1942.*

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE treaty has not yet gone to the Majlis for the second reading. Of a large number of modifications and demands for further explanations suggested by Deputies during the first reading, all except a few were rejected by the Cabinet. The Cabinet did not ask for any modification in the treaty itself, but requested that certain articles should be more clearly and fully defined in letters to be annexed to the treaty. This request has been refused by His Majesty's Government. The Berlin radio had confidently predicted that it would be refused, but suggested that His Majesty's Government would put the onus of refusal on to the Soviet Government.

2. The Prime Minister, both by his own speeches and through obvious inspired articles that have appeared in the press, has been making a fairly effective defence of the treaty and of the policy of the Government that led to its initialling. A paper that ventured to express that section of public opinion which is opposed to the treaty was suppressed—a shock to those who hoped that the days of freedom of speech had arrived. But the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are still very susceptible to the criticism of the Majlis and the public. Conscious that they have as yet little support on which to lean, in spite of the respect which the Prime Minister is held for his honesty, though not for his energy, they are anxious to placate public opinion as far as is possible.

3. The Government is so concerned with the business of getting the treaty through the Majlis that all other business is suffering. Little has been done towards a settlement of the question of the late Shah's large estates. Formerly dependent on forced labour for their cultivation they now lie fallow to a large extent. Other questions needing early attention are the resuscitation of agriculture, the reorganisation of the gendarmerie and the army, the fundamental readjustment of the country's finances, the distribution of supplies and food and the control of prices. The Government has announced that it is drafting a Bill for the prevention of hoarding and profiteering.

4. The desire that America should become a party to the Anglo-Russian-Persian Treaty, which has been evident in Tehran for some time, has now found expression in articles in the Persian press, particularly on the occasion of Mr. Bullitt's visit.

5. The press has recently published articles indicating the advantages Persia has gained from relations with Great Britain, Soviet Russia, America and

Turkey. Great Britain is given credit for following a consistent policy—since the time of Lord Curzon—of supporting the Central Government. (The inference is perhaps that Great Britain did support Reza Shah.) Russia is thanked for the concessions she made to Persia after the last war—the gift of the Tabriz-Julfa railway and of the Russian Bank, among others. To America, Persia owes much for the services rendered by Schuster, Millsbaugh and Dr. Jordan, of the American College. Turkey is praised for her sympathetic attitude during the troubles of the last few months.

6. The Berlin radio announced that a neutral paper had stated that a result of Mr. Eden's talks in Moscow had been an agreement with Russia for the partition of Persia. A *démenti*, based on the assurances of the British Minister and the Soviet Ambassador, was published in the Persian press, as was also a statement by the Prime Minister.

Civil Aviation.

7. In answer to questions in Parliament, the Minister of War gave some details regarding the Aero Club of Tehran. The club was founded three years ago; the total income from subscriptions and donations had amounted to a little over 28 million rials. Of this, nearly 2½ million had been spent on the purchase of 25 Rearwin instructional aircraft; nearly 3½ million on the levelling of an aerodrome and construction of hangars. The balance to the credit of the club was 13,876,495 rials. There are nearly 3,000 members, of whom 400 have flown.

Appointments.

8. Ali Aazam Zanganeh (Amir i Kull) to be Governor-General of Department No. 5 (Kermanshah and Kurdistan).

Musa Nuri Esfandiary (Muvaffaq es Sultaneh), ex-Minister at Berlin, to be Minister in Iraq.

Ghulam Reza Kemal Hedayeh (Mukhbir ed Douleh) to be Governor of Arak (Sultanabad).

Internal Security.

Northern Provinces.

9. The Persian Government is greatly concerned about the situation in the Russian occupied zone, where various insurrectionary activities are evident which the Russian authorities take no steps to prevent, and which the Persian forces, limited to small numbers of gendarmerie and police by Russian orders, are much too weak to suppress. The Nijat Committee, in Urumieh, to which reference was made in Summary No. 1/42, paragraph 12, is employing terrorist methods. The local chief of police and an Assyrian who refused to join the movement have been murdered, and the Governor and all Government officials have been frightened into complete passivity. In the area south of Ardebil the Khalkhalis, a Turki-speaking tribe allied to the Shahsevars, having acquired a number of rifles from disintegrating Persian troops, have expelled such semblances of Government authority as there were in their area. A report, requiring verification, has just been received that some 2,000 armed Karadaghis from the Karadagh mountains (east of Julfa and south of the Aras River), declaring allegiance to Soviet Russia, took possession of Persian Julfa. The Soviet authorities in Tabriz deny any support of this movement, but whatever the truth of the report may be it may be assumed that no such action could take place in this area without the connivance of the Soviet authorities. In Southern Majandiran the inhabitants of the Sang i San region (between Firuzkuh and Sernnan), always turbulent, who have also acquired arms from deserting Persian soldiers, are raiding and robbing on a fairly extensive scale. The Persian Government has asked the Soviet authorities for permission to send a battalion of infantry to each of the three areas, Urumieh, Ardebil and Southern Mazandiran.

Fars.

10. The Persian operations for the relief of Jahrum (see Summary No. 1/42, paragraph 5) were successful. The rebels were dispersed and the rebel leaders, Zaighann and Shikuh, are reported to have taken refuge with Nasir Qashgai. The Persian authorities have demanded that Nasir should hand them over. They have already found reason to be suspicious of Nasir's intentions and regard this as a test case of his loyalty. They are alive to the possibility that Nasir's present professions of loyalty and of a desire to serve the interests of the Persian Government may be bluff to gain time to consolidate his influence with the tribe and to acquire arms.

Kermanshah and Kurdistan.

11. There are no further developments in that part of Kurdistan affecting British lines of communication. The local Persian military authorities appear to have postponed their plans for the occupation of Saggiz, pleading winter conditions, and to be devoting their endeavours to the disarmament of tribes living near the main Kasvin-Khanakin road, notably the Qalbaghis, the Kalkhalis in the Shahabad area, the Kakavand of the Hassin. The General Officer Commanding at Kermanshah has issued a proclamation threatening very severe measures if arms are not surrendered. It is too early yet to anticipate results.

Persian Forces.

12. It is intended to form a special force of gendarmerie for the protection of the railway. First consideration is to be given to the railway north of Tehran.

British Interests.

13. A proposal has been made to the Persian Government that the British air force authorities should lease the Persian aircraft factory for the period of the war, employing as far as possible the Persian technical staff and Persian labour. The proposal has been surprisingly well received by the Persian authorities, possibly from fear that the factory might be taken over by the Russians, who have recently been showing some interest in it.

14. The new pipe-line for the conveyance of white spirit to Andimishk has been laid for the first 30 miles of its length.

American Interests.

15. Mr. Bullitt paid a short visit to Tehran during the week. He was very well received by Persians.

Bulgarian Interests.

16. The Swedish Legation, charged with the interests of Bulgarian nationals in Persia, have asked for the repatriation of about 120 Bulgarians via Iraq and Turkey. The request is still under careful consideration both by the Soviet and British authorities in Tehran.

According to instructions from the Bulgarian Government to the Swedish authorities in Persia, all unemployed Bulgarians are paid a dole of 30 rials per diem.

Hungarian Interests.

17. A party of fifty-eight Hungarian women and children, accompanied by several male adults of over military age and two sick, left Tehran on the 8th January by train for repatriation to Hungary via Basra, Bagdad and Angora.

Travelling with this party as far as Ahwaz were nine Hungarians of military age who had themselves volunteered for internment with the British.

E. S. KIRBY, Major, A.M.A.,
(for Major-General),
Military Attaché

Tehran, January 13, 1942.

[E 798/19/34]

No. 46.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 4.)
(No. 24.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the period the 13th January to the 19th January, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, January 20, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 46.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the Period
January 13 to January 19, 1942.*

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

The treaty is still in cold storage. It has not yet gone to the Majlis for the second reading as, to avert the Prime Minister's resignation, which was nearly an accomplished fact, certain points, on which the Soviet Government have been more complaisant than His Majesty's Government, have been referred back to London. Meanwhile, the press refrain from any mention of the treaty.

2. The dearth of living, the freedom of the press, the necessity for the revival of agriculture and for a new economic plan are the main themes of newspaper articles.

3. A strong desire is becoming evident among Persians to get America more interested in Persian affairs. On the part of many this arises from the all-pervading fear of Russia: America is regarded as possibly being in some respects in a better position to oppose Russian designs on Persia than Great Britain. But some Persians have a better motive. They realise that the existing chaos in administration is not likely to be remedied by Persian politicians and Ministers and that foreign help is necessary particularly to put the finances in order. American Financial Advisers might in present circumstances find a fair measure of support. The Chief of the General Staff would welcome American control of the financial administration of the War Office. The Minister of War has probably other views.

4. Conditions in the Ministry of Finance are reported to be extremely confused. That the Government is faced with a serious loss of revenue and that expenditure is greater than income is said to be about all that is clear. No revenue is coming from the provinces in Russian occupation, nor from certain other areas where Government authority is too weak to enforce its payment. The Russians pay no customs on any goods imported by them, nor the British on goods imported for any military purpose. Moreover, owing to the breakdown of Persian administration along the frontiers, there is considerable smuggling in and out. The abolition of monopolies has also upset the financial balance, and the agreement with the A.I.O.C. for the maintenance of the royalties at the pre-war level has expired. The Ministry of Finance has hitherto been unable to make even an approximate estimate of the current revenue.

Officials.

5.—(i) Qiami, to be Deputy Ustandar and Farmandar of Kermanshah. He has previously been Governor of Arak.

(ii) Colonel Abdull Ali I'timad Mugaddam to be Deputy Chief of the Gendarmerie.

(iii) Colonel Baha-ed-Din Ali, now head of the Sepah (Army) Bank, to change posts with Colonel Ali Farah, now Treasurer of the Army (Military Attaché 83).

(iv) Nadir Arasteh (32) (26) to be Governor-General of Mazanderan and Gilan.

(v) Farzin Mohd. Ali (91) (69), Minister of the Court, has died.

(vi) Ali Mansur's (164) (120) appointment as Governor-General of Khorassan (see Summary No. 1/42, paragraph 2) was mentioned to the Soviet Ambassador before it was announced. He then raised no objection. He has now notified the Government that it is undesirable that Ali Mansur, who was on the point of departure, should go.

(The first figures refer to Military Attaché's, and second to Foreign Office, Personalities.)

*Internal Security.**Northern Provinces.*

6. The situation in Persian Azerbaijan has further deteriorated. The Persian Governor has been driven out of Urumieh and it seems that all semblance of Government authority has disappeared, and that the Nijat Committee is now in control of the town. There was fighting between Kurds and the Ammieh, and it seems certain that the Russian troops stationed in Urumieh did nothing to

help the Persian forces. It seems impossible that these events should have happened without the approval of the Russian authorities. Further details of the situation are expected shortly, as His Majesty's Consul in Tabriz is visiting Urumieh. Confirmation has been received of the turbulence of the Khalkhalis, who are now reported to have taken possession of the small town of Hirabad, some 50 miles south of Ardebil. The report mentioned in last week's Summary of an incursion of armed Karadaghis into Persian Julfa was exaggerated. It is nearer the truth that a band of some 300, some armed, did enter the town wearing red arm bands and declaring themselves Communists.

7. In Mazandaran there is some brigandage and a great deal of discontent arising from the failure of the Government to take any measures for the settlement of the ex-Shah's estates, which comprise almost the whole province.

Fars.

8. In Fars the situation at the moment is quiet. Minor robberies occur in the outlying districts, but the Shiraz-Bushire road seems to be fairly well secured. Opinions as to the possibilities of the situation vary. On the one hand, there are some who profess to anticipate serious tribal trouble in the spring. There are no signs of any possibility of a combined movement by the Arab Khamseh tribes, though hunger may drive them to robbing, and serious trouble could only come from the Qashgai led by Nasir. There is little doubt that Nasir is trying to establish himself as recognised head of the tribe, but there is no evidence yet that the main sub-tribes—the Darashuri, Farsimaidan, Shishbuluki and Kashquli—have any desire to put themselves under his leadership. Nasir is, however, being exhorted by political intriguers, with no particular object except to trouble the waters, to follow the patriotic traditions of his father.

On the other hand, a fairly reliable informant with an extensive knowledge of the tribes says that on the whole there is no desire to make trouble. The whole tribe has suffered greatly in recent years from rapacious officials. In spite of attempts to make it settle, it is still almost entirely nomadic. Given decent conditions, numbers would be prepared to settle. The main sub-tribes have no desire to combine again under one leadership. Hunger may drive some to robbery, but, given reasonable freedom from extortion and an opportunity to redevelop their greatly depleted flocks, the tribe, in the opinion of this informant, is not likely to cause trouble. More food seems to be here, as elsewhere in Persia, the first essential of stable conditions.

Kurdistan.

9. The Russian attitude towards the Kurds has thrown the Persian Government into confusion as regards the policy they should themselves adopt. Events at Urumieh and a report, which they are convinced is correct, that six Russian officials recently visited Saqqiz and told a gathering of Kurds that any attempt by Persian forces to advance to Saqqiz should be resisted has convinced the War Office that the attempt to re-establish Government authority in Saqqiz and northwards would meet with serious opposition stiffened by the Russians. It does seem unlikely that any settlement of the Kurdish question is possible while the Russians encourage Kurdish aspirations.

British Interests.

10. The Persian Government has agreed to sell nine Mohawk aircraft for the use of the Government of India.

Russian Interests.

11. Information obtained from Persian officers who have returned from imprisonment in Russia is generally to the effect that they were reasonably well treated, but that n.c.os. were given more consideration, taken to films, theatres and lectures, and shown anything that might impress them with the advantages of Soviet rule. The n.c.os. were kept separated from the officers. The particular officers who have been met say that they were not subjected to propaganda.

The Chief of the Persian General Staff states that a certain Persian officer who was released some time before the others has now handed in a wireless transmitting set which, he says, was given to him by the Russians for the purpose of transmitting information about British troops and British activities. He had secured his early release by promising to send such information and to apply for

appointment to a station where he could collect it. He was to be provided with an operator by the Russians. Another set had been handed in by a n.c.o. who had promised to serve Russian interests. He was to endeavour to return to his unit at Birjand, from where he was to report on British activities. He had been trained in wireless operation. There is nothing inherently improbable in these stories, but they are also the kind of story the Persian likes to tell. The Persian General Staff consider that a large number of these n.c.os. (there were between 2,000 and 3,000) may now be Soviet agents and that there may be many other wireless transmitting sets.

12. Evidence continues to accumulate of the intrigues of Russian agents or political commissars in Azerbaijan, which is now spoken of by Soviet partisans as South Azerbaijan. The situation can now be described as almost out of hand of the Persian Government and it is difficult to see how it is to be re-established. The Russians will not allow adequate Persian forces, nor will they themselves give any support to Persian officials. The attitude of Russian troops is one of non-intervention and it is in other respects correct enough. For example, a mob of rioters in Bihshahr, in Mazandaran, calling themselves Communists, who had attacked the police and suffered some casualties from police retaliation, on appealing to the Russian military commander for support, were told that it was the duty of the police to keep order. In Khorrasan, where the political commissar is inactive, there are as yet no reports of provocative intrigues in the places occupied by Russian troops.

Turkish Interests.

13. The Turkish Military Attaché expresses considerable anxiety about Russian policy in Azerbaijan, especially as regards the Kurds.

French Interests.

14. The French Chargé d'Affaires, M. Coiffard, seizing on an incorrect interpretation given by the Prime Minister of the purport of the second annexure to the treaty, in which he erroneously stated that Persia would be required to break off relations only with those countries with which Britain and Russia were at war, wrote a hasty and hysterical letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and sent copies to the press. The Minister refused to accept the letter and the press were instructed not to publish it. One paper did publish it. The letter accused the Government of misleading the Persian people and of acting against their wishes, which, it claimed, were in favour of maintaining the long-standing tradition of Franco-Persian friendship.

The Free French Committee have dissociated themselves from the sentiments of the letter.

The French Chargé d'Affaires has been informed by the Persian Government that he is *persona non grata* and he is leaving Tehran shortly. M. Coiffard's motives were probably to endeavour to arouse public feeling to oppose the expulsion of the Vichy Legation, which he resents all the more since the treaty does not oblige Persia to break off relations with Japan.

W. A. K. FRASER, *Major-General,*
Military Attaché.

Tehran, January 19, 1942.

[E 1167/19/34]

No. 47.

(No. 31.)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 21.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 4 for period the 19th January to the 26th January, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, January 27, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 47.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the Period
January 19 to January 26, 1942.*

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

The second reading of the treaty in the Majlis began on the 25th and will probably be finished on the 26th. Ratification is generally expected. Reports that the Russians have been instigating opposition to the treaty have induced some wavering Deputies to accept it.

2. The Majlis has ratified the Bill amalgamating the Ministry of Commerce with that of Industry and Mines.

3. Economic problems have engaged the press during the last week. The Government has been urged to take steps against profiteering and to control prices. Doubts have been expressed of the wisdom of abolishing Government monopolies. The present rial-sterling rate of exchange, which was fixed by decree last October at 140 rials to the pound, has been criticised as being too high, having regard to the amount of sterling the Persian Government is now acquiring, and the Minister of Finance has been obliged to defend it as best he could in the Parliament and the press.

4. Rumours have been current in the city that Tehran is to be reoccupied by British and Russian troops. These probably arise from the arrival in Tehran of detachments of administrative units of British troops in connexion with the evacuation of Poles from Russia.

5. About 100 people from Mazandaran and Gilan have come to Tehran to demand that the Majlis should take steps to return to them the lands of which they were dispossessed by Reza Shah.

Officials.

- 6.—(i) Ghulam Reza Ardalan to be Farmandar of Burujird.
- (ii) Kazim Sharifi to be Farmandar of Gulpaigan.
- (iii) Mohamed Sa'ed (252) (182), Persian Ambassador in Moscow, who has been on leave, is returning to Moscow.

(The first figures refer to Military Attaché's, and second to Foreign Office, Personalities.)

*Internal Security.**Northern Provinces.*

7. The Governor of Urumieh has arrived in Tehran. He reports that, until the arrival of the Soviet Consul, the attitude of Soviet officials, who were then controlled by General Novikoff, commanding Russian forces in North-West Persia, was correct and even helpful. Since the consul arrived there has been continual obstruction on the part of the Soviet officials. Agitators and even murderers arrested by the Persian police have been demanded by the Soviet officials and released by them. The Governor was ordered to return to their owners arms he had taken from Kurds and Assyrians and was forbidden to disarm others coming into the town, as they were "guests" of the Russians. Russian troops stood by while police and gendarmes were attacked, and in some cases killed. Although the Nijat Committee consists of Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians, he considers that the two latter are receiving more attention from the Russians than the Kurds. The committee was terrorising the inhabitants of Urumieh and was living on robbery. His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz reports that about 1,000 refugees have arrived there from Urumieh.

8. The Chief of the Gendarmerie in Azerbaijan has also arrived in Tehran. He confirmed that Persian Government authority has disappeared from the Khalkhal country. A man called Mohamed Taghi, Amir Ahmadi, the son of the late Amir Ashair of these parts, had set himself up in Hirabad (see Summary No. 3, paragraph 6).

The Chief of the Gendarmerie said that he had been forbidden by the Russians to use his force for the collection of revenue, and had been told that he must not retain with his force certain machine guns which he had recovered, but must send them to Tehran.

Khorassan.

9. In Khorassan a certain Soulat-es-Sultaneh, a Hazara notable, exiled for some years in Fars, has declared himself in opposition to the Persian Government. With about 200-250 followers he has set himself up in Turbat Sheikh Jam, having disarmed the police and gendarmerie, and has issued a printed proclamation in Meshed and elsewhere calling on the people of Khorassan to join him in defending their rights against the Persian Government. The Persian authorities consider his activities are the result of Russian instigation. The War Office do not take him very seriously. The Russian authorities have agreed to their sending troops to Meshed.

10. A raid by Baluchis was made on the village of Qaumabad, 4 miles south-east of Shusp, in which an Indian trader and a Persian colonel, who happened to have halted there, were killed. The robbers carried off sixteen camel-loads of loot.

Fars.

11. It was noted in Intelligence Summary No. 2, paragraph 10, that Nasir Qashgai was endeavouring to establish himself as head of the tribe. He has now telegraphed to the press in Tehran that he has been asked by the tribe to represent their claims for—

- (i) Compensation for their sufferings and losses of the last twenty years.
- (ii) The right to elect a Deputy of their own.
- (iii) A revision of taxation.

Kurdistan and Kermanshah.

12. Severe winter conditions have limited activities of all concerned in these areas.

Polish Interests.

13. The Persian Government had been informed of the intention to evacuate a number of Poles through Persia and, not unexpectedly, this was soon publicly known. Questions were asked in the Majlis to which indefinite answers were given, but a day or so later a statement appeared in the press that 25,000 Poles, who were not required in Russia, were to be evacuated through Persia to the Mid-East.

14. There is as yet no indication from the Soviet authorities as to when these Poles may be expected to arrive, nor have they yet signified their acceptance of the proposals regarding the routes of their arrival.

French Interests.

15. General de Gaulle has appointed M. André Godard (Director of Archaeological Services of the Persian Government) to be delegate for Persia of the Comité national français. For some time Free French interests in Persia have been in the hands of a committee presided over by M. Goblot. This committee remains in being.

16. General Catroux has appointed Chef d'Escadron Jouvel, who has for some time been engaged in business in Tehran, to be his military representative in Persia.

17. M. Coiffard, Vichy French Chargé d'Affaires, has left Persia (see Summary No. 3, paragraph 14).

Russian Interests.

18. G.P.U. activities, which are considerable in Tehran at present, appear to be centred in the Soviet Consulate.

19. The Russians have taken over operational control of the railway from Tehran to the Caspian and Tehran to Zinjan.

Tehran, January 26, 1942.

[E 1246/19/34]

No. 48.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 34.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 5 for the period the 26th January to 2nd February, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, February 3, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 48.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5 for the period January 26 to February 2, 1942.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE treaty was approved by the Majlis on the 26th January. Of those members present 80 voted for the treaty, 5 against and 8 abstained. It was signed on the 29th January. It would perhaps not be wise to accept this as a measure of its popularity. While generally the older educated classes, though regretting their eviction from their seats on the fence are prepared to accept the treaty as the less unpleasant alternative, and as at least giving them some ground on which to stand in their relations with Russia, the mass of the people are still fearful that the result will be to bring Persia into the war. They are not impressed by the Allies' preparations to carry out article 3 (1) whereby they undertake to protect Persia against all aggression. An improvement in economic conditions, if that could be shown to be due to Allied help, would, however, quickly change the sentiments of the poorer classes. It is regrettable, though not strange, that Great Britain should be so unpopular among them. Scarcity, high prices, insecurity, the continuance of maladministration and the spread of Bolshevik ideas are all held to be, in varying degrees, the result of British actions. A note struck by the press is that public opinion about the treaty will depend on the nature of the aid given to Persia under article 7. The Prime Minister in his speech at the dinner given by the Persian Government to celebrate the signing of the treaty said that the collaboration of America in the common cause of the Allies gave him grounds for confidence in the treaty. The press says that Persia, having adhered to the Atlantic Charter, now looks to America for support and assistance.

2. It is to be hoped that now that the treaty, which has been the cause of so much anxiety to the Persian Government is out of the way, attention will be given to urgent problems of administration. A Bill has been drafted to regulate the disposal of the lands of the ex-Shah, and the Ministry of Justice is now engaged in drafting a Bill to prevent hoarding and profiteering. Public markets for food-stuffs and fuel have been opened in Tehran under official control with a view to eliminating the middleman.

3. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis to authorise the payment to the dependants of Persian officers and other ranks, who were killed in August, of pensions equal to the pay drawn by the deceased at the time he was killed. The existing law allows only a very meagre pension.

Officials.

4. The Soviet Embassy having withdrawn its objection, Ali Mansour has left for Meshed (see Summary No. 3, paragraph 3 (vi)).

- (i) Niri to be Governor of Turbat-i-Haidari.
- (ii) Roshan to be Governor of Kashan.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

5. His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz recently paid a visit to Urumieh. He reports that order has been completely restored by the Soviet military authorities, but that neither Persian officials nor the police and gendarmerie were functioning.

The Kurds, he thought, were not giving much trouble in Urumieh itself, but were practically independent in their own districts.

6. The Soviet authorities have agreed to Persian troops being sent to Ardebil for operations for the pacification of the Khalkhal country. (See Summary No. 4, paragraph 8.)

Khorassan.

7. A column of Persian troops consisting of two battalions of infantry, four tanks and a battery of field guns left Tehran for Meshed where they are due on the 2nd February for the suppression of Soulat-es-Sultanah (see Summary No. 4, paragraph 9). They are to be joined at Meshed by two squadrons of cavalry from Birjand. Soulat-es-Sultanah has retired to Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam. It is not expected that he will make any serious resistance.

The troops mentioned above are to stay in Meshed.

8. Soulat-es-Sultanah's outbreak led to some disorder in Khorassan. There were many unfounded rumours and some brigandage, some rioting in Turbat-i-Haidari, and wheat that had been purchased for the labourers by contractors employed on the maintenance of the Nokkundi-Meshed road had been looted and lorries carrying wheat prevented from leaving the town. The removal of wheat from any area in the present conditions of shortage and high prices is always liable to cause indignation, particularly if there is suspicion, as in this case, that it is being bought for the British.

9. There was a further raid by Baluchis on a small village in the neighbourhood of Qiamabad (see Summary No. 4, paragraph 10). There is as yet no reason to connect these raids with disturbances further north.

South Persia.

10. Hold ups occurred on the Kerman-Zahidan and Isfahan-Shiraz roads. In the first case some lorries carrying the post were looted by raiders, probably Persian Baluchis, 80 miles west of Bam. In the second, Mr. Winsor, the American irrigation expert, was looted 60 miles north of Shiraz. The band alleged to have committed this robbery, twelve in number, has been captured and taken in to Shiraz.

11. Operations have been initiated for the restoration of Persian Government authority in Dashti and for the collection of arms. A column of Persian troops has reached Khormuj, 40 miles south-east of Bushire.

Kurdistan.

12. Certain sections of the Qalbaghi had already submitted, and the resistance of the remainder of this troublesome tribe has probably been broken by the capture of 150 of them by Persian troops. Arms are now being collected. Mohamed Rashid has not been heard of for some time and is said to be ill. There seems at the moment to be little obstacle to an advance on Saggiz by Persian troops except their own fears of Russian support of the Kurds and perhaps the snow.

Kermanshah.

13. An advance by Persian columns against the Kakavand and Ahmadawand led, according to the statement of the Persian military commander, to the submission of the tribal leaders and the surrender of loot and some 400 rifles. Demonstrations against the Kalkhanis have brought about a humble attitude in this tribe. These events may be taken as indicating that General Shahbakhti is succeeding in instilling some respect, if not for the Persian Government at least for himself, and also that the morale of Persian troops is not quite so bad as it was.

Russian Interests.

14. The improved conditions at Urumieh due, according to His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, to action by Russian authorities, the permission given to Persian troops to pass through the Russian garrisons on the Tehran-Meshed Road on their way to operate against Soulat-es-Sultanah (see paragraph 7) and to move into Eastern Azerbaijan to operate against the Khalkhal insurgents, and the encouragement given by the Soviet Ambassador to proposals made by the Persian authorities for the suppression of this disturbance, may indicate that representations recently made to the Soviet Government by His Majesty's Government have been effective in securing a modification of unofficial Soviet policy in Persia.

15. A note on information given by Miss Eve Curie on her return from a visit to Russia is attached as an appendix.

16. The Soviet authorities show such anxiety to send staffs and detachments to the Persian Gulf for the purpose of taking over American lorries and aircraft there rather than in places further north, such as Tehran and Kazvin, that it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that they regard it as the first step towards the realisation of a long-dreamt dream.

Russian Troops.

17. His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz estimated that the number of Russian troops in Urumieh was about 2,000, mostly cavalry. There were also garrisons of unknown strength at Khoi, Maku and Dilman and posts along the Turkish frontier as far south as Ushnu.

Tehran, February 3, 1942.

Appendix.

Miss EVE CURIE returned from Russia on the 30th January after a visit of about three weeks. She is a shrewd and competent observer. She was specially favoured in Russia, visited Moscow and four different parts of the front, including Mojaik, which she reached three days after the Russians entered it. She was greatly impressed by the Russian army, its healthiness, physique, morale and equipment. It was incomparably better fed and clothed than the civilian population. The latter, however, seemed happy to be sacrificed so that the army should be well found. The high state of organisation and discipline of the army was in noticeable contrast to the apparent sloppiness and casualness in the civilian population. Russian officers (she mentioned especially Voissoff and Govaroff who recaptured Mojaik), although certain of a German counter-offensive in the spring, were not merely confident, but arrogant; they would defeat the Germans in a year. British and American aid they refused to discuss, except to say that the only effective aid was the establishment of a second front on the continent. Libya they belittled. As regards aid in munitions, there was a conventional reply, apparently inspired: "We have promises and we hope they will be fulfilled." When Miss Curie mentioned to one senior officer that she had come to Russia largely to write up British and American supplies, he replied: "Say nothing about it; if you speak the truth it will encourage the Germans."

She got the impression that many Russian officers did not appreciate at all the part Great Britain was playing; they seemed to think that they were fighting the Germans alone, and would beat them alone and would then "settle Europe."

She was struck by the quantities of equipment of all kinds with the Russian army, but saw very little British or American. She saw some German prisoners, miserably clad, underfed and frostbitten, but they may have been selected for her. All the inhabitants of recaptured towns and villages were boiling with hatred against the Germans, and all had ugly tales of German cruelties and atrocities.

Her outstanding impression was of a people fanatically and austere determined to defend their country, even though at best life in that country was harsh and gave them little. Nationalism rather than communism was the inspiration.

[E 1502/19/34]

No. 49.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 42.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the period the 2nd February to the 9th February, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, February 12, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 49.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the Period February 2 to February 9, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political and Economic.

THE treaty appears to be gaining increasing support, largely because it is coming to be regarded as some safeguard against Russia, a view which finds encouragement in an apparent modification of the Russian attitude since it came into force. There are, however, probably few Ministers or officials who are not concerned with preparing the best possible case for themselves in case the Germans should reach Persia.

2. The press has published articles almost fulsome in their appreciation of Soviet policy towards Persia, so different from that of Tsarist Russia. Coupled with this praise is a violent denunciation of those who have tried to arouse ill-feeling and suspicion among the Persian people as regards Soviet intentions by creating trouble and disturbances in the provinces occupied by the Red Army. The correct behaviour of the Soviet troops is very pointedly stressed, and it is plain that the denunciation is addressed to Soviet political agitators.

3. Economic problems, the distress of the poorer classes and the iniquities of officials are the subject of many articles in the press. A number of new papers have appeared, mostly distinctly Left in tone.

4. The Shah has laid the first stone of a new suburb that is to be built on the site of the village of Nazabad, south of Tehran. A thousand small houses are to be built, principally for the working classes, at a cost of 85 million rials to relieve the congestion in Tehran and to reduce house-rents, which are now very high for the poorer classes.

5. The press has announced that the ex-Shah is to go to Canada.

6. The Minister of Ways and Communications gave an interview to the press for the purpose of allaying public anxiety regarding the cost of improvements in communications now in progress and alleged to be projected. He said that it was intended to continue the construction of the unfinished lines from Tehran to Tabriz, Meshed and Yazd and to construct a line from Khorramshahr to Ahwaz, but that there was no intention to build a line from Kazvin to Khanakin. The improvements now being made to certain roads for the transport of supplies to Russia would be paid for by the Allies, as would be the cost of the railway from Khorramshahr to Ahwaz. The Allies were also paying for all goods transported by rail at ordinary tariff rates. The transport of merchandise and munitions by rail was controlled by a joint Anglo-Soviet-Persian Commission.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

7. Persian troops have occupied Saggiz, it is believed with little or no opposition. The Persian authorities had previously announced the appointment of a Kurdish notable, Saifullah Khan Ardalan, as Governor of Saggiz and it is understood that, previous to the advance of the troops, he had entered into some negotiations with the Kurds. Saifullah Khan is a son of the late Hussain Khan, Muzaffer-es-Sultaneh, and nephew of Sardar Rashid, who was imprisoned in Tehran by Reza Shah. He is also his stepson, as Sardar Rashid married his brother's widow.

8. In addition to Saifullah Khan, other Kurds are also exercising authority on behalf of the Persian Government. Mahmud Kanisanan was some time ago appointed Governor of Merivan; Qazi Mohamed continues to function in Sanj Bulagh with the nominal approval of the Persian Government, and Amir Azad is said to have been asked to undertake responsibility for the Mamish tribe. Haji Baba Sheikh, who has political and religious influence in the country west of Saggiz-Sanj Bulagh, and who was one of the Kurdish notables taken to Baku by the Russians, has arrived in Tabriz and has telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior to the effect that he wishes to visit him and offer his services. Other attempts by the Persian Government to give authority to Kurdish chiefs have been nullified by local jealousies.

9. Much has been heard recently of the grievances of the Persian Kurds. The more obvious of these date back for some fifteen years. Previous to that the

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grievances were rather against the Kurds—at least certain tribes who had been for generations the scourge of the countryside. The real grievances of the Persian Kurds to-day are for the most part those common to all Persian subjects who have suffered from the tyranny and corruption of officials and the general over-taxation of recent years. For those they may, in common with other Persian subjects, legitimately demand redress. But the Kurd has also regarded it as a grievance that he should be required to pay revenue, be subject to conscription and be prevented from smuggling and illicit trading. Although there may be arguments for preferential treatment of the Kurds in some respects, as there may be for special policies in certain other parts of Persia, to make obvious exceptions in the case of the Kurds would lead to an outcry for similar treatment from all other tribes and self-styled minorities.

Kermanshah.

10. There is considerable improvement in security in this province, the more troublesome tribes—the Kakavand, Ahmadavand and Khalkhanis—having come to heel. The general officer commanding states that rifles are being collected in satisfactory numbers. He considers the situation sufficiently settled to justify his coming to Tehran for "medical treatment." The real reason is probably to see what his rival for the dictatorship of Persia, Sipahbod Ahmadi, the Minister of the Interior, is doing.

Azerbaijan.

11. Further details have been received from His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz of the situation at Urumieh and in the district. In the town order was maintained by Russian patrols; the Nijat Committee had dispersed or gone to ground; there was little evidence of Persian authority or administration and, apart from keeping order, Russian officials did not concern themselves with the administration. The police and gendarmerie, in too-small numbers to be effective, were entirely demoralised. In the district there were no evidences of Government authority; there were no gendarmes outside the towns; the landlords did not dare to go to their villages to collect their dues; sowing was at least 25 per cent. short of normal. A "no-tax" campaign is in full swing. While these conditions are to a large extent due to Persian maladministration, they are difficult to remedy while the Russians impose an inadequate limitation on the number of police and gendarmerie that may be maintained and at the same time covertly encourage the lower classes in their revolt against the landlords and officials. The Soviet authorities still refuse to allow Persian troops to be sent to Urumieh.

Mazanderan.

12. The Russians agreed to reinforcements of gendarmerie being sent to Southern Mazanderan to deal with disturbances in the Sang-i-Sar region (see Summary No. 2, paragraph 9). The Minister of the Interior states that the situation has much improved and that some of the worst brigands have been caught.

Khorassan.

13. The column mentioned in Summary No. 5, paragraph 7, encountered the rebels before they reached Meshed. This band was dispersed with some casualties. The rebels have retired to Fariman, on the Meshed-Turbat-i-Shaikh Jam road, and were, according to the latest reports received, still holding a strong post on the Meshed-Turbat-i-Haidari road. There had been disturbances in the latter place. The Persian forces were to operate first against Fariman and then to clean up the area around Turbat-i-Haidari. Their casualties are said to have amounted to twenty-five killed and wounded. An engineer recently arrived from Turbat-i-Haidari states that Soulat's forces are not molesting the labourers working on the Meshed-Zahidan road-improvement scheme, but says that the general unsettled state of the locality has brought into being brigands, who, while owing no allegiance to Soulat, are a menace to security.

Simultaneously with the insurrection of Soulat-es-Sultaneh in North-East Khorassan, there was an outbreak on the part of the Kurdish tribes who have been settled in Northern Khorassan since the time of Shah Abbas. They raided Kuchan, although there are Russian troops there, Bujnurd and Shirvan. The Persian General Staff says they withdrew when Persian troops moved to Meshed.

Dashti.

14. It is reported from a consular source that at Khormuz Rais Ghulam Razmi (one of the two important khans, the other being Ali Ismail) has come to terms with the Persian military forces and that the lesser chiefs have followed his example and that no serious opposition is expected until the military come into contact with Ali Ismail, whose forces are said to be based on Dayir. The indications are that he, too, may come to terms.

Persian Army.

15. The latest (the 6th February, 1942) distribution of the Tehran garrison is as follows:—

- 1½ regiments on local guards.
- 1 battalion as additional police in the town.
- 2 battalions at Meshed.
- 2 battalions standing by for operations in the Khalkhal area (80 miles south-east of Tabriz).

According to the Persian D.C.G.S., this leaves little infantry in the capital except recruits.

(NOTE.—The third battalion in each infantry regiment consists of recruits.)

Appointments—Military.

- 16.—(i) Colonel Muhammad Nakhchevan to be promoted general and to command the military forces of Ustan No. 9 (Khorassan).
- (ii) Colonel Abdullah Bahrami to be commander of the Khuzistan Brigade vice Colonel Atapur.
- (iii) Colonel Faridunfar to be Deputy Director of Army Transport.

Foreign Interests.

Polish Interests.

17. The evacuation of 25,000 Poles for Mid-East and the United Kingdom appears to be hanging fire. The Soviet authorities in Moscow say they are waiting for information from the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran. The latter, who is fully informed of the British-Polish plans, states that he has not been informed by Moscow that any Poles were to be evacuated. The plans are ready to be put into execution.

Russian Interests.

18. The Soviet Ambassador has been instructed to negotiate with the Persian Government for the purchase of the machinery of the uncompleted Bren machine-gun factory in Tehran. The Government of India originally hoped to buy this machinery, but it was agreed between London and Moscow that the factory should be completed in Tehran, if the missing machinery, which was mostly in Russia, could be found, and that Russia should take the production. The Soviet authorities have now realised that the factory cannot be put into production in Tehran.

[E 1645/19/34]

No. 50.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 49.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the period 10th–17th February, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, February 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 50.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the Period
February 10-17, 1942.*

Persian Affairs.

1. *Political.*

Criticism of the Cabinet is increasing. This is due partly to genuine dissatisfaction at their apparent dilatoriness in dealing with economic and administrative problems and partly to the inspiration of candidates for ministerial posts. It is probable that there will be some changes, but supporters of British policy hold the opinion that it would be a political mistake to allow the Prime Minister to resign at present. Four men only find support as possible successors: Tagizadeh, now Minister in London; Tadayyun, the present Minister of Education; Qavam-es-Sultaneh, previously several times Prime Minister; and Seyyed Zia, who carried through the *coup d'Etat* of 1921 that brought Reza Khan to power, now in Palestine.

2. *The Royal Family.*

Queen Fawzieh is leaving Tehran by air to pay a visit to her brother the King of Egypt. The Persian press states that the visit is strictly private and will be of not more than one month's duration.

3. *Perso-Soviet Relations.*

In an article dated the 11th February, 1942, on the internal situation and the disturbances in Azerbaijan, the *Journal de Tehran* asks why the Persian Government cannot take more vigorous steps to quell the unrest. "We know," says the article, "that the Red Army gives proof of its good intentions to collaborate effectively." "Why then does the Persian Government hesitate to send troops to the disturbed areas?" This is a covert dig at the recent refusal by the Soviets to allow Persian troops to re-enter Urumieh.

4. *Economics—Live-stock.*

(i) The numbers of existing live-stock in Persia is estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture at:—

Sheep	16,500,000
Goats	8,600,000
Cattle	2,200,000

(ii) The official figures for exports for 1940-41 are as follows:—

Goat skins	52,460 pieces
Sheep skins	17,700 pieces
Lamb skins	15,600 pieces
Goat and sheep casings	3,535 kilog.

(iii) In 1942 the export of live-stock was forbidden by the Government, but the Persian Government admit that many head of cattle have been illegally exported to Iraq and also to the U.S.S.R. The number of cattle taken over the northern frontier to Russia is said to have reached 200 weekly. This has been the subject of protest by the Persian Government to the Soviet Government both in Tehran and in Moscow.

5. *Personalities.*

The death on the 14th February is announced of Daud Miftah (170) (125). Sartip Amini, commanding in Kurdistan, has been killed by the rebels in Saqqiz.

Internal Security.

6. *Khorassan (see paragraph 13 of Summary No. 6).*

The Persian Government forces have cleared up Turbat-i-Haidari, Fariman and Turbat-i-Shaikh Jam. The Meshed-Birjand road is now open. Soulat-us-Sultaneh has fled and is in hiding near Kalat-i-Nadiri.

The rebels have dispersed. The Afghan Government is co-operating by preventing the entry of Soulat-us-Sultaneh into their territory. Some arms are being collected. The prompt action of the Persian Government in this matter, having had no forces in Khorassan when the rebellion broke out, has had a good effect.

7. *Kurdistan (see paragraph 7 of Summary No. 6).*

The Kurdish rebels have retaken Saqqiz, killed Sartip Amini, the local commander, and destroyed and dispersed the entire small force he had taken with him, none of which has as yet returned to headquarters. This reverse for the Government will, it is feared, encourage Kurdish resistance. It has also served to strengthen the belief of the Persian authorities that the Kurds are counting on Russian sympathy if not getting Russian encouragement. They consider that the refusal of the Soviet authorities to allow Persian troops in Urumieh must be taken by the Kurds as evidence of Russian sympathy. It is unlikely that any attempt to reoccupy Saqqiz or to undertake any serious operations against the Kurds will be made for some time. Indeed, the Persian Government has not the number of troops necessary with one column operating in Khorassan and another moving shortly to Eastern Azerbaijan.

In Southern Kurdistan (adjoining Luristan) the collection of arms is proceeding in and around Harsin.

8. *Gendarmerie.*

A detail of the strength of the gendarmerie as it was on the 14th February is attached as an appendix.

British Interests.

9. There is some propaganda in Tehran, encouraged probably by the Japanese Legation, to the effect that Anglo-Russian relations are bad, and it finds some measure of belief. Russian officials are said to be openly criticising the British for their poor defence of Singapore. The Turkish Embassy is watching with close attention for evidence of Anglo-Russian disagreements.

10. Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State in the Middle East, visited Tehran from the 9th to 13th February.

Russian Interests.

11. *Russian Troops in Mazanderan and Gilan.*

Recent travellers in the area Pahlevi-Gorgan have given the following as their impressions of Russian forces in this area:—

(a) *General.*—There are no mechanised or armoured forces in this area.

Intensive elementary training is being carried out from early morning until late at night.

All military stations, depots and premises were very heavily guarded.

Transport markings as follows:—

(i) 4-figure numbers (or two sets of two figures), all commencing 54 or 45, i.e., 5467.

4592.

(ii) D plus 3-figure numbers.

Two types of men were seen:—

(i) Very young recruits—boys of about 16 being common.

(ii) Stiffening of older men, many dressed in clothing suggestive of having come from a much colder area; it may be that the area is used for rest.

A report was received that the area commander at Shahi was Major Zelinovsky. All attempts to check this failed.

Babul Sar is definitely a general hospital and convalescent area.

Isolated sentries seen on coast road looking out to sea, coast-watching.

Generally speaking, officers are prepared to join in drinking parties, but one or two always remain completely sober and control conduct of remainder.

Suggested that extensive training in guerrilla warfare is being carried out in Mazanderan, where the country is very suitable for this. Equipment (parties of about forty): 2/4 mortars, varying numbers of automatic weapons, dummy hand grenades, &c.

[24085]

L 4

The Russian troops are paying cash for all purchases and there are no complaints of their treatment of locals.

All amusements provided for troops are entirely self-contained and no encouragement is given to mix with troops. Locals are not allowed to attend military entertainments.

No surface propaganda—the suggestion being that the Russians hope for a gradual collapse entailing intervention, which would strengthen any post-war claims to control a community incapable of conducting its own affairs.

Local relations: nil.

(b) *Identifications*.—Identifications: nil. Security is obviously an integral part of training.

(c) *Locations*.

Pahlevi: Two companies, guarding docks.

Naushahr: Battalion headquarters, guarding docks. Naval W/T station.

Babul Sar: One cavalry regiment.

Shahi: Base sub-area. Headquarters, infantry regiment (three battalions). A/T battery (two guns seen). Field regiment. 250 lorries. Horsed limbers.

Sari: Divisional headquarters. Headquarters, infantry regiment. 100 horsed transport. General Commanding.

Gorgon: Headquarters, infantry regiment (one battalion only). Heavy workshop. Field artillery regiment. Aerodrome north of town: probably regular service.

Resht: Two companies infantry. New aerodrome built but not used west of town).

Iz-i-Deh: Nil.

Feruzkuh: Nil.

Zirab: Possibly one platoon: not in evidence.

Bandar Shah (Caspian): Two companies infantry. (Administration, transport and guard duties.)

Chalus: One battalion infantry (based on Naushahr); guard duties.

Behshahr: One company infantry. Seventy trucks (based Bandar Shah).

(d) *Strength*.—Total strength in the area visited:—

M.T.	1,000 vehicles.
Troops	15,000

Tehran, February 17, 1942.

Appendix.

Strength of the Gendarmerie on February 14, 1942.

	Officers.	Men.
Tehran ...	166	3,217
Azerbaijan ...	78	1,575
Khorassan ...	57	1,757
Kerman ...	51	2,412
Fars ...	90	3,335
Khuzestan ...	53	2,413
Western area ...	71	1,970
Isfahan ...	47	631
Headquarters ...	86	172
Total ...	699	17,482

Tehran, February 17, 1942.

[E 1649/19/54]

No. 51.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 58.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period 18th to 24th February, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, February 24, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 51.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period February 18 to 24, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

1. The Government.

Agitation for changes in the Cabinet has continued throughout the week. It is directed mainly against the Minister of the Interior, Sipahbod Ahmadi, who was one of Reza Shah's most effective lieutenants and amassed considerable wealth during his reign—a ruthless, energetic man who has little patience with parliaments and democracy, the most forceful character in the Cabinet. Attacks are also being made on the Minister of Ways and Communications, General Jahanbani, who has co-operated well with the Transportation Directorate, and on Dr. Nafisi, the Minister of Finance, an honest and hard-working Minister. The Prime Minister's position seems secure for the time being, as his most serious rival, Qavam-es-Sultaneh, after months of laborious intrigue to create for himself a party in the Majlis, has written to the press saying that rumours to the effect that he desired to become Prime Minister were baseless, as his health would not allow him to accept the responsibility.

The Government's Bill against hoarding and profiteering has made little progress, owing to the effective delaying tactics adopted by the Deputies, with whom the Bill is not popular, since many of them are both hoarding and profiteering.

2. The Press.

The press has been much occupied with demands for reform, for the elimination of officials connected with the abuses of Reza Shah's régime, for the establishment of security and for a reduction in the sterling rate of exchange. There has been some argument for foreign advisers in certain departments. Dr. Millspaugh's work coming in for warm praise in one paper. There has been some discreet pro-Ally propaganda and some cautious condemnation of the Axis, but generally the tone of comments about the war has been pessimistic, foretelling a long war.

3. The Royal Family.

The Queen, accompanied by the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, left by B.O.A.C. plane on the 19th February for a visit to her brother, King Farouk.

Persian Forces.

4. A series of minor successes, notably against Soulat-es-Sultaneh in Khorassan, in Dashti, in Khuzistan against the Bahmai (see paragraph 9 below), in Khalkhal against Amir Ahmadi (see paragraph 8 below), has done something to raise the morale of the Persian forces, both army and gendarmerie, and to establish some—but little—respect for the Persian Government. Saqqiz was a set-back, but it is reported that Persian troops fought fairly well against superior numbers. But there is still a considerable amount of pro-German feeling among the junior officers, and there is little doubt that this is being deliberately kept alive and fostered by some agency. The Japanese Legation is certainly implicated

The prestige of British arms does not at present stand high, and the German spring offensive in South Russia is much in mind. The absence of any indications of British preparations for the defence of Persia creates hesitation and anxiety.

5. Appointments.

Sartip Ghadar to command the Kurdistan Division, *vice* Sartip Amini, killed.
Sartip Mustafa Assa to be Military Governor of Tehran.

Internal Security.

6. When tribal chiefs were released from prison after the abdication of Reza Shah they came to some agreement with each other to form a sort of tribal council, to be headed by Amir Jang Bakhtiari, nominally to represent tribal matters to the Government and offer advice. There is suspicion that the agreement went further than this, and that the chiefs bound themselves to stand together to force the Government to comply with their demands, which would probably be for the restitution of their lands and of some tribal privileges, and in some cases the restoration of their own authority over the tribes, in effect tantamount to some measure of tribal autonomy. The principal chiefs concerned are said to be Nasir Qashgai, some Bakhtiari and Kurdish chiefs. It is fairly reliably reported that sealed Qorans have recently been passing among the tribal leaders. While a concerted move by the tribes may not be likely owing to the chiefs' distrust of each other, it could cause the Persian Government very serious embarrassment. For that reason, and on account of the lack of mobility of their forces due to shortage of transport, the General Staff feels obliged to have forces on the spot in any area where there might be trouble.

7. Khorassan.

Order has effectively been restored around Meshed and on the southern road as far as Turbat-i-Haidari. Soulat-es-Sultaneh, when last heard of, was making for Kalat-i-Nadiri with some following. If he succeeds in reaching that old stronghold there will be some difficulty in dislodging him.

The abortive rising of the Khorassan Kurds around Quchan and Bujnurd, which was apparently meant to synchronise with Soulat-es-Sultaneh's rebellion, seems to have fizzled out.

8. Azerbaijan.

Conditions in Azerbaijan have generally improved. The gendarmerie have carried out successful operations against the Khalkhal rebels and have killed their leader, Taqi, Amir Ahmadi. Less is heard of Soviet propaganda, Kurdish Azerbaijan is quiet and Kurds are no longer allowed to carry arms in Tabriz. But the local Soviet authorities still refuse to allow Persian troops in Urumieh (Rezaieh). It remains to be seen whether they will agree to the increase of gendarmerie and police up to the limits thought desirable by the Persian Government, as the Russian Ambassador in London states they have been instructed to do.

9. Khuzistan.

A gang of Bahmai tribesmen who had been creating trouble in the Haft Khel area has been dispersed and the leader captured by a force of gendarmerie. This outbreak may be connected with reports received from Isfahan of the activities of a young Bakhtiari Khan, Nadir Quli, son of Sardar Ashjaa, a reputed hothead of little importance, who is said to have left for Malamir with the intention of raising a band for the sabotage of the oil-fields. Whether that is his intention or not, reliable opinion is that he is not likely to acquire much support.

10. Fars.

Operations in Dashti are not yet completed, Ali Ismail not yet having submitted nor, as far as is known, has any action been taken against him at Daiyir.

An unconfirmed report from Shiraz says that a large force of Buvair Ahmadi tribesmen has collected in Ardakan and has attacked and disarmed a military post at Tal Khosrovi ($\frac{1}{4}$ -inch map, sheet H.39.J).

Tehran, February 24, 1942.

[E 1889/19/34]

No. 52.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 66. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 9 for the period the 25th February to the 3rd March, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, March 3, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 9 for the Period
February 25 to March 3, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

1. The Cabinet.

IN a secret session of the Majlis the Prime Minister was given a personal vote of confidence which did not extend to his Cabinet. The other Ministers resigned on the 26th February. The new Cabinet was announced on the 2nd March and was as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister for War: Muhammad Ali Faroughi (71) (88).

Agriculture, Food Supplies and Economics: Abdul Majid Ahi (5) (7).

Health: Ali Ashgar Hikmat (85) (111).

Posts and Telegraphs: Hasan Ali Hidayet.

Foreign Affairs: Ali Soheili (203) (283).

Interior: Baqir Kazemi (105) (142).

Finance: Yadullah Azudi (39) (49).

Communications: General Amanullah Jehanbani (100) (132).

Industry: Abdul Hussein Hajir (80) (104).

Justice: Gulshayan.

Education: Mustafa Adl (1) (1).

(The first figures refer to Foreign Office Personalities and the second to military attaché's.)

They resigned *en bloc* some hours later.

It is to be hoped that a new Government can speedily be appointed which will have some stability, and that Ministers will remain in office long enough to carry through some of the talked-of and much-needed reforms. The most prominent causes of unrest, which, unless remedied, may lead to serious trouble, are hunger and the demand for restoration of expropriated lands. The most critical and urgent problems before the Government are to ensure a fairer distribution of food-stuffs and to give concrete evidence that the matter of restoration of lands is really under way.

It has been decided to hold one secret session of the Majlis each week at which Under-Secretaries of Ministries will attend.

2. Legislation.

The law of the 25th Dalve, 1303, has been annulled. The law in question read as follows:—

"Single Article.—The National Assembly confers on Aqai Riza Khan Sardar Sipah supreme command of the nation's defence and security (Amnieh) forces, and he will carry out his duties with full powers within the limits of the fundamental law and the laws of the land; this position cannot be taken from him without the approval of the National Assembly."

The intention of the annulment is to vest the control of the army in the Ministry of War, which is, in turn, responsible to the Majlis.

3. Economic.

There is strong agitation against the maintenance of the present rate of the rial-sterling exchange (140 rials to the £ sterling). Some demand the abolition of control, which, it is claimed, would result in a very considerable cheapening of sterling; others put forward more reasoned arguments to show that a rate between 100-120 should be adopted and control maintained. The Minister of Finance, in defence of the present rate and in answer to criticisms that Persia was getting flooded with unnecessary sterling and consequently need not pay so high a price for it, stated that he expected to have to import during the year 1942-43 wheat to the value of £2 million, sugar and piece-goods each to a similar value, and motor vehicles, tyres and spares to the value of £4 million; in other words, so far from sterling being a drug in the Persian market, it is more necessary than ever in order to obtain essential imports, including food.

It is anticipated that the current financial year will close with a much smaller deficit (about 400 million rials) than was at first estimated. For the coming year expenditure is estimated at 3,000 million rials, revenue at something less; but the budget excludes all capital expenditure, which it is hoped to meet by a loan.

Persian Forces.

4. The Persian General Staff has now drawn up a scheme for the reorganisation of the Persian army. It allows for eight divisions (seven of which have three brigades and one two brigades) and one independent brigade. Each brigade consists of one infantry regiment, one squadron of cavalry and one battery of artillery.

The location is as follows:—

Tehran—

2 divisions, each with a brigade detached, one to Resht and one to the South-East Caspian.

Azerbaijan—

Divisional Headquarters and 1 brigade, Tabriz.

1 brigade, Ardebil.

1 brigade, Rezaieh.

Kurdistan and Kermanshah—

Divisional Headquarters and 1 brigade, Kermanshah.

1 brigade, Senneh.

1 brigade, Saqqiz and Iraqi frontier.

Lurestan and Khuzistan—

1 brigade, Lurestan.

1 brigade, Khuzistan.

Fars—

Divisional Headquarters and 1 brigade, Shiraz.

1 brigade, Kazarun area.

1 brigade, Jahrum area.

Kerman and Persian Baluchistan—

Divisional Headquarters and 1 brigade, Kerman.

1 brigade, Khwash.

1 brigade, Seistan.

Khorassan—

Divisional Headquarters and 1 brigade, Meshed.

1 brigade, Afghan frontier.

1 brigade, Bujnurd.

Isfahan—

1 brigade.

The total strength, including recruits and services, is 86,000. The cost is nearly 900 million rials. The Minister of Finance has, however, budgeted for 600 million rials only, and if this is maintained, as is probable, the strength will have to be reduced to between 50,000 and 60,000. It is not yet known what numbers the Russians will accept in their areas. The Soviet Government has accepted in principle the right of the Persian Government to locate their troops as necessary for the maintenance of security.

A governing factor in the strength and dispositions of the Persian forces is its lack of transport and consequent loss of mobility.

A War Office commission is now visiting the Fars and Kerman Divisions to initiate the new organisation.

Conscription is to be maintained for the present as higher pay than can be afforded would have to be offered to secure voluntary recruits. There is considerable public feeling against conscription, which is, however, not likely to find effective expression until security is on a firmer basis than at present. There is general anxiety about the spring, when it is feared there may be tribal unrest leading at least to brigandage. If the authority of the Central Government is re-established and order restored, then the opposition to conscription and the demand for the reduction of the army to the minimum essential will probably be more plainly heard. Meanwhile, efforts are being made by the War Office to eliminate the worst abuses of conscription. Theoretically, it has been removed from the control of divisional commanders, to whom it was a considerable source of profit, and is now controlled by an independent commission.

The main lines of military policy are directed by the Higher Military Council, which meets twice a week and is usually presided over by the Shah himself. It consists of the Minister for War, the Chief of the General Staff, the three army inspectors (Generals Shahbakhte, Ahmadi and Jahanbani) and the financial officer of the War Office, Colonel Alai. The Minister for War and the Chief of Staff visit the Shah almost daily.

A column of Persian troops left Tehran on the 21st February under the command of Colonel Ahmad Janpulad, for the Khalkhal country (Eastern Azerbaijan). Small columns have also visited Quchan and Bujnurd. The column consisted of two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery.

Internal Security.

5. Khorassan.

Minor cleaning-up operations are in progress in Northern Khorassan, but Soulat-es-Sultaneh has not yet been captured. Farajollah Picharanlou, the leader of the Kurds of the Bujnurd-Quchan area, who had raised an incipient revolt, has submitted to a column of Persian troops which had been detached from the forces at Meshed. This operation was not objected to by the Russians, although it is well inside the area occupied by their troops.

6. Azerbaijan.

The despatch of Persian troops to Eastern Azerbaijan (see paragraph 4 above) should have a good effect on that part of the province, and should prove a discouragement to those secessionists who were claiming to have Soviet support. If the Soviet authorities agree to the despatch of Persian troops to Urumieh (Rezaieh), Kurdish pretensions to Soviet support will lose much force. The situation at Rezaieh and Sauj Bulagh is now reported to be calm, largely due to the influence of Qazi Mohamed (see Summary No. 6, paragraph 8).

7. Khuzistan.

The Bani Turuf threatened a revolt to recover lands of which they had been deprived in Reza Shah's reign. The disturbance was, however, quickly quietened by the prompt action of the Persian authorities without fighting as far as is known at present.

Russian Affairs.

8. A party of four Russian military officers, accompanied by some non-commissioned officers, has reached Bandar Abbas after visiting other places in South-East Persia. Their nominal object is to advise on measures for the suppression of locusts. One hundred Russian soldiers, accompanied by eight officers, have gone to Bushire. The pretext here was to take over American lorries for delivery to Russia. Although the Soviet authorities were well aware of the fact that these lorries were to be delivered at Tehran by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and that all arrangements had been made to that end, their military authorities insisted on sending the party. The first convoy, consisting of some sixty lorries, is now on its way from Bushire to Tehran. Other Russian detachments will shortly be going to Abadan and Andimeshk for the purpose of taking over aircraft and lorries. This Russian penetration to the Persian Gulf is a matter of much concern to the Persian authorities, who are surprised that the British authorities should allow it.

9. The following, reference Russian forces in Persia, has been supplied by the Way Mission, to whom it was given by Soviet authorities in Tiflis:—

Tabriz—

Headquarters, Cavalry Corps.

2 cavalry regiments, both with headquarters at Urmia.

Khoi and Maku—

Infantry regiment, plus three batteries of artillery in each place.

Ushnu, Maracheh, Nianek, Zinjan and Kazvin—

1 cavalry squadron, additional to 2 regiments.

Ardabil, Pahlevi and Resht—

1 company infantry at each place.

Tehran, March 3, 1942.

[E 1962/19/34]

No. 53.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received March 27.)

(No. 75.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 10 for period the 4th to 10th March, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, March 10, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 53.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the Period

March 4-10, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

1. The Cabinet (see Summary No. 9/42).

THE crisis continued till the 9th March. One cannot help feeling that the public, or at least the Deputies, have rather enjoyed it and are proud of having had such a "grown-up" malady. For some days Feroughi tried to form a Cabinet and then refused to try further, since nothing that he could produce was acceptable to the Majlis. The press has, in the main, supported him and lays the blame on the Deputies for objecting to his Cabinet nominees without stating their reasons or producing other suggestions, i.e., adopting an attitude of purely destructive criticism. They have been held up as obstructionists and place seekers. Both these accusations are partly true, but much of their ceaseless speech-making was due to a determination to have their say and to exercise that right of free speech so long denied to them under the late régime. Summoned but seldom by Reza Shah, and then only to accord a submissive affirmative, they must, naturally, take a new-found delight in exercising an organ almost atrophied by disuse. A novel method of Cabinet-making was tried on the 6th March, when fourteen Deputies were chosen by lot to advise Feroughi as to the composition of his Cabinet. Feroughi, disappointed with the lack of support and the continued criticism (not of him, but of his nominees), is said to have refused to discuss his Cabinet with Deputies chosen by such means, and finally resigned. Ali Soheily was then sent for by the Shah and was entrusted with the task of forming a Government. Ali Soheily, at a private session of the Majlis, received a majority of 100 to 2 on a vote of his selection as Prime Minister.

He announced his Cabinet at a public session on the 9th March. They are as follows:—

Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Home Minister: Ali Soheily (203) (283).

Minister of War: Sarlashgar Amanullah Mirza Jehanbani (100) (132).

Minister of Finance: Mahmud Badr (41) (51).

Minister of Education: Mustafa Adl (1) (1).

Minister of Roads and Communications: Yadullah Azudi (39) (49).

Minister of Justice: Abdul Majid Ahi (5) (7).

Minister of Health: Ali Asghar Hikmat (85) (111).

Minister of Commerce and Industry: Abdul Hussein Najir (80) (104).

Minister of Agriculture: Ahmad Hussein Adl (a former Director-General of Agriculture, lately in business, an Azerbaijani educated partly in France, cousin to Mustafa Adl).

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs: Fazullah Bahrami (47) (nil).

The Government's programme is to be announced at a public session on Thursday, the 12th March, after which a vote of confidence in the new Cabinet will be taken.

2. Economic.

The present wheat shortage is being aggravated by a deficiency in M.T. Surplus stocks exist in some areas, but cannot be transported to areas in need of supplies. Contracts with the British military authorities at better rates than the Persian Government has paid have also created a shortage of lorries available for the transportation of wheat.

It has already been suggested to the Persian Government that a proper use of the considerable A.T. resources of the country would go far towards remedying this evil.

Persian Army.

3. (See paragraph 4 of last Summary, No. 42/9.)

The Chief of the General Staff has said that his intention is to form a division in Isfahan instead of a brigade because (a) the locality is centrally situated, and (b) it is near the largest recruiting area.

Internal Security.

4. Khorassan (see paragraph 5 of last Summary, No. 42/9).

Soulat-es-Sultaneh is still in hiding at Kalat Nadiri, but his following has nearly all dispersed. The arrival of Persian troops in the Quchan-Bujnurd area has had a steadying effect.

5. Fars.

Acts of brigandage on the Shiraz-Bushire road and the Shiraz-Tul-i-Khosrovi road are reported. Operations in Dashti based on Khornuj against Ali Ismail's followers have begun again.

6. Kurdistan.

According to the Chief of the General Staff, the situation in Kurdistan is still serious. Insufficient troops and the unhelpful attitude of the Russians in not allowing Persian troops into Urumieh and Mehrabad (Sauj Bulaq) are hindering operations, since, without a simultaneous advance southwards from Mehrabad through Saqqiz, operations northwards from Senneh must lose much of their efficacy if the Kurds can slip away either northwards into the Russian zone or westwards over the Iraq border.

7. Azerbaijan.

Persian troops have advanced from Ardebil towards Mughanat⁽¹⁾ in their cleaning-up operations.

Tehran, March 10, 1942.

⁽¹⁾ Not traceable, but thought to be between Ardebil and Ahar.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

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(16245)

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 49

April to June 1942

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

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(16245)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 49. APRIL TO JUNE 1942.

CHAPTER I.—PERSIA.

(A) General.

[E 2182/21/34]

No. 1.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 16, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from Tabriz, No. 6 of the 26th February, in which His Majesty's Consul gives a translation from the Azerbaijan Turkish dialect of the *Programme and Desires of the Azerbaijan Workers' Committee*. The mere comprehensiveness of the programme establishes, as Mr. Cook suggests, a foreign origin, and there are many touches which point straight to Soviet Russia, e.g., the demands for the protection of the vernacular theatre, for the absorption into productive factory work of the inmates of brothels, and for the equality of women with men in social and political affairs—all matters remote from the views of the oriental and the Moslem. I mentioned this programme to my Soviet colleague as the kind of thing that did us great harm in adding to the suspicion of the Turkish Government that Soviet Russia had designs on Azerbaijan. M. Smirnov not only denied that there could be any Soviet influence at work here, but so far forgot his excellent sense of humour as to suggest that an enemy had done this: there were, he said, many signs of "provocation" in Azerbaijan.

2. It is possible that the Soviet authorities, having been obliged to retreat somewhat in their encouragement of the Kurds and other minorities and to be more accommodating in the matter of the installation of adequate numbers of Persian police and gendarmes in Azerbaijan, are turning more attention to political parties. It seemed to me that M. Smirnov took a keener interest in the recent Cabinet crisis than he had ever taken in Tehran politics before. He spoke to me strongly in favour of Qawam-al-Saltana as a possible Premier, and from the Qawam we learn that M. Smirnov sent for him and made much of him; and now we have this programme of political and social demands which, for all that it is more discreet than inviting Kurdish leaders to visit Baku and refusing to allow the Persian Government to keep adequate numbers of police at Rezaieh, has yet a separatist tendency which can only help to confirm the suspicion with which Soviet policy in Azerbaijan is regarded by the Persian and Turkish Governments.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, and copies, with copies of the enclosures, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Tabriz, February 26, 1942.

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 5 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the programme (printed in Turkish dialect in the form of a booklet) of the chief of the new clubs in Tabriz.

2 The Soviet authorities firmly deny that they have anything to do with the matter, but the Persians say that they know that the chief members of the club or committee continually visit the Soviet military offices and are in close touch with the Soviet-Azerbaijan journalist Azhderoglu, who is supposed to have had the booklet printed here in the press which prints the Soviet army's newspaper, *Vatan Yolanda*, for the Caucasian troops in Turkish dialect. They say that the ordinary local printers do not know how to set up type in the dialect, and only print in Persian. It is difficult for the Persians also to believe that among the local down-trodden and politically undeveloped proletariat there has suddenly sprung up a body of leaders capable of compiling unaided such an ambitious, all-embracing, albeit mostly half-baked, programme.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

Sub-Enclosure.

The Programme and Desires of the Azerbaijan Workers' Committee.

TO fight energetically against despotism, dictatorship and fascism and to establish complete liberty: of the nation, of association, of the individual, of language and of the press.

2. To form (in accordance with the constitutional law of Persia) unions in town and country by the free association of the workers, and to increase their power like a national Parliament.

3. To spread and teach the idea of democratic freedom in every part of the country and to every person among the workers.

4. To form workers' unions to improve the material and moral welfare of workers and servants, and to make known these aims officially to the Government authorities.

5. To remove unemployment, and to form unemployment exchanges to gain exact statistics of the unemployed.

6. To arrange long-term loans to the peasants through the Agricultural Bank.

7. To take advantage of the increase of purchasing power by having local industries enlarged.

8. To abolish internal concessions in order to increase the output and capacity of internal industries, and so create more competition and freedom in industry.

9. To establish committees for securing the vital needs of the workers and utilising their labour, consumption, production and village properties.

10. To amend the customs tariffs on imported luxury goods and home-produced goods, and impose heavy taxes on unnecessary wares in order to protect home industries and combat unemployment.

11. To protect the education of the minorities (language, writing, theatre, press) and respect their nationality.

12. To have judicial proceedings in Azerbaijan carried on in the Azerbaijani language, to have a High Court established in Azerbaijan, and have all laws and codes translated into the said language, in order to avoid difficulties for the workers who are not acquainted with the Persian language.

13. To establish medical, agricultural, law and teachers' training schools in Azerbaijan.

14. To see that all teaching and medical treatment are general and free.

15. To review the laws and social laws in order to protect the welfare of the workers.

16. To reduce all indirect taxes in a just manner.

17. To reorganise transport and communications in order to benefit economic shipping.

18. The ex-Shah's properties and possessions to be confiscated and a due portion (assessed according to the population of Azerbaijan as part of all Persia) to be set aside and spent for social improvement in Azerbaijan.

19. To see that the whole of Government revenues in Azerbaijan are spent on its needs.

20. To oppose illegalities in Government departments and among authorities and officials, especially the police and gendarmerie who ill-treat lovers of freedom, and to oppose the bad advantages taken of the law.

21. To establish close relations with the other workers' associations formed in other parts of Persia, and to help them when necessary.

22. To recognise the equality of women in political and social affairs.

23. To establish clubs and theatres for the political and social education of the workers and to publish various papers.

24. To abolish the laws passed against the freedom of the people during the time of the ex-Shah Pahlevi.

Methods of the Azerbaijan Workers' Committee.

1. Unions must be formed in town and country of all parties of the nation, and their powers must be those of a local Parliament.

2. Strong opposition must be offered to despotism and fascism, and their secret activities must be revealed to the people.

3. Immediate help must be given to small business-men and unemployed workers as follows:—

Textile, cloth, carpet, leather, shoe-making and other manual trades must be put under the control of agricultural and industrial banks, the capital of which must not be less than 10 million rials.

To guarantee the collection of the above sum, 2 million rials must be deposited with the bank from the sum sent in the name of the Shah.

Cinemas must be established in the municipality and other named places, the profits to be controlled by the committee and devoted to the poor and the sick, and for collecting beggars from the streets.

Monies collected by the customs, finance and other local commissions must be spent under the control of the committee.

In order to prevent hoarding, monopolised goods must be sold not to wholesale merchants, but direct to retailers and co-operative stores, &c.

4. Immediate facilities must be granted for the teaching and spread of the Azerbaijan language in Azerbaijan as follows:—

Text-books must be translated into Azerbaijani before the commencement of the school-year 1321.

All stories and phrases in favour of despotism must be deleted from school-books, and stories of Azerbaijan freedom inserted instead.

The Persian language will be studied in schools after the 4th class.

5. Criminal law and other law will be translated into the Azerbaijan language.

6. Judgments beginning with preliminary investigation and up to the High Court will be in the Azerbaijani language, and a High Court will be established immediately in Azerbaijan.

7. Houses of ill-fame, which are a relic of despotism, must be entirely closed and prevented from opening, and the inmates given first acceptance in the productive factories.

8. Authorities guilty of criminal practices during the reign of Pahlevi must be held responsible and brought to proper trial.

9. Rich men who are drawing large salaries in Government offices must be replaced by capable unemployed.

10. Corrupt bribe-takers in Government departments must be fought against without exception, and heavy punishments inflicted on them.

11. In order to ensure the fair distribution of goods which are now becoming scarce, and to see that they reach the people without bribery, representatives and controllers from the Workers' Committee must be included on the various commissions.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 86.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 7 of the 9th March to this legation on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, March 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, March 9, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last fortnight the disturbed situation in Tabriz has improved very little, while, on the other hand, the province of Azerbaijan is comparatively quiet for the moment.

2. Outstanding robberies and burglaries have been fewer, except for one in the house of an Armenian Turkish subject, where four armed men cowed the occupants and took away about 10,000 rials and some valuable carpets. Luckily, the police arrested two of the men within a week, both described as Armenian refugees from the Caucasus, and found much stolen property from other burglaries in the house of an old woman refugee. Next day a story was spread in the town that, while this woman was being interrogated at the police station, another refugee entered with two Soviet soldiers and demanded her immediate release. On hearing this I went to see my Soviet colleague and urged him to have the matter investigated quickly, as the Persians were sure to make the most of such a story of Russian interference on behalf of the hated "refugees," whom the Soviet authorities were continually accused of backing in their misdeemeanours. So far the alleged Soviet soldiers have not been traced, and the Soviet Consul-General declares that they were probably local individuals masquerading in Soviet uniforms, either to make sure of obtaining their friend's release or (as he hints) as a provocative act staged by someone interested in arousing anti-Russian feeling. The police say that the woman was not released.

3. The "proletarian" clubs and committees still continue to cause nervousness among the general public of Tabriz, although there are signs that their sudden burst of activity is on the wane, partly because of lack of funds and partly because they foresee Persian police action against them soon. It now appears that there is a principal club forming the headquarters of about a dozen noisy demagogues, nearly all of whom have Russian-Azerbaijani names ending in—off, but under the control of a dubious Kurdish lawyer named Zandi, and then four or five affiliated clubs in various parts of the city. Those enrolling pay 5 rials only, and Persians are quick to point out that the organisation's expenses cannot be met without funds from other sources—Soviet sources are, of course, implied. It is also alleged that members receive a card which entitles them to extra sugar rations at a co-operative store backed by the Soviet authorities. The truth seems to be that the Soviet authorities did assist the committee's finances, but by an ingenious method which entailed no expense to themselves; their trade commissioner here supplied the club organisers with sugar at wholesale prices, which they sold to members at the usual retail price, using the profit for club expenses (and personal expenses, no doubt). For some reason the Russians have lately withdrawn this privilege, and Zandi admits that funds are now too low to last long. In my despatch No. 6 I forwarded a translation of the ambitious and high-faluting programme of the principal club, which assuredly could not have been drawn up by the local leaders without (shall one say) "Caucasian" assistance. I have discussed these clubs several times with my Soviet colleague (who, of course, denies any Soviet connexion with them at all) and pointed out the undesirable character of many of the leaders and the stupid inflammatory speeches they make to the members, warning him that sooner or later they will cause trouble here. M. Koulagenkov said that if the local police have real grounds for complaint they should arrest the ringleaders; my reply was that I knew they would not do so without being sure of Russian consent, and a few days later he told me that he had spoken to the Soviet Colonel Commandant here, who had

declared himself willing to offer support to the Persian authorities if they asked for it. A week ago I informed both the Governor-General and the Chief of Police of this, but they seem very hesitant and afraid of taking definite action. It seems to me that the Chief of Police might act, although he knows that his police are mostly frightened and unreliable, but that the Governor-General is temporising for some reason or other. Possibly they wish to shelter themselves in case of any awkward incident either behind the Soviet authorities or even behind this consulate. A day or two ago I received an unofficial intermediary from the Governor-General, saying he wished to effect some arrests and wanted my opinion. I could only repeat what I had said before, adding that time was going by with no action taken, in spite of continual Persian complaints against these clubs. Later I learnt that the Governor-General thinks that the threat of arrest is causing the committee to go into hiding and the clubs to be faced with closing down.

4. So great is the Persian dislike of decision or responsibility that lately Tabriz is full of stories that the British Consul is to blame for the present state of unrest and disorder, which could quickly be ended if he "dealt firmly" with the Russians, as he was supposed to have done last September and October, but that since the signing of the treaty he has stood back idly and left everything to the Persians! They apparently do not see, or at least do not admit, that there is any difference between last autumn, when I was obliged to act as a kind of liaison between a makeshift Persian Administration, paralysed with fright, on the one hand, and a purely military, somewhat unimaginative and inexperienced Soviet force, on the other hand. Now there is a full Persian Administration supposed to be functioning normally, able to consult with a trained and reasonably friendly Soviet Consul-General, working with a comparatively small, almost nominal garrison in the town. But the Persians either cannot or will not collaborate as they should do and might be expected to do, and it almost seems at times as if some of them do not really wish for complete order and tranquillity in the town, which would be perhaps too good an advertisement for the well-behaved but still hated Russians. I myself am sometimes inclined to think that the Governor-General, either acting on his own or on orders received from Tehran, wishes to force the Soviet authorities to permit the return of Persian troops to Tabriz by showing that the police and gendarmerie by themselves cannot keep order.

5. It is certain that the police enjoy little respect. The Kurds, who continually visit Tabriz, are again walking about the streets with revolvers and cartridge-belts bravely showing, although they know that the local administration objects to this. I have told the Chief of Police that the Soviet authorities are willing also to support him in dealing with this particular problem, but he seems to hesitate to act. A few days ago he decided to arrest a doubtful character, after consulting the Soviet Consul-General; the next day a body of "committee-men" went to his house, all armed with rifles or revolvers, and demanded the man's release. Instead of answering them as a Persian officer backed by 400 armed police, he replied that he must first consult the Soviet authorities (thus making it appear as if the Russians had instigated the arrest), and asked them to call again next day. The "committee" apparently swallowed this, but were too prudent to call next day, when he presumably had other precautions ready. It is obvious that firm measures have to be taken sooner or later, when a self-appointed imitation trade union can walk about armed and query any action of the lawful authorities.

6. The local newspaper, *Azerbaijan*, has again become more abusive and outspoken against the so-called rich and dangerous parasites who still fatten on peasants and workers and are still supported by those who are in charge of the political and economic affairs of the country. The latter are called Government autocrats intent on smashing the workers by all kinds of new repressive regulations, and on destroying their rights instead of protecting them. The latest article warns the officials that, as long as the workers' rights have not been safeguarded or new agrarian reforms carried out, revolution and disorder cannot be staved off and will grow greater instead of less.

7. The local authorities in Tabriz now have about 1,500 unemployed men working on the streets, cleaning ditches and planting trees, &c., the usual pay being 5 or 6 rials per day. In addition, there are schemes afoot for helping small craftsmen, such as stocking-makers, cobblers and leatherworkers, with small advances of money and raw materials to tide them over their present difficulties. The police had the idea of distributing a small dole to certain of the "refugees," who do not benefit by any other scheme and are certainly not likely to be helped by

private charity here, but such a large and uncontrollable crowd collected that the doors were kept locked and the wretched people sent empty away.

8. Local commerce and trade conditions are bad and show no improvement. One factory owner says he will be able to start a new textile industry in a few months with the German machinery he received last year. I am told, however, that the important contract expected to be signed in Tehran between the Soviet authorities and two Tabriz leather factories remains unsigned after several months of negotiations. One curious fact is that the large market in carpets appears to continue brisk, although the export of carpets to Turkey and Switzerland has temporarily been stopped by the British authorities in Bagdad, while the export to New York remains comparatively small. Probably, some general merchants, unable to use their liquid capital, are investing in carpets and moving them to other supposedly safer parts of the country, or hoping to sell them to German-occupied Europe later. The exodus of better-class families from Tabriz to Tehran, Isfahan and other towns still continues on a lesser scale, and one still sees lorries piled high with furniture and household effects leaving Azerbaijan for the south. It is of no use telling officials and merchants that they are encouraging disquiet and unrest in this way, and that the poor and working classes will soon be the only ones left here, a prey to unemployment and possible social revolution. In Persia the only sentiment, open and unashamed, is everyone for himself and the devil (in this case supposedly a Bolshevik outbreak or the German spring offensive) take the hindmost.

9. There is little news from the Kurdish area of Azerbaijan, except that a meeting of about a dozen important Kurdish chieftains, including one Sheikh Abdulla, formerly a fugitive in Iraq, is reported to have taken place recently in Sanj Bulagh. The brother of the chief rebel leader Mohamed Rashid Khan, is said to have been killed. Amir Aund, chief of the Dehbukri tribe, has succeeded in ousting the Kurdish farmendar of Niandoab from his post and installing one of his own relations, in spite of the Governor-General's repeated warnings that such action would not be tolerated. So little did he fear the consequences that he came last week to Tabriz and has now gone to Tehran on a semi-official invitation. Visitors from Rezaieh report the town entirely quiet since my visit in January, although there are minor incidents in the villages, including attacks on Armenian Christians. The Governor-General last week paid a visit to Sarab, which had been the centre of much banditry and disorder until recently, and reports that all classes of the inhabitants are almost overwhelmingly relieved at the restoration of law and order in the district. According to him the "Arbabs," or village landowners, generally represented as grinding down the poor, are being welcomed back by their peasants after the taste which the latter have had of "liberty."

10. It is to be hoped that the peasants will settle down in time to think about proper sowing for the next harvest. In the Ariebil-Serab area the autumn and winter sowings were admittedly much below normal because of disturbed conditions, but the local authorities say that in the rest of Azerbaijan there is nothing to complain of on this score. However, such is not the impression I gained at Rezaieh, and I have heard pessimistic accounts of short sowing from other persons in Tabriz also. Local opinion is still strongly opposed to allowing any surplus wheat to leave Azerbaijan for Tehran or any other part of Persia, but I know that considerable quantities have recently left the Himmeh district for the capital. On the other hand, the growers and exporters of locally produced dried fruits are finding their stocks piling up in Tabriz and other centres with no prospect of sale, and will soon be faced with ruin. Wool also is unsaleable, and the new clip will shortly be here to worsen matters. Germany was the principal buyer before, with Russia a lesser outlet; neither are buying now, and the British market is not interested, partly because of the high cost of transportation to the nearest Persian Gulf port.

11. Pro-German and anti-allied talk and sentiment seem to have been increasing lately, and there is no doubt that our set-backs in the Far East are having their effect. If we imagine that any Persians (except perhaps a few self-seeking or time-serving individuals in Tehran) like or appreciate us any the more for the treaty, we are likely to be mistaken. Nobody here expects the Russians to adhere to their undertaking to leave Persia after the peace, and, while we ourselves may perhaps be regarded as more likely to keep our word, the fact of our signing the treaty at all can easily be construed by the oriental mind into a sign of nervousness or weakness on our part. I have never heard the slightest expression of gratitude for all the wheat, sugar and other supplies we are well known to have brought into Persia, and the result of all the money we are bringing month by month into the country is to encourage attempts to

lower the rate for sterling, pounds and Iraq dinars having been offered last week in the bazaar here for 120 rials. Among the ignorant general population the present position does not matter much, as they are firmly convinced of a welcome and benevolent German rule here before many months. Other intelligent Persians whom I have discussed matters with are generally pessimistic, and frankly say that they see no hope for their country except in some kind of friendly foreign control—possibly British, but definitely *not* Russian. Even the Governor-General, who is a former ambassador, and is thought to cherish hopes of ministerial position one of these days, has privately told me that it would be a good thing if Persia could have foreign advisers in some departments, as the Belgian customs officials and Swedish gendarmerie officers in days gone by. Nobody seems to think it possible to find a strong and efficient Government among the present crowd of politicians, and very few people respect us for our desire to leave the administration entirely in such hands. I have even heard of assertions that the hard times under the old Shah were better than the present confused and anxious régime under a Government which does not know its own mind and gets nothing whatever done. It is possible that the extraordinary admiration for the Germans and wishes for their arrival here have something to do with appreciation of the German thoroughness and organisation which were particularly displayed in Tabriz and Tehran, even when they included penetration of and interference with the native administration. We at present seem to have nothing to offer them except democracy, which educated Persians from past experience (in Azerbaijan at any rate), fear and dislike, and which they do not know how to adapt to their own pressing needs.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 2234/14/34]

No. 3.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 89.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 18, 1942.

SUPPORTED by the vote of confidence of over 100 to 2, which I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 301 of the 7th March, Mr. Soheily succeeded in forming a Government which was approved by the Majlis a few days later by a similar vote. The sudden change in the Majlis, from complete irresponsibility and chaos to almost complete unanimity, is so remarkable as to deserve examination.

2. Mr. Firughi is personally popular because he has never sought office, was in disgrace with the late Shah for the last years of the old régime, and is admitted by all to be completely honest—a phenomenon almost as rare in Persia as a two-headed calf, and attracting as much attention. Much opposition, however, gradually collected against him, some of it factious and malevolent, but some of it well founded. He chose as Minister of Education Mr. Mirat (Personalities No. 126), who was exceedingly unpopular with the more reactionary Persians for having cleared away a mosque to make room for one of the Shah's schemes of town improvement, and, above all, for being identified with the policy of encouraging Persian schoolgirls to take part in sports, including swimming, in public. The clamour against Mr. Mirat was so great that he resigned. The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Hakimi (No. 81), had little to recommend him except that he had held the office before and that he was reputed to be honest; he was a sick man, and at moments when the most ruthless efficiency was wanted, to encourage landowners and cultivators to use every opportunity to grow food-stuffs so as to reduce the dependence of this country on foreign imports, it was unreasonable to retain in office a man who did nothing whatever. Eventually, I pointed this out to Mr. Firughi, who did, in fact, discard Mr. Hakimi, but only when the crisis had gone too far to be restored without a change of Prime Minister. The Minister of War, General Nakhchevan, was quite unable to deal with the problem of re-establishing the army after its collapse and disgrace at the time of the Allied entry into Persia. Mr. Sajjadi (No. 183), who was insufficiently active in his co-operation with the Allies in the Ministry of Communications, was early discarded at my request, and replaced by General Jahanbani (No. 100), whose mildness of character, which had been out of place at the Ministry of the Interior, enabled him to work harmoniously with the

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British and Soviet transport experts, and whose inability to refuse a friend a job could be held in check by Brigadier Rhodes. General Jahanbani's successor at the Ministry of the Interior, General Ahmedi (No. 16), is active and determined, but he is very unpopular because it is feared that he might attempt to obtain despotic powers, while the corruption by which he amassed the substantial fortune he possesses affords another ground of objection to his holding office. The general criticisms of the Firughi Cabinet were that it was inactive, having failed to solve the questions of security, food supplies, return of lands acquired forcibly by the late Shah, and so on; that it contained too many soldiers (the Ministers of War, Interior and Communications); and that too many of its members had held office under the former régime, and could be regarded as Reza Shah's men. Unfortunately, one of the best Ministers was the subject of some of the most violent attacks. This was Dr. Nafisy (No. 142). He had worked untiringly to try to restore the financial situation after the shock of the Allied occupation, but he is not a man who courts social popularity, and he could not carry off successfully the double crime of having worked for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and of maintaining openly that the rate of 140 rials to the pound is reasonable.

3. Mr. Firughi was not made to deal with such a crisis. He is not good at lobbying; he believes in the power of reason—a commodity in small demand among the Deputies of the Majlis; and when attacked he adopts a take-it-or-leave-it attitude, which, while it is a tribute to his disinterestedness, encourages his critics to leave it. On the other hand, the Deputies, who have already forgotten for how many years they were lick-spittles of Reza Shah, are so deeply conscious of their responsibility towards the nation that they seem to think that every Minister must be approved by every Deputy, and, while they continued to vote for Firughi, they refused to vote for the last two Cabinets which he presented, and there was nothing for him to do but resign. He has since been appointed Minister of Court—a position well suited to his education and character. It is pleasant to see the mutual confidence of Mr. Firughi and the young Shah, the more so in that the Shah, in the first days of his reign, complained that Mr. Firughi was keeping him in the dark, and that Mr. Firughi hardly expected any son of Reza Shah to be a civilised human being.

4. In my telegram No. 286 I reported the figures of the vote on the premiership which was taken by the Majlis at a private session on the 4th March. They were:—

Firughi	47
Qawam-al-Saltana	39
Tadayun	5
Soheily	4

Later about seventy Deputies declared that they would support Firughi in the formation of a Cabinet, but the Majlis then selected by lot a committee of fourteen to advise him on the formation of his Cabinet, and, as it included an even larger proportion of his enemies than the Majlis itself, he was naturally unable to come to an agreement with them, and resigned.

5. Then followed a period of great confusion, the Deputies looking rather uneasily at the mess they had made, and the newspapers and the public realising that, unless the Government could enjoy some freedom to do its work and some hope of continuity, the situation was hopeless. In view of the vote taken on the 4th March, it seemed probable that Qawam-al-Saltana might be called upon to form a Government. I found that he was supported by the Soviet Ambassador, who spoke strongly in his favour, though this may perhaps have been because he had no hope of a Soheily Cabinet at the moment (no one had), and because he is particularly hostile to Tadayun for having, as Minister of Education, suppressed a newspaper which the ambassador considered "anti-Fascist." My own tendency was rather the other way, since Tadayun was a member of the Cabinet which concluded the Tripartite Treaty, while the Qawam was supposed to have been connected with a newspaper, the *Iqdam*, which published a rather contemptuous article on the treaty a few days after it had been signed. I enclose an extract from a note written by the oriental secretary, Mr. Trott, on an interview which he had with Qawam-al-Saltana. He denies all connexion with the objectionable article in the *Iqdam*—a denial which I had already received through another channel and accepted. He denies that he had bound himself in any way to the Russians, and, while M. Smirnov's attitude suggested a greater anxiety for his election than is quite compatible with such an assurance, it may be truthful. Finally, he declares that he withdrew his candidature at the request of the Shah.

6. Whether the Qawam recommended Deputies to vote for Soheily or not, it seems that Soheily's election was not secured without considerable pressure. There was legitimate pressure from certain classes of the public, especially the merchants, who are interested in the passage into law of one or other of the proposals now before the Majlis, or who merely want to see in power a Government which will be more active than that of Firughi; and these are said to have told Deputies that, if they continued to make it impossible for any Government to work, they would find the Majlis dissolved and their salaries at an end. Soheily admits that he himself placed this prospect before certain members of the Majlis. Finally, it is asserted with some credibility that the police canvassed Deputies on Soheily's behalf, saying that he was the Shah's candidate and they had better vote for him.

7. Mr. Soheily's Cabinet is composed, on the whole, of as decent a body of Persians as we are ever likely to secure. They have certainly shown praiseworthy activity, and Mr. Soheily tells me that they are working together with a unity which is refreshing after the dissensions of the Firughi Cabinets. I was rather apprehensive when I heard rumours of the impending appointment of Mr. Badr (No. 41) as Minister of Finance, since he was closely identified in Reza Shah's time with negotiations with the Germans and has been said to be pro-German; but after careful consideration, and consultation with the general manager of Imperial Bank of Iran, I decided not to object to his appointment, on the ground that a clever man who understood finance might be more useful to us in the matter of the rial rate, the increase in the note circulation, &c., than an acknowledged partisan of the British, especially one not able to argue the point with knowledge. It was decided to watch his work and to object at the first sign of anti-British or even unhelpful conduct. In point of fact, his attitude has been by no means unhelpful, and he has just taken a decision, designed to secure local wheat for labourers working on the roads for the C.R.E., which required both courage and determination.

8. It is not to be believed that the Deputies will continue in the state of almost complete unanimity with which they welcomed the Soheily Cabinet. There are no parties in the Majlis, and no divisions of principle, and if left to themselves the Deputies could easily swing over to the Opposition in a few days. There are strong rumours that they will give Mr. Soheily a month and will then embark once more upon criticism, which can be counted upon to be rambling, venomous and destructive. Mr. Soheily has, I know, considered seriously whether in such a case it would not be better to get the Shah to dismiss the Majlis, *e.g.*, on the ground that they were nominated, not really elected, under the late Shah; but it is hoped that the possibility of being thrown wageless upon an unsympathetic world will tend to make the Deputies less obstructive.

9. If Mr. Soheily's Cabinet does fall, it will probably be as difficult to find a successor as it was to find a successor for Mr. Firughi. Perhaps the Qawam will come forward with his proposal for a Ministry of all the talents, but we know from your telegram No. 339 that Taqizadeh is not prepared "to be at the mercy of irresponsible Deputies"—a significant statement from one of the stalwarts of the revolution and of the first Majlis; and Saiyid Zia (No. 206) has shown no sign of ambition to return to political life in Persia. Tadayun seems to be in eclipse for the moment, but I think that he may emerge again, and that, if he does, he should not be hastily rejected by us as a candidate, if he secures the necessary support from the public and the Soviet Embassy. In the Majlis he has shown himself strong and able to make himself respected, and while at the Ministry of Education he managed to do what very few Ministers could have done without being subjected to indignant and mostly interested criticism: he got rid of a considerable number of senior employees who had been occupying positions for which they were unfitted. It is true that he is accused of being reactionary, but after the violent campaign of modernisation under Reza Shah a certain reaction was probably as inevitable in Persia as was the reaction in England in 1660, and there is no indication that Tadayun did not share the views of the Cabinet in general, which did nothing to encourage any violent reaction in social life, and continued the Reza Shah policy of preventing any religious excesses in public during the month of Muharram.

10. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Angora, Kuibyshev and Cairo, and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Extract from an Interview with Qawam-al-Saltana by Mr. A. C. Trott.

IT was untrue to say that he was in any way responsible for the newspaper *Iqdam*. He knew the editor and had on several occasions given him good advice and tried to make him write more sensibly, but his advice was usually ignored. Anyway, we could be quite sure that he was not responsible in any way for what that paper wrote. The Qawam also said that, as far as he remembered, the paper had not come out till after the treaty had been signed. I said that, anyway, there had been an article against the treaty.

2. It was untrue to say that he had in any way bound himself to the Russians. He had been to their national fête, and after that he had had a talk with M. Smirnov, in which he told him exactly what the Persians thought of the Russians, and how bolshevism would never go down here. After that he had not met the Russians till our party. M. Smirnov made much of him at that party and insisted that he should go to lunch at the Soviet Embassy, and he went. There was much talk about what he thought of the Government and of the Majlis; he replied, in answer to questions, that Firughî was an excellent man and that he thought it very undesirable that he should be changed; similarly, if any of the Ministers who were principally connected with the treaty should be changed, he thought it would be very unfortunate.

3. It was untrue to say that he had sought to form a Government. He wished to give me an account of the recent Cabinet crisis as far as he knew it. On the Wednesday Mahmoud Badr came to him with a message from the Government to say that it was proposed that a new Cabinet should be formed by him, with Firughî as one of the members. He asked Mahmoud Badr to come back again next morning so that he could have time to think about the proposal; and he even began to make out a provisional list of suitable people for the Cabinet, his idea being to have a truly national Cabinet, including Taqizadeh, Seyyid Zia, Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk, and others. The next day Mahmoud Badr turned up, so the Qawam sat him in the waiting-room; meanwhile, Soheily and Ahy also turned up, so he saw them first. They asked whether he would accept to serve in Firughî's Cabinet. He replied that he thought the proposal was the other way about, and brought in Mahmoud Badr to prove it. The result was that everybody agreed that the main thing was to have both of them in the Cabinet, and the Qawam agreed to that, whichever way it was. The next thing was he heard that the Majlis was in an uproar and was being canvassed to give an unconditional vote of support to Firughî; so he (the Qawam) got annoyed and gave it up. The next thing was that the Shah sent for him and asked his advice, telling him that Firughî had gone away. The Qawam advised the King that Firughî was the man and ought to be got back. The Shah insisted that Firughî would not have it; failing Firughî, whom would the Qawam suggest? The Qawam refused to be drawn and left it to the Shah. The Shah said: "In that case we'll have Soheily," and expressed the hope that the Qawam would do his best to secure support for him. The Qawam agreed, and ever since then had done his best for Soheily, with, he thought, complete success.

Tehran, March 13, 1942.

[E 2793/163/34]

No. 4

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 113.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of despatch No. 9 from the British Consulate at Tabriz on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, April 11, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 9. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, March 24, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that the situation in Tabriz has become much calmer during the past fortnight, and the police authorities themselves appear to think that the danger of the political clubs has disappeared or is disappearing for the time being.

2. No doubt the Chief of Police is congratulating himself on this result, but in my opinion the improvement in public order is due largely to the Russian authorities having let it be known that they were not supporting the band of nondescript demagogues who were running the clubs or committees, and partly to the character of the demagogues themselves. Their funds are getting low and (as I foretold) they are beginning to quarrel among themselves. The Chief of Police, who was complaining a few weeks ago of their malevolence and of the danger they constituted to the town, now that the Administration is no longer so worried by or afraid of them talks of the advisability of not taking unnecessarily stern measures against people who are doing no real harm.

3. In this somewhat surprising lenient attitude towards fellow-Persians, who are officially undesirable and at the same time unprotected, he appears to differ temporarily from his widely-hated colleagues in the gendarmerie, who are said on all sides to be perpetrating continual cruelties and excesses on the wretched peasants and villages in districts unfortunate enough to be the scene of their operations. Numbers of these people come miles into Tabriz to bewail their treatment at the hands of their own authorities, and often finish up at the Soviet Consulate. My Soviet colleague tells me that he knows for an unimpeachable fact, with names and full details, that the eyes of two villagers were recently put out by the gendarmerie—now so full of zeal where they were so abjectly cowardly six months ago. The Soviet political officers seem to have moderated their activities to a remarkable extent during the last few weeks, and certainly they need not spend so much effort as is alleged against them on subverting the local peasantry while the Persian Government's minions will stir up hatred against itself so much more efficiently.

4. After the departure of the allegedly corrupt and worthless Colonel Basti, who has been openly accused in a Tabriz newspaper of having extorted £7,000 during his tenure of three months in Azerbaijan, a new Chief of Gendarmerie has been appointed in the person of Colonel Rashimi, until recently an army officer, of a well-known local family, reputed to be energetic and to have a thorough knowledge of Azerbaijan. His first task has been to drive out a number of Shahsevan marauders from the Maragha district; they are reported to have retreated after some fighting to the neighbourhood of Sain Kala, where they can efface themselves among other Shahsevens who have settled peaceably there as agriculturists.

5. Apart from this comparatively unimportant trouble, the province of Azerbaijan is, for the moment, quiet. It cannot be said, however, that law and order are restored while the police and gendarmerie are so inactive and inefficient as in most districts. Landowners tell me that peasants will not take out their draught animals to plough, except in fields close to the villages, because they fear cattle-lifting, not only from marauding tribesmen, but from the peasants of other nearby villages, against whom at present there is little hope of redress. For this reason the Governor-General is again making efforts to obtain Soviet permission for the return of Persian garrisons to Tabriz and Rezaieh, say 2,000 troops in each town. He says that the return of Persian troops to Ardebil has had an extraordinarily good effect in that formerly disturbed district. It is true that the presence of a garrison here would make conditions seem more normal, would give confidence to law-abiding citizens and intimidate many wrongdoers, except the wildest, while at the same time it would provide a moral backing for the police and gendarmerie, and perhaps improve their courage and standards of behaviour.

6. The local newspaper, *Azerbaijan*, has again been crying out for the liberty of the nation and the election of Deputies by the people. In its last number it pointed out that the constitutional law makes provision for the popular election of provincial and municipal councils, which will work for public improvements in accordance with the law. The journal asks why the present Government does not show any signs of granting such constitutional rights (since

everyone knows that the elections hitherto have been a farce), or why the liberal-minded democrats of Azerbaijan do not insist on their rights, won by the blood of local martyrs thirty years ago, and demand their own councils which can remedy all the present trouble, insecurity and unemployment included.

7. The Governor-General has retorted with a curious printed public notice, which begins with a recital of the lootings and murders carried out by so-called liberals and democrats in the country districts of Azerbaijan during the last six months. He asks why the self-styled liberal and democratic associations, parties and newspapers here did not mention these things, but as soon as the gendarmerie set about punishing the brigands in question raised a loud outcry about the gendarmes' cruelties. The Governor-General then publicly admits that there are bad types among the gendarmerie and he does not wish to defend them, but their cruelties are not 10 per cent. of those of the brigands, who, in order to frighten the villagers, masqueraded as emissaries of the Soviet authorities until the latter disowned them and helped to punish them, for which the Government is most grateful. The notice goes on to say that, while everybody's sympathy is with the peasants and workers, their demagogic "protectors" are trying to raise wages and reduce hours of work without reflecting that such measures will cause disorder and finish by closing the factories and workshops.

8. The Governor-General concludes by saying that Government employees are to remain aloof from politics, and must not allow themselves to be used as tools in interfering with the work of their departments, while the political associations are advised when making complaints in Government offices to consult only the chief official. This possibly refers to recent incidents when "committee" leaders went round canvassing various departments for some kind of financial redress for one of their members, until they reached the office of the Director of Economic Affairs. Instead of listening timidly to them as the police and others had done, he drew a revolver from his desk drawer and, shouting imprecations, drove them from the premises. Thus public life goes on at Tabriz, while the Soviet authorities now look on quietly and for the moment do not interfere at all.

9. The Persian New Year was celebrated very quietly with a reception by the Governor-General, attended almost entirely by Government officials, since most of the leading civilian residents have left the town, and the place of the usual galaxy of resplendent Persian army officers was this year filled by a few soberly-clad Soviet colonels and majors. The party was enlivened, however, by the appearance of a small party of Kurdish notables in full tribal dress, complete with pistols and holsters, and a few moments later by the unexpected entrance of the nondescript and distinctly unkempt "Azerbaijan Proletariat Protection Committee."

10. An English contractor from Kermenshah recently came to Tabriz hoping to buy several hundred tons of potatoes for the British forces in Persia and Iraq. As he had learnt that the Soviet military authorities at Zenjan were stopping the sending out of food-stuffs from their zone to other parts of Persia, he got into touch with the Soviet supplies department here through this consulate with a view to exporting the potatoes for our troops without difficulty. The Russians, however, refused any facilities, saying that local supplies of food-stuffs in general were already running short, and that in a month or two there would be hardly enough for the needs of the Red Army, which no longer brought supplies from the U.S.S.R. and had to obtain them here in Azerbaijan. I think this attitude somewhat exaggerated, although it is probably true that this province does not normally produce enough potatoes and vegetables for export. With proper encouragement and organisation, however, Azerbaijan could probably provide large quantities for our troops and the Russians as well. Yet local feeling is so unsure of itself, because of what is expected to happen in the next few months, that little extra growing is likely to be done. Fears are common, on the contrary, that the local harvest will be less than usual, and the Governor-General recently refused the request of the Tehran authorities that several thousand tons of wheat should be sent to the capital from the Bustanabad district, near Tabriz. His view is that, while some wheat might perhaps be taken from the outlying districts of the province near Mianeh, it would be imprudent to remove wheat from so near this large city of Tabriz, where the Government silo is as yet less than half full, and where scarcity of transport makes the collection of proper local reserves a slow and difficult business.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 117.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 10 of the 8th April, 1942, from His Majesty's Consul, Tabriz, together with Chancery letter of the 14th April, 1942, from His Majesty's Consul, Tabriz, regarding the internal situation of Tabriz and Azerbaijan.

Tehran, April 20, 1942.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 10. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, April 8, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the situation in Tabriz and Azerbaijan generally is now quiet, and is probably closer to normal than at any time since August last.

2. Robberies and thefts have almost ceased in Tabriz itself, and the "democratic" committees are gradually breaking up and losing the disquieting effect they had on the general population only a month or two ago. The police have displayed an extraordinary leniency towards the leaders, once that they knew they could deal with them without difficulty, and have allowed several of the noisiest firebrands to go into hiding. The official explanation is that the authorities did not wish to incur a charge of being as harsh and repressive as during the former detested régime and so afford material for further attacks on the Tehran Government. This would accord with the easy-going and would-be diplomatic personality of the Governor-General, M. Khalil Fahimy, but he tells me confidentially that he is not satisfied with the laxness and poor efficiency of the local police and of its chief in this connexion. It is a fact that, after the police had watched all night to arrest one Pouladoff, in the morning he was spirited off by four unknown civilians under their eyes and lost to them. I suspect that the local authorities are still nervous of the susceptibilities of the Russians, whom they still credit with being behind these "clubs" in spite of all disclaimers; it is also practically certain that some of the leading committee-men were police agents, so that it might be awkward to arrest them. At any rate this episode is nearly over, although we shall doubtless hear more of the "democrats" later in some guise or other.

3. The newspaper *Azerbaijan* overstepped itself last week in its usual anti-Government tirades by printing an article accusing the local authorities of sending large quantities of wheat from Bustanabad (near Tabriz) to Tehran while there was only forty days' supply left here, so that in a few weeks Azerbaijan would be without bread. As a result the whole ignorant population of Tabriz rushed to the bakeries and each tried to lay in as big a stock of bread as they could buy. The Governor-General acted quickly by publishing a notice saying that the report was completely baseless, that no wheat was being moved from Bustanabad except to Tabriz—very gradually because of lack of transport—and that anyone who wished could go and inspect the stocks of over 5,000 tons of wheat in the silos here. He then turned the tables on the editor by saying that spreading panic by such means was a crime, and that it might be remembered that just recently Berlin and Rome had been broadcasting false reports of food shortages in Azerbaijan, so that readers could draw their own inferences as to the editor's sources and intentions. As the editor and sub-editor are bosom friends of the Soviet political officers here, this may be considered a heaven-sent opportunity for the local authorities to deal with their most troublesome detractors; they immediately closed the press, seized the next issue and have bound the editor over as regards his future behaviour.

4. The truculent-looking and unpopular Kurds who have been loafing about for some time in Tabriz (largely in the hope of buying sugar and cotton-goods wholesale from the Russians) have also played into the hands of the authorities recently, and are being forced back to their own districts. Ten days ago there

was a shooting affray between a Kurd and an Azerbaijani, both being smugglers and both being killed. The other Kurds in the town rushed to the spot and began excited threatenings (all being armed, of course), some rushing into the police stations in quest of Kurds wrongly alleged to have been arrested. Fortunately no further incidents occurred, but the authorities decided to try and remove the menace. The Soviet Consul-General agreed that the Kurds ought to leave, and I spoke to two Kurdish notables in that sense. The Governor-General distributed a quantity of sugar to the leading Kurds, and most have now gone away. At the same time he published a notice saying that all persons carrying arms in public would be disarmed by the police, and most Kurds took the hint, only a very few having had to be disarmed in the street.

5. All these measures could have been taken several weeks ago, but the authorities are still inefficient, and, as I wrote in my preceding despatch, possibly did not wish to see public order fully restored, so that they could continue to press for the return of Persian troops here. It is now known that the Soviet authorities have agreed to the sending of a military garrison up to a brigade to Tabriz, and to the increase of the gendarmerie forces in Rezaieh. There is no sign of these military forces as yet in Tabriz, but about 300 well-armed gendarmerie have already arrived here from Tehran for Rezaieh. The Governor-General tells me that the Soviet authorities have agreed to let their troops on the Turkish frontier work in close co-operation when necessary with these new gendarmerie forces, so as to check the smuggling and illicit crossings alleged to be going on there.

6. A month ago I mentioned that the Kurdish chieftain Amir Asad had gone to Tehran by official invitation. Ten days ago, to the surprise of the Governor-General and many others, he returned here as newly-appointed Farmandar of Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh), with a motor-car, new clothes and a considerable sum of Government money to set him up in his new post. He told me that he had not wished to accept the appointment, but that the Minister of the Interior had insisted, and had given him authority to maintain 300 mounted Kurdish levies to preserve order in the whole district, as far as the Iraq borders. In principle the appointment of a Kurd as Governor of a Kurdish district may be applauded, but whether the present nomination will be a success remains to be seen. Amir Asad is an intelligent and ambitious little man, but with no polish or training and, it need hardly be said, with many jealous Kurdish rivals among the other tribes over which he is now placed in addition to his own. He will have to appease many of them with minor posts and suitable emoluments, which will go hard against the grain. The chief notable of Sauj Bulagh, Ghazi Mohamed, has already left the town and is probably going to Tehran, doubtless to intrigue against him. There is another allegedly influential Kurd in this district, one Sheikh Abdulla, a chieftain reported to have been living at Batas in Iraq in exile for some time, who has recently crossed into Persia again and is said to have been consulting with all the leading Kurds in the Rezaieh and Sauj Bulagh areas. The story is that he has been using his prestige to persuade the chieftains to cease quarrelling at this critical juncture and join together in spiritual harmony, although I have heard nothing of any political tinge being given to this, or any talk of Kurdish independence, which most chieftains now regard as impracticable. The Russians seem to be curious about him and his activities and, as I have heard from a good source, have warned him to be gone.

7. There is little news of the rebel Rashid Khan, except that he has been bombed out of Saqqiz and was said to be inclined towards peace. Amir Asad informed me that he himself intended to try and fix up some agreement between the rebel and the Government forces, and that General Shahbakhti in Tehran had authorised him to do so. I was surprised when he asked earnestly if I also authorised him to try and settle the Kurdish revolt, and whether he could tell Rashid Khan that I was in favour of a truce. But only a few days before the Governor-General had also asked my views equally earnestly on his own desire to get in touch with the rebel and make peace, at the alleged instance of M. Soheily himself. It can only be concluded that certain official circles here as in Tehran are still of the opinion, or at least not wholly unconvinced, that we are or were behind or connected with the troubles in Kurdistan, as was generally alleged last autumn.

8. The post of Governor of Rezaieh has recently been filled by the transfer of the second-rate, timid and unpopular Buzurg Khan from Mahabad, which shows a slipshod policy on the part of the Tehran Government, who apparently do not even consult the Governor-General here beforehand. The latter says that an equally poor choice has been made at Ardebil, and that at Maragha the new Farmandar was such an egregious failure that he had to have him quickly

removed. At the present juncture Azerbaijan needs the best possible officials to hold up the shaky prestige of the Central Government, not mere routine transfers of known misfits or nominees of friends of Ministers in Tehran.

9. I have already reported how conspicuous by their absence have been the Soviet political officers, who, until about two months ago, infested the countryside. This improvement was due, no doubt, to our representations in Moscow and Tehran, coupled with the arrival of a trained and intelligent Soviet Consul-General here in January. I notice, however, that one of the most persistent, one Miroslanoff, has just returned to Tabriz after his absence somewhere in the Caucasus, and learn that the most objectionable of all, a certain Bagharoff, has been seen again in the Sarab area, where he is said to have expressed himself most angrily to some village headmen about the restoration of normal conditions and the virtual annulment of his previous hard work! I have an idea that the Russians will try again—but very discreetly—to work among the Kurds, whose leaders fear and dislike communism but like intrigue and personal favours. It is almost openly said in places like Maragha that the Russians are using Kurds to go over the mountainous Iraq frontier to work for them in Mosul and other districts now occupied by our forces; this may be true since their military mission left Bagdad.

10. A new general officer, Major-General Melnik, has recently arrived to take command of the Soviet forces in Azerbaijan, which for some months have been commanded by a colonel only. He is a young-looking cavalryman who has seen service at the front. The Soviet authorities have asked the Persians to take steps to see that no supplies leave this district, as they apparently fear shortage in supplying their own troops here. They are also exporting local cattle to the Caucasus, with the unwilling permission of the Persian officials; the latter prefer sheep to be taken, but the Russians say that these are too poor and lean.

11. The local authorities say that there is enough seed-corn available in Azerbaijan, except in the Khalkhal district near Ardebil, and asked the Soviet trade bureau to sell them 500 tons. The Russians offered to provide the wheat at 1,500 rials per ton (the local price being 1,000 rials), against an equivalent amount of Persian rice to be sold to themselves at 1,200 rials per ton (the local price being at least 3,000 rials), and the business naturally broke down. Meanwhile the Soviet trade bureau is selling in Tabriz quantities of the sugar recently supplied from India and Java; part is being sold at normal prices through the co-operative store they are supposed to foster here, and part is sold in the bazaar at "black-market" rates. After five months they still decline to pay customs duties on the merchandise imported from the Soviet Union, which means large profits for them in rials.

12. Unemployment and poverty are somewhat less marked in Tabriz, as labour is now needed for the gardens in and near the town, and many villagers who had flocked here during the winter have returned for the spring farm work. The authorities also continue with their road-making works and with assistance to small industries.

13. It is reported that the railway construction from Zinjan has now advanced to the entrance to the Kufan Kuh gorge, a few miles from Mianeh. The gorge itself will take a long time to pass, with its several tunnels and the large bridge necessary over the river there. Unfortunately work is entirely suspended on lots 12 and 13, on the Tabriz side of Mianeh, as the original contractors are short of funds. Work is said to be going on in lot 14.

14. The Turkish Consul at Rezaieh recently set out for Angora via Maku and Erzerum, but had to turn back as the road inside Turkey was blocked by snow and will not be clear until mid-April. This winter has been unusually severe and prolonged, and it still continues to snow at least one day a week in Tabriz. The Turkish Consul-General here went specially to Khoi to discuss with his colleague *en route* to Angora. He has lately been seeing the Soviet Consul-General more frequently than usual, and seems to be much more circumspect in his views and utterances than he was before. This may be due to admonitions from his ambassador in Tehran.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Consul Cook to Chancery, Tehran.

(Confidential.)

Dear Chancery,

Tabriz, April 14, 1942.

AS a safe hand is going to-day, we may add the following interim notes to our last political despatch No. 10 of the 8th instant:—

The Kurdish stock here has fallen since the apparent switch-round in the Russian attitude towards them. The newspaper article in the *Vaten Yolanda* last week, saying that the Iraqi and Persian Kurds were being provided with modern arms by German agents in Turkey in order to stir them up against us in the oil-fields, has made them nervous, especially since the Soviet authorities here have shown themselves in favour of having them disarmed in Tabriz by the despised Persian police, and have declined (it is said) to give them any more sugar and piece-goods except at much enhanced prices. The Governor-General here, however, says that the Russian commander at Rezaieh is still publicly hand-in-glove with the Kurds and Assyrians there, but we have no means of checking this at present.

The Turkish authorities can hardly be pleased either at the Soviet article above, as it was implied that the Kurds on the Turkish side of the frontier also were being armed for mischief. There is undoubtedly a good deal of *va-et-vient* over the Turco-Persian frontier, which the Russian troops are unable to cope with—hence perhaps the offered co-operation with increased gendarmerie in that area. A committee of inspectors sent from Tehran to Rezaieh recently apparently had a very thin time proving to the Soviet there that they were not a band of German agents come to stir up the Kurds.

Quantities of Japanese silks and artificial silk-stuffs are coming here from the Sauj Bulagh area, almost certainly smuggled out of Iraq, so that there is a lot of unauthorised crossing of that frontier too. Amir Asad, I know, thinks that he may have trouble with Kurds coming over more or less freely from the Iraq side, and asked me whether I could have anything done about it in Bagdad and Sulaimaniya. Being now clothed in authority, and doubtless for the moment "*plus royaliste que le Roi*," his idea is to wean disaffected Kurds away from Rashid Khan gradually, if the latter will not make peace. It is rumoured, however, that Rashid has expressed his intention of coming shortly to Sauj Bulagh to singe Amir Asad's whiskers for traitorously joining the Tehran side.

The "democratic" clubs seem to be on their last legs, especially since two of the leaders have at last been arrested—one of them for theft and receiving of stolen goods. The Kurdish sea-lawyer Zandi, abandoned by the Russians, now goes round begging from the Persian authorities and even from the Armenian clergy. It is said that his newest idea is to band together Kurds and Armenians in a cultural and political brotherhood, but that bantam will never fight here!

Some of the self-exiled Tabrizi upper-class are reported to be returning here from Tehran, partly because of the dearth of living and shortage of bread there, and partly because of the alleged serious outbreak of typhus in the capital. Everyone says—and with great relish, of course—that the dread disease has been brought into Persia by the Poles, whom the British and Russians have introduced into this country.

Re measures against pro-Axis sympathisers, I spoke meaningfully about a fortnight ago to the Chief of Police here, giving the names of the six worst offenders. He apparently called them up and warned them, and one of them (Ardesch-Haidarzadeh) was so scared that he went to Tehran. The chief café keepers also were warned not to allow nonsense to be talked in their establishments, and the anti-Allied talk is certainly not so noticeable as it was a few weeks ago.

Yours ever,

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 3126/1918/G]

No. 6.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Kuibyshev).

(No. 151.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 15, 1942.

IN the course of our conversation this morning the Soviet Ambassador said that his Government had asked him to take up with me the number of British troops now posted in and around Tehran. He was informed that there were a

fortnight ago, approximately 1,000 British troops in Tehran and another 1,000 posted as military guards on the railway and elsewhere—2,000 in all. In addition, there were British units in the neighbourhood of Tehran. Since none of these troops were in our own area, could I tell his Excellency what they were doing there?

2. I said that I had heard nothing about them whatever. I knew that our forces in all Persia were, in any event, not very large. It was true that the Duke of Gloucester had recently paid a visit to Tehran, which had fortunately proved very successful, and it might be that some troops had been moved to guard the railway, or even the capital itself, in connexion with the visit, but I would make enquiries and let the Ambassador know.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 3166/163/34]

No. 7.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 133. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 11 of the 23rd April to Tehran on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, May 2, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Consul Cook to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 11. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, April 23, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that the situation in Tabriz and Azerbaijan is still quiet, and only a few minor cases of robbery are reported from villages near Rezaieh. The Chief of Gendarmerie has reported from Rezaieh that the position there is satisfactory, so that the Prime Minister's recent protests on this score appear to be at least out of date. This is the time of year, of course, when nearly all the population are busy with ploughing and sowing in this part of the world, so that there is less time for mischief and politics, and agricultural conditions seem to be particularly favourable this spring.

2. The so-called "democratic" club movement has now disappeared in Tabriz, following a poor display of inefficiency and half-heartedness by the local police. After allowing the ringleaders to go into hiding, the authorities arrested one member, who had fired a pistol in public, and were bold enough to seize the new painted sign of the club. As a protest several members shut themselves in the club with their arms, and the police waited outside for some hours. A party were then allowed to leave the club premises and march (fully armed) to the Soviet Consulate-General to ask for advice and assistance, but my Soviet colleague says that he refused to see them. Realising that the game was up, the "democrats" dispersed, and the leading light, a seedy Kurdish sea-lawyer named Zandi, was given a sum of money by the Governor-General to leave the district for Rezaieh, a bus being also kindly placed at his disposal for the transport of his two wives and eighteen children.

3. The story then went round the town that the Soviet Consul-General had interviewed the "democrats," but had told them that he could not assist them because the British Consul was set against the club and insisting on its closing. In this way the Persian authorities, having at first blamed the Soviet authorities for their failure to deal efficiently with the undesirable features of the club in order to excuse themselves in the eyes of the middle-class element, now apparently sought to remove from themselves any odium in the eyes of the Liberal and working-class element by imputing their clumsy and half-hearted closing of the club to another foreign Power, the British. One may be sure, however, that, in their reports to Tehran, the chief local officials have been heaping lavish encomiums upon themselves for their masterly handling of the exaggerated difficulties of

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the situation (for which they themselves are largely responsible) without mentioning the number of times they have come to the Soviet and British Consulates for advice and assistance in dealing with their own people. Gratitude or common honesty is not a modern Persian characteristic. And as in Tehran, the arrest of an objectionable character appears to lose its urgency or advisability if it is seen to be approved by the Russian or British ally. The local police, after dallying for over three months with a list of foreigners resident in Tabriz which they promised to this consulate, have now produced an innocuous series of mangled names with gaps which look only too deliberate, including as they do Bulgars, Swiss and Hungarians who are known to be still here. The police here, as elsewhere in Persia, are probably those with eyes most cocked in the direction of the hoped-for German legions and doubtless the still more hoped-for tangible rewards therefrom.

4. A new journal, called *Talk and Action*, has appeared in Tabriz, edited by one Akhbari of the Education Department, who was suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies not so long ago. The first harmless number contained an article calling for national unity and co-operation, and another demanding the forcible tearing-off of women's veils by the police, as under the former régime. To the general surprise the Soviet-sponsored newspaper in Turkish, *Vatan Yolanda*, is now to be restricted to the Red Army, and copies will not be available for the local public; only a few months ago its circulation in Persian schools, factories and offices was being boosted by Soviet political officers in uniform, but the new major-general here has other ideas, or has perhaps received other instructions. The paper's recent article on German activities on both sides of the Turkish frontier may also have something to do with its sudden restriction. On the other hand, an anonymous broadsheet in Turki dialect attacking the local authorities and their alleged Fascist policy has been widely distributed this last week here and in other parts of Azerbaijan.

5. News from the Kurdish area is that the rebel Rashid Khan, after another clash with the Persian military, is now in Sahab, and has declined peace proposals made by Amir Asad, the Kurdish farmandar of Sauj Bulagh. The proposals are said to have included the promise of a post as bakhshidar at Baneh, but Rashid Khan evidently does not trust the Persian authorities, and remembering past treatment of chiefs who had trustfully submitted has perhaps good reason for not doing so. The Kurdish notables Ghazi Mohamed and Sheikh Abdulla are still in Tabriz, and the local authorities have the idea of giving them a small sinecure or some form of monthly subsidy. The appointment of a commission in Tehran several weeks ago to examine tribal questions has only just been heard of here and has caused no particular comment or reaction. Even in the Governor-General's view, the new policy does not concern Azerbaijan tribes, either Kurdish, Shahsevan or Karadaghi, being intended for tribes in the south who were more aggrieved by the former Shah's repressions and exactions.

6. Some of the self-exiled Tabrizi upper-class are reported to be returning here from Tehran, partly because of the dearness of living and shortage of good bread there, and partly because of the alleged outbreak of typhus in the capital. This outbreak is blamed by everyone on the influx of Polish refugees, whom the British and Russians have introduced into this country. There are several cases of typhus reported also in Tabriz, and some people are already staying away from cinemas and other public places. The Soviet military authorities have offered their assistance if required.

7. The Soviet authorities have also agreed to lend transport for the moving of 400 tons of wheat from Bustanabad to the Government silo at Tabriz. The latter now contains about 4,500 tons of grain, and has earmarked another 1,300 tons of wheat at Ushnu and smaller quantities at Maragha and Miandab, none of which can be collected, however, for lack of transport. Tribesmen at present refuse to hire camels, which are at spring pasture.

8. There has been a good deal of Russian troop movement here lately, five train loads of cavalry having arrived in one day. Some of this is due to ordinary changes in garrisons and personnel, but there has undoubtedly been an addition to the previous numbers of troops in North-West Persia. It is difficult to get exact information as the Russians are so secretive on the one hand, and the Persians and Azerbaijanis so childishly mendacious and fond of exaggeration on the other, but increases have apparently taken place along the Turkish frontier, where the Soviet military have agreed to let local gendarmerie work with them in policing and watching the border (for alleged smugglers, it is explained), and appreciable numbers of mounted troops, estimated by some Tabrizis at four regiments, have gone towards Minjan and Kasvin. The latter movements, of course, caused full

credence to be given locally to the recent German broadcasts, which stated that the British were withdrawing from Persia and allowing the Soviet forces to occupy Hamadan and Kermanshah to begin with, and to move as far as the Persian Gulf later.

9. A United States Consul, Mr. B. E. Kuniholm, arrived here last week to open an American Consulate after a period of many years without one in Azerbaijan. He is a specialist from the Baltic States and Russia itself, and has made no secret, in his first official visits to the Persian Governor-General and others, of the fact that the only American interest here is to ensure the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to Persia, or, in his own words, to see fair play by the Russians. He will soon find out that the Persians, official and non-official, may be relied on to keep him well up to the mark in this respect.

I have, &c.

F. A. G. COOK.

[E 3340/163/34]

No. 8.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 141.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of despatch No. 13, dated the 7th May, from His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz, on the subject of the internal situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, May 11, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Consul-General Urquhart to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 13. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, May 7, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report in amplification of my recent telegrams on the troubled state of Western Azerbaijan.

2. It is now accepted that the Kurdish bullet which killed the American, Mrs. Burdett, on the road from Mehabad to Tabriz was intended not for her but for a young Kurd who was accompanying her. Her death is therefore no more than a tragic incident in a Kurdish blood-feud. Her murderers were arrested.

3. From Rezaieh on the 28th April there came news of seemingly very serious import. The Kurds were advancing in strength on the town. During most of the 27th there had been heavy rifle-fire, which sent the people from the surrounding villages panic-stricken into the town, carrying and driving before them what they could of their portable possessions and flocks. Presently the town was surrounded, even the 12-mile road to the lake being cut, so that there was no communication except by telegraph. These conditions persisted for seven or eight days, when there came a relaxation in the tension. At the moment the Kurds seem to have withdrawn a little from the town, but both Rezaieh and Salmas are stated to be full of refugee villagers, who will certainly have lost some part of their possessions, to say nothing of their time, at a season when time is indeed money, even in Persia.

4. The Persian Government has been poorly represented and badly served during this crisis. There has been no Governor-General there since General Cupal left. Buzurg Amir Ibrahim, recently appointed Governor, was acting as Governor-General, but he seems to have left at the first signs of trouble and is thought now to be under arrest. At all events, Mr. Fahimy here was given temporary charge of Western Azerbaijan as from the 28th, but could not bring himself to proceed. He contented himself with persuading two Kurdish notables of Mehabad, Ghazi Mohammed and Sheikh Abdullah, to go to Rezaieh and try to persuade the Kurds to disperse. They were both there by the 30th and claimed an initial success, which cheered Mr. Fahimy greatly. Then their stock fell; it seemed that the Russians were jealous of their activity, if the Persians were to be believed, and it is certain that the officials already on the spot were aggrieved because these men arrived without warning and proceeded on mysterious missions without consulting them. But the most effective opposition to the Ghazis was

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made by an Assyrian who removed parts from their car so that for some days they sat in Rezaieh complaining by telegraph that the Russians would not give them transport. By the 3rd or the 4th May they had obtained some sort of transport and were moving around the encampments again, but by this time all hopes had been transferred to the possibility that someone would come from Tehran and take charge of the situation. Meantime the petty officials left in Rezaieh sent telegram after telegram pleading their danger and helplessness, blaming the Russians for helping the Kurds and demanding instructions.

5. The Russians, it is said, could have stopped the trouble at an hour's notice by merely telling the Kurds to go home. Why, therefore, it is demanded, did they not expend the small amount of energy necessary to put an end to the turmoil? The answer comes all too easily that the Russians are planning to kill the authority of the Persian Government here in the north. The Russians certainly seem to have done very little to support the gendarmes and comfort the peaceful population. The Soviet Consul-General and the Chief of Staff certainly flew to Rezaieh on the 30th and met a body of Kurdish leaders the same evening. They appealed to them to disperse and supported the chief of police in his explanation that there was no intention to disarm the Kurds generally, but merely to prevent them carrying arms into the town; but the net result was that the Kurds presented demands (see Appendix) some of which seem to be hardly the sort of thing a Kurd would think of readily. I had many talks with my Soviet colleague after his return, but I found it difficult to get more out of him than variations of the themes that there had been great exaggeration, that the local authority was incredibly inefficient and also lacking in goodwill to end, by making reasonable concessions, a commotion which they themselves had started. I tried to persuade him that the inefficiency of the average Persian official is a permanent factor in this country, that exaggeration and panic are normal, but that a state of affairs existed which was sufficiently alarming to require some controlling action. I told him that obviously there must be suffering in the villages in view of the pillaging of such property as the villagers had been unable to carry with them, and that possibly crops would be lost to an extent which might threaten a shortage of food. I repeated some of the things our Turkish colleague had feared, suggesting that, even if he, too, were exaggerating a good deal, German propaganda was bound to make use of these events and all the attendant rumours for purposes of propaganda in Turkey, and particularly propaganda addressed to military circles there. During one conversation he placed the number of Kurds under arms at 10,000, and was obviously worried by the mere idea of a punitive expedition by the Russians against such numbers. I think he was genuinely concerned lest the Soviet authorities should drift into hostilities with the Kurds. The military authorities probably do not care to rely on the theory that they have but to say the word to see the Kurdish forces melt away; they would probably not care to risk a fiasco, and to be sure of enforcing an order to disperse they probably would like to have certain forces at their disposal. It seems unlikely that a request for permission to divert such forces for possible hostile operations against the Kurds would be welcomed at headquarters, or that any local official here would sponsor it if he could avoid doing so. I have therefore wondered these days whether Kuibyshev knew what was happening, whether the local officials were trying to minimise the commotion and hoping that it would solve itself with no more than the loss of lives here and there and the pillage of some villages.

6. My Turkish colleague was no doubt right in stressing the propaganda value for the enemy in the events of the past ten days. His interest in what is happening on the Turkish frontier is natural and I expect there is some ground for his view that there are elements among the Kurds who thirst for revenge on Turkey and who are only awaiting a favourable moment in order to make trouble on the Turkish side of the frontier. I think, too, that he was justified in noting any signs of Russian consideration and tenderness for the Kurds as against the Persians and in scrutinising closely those of the Kurdish demands which contained indications that some Kurds are thinking of a Kurdish national life and the perpetuation of a separate Kurdish organisation within the State, in direct opposition to the policy of both Turkey and Persia towards such minorities. But his talk goes far beyond such considerations and he sees in the Rezaieh disorders the beginning of religious massacres and the possibility that Turkey may have to intervene again. He has made much of a demand made by a delegation of Rezaietes that the frontier be thrown open so that the peaceful people of Western Azerbaijan may flee to the protection of their brother Turks. He took this piece of oriental exaggeration more or less seriously, but the Turkish Vice-Consul at

Rezaieh was wiser; he asked the persons who made a corresponding request to him to put it in writing, and that was the end of the matter. The fact is that the Turkish Consul-General here is definitely persuaded that the Germans will succeed in breaking up the Russian defence and that there will be serious disorder in these parts before the Germans can take control.

7. As Mr. Cook indicated in his despatch No. 11 of the 23rd April, the new consul of the United States of America has more or less publicly declared himself to be a watchdog against possible Russian aggression. He told me on the 28th April that he had found the Soviet Chief of Staff and the consul-general together at the Soviet Consulate-General and that they had asked him whether or not they should intervene and that when he left them they had determined not to do so. At the time I thought it possible that at some stage the same question might be put to me and accordingly I enquired by telegram whether you agreed that the Russians should be encouraged to support the gendarmes. The question was never put, however, and I now think that the American Consul was consulted not because there was any intention to take his advice, but to see into his mind. It may do the Russians no harm to know that the United States Consul is convinced that they have ulterior motives.

8. After consideration of all the facts, distorted as they are by rumour and fear, and having heard what my colleagues have to say, I am sure that the Russians are justified in saying that it is the Persians themselves who have touched off this explosion. No doubt the explosive were already there; the Kurds were bound sooner to start shooting after so many years of restraint. But the weakness of the Government's team at Rezaieh, the speed with which Governors-General have left compared with their reluctance to arrive and the nervousness of the "Ajams" in general were an invitation to an ebullition of the Kurdish warlike spirit. It was Serhang Hashimi's visit to Rezaieh which brought matters to a head. An order was issued that Kurds must not carry arms into the town, and Serhang Hashimi told his gendarmes to see that it was enforced. A number of incidents followed in which the Kurds considered that they were attacked by the Persians as part of a scheme to restore tyrannical control. A son of Sheikh Taha, riding in Rezaieh in a carriage with his rifle in his hand, was dragged down and beaten. A Kurd wearing a turban had his face slapped. Two sons and three servants of Hadji Agha, carrying rifles in or near the town, were attacked by gendarmes and wiped out. The Kurds knew that the Persians lacked the force to back up this attitude; they apparently counted on a free hand from the Russians, and so the trouble started.

9. Now at last a representative of standing has been sent from Tehran. The Minister for War reached Rezaieh to-night, and with him were the new Governor-General for Western Azerbaijan, Dr. Marzeban, the Governor-General for Eastern Azerbaijan and the Soviet Chief of Staff from Tabriz. The Minister received the Consular Corps on the afternoon of the 6th while still at Tabriz. He said that he had practically secured Russian co-operation and that he expected to be able to send a division of Persian troops to be stationed at Ardebil, Tabriz and Rezaieh. He hoped that Persian troops from the south and from the east would converge on Rezaieh and crush the Kurds, but at the same time he said the present was not the moment for a final settlement. As regards the vexed question of carrying arms, he said he contemplated for the time being some arrangement such as obtains in Iraq, where licences are issued freely to enable Kurds to carry weapons and to be within the law. To-day it is said that the Prime Minister has telegraphed to him urging him not to be too lenient with the Kurds, and for the moment Persian confidence is climbing steeply out of the abyss where it was plunged for the past ten days. It will indeed be interesting to observe what will become of the Kurdish demands, how far the Russians may assist, or at least permit, the Persians to restore their authority, and whether the Persians will show wisdom and restraint if they do get the upper hand.

10. It should be stated that, whereas the Soviet Consul-General alleged that the Kurds of the north-west had been assisted by others from the south and from the Iraqi frontier, information so far obtained from the Persians themselves and from a Kurd living in Mehabad is definite that no tribes were involved except those living in the area along the frontier west of the lake. Salmas was not involved. The total number of rifles may be put at 1,000, or 1,500 at the most, according to the Persians.

11. It was rumoured from time to time that Assyrians and Armenians had joined the rebel Kurds, and no doubt there were individuals from the minorities who were ready to loot and wipe off old scores. In general, however, there seems

to be no question of fighting for religion alone, and it now seems likely that the total death-roll will not correspond with the panic. There has been nothing in the nature of a massacre and the talk of atrocities has no doubt been exaggerated. At present the list stands at seven women with breasts cut off, some girls raped and some children thrown into a stream. The Soviet Consul-General has assured me that the newly appointed Russian Consul at Rezaieh went with the chief of police to investigate one atrocity report and found it to be quite untrue.

I have, &c.

R. W. URQUHART.

Appendix.

CONDITIONS laid down by Kurdish leaders at a meeting with Persian and Russian representatives on the 30th April, 1942:—

1. There must be no amniehs in the Kurdish district between Khoi and Mehabad.
2. The Kurds must be allowed to carry arms freely.
3. 1,200 rifles in the hands of Persian villagers in the Rezaieh district must be collected and delivered to the Red Army.
4. There must be one representative of the Kurds in every Government department in Rezaieh.
5. The Kurds must have freedom in their national affairs.
6. The Government must pay for schools in Kurdistan, in which the Kurdish language must be used.
7. The villages of Mergavar, Tergavar and Dasht, claimed by the Herki Kurds and Seyyid Taha's sons, and the villages of Biradost, claimed by Hassan Agha and the Abdivi Kurds, must be restored to the claimants.
8. The release of twenty Kurdish prisoners is demanded.

The following conditions were laid down by another group of leaders at a similar meeting at Geuktepe on the 1st May:—

1. There must be no gendarmerie posts in Kurdish villages, nor must the gendarmes interfere with Kurds.
2. Kurds must be free to administer their own internal affairs.
3. Arms held by "Ajams," who are the enemies of the Kurds and are Fascists, must be collected and handed to the Soviet authorities.
4. As for goods taken from villagers, they cannot be restored; Kurds who have suffered casualties cannot be asked to give back what they have taken.

[E 3425/3000/34]

No. 9.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 152.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 19, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester reached Tehran by air from Habbaniya on the 10th May and left for Abadan on the 13th May. His Royal Highness had intended to visit Kermanshah on his way to Tehran and all arrangements had been made for him to inspect the British troops in the area and to receive the Governor-General and General Shabbakhti and representatives of the British community. The visit unfortunately had to be cancelled at the last moment because the weather was bad.

2. I enclose herein the programme⁽¹⁾ of His Royal Highness's visit to Tehran, which was carried out without a hitch. It was arranged so that he should see the largest possible number of people in the time available. As you will see, His Royal Highness received the salute of Persian, British and Soviet guards of honour on arrival. He was met by the Minister of Court, on behalf of the Shah, and by a number of prominent Persians, by the Soviet Ambassador as well as by myself and members of my staff. The same afternoon His Royal Highness received the Prime Minister and attended a reception at the Gulestan Palace, where he met the members of the Government and a large number of leading Persian personalities. In the evening I gave a dinner-party for the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

heads of missions in Tehran, which was followed by a reception for the principal American and Polish military representatives, junior foreign diplomats, leaders of the British community and members of the legation staff. On the 11th May His Royal Highness carried out an inspection of the Polish troops, which gave particular pleasure and was witnessed by the Polish civilian refugees. Afterwards His Royal Highness received the Persian press, and met at luncheon at His Majesty's Legation the members of the Persian Cabinet, the Soviet Ambassador and several Persians no longer in office who were active members of the Cabinet which signed the treaty. In the afternoon His Royal Highness called on His Imperial Majesty the Shah for an informal talk. I was present at the audience. Subsequently military officers under command of Xth Army, R.A.F. officers and a number of Polish officers were presented to His Royal Highness at His Majesty's Legation and the ceremony was followed by a garden-party for the British and British Indian communities. All important British subjects were individually presented to His Royal Highness. Later His Royal Highness opened a club for British soldiers organised by the ladies of His Majesty's Legation and the British community, where he was given the opportunity of meeting n.c.os. and other ranks. In the evening His Imperial Majesty the Shah gave a dinner-party for His Royal Highness, which was attended by myself, by the Duke's suite and by several members of my staff.

3. I enclose herein:—

- (a) The English texts⁽¹⁾ of the speeches made by the Shah and by His Royal Highness in English and Persian at the dinner at the palace, and
- (b) The full text⁽¹⁾ of His Royal Highness's statement to the press.

Both the speech and the statement were summarised by telegram to the Foreign Office in advance and was subsequently published in the Persian press.

4. The following day, the 12th May, was kept free. His Royal Highness was taken by Mr. and Mrs. Holman and Mr. Trott for a picnic-lunch in the mountains, and afterwards went with his suite for an informal ride with the Shah. As I have described in my telegram No. 629, His Majesty drove the Duke back to the legation in his own racing car, to the delight of the populace and the concern of the escort, whose cars were left far behind. This was the first time for a great many years that the Shah had entered this legation, and it is an excellent augury that His Majesty should have come in such an informal and friendly manner.

5. His Royal Highness gave particular pleasure to my American colleague by attending an informal cocktail party at the American Legation in the evening. His Royal Highness left by air on the 13th May and, on his departure, received the salute of a Persian guard of honour. The Minister of Court, the Minister of War, the Chief of Staff, the head of the Persian air force, the "chef de protocole" of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as well as myself and members of my staff were present at the aerodrome. An escort of Hurricanes accompanied His Royal Highness's aeroplane.

6. I was most grateful to His Royal Highness for undertaking this heavy and concentrated programme. It would be difficult to exaggerate the effect of the visit, which, as I said in my telegram No. 629, was a very great success. The Persians have continually been subjected to considerable diplomatic pressure by His Majesty's Legation in recent months, and it is hoped that the visit will have gone some way to remove the impression that we are "unfriendly" to them and will tend to facilitate the amicable solution of future problems. I think that there is no doubt that His Imperial Majesty the Shah, the Government and the people of Tehran were much gratified to have this opportunity to welcome His Royal Highness to the capital. I hope, in particular, that, as the result of the visit, the army and younger elements in the country may become less reserved in their attitude towards us, as they tend to take their cue from the Shah. In any case, the fact that His Royal Highness succeeded in establishing such warm and personal relations with His Majesty should not be without its effect from the political point of view.

7. Elaborate but unobtrusive arrangements for the security of His Royal Highness were made by Brigadier Crampton, the British station commander, in conjunction with the Persian Director-General of Police, General Radsar. I have addressed a letter of thanks to General Radsar on His Royal Highness's behalf for his assistance.

8. His Imperial Majesty the Shah offered to place a palace at His Royal Highness's disposal, but it was felt to be more convenient that His Royal Highness

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

and his suite should stay at this legation. The Shah, however, placed a car and his own chauffeur at His Royal Highness's disposal throughout the visit and presented His Royal Highness with a Persian carpet on the eve of his departure.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3530/69/34] No. 10.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 158.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 25, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, as reported in my telegram No. 634, dated 14th May 1942, the Imperial Persian Government on 14th May, 1942, authorised the Foreign Exchange Commission to resume dealings in foreign exchange at rates based upon the following rates for the pound sterling:—

	Rials to £1 sterling.
Buying rate	128
Selling rate	130

2. The change in the rate was effected by Decree No. 3622 of the Council of Ministers, of which I enclose a copy.

3. Under Article 5 (2) of the Draft Financial Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Imperial Persian Government, the Persian Government undertakes to place no unreasonable restrictions upon transactions in sterling area currencies. Article 4 of the Decree of the Council of Ministers permits the Exchange Commission to issue licences without restriction for the purchase of foreign exchange by the general public. The commission is, in practice, issuing licences without restriction for the public to purchase sterling area currencies; but it is still necessary for the authorised banks to go through the formality of making application to the commission in each individual case.

4. I have represented to the Persian Minister of Finance that this procedure merely causes vexatious inconveniences and delay, and that the Exchange Commission should be instructed to issue a general licence to the authorised banks permitting them to deal freely in sterling area currencies at the controlled rates and without reference to the commission in particular cases.

5. Copies of this despatch (without enclosure) have been sent the Minister of State, Cairo; to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Cairo and Kuibyshev; to the General Officer Commanding, Xth Army; to the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq; and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.,

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 10.

*Decree No. 3622 of Council of Ministers, dated November 24, 1321.
(May 14, 1942.)*

THE Council of Ministers in their session of the 23rd Ordibehesht, 1321 (13th May, 1942), on Proposal No. 5748 of the 23rd Ordibehesht (13th May, 1942) made by the Ministry of Finance, and by virtue of the authority conferred on them by the Foreign Exchange Law of the 10th Esfand, 1314, hereby make the following regulations:—

ARTICLE 1.

As from the 24th Ordibehesht, 1321 (14th May, 1942), the buying rate for the pound will be 128 rials and that for the dollar 32 rials, and the selling rates for pounds and dollars shall be 130 rials and 32.50 rials respectively.

ARTICLE 2.

As from the above date, the authorised banks must buy at the above-mentioned rates, for the account of the Exchange Commission, the exchange obtained from exports and all other exchange offered.

ARTICLE 3.

The authorised banks may sell exchange to importers at the official rates prescribed in article 1 of the present decree for the importation of all kinds of goods, in accordance with licences issued by the Exchange Commission.

ARTICLE 4.

The Exchange Commission is authorised to issue licences for the purchase of exchange at the official rates for every other sort of requirement, including educational, travelling, medical treatment expenses, &c.

ARTICLE 5.

The provisions of Decree No. 7082 of the 6/VII/1320 (28th September, 1941) are hereby repealed.

Tehran, May 15, 1942.

[E 3618/163/34] No. 11.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 166.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Tabriz despatch No. 15 of the 24th May, 1942, reporting on the political situation in Azerbaijan.

Tehran, June 1, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Consul-General Urquhart to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 15. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, May 24, 1942.

THE reports about trouble with the Kurds in Western Azerbaijan which began to reach Tabriz from the 28th April onwards were alarmist, often contradictory and generally unreliable. It was clearly desirable that I should go to Rezaieh as soon as possible and see what was actually happening, but I decided not to rush into the middle of the matter too quickly. One of my reasons for so deciding was that both the Russians and the Persians were eyeing the new British Consul-General with something more than an innocent curiosity, and it would have been only too easy in the first days after my arrival to create an impression, possibly difficult to correct later, that my zeal had a bias for one side or the other. In particular, I feared that the Russians would be suspicious of a visit to Rezaieh at a time when the Persians were claiming that what was to be seen there was the proof that the Russians were trying to detach Western Azerbaijan, at the time, too, when the Russian Consul-General had very properly gone there to try to improve the link between the Russian military and the local civil authorities. While I had no intention of surrendering my right to travel in my district freely, it seemed good to me to find a normal excuse for making the journey, and the arrival of the new Governor-General provided it. He asked me to allow him a few days to take up his functions and then, after an exchange of plain language telegrams which would, I knew, be read by persons interested in my movements, I went to Rezaieh on the 15th May. I had intended to return on the 19th, but I stayed one day longer in the hope of being able to report the beginning of a movement of the refugees back to their villages.

2. I offered a seat in my car to my United States colleague, whose own car has not yet arrived, but he did not accept.

3. My visit was an interesting one and, I hope, useful. I propose to submit a detailed account as soon as possible, but so much of my time is taken up with cyphering and office work that it may be delayed. I am therefore giving you now my main conclusions. Before doing so, however, I think it will be useful to describe briefly the background against which these recent events have taken place, and the present atmosphere.

4. It is vividly within living memory that the last war brought the Russians and the Turks into conflict in Azerbaijan, that disorders ensued in which the civilian population suffered, the Christians particularly. The local officials of the two countries are distrustful of each other to-day and the public cannot fail to know it. To the ordinary man there is nothing far-fetched in the idea that they may again be fighting one another, and that the civilians will again run the risk of massacre. Whatever his race or religion, the ordinary man in these parts is fear-ridden, easily startled by rumour. If he is a Shiah he is a poorish specimen, morally and physically, probably an opium smoker, and abject coward unless he is overwhelmingly strong, and then he shows all the violent brutality of the coward. If he is a Christian, whether Armenian or Assyrian, he has behind him three or four generations of the decline of his people in this region, of suffering and massacre at the hands of Turks, Kurds and Persians. If he is a Kurd, he knows that his people cannot stand up to the Mustapha Kemals and the Reza Shahs, that, though the present offers a chance for some to wipe off old scores with the gendarmes, to pillage, and even to talk insolently to the Persian officials in the jargon which some of them have learned at Baku, the future is very uncertain. Indeed, all of them see the future as uncertain and dangerous because all of them think there is a strong chance that the Germans will break through on the Caucasus front, that the Russians will have to leave and that there will be a period when anything might happen before the Persians, with German help, get firm control and put the Kurds and Christians back where they were, under the gendarmes.

5. It only made matters worse that many civilians were able to acquire Persian army rifles and ammunition. Although no doubt the Kurds are better armed than the others, all of them have weapons and all of them consider that what is a measure of prudent precaution for their sect is an act of aggression when others do likewise; this is particularly the case as between the Kurds and the Shiahs, who circulate, and end by believing, very exaggerated tales about the arsenals held by the other.

6. In these circumstances the recent Kurdish outbreak has had an emotional effect out of proportion with the number of Kurds involved, the numbers killed and the damage done. They are circumstances in which it is difficult to form a sane and balanced judgment, hence, I think, the extravagance of my Turkish colleagues and the violent folly of Persian officers like Serhang Hashimi. Indeed, almost any foolishness can be expected from Rezaieh unless the Persian officers now going there are exceptional men; at the best of times they are poorly equipped to resist suspicion, rumour and intrigue and they must, being frustrated men, be expected now to have less sense of balance than ever.

7. I now summarise briefly the results of my observations:—

Origins of the Outbreak.—The hand of Reza Shah was firm, but it was not just. It weighed heavily on the Kurds, less heavily on the Assyrians, while still making it plain that they had no hope of equal treatment with the Shiahs. Its instrument was the gendarmerie. When the firm hand was lifted the gendarmerie disappeared and the Kurds dug up their hidden rifles. More than that, they acquired rifles and ammunition from the disbanded Persian troops. Then came General Cupal and later Serhang Hashimi, literally shouting aloud their intention to disarm the Kurds, to re-establish the *status quo*. When Hashimi began to recruit gendarmes from among the local Shiah population and to give arms to others so as to build up a numerous force, and when these undisciplined men began by killing the first Kurds they tried to disarm—two men travelling to Mehabad to buy goods—the tribes concerned were stung into action.

That is the Russian version, and, even if it is not perhaps all the story, I accept it as substantially correct. The Persians, on the other hand, say that the Russians have since their arrival made a definite attempt to seduce the people from its loyalty to the Shah, that the Shiahs did not respond, and that the Russians accordingly made up their minds to get rid of them, using the Kurds for the purpose. There are grains of truth in this, but I feel perfectly sure that, while they have shown regard for the Kurds and others who are well disposed to the Soviet, the Russians never planned the expulsion of the Shiahs from their villages. I have no doubt that they were astonished by the extent of the panic which followed the attack of the Kurds on the gendarmes. It is most regrettable that the men on the spot have remained inactive; most probably they are under remote control from Kuibyshev, which failed to realise what was happening either from lack of information or from incredulity. But the Persian Government has little right to complain. At a moment when it ought to have had its best men on

the spot and to have shown zeal and leadership it remained silent and the post of Governor-General stood empty because no one could be persuaded to fill it willingly.

As regards the accusation that the Russians gave the Kurds ammunition, I confess I am in doubt, but quite definitely the verdict must be "not proven."

Course of Events.—It is not possible to give a reliable account of the progress of the fighting. The villagers are unreliable, the Persian official almost more so, the Russians non-communicative. I feel satisfied, however, that the Kurdish attack fell first on some newly established gendarme posts in the Baranduz valley, and that some of the Shiah villagers tried to help the gendarmes. The gendarmes were beaten and the Kurds set about trying to make the Shiahs give up their arms, alleged to have been distributed by Serhang Hashimi or obtained from the Persian army last autumn. The most extraordinary panic set in and villages were evacuated by the Shiahs with or without the firing of the first shot. Pillage ensued, of course. But somehow the word went round that the Kara Sunnis and the Assyrians and Armenians had nothing to fear, that they could "stay put" and that word was sufficiently definite to enable them to resist the panic, and even to dare, as many of them did, to receive the goods and cattle, sometimes even the owners themselves, from the neighbouring Shiah villages. With the Russian political officers at my side it was quite impossible to enquire just how this intelligence got around with any hope of a useful reply, but I may be able to discover the truth later.

The Kurds several times came on right to the outskirts of the town. The last occasion was on the 11th May, when both the Russians and the local gendarmes stood forth to meet them. In the fusillade a Russian soldier was shot in the leg, but the Russians said it was a gendarme who did it, firing wildly, and asked that the relatively untrained gendarmes be made to deposit their arms at their depot and not carry them about. They undertook to maintain order and their request was agreed to. Thus did the Kurds succeed in defeating and disarming the gendarmerie, and it is a fact that since the 11th May they have been quiescent.

Present Condition of Affairs.—I have nothing to add to my telegraphic reports about the number of deaths and the damage done. As regards atrocities, I would add that I still do not believe that even the one woman whose case was mentioned by the Minister of War had her breasts cut off before she was killed. I similarly doubt if there was a single case of rape by the Kurds, and I blame Christian riff-raff for some cases reported recently. It is, however, true that some men had hot irons applied to make them disclose where the rifles were, but on the whole it would be difficult to imagine a greater panic, a more abject flight, for so little killing. Only the unhealthy circumstances which I have described in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 can have produced the present results.

The important fact, however, as I have tried to persuade my Russian colleague, is not that the panic was unjustified and the results exaggerated, but that many thousands of people did, in fact, flee from their homes and are, most of them, still in the town. It seemed to me when I was looking at their houses, their fields and vineyards a week ago that, if only they would get back to work at once, the damage would by no means be disastrous. The Governor-General was spending 50,000 rials daily among them. He said there were 48,000 persons, and there were certainly great numbers crowded into that small town. I have put the figure at 30,000 and in the absence of any sort of statistics it is a guess as good as any other. There were reports of typhoid and dysentery among these refugees, under a score all told, so that there seemed, when I was there, to be no immediate threat to health; but the Governor-General's dole was not sufficient for their needs and they were killing off animals both for food and for sale; they were also going forth during the day and cutting down trees, which represent capital, and which, in any case, were not their property. The less worthy elements were stealing on the one hand and trying to get a bigger dole from the Governor-General on the other. Altogether the situation was unhealthy, and its most remarkable feature was the absence of any suggestion of leadership from the Persian officials, although every day's delay meant heavy loss.

Despatch of Persian Troops.—The news that the Russians had agreed to the despatch of a substantial Persian force caused excitement, especially among the Shiahs and the Kurds. The latter responded with the news that their kinsmen, now migrating from Iraq to the Persian uplands, were coming over "like ants" to their assistance. For their part, the Shiahs were already savouring their revenge on the Kurds, a bloody one, and were by implication blackening the faces of the Russians and their friends, since Persian arms were to restore that order

which, according to them, the Russians had deliberately disturbed, and which even their best friends had to admit they had failed to maintain, although it was in their power to do so. There seemed to me to be a strong probability that, if the Persian troops came to Rezaieh while the villagers were still there in their thousands, not even the wisest of commanders could prevent an outburst of emotion which might produce troublesome incidents. Yet when I got there a deadlock between the Governor-General and the Russians was apparent over the establishment of joint road guard posts, and neither side was making any move to persuade the villagers to go home.

Since I began writing this despatch I have had a conversation with the Persian commander. He seems to be unusually reasonable for a Persian officer, and I think he will do his best to avoid incidents. I do not think he is a strong character, however, and I doubt if he possesses the perseverance which his task will demand of him.

His troops are moving northwards slowly because his lorries cannot lift the whole force at the same time, so the sections are being leap-frogged. Moreover, some of his tank-carrying vehicles have had difficulty in negotiating the tortuous approaches to certain narrow bridges. He cannot now be in Rezaieh before the 30th or the 31st, and I can only hope that by then the majority of the villagers will have become tired of the town and plucked up the courage to go home.

The Persian Government's Position in Western Azerbaijan.—Despite the Government's neglect of this distant province, despite the incompetence and folly of its officers, I found its position surprisingly strong for the moment. I suspect that the Governor-General here has been more active these past months among the more important Kurdish tribes than is generally known, and that the sugar, presents and appointments which he has given to the chiefs of the larger tribes have been more effective than medals and trips to Baku. The line, of course, had to be drawn somewhere and for face-saving purposes the Government had to establish its authority over some of the Kurds, preferably, I would suppose, those within easy reach of Rezaieh. Unfortunately, as it has turned out, the line was drawn a trifle too high and by his violent foolishness, perhaps also by his inability to secure Russian goodwill, Serhang Hashimi failed signally to establish the Government's authority even in the Rezaieh plain. The big tribes like the Karapapak, Momish, Piran, Mangur, Denboukri, Faisullah begli and a large section of the Shekak are on the Government's side. It was the smaller tribes, the Begzadeh, the Herki, Mamedi and Hinari, which caused the trouble. They would normally be punished by the despatch of troops to their villages, but this is not the moment for that. For one reason, the 1,500 men which these Kurds can, at a pinch, put into the field would be more than a match for the force now going to Rezaieh with Russian approval. The first complication would be a Persian demand for many more troops, and then, if they gained the upper hand, they would behave in a manner which the Russians would not approve. The wise solution is to extend to these discontented Kurds the benefits which have kept the larger tribes friendly, so as to gain time. The Governor-General at Rezaieh thinks it can be done, but the Russians must, at the same time, allow the Persians some means of saving their faces.

Position of the Russians.—The Russians came to Azerbaijan with all the prestige which their claim to be the protectors of the peasantry gave them. They have quite lost it, because to the simple peasants of Azerbaijan, and they are the bulk of the population, the results speak for themselves. For them the coming of the Russians, for that matter the Anglo-Russian occupation, has meant heavy loss and the quickening of old hatreds and fears. The Christians abhor the recent disorders almost as much as the Shiah. They have derived no present benefit from them; on the contrary, they have a lively fear that the day of reaction may come as it has always tended to come in the past. Only the Kurds can be supposed to be happy with matters as they now are, but the best of them are in the Persian Government's pay and, if the Persians are wise, they will make an effort to find a means of pacifying those who have shown themselves strong enough to make serious trouble.

If, however, the Persians now commit some act of folly against the rebel Kurds, they may very easily alienate some of those now friendly and cause more than the present small proportion to turn to the Russians as their hope.

I have little doubt, however, that it is their conception of their military necessities, and not any political theory or ambition, which has determined Russian policy latterly in Azerbaijan. The political officers are no doubt at work in a routine fashion, but events have caused them to lose ground so markedly that there must be some overwhelmingly strong reason for continuing in the

present policy. I have suspected that Russian military strength in Azerbaijan, far from being an increasing threat to Turkey, is low and that they are genuinely worried about the Turkish frontier themselves. If we were in their place, sharing their apprehensions about Turkey, hearing perhaps of the chauvinistic remarks which Turkish officials are capable of making, I think we, too, should consider it our duty to neglect no means and to examine the possibility that the Kurds might serve for defensive operations. I have noted from your telegrams to the Foreign Office that the Persian authorities and the Turkish Ambassador have suggested that the Russians have considered using the Kurds against the Turks; it seems to me that this need not be a matter for excitement or resentment in any quarter. Both Turks and Persians whom I have met say that the Kurds have no military value in the modern sense and I think the Russians themselves would agree that for attack they have none, although it might be argued that for defence, on their own ground, they might be of some use. Hence, possibly, their tenderness for the Kurds.

I have several times, in conversation with my Russian colleagues, sensed a revulsion when the possibility of military action against the Kurds was threatened. I therefore concluded that they would at all costs avoid hostilities with them. The signs of a firmer attitude which I saw at Rezaieh, and the Russian casualties—two killed—in a brush with the Kurds near Khoi the other day, gave me some hope that the Russians were really resolved to restore order before the Persian troops arrived. I have since been informed that the Russian patrols in Western Azerbaijan, far from smiting the Kurds whom they find prowling about, shake hands with them, enquire why they are not in their villages, and remind them that it is forbidden to do this and that. They then pass on. Now the Persian commander has informed me, on the authority of the Russian general, that an emissary has been sent to treat with the Shekak minority which caused the trouble near Khoi and that they regard the clash as an accident which would not have occurred had they been able to talk with the Kurds beforehand. Moreover, according to the Persian commander, the general has "advised" him not to try to disarm any Kurds. I must therefore revert to my original idea that the Russians will do their utmost to avoid hostilities with any Kurds, and that the policy of tenderness will continue.

Is not the solution for this *impasse* to be sought on the Russian front? If the Russians are successful there, they will not, I feel sure, continue their present policy, which must be unsatisfactory for their political officers and distasteful to their soldiers. If this interpretation is correct, we cannot but feel sympathy with them in their concern, even if their policy of nursing the Kurds seems hardly worth while to us. I do not know what the prospects may be of persuading them to revise their policy here, but I judge that it would be difficult and perhaps hardly worth while. The issue will be decided on the Russian front before many months.

I have, &c.
R. W. URQUHART.

[E 3655/3655/34]

No. 12.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 160.)
Sir,

Tehran, May 26, 1942.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in the Right Hon. the Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to transmit herewith a political report on Persia for the year 1941. The report has been prepared with some difficulty. In the first place, most of the records for the period from the 1st January, 1941, until the occupation by Allied troops in August have been destroyed; in the second, Mr. Greenway, to whom I am indebted for a draft of a considerable portion of the report, was transferred, and it was some while before time could be found, by those who had a first-hand knowledge of the events of 1941, to bring the report to completion.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

Annual Political Report for 1941.

FROM the beginning of 1941 until the invasion of Persia by the British and Soviet troops in August there were no serious attempts on the part of the Persian Government to take advantage of the difficulties of Great Britain or to renew the pressure which had been applied in the previous year by the cancellation of the credits agreements and the blackmailing of the A.I.O.C. over the royalty question. The Shah, whose rigid policy of maintaining neutrality and of pursuing his plan of economic development was stressed in the report on Persia for 1940, still hoped that he would be able to secure the maximum advantage from both sides. In accordance with this policy, therefore, his Government turned a deaf ear to British protests about the presence in Persia of large numbers of potentially dangerous Germans and to the risk to which both British and Persian interests were exposed by the presence of Axis merchant vessels laid up, with skeleton Axis crews, in Persian waters. This problem, which was to be solved so dramatically later in the year, was even at the beginning of 1941 a source of considerable anxiety to His Majesty's Government. In January His Majesty's Minister renewed the representations which he had made without success in the previous year, and drew the attention of the Persian Government to the fact that, among the excessive number of so-called German specialists and business men, were many who were credibly believed to be German officers, and who had, in any case, no real connexion with the firms by whom they were nominally employed. The danger which this situation presented to Persia as well as to Great Britain was stressed in vain; the Persian Government complacently replied that measures had already been taken to keep all Germans under surveillance, to send away some suspicious characters, and to grant visas to Germans desiring to enter Persia only at Tehran and after exhaustive enquiry. They calculated that these measures were amply sufficient to obviate any untoward incident.

2. There was, unfortunately, some ostensible justification for the presence in Persia of many of the German specialists, since there was much machinery of German origin to be installed or maintained in connexion with the Shah's numerous industrial schemes; and the very fact that these men were nominally employed in undertakings in which His Majesty had a personal financial interest made it impossible for his Government, who had long ceased to resist his will, to take more active steps, even had they wished to do so. Moreover, apart from their fear of the Shah, the Government showed increasing awe of the Axis Powers, whom they were beginning to regard as invincible, while the enigmatic attitude of Russia was a source of no less misgiving. It is not altogether surprising that the Persian Government, tormented by these three conflicting fears, had little consideration for Great Britain, of whose final victory they were far from being convinced. Representations by His Majesty's Minister on the subject of the German and Italian ships lying at Bandar Shahpur (P.G.), and to the danger which they constituted, were received with equal complacency. The Persian authorities, it was stated, had assured themselves that there were no explosives in these ships, and were unable to accept the British contention that security required either the replacement of the Axis crews by Persian or the removal of essential parts of the machinery. In the event, these assurances were shown to be totally unjustified. When British troops captured Bandar Shahpur two of these ships were sunk by their crews by means of the explosives which, with or without Persian connivance, had been concealed on board.

3. Commercial relations between Persia and Germany were strengthened by the signature at the end of January of a *procès-verbal* providing for the export to Germany during the financial year of over 100,000 tons of Persian produce, including 20,000 tons of rice, 18,000 tons of cotton and 15,000 tons of barley, as well as of 36,000 kilog. of opium, £4 million worth of skins and a large quantity of carpets. About the same time the Persian Government requested His Majesty's Legation to assure the importation from India into Persia of some 30,000 tons of wheat, and, on the strength of categorical assurances both from the Prime Minister and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that no wheat was being sent out of Persia, a licence for this order was secured. When half of the wheat had arrived, however, it was reported on good authority that at least some Persian wheat was, in fact, being exported from northern ports, and there was some reason to believe that this was being done by direct order of the Shah, possibly without the knowledge of the Prime Minister. The Government of India therefore suspended the export of the wheat for some time, but it was

eventually resumed in view of the shortage of bread in Persia, and of the certainty which was established that the quantity of wheat exported from Persia could only have been small.

4. The outbreak in Iraq of the rebellion of Rashid Ali was viewed at first with considerable alarm by the Persian Government. They adopted an attitude of uneasy neutrality, but failed to control the activities of the German Legation, who organised the despatch of parties of Germans to Northern Iraq and Kurdistan to join the rebel forces. The Government did, however, refuse a transit visa to the German Minister in Bagdad, Herr Grobba, who wished to return to his post via Persia. Moreover, they refused on technical grounds the *agrément* as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran of the fanatical Nationalist Talib Mushtaq; and they rejected the German demand that the Persian Government should refuse to allow British warships to station themselves in any part of the Shatt-el-Arab. On the 3rd June, after the rebellion had been crushed, a large number of refugees from Iraq, including Rashid Ali himself and several of his Ministers, the officers forming the "Golden Square," and the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, reached Tehran, many of them in stolen cars. They took up residence in the principal hotels pending arrangements for other accommodation and immediately put themselves in touch with the German and Italian Legations. Rashid Ali himself was finally permitted by the Persian Government to leave for Turkey, where he was to reside on parole.

5. His Majesty's Minister made repeated representations to the Persian Government regarding the danger which these refugees constituted, and requested that they should be removed to provincial towns, where they could not easily communicate with each other, with the Axis Legations, or with their accomplices in Persia and other countries. The Persian Government did finally remove some of them to Zenjan, whence, on the approach of the Russian forces, one of the most dangerous, Salahuddin Sabbagh, succeeded in escaping; the others fled back to Tehran, where they were subsequently arrested for deportation, but Sabbagh disappeared completely. On the 3rd September His Majesty's Minister formally requested the Persian Government to hand over the Iraqi, Palestinian and Syrian refugees, and after some delay they agreed to do so. It was at first proposed that the Iraqis should be handed over to the Iraqi Government for trial, but it was finally decided that they should be taken over by the British military authorities for internment in India or elsewhere. Accordingly, they were despatched with their families to Ahwaz and finally interned in Southern Rhodesia. The attitude of the Persian Government in regard to the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem was consistently unsatisfactory, but seems to have been the result of complacency rather than of deliberate obstruction. Sir R. Bullard continued to press for effective control of his movements, stressing the serious view taken by His Majesty's Government, but received in reply only assurances that he was being held under the closest surveillance. Finally, the Persian Government agreed to send him to Yezd, but they were too late. At that moment the Russian troops were already advancing on Tehran, and the Mufti's guards, sharing in the prevailing panic, and perhaps encouraged by Axis largesse, fled incontinently. The Mufti himself was not slow to follow their example, and all that is known for certain of his subsequent movements is that at one time he took refuge in the Japanese Legation, but left after a few days' stay, though he may have returned there later.

6. By the end of July both His Majesty's Government and the Government of India were becoming increasingly perturbed by the direct threat, both military and political, which the German Fifth Column constituted for British and imperial interests. His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador were accordingly instructed to make parallel representations to the Persian Government with a view to a substantial and immediate reduction in the German community, which contained an alarmingly high proportion of notorious agents. At the same time His Majesty's Government and the Government of India were in consultation as to the use of sanctions to be applied if diplomatic pressure failed in its object, their opinion being that economic sanctions would be ineffectual by themselves and in any case would be too slow. On the 16th August Sir R. Bullard and M. Smirnov addressed further representations to the Persian Government, accompanied by detailed memoranda. They requested the Persian Government to furnish details of their programme of reduction of the number of Axis nationals and lists of Germans who had already left or were about to leave the country; but stated that there was no objection to the retention of German specialists essential for the economic life of the country, provided that they were not personally suspect, and were not employed on communications or in departments where their presence would be dangerous.

7. On the 19th August the Persian Government replied with counter-proposals on an extremely limited scale, coupled with a refusal to supply written details. This reply convinced His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government that nothing more was to be hoped for from continued negotiation, and accordingly at 4.15 A.M. on the 25th August the Allied representatives called on the Prime Minister and handed him notes showing that the patience of their Governments was exhausted. The British note, after summing up previous inconclusive negotiations, stated:—

"It is evident that the Persian Government attach greater importance to retaining these German nationals in Persia than they attach to meeting the wishes of His Majesty's Government. . . . The Persian Government must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their decision."

The note concluded by stating that His Majesty's Government were obliged to take appropriate measures to safeguard their own vital interests and to deal with the menace arising from the potential activities of the Germans in Persia. These measures were in no way directed against the Persian people or the independence and territorial integrity of Persia. Military measures that might be taken were of a temporary nature only, and were directed solely against the Axis Powers.

8. Mr. Ali Mansour repeated previous assurances that all Germans would be deported, and said that the programme would be accelerated. Everything, he urged, could be arranged amicably, if only the movements of British and Soviet troops, which had just been reported to him, could be countermanded. But his assurance, which was in any case of little value, came too late. British and Russian troops met with very little resistance in their advance; some clashes, however, occurred in Khuzistan, in the course of which Admiral Bayandor, commanding the Persian navy, was killed. As a result of naval operations at Bandar Shahpur six out of the eight German and Italian merchant ships were seized and despatched within a week to India; while a seventh, which had been sunk, was raised and also taken to India. The eighth ship, which had been blown up by its crew, was a total loss. Those members of the German and Italian crews who were at Bandar Shahpur were taken prisoner; others, who were on holiday in Northern Persia, made good their escape, with the exception of a few individuals whose arrest His Majesty's Legation were able to secure. The half-dozen small gun-boats which constituted the Persian navy were either sunk or captured. It had not been expected that any great show of resistance would be made, owing to the low state of morale in the Persian armed forces, due to underfeeding, underpayment, lack of training in modern warfare, and an almost total absence of supply arrangements; but the rapid and complete demoralisation of the Persian troops, even of those not engaged in operations, came as a general surprise. Some divisions melted away completely, the officers leading the rout, and the rank and file abandoning or selling their arms, and making their way back to their villages.

9. During the night of August the 24th-25th His Majesty's Minister, assuming from indirect evidence in his instructions that hostilities were about to begin, sent word to all British subjects in Tehran, who quickly assembled and took refuge in the legation compounds at Gulhek and in the city. Here they were joined by some nationals of a number of Allied States—Poles, Czechs, and Greeks; and even by some neutrals and some German Jews who professed strong pro-Ally sympathies. In all about 650 people were accommodated in the two legations and their gardens, where they remained for a fortnight. On the morning of the invasion the Shah sent for the British and Soviet representatives and asked what the two Governments wanted. They replied by referring to the text of the communications which they had made to the Prime Minister that morning. It was obvious that the invasion had been a very great shock to the Shah, who, as it seemed to them, had been ill-informed by his Ministers and had been living in a world of unreality. The Shah compromised: on the one hand he issued an absurd war communiqué—No. I, never to be followed by No. II; and on the other he dismissed Mr. Ali Mansour and appointed as Prime Minister Mr. Firoughi, almost the only statesman who was trusted completely for his honesty. Soon afterwards (the 28th August) the Shah issued the order to cease fire. Hostilities ceased on the British side also, but the Russians, who had already done a great deal of senseless damage by bombing undefended targets, kept up small-scale bombing for several days, first because the orders took a long while to reach their air units, and afterwards because a Russian aeroplane which dropped pamphlets on Tehran was fired at by the Persians, who alleged

that they were firing at two of their own aeroplanes whose pilots had refused to obey the order to cease fire.

10. Negotiations were at once entered into for the regularisation of the situation by an exchange of letters. The main objects on the Allied side were to fix the limits of occupation, to secure the delivery either to the British or Soviet forces of all the members of the German community except the *bona fide* staff of the German Legation and a few technicians not employed on communications or military establishments; and to ensure that the despatch of supplies across Persia to Russia, including war material, would not be hindered. On their side, His Majesty's Government agreed to continue to pay the oil royalties and to facilitate the supply to Persia of her economic requirements; and to halt the further advance of their troops and, as soon as the military situation should permit, to withdraw their forces from Persian territory. The first reply from the Persian Government had, however, hardly been received when the Allied Governments decided that they could not accept a solution under which the Axis Legations would be free to carry on in Tehran activities against both Persia and the Allies. Consequently, on the 6th September the British and Soviet representatives addressed notes to the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing out that the Axis Legations and Governments had taken advantage of Allied forbearance in not occupying Tehran to indulge in anti-Allied propaganda, and asking that the German, Italian, Hungarian and Roumanian Legations should be removed at the earliest possible moment. His Majesty's Minister added to this an oral request that the Bulgarian Legation should also be removed—a request with which the Soviet Ambassador could not associate himself officially, since the Soviet and Bulgarian Governments were still in diplomatic relations with each other, though he was able to inform the Persian Government that he regarded them as having a free hand in the matter. The Persian Government agreed to get rid of the five missions, and stopped their cypher and bag facilities at once; but they were so dilatory in their preparations for the departure of the missions that the Allies decided to move troops to the capital as the only means of securing this object without dangerous delay. The troops arrived in the suburbs of Tehran (they never occupied the town itself) on the morning of the 16th September. The British troops camped on the south, the Russians on the other three sides of the town. In the course of the exchange of letters the Persian Government obtained permission to station Persian troops at certain points in the British zone of occupation (not in the Russian), but they tried in vain to secure the immediate return of war material captured during the hostilities and a promise of compensation for war damage. Although these letters were set aside by the occupation of Tehran and the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty, they set the tone for the mutual relations of His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government for the rest of the year.

11. The British zone of occupation, as defined in the exchange of letters, was to be bounded by a line running north and east of Kermanshah and Kurramabad and of the oilfields of Masjid-i-Sulaiman, Haftkel and Gach Saran, and ending at Bandar Dulaim, on the Persian Gulf; but British troops were already in occupation of Hamadan, the Aveh Pass and Sultanabad when the negotiations began, and these points remained in our occupation after the troops which were sent to occupy the suburbs of the capital had been withdrawn. The limits of the Russian occupation (apart from the period when the Russian troops were at Tehran) have been as defined in the letters: the line runs from Ushni through Zenjan to Qazvin, then up to the Caspian, whose southern shore it follows, then through Babul, Zirab, Semnan and Shahrud and north to Aliabad, on the frontier. There is, however, one exception to this: at the last moment the Russians added to their definition an oral statement that, while Meshed would not be occupied, a certain number of aeroplanes, with ground troops to protect them, would be stationed outside Meshed. This was an important rider, since the presence of Russian troops so near naturally affected the administration of Meshed, the centre of an important province.

12. Even before the Allied entry into Persia it had been debated whether it paid us any longer to support Reza Shah to the extent we had done in the past, viz., by discouraging the publication in the British press of any matter disparaging him or his régime. His Majesty's Government fully realised that the popular belief, that we maintained him on the throne for our own ends, did us great harm, but they considered that his remarkable hold over his people warranted his retention on the throne so long as we could hope to secure his co-operation, or at least his real neutrality. His obstinate refusal to get rid of

the Axis nationals with reasonable speed had already shaken our hopes when the Allied occupation showed that he was quite incapable of dealing with the problems of the moment. When his parade army collapsed he made no effort to prevent disintegration. Moreover, he showed no consciousness of responsibility for the collapse of his pretentious military façade, or of recognition of the urgent need for reform: even after the occupation he one day beat the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff with his sword for putting up a scheme of which he disapproved, and threw them into prison, and he would probably have had them executed if he had not had to abdicate. Meanwhile our position had grown worse, since whereas the Persians expected that we should at least save them from the Shah's tyranny as compensation for invading their country, they found that they now had to bear both the foreign occupation and the Shah. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Firoughi, though he realised that it would be impossible to find a successor to Reza who would wield the same authority, eventually came to the conclusion that the reforms which were essential could not be secured under Reza Shah, since, even if he promised to accept a programme of reform, he would soon return to his old arbitrary ways and penalise the authors of the programme. His Majesty's Government thereupon agreed that the B.B.C. might now begin to give various broadcasts in Persian which had been prepared beforehand, starting with talks on constitutional government and increasing in strength and local colour until all Reza's mismanagement, greed and cruelty were displayed to the public gaze. It is probable that no broadcasts have ever been received with more excitement and approval than these. If the Persian public approved them, to the Shah they gave a violent shock, and he made an unsuccessful appeal to His Majesty's Minister that these broadcasts should cease. Encouraged by the lead given by the B.B.C., the Deputies in the Majlis, who had been subservient for so many years, passed a resolution addressed to the Shah, asking for reforms. A deputation of them was to wait upon the Shah on the 16th September, resolved it was alleged, to ask him to abdicate; but it is quite possible that in view of the fear in which they held him they would have withdrawn their request or been put off with promises. Early that morning, however, the Shah received news that Russian forces were advancing from Qazvin, and he signed a deed of abdication, drafted by Mr. Firoughi, in favour of the Crown Prince, and retired to Isfahan, where a few days later he signed another deed, this time transferring his property in Persia to the new Shah.

13. Events moved so rapidly towards the end that the Shah had been replaced by his eldest son before His Majesty's Government had been able to decide who would be the most suitable successor. The Persians were divided among themselves: some wanting to get rid of the Pahlevi dynasty altogether (though not to go back to the Qajars), some preferring the third or the fourth son (though never the second) to the eldest, or even wishing to have one of the two youngest, aged 9 and 6 respectively, under a Regency. In the end the eldest son succeeded because that was in accord with the Constitution and therefore less open to objection than any other course. His Majesty's Government had hesitated to commit themselves beforehand. The Crown Prince had been carefully excluded by his father from participating in the work of government and even from contact with the public and the foreign representatives, so that his character and abilities were alike unknown to His Majesty's Government. Moreover, he had a reputation of being pro-German, which was perhaps unjustified and, in any case, was never confirmed by anything that happened after his accession. His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador could think of no better candidate, and Mr. Firoughi, who was well disposed towards the Allies, forecasted a constitutional régime under which the Shah would have little power. His Majesty's Government, therefore, agreed that Mohamed Reza should be given a trial subject to good behaviour, which would include the granting of extensive reforms, the restoration to the nation of the property illegally acquired by his father, and the exclusion of all his brothers from Persia. One of his first acts on assuming the throne was to send messages to Sir Reader Bullard, assuring him of his whole-hearted and loyal co-operation with Great Britain. At the same time, he enquired privately whether it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to allow a Persian Government to administer the country, or whether the British and Russian Governments themselves proposed to do this; and stressed the fact that no Persian Government could be expected to control the country when the capital was surrounded by Allied troops.

14. To dispose of the old Shah was no easy matter. The Prime Minister, Mr. Firoughi, feared that, if he stayed in the country, he would not be able to refrain from interference in the Government. The Shah himself wished to go

to South America, and an application, which was eventually granted, was made to the Argentine Government, for permission for him to live there. Meanwhile, he wished to go to India, but the Government of India were unwilling that he should make even a temporary stay in that country. Eventually His Majesty's Government sent a vessel to Bandar Abbas for the Royal party, which included all the sons except the eldest, as well as two daughters and one of the Queens. The vessel called at Bombay, where the party were, however, not allowed to land, and then proceeded to Mauritius. The Shah appears to have brought a charge of bad faith against His Majesty's Government, who thereupon sent him through the Viceroy a telegram saying that they had never agreed that he might go to South America with his family; the decision that he should remain temporarily in Mauritius was based on the requirements of the war situation; there was no intention of treating him as a prisoner. The new Shah showed great anxiety both for his father's health and his brothers' education, and he asked whether they could not be allowed to go to some place in the British Empire, *e.g.*, Canada or South Africa. His Majesty's Government sent the Shah a statement explaining why they had at first held it better that his father should remain in Mauritius until the end of the war, *viz.*, that he would there be free from Nazi agents and propagandists, journalists and political intrigues; but by the end of the year arrangements had been made for the ex-Shah to reside in Canada.

15. The approach of Russian troops to Tehran spread panic among all classes, and the Government were galvanised into giving last-minute, though quite inadequate, assistance to the efforts of His Majesty's Legation to discover the whereabouts of Axis agents and the other members of the Axis communities, and to arrange for their immediate removal from Persia, together with that of the Axis Legations. On the 17th September the German Minister and his staff left for Germany via Tabriz, together with several hundred German women and children, whose husbands had already been or were about to be deported. The journey of this convoy, for which transport was only provided with the greatest difficulty by the Persian authorities, was slow and difficult; and there is little doubt that the travellers were treated extremely badly by the Russian forces through whose lines they passed, especially when they reached the frontier, where the Russians seized all the foreign currency and most of the personal belongings of the non-diplomats and all the luggage of the members of the legation which was not with its owners in the diplomatic cars. The Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires and his staff left for Bucharest via Bagdad, and the Bulgarian Legation for Sofia via Tabriz. Two days later the Italian Legation, with several hundred members of the community, left for the Turkish frontier. They received far better treatment than the Germans at the hands of the Russians.

16. Meanwhile, every effort was being made to round up the remaining Germans in the face of many difficulties. It was, however, decided to allow a certain number, nearly all of whom were Jews, known or believed on good grounds to be hostile to the Nazi régime, to remain at least temporarily in Iran. Unfortunately, the two principal German agents, Gamotta and Mayr, who were believed to have played an important part in the Iraqi rebellion, were not to be traced. It was believed that at one time they took refuge in the Japanese Legation, which certainly gave shelter to the Mufti of Jerusalem. The continued efforts of His Majesty's Legation, willingly but ineffectually seconded by the Persian police, to lay hands on these three dangerous individuals were without effect. Whether they left the country could not be ascertained, but in any case no acts of sabotage occurred such as they might have been expected to arrange, and it is not necessary to presuppose the presence of Germans in Persia to account for the pro-German propaganda which began to be heard on all sides.

17. On the 27th September the ex-Shah embarked at Bandar Abbas with the ex-Queen Consort and seven members of the Royal family. All his real property had in the meantime been transferred to the State by the new Shah, who also made over to various charitable objects a considerable sum out of the large fortune (600 million rials) lying in his father's name in the Banque Mellié.

18. Meanwhile, in the region of Tehran, the discipline of the Russian troops, which had at first been exemplary, deteriorated somewhat; though as they received no pay that could be spent in Persia, where they saw in the shops watches and other articles unobtainable in Russia, there was an explanation, if not an excuse, for thefts and robberies which they may have committed. In the districts under Russian occupation it became almost impossible for the Persian authorities to maintain order, as the Soviet authorities first disarmed the police and gendarmerie and then refused to help to maintain order on the ground that

this would constitute interference in the civilian administration. Eventually an agreement was concluded for the rearming of a given number of police and gendarmes in occupied zones, but there were disputes as to the execution of this agreement. The attitude of the Soviet authorities was attributed by the Persians to a definite policy of weakening the authority of the Central Government and of preparing the soil for suitable ideological propaganda.

19. In the capital itself panic, defeatism and despair were growing daily stronger. Criticism of the Government was almost universal, though none of the critics seemed ready to help with criticism that was not purely destructive. The Mollas raised their reactionary heads again, every merchant in the bazaar was prepared to accept the post of Minister of Finance, every lawyer to be Minister of Justice, and intrigue of every kind was rife; and in the chaotic conditions inevitable in the sudden change-over from pure despotism to an alleged constitutional and democratic régime there was a general scramble for the fruits, though not for the responsibilities, of privilege and office.

20. As a result of these conditions, British popularity, which had flared up for a moment when the Shah was removed, rapidly declined once more. We were almost universally blamed, chiefly for the excesses, real or alleged, of the Russian troops and for their very presence on Persian soil; but also for the incompetence, mismanagement and continued corruption of the Persian administration. The widespread shortage of wheat, sugar and other essential commodities was easily attributed to the selfish British, and no credit was for a moment given for the supplies which were despatched to Persia in considerable quantities and in ships badly needed for other purposes. For the growth of this feeling a skilful pro-German propaganda, and in particular the daily broadcasts in Persian from Berlin, was partly to blame, but it has become almost automatic in Persia to attribute to Great Britain the responsibility for any unpleasant event that may occur. Even the Persian Government, who were in possession of all the facts, though pressed continually by His Majesty's Minister to give them publicity in the press and on the wireless, supinely preferred to occupy themselves with other matters, regardless of the fact that their own prestige was receiving a corresponding set-back. The abdication of Reza Shah gave a momentary fillip to our reputation, but the inconveniences and privations resulting from the war in general and from the occupation in particular, soon reduced us to the position of permanent villain in Persian eyes.

21. It was in these unfavourable circumstances that negotiations for a treaty of alliance between Persia, Great Britain and Soviet Russia were launched on their long and tortuous course. The proposal had originated with His Majesty's Government even before the overthrow of Reza Shah, and had the personal approval of the Prime Minister, Mr. Firoughi, and Sir R. Bullard was instructed on the 14th September to inform Mr. Firoughi and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Soheily, of the desire of the Allied Powers to conclude such a treaty, negotiations for which might be initiated as soon as the question of the Axis Legations and communities was satisfactorily solved. Mr. Firoughi promised to work to that end immediately on the conclusion of the constitutional crisis which had arisen out of the abdication of the Shah. On the 1st October a copy of the draft text, which had been drawn up in London, was communicated unofficially to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the same time, in order to create a more favourable atmosphere, the question of withdrawing British and Soviet troops from Tehran was under consideration. On the 6th October, however, Mr. Soheily addressed identical and somewhat peremptory notes to Sir R. Bullard and M. Smirnov, requesting the evacuation of Tehran and its neighbourhood in order to allay public anxiety, restore security and permit the Persian Government to carry on with the administration of the country. These notes were obviously directed against the Soviet Government and had an unfortunate effect on M. Smirnov, which did not predispose him to treaty negotiations, though he had hitherto appeared to share the opinion of His Majesty's Minister, that the proximity of the Allied troops to the capital tended to demoralise the Persian Government and to create the risk that the Allies might be dragged into the administration first of Tehran and then of the whole country. The Soviet Government, however, accepted the British draft treaty, which was communicated to the Persian Government officially on the 17th October. On the same day British and Russian troops withdrew from the neighbourhood of Tehran.

22. The examination of the draft by the Persian Government was now adversely affected by the Russian withdrawal in the Ukraine, which, to the minds of the majority of the Persians, seemed likely to result in the early occupation of the Caucasus by the German forces. When the German community was ejected

from Persia, they departed with loud assurances that they would return in three months. This fear of the return of infuriated Germans bent on revenge for their summary dismissal was artfully fomented from abroad by the Berlin broadcasts in Persian, and from within by agents, of whom the great majority were themselves Persians, certain of the invincibility of German arms, seduced by German gold, and looking for reward, or at least hoping for immunity if the country should be occupied by the Germans. Moreover, it seemed certain that to reconcile the Persian public to an alliance with the traditional enemy—Russia—would prove an almost superhuman task in view of the reports (usually exaggerated) of the behaviour of the Russian troops. The Prime Minister himself was old, tired and preoccupied with grave problems of internal security, food shortage and a financial deficit. Universally respected though he was, he had neither the physical strength nor the forceful personality necessary to reconcile the divisions in a pusillanimous Cabinet. The negotiations initiated in this uneasy atmosphere recalled those which led up to the conclusion in A.D. 363 of the Treaty of Dura, as to which Gibbon observes:—

“The crafty Persian delayed, under various pretences, the conclusion of the agreement, started difficulties, required explanations, suggested expedients, receded from his concessions, increased his demands, and wasted days in the arts of negotiation.”

Painful experience was to demonstrate 1,600 years later that the modern Persian has lost no whit of the cunning of his ancestors; while the laborious processes of parliamentary procedure, imperfectly understood even by the Ministers of State, caused an unexpected delay of yet another month at the last moment. The Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and a few colleagues who were not insensible to the advantages which the treaty would bring to their country did their inefficient best to pass it through a corrupt and grasping Majlis; but the determination of the Prime Minister to allow a full and free discussion of the treaty, so that no one could subsequently accuse him of having passed it through under pressure, and the fear and greed of the Deputies, so far impeded the progress of negotiations that at the end of the year the treaty itself, though initialled by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 15th December, was still far from receiving the endorsement of the National Assembly.

23. The treaty as initialled in December and as signed in the following month (for the only result of the subsequent debates in the Majlis was the addition of an annex of no great importance) contained undertakings by Great Britain and the Soviet Union to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Persia, jointly and severally to defend Persia from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power, to withdraw their troops from Persian territory not later than six months after the conclusion of hostilities or of peace, whichever should be the earlier, and to do their best to safeguard the economic existence of the Persian people against the privations and difficulties arising out of the present war. On their side, the Persian Government undertook to co-operate with the Allies in the defence of Persia, the assistance of the Persian forces being limited, however, to the maintenance of internal security on Persian territory; to give the Allies full facilities and assistance (1) for the passage of troops or supplies from one to the other, (2) in the matter of communications, and (3) in securing material and labour; and to co-operate in the censorship measures required. The Persian Government also gave the Allies the right to maintain in Persian territory land, sea and air forces in such number as they might consider necessary.

24. As originally drafted by the Foreign Office, the treaty required the assistance of the Persian forces in the defence of Persia, though only on Persian soil, but the Cabinet feared that this would frighten the population and preferred a less dignified provision restricting the rôle of the Persian army to the maintenance of internal order—a provision which only the Shah, and perhaps some army officers, seemed to consider derogatory to the Persian army. The Persian Government secured various minor amendments designed either to spare the susceptibilities of the Persian people or to compel the Allies (and particularly the Russians) not to interfere in the internal administration or with the normal economic life of the people, and they induced His Majesty's Government to reduce from twelve to six months the period during which the Allied troops must leave Persia after the war. There was much debate about article 6. Each side undertook not to adopt in its relations with foreign countries an attitude prejudicial to the other, and, in addition, the Allies undertook to consult the

Persian Government in all matters affecting the direct interests of Persia. The Persian Government tried in vain to enlarge the scope of this last provision in order to secure full representation at any peace conference or conferences. His Majesty's Government, for reasons, some of which it would not have been expedient to explain to the Persian Government (*e.g.*, the possible effect upon Egypt and Iraq), could not go so far, but the Allies did give some satisfaction to Persia in an annex which included the assurance that they would do their best to ensure that Persia should be represented on a footing of equality in any peace negotiations directly affecting her interests. An important annex (No. 2) consisted of a letter to be addressed to the British and Soviet representatives in Persia by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that the Persian Government would consider it contrary to their obligations under the clause about the attitude to be adopted towards foreign Powers, to maintain diplomatic relations with any State which was in diplomatic relations with neither of the Allied Powers. This wording was adopted so as to prevent the closing of, *e.g.*, the Netherlands Legation, whose Government was not in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, but it was defective in one important respect: it secured the closing of the Vichy Legation, but not the closing of the Japanese Legation, which had to be secured later by other means. The treaty provided for the conclusion of subsidiary agreements of an economic and financial nature. The Persian Government wished to embody in the treaty some of the favours they had in mind, but the Allied Governments would not commit themselves in advance.

24A. While the treaty negotiations were in progress the Prime Minister effected minor changes in the Government, which had been accused by the people, not without reason, of representing the old régime of oppression, corruption and subservience to the will of a despot. Popular clamour was directed even more loudly against the Majlis, on the same grounds and with even greater justification. The Prime Minister, however, hesitated to dissolve the Majlis, not only because this could not have been effected without a technical breach of the Constitution, but also because he feared that the areas in Soviet occupation might return Communist Deputies.

25. The Government that found itself responsible for the conduct of affairs after the abdication of Reza Shah had no lack of problems on its hands. It had to regularise its relations with the Allies and to struggle with the criticism released by the fall of the despot; while the problems of the food supply, the financial situation and the growing insecurity in various parts of the country gave them no respite.

26. The late Shah's short-sighted economic policy, whereby the staple occupation of the country, *viz.*, agriculture, was neglected and an ill-conceived and over-rapid programme of industrialisation was pursued without regard to its effect upon the population, had been leading up to a crisis for some years. There was already a warning sign in the winter of 1940-41, when the huge silos erected at so great expense stood empty and wheat had to be imported from India. Local wheat production had fallen off, partly because the Shah encouraged the growing of cotton and sugar-beet without increasing the supply of water, but mainly because, in order to keep down the price of bread in the towns, he fixed so low a price for the compulsory purchase of surplus stocks that the wheat-grower tended to limit sowings to his own needs. In normal times it would have been easy to make up the shortage by imports from outside, but not only was shipping short throughout the year, but there was the serious interruption resulting from the occupation by foreign troops, and by local disturbances in which grain was often stolen or hidden. Sugar, of which Persia normally used to import some 80,000 tons, was also short, because of the shipping shortage and the long distance between Persia and the normal source of supply, Java; and this shortage was accentuated by the lack of security and of internal transport after the occupation, which resulted in a reduction of the quantity of sugar beet carried to the factories. Great efforts were made by His Majesty's Government, on grounds both of humanity and of policy, to send supplies of wheat and sugar to Persia as soon as possible after the occupation, and by the end of the year they had despatched about 45,000 tons of wheat and 36,000 tons of sugar, of which about 33,000 and 15,000 tons respectively had been already landed at Persian ports. This creditable result did not prevent the Persian broadcasters from Berlin from alleging that the Allies, and especially the British, were removing food supplies from Persia, and these allegations easily secured acceptance in the suspicious minds of many Persians; and on one occasion the mistaken belief that it was the British military authorities who were removing from Hamadan wheat, which was, in fact, taken away by the Persian Government for the civil

population elsewhere, led to a hostile demonstration, in which stones were flung by Persians at British troops, who eventually had to fire, and thereby caused the death of several of the demonstrators. Publication of the facts and ocular evidence eventually weakened, if it did not eradicate, the belief that His Majesty's Government were taking the Persian's food away.

27. The financial situation was already bad at the time of the occupation. The budget for the current year was largely imaginary, and the new Minister of Finance estimated that income had been over-estimated by some 500 million rials and expenditure underestimated by a like amount. The falling-off of imports reduced seriously the yield from customs duties—a tendency which increased when the military operations of August brought about a temporary break-down in the customs and frontier administrations; while the military and political events of the period combined to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and lawlessness particularly unfavourable to the regular collection of taxes of any kind. The attitude of the Soviet authorities was also unhelpful. One of their first acts, after the occupation, was to require the Persian Government to open in their favour a credit of 80 million rials. Under the agreement concluded this sum was to be wiped off by the importation of Soviet goods for the Persian Government, but although some goods—including some wheat—were imported, the Soviet authorities sold them to merchants in order to secure rials, thereby not only leaving the credits outstanding, but also pocketing the taxes which ought to have been collected by the Persian Government. The Persian Government effected some economies, *e.g.*, by stopping work on some of the less important industrial schemes in progress, but these were offset by large increases of pay granted to the army and the civil service as an encouragement to honesty. Finding themselves in this financial morass, the Government tended to look to the Allies (especially to His Majesty's Government) to extricate them by means of vaguely-conceived financial and economic assistance to be afforded under the supplementary agreements provided for in the treaty.

28. There is one virtue that no one denies Reza Shah: in his reign law and order were maintained as never before in Persia. The roads were safe, and the severe treatment which had been meted out to the tribes and the removal of all the more important leaders to other districts kept down the tribal troubles which for many years before his accession had kept the Central Government in a chronic state of paralysis. Within a month or so the situation changed. A foreign invasion weakened the authority of the Tehran Government and of the local administrations; the gendarmerie, hated for their depredations (the harassed population made no allowance for the fact that the gendarme's wage was not enough to live on and that his officers stole a large part even of that wage), found themselves faced with growing resentment, while the authority on which it had rested was melting away; Reza Shah abdicated, and his army disintegrated; the desertion of thousands of men from the army, with their arms, supplied with modern rifles large stretches of country which had for years been almost completely disarmed; and the release by the Government of most of the tribal leaders who had been kept in Tehran in prison or under supervision, while it did credit to the reforming zeal of the Firoughi Government, created here and there centres of ambition and discontent which were full of danger to the State—a danger accentuated by the fact that one or two leaders which not even M. Firoughi had intended to release, *e.g.*, Nasir Khan of the Qashgai, managed to escape. It is not surprising that in these circumstances the roads in the unoccupied areas became unsafe. The least safe was probably the road from Isfahan to Bushire. His Majesty's Legation lent their assistance by encouraging the Government to remove the most corrupt and brutal of the gendarmerie officers and, when the law raising the pay of all public servants was finally passed, to see that the gendarmes received the increase. The rehabilitation of the army was a more serious business, and it is fortunate for the Persian Government that only in Kurdistan were its troops called upon during the first few months of the new régime to undertake serious military operations.

29. The number of men in the army had been greatly reduced by desertion during and immediately after the invasion, and the problem was how to fill the gaps. Conscription was perhaps the most deeply hated of all Persian institutions, mainly because of the corruption of the recruiting officers, and His Majesty's Legation, like very many Persians, would have liked to see it replaced by a system of voluntary recruitment. Most of the Persian officers, however, maintained that even if the army was to be reduced considerably below its former figure, it could not be maintained by voluntary recruitment;

to pay rates which would attract recruits would be too costly, and even then it would be the out-of-work in the towns who would enlist, and not the peasants, who were the best material. An attempt—no one can say how serious—was actually made to find voluntary recruits to fill some of the gaps, but only a few score men were secured in this way. The country, therefore, returned reluctantly to conscription, but owing partly to prevailing disorder, partly to the Russian refusal to allow conscription to be applied in the provinces occupied by their troops, and partly to the fact that large parts of the tribal areas were not in effective control, conscription could be applied only to the unfortunate few, and the ranks of the army were still considerably depleted at the end of the year.

30. Half-hearted efforts were made to restrict the worst abuses in the application of conscription and in the army generally; certain of the more notoriously corrupt officers of the old régime were retired; a few well-educated senior officers with relatively good moral reputations, but lacking the force of character of their unprincipled predecessors, were brought into the General Staff at Army Headquarters; and various schemes of reorganisation to suit the limited rôle of responsibility for internal security only that had been allotted to the army in the draft treaty were discussed and put on paper. The hollowness of the army's pretensions and its unworthiness of the admirable modern equipment with which it had been furnished at enormous expense to the country had been shamefully exposed by its performance in the face of Russian and British troops. No one could expect that the Persians should fight to annihilation against two powerful enemies, but that does not excuse the officers who, with some honourable exceptions, fled the field—usually in order of seniority—without thought for their men. The defects in the army were clear even to the Persians themselves. On the moral side they were an absence of a sense of duty on the part of the officers, either to their country or their men, and on the part of the soldier in the ranks dislike and distrust of his officers. On the material side there was a complete lack of services for the supply of rations or munitions to troops in action, or for the treatment and evacuation of sick and wounded.

31. Only drastic action could hope to remedy the moral defects so flagrantly exposed, but the army had been for so long a law unto itself and free from any control except that of the ex-Shah, that no Minister could be found with sufficient courage to grasp the nettle. Moreover, the young Shah, who had himself been trained as an officer and had consequently deeply felt its humiliation, was also an obstacle, for although he admitted to His Majesty's Minister that there was corruption and cruelty in the army, he was inclined to resent concrete criticism or the suggestion that his corps of officers needed heavy pruning and some exemplary punishment.

32. Appeal was made to His Majesty's Legation to assist in remedying the material defects. The most urgent need was for transport to give the army some mobility and so to avoid the necessity of maintaining large garrisons in numerous detachments in the provinces. Our military authorities were, however, too short of transport themselves to justify holding out any hope to the Persian Government of any motor vehicles being available in the near future.

33. By October the disintegration and demoralisation of the Persian forces had reached a very low level. Desertions with arms were so common that in most units the arms were kept permanently under lock and key. Sufficient reliable troops could not be found to provide parties to pursue deserters or to operate against brigands. Officers were sullen and defeatist. By the end of the year there had been some slight improvement, which showed itself in a reduction in the number of desertions and a slightly less passive attitude in the face of rebels and robbers.

34. Although there are in the army officers with sufficient technical knowledge to plan the necessary reforms and re-organisation, it was obvious that those who had the will to carry them out had little hope of success in any reasonable time without the help of a mission of foreign advisers. The main task of the latter would be to check abuses, to restore morale, to endeavour to eliminate the strong pro-German sentiments and to soothe the resentful feelings of the humiliated officers.

35. By the end of the year no progress had been made towards securing such a mission. In the army there was some strong opposition—Persian military vanity does not readily admit the need for foreign advice; but there is little doubt that a mission of, say, American officers would find considerable support within the army. Without considering possible Russian objections, it was held that a mission of British officers could effect little owing to the ill-feeling

towards the British that was regrettably common within the army. This is due to the humiliation that it had undergone and its consequent sense of inferiority; to resentment at our association with the Russians; and to its admiration for German achievements.

36. Little improvement was effected in this respect, but by the end of the year the General Staff were evolving a scheme of re-organisation into small mixed brigades which, if the necessary transport could be found, seemed well suited to present needs.

37. The necessity to define our attitude towards the tribes was made evident even before the occupation, when a Qashguli chief approached His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Shiraz and offered his services to the British Government. It was accentuated after the occupation, when signs of tribal unrest appeared immediately in Fars, Dashti and Tangistan, and above all in Southern Kurdistan, where the Persian officials fled or were ejected and the area remained in the hands of the Kurds, who not only indulged their tendency to pillage but showed clear signs of an intention to use the opportunity to keep their country free from Persian control in future. During the visit of General Wavell to Tehran at the end of September the question of our attitude to the tribes was discussed in the light of the instructions of His Majesty's Government that our object must be to get the civil administration running again. As a result of this discussion, in which the General Officer Commanding, Iraq, as well as members of the Legation staff with long experience of provincial Persia took part, it was unanimously decided that it was undesirable to encourage the tribes because a policy of encouragement would work against our attempt to keep the administration running and would involve us in family and sectional intrigues to little purpose, since serious tribal resistance to a German advance was not to be expected; and, moreover, the example of the Sheikh of Mohammerah stood as a warning against holding out to the tribes any promise of support against the central Government. It was, however, agreed that there was nothing to prevent our paying tribal leaders or elements for specific services such as handing over Germans or helping to protect the oil wells.

38. This policy was approved by His Majesty's Government, and during the rest of the year there was no reason to regret its adoption. Had there been any sign that we were encouraging the tribes it would have aroused the suspicion and hostility of the Persians, and particularly of the Persian army, who, having quelled the tribes once, did not wish to have to risk their lives in suppressing them a second time. Our attitude, which involved giving all moral support to the Persian Government in its efforts to restore order while at the same time urging them to take serious steps to remedy tribal grievances, was particularly necessary in regard to Kurdistan, where any encouragement given by us to the Kurds would also have given great offence to the Turkish Government, who, having had what almost amounted to a civil war with the Turkish Kurds a few years before, would have regarded encouragement of the Persian Kurds as a direct incitement to the Kurds in Turkey. That this is not exaggerated is proved by the suspicion and anxiety with which the Turkish Government regarded events in Azerbaijan, where they believed that the Soviet authorities were lending at least passive encouragement to the Kurds by preventing the Persian Government from using adequate armed forces to maintain order, and where the visit of a considerable number of Kurdish chiefs to Baku in response to a Soviet invitation suggested that the encouragement was to some extent positive. Towards the end of the year it seemed to His Majesty's Legation that some open step must be taken to dissociate His Majesty's Government from the claims which some of the Kurdish leaders were undoubtedly making in order to secure support, that the Kurdish movement was viewed with sympathy by the British. Accordingly, a statement was printed and eventually dropped over the areas in revolt by Persian aeroplanes, stating that the policy of His Majesty's Government was to encourage the Persian Government to restore their authority in Kurdistan while redressing all legitimate grievances of the population; and specifically denying that any support was being given to the rebel leader, Hama Rashid. This statement gave satisfaction to the Turkish and Persian Governments, though the Persians considered that our statement ought to have repudiated all the Kurdish rebels and not simply Hama Rashid. Hama (or Muhammad) Rashid was, however, the mainspring of the Kurdish revolt. He is believed to be of Iraqi origin, but he used to own considerable properties in Persian Kurdistan; these were taken from him in the time of Reza Shah and he had taken refuge in Iraq. He visited His Majesty's Embassy in Bagdad in October, where he sought for sympathy and declared that never again would the Kurds accept Persian rule, but, in spite of

the discouraging reply he received, he nevertheless entered Persia and embarked upon military operations against the Persians which were still in progress at the end of the year. These operations went rather better than we had expected, partly because an ineffective General Officer Commanding, Muqaddam, was replaced by a more active man, Shahbakhti, and partly because we not only gave no encouragement to the Kurds but, by releasing our Persian prisoners of war, by collecting and handing over to the Persians considerable quantities of rifles which had been given or sold to the population by deserting Persian troops, and by strengthening the morale of the Persian officers by our general attitude, we helped to get the Persian army on its feet again.

39. It is curious that after the efforts made by His Majesty's Government for so many decades to keep the Russians beyond the northern frontiers of Persia, a joint Anglo-Russian occupation of Persia should have been brought about mainly at the instigation of His Majesty's Government. The occupation was necessary, in order to root out the strong Axis influence in Persia and to establish communications for supplies to Russia; but the fact that the British and Russian forces were brought into direct contact, and in Persia above all places, created a situation which called for careful handling. British and Russian troops operated in Persia in the 1914-18 war, but before serious contact was established the Kerensky revolution had occurred, the Russian army was beginning to disintegrate, and a serious difference between Russian and British interests was no longer to be feared. In 1941 the situation was quite different.

40. The Russians seem to have used unduly violent measures, and to have prolonged them unnecessarily, when they occupied the Northern Provinces; they also requisitioned motor transport, both public and private, very greedily and never returned it; and they carried off about 250 Persian officers whom they eventually decided to keep in detention until the treaty should be signed; but their behaviour as an occupying Power was, on the whole, surprisingly good. The Persians were disposed to believe and to spread the wildest stories of Russian atrocities, and such incidents as the removal of the furniture from a Persian Government building, or an occasional robbery by a Red soldier during the occupation of the suburbs of Tehran, were multiplied and exaggerated by fear and malevolence. Even wilder reports seem to have been spread outside Persia, and His Majesty's Legation were called upon to report on alleged massacres of Persians and acts of sacrilege at the Shiah shrines—stories without any foundation whatsoever. Perhaps the worst feature of the Soviet occupation was the treatment of the forces of law and order. There is something to be said for the exclusion of Persian troops, whose officers were believed to be on the whole pro-German, from the areas occupied by the Soviet forces, but it is difficult to defend the Soviet policy of first disarming the gendarmerie and police and then refusing to assist in the maintenance of order on the ground that this would be interference in the internal affairs of Persia. Slowly and grudgingly the Soviet authorities gave permission for the rearmament of the gendarmerie and police, but they limited the number of both, and at Tabriz towards the end of the year they suddenly declared that the number of police at Tabriz and other towns was in excess of the agreed figure and must be reduced forthwith. The controversy on this point was still going on at the end of the year. From the economic point of view the Russian occupation was alleged by the Persian Government to be disastrous, and in spite of the fact that the Russians imported certain quantities of wheat, sugar and piece-goods for the civil population, their influence on the economic life of the country would seem to have been in the main bad. The devices which they used in order to obtain rials for which they could not have produced foreign exchange, have been described above (paragraph 27); they interpreted in a manner most advantageous to themselves the definition of "German goods," considering as still German all goods of German origin found in the customs, and as already German any goods of Persian origin, wherever found, which it had been intended to export to Germany. This led to innumerable complaints by the Persian Government, who alleged privately that the only claimants who ever obtained satisfaction were those who paid bribes to the Soviet officials concerned. The country north of the Tabriz-Tehran-Meshed line, which normally contributes about two-thirds of the total revenue of Persia, paid very little in taxes after the occupation, and this was attributed to the fact that where not occupied it was at least influenced by Soviet troops. Moreover, no wheat came to Tehran from Azerbaijan, which is in normal times one of its main sources of supply, and this blocking of the normal channel of food was certainly supported by the Soviet authorities, who alleged that there was, in fact, no surplus of wheat in Azerbaijan.

41. The Russians were naturally accused by the Persians of having political designs upon the north of Persia, at least upon Azerbaijan, though it seems unlikely that the Soviet Government would decide to remain in occupation of Azerbaijan at the end of the war, in violation of the pledges in the draft treaty, when it would be just as easy to stir up trouble in Persia at any later time and to find a humanitarian pretext for the spontaneous adhesion of Azerbaijan to the Soviet Union. There was, in fact, little sign of any coherent Soviet policy. In December the Turkish Ambassador stated that the Soviet Ambassador had declared that even after the signature of the treaty, the Government would continue to show particular interest in three questions: (1) the nationalisation of the property of the late Shah, (2) a reduction in taxation, (3) the relaxation of administrative centralisation. This statement seems to have been an echo of a similar one which M. Smirnov made to the Prime Minister soon after the occupation: on that occasion he also suggested that fresh elections ought to be held—upon a broader and more representative basis. It is natural that the Soviet Government should favour the retention by the Persian State of the lands of the late Shah, as against the policy adopted of returning them to the original owners. The third proposition might be held by the Persians to justify their suspicion that the Soviet Government had encouraged a separatist movement in Azerbaijan. That there was much talk in Tabriz against the Central Government, after the occupation, is true, but it is equally true that the rich province of Azerbaijan had always been—like other provinces—squeezed and neglected, and that at the distant sound of the Russian approach almost all the important Persian officials fled to Tehran, abandoning their offices and their human charges with complete callousness. On the other hand, the Persian Government made a good case: the Russians would not allow Persian troops to go to Tabriz or Rezaieh; they disarmed the civil security forces and, when they allowed them to be rearmed, limited their number; individual commissars encouraged the use of Turki instead of Persian, and newspapers, films, plays and concerts in Turki were provided under Soviet auspices; and, finally, a number of Kurdish chiefs were invited—pressingly, in some cases—to pay a visit to Baku. This visit was subsequently described by M. Molotov to Sir R. Bullard, who saw him in Moscow when he went there to report to the Secretary of State, as purely cultural, but it might well have aroused suspicion in more trustful people than the Persians.

42. The Soviet Government profited by the occupation to increase very considerably their consular representation in Persia. In October or November they requested permission to establish consular posts at many places, including Tabriz, Meshed and Resht in the north, and Shiraz, Bandar Abbas, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Ahwaz and Khorramshahr in the south. The position for the preceding few years had been that the Russians had one consul in Persia, at Enzeli, while the Persians had one in Russia, at Baku. The Persian Government, basing themselves on the principle of reciprocity in consular affairs, replied that consular posts at Tabriz and Meshed might be opened provided that the Persian Government was allowed to have consular posts at Tiflis and Ashkabad; and that, as for the other places, the matter would be examined. The Soviet Government eventually said that they were prepared to agree in principle to the extension of Persian consular representation in Russia, but not during the war; and they appointed consular officers to Tabriz and Meshed, and then requested authorisation for consular posts in what they described as the "second group" of places, which included only two in the south, viz., Ahwaz and Kermanshah. The Persian Government had to give way. The Foreign Office, while, like the Government of India, apprehensive about the spread of Soviet influence in Persia, decided that since we already had about a dozen consular posts in Persia when the Russians had had only one, it was for the Persians, not for us, to counter the Russian demands by an appeal to the principle of reciprocity. By the end of the year the Soviet Consulate at Kermanshah was being opened and a representative of the Soviet Trade Delegation had appeared at Ahwaz.

43. Anglo-Soviet relations were—all things considered—quite good. His Majesty's Minister was fortunate in that, just at the beginning of the Russo-German war, the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, a railway engineer who had never been known to make any but purely conventional remarks to any diplomatic colleague, was replaced by an able and agreeable young man, M. Smirnov, who had spent several years in Berlin, first as assistant press attaché, and later as counsellor to the Soviet Embassy. In Meshed the Soviet military authorities showed the deepest suspicion of His Majesty's Consul-General, to such an extent that an appeal for co-operation had to be made to the Soviet Government by

Mr. Eden, though before the instructions from Moscow, which were eventually sent, could reach Meshed, the attitude of the Soviet military authorities there had altered completely on the arrival from India of the first consignment of jute and shellac for Russia by the Zahidan route. General Novikov, who was in command of the Soviet troops in the west, though blandly evasive whenever his British comrades-in-arms asked for information, was personally full of friendliness and hospitality. The Soviet troops, both officers and men, seem to have been astounded at the easy and friendly relations existing between the officers and men in the British and Indian forces; it was obvious that the opinions instilled into them by official Soviet propaganda was badly shaken. The Soviet authorities, however, found much in our official actions to feed their suspicions. It was unfortunate that the fact that the Russians are suspicious had apparently not been communicated to the British military and air authorities. Representatives of the air command would arrive, sometimes unannounced, with the statement that they were going to reconnoitre the aerodromes in the Soviet zone; a party of British journalists and photographers from Bagdad went to Azerbaijan without seeking the permission of the Soviet authorities; and, finally, three British officers with four lorries filled with Indian troops arrived at Tabriz from Bagdad, unannounced, to reconnoitre the roads in the Russian zone up to the Soviet frontier, and had to be ignominiously withdrawn in the face of Russian objection. The argument of the British authorities responsible for these incidents seems to be that, since the object in every case was the promotion of the common cause, the Soviet authorities had no need to worry or object. The answer to this is that the Soviet authorities considered themselves capable of reconnoitring their own roads and aerodromes, and probably, not having been allowed by their Government to forget the "intention" of Great Britain and other Powers after the last war, regarded our curiosity on the subject as likely to be directed against the Soviet Union as much as against Germany. At one moment the Government of India became slightly alarmed at the advance of Russian troops to the south of Meshed and secured the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of a proposal to send at least a token force to Zabul or possibly Birjand should it prove necessary, the Russians, however, withdrew so the project was not carried into effect.

44. About a month after the occupation the economic state of Persia seemed to be so unfavourably affected by local Soviet policy that His Majesty's Minister suggested that a permanent commission should be set up in Tehran with British and Persian members to deal with all non-military questions arising out of the occupation. The Soviet Ambassador declared himself to be in favour of this scheme personally, but was obviously unwilling to take action. What was wanted, in Sir R. Bullard's opinion, was a Soviet commissar with wide powers to undo the knots tied by Soviet stupidity and fear of responsibility. This proposal was supported by His Majesty's Government, but the Soviet Government preferred to leave such matters to the British and Soviet representatives in Tehran to deal with. It is possible that the Soviet Government feared to find themselves in a permanent minority in such a tripartite committee, and, indeed, great discretion would have been required on the part of the British representative. In point of fact, His Majesty's Minister avoided all Persian attempts to drag His Majesty's Government into Soviet-Persian disputes, though at times His Majesty's Secretary of State had to bring arguments to bear upon M. Maisky in order to effect an improvement in the behaviour of the Russians in Persia. The British in Persia were doing their best to assist the Soviet effort by pushing through the largest possible quantity of goods. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, whose original business had been to buy up goods of which the enemy had urgent need, now set up a huge road-transport organisation for the carriage of goods to Russia. Skilled railway officials from India and elsewhere were despatched to Persia soon after the occupation: by the end of the year they had already effected great changes for the better in railway administration, and large numbers of workshops and operational personnel were on the way, and locomotives and wagons were beginning to arrive. An enormous scheme of road repair and improvement was embarked upon, on routes by which goods could be carried to Russia. The quantity of goods carried in 1941, however, was not so great as to arouse any lively gratitude in the Soviet authorities. Indeed, they were inclined to gird at real or imaginary delays, and the Soviet railway commission was manoeuvring to try to obtain a larger, if not a preponderant, share in the management of the north-to-south railway.

45. In mid-October a secret message was received from the new Shah, saying that he would like to see His Majesty's Minister fairly often, alone and

without the knowledge of the politicians: he felt that some of his Ministers distorted the truth for their own ends, and mentioned various constitutional and administrative questions on which he would like Sir R. Bullard's advice. He wished, he said, to have the support of the British Empire and to work in close agreement with His Majesty's Legation with the greatest discretion. His Majesty's Minister replied that, while he would ask for instructions, he was sure that it would not be possible for him to be received without the knowledge of the Persian Cabinet and of the Soviet Ambassador. The Shah then sent word that he realised the difficulty for a Minister, but hoped that the counsellor might see him—say twice a week. His Majesty's Minister reported to the Foreign Office, saying that while he sympathised with the Shah's wish to learn how best to serve his country, that object could not be attained by the attachment of the Shah to one Power exclusively. Sir R. Bullard foresaw obvious objections to frequent visits, whether secret or open: the Shah would tend to regard His Majesty's Government more and more as a bulwark against Soviet Russia, and on the other hand might be encouraged to feel that he understood public business and to intervene in the affairs of Government. The Shah had yet to consolidate his position, though criticism was dying down, and should follow a non-political rôle. If he became publicly identified with His Majesty's Government he would suffer for our real or alleged mistakes and we for his; our relations with the Persian Government would be embarrassed, and the Soviet Government would have ground for their so far baseless suspicions and might set dangerous forces in motion. Sir R. Bullard concluded by suggesting that the Shah should see all foreign representatives and all foreigners of distinction, so that if he happened to see the British rather more often than others, it would hardly be noticeable. This policy was approved by the Foreign Office. In fact the Shah did see His Majesty's Minister and the counsellor, for one good reason or another, several times before the end of the year, besides giving to the military attaché an audience at which he talked very frankly. He did not, unfortunately, adopt the practice of seeing the heads of other foreign missions and so missed an opportunity to get a more general conception of world affairs. Whenever he did see the head of a foreign mission he made a good impression. He showed perhaps disproportionate interest in the army, but this was natural in view of his own army service and of the importance which his father had attached to military affairs. In foreign politics he showed his wisdom, firstly in accepting wholeheartedly the necessity to work with the Allies, and secondly in maintaining that his Government were harming their own cause as well as that of their allies, by their failure to support it by active pro-Ally propaganda.

46. The Berlin broadcasts in Persian continued to exercise a great influence upon the classes of the population which have access to wireless receivers, and news items from Axis sources continued to appear in the local press, though in a much smaller proportion than before the occupation. It was thought better to reduce the proportion gradually rather than to stop all Axis news in the press at once. The treaty provided for the establishment of a complete tripartite censorship. The official application of this provision had to await the signature of the treaty in January 1942, but a complete scheme for the censorship was sanctioned, early in November, and although the Chief British Censor did not arrive until the 30th December, and then without any staff, a good beginning was made unofficially with the control of telegrams and the Persian Government even agreed, though with some reluctance, to abandon completely all wireless communication with Axis countries. With the assistance of a succession of volunteer helpers a censorship of outgoing press messages was set up, and if that did not work to the complete satisfaction of the foreign journalists, this may be attributed partly to the fact that messages are bound to be delayed and often badly blue-pencilled which have to run the gauntlet of three separate censors, one of whom is Russian and another Persian. So much for the negative influences on public opinion, in the Allied interest. On the positive side efforts were being made which were to convert into a large Public Relations Bureau what had been the office of one overworked press attaché.

47. At the end of 1941 Mr. Firoughi, who had been called in by Reza Shah immediately after the Allied invasion of Persia, was still in power. Ill-health and a scholarly disinclination for the rough-and-tumble of political life would probably have led him to resign, but for a disinterested patriotism rare among Persians, which induced him to stay in power in order to carry the treaty through. Being naturally in favour of democratic institutions, and having been one of the principal opponents of the despotism set up by Reza Shah, he

considered himself bound to work with the Majlis and above all not to force them to pass the treaty or even to cut down the maximum period allowed by the Majlis for discussion. He was, however, completely disillusioned by the attitude of the deputies, who were in fact below even the Persian average. For years no free elections had taken place: the form was gone through, but the candidates were nominees of Reza Shah's and were never opposed. Few of them would have been elected but for the Shah's orders, and many were dishonest time-servers of a low type. All of them had served merely to countersign anything sent to them by the Shah for "discussion," and it was revolting to see the passion for liberty which seized these former sycophants now that it could be indulged in without danger. Bills of great urgency, such as the Hoarding Bill and the Bill for the Return of the late Shah's Estates to the Original Owners, made very slow progress, mainly because of the personal interest of many of the deputies, and the attitude towards the treaty was timorous and pettifogging. It was too much to hope that men chosen by Reza Shah for their subversion would now show independence in face of the general attitude of the Persian public, which was pro-German rather than pro-Ally. The great Russian offensive which began in December, and especially the recovery of Rostov by the Russians, together with the entry of the United States into the war, afforded something to daunt our enemies and hearten our friends, but the early successes of the Japanese were an influence on the other side, and it was not surprising that with the issue of the war still uncertain the unheroic Persians should do their best not to commit themselves.

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 2186/19/34]

No. 13.

(No. 87.)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 8.)
HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 11 for the period the 11th to 17th March, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, March 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 13.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 11 for the Period
March 11-17, 1942.*

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE new Cabinet and its programme received an almost unanimous vote of approval in the Majlis on the 12th March. The Deputies were, it seems, a little ashamed of their previous exhibition of capriciousness and irresponsibility; and a little frightened of the possible results of their demonstration of their own unfitness for democratic government. They are well aware that there are aspirants to another dictatorship.

2. The change of Government cannot be interpreted as an indication of public displeasure with the treaty, as the new Prime Minister was, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, intimately connected with the treaty negotiations. He intends to retain the portfolio of the Interior, but to hand over that of Foreign Affairs when the nominee he has in view, who is believed to be one of the Persian representatives now abroad, reaches Tehran. Ali Soheily is a man of some courage and energy, untroubled by too fine scruples. He starts with the advantage *vis-à-vis* his own countrymen of having formed his Government without being influenced by foreign pressure.

3. The programme of the Government, as published in the press, is as follows:—

- (i) In foreign policy, while upholding the interests of the country, to implement all the treaties in force and particularly to collaborate closely with those Governments whose interests are linked with those of Persia.
- (ii) The reform of laws with a view to ensuring a more complete juridical security, and of other laws not consistent with actualities.
- (iii) The reform and strengthening of the organisation of the army and security forces.
- (iv) To make every possible effort to assure food supplies.
- (v) To overhaul economic and financial affairs, taxation and expenditure, commercial regulations, and to ensure budgetary equilibrium.
- (vi) To pay particular attention to agriculture, to the improvement of the condition of peasants, to the extension of irrigation; to effecting a gradual reduction in the cultivation and use of opium.
- (vii) The improvement of national industries and of the living conditions of the working classes.
- (viii) Reform of the political division of the country; development of local self-government.
- (ix) Development of national education and endeavour to improve the moral level of the nation.
- (x) Development of the organisation of the Ministry of Health.

In his speech introducing this programme the Prime Minister particularly stressed his concern with public health, security and the supply of food. These, he said, would receive the first attention of the Government.

Press.

4. A number of new papers have appeared expressing sentiments and policies of every kind, even friendliness to Great Britain. The demand for an improvement in security and for a higher sense of public responsibility is general, and the sterling-rial exchange continues to be of considerable interest. The opinion that Persia is acquiring more sterling than can be of immediate value to her is widely held by the public.

Appointments.

5.—(i) The late Prime Minister, Mr. Feroughi, has been appointed Minister of the Court. He should be a wise counsellor to the Shah.

(ii) Mr. Sadjadi (M.A. 248/A; F.O. 183), formerly Minister of Ways and Communications, has been appointed Mayor of Tehran.

Economic.

6. The food situation remains serious in many parts of the country. Prices of sugar and of wheat in particular are extremely high in spite of Government control, as, owing to shortage of Government stocks, a black market prevails for those who can afford it. Inefficiency and corruption greatly aggravate the existing shortage, which is at present the main cause of discontent and of anti-British sentiment. Announcements in the press of the considerable quantities of wheat imported by the British authorities have no favourable effect on people who experience only high prices and scarcity.

Internal Security.

General.

7. Except in Fars, Bakhtiari and parts of Khuzestan, there have been few reports of disorder. In the provinces of Khorassan, Kerman, Mazandaran and in Eastern Azerbaijan the situation has improved. Kermanshah is quiet and Kurdistan has produced no new developments except a minor skirmish between Persian forces from Diwandarreh and Kurds, which is said to have resulted in the dispersal of the latter.

Fars.

8. The road between Shiraz and Bushire is disturbed. There have been minor robberies, some shooting at lorries and a few hold-ups. There is as yet no reason to believe that these incidents have any political significance. But there is general unrest and anxiety lest there should be an increase of disorder when

the tribes migrate in the spring. Nasir Qashgai (see Summary No. 4/42, paragraph 11) and the Government are still temporising with each other. If he were dealt with firmly now, he would probably submit, but further delay may encourage him to defiance. He has been promised the support of certain disgruntled Kalantars of sub-tribes and there are always sections of the tribe ready to create trouble. But, as far as present information goes of the four main sub-tribes, the Darashuri and Shishbuluki are not anxious to be forced into opposition to the Government. Some of the Kashquli chiefs are said to have promised to support Nasir, but it is doubtful whether the majority of the Kashqulis will wish to get involved. The attitude of the Farsimadan is not yet clear. The Qashgai tribes have not more than 2,000 rifles, probably less, and a very limited amount of ammunition. They are offering huge prices for both.

9. Concentrations of the very troublesome Boir Ahmadi tribe are reported near Ardakan (58 miles north-west of Shiraz). The report mentioned in Summary No. 8/42, paragraph 10, that a military post at Tal Khosrovi (1-inch map sheet H.39.J) had been attacked and disarmed has been confirmed. The Boir Ahmadi have also been robbing in South-Eastern Khuzestan. There are reliable reports that they have been in communication with Nasir Khan, although the distance between them is great and they have not usually collaborated with the Qashgai. A circumstantial report has also been received that certain German agents, accompanied by one of the Boir Ahmadi chiefs who was under detention in Tehran, left Tehran recently with rifles, ammunition and money for the Boir Ahmadi. This report has been confirmed except as regards the German agents and the destination of the arms, &c.

Bakhtiari.

10. In Bakhtiari there are unusual movements, signs of restlessness and many rumours of impending trouble, but there is not yet sufficient evidence to allow of an appreciation of probabilities. It is not impossible that the rumours are put about and the signs of restlessness created by the khans themselves, some of whom are endeavouring to persuade the Government that the situation in Bakhtiari requires the restoration of the khans to their old position of authority, and all of whom are agitating for the return of their lands.

11. For a report regarding the possibilities of combined action by tribal leaders, see Summary No. 8/42, paragraph 6.

British Interests.

12. There has been a noticeable increase in anti-British and pro-Axis propaganda since the fall of Singapore and Rangoon, these defeats having greatly encouraged Axis sympathisers. The propaganda is mainly verbal; wherever it originates, it is spread by ordinary bazaar gossip.

13. Sir A. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador-Designate to Russia, left Tehran by air for Kuibyshev on the 13th March.

14. The railway line from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr has now reached Mile 34.

Russian Interests.

15. The first convoy of goods for Russia by the Nokkundi-Meshed road reached Meshed on the 2nd March.

16. Over 800 American lorries have been delivered to the Russians in Tehran.

Italian Interests.

17. The Swiss Legation has taken charge of Italian interests from the Japanese Legation.

Chinese Interests.

18. The Chinese Minister to Turkey is expected to reach Tehran shortly to establish diplomatic and commercial relations between Persia and China.

Dutch Interests.

19. Baron von Aerssen Beyeren, Dutch Minister in Tehran, has left Persia to take up a similar appointment in Australia. M. Brauw, recently Dutch Consul in India, is now chargé d'affaires.

Tehran, March 17, 1942.

[E 2214/19/34]

No. 14.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 93.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period the 18th to 24th March, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, March 24, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 14.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the Period
March 18 to 24, 1942.*

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Economic.

THE Minister of Finance has presented his budget for the year 1942-43 to the Majlis. He has estimated revenue at 3,134 million rials and expenditure at 3,132 million rials. He states that he has estimated for the maximum probable revenue and the minimum probable expenditure. Compared to the previous year, receipts are down by 479 million rials and expenditure by 1,191 million rials.

2. A commission has been formed of officials of the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance and Interior to consider and execute such measures as are necessary to ensure adequate sowing while there is yet time. The Agricultural Bank has been authorised to give an advance of 3 million rials for the purchase of spring wheat.

3. The Majlis has passed a Bill which is designed to prevent hoarding, cornering and speculating in necessities. The intention is good; the execution unfortunately depends on venal departmental officials.

4. The press has recently published articles stressing the need for careful consumption and maximum production of food-stuffs, for the reason that imports by sea may be made impossible by the Japanese.

5. Some pressure is being brought on the Government by the press and public criticism to persuade them to cease the purchase of sterling until the amounts accumulated have been spent on goods to be imported.

Royal Family.

6. The Queen returned from Cairo on the 18th March.

Appointments—Civil.

7. The following appointments have been announced:—

- (i) Mubasir Roshanan to be Farmandar of Ardebil.
- (ii) Hussein Ali Said Nairi, now Farmandar of Turbat-i-Haidari, to be Farmandar of Quchan.
- (iii) Shahrukh Nairi to be Farmandar of Bujnurd.
- (iv) Karim Izadpaneh to be Farmandar of Turbat-i-Haidari.
- (v) Morteza Quli Khan Bakhtiari (M.A. 60; F.O. 49), son of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, to be Governor of Bakhtiari.

Persian Forces.

8. The Majlis has approved the Bill authorising the payment to the dependants of officers and men killed in the Anglo-Russian invasion of pensions equivalent to the rates of pay being drawn by the deceased at the time of his death (see Summary No. 5/42, paragraph 3).

Appointments—Military.

9. Sarlashkar Riazi, from Deputy Chief of the General Staff to be Under-Secretary of State for War (see Summary No. 22/41, paragraph 17).

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Sartip Seifullah Shihab, from Director of the IIInd Bureau of the General Staff to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

Sartip Mohamed Hussein Firuz (M.A. 94; F.O. 75) to be General Officer Commanding the Fars Division, *vice* Sartip Siahpush. It is understood that he is to become Governor-General in addition.

10. With possibly serious disturbances impending in Fars, Bakhtiari (possibly affecting the oil-fields area and the railway) and Kurdistan, the Persian General Staff are hard put to it to find the necessary troops. They are unable to take advantage of the permission of the Russians to send a brigade to Tabriz and have to content themselves with a skeleton staff and the cadre of an infantry regiment. The troops they have are in many cases unreliable and they are very largely recruits. The sentiments of a number of the officers remain strongly pro-Axis and anti-British. They are consequently not disposed to take effective action in the protection of what they may consider to be British interests.

Internal Security.

Khorassan (see Summary No. 10/42, paragraph 4).

11. Saulat-es-Sultaneh has informed the Persian authorities that he is willing to surrender if given a guarantee of life.

Azerbaijan.

12. With the arrival of Persian troops in Ardebil (see Summary No. 9/42, paragraph 4, last sub-paragraph), Eastern Azerbaijan appears to have settled down. The Russians have now agreed that Persian troops may be sent to Tabriz. Owing to lack of troops, only a token force can be sent.

Kurdistan.

13. There are no further developments.

Khuzestan.

14. There are disturbances around Gach Saran, of which details have not yet been received. These are probably connected with the unrest among the Bakhtiaris and Boir Ahmadi reported in Summary No. 11/42, paragraphs 9 and 10.

Fars.

15. Although no serious incidents have been reported during the week, the situation remains very unsatisfactory. Nasir Qashqai has again refused an invitation, accompanied by a guarantee of his liberty, to come to Shiraz to discuss the question of his lands. He has now moved from his quarters near Firuzabad to the country north-west of Kazarun, where he can get into touch with the Kashquli, Darashuri and Boir Ahmadi.

16. It is now confirmed (see Summary No. 11/42, paragraph 9) that the Boir Ahmadi chief who broke away from Tehran was Abdullah, son of the late notorious Shukrullah. He was accompanied by Hussein Quli Mamassenni, son of the late Imam Quli, and by Abdul Qasim Bakhtiari, son of Amir Mufakham. All of them were under detention, although not imprisoned, in Tehran, and their escape and their return to their tribes will probably lead to an increase of disturbance.

Bakhtiari.

17. The appointment of Morteza Quli Khan as Governor of Bakhtiari (see paragraph 7 (v) above) is in the long view a retrograde step forced on the Persian Government by their weakness, and particularly that of their forces. The restoration of tribal chiefs to positions of authority in their own tribes cannot in the long run be in the interests of Persia. The immediate effect in Bakhtiari will probably be good and to the advantage of British short-term policy. Morteza Quli Khan has never shown any particular pro-British sentiments, but he is probably the most influential of the Bakhtiari Khans and his interests lie with the preservation of order owing to his considerable wealth, some of which consists of land in the vicinity of Tehran. But his appointment at this moment, when there was disturbance and disorder in Bakhtiari, may encourage other chiefs, such as Nasir Qashqai, to provoke similar conditions in the hope that they may result in a similar solution.

British Interests.

Goods to Russia.

18. The weight of goods for Russia carried by road transport by the U.K.C.C. is as follows:—

From Andimeshk to Pahlevi and Tabriz—

	Tons.
In January	8,407
In February	7,858
1st-18th March	2,747

19. Up to the end of February 756 trucks for Russia had been assembled at Bushire, of which 263 had carried 400 tons of mixed goods for Russia to Tehran.

20. The U.K.C.C. has now 1,200 trucks under contract, of which 400 are out of action owing to lack of tyres and spares.

21. Russians in Tehran have been openly expressing discontent, particularly to Americans, with the delay in the erection of the lorry assembly plant at Andimeshk. The Russians appear to believe that the fault lies with the British.

Evacuation of Poles.

22. Owing to shortage of food in Russia, a considerably greater number of Poles is to be evacuated through Persia than was originally intended. If the Russian authorities carry out the programme which they have agreed upon with the Polish authorities in Russia, 40,000 Poles will reach Pahlevi between the 27th March and the 2nd April.

Russian Interests.

23. Although the Russians have agreed to a Persian garrison at Tabriz, they maintain their refusal to have Persian troops at Rezaieh (Urumieh). They have, it seems, hinted to the Persian Minister for War that this is because they are uncertain of the Turks, and consequently want no troops along that border but their own.

Tehran, March 24, 1942.

[E 2522/19/34]

No. 15.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 100.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the period the 25th-31st March, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, March 31, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the Period
March 25 to 31, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE new Government has not yet shown any greater capacity for making up its mind than its predecessor. Urgent problems, such as the critical shortage of currency, tribal policy, the disposal of expropriated lands, are still the subject of inconclusive arguments between conflicting, but undecided, views. A declaration of tribal policy is promised in the near future.

2. Generally, it may be said that almost everyone in Persia—Government officials, tribal chiefs—is playing for time: endeavouring to postpone any definite action until it is known what the spring will bring forth.

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Economic.

3. The shortage of currency has become critical and, unless an extra issue of notes is made, banks will have to close in the near future. A reserve of notes is available, but the Government pretends to be unable to justify its issue. Various measures for forcing the hand of the Government are now under consideration.

Internal Security.

Khorassan (see paragraph 11 of Summary No. 12/42).

4. Following a convergent movement of Persian troops on Soulat-us-Sultaneh's refuge at Kalat-i-Nadiri, he has gone to Bajgiran to negotiate the terms of surrender with General Nakhchevan.

Azerbaijan (see paragraph 12 of Summary No. 12/42).

5. The Soviet authorities have not yet agreed to the despatch of troops to Rezaieh. Owing to shortage of strength, those sent to Tabriz will consist of an infantry battalion cadre and a skeleton divisional headquarters only.

Kurdistan (see paragraph 13 of Summary No. 12/42).

6. General Shahbakhti has returned to Kermanshah and has resumed command of the Kurdistan operations. Persian troops are said to have advanced again to within 12 miles of Saqqiz and a clash between them and the rebels would seem imminent.

Khuzistan (see paragraph 14 of Summary No. 12/42).

7. Further unrest in the Gach Saran area is reported and the Persian troops have attacked a Boir Ahmadi tribal encampment in the A.I.O.C. area, killing several people, including women. As a result, the tribal situation is likely to deteriorate in this area.

Fars.

8. Nasir Qashqai is still endeavouring to meet British officials, but has so far refused to come to Shiraz to meet Persian officials. A force has been despatched to Ardakan to deal with a new Boir Ahmadi threat to that place.

Dashti.

9. The incompetent Colonel Ahenin has been relieved of the command of the forces operating against Ali Ismail. No rifles have been collected and the withdrawal of the force to Khormuj and subsequent inaction seem to imply that the settling of this affair has made no progress.

Road Security in Fars: Bushire and Shiraz Road.

10. As a result of a recent tour of inspection, certain causes of the present insecurity have been noticed. They are briefly:—

- (i) Lack of strength: about 1,500 men short in Fars and about eighty short on the section Bushire-Shiraz.
- (ii) Lack of mobility: no striking force or force for hot pursuit can be organised.
- (iii) Lack of any means of inter-communication between gendarmerie (Amnieh) posts.
- (iv) Inertia of Amnieh personnel, due to long periods on detachment with no inspection by their officers to ascertain their welfare or their efficiency.
- (v) Low morale of Amnieh, who now are concerned chiefly with protecting themselves and their posts rather than traffic on the road.
- (vi) Lack of any system of effective patrolling or picqueting.
- (vii) Lack of liaison and co-operation between army and Amnieh, due to their being under separate Ministries, i.e., War and Interior.

Persian Officials.

- 11.—(i) Ibrahim Qawam, Qawam-ul-Mulk (M.A. 231) (F.O. 169), returned with his family to Tehran on the 28th March from India.
- (ii) Muhammed Ali Humayunjah, Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has been appointed Under-Secretary of State in that Ministry.

*British Interests.**Evacuation of Poles.*

12. The evacuation of Poles from Russia has begun, but instead of this being at the rate of 2,500 a week, as had been originally proposed, the Soviet authorities decided at very short notice that 40,000 Poles would be landed at Pahlevi at the rate of 3,000–5,000 a day, beginning on the 26th March. These Poles belong to the 8th, 9th and 10th Polish Divisions and also include the personnel of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the Army Artillery School, the Army Tank School and the Reinforcement Depot. They are to be followed after an interval by a further 40,000–50,000 Poles, made up of Poles from Russian labour battalions and camps and other sources. Information has also been received that it is the intention of the Soviet authorities to evacuate to Persia about 12,000 Polish civilians, largely women and children.

13. This sudden change of Soviet policy is believed to be due mainly to shortage of food in Russia, but partly to Russian anticipations that there would be delays in the promised equipment and arming of Polish divisions in Russia.

14. Owing to various unavoidable bottle-necks, it will be impossible to evacuate the Poles from Persia as fast as they arrive. Consequently it is necessary to form large holding camps at Pahlevi and Tehran. Arrangements are being made to accommodate 15,000 in Tehran.

Railways.

15. Sixty-four miles of the railway from Nok Kundi to Mirjawa had been completed by the 27th February.

Tehran, March 31, 1942.

[E 2682/19/34]

No. 16.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 109.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the period the 1st–7th April, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, April 7, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the Period April 1–7, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government, who laboured long over it, has at last announced a so-called tribal policy. It is a very small mouse. It makes vague promises of improvements in education, medical services, administration, and undertakes to examine complaints and remedy injustices. It makes no reference to special tribal problems and indicates quite clearly that the Government has no tribal policy. In the hope of finding one, it has now appointed a commission, which is to include some alleged experts on tribal affairs. The real problem is whether authority over the tribes is to be restored to tribal chiefs or to be exercised through Government officials. The former solution is a reversal of the policy consistently followed by Reza Shah, who successfully substituted his own tyranny for that practised for many years by tribal chiefs. Tribesmen who have experienced both are probably not unanimous in their preference. The solution they would choose is no authority at all. The Government is very loath to take the first steps towards a return of the conditions of twenty years ago—with some reason, as is shown by the history of Fars from, say, 1910 to 1920. On the other hand, they feel that the situation is getting out of hand; their generals tell them that the troops are unreliable; firmness is a quality not yet developed in a constitutional Government in Persia; and they may take this retrograde step and let future Governments pay the price.

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Economic (see Summary No. 13/42, paragraph 3).

2. The Government, under strong pressure from His Majesty's Minister, rushed a Bill through the Majlis authorising a further issue of notes to the value of 700 million rials. There has been public criticism and anxiety lest this means inflation. The Minister of Finance and the press have made reasonable statements explaining that the issue is fully justified by the increase in value of the cover (gold, silver and Crown jewels) available, and these have had some effect. Profiteers are, however, making the additional note issue a pretext for raising prices.

3. The Government has imposed a ban on the purchase of all foreign exchange by the banks. They propose that British Government requirements in rials should be provided by a credit of 400 million rials, to which account will be credited the value of goods supplied from the sterling area. This matter is under discussion.

4. The food situation remains critical in many of the country districts, notably in parts of Khuzestan and South-East Persia, where very severe conditions prevail. Some towns are living from hand to mouth, but impending crises have been averted just in time in most cases. It is believed that wheat is still being hoarded, but with the approach of the new harvest, which, it is hoped, will be up to the average, hoarded stores should soon appear on the market.

5. The influx of 45,000 Poles has greatly increased anxiety regarding the food situation. Although these are being supplied by the British military authorities with imported wheat, sugar and tea, other articles of food, such as meat, vegetables and fruit and fuel, are being purchased locally on a limited market. This is undoubtedly causing hardship to the local population and complaints are already loud.

6. The Minister of Finance in an interview with the press stated that since September 1941 imports of wheat from the sterling area has been 40,798 tons at a cost of £630,355, and that other goods had been imported to a value of about £600,000.

Air Services.

7. The Persian Government has announced its intention to inaugurate air mail services between Tehran on the one hand and Kermanshah, Meshed, Tabriz and Bushire on the other. It is doubtful whether this programme will be implemented in full, but the service to Kermanshah is due to begin at once.

Appointments—Civil.

8.—(i) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Firuz to be Ustandar of Fars (see paragraph 9 of Summary No. 12/42) in addition to commanding the Fars Division.

(ii) Ali Akbar Assadi to be Farmandar of Nishapur.

(iii) Ali Ashgar Musavvir Rehmani to be Farmandar of Bam.

(iv) Buzurg Ibrahim to be Farmandar of Rezaieh.

(v) Amir Asad to be Farmandar of Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh). He is a prominent Kurd of the Mukri tribe.

(vi) Abu Talib Shirvani to be Director of the Department of Publicity and Propaganda.

(vii) Hasan Isfandiari Haji Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh (M.A. 97) (F.O. 125) has been re-elected President of the Majlis.

Internal Security.

Fars.

9. The situation has not outwardly changed. There has been no increase in disorder except on the part of the Boir Ahmadi, but it may be assumed that Nasir Qashqai has been endeavouring to strengthen his position with a view to defying the Government if they should challenge him. The Government's policy remains quite indefinite.

Boir Ahmadi.

10. This tribe is living up to its old reputation for lawlessness and truculence. A section of them who winter in Khuzestan attempted to blackmail the A.I.O.C. with a demand for a large sum of money, backed by threats of an attack on Gach Saran. As was reported in Summary No. 13/42, paragraph 7, they were attacked by Persian forces, who, after some desultory fighting, appear

to have caught up and fired on the main body of the section, which included women, of whom three were killed. There were other casualties among the tribesmen. Apprehensions were expressed lest the tribesmen might attempt to take their revenge by attacking the A.I.O.C. at Gach Saran, so a battalion of British troops has been sent there. There is no evidence yet whether the effect of the action of the Persian forces will be locally salutary or provocative.

11. Other sections of the tribe are reported to have surrounded and to be attacking Ardalan (58 miles north-west of Shiraz), and raiding parties have attacked traffic on the Shiraz-Isfahan road near Yazdikhast. An increase in Boir Ahmadi lawlessness was anticipated in Summary No. 12/42, paragraph 16, when the escaped chiefs joined the tribe. In addition to Abdullah, son of Shukrullah, Hussein Quli Mamasseni and the son of a famous old Boir Ahmadi brigand, Sartip Khan, are reported to be in the vicinity of Ardalan, where they are likely to be joined by Ali and Vali, who have been creating trouble in the south.

Bakhtiari.

12. The appointment of Morteza Quli Khan to be Governor of Bakhtiari has not yet taken effect. Morteza Quli is being wayward and has again increased his demands. It seems doubtful now whether he will accept the appointment on any reasonable terms. Meanwhile, although there are many reports of what the Bakhtiari could do and might do, nothing very much is happening. The general impression is that the majority of the tribesmen want to be left in peace. This does not mean that they cannot be stirred up. A report, for which there is probably some basis of truth, says that a detachment of Persian troops of some thirty men was disarmed at Luzdegan in the Janiki Sardsir, 70 miles south-west of Isfahan. The leader in this affair is said to have been Abdul Qasim Bakhtiari, who was reported in Summary No. 12/42, paragraph 16, to have broken away from detention in Tehran.

Kurdistan.

13. The rebel Kurds are reported to have evacuated Saqqiz and to have withdrawn towards Baneh. This is reported in the Persian press as a great success for the Persian army. There may have been some skirmishing with the rebels, but there is no immediate intention of reoccupying Saqqiz with Persian forces. It is reported from Tabriz that an emissary from Hama Rashid had arrived there saying that the latter was ready to discuss terms of peace.

Khorassan.

14. Soulat-es-Sultaneh is reported to have surrendered and to be on his way under escort to the capital.

Persian Forces.

Morale.

15. In the south a spirit of defeatism seems to be spreading among Persian troops. As the tribes grow bolder, the army grows more pusillanimous. Several small detachments have surrendered their arms without excuse. The generals of the Isfahan and Fars Divisions, believing that they hear the rumblings of coming trouble in the Bakhtiari, Boir Ahmadi and Qashqai tribes, have reported that their troops, being locally conscripted, cannot be relied upon to fight against local tribes. This is a pretext, as only a small proportion of the Fars and Isfahan troops are enlisted from the tribes mentioned. The generals in question have been relieved. The fault lies entirely with the officers, many of whom, apart from their natural dislike of any hardship, are influenced by their pro-Axis sentiments and by enemy propaganda against taking any action that might be helpful to the British. There are many indications that the attitude of young officers is very hostile.

Appointments—Military.

16.—(i) Sartip Abdur Reza Afkhami (M.A. 2) (F.O. 2) to be Military Governor of Tehran.

(ii) Sartip Mehdi Quli Tajbaksh (M.A. 209) (F.O. 291) to be General Officer Commanding the South-Western Division (Lurestan and Khuzestan).

(iii) Sartip Zahidi Fazlullah (M.A. 303) (F.O. 217) to be General Officer Commanding the Isfahan Division.

The Persian Royal Family.

17. According to the *Journal de Tehran*, the ex-Shah is not in good health in Mauritius. The following from his entourage have left Mauritius for Persia:—

- H.M. Ismat-ul-Maluk, wife of Reza Shah.
- H.H. Prince Hamid Reza, sixth son of Reza Shah.
- H.H. Princess Fatimeh Pahlavi, third daughter of Reza Shah.
- H.H. Shamsul Maluk, eldest daughter of Reza Shah.
- Faridun Jam, son-in-law of Reza Shah.

*Polish Interests.**Evacuation of Poles from Russia.*

18. Up to the 3rd April 34,828 Poles had landed at Pahlevi. These included 27,428 men and 1,075 women for the military forces, and 6,325 civilian refugees. Of these, 7,032 of the former and 3,864 of the latter had reached Tehran by the 4th April. The Poles of military age who have reached Tehran are in very good spirits and, on the whole, in very fair physical condition. They appear to be excellent material.

19. The disinfecting, clothing, feeding, transport and accommodation of these Poles are most difficult problems which are taxing all concerned to the utmost, particularly as regards the civilian refugees. Their arrival was quite unexpected; consequently, all arrangements have had to be improvised at the shortest notice with very little means. They are without any organisation; many of them destitute, under-nourished and sick. In Pahlevi there is inevitably considerable confusion and some hardship. In Tehran some organisation is appearing. The arrangements for the military Poles are working surprisingly well considering that they were only prepared to deal with a fraction of the numbers now arriving.

20. General Anders passed through Tehran on his way from Russia to London. General Zajac from Mid-East is now in Tehran. The announcement made by the Polish authorities in London that General Boruta-Spiechowicz is to command the Polish army in the Middle East has, it seems, been very well received by the Poles, but is believed to be a disappointment to General Zajac.

Tehran, March 7, 1942.

[E 2795/19/34]

No. 17.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 115.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 15, the 8th–14th April, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, April 14, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the Period April 8–14, 1942.

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE crisis of the week has been the British demand for the expulsion of the Japanese Legation. The Majlis, consulted by the Cabinet in secret session, rejected the demand, it is believed, unanimously. Further pressure met with further delaying tactics, but eventually resulted in the Japanese Legation being informed on the 12th that they were to leave within a week.

2. Action has at last been taken against certain notorious pro-Axis Persians, six in number, who had been named by His Majesty's Legation. They have been removed to towns in South-Eastern Persia, where it is promised they will be kept under police surveillance.

3. The commission referred to in Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 1, whose purpose it is to investigate grievances in tribal lands, is to consist of the Minister of Justice as president, the Attorney-General, the Under-Secretaries and Directors-General of the Ministries of Finance and of the Interior, and a representative of the Ministry for War (General Muqaddam (M.A. 182)).

4. The Government has announced in the press that instructions have been given to the Governor-General of Kermanshah and to the General Officer Commanding the Forces in the West to investigate certain complaints made by the inhabitants of Kurdistan regarding their lands.

5. Hostility to the Allies is extending and deepening. Their supporters are disheartened and afraid to give practical expression to their sympathies. The causes are many: the occupation is resented; people are hungry and miserable; prices continue generally to rise, due, it is popularly believed, to British purchases and British insistence on an additional note issue; there is great disappointment that article 7 of the treaty, which promises economic help, has as yet brought no additional benefits nor even concrete promises; insecurity is increasing; the news continues to tell of British disasters. These sentiments in the country are partly responsible for the Government's reluctance to take any definite pro-Ally or anti-Axis action.

Appointments—Civil.

- 6. Mohsin Samiyi to be Farmandar of Gorgan.
- Ismail Nawab to be Farmandar of Bandar Abbas.

Economic.

7. The Minister of Finance in a statement to the press stated that the reasons for the scarcity of wheat in recent years were—

- (i) The limitations imposed on the cultivation of rice resulting in a greater consumption of wheat.
- (ii) Development of cotton-growing on land previously producing wheat.
- (iii) The uneconomic price paid to the cultivator for wheat.

8. The Government has prohibited the export of potatoes and onions.

9. A statement has been published in the press giving a denial to the reports that the British military authorities were exporting wheat from Persia, and stating that, on the contrary, 60,000 tons of wheat had been imported from Canada and India.

Persian Forces.

10. There has been some criticism of the Persian army in the Majlis of its inability to maintain order in spite of the large sums of money spent on it in recent years, suggestions for its reduction, and even for its disbandment. The Minister for War, in reply, said that recent events had shown that the army had been unsuitably organised, but that it was now being reconstituted.

11. The Shah has ordered the trial by court-martial of all senior officers who deserted their posts at the time of the British and Russian invasion.

12. Two battalions of infantry from the Tehran divisions are being sent to Fars to relieve two local battalions, in the hope that the former will prove more reliable.

Appointments—Military.

- 13.—(i) Sartip Hassan Arfa (M.A. 30) (F.O. 37) to be Inspector-General of Cavalry.
- (ii) Sarhang Mohamed Bagher Hushmand to be Chief of the Military Police.
- (iii) Sarhang Shahraiz to the Director of the 1st Bureau, General Staff.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

14. The situation has not improved, nor has it outwardly worsened.

Kurdistan.

15. According to an announcement in the press, there has been an encounter between rebel Kurds and Persian forces at Sahib (12 miles south of Saqqiz). It reports that on the 7th and 8th April two Kurdish chiefs, Osman Agha Pushtidari and Khoda Abdollah, with fifty-four of their followers were killed.

Polish Affairs.

16. The evacuation of the first echelon of Poles from Krasnovodsk has been completed.

The following numbers have been landed at Pahlevi:—

Military Poles—

Males	30,030
Women	1,159
Boys	1,880

Civilian Poles—

Males	1,772
Women	5,897
Children	3,070

Arrangements have been made for the temporary accommodation in Tehran of the civilian refugees.

Egyptian Affairs.

17. The appointment of Abdul Latif Talat Pasha as Minister of Egypt in Tehran has been announced.

Tehran, April 14, 1942.

[E 2879/19/34]

No. 18.

(No. 120.) Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 8.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the period the 15th to 21st April, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, April 21, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the Period April 15-21, 1942.

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

IN the Majlis the budget session let loose, as usual, an extra heavy spate of garrulity on the part of the Deputies. Criticism was directed against almost every Department of State, and even the Ministry of the Court came in for some adverse comment. The Minister of War's reply to criticism of the army is summarised in paragraph 5 below. The army budget is summarised in paragraph 6.

Economic (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 2).

2. The future expansion of the note issue (which will be necessary to finance our undertakings in Persia) will present considerable difficulty and produce much opposition in the Majlis. A possible and suggested action would be for the Persian Government to find the cover for this extra issue from its sterling holdings. They are unlikely to adopt this obvious plan, but will almost certainly press as a *quid pro quo* for an alteration in the rate of exchange, a substantial measure of economic help and any other desiderata. Negotiations are still in progress.

The Press.

3. The chief topics have been the increased cost of living, hoarding of food-stuffs, especially wheat, profiteering, corruption in public life, and the usual platitudes about the need for co-operation by all classes to make a better Persia.

Appointments, Changes, &c.—Diplomatic, Civil and Military.

4.—(i) According to a press report, Mohsin Rais (F.O. 172) (M.A. 239), former Persian Minister to Vichy, who was recalled, has left Switzerland with his staff for Persia.

(ii) Following on the notice to quit being given to the Japanese Legation (see Summary No. 15/42, paragraph 1), Najm (F.O. 144) (M.A. 192), Persian Minister to Tokyo, has been recalled.

(iii) Sarhang Naqdi has been appointed Judge Advocate-General of the Persian army, *vice* Hassan Moaper relieved.

(iv) Imad Mumtaz has been appointed Farmandar of Meshed and assistant to the Ustandar of Khorrasan.

(v) Muhammad Hadi has been appointed Farmandar of Zabul.

(vi) Sartip Shaibani to be Governor of Mamassani, Quhgilu and Behbahan (a new appointment).

The Persian Army.

5. The following is a summary of the reply given in the Majlis by the Minister of War to criticism on the army vote: The Persian army was the creation of twenty years of effort. At the cost of many casualties in officers and men, it has given the country security. After fulfilling its task of achieving security, it was preparing itself for the task of national defence when the war broke out. Like many other modern armies, it was insufficiently mechanised, and, like many other armies, it had broken down in consequence. Certain officers had shown a lamentable neglect of duty in deserting their posts when danger came and they were being sought out and punished. Steps were being taken to improve the type of young officer student. A new organisation had been laid down (see military attaché's Summary No. 9/42, paragraph 4). Conscription was necessary as the basis of a national army. The country, besides, could not afford a volunteer army.

The Army Budget.

6. The budget, which to date has passed its first reading, makes a provision of 700 million rials "for the Ministry of War and balance on account of army purchases." As usual, expenses of the navy and air force are included in this vote. A provision for the Amnieh (gendarmérie) is made of 150 million rials. Though this force is under the Ministry of the Interior, it is, in effect, a defence services item. A further sum of 1 million rials is provided for the expenses of the Conscription Department. Thus the total sum for defence or quasi-defence departments amounts to 950 million rials (equals £6,500,000 at the present rate of exchange), or approximately 33½ per cent. of the country's total budget provision of 3,132,873,081 rials.

Internal Security.

Dashti (see Summary No. 13/42, paragraph 9).

7. Though Colonel Ahinin has been recalled, and though reinforcements amounting to 200 rifles reached this force on the 22nd March, the force is still inactive in Khormuj. The situation shows signs of deterioration.

Bakhtiari (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 12).

8. The appointment of Murteza Quli Khan as Governor of Bakhtiari has not taken effect. All the Bakhtiari Khans residing in Tehran have been placed under police surveillance, and a reliable report from Isfahan states that the Khans residing there have been treated in a similar manner. Some apprehension is felt that these precautions, coupled with the despatch of two columns from Isfahan and Shahreza converging on Semirun (some 25 miles south-west of Yazdikhvast), may signify some offensive action against the Bakhtiari with the strong possibility of inflaming sections of the tribe at present quiescent, and with the probable result that the weak and untrained Government forces may suffer a reverse and precipitate a general Bakhtiari rising. The new General Officer Commanding in Isfahan, Zahidi, is reported to be a fire-eater. The Chief of the General Staff has definite ideas about tribes and has expressed the view that nothing but a good drubbing will bring them to heel. He appears to resent the opinion that, sound as his views may be, the Persian army is hardly in a state to undertake any offensive action. The Minister of War showed a better understanding of the situation and assured the military attaché that Zahidi had been

told to do nothing precipitate and that the two columns were not sent on any offensive mission, but that their presence in Semirun would have a steadying effect.

Azerbaijan.

9. The general situation has improved. Owing to the cessation of Soviet support, Kurdish stock has fallen. The streets are no longer full of swash-buckling Kurds who defy arrest. The numerous democratic clubs are on their last legs. Many of the upper-class Tabrizis who fled the town in fear of local unrest have returned from Tehran through fear of typhus and rising prices.

10. Amir Asad, the Governor of Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh) (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 8 (v)), is likely to experience difficulty in maintaining order, placating rival aspirants and, in particular, combating the influence of the Ghazi Muhammad.

Kurdistan (see Summary No. 15/42, paragraph 15).

11. General Shabbakhti has recommended to the Persian Government that negotiations should be opened with the Kurds. The Governor-General of Kermanshah began a tour of the area on the 11th April to examine the grievances which the Kurdish chiefs might put forward. The Persian Government's proclamation (see paragraphs 3 and 4 of Summary No. 15/42) has had very little effect in Kurdistan, even though leaflets announcing it were dropped over the area on the 10th April. The Kurds like other tribes, have little faith in Persian Government promises and would prefer a British guarantee of eventual fulfilment. This they cannot, of course, have unless the policy of His Majesty's Government were to be completely changed. Even so, General Shabbakhti's suggestion and his Government's acceptance of it and the Kurds willingness to treat are hopeful signs. Owing to Kurdish disunity, it is extremely unlikely that all unrest will cease, but a temporary lull will benefit the Persian Government.

Fars.

12. There has been a general deterioration in the security situation. On the Shiraz-Bushire section Amnieh posts have been attacked, road gangs have been shot at and travellers robbed. Around Shiraz itself robbers have been active on the outskirts of the town. On the Shiraz-Isfahan section the Boir Ahmadi have again been looting travellers on the stretch Abadeh-Yazdikhvast-Aminabad.

13. Sartip Firuz, the new Military Governor-General of Fars, has started to negotiate with Nasir Khan Qashqai. This in no way implies that Firuz approves of setting up Nasir Khan as the chieftain of the whole of the Qashqais or that he is in sympathy with all of Nasir Khan's demands, or that he approves of negotiating with a man who defies the Government. It is the weakness of his forces, their low morale, their lack of mobility and his lack of experienced officers which has led Firuz to play for time and to try and wean some of the main tribes away from Nasir Khan; in short, to achieve by politics what he cannot achieve by force.

Foreign Interests.

Russian.

14.—(a) Major-General Melnik has taken over command of the Soviet forces in North-West Persia from Colonel Selivanoff.

(b) On the 15th April a fracas occurred between some Persians and a Russian lorry-driver whose vehicle had collided with a child, as a result of which some Soviet officers who intervened received minor injuries. The incident, though trivial, had repercussions, and the Minister of War stated to the British Military Attaché that, on the insistence of the Soviet Embassy, he had been obliged to tender an official apology on behalf of the Persian Government. The British Military Attaché took this opportunity of speaking to the Minister of War in very plain language of a number of cases of insults to British soldiers on the part of Persian soldiers and officers in Tehran.

(c) The number of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan is said to have increased considerably in recent weeks and to have reached a total of 100,000-105,000. According to one observer, the Russians are apprehensive of Turkey's attitude in the event of a German invasion, and the refusal of the Russian authorities to allow Persian troops into Western Azerbaijan is due not to their desire to see disorder continue (as previously thought), but to their wish to keep such dubious allies as the Persian army well away from the possible scene of combat.

Polish.

15. On the 16th April the distribution of the Poles evacuated in the first echelon was as follows:—

				Left	Destinations other than
		Pahlevi.	Tehran.	Tehran.	Tehran.
Military Poles—					
Males	7,752	8,600	5,124	7,566
Women	131	880	17	...
Boys	1,185
Civilian Poles—					
Males	1,568
Women	5,310
Children	3,267

These figures were supplied by the Poles and are not to be taken as exact.

Japanese.

16. According to the Chief of Police, there has been much closer social contact between the Turkish Embassy and the Japanese Legation since the Persian New Year. The Turkish Military Attaché, in particular, has been paying frequent visits to his Japanese colleague. The Japanese, according to the same informant, have sold all the furniture in their legation and all their motor cars except one to their landlord for a sum of 900,000 rials (about one-quarter of their present-day value). The only motor car they have retained is the large car previously owned by the Grand Mufti, in which they propose to travel when they leave the country. Their departure has been postponed to the 23rd April.

Norwegian.

17. M. Rolf Otto Chidvoid, Norwegian Minister to Moscow, also accredited to Tehran, presented his letters of credence to H.I.M. the Shah on the 20th April.

Tehran, April 21, 1942.

[E 3082/19/34]

No. 19.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 131.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 17 for period the 22nd to 28th April, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, April 28, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 19.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the Period
April 22 to 28, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

REPORTS of a concentration of British troops at Sultanabad and of the move of Russian troops from Zinjan towards Kazvin, which, though exaggerated, were founded on fact, notably improved the atmosphere in Tehran, and induced an almost pro-Ally sentiment in some Persian officials.

2. The following proclamation under the signature of Police Headquarters has been made in the Tehran press:—

"According to the Tripartite Treaty Persia being allied to the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, it is notified that all pro-Axis or anti-Ally propaganda or attempts to conceal Axis subjects is contrary to the interests of the country and to the terms of the alliance. The police will deal severely with delinquents according to the law."

Appointments—Civil.

3. Ahmad Mashaikhi to be Farmandar (Governor) of Kashan.

The Court (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 17).

4. The Queen Ismat-ul-Muluk and her children, Hamid Reza and Fatime, who had accompanied Reza Shah to Mauritius, have returned to Persia via Zahidan.

Communications.

5. The construction of the railway line from Ahwaz to Khorramshahr has now been completed.

*Internal Security.**Kurdistan.*

6. There have been clashes between Persian troops and rebel Kurds in the area south of Saqqiz. According to the reports made to the Persian War Office by the General Officer Commanding in Kurdistan, the fighting originated in attacks by the Kurds on his forces and resulted in the defeat and withdrawal of the Kurds. He reports that his forces have pursued to within 10 miles of Baneh, where they are now holding an important pass. If these reports are true, this success of the Persian forces should produce in the rebel Kurds a more reasonable attitude towards terms of settlement.

Both the Persian Government and General Shahbakhti, the military commander, if his report to the Minister for War can be accepted as a true expression of his sentiments, are prepared to go some way in satisfying Kurdish demands.

Fars.

7. Although there is still general insecurity, which has a harmful effect on road maintenance owing to the number of petty robberies perpetrated on labourers, in its main features the situation has not further deteriorated. The new Governor-General, who is also general officer commanding, appears to be plucking up some courage, but whether it will be sufficient to embolden him to take a firm stand with Nasir Qashgai is doubtful. The acknowledgement of this chief as head of the Qashgai tribes would give him considerable power in Fars, and, if the military situation in Persia were unfavourable to the Allies, it is unlikely that that power would be used in our interests.

The Boir Ahmadi are still quite out of control. Columns of Persian troops are said to be converging on their summer headquarters from Shiraz and Isfahan, and it is reported that two important sections of the tribe have already fallen out and are fighting each other—a not unusual condition.

Bakhtiari.

8. It is refreshing to find that the new General Officer Commanding the Isfahan Division professes a much less serious view of the Bakhtiari situation than did his predecessor and more confidence that he can control it with the forces at his disposal. He claims to have defeated the rebel band of Abul Qasim Bakhtiari (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 12), but this defeat was clearly not decisive, as Abul Qasim and his band are still in being.

*Foreign Interests.**Russian.*

9. Reliable reports from various places occupied by Russian troops all speak of their admirable behaviour and discipline. Drunkenness or brawling is almost unknown; their treatment of the local population is considerate, and enquiry in towns where there are Russian troops produced no complaints from the lower classes. Their appearance makes a very favourable impression. They are not smart, but they and their horses are generally fit, hard and workmanlike.

10. A further batch of 850 American trucks for Russia is to be assembled at Bushire and to be driven via Tehran to Tabriz by Russian and Persian drivers engaged by the U.K.C.C. For this purpose the Russians are sending 200 military drivers, who will be armed, to Bushire.

11. The Russians have offered to assist the Persian Government in their anti-locust campaign by providing aircraft to spray the infected areas in Khuzestan. Seven of these aircraft left Tehran for Ahwaz on the 28th April. The Persian Government are to pay fairly heavily for this assistance.

Japanese.

12. The Japanese Legation staff left Tehran on the 23rd April for Japan via Pablevi and Baku for Kuibyshev.

American.

13. The United States are shortly to open a consulate in Tabriz.

Norwegian.

14. Correction. In paragraph 17 of last Summary (16/42) the name of the Norwegian Minister should read Andvord, and not Chidvoid.

Polish.

15. The distribution of the Poles in Persia up to the 26th April was as follows:—

Military Poles—		Pablevi.	Tehran.	Ahwaz.	In other locations on Habbaniya Route.
Men ...	400	3,703	11,114	13,531	
(Rear party)					
Women ...		1,147			
Boys ...		1,181			
Civilian Poles—					
Men ...		1,646			
Women ...		5,556			
Children ...		3,334			

In hospital in Tehran: 617.

Tehran, April 28, 1942.

[E 3168/19/34]

No. 20.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 138.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period the 29th April to the 5th May, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, May 5, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the Period April 29 to May 5, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Economic.

THE following is the text of a decree issued by the Government:—

Goods, Exports of which are Prohibited.

The Council of Ministers has approved, in accordance with the proposal of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Mines, that export goods should be divided into three classes:—

Firstly: goods, the export of which is absolutely prohibited in order to assure the country's needs.

Secondly: goods, the export of which requires a permit from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the exporter undertaking to import specified goods in exchange.

Thirdly: goods which can be exported by making a foreign exchange undertaking in accordance with the regulations in force as before.

The goods whose export from the country is absolutely forbidden are as follows:—

Gold and silver in ingots or as coins, articles made of gold and silver, all animals and edible meat, cereals such as wheat, barley, rice, millet, maize and grains such as peas, lentils, split beans and vetch, beans, potatoes and potato starch, dairy products, honey, eggs, elastic woven garments, cotton, sterilised cotton, surgical gauzes, sewing thread, woollen cloth and stockings, woollen thread, blankets, clothes and other things made of wool and cotton, leather, shoes, leather bags and suit-cases, oxen and buffalo hides, matches, gunny bags and wrappers, jute thread and cord, raw flax or jute, home-produced cardboard, foreign goods whether in their original form or changed in any way, and any goods manufactured from foreign goods (with the exception of old glass and crockery of no practical use), hats made in Persia, soft sugar and loaf sugar, treacle sweetmeats and other stuff containing sugar, tinned fruit, metals and articles made of metal.

Motor Transport.

2. The following statistics of motor transport in Persia have been compiled from U.K.C.C. sources:—

(A) Total number of civilian motor vehicles now under licence, including all Government transport, army contractors' vehicles, but excluding vehicles owned by the army:—

- (i) Load-carrying vehicles: 2,000 light, 2,000 medium and heavy.
- (ii) Passenger buses: 600.
- (iii) Passenger cars: 2,800.
- (iv) Motor cycles: 500.
- (v) Technical and all unclassified vehicles and tractors: 50.

(B) Categories as above, off the road awaiting spares and tyres:—

- (i) 750 light, 750 medium and heavy.
- (ii) 100.
- (iii) 700.
- (iv) Unknown.
- (v) Unknown.

Irrigation Projects.

3. The following note on irrigation projects was given recently by the Minister of Finance at a weekly press conference:—

- (a) The Shabankareh barrage on the Shahpur River (Fars). Started in 1938. Will irrigate 10,000 hectares this spring; it can be extended to irrigate 30,000 hectares.
- (b) A dam is to be constructed near Bushire to provide that town with a suitable water supply.
- (c) The Behbahan Irrigation Company began work in 1938 to utilise the waters of the Marun River. The scheme will begin to provide water this autumn.
- (d) The Rawansar dam on the Qara Su River near Kermanshah started to provide water for irrigation last autumn.
- (e) New channels have been dug to make better use of the springs near Semnan.

Pro-Axis Agents.

4. A further list of twenty-four persons believed to have pro-Axis sentiments has been handed to the police. Of these, four are to be deported, the rest to be warned and watched. A German, Gottlieb Ruppel, who was in hiding, has been arrested.

Perso-Russian Relations.

5. In connexion with the Kurdish outbreak at Rezaieh (see paragraph 10 below), the Persian Government has sent strong notes of protest to the Soviet Ambassador and directly to M. Molotov against the continued Soviet refusal to allow Persian troops at Rezaieh.

Appointments—Civil.

6.—(i) Dr. Hussain Marzuban to be Ustandar (Governor-General) of the 4th Ustan (Rezaieh).

(ii) Hussain Naficy, a Director-General in the Finance Department, to be Director-General of the Persian State Railways.

(iii) Yahiapur, formerly Farmandar of Saveh, to be Farmandar of Garrus.

(iv) Adil Rukni to be Farmandar of Saveh.

(v) Mustafa Quli Kemal Hedayet (Fahim-ud-Dowleh) (F.O. 104) (M.A. 141) to be Ustandar of Isfahan Province (Department No. 10).

(vi) Muhammad Ali Muaddil to be consul at the Persian Consulate-General in Delhi.

Persian Forces.

7. There has recently been considerable criticism of the army in the press and Parliament, directed against its oppressive conduct in the past, its heavy cost to the people, the arrogance of its officers and its present inefficiency in the preservation of internal security. This caused some concern to the Shah, who associates himself very closely with the army, and to the officers, who had long enjoyed immunity from public criticism. The effect has probably been salutary.

8. The Minister for War has laid before the Majlis a project of a law for the reformation of the Conscription Law. Details are not yet available, but its purpose is believed to be to lighten the burden of conscription and to prevent some of the existing abuses in its application.

Appointments—Military.

9. Brigadier Abdullah Hidayet to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

Brigadier Seifullah Shihab to be Director of Military Schools.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

10. There has been further trouble at Rezaieh, originating in an attempt by the Persian gendarmerie to disarm some Kurds entering the town. This occasioned a rising of considerable numbers of Kurds, who surrounded the town, pillaged adjacent villages and attacked and disarmed a gendarmerie post of twenty-eight men. Whether they entered the town or not is not yet known. Owing to Russian objections, there are no Persian troops in that area and the gendarmerie is restricted to small numbers inadequate to deal with serious disorder. The Russian garrison refused to intervene, but it is reported that the Soviet authorities were instrumental in persuading the Kurds to withdraw from the vicinity of the town. Considerable panic reigned for a time, but the situation is now calmer. At a conference between the Soviet Consul-General, the Persian Chief of Police and the Kurdish leaders the latter formulated the following demands, which were forwarded to Tehran:—

- (1) No gendarmerie posts to exist in Kurdish region between Khoi and Mahabad.
- (2) Kurds to be allowed to carry arms.
- (3) 1,200 rifles alleged to have been given to Persian villagers in the Rezaieh district to be withdrawn.
- (4) Kurds to have one representative in each of the Government Departments in Rezaieh.
- (5) Kurds to enjoy freedom in their own national affairs.
- (6) Persian Government to provide schools in Kurdistan, where the Kurdish language would be used.
- (7) Certain specified lands to be restored to their original Kurdish owners.
- (8) Twenty Kurds now in prison to be released.

The rifles mentioned in the third demand—though probably less than 1,200—were issued by the Persian Government to villagers for their own defence against Kurdish depredations.

Kurdistan.

11. The action of the Persian forces against the Kurdish rebels reported in paragraph 6 of Summary No. 17/42 appears to have been effective. The Persian forces are reported to be in strong occupation of a pass on the Saqqiz-Baneh road some 7 miles from Baneh. The greater part of the rebel band has dispersed, and Hama Rashid, the rebel leader, is said to have taken refuge in Iraq. Some Persian officers, whom he had taken prisoner, have been released and state that they were well treated. Saqqiz has been reoccupied and telegraphic communication with Tehran has been re-established.

12. The officer commanding the operations has reported that the villages have suffered greatly from the depredations of Hama Rashid's followers. He also reports that he hopes to make a peaceable settlement with the Kurds of Avroman and Merivan.

13. It is feared that the unpunished outbreak of the Kurds at Rezaieh (see paragraph 10 above) may have disturbing repercussions on the Baneh area.

Fars.

14. There have been fewer cases of brigandage on the roads, but the situation as regards Nasir Qashgai remains much where it was. There is no fresh information about the Boir Ahmadi and as yet no indication that the local authorities are ready to take effective action against them. Meanwhile, they are fighting each other.

Bakhtiari.

15. Abdul Qasim (see paragraph 8 of Summary No. 17/42) has not yet submitted, but His Majesty's Consulate, Isfahan, reports that he is disheartened, that his followers are leaving him and his funds running out. The truth probably is that the senior Bakhtiari Khans in Tehran, who have probably been investigating these disturbances, have become doubtful of the success of their bluff.

Kerman.

16. His Majesty's Consul reports a deterioration in security. This was to be expected, as economic conditions in parts of the province are appalling; many people are dying of hunger.

Foreign Interests.

Russian.

17. Russian officers in Persia do not conceal their suspicions of Turkish good faith. They profess to see in the arrest and trial of two Soviet citizens in Angora, accused of an attempt to murder von Papen, evidence of Turkish subservience to Germany. These suspicions probably account for the increase of Russian troops along the Turkish frontier reported in paragraph 14 (c) of Summary No. 16/42. The numbers there reported were, however, an exaggeration.

18. It seems clear that the Russians have now withdrawn encouragement and support from the various clubs and committees of subversive character that had been flourishing in Azerbaijan. They are now inactive and languishing from lack of funds. But towards the Kurds Russian policy seems to have some ulterior motive. Recent events at Rezaieh and their continued refusal to allow Persian troops to be stationed there or the gendarmerie to be made up to adequate strength seem to indicate that they have no intention of allowing the Kurds to be disarmed. They may perhaps hope that they might be useful to them against Turkey.

19. The port of Bandar Shah (C) has now been dredged sufficiently to allow of ships coming alongside the jetty. A ship has actually discharged direct to the jetty.

20. The Soviet Government have delivered 1,000 tons of wheat to the Persian Government at the port of Naushahr. At the same time they are preventing the export of food-stuffs from the occupied provinces to other parts of Persia.

21. The Russians secretly moved by night 300 troops from Kazvin to the Qaleh Morgeh aerodrome in the vicinity of Tehran, which they had already occupied with air force and transport personnel some time ago. The purpose of this move is not clear, but it may have been to anticipate a possible occupation of Tehran by British troops.

American.

22. It has been announced that Lease-Lend facilities are to be extended to Persia and Iraq.

23. An American journalist, Mrs. Burdett, travelling in Azerbaijan, was killed near Miandoab by Kurds. The Soviet authorities believe that the attack was instigated by Axis agents, but it is more probable that she was accidentally killed in a quarrel between Kurds who were accompanying her and a party met on the road.

24. An American Consulate has been opened at Tabriz. The consul, Mr. Kuniholm, has stated that he is there expressly to observe Russian policy in Persia.

Polish.

25. The distribution of the Poles in Persia up to the 4th May was as follows:—

		Pahlevi.	Tehran.	Ahwaz.	On Habbaniya Route.
Military—					
Men	400	1,785	11,106	15,709
		(Rear party)			
Women	1,205	11	22
Boys	119	...	1,077
Civilians—					
Men	1,703
Women	5,677
Children	3,406

[E 3342/19/34]

No. 21.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 143.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the period the 6th–12th May, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, May 12, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the Period May 6–12, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Economic.

A MINISTERIAL decree regulating the transport of food-stuffs from one district to another has been published. Under these regulations persons wishing to transport food-stuffs must obtain a permit from the Finance Department of the place of origin and a certificate of delivery at the declared destination. In this permit the nature, quantity, value, means of transport, destination and the names of consignor and consignee are to be entered.

2. New coins of the denominations of 5 rials, 1 rial and $\frac{1}{2}$ rial are being struck.

Communications—Telegraph.

3. The telegraph line between Tabriz and Ahar (million sheet I.D.2), which had been completely destroyed and removed by rebels, has been repaired and through communication has been restored.

Appointments—Civil.

4. Ismail Bahadur to be Farmandar (Governor) of Kashan *vice* Mushaikh, appointed an inspector in the Ministry of the Interior.

Persian Forces.

Appointments—Military.

5.—(i) Colonel Ibrahim Arfa (M.A. 36) (brother of Sartip Hassan Arfa (M.A. 37)) has been promoted brigadier for his services in the operations now in progress in Kurdistan.

(ii) Sartip Majid Firuz to be head of the Legal Department of the War Office.

Foreign Relations.

6. The press reports that the Persian Legation in Tokyo has left Japan.

7. For the first time for many years all foreign military attachés were recently invited to attend a Persian military function, the occasion being a display of jumping at the Military School. The performance was very creditable.

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8. The Prime Minister has announced that M. Molotov has replied to the telegram sent to him by the Persian Government regarding the situation in Rezaieh (see Summary No. 18/42, paragraph 5) to the effect that he accepted in principle the right of the Persian Government to send troops to Rezaieh, and that details were to be arranged with the local Soviet military authorities; also, that he had given instructions that Russian forces were to co-operate in the restoration of order.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

9. There is little further reliable news from Rezaieh (see Summary No. 18/42, paragraph 10). The Kurds have withdrawn from the vicinity of the town, where the situation is now reported to be calm. The Minister for War, who has some prestige in that area, accompanied by the new Governor-General, Dr. Hussein Marzuban, has visited the town. The former, in a proclamation to the inhabitants, said that he had been deputed by the Government to enquire into the situation and make the best possible settlement. He promised that the following steps would immediately be taken:—

- (i) Urgent representations would be made to the Soviet authorities with a view to the re-establishment of security.
- (ii) Armed troops would be sent to suppress the bandits.
- (iii) Government would indemnify those who had been looted.
- (iv) Complete re-establishment of security. When military posts had been established the people would be informed and they would then return to their villages.

Many telegrams and other reports have been received by Government from inhabitants of the Rezaieh district giving harrowing tales of pillage and atrocities by the Kurds. These are probably exaggerated, but it seems true that for a time there was panic in the villages.

Discussions are now in progress between the Ministry for War and the Soviet military authorities in Azerbaijan regarding the strength of Persian forces to be sent to the Rezaieh area.

Kurdistan.

10. Details are not yet available regarding recent developments in Kurdistan. There have been no further hostilities, and the bulk of the Persian troops have been withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Baneh to Saqqiz. Hama Rashid is reported to be close to the frontier, sometimes in Iraq, sometimes in Persia. His followers appear to be inactive. There have been negotiations between the General Officer Commanding Persian forces and certain Kurdish chiefs of the area, of which details are not yet available, but it is reliably reported that the latter have accepted certain responsibilities for order and administration. The general officer commanding has made further reports of the destitution and misery prevailing in the villages in the area which have been ravaged by Hama Rashid and his followers.

Bakhtiari (see Summary No. 18/42, paragraph 15).

11. Abdul Qasim Bakhtiari, son of Amir Mufakham (M.A. 63), has submitted to General Zahidi and has undertaken to reside in Isfahan. Presumably his band has dispersed. There are no further reports of trouble in Bakhtiari.

Fars.

12. The situation is calmer. There have been fewer robberies. Pourparlers still continue between Nasir Qashgai and the Governor-General (Sartip Firuz). It is understood that the latter's proposal to make Nasir Governor of the Qashgai has not met with the approval of the Persian Government. There is no further news from the Boir Ahmadi.

Khuzistan.

13. There has been some robbery and pillage by bands of Arabs, and the local Persian commander (Sartip Tajbaksh) proposes to make some demonstration with troops to restore order. He does not expect any serious opposition.

British Interests.

14. H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester arrived in Tehran by air on the 10th May. He was met at the aerodrome by His Majesty's Minister, the Soviet Ambassador, the Chief of the Persian General Staff and other Persian officials. There were Persian, British and Russian guards of honour. The Prime Minister called on him soon after his arrival, and he later met the members of the Government and Persian notabilities at a reception given by the Prime Minister. His Royal Highness visited H.I.M. the Shah on the 11th May.

U.K.C.C.

15. In connexion with the evacuation of Poles, the U.K.C.C. transport organisation made 1,150 return trips from Tehran to Pahlevi, 272 trips from Pahlevi to Hamadan, 170 from Pahlevi to the Iraq frontier, and 100 from Tehran to the Iraq frontier.

16. The assembly of American trucks for Russia at Bushire by the U.K.C.C., which recommenced on the 22nd April, has progressed well. Of 850 trucks unloaded, 833 had been assembled by the 9th May and 380 have left Bushire for Tabriz.

Polish Interests.

17. The distribution of the Poles in Persia up to the 10th May was as follows:—

		Pahlevi.	Tehran.	Ahwaz.	On Habbaniya Route.
Military—					
Men	400	1,143	11,466	} 4,037
		(Rear party)			
Women	1,206	11	
Boys	
Civilian—					
Men	1,703	...	
Women	5,677	...	
Children	3,406	...	

In hospital in Tehran: 446 males.

Tehran, May 12, 1942.

[E 3418/19/34]

No. 22.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 151.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the period the 13th to 19th May, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, May 19, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the Period May 13-19, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Economic.

THE new ministerial decree relating to foreign exchange is published as Appendix (A) to this summary.

2. Prospects of the coming harvest are less favourable than they were some weeks ago. There has been some loss due to locusts and rust and to the failure of the spring rains in some parts.

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Communications.

3. The Persian air service between Tehran and Kermanshah has been running regularly once a week since the 6th April.

4. The Minister of Communications has announced that the railway from Tehran to Shahrud and from Tehran to Zinjan will shortly be opened for public traffic.

Appointments—Civil.

5.—(i) Mehdi Shahrukh, formerly Farmandar of Gurgan, to be a Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, *vice* Pirzadeh, appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, *vice* Hussein Naficy.

(ii) Sultan Hussein Rakshani to be Director-General in the Ministry of Finance.

(iii) Ali Asghar Rahmani to be Farmandar of Bam, *vice* Adl-us-Saltaneh Isfandiari.

Diplomatic Moves.

6. Ardelan, counsellor to the Persian Legation at Vichy, accompanied by his staff, arrived in Tehran on the 11th May.

No news has yet been received of the date of departure from Bucharest of Mohsin Rais, Persian Minister at Vichy.

Persian Forces.

7. The force to be sent to Rezaieh (see paragraph 12 below) is to consist of—
- 2 weak battalions of infantry,
 - 2 squadrons of cavalry,
 - 1 battery of 6 guns,
 - 1 detachment of 4 mortars,
 - 1 detachment of 6 light tanks.

The total strength is 1,500.

The commander is Colonel Mahin, an artillery officer, speaking French and Russian, sensible and tactful.

8. The Persian Government has asked the American Government for the services of two advisers, one for the administrative work of the War Office, the other for the gendarmerie. It is understood that the American Government has agreed to supply these officers.

Appointments—Military.

9. Sarhang Ahmed Sartipe to be Inspector of Infantry on the staff of General Shahbakhti.

Legal.

10. In the past the serving of summons, writs and notices on military personnel has been a slow and sometimes impossible task. In order to speed up the procedure, new legislation has been introduced whereby such summons, &c., will be served direct on military personnel residing outside barracks and military zones, and on those residing in barracks or military zones through military tribunals, who are enjoined to see that no delay occurs.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

11. The situation in the Rezaieh district is calmer, but villagers are still afraid to return to their homes. On the 17th May the Governor-General reported that in Rezaieh there were 60,000 refugees from the villages who were refusing to go back until some security was guaranteed to them. There are more refugees in Shahpur and Khoi. The Soviet authorities are said to be co-operating with the Persian authorities, but not to the extent of taking action by force against the Kurds. They had promised the Minister for War to post detachments of troops among the villages with the object of inducing the inhabitants to return, but this measure has not yet sufficiently restored confidence.

12. The Soviet authorities, after holding out for some time for a maximum of 500, have now agreed that 1,500 Persian troops may be stationed at Rezaieh. The first detachment is to be sent from Tehran on the 18th and 19th May.

13. The outbreak at Rezaieh is reported to be confined to the Herki and the Shakak, some of the latter having come over from Iraq. The Herki are renowned for their savagery and lawlessness, and, although the atrocities attributed to them were greatly exaggerated, preliminary reports indicate that they caused considerable loss of life and destruction. The Minister of War says that, according to reports given to him at Rezaieh, there were about 350 killed and wounded among villagers and gendarmerie. This number may prove to have been exaggerated. The Governor-General of Rezaieh has reported that some 300 villages have been pillaged in the district.

14. A peculiar feature of the outbreak is that, according to reports from several sources, Assyrian and Armenian villages did not suffer. This is regarded by Persians as an indication that the Kurds were anxious not to antagonise the Russians, on whose neutrality they felt they could rely. The Turkish Military Attaché finds it even more ominous. He sees in it proof that the Russians are favouring the Kurds and Assyrians with a view to instigating them against the Turks should necessity arise.

15. The General Staff reports that the forces sent to Eastern Azerbaijan (see Summary No. 12/42, paragraph 12) are now disarming the Luchianlu section of the Shahsevan tribe in the neighbourhood of Ahar (D.S. No. J. 38 L.).

Kurdistan.

16. No further developments have been reported. Hama Rashid is still at large, sometimes on one side of the frontier, sometimes on the other. Until he has been put under restraint, the peace of Persian Kurdistan will always be liable to be disturbed.

Fars.

17. There has been no serious interference recently with traffic on the road between Bushire and Shiraz, but between Shiraz and Isfahan there have been hold-ups and assaults on labour. These are probably the work of migrating Arab tribes. There is insecurity in the countryside and some destruction of crops by the tribes who are now in migration. There is, however, a general feeling of anxiety. The Governor-General's overtures to Nasir Qashgai have as yet led to no settlement. It is understood that the Government disapproves of the extent to which he wishes to go to placate Nasir, on the ground that the latter would then be too powerful.

18. The Boir Ahmadi are still on the warpath, robbing indiscriminately villagers, other tribes and each other. The Qashquli sub-tribe of the Qashgai and the Bakhtiari have been obliged to alter their lines of migration to keep out of the way of the Boir Ahmadi. A party of the latter attacked Bandar Dilam and apparently suffered a reverse. The leader, Kabutar Farsi, is reported to have been wounded and captured. This is the man who attempted to blackmail the A.I.O.C. at Gach Saran (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 10), and the attack on Bandar Dilam was probably retaliation for the punishment he had suffered from the Persian forces near Gach Saran.

Bakhtiari.

19. The migration appears to be progressing with no more than the usual disturbance. There are no reports of lawlessness. A British official who recently travelled through Bakhtiari country, meeting some headmen of sub-sections, reports that he found, on the whole, friendly sentiments towards the British and only the general complaints of all Persians against bad administration.

British Interests.

20. The visit of H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester had a very good effect. It was appreciated as a compliment to Persia and did something to soothe injured feelings. Although his movements were not advertised beforehand, fairly large crowds greeted him cordially wherever he went.

Belgian Interests.

21. All Belgian technicians and specialists in Persia, who could be useful in the development of the resources of the Belgian Congo, are being mobilised for service and sent there.

Russian Interests.

22. Colonel Selivanoff, Chief of Staff to General Melnikoff, Commander of the Russian Forces in North-West Persia, has been promoted to general's rank.

23. As far as can be deduced from recent events in Western Azerbaijan, Russian policy towards the Kurds within their zone of occupation is to avoid antagonising them and to give no help or encouragement to the Persian authorities in disarming them. There is no reasonable ground for the accusation made by the Turkish Military Attaché that they have armed the Kurds, but, on the other hand, they do not appear to have made any attempts to prevent them from acquiring arms from the Persian forces when they disintegrated before the Russian advance in August last. The purpose of this benevolence can only be to gain the friendship of the Kurds with a view to making use of their nuisance value. There is some excuse for the Turkish suspicions that in following this policy it is Turkey that the Russians have in mind. There is insufficient evidence to show how far they have encouraged Kurdish aspirations, but there is no doubt that the Kurds, or some sections of them, have interpreted the Russian attitude as encouragement. Reliable information, however, shows that the Soviet authorities have been shocked by the damage done in this recent outbreak to peaceful villagers, who, failing to get protection from Russian troops, have naturally assumed that the Kurds were acting with Russian approval. To antagonise the peasant is no part of Russian policy.

Iraqi Interests.

24. Abdul Rahman Falahi, first secretary of the Iraqi Legation in Angora, has been appointed Iraqi Consul at Kermanshah.

Polish Interests.

25. A total of 351 Poles left Tehran on the 15th May on the Habbaniya route, making the distribution up to the 18th May as follows:—

		<i>Pahlevi.</i>	<i>Tehran.</i>	<i>Ahwaz.</i>	<i>On Habbaniya Route.</i>
Military—					
Men	400	878	11,466		
	(Rear party)				
Women		1,145	11		4,388
Boys					
Civilians—					
Men		1,703			
Women		5,670			
Children		3,406			

In hospital in Tehran: 446 (mostly males).

Appendix (A).

Decree No. 3622 of Council of Ministers, dated 24.II.1321 (May 14, 1942).

THE Council of Ministers in their session of the 23rd Ordibehesht, 1321 (the 13th May, 1942), on Proposal No. 5748 of the 23rd Ordibehesht (the 13th May, 1942), made by the Ministry of Finance, and by virtue of the authority conferred on them by the Foreign Exchange Law of the 10th Esfand, 1314, hereby make the following regulations:—

Article I.

As from the 24th Ordibehesht, 1321 (the 14th May, 1942), the buying rate for the pound will be 128 rials, and that for the dollar 32 rials, and the selling rates for pounds and dollars shall be 130 rials and 32.50 rials respectively.

Article II.

As from the above date, the authorised banks must buy at the above-mentioned rates, for the account of the Exchange Commission, the exchange obtained from exports, and all other exchange offered.

Article III.

The authorised banks may sell exchange to importers at the official rates prescribed in article I of the present decree for the importation of all kinds of goods, in accordance with licences issued by the Exchange Commission.

Article IV.

The Exchange Commission is authorised to issue licences for the purchase of exchange at the official rates for every other sort of requirements, including educational, travelling, medical treatment expenses, &c.

Article V.

The provisions of Decree No. 7082 of 6.VII.1320 (the 28th September, 1941) are hereby repealed.

Tehran, May 19, 1942.

[E 3534/19/34]

No. 23.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 10).

(No. 161.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the period the 20th to 26th May, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, May 26, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 23.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the Period May 20-26, 1942.

*Persian Affairs.**Economic.*

AN increasingly gloomy view is being taken by the Persian authorities of the prospects of the coming harvest. Such reports as are available indicate that, although crops in some areas are likely to be considerably below earlier hopes, there is as yet no cause for serious anxiety provided hoarding can be prevented and transport is available to ensure distribution.

2. The Minister of Finance, in arguing that the increase in the note issue was little to blame for the rise of prices, stated that the present note circulation was 2,190 million compared with a previous 2,000 million.

3. The following foreign trade statistics have been published for the month the 21st March-20th April:—

	<i>Rials.</i>
Commercial and duty-free imports	92,473,390
Exports (other than A.I.O.C. and fisheries)	69,486,790
Value of real foreign trade	126,161,045
Excess of exports over commercial imports	12,689,171
Total revenue collected by Customs	82,486,790

Communications.

4. Railway passenger service to Zinjan was inaugurated on the 21st May and to Shahrud on the 23rd May.

Officials.

5. A warrant has been issued for the arrest of Fathullah Pakravan (M.A. 208) (F.O. 154/1940), formerly Governor-General of Khorassan and *ex officio* controller of the Meshed shrine, for alleged embezzlement.

Appointments—Civil.

6.—(i) Masud Moazid, head of Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be Director-General in that Ministry.

(ii) Reza Hikmat, Sardar Fakhir (M.A. 112) (F.O. 86), to be head of the Department of Statistics and Civil Status.

(iii) Muhammad Said Maraghehi (M.A. 252) (F.O. 182), Persian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has left Moscow to return to Persia to take up the appointment of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(iv) Amanullah Ardalan has been appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance.

Khorassan.

Internal Security.

7. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports a recrudescence of banditry by trans-frontier outlaws which has affected the security of the Meshed-Zahidan road between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari.

Azerbaijan.

8. The situation at Rezaieh has greatly improved, due to the co-operation of the Russian authorities, who, in addition to posting detachments to give confidence to the villagers, have been persuading the Kurds to return some of the loot. Pillaging has ceased and the countryside has returned to normal. The first echelon of the Persian troops destined for Rezaieh has reached Tabriz, where it will await the arrival of the second echelon.

9. Recent and relatively reliable information shows that the number of killed and wounded was considerably less than the figures reported in Summary No. 20/42, paragraph 13. The Soviet authorities estimate that the casualties on both sides were about forty killed and seventy wounded, and that the material damage done was considerably less than the 70 million rials reported by the local Persian authorities.

Kurdistan.

10. The situation is quiet. Hama Rashid and his followers—reliably reported not to exceed 200—are in the mountains near the frontier. A detachment of Persian troops is in Baneh. The Persian authorities appear to be behaving with moderation, and to be avoiding provocation, but while Hama Rashid remains at large there will be anxiety that he will raise trouble again when the moment seems favourable.

Khuzestan.

11. It is unlikely that any operations will be undertaken against the Arabs (see Summary No. 19/42, paragraph 13), as the Government is of opinion that the situation does not call for military intervention.

Fars.

12. There is little to report except minor robberies and pillaging incidental to the tribal migration. There was a fight between a small detachment of Persian cavalry and a superior force of Boir Ahmadi raiders, in which the former are reported to have acquitted themselves well.

Bakhtiari.

13. There is little fresh news after the surrender of Abul Qasim reported in Summary No. 20/42. General Zahidi is said to be using Abul Qasim to procure the surrender of other recalcitrant Bakhtiari leaders, such as Nadir Quli and Alidad.

Foreign Interests.

Swiss.

14. Mr. Rudolf Fenninger, a director of the Swiss National Bank, has been engaged as adviser to the Banque Mellie.

Polish.

15. On the 23rd May a total of 450 Poles left Tehran on the Habbaniya route. The distribution on the 26th May was as follows:—

				On Habbaniya	
				Route.	
				Pahlevi.	Tehran.
				Ahwaz.	
Military—					
Men	400	523	11,466
			(Rear party)		
Women	1,086	11
Boys		
Civilian—					
Men	1,703	
Women	5,670	
Children	3,406	

In hospital in Tehran: 446 (mostly males).

Tehran, May 6, 1942.

[E 3619/19/34]

No. 24.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 167.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 22, the 27th May to the 2nd June, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, June 2, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the Period
May 27–June 2, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Reactions to the War.

THE German success in the Kerch Peninsula has reawakened public fears that the war may reach Persia. They are little, if at all, allayed by Timoshenko's offensive. Numerous rumours are current, calculated to increase public nervousness. Pro-German propaganda is active, but has not yet reached that pitch of intensity which may be expected to coincide with the German offensive. The battle in Libya is arousing some interest. The press remains favourable to the Allies.

Economic.

2. There has been a slight fall in some prices, notably wheat and sugar, the former due to the approach of the harvest and the release of hoarded grain.

Anti-Hoarding Regulations.

3. Regulations on this subject have been issued under the authority of the Anti-Hoarding Law of the 18th March, 1942, referred to in Summary No. 12/42, paragraph 3. These regulations provide, *inter alia*, for provincial commissions comprising governors, provincial directors of finance, public prosecutors, bank managers, municipal chiefs and local notables. The commissions have the right to fix prices, specify certain goods as scarce and liable to declaration, and to carry out searches for suspected hoards.

The selling of wheat except to Government is forbidden. In order to prevent profiteering in medicines, chemists are forbidden to sell except on a doctor's prescription. Doctors must keep records of all prescriptions given and chemists of all drugs dispensed.

In order to regulate the consumption of essential food-stuffs, &c., the following quantities have been laid down as normal consumption:—

	Kilog.
Flour per person, per day	1½
Rice per person, per year	60
Cooking butter and butter, per year	20
Grains and potatoes, per year	50
Charcoal, per year	150
Soap, per year	15

Legislation.

4. In future, export certificates are to be abolished and a stamp duty of 6 per cent. *ad valorem* is to be charged on all import licences. A stamp duty of 1 per cent. *ad valorem* is to be charged on all customs licences for exported goods.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

5. There is still anxiety among the populace of the Rezaieh region, but confidence is being restored. The Soviet authorities have expressed to His Majesty's Legation apprehensions of incursions of Herki Kurds from Iraq. The

first echelon of Persian troops has reached Rezaieh. It is unlikely that they will take any provocative action against the Kurds, still less make any attempt at wholesale disarmament.

Kurdistan.

6. The Political Adviser to the General Officer Commanding, 10th Army, recently visited Saqqiz and the headquarters of the Persian troops who operated against Hama Rashid. He heard from local Kurdish villagers many complaints of the depredations of Hama Rashid and his men, and himself saw examples of senseless destruction at Saqqiz. He found little or no sympathy for Hama Rashid nor any inclination by local Kurds to regard him as a national hero. The situation is now quiet. Some responsibility has been given to local Kurds for the maintenance of order, but Hama Rashid, who is in the mountains near the Iraqi border, remains a potential source of trouble.

Bakhtiari.

7. The Bakhtiari tribes are now giving no cause for anxiety. They are themselves suffering from the depredations of the Kuhgalu, principally Boir Ahmadi, tribes and have had to abandon their normal line of migration. A reliable British observer who recently travelled through the tribal country reports that he found many evidences of friendly feelings towards the British, very little interest in the war, no evidence that German propaganda or intrigues had had any effect, and generally a desire to be left in peace. He found no desire on the part of heads of sections for the return to positions of authority in the tribe of the big chiefs, who have for long been exiled in Tehran or Isfahan. They had complaints against the extortion practised by Persian officials, but, on the whole, did not seem to think that they were very much worse than their old Khans had been.

Fars.

8. The situation in general has shown no change. There has been no increase in highway robberies. Some of the Khamseh tribes have been looting villages on their upward migration in the Dehbid and Sivand areas.

Dashti.

9. The Persian forces at Khormuj have been reinforced by some 300 men and two tanks. Sargurd (Major) Arab Shaibani has taken over command of the force from Colonel Ahenin. The Persian troops have advanced as far as Kaki and Abdan (65 miles south-east of Bushire) without opposition. Another detachment has been despatched by sea to effect a landing on the Dashti coast. Ali Ismail, the Dashti leader, is reported to have taken to the hills.

Persian Forces.

Appointments—Military.

10. The following Sarlashkar (Major-General) to be Sipahbod (Lieutenant-General):—

- (i) Murteza Yazdan Panah, Chief of the General Staff (F.O. 216) (M.A. 301).

The following Sartips (Brigadiers) to be Sarlashkars:—

- (ii) Fazlollah Zahidi, commanding Isfahan Division.
- (iii) Farajollah Aghevli, Chief of the Gendarmerie (F.O. 25) (M.A. 6).
- (iv) Majid Firuze (Nasr-ed-Dowleh), commanding the Air Force and head of the Legal Department of the Army.

The following Sarhangs (Colonels) to be Sartips:—

- (v) Abdul Ali Itemad Moqaddam, Deputy Chief of the Gendarmerie.
- (vi) Ghulam Hussein Naqdi, Judge Advocate-General's Department, War Office.
- (vii) Ibrahim Zarabi, commanding the gendarmerie of the South-Western District.
- (viii) Colonel Garzan, formerly employed in the Railway Administration, to be Director of the 1st Bureau, General Staff, Army Headquarters, *vice* Sarhang Shahraisi.

British Interests.

11. A Financial Agreement between the British and Persian Governments was signed on the 26th May:—

- (i) The agreement fixes the sterling/rial rate for the duration of the war at 128/130, and corresponding rate for United States dollars based on the official sterling/dollar rate of exchange.
- (ii) The Persian Government undertakes—

- (a) To purchase for rials at the controlled rates of exchange all sterling area currencies offered to finance the British Government's expenditure in Persia;
- (b) To place no unreasonable restriction on transactions in sterling area currencies;
- (c) To allow all authorised transactions to take place at the controlled rates of exchange; and
- (d) To make arrangements for maintaining a supply of local currency adequate to finance all commercial and financial transactions between Persia and the sterling area.

(iii) The British Government undertakes—

- (a) To do everything possible to ensure a flow of essential supplies to Persia.
- (b) If Persia has insufficient dollar balances to pay for "essential supplies" from North America, to convert into gold so much of Persia's sterling balances as are needed to make up the insufficiency of her dollars.
- (c) To convert into gold 40 per cent. of Persia's final unspent sterling balances as at the 30th June, 1942, and 40 per cent. of the half-yearly accretions thereafter.
- (d) To guarantee Persia's sterling balances against any depreciation of sterling in terms of gold.

(iv) The agreement extends treatment to Persia that has not been extended to other countries in the Middle East; in particular, the provisions relating to gold conversion and guarantee of sterling balance may, if they become generally known, cause some embarrassment to His Majesty's Government in their financial relations with these other countries. Accordingly, as little publicity as possible will be given to the contents of the agreement, although the fact that it must go before a public session of the Majlis for formal confirmation makes it impossible to treat the agreement as confidential.

(v) With effect from the 14th May, the Persian Government authorised the resumption of dealings by the authorised banks in foreign exchange at the rates of exchange fixed by the agreement. So far as sterling area currencies are concerned, the Exchange Commission is granting buying and selling permits freely.

(vi) The special arrangement for the supply of local currency for the Army, &c., that was introduced by His Majesty's Legation when the Persian Government placed a ban on the purchase of foreign exchange has now been terminated, as normal dealings in foreign exchange have been resumed.

12. Sir Reader Bullard left Tehran on the 27th May for London for consultation with His Majesty's Government.

13. The General Officer Commanding, 10th Army, visited Tehran from the 25th to 27th May.

14. A Central Supply Committee has been set up in Tehran as a branch of the Middle East Supply Council.

Russian Interests.

15. It is reported on good authority that, as a result of recent events in Rezaieh, Russian influence has diminished in Western Azerbaijan among both Kurds and non-Kurds.

16. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that the Russian garrison there has been increased by 1,200 infantry from Askhabad.

Polish Interests.

17. General Anders arrived in Tehran from Cairo and London on the 25th May and left by air for Polish headquarters at Yangi Youl (near Tashkent) on the 28th. He said that he had no doubt that he would succeed in getting Soviet agreement to the evacuation of thousands more Poles. Indeed, he hoped to get all Poles, including the divisions he commands, out of Russia.

18. General Boruta-Spiechowicz has left Tehran for England, where he is to join the Polish forces. He has, it seems, lost the confidence of General Anders.

19. There is no change in the Polish evacuation figures given in paragraph 15 of last week's Summary.

Tehran, June 2, 1942.

[E 3737/19/34]

No. 25.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 180.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the period the 3rd to the 9th June, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, June 9, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period June 3 to 9, 1942.

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Public Opinion.*

THE 1,000-aircraft raids on Cologne and Essen have appealed to the Persian sense of the dramatic and have had an impressive effect. This, together with the obvious defeat of Rommel's original plans and the delay in the launching of the main German offensive in Russia, has steadied public morale and raised Allied prestige.

Tribal Affairs.

2. A commission has been formed in Tehran to investigate complaints of the tribes. It is presided over by the Procurator-General, and its members include representatives of the Ministries for War and Interior, the deputy director of the National Bank, and the Director of Transferred Properties.

Economic.

3. The Governor-General of Fars paints a very gloomy picture of conditions in the province. He says that, in the southern half of the province, crops are almost a complete failure, that famine already exists outside the towns, that on an optimistic estimate of all the harvest available, wheat, barley and maize, the province will require 30,000 tons of wheat before next harvest. He states that, unless grain and fodder can be imported, many animals will die. This is a serious matter as, owing to the shortage of motor transport, every form of animal transport will become increasingly important.

Officials—Civil.

4. Mr. Saed, Persian Ambassador in Moscow, has left Kuibyshev to take up the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Persian Government.

Officials—Military.

5. Sarlashkar Amanullah Jahanbani, the Minister for War, has been granted the Order of Humayun, First Class.

Internal Security.

6. The Commanders of the Western Corps, the South-Western (Lurestan and Khuzestan), 9th (Isfahan) and 6th (Fars) Divisions are now in Tehran, having been summoned by the Chief of the General Staff for a conference on internal security. Tribal questions generally are under discussion and particularly the attitude the Government should adopt towards the return of tribal chiefs to their estates in tribal areas. Some of these, taking advantage of the breakdown in administration that followed on the events of last August, have already taken possession of their lands. The generals are on the whole not enthusiastic about undertaking the operations necessary to dispossess them by force. The Government are also averse from extensive military operations, but at the same time fear the result of allowing the chiefs again to establish themselves in authority in the tribes.

Azerbaijan.

7. The situation in the Rezaieh district is calming down. The Soviet authorities are co-operating to restrain the Kurds. Most of the villagers have returned to their homes.

8. In Khalkhal (Eastern Azerbaijan) there has been some disturbance resulting from the collection of arms by Persian troops (see Summary No. 20/42, paragraph 15).

9. The whole of the force despatched from Tehran (see Summary No. 20/42, paragraph 7) has now reached Rezaieh.

10. The following important Kurds of Azerbaijan are now in Tehran: Qazi Mohamed and Sheikh Abdullah of the Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh) District, and Qarani Agha, Chief of the Mamish. Among representations they have made is that the Dehbukri chieftain, Amir Assad, whom the Persian Government recently appointed Governor of Mahabad, should be replaced by a Persian official.

11. The intrusion of a small British mechanised column, moving from Mosul via Rowanduz to Saqqiz, Senneh and Kermanshah, has given rise to a number of rumours in Azerbaijan: the British were coming to keep order in the Rezaieh area, the Russians having failed to do so; the Germans were approaching the Caucasus and the British had come to help the Russians; the British had realised that the Russians were bound to be defeated and were reconnoitring positions to be occupied when that happened.

Fars.

12. The General Officer Commanding the Fars Division reports that the operations in Dashti have been brought to a successful conclusion, all chiefs having submitted except Ali Ismail of Daiyyr.

13. Except for some minor robberies on the road between Shiraz and Abadeh, the work of migrating tribes, the situation in Fars is quiet. Troops are being moved from both the Fars and Isfahan Divisions towards the summer quarters of the Boir Ahmadi and these movements may explain approaches recently made by certain rebel Boir Ahmadi chiefs to Persian officials both in Ahwaz and Isfahan.

14. The Government have informed the Governor-General of Fars that they will in no circumstances agree to the recognition of Nasir Qashgai as head of the tribe.

Khuzestan.

15. The General Officer Commanding South-Western Division now considers that it will be unnecessary to make a military demonstration against the Arabs. He has advocated a reasonable policy of reconciliation (see Summary No. 21/42, paragraph 11).

Kurdistan.

16. The situation in Northern Kurdistan is reported in paragraph 7 above. In Southern Kurdistan the situation is still quiet. General Shahbakhti has, according to his own statement, made an agreement with some of the Baneh Beqzadehs, not including Hama Rashid, regarding local security and responsibility which may be temporarily satisfactory. There are now no Persian troops nearer to Baneh than Saqqiz, where Persian administration has been re-established.

17. In the Shahabad area there are signs of impending trouble, where the Waladbegi and Babajani tribes are reported to be meditating an attack on the Guran. There is, however, as yet no reason to think that this will develop into anything serious.

Russian Affairs.

18. The Soviet military authorities at Kazvin are now refusing to allow British officers and military personnel to go to Resht and Pahlevi. The matter is being taken up with the Soviet Embassy, who have previously stated on several occasions that there was no restriction on movements to Resht and certain other places.

19. This change of attitude may be due to one or more of several causes. For some time past the Soviet military authorities have been asking for the withdrawal of Polish evacuation staffs at Pahlevi and Kazvin on the grounds that there is to be no further evacuation of Poles. It is probable also that they resent the intrusion of British troops into their zone mentioned in paragraph 11 above, and that their suspicions have been further aroused by the inquisitive journeyings of British general officers in the vicinity of Mianeh, Kazvin and Resht.

Egyptian Affairs.

20. Abdul Latif Talat Pasha has been appointed Egyptian Minister in Persia.

Polish Affairs.

21. On the 5th June a convoy of 910 Polish military personnel left Tehran on the Habbaniya route. The approximate distribution on the 8th June was as follows:—

		Pahlevi.	Tehran.	Ahwaz.	On Habbaniya route.
Military—					
Men	...	400	301	11,466	5,748
		(Rear party)			
Women	435	11	
Boys	
Civilian—					
Men	1,703	...	
Women	5,607	...	
Children	3,406	...	

Tehran, June 9, 1942.

[E 3806/19/34]

No. 26.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 190.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 24, the 10th-16th June, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, June 16, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the Period
June 10-16, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Legal.

DRAFT regulations have been laid before the Majlis to regularise the establishment of military courts formed under the Military Government Law of 1909-10. There were no such regulations previously in force, and it was not clear what offences were triable by military courts. The principal offences now to be brought within the jurisdiction of such courts are offences against the safety of the Realm, subversive movements against the Constitution (to profess a belief in communism is a specific offence), sabotage, certain breaches of the Press Law, and offences against the anti-hoarding laws.

2. The Government, not content with the powers given to it by the Anti-Hoarding Law, has asked the Majlis for full powers to deal with problems of food distribution. On the 14th June the Majlis approved a single-article Bill which gives the Government full powers to take any necessary measures, in addition to those authorised in the Anti-Hoarding Law, for the acquisition and distribution of food-stuffs.

Economic.

3. The press, Parliament and the public are greatly concerned about the question of food for the next twelve months. Unfavourable reports of the harvest reach Tehran from many parts of the country. Serious shortages undoubtedly do exist in some areas, but it was to be expected that local officials and landowners would underestimate their own resources. An even approximately accurate estimate of grain available cannot yet be made. The current belief that there is a shortage will encourage even the peasant to hoard his grain.

4. The Government has now fixed the buying price of grain for certain areas, of which the following are examples:—

	Rials per ton.
Kerman	1,500
Fars	1,600
Khuzestan	1,650

5. The shortage of motor transport, which is largely due to shortage of tyres, is a problem which is likely to be of increasing complexity. It affects not only the distribution of supplies, but also the ability of the Persian forces to maintain order. Nothing is more likely to provoke disorder than failure to ensure an equitable distribution of supplies. There may be some scope in the development of animal transport, but it will possibly be found that the greater part of the available animal transport is already employed on essential carriage. Shortage of grain and fodder also limits its possibilities.

Appointments—Civil.

6. Farajullah Asef—a Kurdish Deputy of the Majlis—to be Governor of Senneh.

Persian Forces.

7. There is a noticeable improvement in the morale of the Persian Army. Desertions are fewer; in the Tehran divisions the men look less victimised, and it seems they are being less badly treated by their officers. There is, however, no evidence that the army is, on the whole, more pro-British in its sentiments.

8. The gendarmerie is still indisciplined, corrupt, badly officered and under strength. Service in the gendarmerie is voluntary and its attraction has always lain in the opportunities for blackmail and pickings of various sorts. The present rates of pay, together with the generally reduced opportunity for illicit additions to income, fail to attract recruits.

8A. A brigade on the new establishment is being formed at Turbat-i-Jam in Khorassan.

Appointments—Military.

- 9.—(i) Sartip Kazim Shaibani to command the Tehran Independent Cavalry Brigade.
- (ii) Sarhang Mohamed Mazheri to be Director of the Ist Bureau, General Staff.
- (iii) Sarhang Garzan to be Director of the IIIrd Bureau, General Staff (previously Director of the Ist Bureau).
- (iv) Sarhang Himmat to command a brigade of the Fars Division.
- (v) Sarhang Hashimi to be Chief of the Gendarmerie in Fars.
- (vi) Sarlashkar Muqaddam to be Military Governor of Tehran, *vice* Sartip Abdur Reza Afkhami.

Conscription.

10. Certain articles of the Conscription Law of the 19th June, 1938, have been amended. The main changes introduced by these amendments are as follows:—

- (i) Provincial conscription committees may tour their province so as to lessen the journey to be made by conscripts called up for examination.

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- (ii) Conscripts may perform their military service in the garrison town nearest to their temporary place of residence if they so desire.
- (iii) The Civil Status and Statistics Department will in future be the body charged with verification of the particulars of men called up.
- (iv) Previously men passed as partially fit or fit for light duties were allotted sedentary occupations in military service. Under the amended law men not passed as fit will not be called up.
- (v) Previously certain categories of breadwinners and sole supporters of incapacitated relations or minors used to serve eight months with the colours and were subsequently drafted for the balance of their military service (sixteen months) to the road guards. Under the amended law such persons shall receive exemption for a year at a time up to five years, after which they will be called up for one year and then released.
- (vi) The care of a conscript's destitute dependants devolves upon the municipal authorities and is a charge against them.
- (vii) The course of training for reserve officers has been reduced from twelve to six months.
- (viii) The work of provincial conscription committees will be subject to periodical inspection by inspectors from the capital.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

11. In Western Azerbaijan there have been some alarms. It was locally believed that Shahpur (Dilman) was being threatened by Kurds, and there was some panic, which was calmed by some unspecified action of the Soviet authorities. Anxiety was also created at Maku by movements of the Jalali Kurds which, as far as is known, have not yet resulted in any disorder.

Kurdistan.

12. The situation is quiet, and if Hama Rashid were removed to and detained in Iraq there would be little cause for anxiety in this area.

Fars.

13. After a month or so of relative security robberies have again occurred on the Bushire-Shiraz road. The offenders are probably Boir Ahmadi tribesmen, and possibly malcontents from Dashti.

14. At the meeting of divisional commanders referred to in Summary No. 23/42, paragraph 6, a plan of action was concerted against the Boir Ahmadi. The plan envisages concerted action against the Boir Ahmadi summer headquarters in the vicinity of Tal Khosrow (D.S. H.39.J) by columns from the Fars Division operating from Baiza (D.S. H.39.Q), from the Isfahan Division operating from Simarun (D.S. H.39.D), and from the South-Western Division operating from Behbahan (D.S. H.39.I).

Kerman.

15. There have been hold-ups of traffic on the Bandar Abbas-Kerman road, U.K.C.C. lorries carrying petrol being stopped in one case. They were, however, allowed to proceed after the drivers had been relieved of their cash. Hunger is probably the incentive for these robberies. From Khamir, a small coastal town between Bandar Abbas and Lingeh, comes the report of a clash between Amnieh and a gang of robbers. The former suffered defeat, the loss of six rifles and a fine which was levied in return for the release of their commanding officer, who had been captured in the affray.

Russian Interests.

16. The Soviet authorities have said that for reasons of security they must insist that no foreigners may enter the Russian-occupied zone without passes signed by the Soviet Military Attaché. This applies to British officers in uniform, the Soviet justification being that a British uniform is the most likely disguise for a German spy. Applications for passes have been dealt with very promptly.

17. Lieutenant-Colonel Masloff, Soviet Military Attaché, has been recalled to Russia and has been replaced by Colonel Razin. An Assistant Soviet Military Attaché, Major Belachev, has also been appointed.

CHAPTER II. American Interests.

18. The press has been running a strong campaign in favour of the engagement of American advisers, particularly for finance and education. America has recently been the subject of many flattering articles.

Free French Interests.

19. M. Goddard, the representative in Persia of the Free French National Committee, has been officially recognised by the Persian Government. M. Goddard has been Director of the Archaeological Department of the Persian Government since 1934.

20. Commandant Jouvel has been nominated as military delegate in Persia of the Free French forces and represents General Catroux.

Tehran, June 16, 1942.

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 1847/207/89]

No. 27.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office, April 9.)

Weekly Political Summary.

(No. 730. Saving. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, March 19, 1942.

1. *General.*

THERE has been a further lull in the political troubles that have been gathering in Syria and the Lebanon. Shukri Quwatli is still in Bagdad and will probably remain there for another week, as he is reported to be busy in his efforts to settle outstanding difficulties between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The strike which the students in Damascus were reported to be organising for 14th March did not take place, which is significant in that it probably indicates that they were uncertain of popular reaction. It is now apparent that, though the arrests of the political agitators in Damascus provoked high feelings, the strong action taken has nevertheless acted as a sedative to a situation which showed signs of getting out of hand.

Control of the issue of passports has been handed over to the Syrian Government by the Free French. This does not appear to have created any profound impression, but it is likely that at least its political implication has temporarily confounded political agitators.

The visit of Colonel Glubb to various parts of Syria has caused much speculation and given the politically conscious food for thought.

The price and the supply of wheat remain the burning question throughout the land and anxiety is general that prices may sky-rocket and a state of partial famine arise where local consumption is not covered by distribution under the present scheme. To meet this situation, measures have been devised, and an agreement virtually reached between British and French economic advisers, but unfortunately the "Comité supérieur de Ravitaillement" was unable to set the seal on them at its meeting last week, as the new Syrian delegate had apparently no knowledge of the wheat problem nor authority to discuss it. Meanwhile, the Syrian Ministers of Supply and Interior have suddenly shown great activity and have succeeded in buying appreciable quantities of wheat in the Jezireh which they are moving in to Aleppo. Although this belated disposition to help themselves on the part of the Syrian Government is something to be encouraged, it is clear that only an overall scheme to deal with the interim period until the harvest, the new crop and the ever-present activities of the speculators will adequately meet the situation. It is hoped that agreement to such a scheme will be arrived at this week at a meeting of the comité in Damascus. Already it is becoming clear that transport is likely to be a major factor in handling the new crop.

An anti-locust conference was held in Damascus on 12th March attended by British, French, Syrian and Lebanese representatives, and another meeting is taking place on 18th March at Haifa to co-ordinate measures between the adjacent Levantine countries.

The local Franco-Syrian authorities are at present reported to be dealing efficiently with an outbreak in the area between Kamischlo and Hassetche.

Twelve cases of typhus have been reported from the Damascus area and three from Aleppo, while the village of Kannassai (50 kilom. south-east of Aleppo) was found to be so badly infected that it has been isolated by the medical authorities. Steps have been taken for the immediate exchange of information about epidemics between the local Syrian and Turkish frontier authorities.

2. *Syria: Damascus.*

Political activity has been slight and there has been no breach of public order during the week. A number of petitions and rumours are the only reactions to the shock caused by the arrests in the previous week.

Resentment against the authority exercised by the Services spéciaux was again expressed to our political officer. The Government is reported to be writing to General Catroux asking that S.S. officers should be instructed not to intervene directly in Syrian administration but should confine themselves to acting as Intelligence Officers and advisers. Reasonable as such a request seems, it savours of a counsel of perfection, since the Syrian Civil Service is not to be relied upon to administer the country efficiently and honestly and its authority counts for little in the outlying and tribal districts. On the other hand, there is no doubt that some of the S.S. officers are not qualified for their posts and are tactless in handling the local authorities.

There has been great speculation as to who will fill the vacancy in the Cabinet caused by the death of Abdul Ghaffar Pasha Al Atrash, but so far no decision has been taken.

On 12th March the President of the Republic drank a large dose of benzine in mistake for water and great consternation followed. Wild rumours spread through the town and, to calm the population and to dash the hopes of many, it was deemed necessary for the sheikh to take the air publicly on Friday, 13th.

At the time of writing, an outbreak of trouble among Senegalese soldiers at Damascus is reported, in which it is believed at least one French officer was killed. Firing lasted for about an hour. No British or local inhabitants were involved and it seems that the fighting was the result of differences between a section of Senegalese troops and their officers. Though this has created a bad impression, it appears that the cause of the trouble was a personal matter and has no local political significance. Further reports are awaited.

3. *Aleppo.*

The situation has remained quiet but the feeling in the area is increasingly uneasy, mainly because of the excessive prices of bread and other commodities, rumours regarding the arrests at Damascus and the absence of reassuring war news.

None of the fourteen Deputies from the Aleppo district in the last Syrian Parliament, nor those from the adjacent northern district, has signed the recent circulated manifesto in favour of Sheikh Taj. Over plans for welcoming back Shukri Quwatli the two main local Nationalist factions, those of the Jabris and of Dr. Fouad Hassan Ibrahim, are reported to be uniting temporarily. Government schools were given a short holiday for fear, apparently, that demonstrations would be made.

Details of the Government purchases of wheat in the Jezireh are not yet available, but on the recent visit of the Ministers of Interior and Supply a promise was made that bread in Aleppo would soon be on sale at PS. 30 a kilog. to all except the rich. The poor will also try to buy at this price to supplement their cheaper daily ration of $\frac{1}{4}$ kilog. of flour, which is inadequate when the prices of other normal foods are prohibitive. It is felt locally that urgent action is becoming necessary against hoarders, or that increased supplies of cheap wheat must be made available; failing which, there may be serious local unrest in the near future.

There have been further rumours of Turkish troop concentrations in the Hatay area, and according to one rumour Germany has offered Syria and Iraq to Turkey if the latter country will allow the free passage of German troops.

4. *Homs and Hama.*

There is little to report from this area during the week.

Sheikh Trad-el-Melhem, of the Hassench, prepared a feast at Quriatein, at which Colonel Glubb, who was unfortunately delayed, was to have been guest of honour. The political officer was also invited and received a deputation of Imams, who pleaded for the release of Sheikh Moustapha S'bai, arrested some time ago in Palestine. Sheikh Trad eloquently supported this plea, and made a second appeal on the question of *ravitaillement*. The company then sat down to a feast of eighty sheep and three camels!

5. *Jebel Druze.*

Generals Catroux and Collet, and political officers representing General Wilson and Mr. Hamilton, as well as all the members of the Syrian Government (except Sheikh Taj) were present at the funeral of Abdul Ghaffar Pasha Al Atrash. General Catroux delivered an oration in which he praised the Pasha's loyalty to France; but his speech caused some criticism in Government circles.

because it contained references to the Druze nation which tended to perpetuate the semi-autonomous régime of the Jebel.

Great interest has been aroused in the Jebel as to who will be appointed Minister of Defence. The Druze feel that another Druze must inevitably be chosen, and there is much to be said for their contention. It is reported that Soltan Pasha El Atrash has been approached by the Damascus Government with a view to his accepting the post. Soltan, who is still very anti-French, has apparently been sulking in the country since he was not consulted in the matter of Sheikh Taj's appointment. It does not appear likely that he will accept.

6. *Alaouite Territory.*

There are no events of political importance to record.

7. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

Although more or less cordial relations exist between Free French S.S. officers and Turkish officials on the frontier, the general situation is far from satisfactory, in that only a few of the multitudinous minor frontier incidents ever get settled. The Turks have twice lodged a strong protest to the British Embassy at Angora to the effect that the French take no adequate steps to stop these raids nor settle them. The French, in turn, are as vehement in regard to alleged violations of the frontier by Turkish raiders. Matters are now more or less at a standstill, but it is hoped to arrange shortly to get frontier relations on a better footing by an *ad hoc* understanding between the parties.

The délégué adjoint has promised to provide statistics on the registration of arms which is being completed. It seems probable that only some 3,000 rifles have been declared out of a total estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 for the Euphrates Province alone.

The wheat situation is somewhat confused, with the local authorities seeking to scrape together the small quantities offered on the market, for distribution to the poor of the towns. In spite of alarms raised from time to time, the latest reports on crops throughout the area are favourable, and the recent heavy rains have caused a feeling of optimism in regard to the forthcoming harvest.

The oft-postponed tribal conference on the disputes between the Feda'an and Wulda took place in Damascus on 12th March, when it appeared that both sides were anxious to make peace. The agreement proposed by the tribal arbiters was readily accepted. It awarded a lump-sum indemnity of £S. 50,000 to the Wulda. As the Wulda were fined £S. 13,000 by the Free French authorities for their recent breach of the truce, in the final analysis the Wulda sheikhs receive £S. 37,000, which, owing to the recent heavy casualties of livestock suffered by the Feda'an, is likely to be met by the Syrian and French authorities. It is hoped that this agreement closes another chapter in the rich history of blood feuds in this area.

8. *Lebanon.*

Initial discussions between the Lebanese Government and the Délégation générale regarding the handing over of certain powers to the former have revealed a number of difficulties, mostly connected with finance, and no definite decisions have yet been recorded except as regards the issue of passports. It is learnt privately that the Free French authorities are much concerned over the question of the "intérêts communs," from which they are at present drawing much of their funds, as they are not anxious to have this fact brought into the open, but realise that they will have to meet increasing pressure from the Lebanese side on the subject.

The Constitutional party are bickering amongst themselves about the constitution of their working committee, and, failing active British support, now seem more unlikely to be able to constitute a solid Opposition front to the present Government.

The recent severe fines inflicted by the French military courts on a large group of merchants accused of profiteering in rice have given rise to an unofficial protest by the Merchants' Association to General Catroux, on the grounds that the sentences were unjustified by the evidence.

General Catroux's proclamation to the population requiring the surrender of all arms by 31st March has now been posted up.

9. *Press and Propaganda.*

The transfer of the Passport Service from the Free French authorities to Syria has resulted in an outburst of enthusiasm for Free France, not only from

the Syrian but also from the Lebanese press. On this subject several articles were published, the tenor of which was that Free France had responded, by a spontaneous gesture, to a question of national pride, and that the independent life of Syria was now proved beyond a shadow of doubt.

The death of Abdul Ghaffar Pasha Al Atrash was deeply mourned by the press of both countries, and several papers published biographical articles.

The war in Russia continues to hold the headlines, but the exploits of Free French forces in Libya have come a very close second as regards prominence, especially in the French press.

The Syrian press was particularly insistent on a solution of the food problem, while *An Nidale*, of Beirut, asked bluntly how long the Government intends to remain a spectator in the crisis in the rise of prices.

Some excellent news-reels have been shown in cinemas, which have had a marked effect on the population. A film of the raid on Vaagso produced an audibly good effect on the audiences.

The enemy have chosen diverse subjects for radio propaganda, ranging from war news to British atrocities and Arab resistance. Special emphasis was laid on reports of risings in Syria and the Lebanon "following large-scale arrests by the British."

[E 2242/207/89]

No. 28.

General Spears to Minister of State (Cairo).—(Received in Foreign Office April 10.)

Weekly Political Summary.

1. *General.*

In Syria—as in the Lebanon—the week has passed quietly, but the general feeling of political malaise persists. All the underlying causes of instability remain and economic difficulties provide ever-present incentives for unrest. Political agitators have not yet recovered from the cold douche of the Damascus arrests. Shukri Quwatli is still in Iraq, and the Nationalist politicians, discouraged in their hopes of bringing about an Anglo-French split, are waiting on events. The lack of success of Allied arms continues to have a depressing effect on the country, which is living in fear of what the spring may bring.

The absence of cohesion in the Syrian Government has come to the surface. Faïdi Bey al Atassi (Minister of Education) resigned because he could not get on with his colleagues, notably with the President and Prime Minister, and also, it seems, because of his fears of an impending Axis attack. Though there is a good deal to be said for Faïdi's complaints, his departure is not likely to be felt. It now appears probable that Soltan Pasha al Atrash will fill the place of Abdul Ghaffar (Ministry of Defence). Bahji Bey el Khatib (Ministry of Interior), who only agreed to accept office temporarily, is anxious to be relieved of his post. It is proposed to ask Hikmet el Haraki (Ministry of Ravitaillement) to make way for someone more effective, and there is talk of still another of the present Ministers disappearing.

With the several vacancies thus available, the Government has an opportunity of making changes and bringing in new blood. However, the choice of public men who will accept office under Sheikh Taj is limited. Moreover, the latter continues to interfere unduly in the work of the Ministries, so that it seems likely that the President and Prime Minister will soon fall out again.

The politicians of the National bloc are naturally pleased to see a Government crisis in the offing, and do not believe that any reshuffle will do more than postpone a breakdown. The Shahbandarists find in present developments a good opportunity for seeking additional portfolios. It remains to be seen whether the Free French authorities will take advantage of the increased fluidity of the political situation and try to give, by means of judicious concessions, the necessary impetus to a reformed Government to carry it through the difficult months ahead.

Widespread anxiety over the supply of wheat persists and the situation has worsened in the villages of North-West Syria, where acute shortage is beginning to show itself. The local authorities in various parts of the country are buying up the small quantities available on the market as a reserve for distribution to the poor. Looking further ahead, satisfactory rains in most areas have caused increasing confidence in the prospects of a good harvest.

At a recent meeting of the Comité supérieur de Ravitaillement Damascus to finalise Anglo-French wheat proposals it was learned that the Syrian Government's "peaceful" buying programme was going so well that they were fairly confident that they would be able to acquire the necessary reserves to tide them over to the new harvest, provided no steps were taken which would upset the market and frighten available stocks underground. It was agreed, therefore, to give them until the end of the month, and in the meantime to put the finishing touches on the new regulations for handling the next crop and the decrees designed to combat hoarding. In the meantime, the Lebanese Government have decided to proceed immediately with anti-hoarding measures with a view to unearthing a part, at least, of the hidden stocks.

Major-General Sir Edward Spears, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., M.P., first Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Levant States, returned to Beirut from London on the 24th March.

2. Syria: Damascus.

The general situation has remained quiet. Owing to unseasonable storms the Beirut-Damascus road has again been closed by snow.

Trouble which had appeared among the Free French Colonial troops at Homs and Deraa culminated in a mutiny in Damascus on the 17th March. The men involved were Arabic-speaking Moslems from French Equatorial Africa, comprising a battalion and a squadron of reconnaissance groups. In one company a refusal to obey orders was followed by a serious shooting affray, which ended in the death of three French officers and three n.c.os. The other companies were affected, but did not get completely out of hand.

The affair has naturally had considerable adverse repercussions among the local population. As far as can be ascertained, its main causes were: young and inexperienced officers, the prolonged absence of the men from home, and disaffection caused by contact with anti-Allied Syrians. The least reliable portions of the units are being repatriated and the rest put into training outside Syria for active service. Replacement will be effected by other coloured troops now on the way.

The deflation policy of the banks continues to be felt, and was reinforced during the week by the effects of the bombing of Milas (Turkey). Merchants, feeling convinced that it was the beginning of the Axis attack on that country, took fright and began to sell out in order to convert their stocks into gold. In consequence a marked decline was shown in the price of cotton and silk piece-goods and yarns.

The concern shown by the British military authorities towards the victims of accidents caused by W.D. vehicles, and the compensation paid, have produced a good impression in the town.

3. Aleppo.

The week passed without disturbances, and on the whole the political and economic situation show a slight improvement. Efforts are being made to fill at least one vacancy in the Government by a representative from this area, and Mounir Ajlani has been visiting Aleppo as a personal representative of the President with this in view.

At the beginning of the week bread and flour were still being sold at prices largely beyond the reach of the poorer and even the middle classes, but on the 18th March a new decree regarding Government control of wheat was published, which, if properly handled, and if transport is available, should enable supplies from the Jezireh to be distributed where most required. By the end of the month ration cards should be available for all but the rich in Aleppo, enabling their holders to buy bread at PS. 32 per kilog., or its equivalent in flour, at certain intervals.

On the 19th March there was a considerable gathering in the Tajhiz school in honour of Dr. Trabulsi, who used to teach there, and who, it will be remembered, was accidentally shot by a British corporal two months ago. Representatives from other towns were among the teachers, but the meeting passed without incident or ill-feeling.

4. Homs and Hama.

The souks were closed on several occasions in Hama; there were demonstrations in the streets and several attempts were made to break into the houses of the leading merchants—the reason, as usual, being popular resentment at the high cost of living. The market price of wheat both in Homs and in Hama still remains at £S. 600 per ton.

Certain Nationalists, plucking up their courage, have been distributing pamphlets attacking "an independence which coincides with nothing, as the country remains without Parliament or Council of State and with a President who has not been elected."

5. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The Minister of the Interior, paying a flying visit to Deir ez Zor during the week, expressed his relief and satisfaction that the supply of wheat was abundant, and told the political officer that there would be a sufficiency until the next harvest. But as yet no decision has been taken for its distribution at prices which the poor could afford to pay. The Minister also stated that the Government was considering plans for building dams across the Khabour at Hassatche and Chaddadi, which would enable large areas of land to be flooded for the cultivation of rice.

Patrols from British detachments have now been arranged in the neighbourhood of the Assyrian Settlement on the Khabour. The Assyrians at present have 160 German and Russian rifles, but little ammunition. The provision of more is being seen to, and it is considered locally that the security of the Assyrians is sufficiently taken care of.

One of the authors of the recent anti-Ally posters has been arrested personally by the Syrian chief of police. The sight of Indian troops who recently marched through Deir ez Zor, combined with a display of Hurricanes, had an excellent effect upon the population. This news is gratifying, but in general the distribution of propaganda is inefficient and badly needs expert organisation.

6. Jebel Druze.

The Eighth Day Condolence Ceremony for the death of Abdul Ghaffar Pasha al Atrash was held on the 16th March. It was attended by about 15,000 people, including bedouin chiefs, Druzes from Mount Hermon and the Lebanon, a representative of the British Druze Regiment, and the délégué adjoint and British political officers. At the end of the ceremony Emir Hassan took the dead man's cloak and laid it symbolically on the shoulders of Yusef Bey.

The ceremony was not without political importance, as it enabled personalities of the Syrian Arab world to exchange opinions, and it is interesting to note that, although references to the 1925 revolt and the valour of Ghaffar Pasha were made in all the speeches, no lasting resentment against the French seems to have been retained at its suppression.

7. Alaouite Territory.

There are no political events to report, but the following brief summary on the security of the area is of interest.

Religious faith—and not party allegiance—determines the structural inter-relations of the Alaouite territory. The Alaouites (250,000), the Sunni Moslems (70,000), the Christians (70,000) and the Ismailis (7,000) all cordially detest each other; but this perpetual state of tension is most unlikely to develop into a state of insecurity, unless the Moslem Government at Damascus were to place Damascene officials in the more important administrative posts, as happened in 1936 and 1939.

There are few politicians in the territory, and it is only amongst some of the educated Moslems that party membership is important. A small section of the Moslems are prepared to do much to oust the French. Were we in control these latter would probably be with us; whereas, while we support the French, they are opposed to us, although not hostile, and in operations would probably remain neutral. Other members of the community are ready to accept the present situation, hoping for favourable post-war alterations—the Alaouites wanting more autonomy, the Christians stronger European control.

Insufficient grain is grown in the territory, and it has not received enough wheat from outside. What little has been sent seems to be mainly to the towns, although the bulk of the population lives in the hills, where the people are near starvation. Security is not threatened by disturbances, but the Alaouites are possibly the only people in Syria who might give us active assistance in the event of hostilities, and they want wheat—not propaganda.

Disturbances on religious, political or economic grounds are unlikely. Should Germany march through Turkey the Christians and the Moslems would remain passive, but almost all of these are townspeople—not fighters. On the other hand, the Alaouites are well-armed and hardy fighters, occupying almost

inaccessible country, and would be a considerable menace to the lines of communications. Given leadership and encouragement, they might assist us.

It is impossible to influence the Alaouites by political promises at the present time. Corn and flour have done much, but were insufficient. The best way in this primitive country is by personal friendships with the leaders and sheikhs (which count far more than political arguments or propaganda) and by our officers visiting and staying with these people in the hills. The French have never done this and have objected to our doing so, but we must override these objections on the grounds of security.

There are many disagreements between the leaders, but the best sheikhs on whom to rely are Shauqat el Abbas, the Mohafez and Ali el Kinj, the local Minister of the Interior, who are politically united with Suliman Murshid, the Alaouite "God." This triumvirate is too powerful for opposition, and our policy has been to support them and to try and make them personal friends. If this policy is continued we should not be endangered by enemy intrigue or insecurity in the Alaouite hills.

8. Lebanon.

Politics in the Lebanon during the week under review have given the appearance of being governed by the forthcoming arrival of His Majesty's Minister. The Constitutional party and Salah Beyhum's Moslem group are both preparing approaches to be made to him on his arrival, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has verbally indicated to President Naccache his desire to resign, is proposing to hold his hand until he has had the opportunity of discussing the situation in general, and his own position in particular, with General Spears. President Naccache, whose attitude swings pendulum-wise between the French and British authorities, is now swinging in the latter direction and is giving every appearance of wishing to collaborate fully with us at present.

On his recent visit to Egypt General Catroux discussed with Nahas Pasha the question of Egypt's recognition of the Lebanon.

There have been slight disturbances in the Tripoli region on account of the maldistribution of flour to the population, chiefly due to the bad organisation by the Ravitaillement authorities.

General Catroux' proclamation to the population to hand in their arms by the 31st March seems up to the present to have had no effect whatever, and in Tripoli many of the posters have been torn down.

9. Tribal.

As a result of the abnormal winter losses in livestock, especially among some of the large nomad tribes, there has recently been an increase in the number of minor raids, which the Contrôle Bédouin, backed by the light desert companies (ex-Meharistes), have been hard put to it to check. On the other hand, the peaceful settlement of the Wulda-Feda'an feud and the composition last week of the difficulties between the Beni-Khaled and the Alaouites, have created a good impression generally.

In order to relieve genuine distress among the tribes, as well as to consolidate the allegiance of the chiefs, a plan of assistance has been evolved between the British and French authorities. Subsidies amounting to some £15,000 are to be distributed to the leading sheikhs, roughly in accordance with the importance of their tribes. In addition, supplies of wheat, dates and ewes (if available) are to be provided gratis. A proportion of money and supplies will also be distributed to the semi-sedentary tribes, under Anglo-French supervision.

10. Press and Propaganda.

Press commentary on the war during the past week dealt mainly with Britain's intention to concentrate on Germany as the arch-enemy. General satisfaction is expressed at the plan of isolating Japan, who would then have to face the combined onslaught of the Allies after the destruction of German military strength.

The all-important question of food supply continues to take up the greater part of the space devoted to local affairs in the papers. It is gratifying to note that criticism is now mainly directed against speculators and against the population itself rather than against the supply authorities. One Arabic paper devoted an entire issue to denouncing hoarders and to appeals to the public to assist in bringing the culprits to book.

A dramatic performance in Arabic, entitled "Homage to Democracy," was given last week in Beirut, and was particularly well received by large audiences.

In his broadcasts in Arabic the enemy was particularly insistent on the theory that Persia is being taken over by the Soviets, with the usual trimmings of terrorism and mass executions. The "Free Arab" station gave a list of anglophiles, including several Lebanese and Syrians, the population being warned to avoid contact with these persons, "who would betray them to the British."

(Copies sent to Mr. Armstrong.)

Beirut, March 26, 1942.

[E 2121/207/89]

No. 29.

General Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 2. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, April 2, 1942.

Weekly Political Summary.

1. General.

THE week has passed quietly—in Syria as in Lebanon—but political developments are the general expectation in both countries. The arrival of His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States has been widely welcomed and has aroused hopes of British intervention in all manner of local problems. Politicians are considering how best to trim their sails to take advantage of possible changes in the wind. The wheat situation is no worse, though it does not seem that the top of the hill has yet been reached. As the season advances, the feeling of living in the shadow of the war intensifies and tends to inhibit political activity.

In Syria the members of the National bloc are still waiting on developments and Shukri Quwatli has not yet returned to Damascus. It is reliably reported that some sort of reconciliation has taken place between Jamil Mardam and Hashem el Atasi, with an agreement, possibly, to co-operate in ridding the country of Sheikh Taj and establishing a constitutional Government. If confirmed, such a rapprochement would indicate a strengthening of Jamil Mardam's position as a rival of Shukri Quwatli.

The crisis within the Government continues. The Prime Minister proposes to reconstitute the Cabinet into a cohesive whole, with the Ministers responsible to himself instead of, as now, to the President. The latter, whose prerogatives would be fully respected, would no longer be allowed to interfere with the workings of departments. As a corollary, the Prime Minister considers a strong line must be taken with the Free French to insist that they proceed to implement the promises of independence.

The political situation in Syria is therefore more fluid at the moment than it has been since the Government was constituted. General Catroux has visited Damascus, but it is not yet known with what result. The most probable outcome would seem to be a reconstitution of the Cabinet on the lines proposed by the Prime Minister, accompanied by further concessions to independence. A declaration referring to the inauguration of constitutional procedure in the future would also be likely to render any interim régime more generally acceptable. Failing some such steps, it is on the cards that the Government will disintegrate.

His Majesty's Minister presented his letters of credence to the Lebanese President on 27th March and to the Syrian President on 31st March. The ceremony in Damascus was particularly impressive, and on both occasions there were considerable and spontaneous manifestations of enthusiasm on the part of the public.

2. Economic.

While there has been no further deterioration in the wheat situation in Syria, it is too early yet to assess the results of the Government's buying programme and their endeavour to locate hidden stocks by "peaceful" methods. At any rate, sufficient wheat has been purchased to maintain supplies—provided transport is available—for the next month or so. The Minister of the Interior is hopeful of a record harvest this year, which he estimates will be:—

Wheat	550,000 to 600,000 tons.
Barley	200,000 to 250,000 tons.
Millet	125,000 tons.

An important measure passed by the Lebanese Government on 26th March compelled the declaration of all stocks of wheat in the country under the threat of heavy penalties for failure to do so, and fixed the price of wheat in the market at £S. 360 per ton. The immediate result was a drop in the price of wheat in the open market. Public opinion, however, is suspending judgment on the measure until it can be seen how effectively it will be enforced and whether the Syrian Government will pass a similar measure (which is, in fact, under urgent consideration). The stocks of wheat held in the Lebanon are generally supposed to be much smaller than those held in Syria (particularly in Aleppo), and, unlike Syria, prominent members of the Government are not amongst those supposed to hold some of the largest stocks.

Abnormal mortality among live-stock, due to the severe winter, coupled with the demands of the Allied armies, has brought about serious problems in the supply of meat, and a meeting was held in Jerusalem on 26th March of representatives of Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon to co-ordinate measures. It was agreed that the army should be given the right of sole purchases in the Middle East outside the three countries (which are meat-importing). Proportions were established for the subsequent distribution of cattle and sheep purchased, and proposals accepted, subject to ratifications, for four meatless days in each of the countries. It was furthermore agreed that there should be common fixed prices for live-stock, based on the imported cost, and that retail prices should also be kept in line as far as possible.

3. Syria: Damascus.

On 23rd March the students of three secondary schools went on strike in protest against the arrest of a master (one of the ten men arrested at the end of February). The strike appears to have been little more than a formal protest and all the boys returned to school the next day.

On 27th March there were demonstrations against the price of bread. Owing to a misunderstanding, a notice was issued prematurely by the municipality raising the price of bread for the middle classes. The purport of the notice was misunderstood and exaggerated, and excited crowds indulged in some stone-throwing, certain shops were closed, and in two districts trams prevented from running. The President hastened to issue reassurances and the people were calmed fairly quickly. This was fortunate, as demonstrations which take place on Fridays often assume dangerous proportions. The Municipality of Damascus has since revised its method of distribution, dividing consumers into four classes, for whom bread (or the equivalent in flour) will be available at prices varying from PS. 10 to PS. 50 a kilog.

On 29th March, the Prophet's birthday, great celebrations took place at the Omayyad Mosque, attended by representatives of the French and British authorities. Further official junketings in the afternoon marked the unification of Syria. These ceremonies, which were accompanied by colourful parades through the town designed to display Syrian military pomp and strength, apparently had a good effect on the Damascenes.

Emir Faour el Faour, chief of the Fadl tribe, has completed his peregrinations on behalf of the President. He states that he has obtained, without difficulty, the signatures of a majority of the ex-Deputies to the "mazbata" proclaiming their support to the present Government. In a conversation with the Political Officer, Damascus, he passed the following comments on Shukri Quwatli, which are worth recording:—

Although not a friend of Shukri's, they recently made the pilgrimage together. Shukri's intention, according to the Emir Faour, was to prevail on Ibn Saud to act as intermediary between himself and the British with a view to changing the régime in Syria, Shukri, for his part of the bargain, being prepared to pledge the Nationalist party's loyalty to the Allies. The King had replied that the present time of flux and uncertainty was not propitious for changes, especially in institutions that were only provisional and bound up with personalities. Shukri, being most disappointed with this reply, returned to Bagdad to get Nuri Pasha Said to do what Ibn Saud had refused. Nuri had been, the Emir Faour thought, somewhat more amenable and was willing to put him in touch with the British, but not to go any further on his behalf. Eventually, to employ Shukri's pent-up energy, both Nuri and Ibn Saud thought they might do worse than to use him to solve some outstanding minor difficulties between themselves. The Emir Faour obviously endorsed the cautious attitude adopted by both the King and the Prime Minister, and remarked that it would

be folly to trust the Nationalists, who were of the same movement as Rashid Ali, the Mufti and so many other pro-Axis elements.

The Emir Faour went on to express the view that Shukri Quwatli and Jamil Mardam were by nature and position opposed to each other: Jamil, ambitious and clever, but having lost public confidence; Shukri, a man of principle, less subtle, but with a following. He was certain they would eventually come into open conflict over the leadership of the Nationalist party.

4. Aleppo.

The area has remained quiet, though there continues to exist a dangerous discontent over the high cost of food. The discontent in the surrounding villages is quite as great, though it is not so potentially troublesome, as in Aleppo. Crop prospects remain satisfactory, however, and the anxious period is shortening.

It is hoped that the new ravitaillement arrangements will be operating early in April, whereby some 170,000 of the population will be able to buy bread at not more than PS. 36 a kilog., in addition to the 85,000 poor who should be getting British flour at 40 per cent. of this price. The remaining 45,000 or so will have to rely on their own stocks or else buy in the open market, which remains at over PS. 60 the kilog. for bread. Pending the issue of ration cards, inevitable confusion and duplication is taking place.

Munir Ajlani, who visited Aleppo as the special representative of Sheikh Taj, has returned to Damascus without having persuaded any of the leading local men to join the Government. He contacted possible candidates of all parties, excluding only Saadullah Jabri. The impression in local political circles remains that the present Ministry cannot last long and that this is no moment to join it. People in Aleppo are true to form in their failure to show effective public spirit, as exemplified by the bread problem, but they have been consistent in their disapproval of Sheikh Taj. General Collet also has been especially unpopular in the north since his leading part in the return of the Hatay to Turkey.

Some hopes have been raised of a change in the Turkish attitude towards the retention of all Syrian and other foreign property in the Hatay. Official information is lacking, but a leader of the Barmada family, who is one of the largest landowners affected, has returned from a reassuring visit to Angora. The wish of the Turks not to make themselves unpopular in Northern Syria just now may have something to do with this. For once, Syrians look rather enviously across the frontier, because bread is better controlled there.

There were no frontier incidents worthy of mention, and relations are reported to be satisfactory. On a visit to Antioch the Political Officer, who took with him the Turkish Consul from Aleppo, was received in very friendly fashion by the Vali and other officers in charge of the frontier. Some talk about mutual problems was inevitable. The Turks' only complaints were regarding the extent of cattle-smuggling from the rich Hatay pastures to this denuded country and, as usual, regarding the Armenian interpreters of the French S.S. officers who handle frontier affairs.

The movement of armed tribal bands in certain areas east and south of Aleppo is being watched by the authorities, but no clashes are reported. Grazing is now comparatively plentiful, so that troubles on this score should diminish.

The radio broadcast of the "Arabes Libres" is stated to have threatened local security officers, following the recent arrest here of a gang which previously caused trouble in Palestine. Other threats about this area have also continued in foreign broadcasts. Food prices, however, have been the main material of hostile propaganda.

5. Homs and Hama.

The week has been marked by some increased political activity. Schools in Homs and Hama were closed for three days in sympathy with those of Damascus. Members of the National *bloc* are again agitating for a change in the Government, and there are indications that they still consider that the Nationalist cause is supported by the British. There have been many rumours that Jamil Mardam will be appointed by Sheikh Taj as Prime Minister, a step which, it is supposed, would meet with the approval of the British but not of the French. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that, during two meetings held in the houses of Homs notables recently, it was admitted that, locally at least, there was no use in attempting to drive a wedge between the British and the French. Faïdi Atasi, until recently Minister of Education, has resumed his post as President of Homs Municipality.

There is no change in the wheat situation. The recent few days of very bad weather have not affected cereal crops, although it is feared that some orchards have suffered. The prices of sugar, coffee and some other commodities showed a slight fall.

Enemy radio broadcasts continued to heighten fears of an impending attack on Syria.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

Detailed reports have not been received from this area, but, in general, the situation remains calm.

On his recent visit to the area, the Minister of the Interior apparently succeeded in arranging for the immediate purchase of 1,500 tons of wheat in the Jezireh, and for a further 6,500 tons to be delivered at the railway in the near future, at prices around £S. 340 per ton. The Minister complained that Aleppo merchants were ordering wheat from the Jezireh at £S. 550-600 per ton, but stated that he had taken steps with the postal authorities not to transmit such orders. Efforts are being made to assist the Syrian Government by making available railway trucks and motor transport to move supplies of wheat to the areas of consumption.

7. Jebel Druze.

Speculation continues as to who will fill the vacant post of Minister of Defence. It is reported that the Emir Hassan el Atrash has been approached, but is only prepared to accept on condition that he is allowed to remain, at the same time, Mohafez of the Zebel. Soltan Pasha has had interviews with General Catroux and the President, and it now appears probable that he will accept.

Mohammed Pasha Izzedine el Halabi, one of the principal traditional opponents of the Atrash family, has voiced to the Political Officer his views on the Atrash Government of the Jebel and the nepotism that goes with it. Mohammed Pasha's followers are not strong enough to be a danger to security at present, but their pride is hurt and their pockets none too full.

Similar dissatisfaction is reported from the Hauran: that Damascus pays too much attention to the Atrash oligarchy. Such criticisms are somewhat disturbing, as they show the existence of fertile ground for Axis propaganda.

8. Alaouite Territory.

There are no events of political importance to report and the Political and Economic Officers have been spending much time in arranging the distribution of flour by the American Red Cross, and assisting in its repartition among the Alaouites of the mountains.

Several minor disturbances, possibly connected with the food shortage, have taken place, when Alaouites have made road blocks and held up cars for robbery. It is reported that these acts were caused by the people of Suleiman Murshid, but evidence is lacking, and the origin of the trouble is still obscure.

9. Lebanon.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs took the occasion of his first visit to His Majesty's Minister to expose his dissatisfaction both with the present lack of real independence of the Lebanon and with the lack of resolution of the Lebanese President and of the remaining members of the Government in tackling the French on this question. He appeared fully satisfied with the results of this conversation.

General Catroux's delegate to the Lebanese Government and his secretary-general appear to be working for a reshuffle of the present Lebanese Government with a view to eliminating Hamid Bey Frangieh (Minister for Foreign Affairs), who has shown himself too independent for French tastes, and some of the more obviously incapable Ministers. The names so far put forward are, as was to be foreseen, mostly drawn from the pro-French followers of the ex-President Eddé, or from the small group of influential politicians who have kept a foot in the President's camp, and no members of Béchara el Khoury's Constitutional party have been put forward. No decision has yet been taken by the President on the matter.

A restatement of the already existing law against political assemblies and popular manifestations was issued by the Lebanese Government on 26th March. It caused offence to the Najjadé party on the grounds that it was obviously directed against them and would undoubtedly be enforced against them but not

against their rivals, the Phalanges, who are popularly supposed to be protected by the President; and the party is again threatening trouble. They do not, however, command sufficient support to make it likely that this trouble will be serious.

A special court for the trial of those accused of profiteering in and hoarding current commodities is shortly to be established in the Lebanon, and the Lebanese President has offered the somewhat thankless post of president of this court to one of the more resolute members of the judiciary. It remains to be seen whether he, or any other prominent judge, will agree to take on a task likely to expose him to so much unpopularity in influential commercial circles. The handing over of these cases from the hated French military courts to a Lebanese court will, however, be a much-welcomed step.

The Lebanese tax on war profits, which has been drafted by a French financial adviser, is still being discussed. This much-needed measure is likely to be strongly resisted in commercial circles and runs the risk of being whittled down to ineffectuality by the pressure of vested interests.

There have been minor disturbances in the Tripoli area owing to the maldistribution of flour, but the gendarmerie restored order without difficulty.

10. Press and Propaganda.

The return of Sir Edward Spears to Beirut provoked a burst of enthusiasm on the part of the press. Many highly appreciative articles were published, the tenor of some being that speculators and hoarders were already shivering in their shoes at the approach of their most redoubtable enemy. The ceremony of the presentation of the letters of credence was also reported in full, and gave rise to further enthusiastic articles.

As regards the war, the press has devoted much space to speculation as to German intentions for the spring offensive. The name of Turkey has frequently been reiterated in this connexion, together with the oft-repeated refrain: "Turkey is prepared, and intends to carry out her obligations towards the Allies." There are grounds to believe, indeed, that the press feels genuinely confident that Turkey would resist the Axis, and with some success, in the event of invasion. It has also been pointed out that Germany cannot undertake a really large-scale offensive while the threat of the Russian army remains. On the Far East front there have been several warnings that Japan intends to attack Siberia in the near future.

In the economic field, the new Lebanese decree, imposing stiff penalties on wheat and flour hoarders has been received with great satisfaction, and the press is clearly itching to see the offenders severely punished.

Enemy broadcasts contained a good deal of local "news," always unfavourable to the British and Free French, accompanied by the usual warnings and exhortations to listeners. The only fixed line of propaganda at the moment is the bolshevisation of Persia, which is being repeated *ad nauseam*.

[E 2276/207/89]

No. 30.

Weekly Political Summary issued by Spears Mission, Syria and the Lebanon, April 9, 1942.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 24.)

1. General.

THERE has been no appreciable change in the general situation outlined in last week's Summary. Political developments in Syria and the Lebanon continue to hang fire. Economic conditions have shown no further deterioration and an easing of public anxiety over food can be expected with the approach of summer. On the other hand, the menace of the war, heightened by enemy radio propaganda, continues to dominate the local stage.

In both countries the Governments maintain a lingering existence, without cohesion or direction, and are generally considered to be little more than puppets of the Free French. Whatever General Catroux' plans are for the reorganisation of the Governments, it is doubtful whether they include any important concessions to independence. Although the institution of representative government does not seem to be expected in any responsible quarter until after the campaigning season, a definite indication that a return to constitutional government will be made as soon as circumstances allow would go a long way towards satisfying local aspirations.

2. Wheat.

The Syrian Government have now taken over the supply of wheat to Damascus in addition to the 40 tons a day provided by the British for the poor. Purchases from the Jezireh are also supplementing the distribution of British wheat at Aleppo and other places in the north where shortage is severe. The Syrian Government are evidently reluctant to bring out and enforce stringent anti-hoarding regulations at the present time and, instead, the local authorities are endeavouring to unearth supplies "peacefully," apparently with little success. More energetic steps will probably have to be taken before the harvest, as it now appears that the Government's purchases in the Jezireh were not as great as they were given out to be.

The Lebanese Government's measures against hoarders and profiteers lost a good deal of their sting because of the delay in commencing enforcement. However, the Government expect to uncover some 5,000 tons and to remove some 200,000 individuals belonging to families already "provisioned" from the ration lists. These results, if achieved, can be considered as satisfactory.

Crop conditions throughout the country remain good, but it will be another month before the harvest can be estimated with any certainty, since lack of April rain or excessively hot winds in May may completely nullify present hopes. An "Office du Blé" under Anglo-French control, in which Syrian and Lebanese representatives will participate, is being set up. It will be charged with carrying out the measures agreed upon for handling the new crop. An assessment of the acreage under cultivation has already begun.

3. Syria: Damascus.

The filling of the vacancies in the Cabinet, caused by the death of the Minister of Defence and the resignation of the Minister of Education, have brought the President and the Prime Minister into conflict once more. A deadlock appears to have been reached, and it is reported that the President is withholding his signature from decrees and generally impeding the course of the Administration. Recrimination is mutual, and each blames the other for an impossible state of affairs, which the Prime Minister proposed to put an end to by forming a new Cabinet, the members of which are to be chosen by himself.

The only candidate on whom the President and Prime Minister agree is Soltan Pasha el Atrash, and he, up to the present, has been unable to decide whether to accept office or not. Soltan Pasha's presence in the Government would be likely to strengthen its prestige, though not its ability or cohesion. That the Government needs strengthening is very apparent, since during its period of office it has taken only one important administrative step, made no reforms, failed to produce a budget, and spent its time quarrelling over nominations. It has been unable to assert its authority over the public, and the President has given way whenever there has been an outcry.

Although anxiety regarding the supply of wheat persists and bread queues are a common sight, there have been no demonstrations or disturbances. During the week the prices of sugar, rice and coffee have shown a tendency to fall, probably as a result of the continued strict credit policy of the banks.

Certain Nationalists are said to be spreading the rumour that the appointment of General Spears as Minister is a proof that Syrian independence is a farce and that the British are preparing to make a colony of Syria. Such a rumour, although a contradiction of all logic, is doubtless convincing to many Damascenes.

4. Aleppo.

The situation has remained quiet and recent celebrations on the Prophet's birthday passed without incident. Considerable notice has been taken of His Majesty's Minister's reception in Damascus, and the impression of the strengthening of British influence in Syria is generally welcomed.

The quality and quantity of "middle-class" bread supplied from Syrian Government purchases has improved. Disorganisation still persists, however, owing to the delay in the issue of ration cards, and there are many complaints against the "Ravitaillement." In spite of the pretended optimism of the local authorities, there remains a distinct danger of popular outbursts between now and the harvest against the scandalous immunity enjoyed by hoarders. Resentment is felt also that, of the supplies coming forward from the Jezireh, a large proportion is now being diverted for the benefit of Damascus.

No special incidents are reported from the Turkish frontier. After the recent report that the number of troops in the Hatay were to be doubled, the latest unconfirmed information is that the garrison is to be reduced. Actually, no changes have been noted. On the occasion of the taking over of a second British destroyer at Alexandretta, the senior general sent specially from Turkish General Headquarters made a speech with unusually definite references to the British as allies in all eventualities.

5. Homs and Hama.

Nothing of interest is reported from Homs or Hama this week. The general atmosphere of these towns remains unsettled, although there has apparently been no deterioration recently.

6. Euphrates and the Jezireh.

The optimism shown by the Ministers of Interior and Supply on their recent visit seems to have been hardly justified, and it is generally thought that little wheat is being extracted from the hoarders, especially in the region of Deir ez Zor, where the hoarders and the politicians are the same persons. It is the old story of the local authorities being unwilling and incapable of taking effective action where local notables are involved.

The Braij section of the Shammar Khrossa have given out that they refuse to accept the peace terms between the Shammar of Iraq and the Agaidat signed in Mosul last January. Raiding has broken out between the two tribes, and the French authorities have sent a section of the Light Desert Company to investigate and prevent further trouble.

The general economic condition of the tribes in these provinces is bad owing to the hard winter and the all-round increase in food prices. Recent rains have in many areas produced roots and fungi which the semi-sedentary tribes, in particular, are accustomed to eat in quantity. However, distribution of wheat and dates—a part of the larger scheme of relief to the nomad tribes of Syria—is an urgent security measure and is being hastened.

Various degrees of obedience and disobedience have been shown by the individual Agaidat tribesmen who were condemned to enforced residence at various points by the joint commission last October and subsequently released, owing to a "mistake" in Damascus which has never been satisfactorily explained. The distinctions between their individual behaviours are now so complicated that the délégué adjoint recommends a complete amnesty be granted, except in the case of the three men who were refractory from the outset.

Turkish officials from the vilayet of Mardine visited the Jezireh in connexion with the arrest of the murderer of a Turkish policeman, when contact was made with the British as well as the French officers. The S.S. officer concerned, accompanied by a Syrian official in the rôle of technical adviser, returned the visit to Mardine, where he was cordially received by the Vali. The officer formed the opinion that the Turks were doing their best to be good neighbours.

7. Jebel Druze.

There are no developments of importance to report.

8. Alaouite Territory.

The minor disturbances reported in last week's Summary have entirely ceased and the property stolen, or most of it, returned to its owners. Although the ostensible reason for the road blocks and robberies was hunger, they undoubtedly had political implications and consequences. It is widely suggested that they were engineered by persons wishing to bring discredit on the present Administration by creating a state of insecurity.

The incidents are also being used by certain sections of the Moslem and Christian communities in an endeavour to influence the British to take action against Suliman Murshid, whose people were involved.

An unfortunate result of the incidents has been a more or less open quarrel between the Mohafez and the (local) Minister of the Interior on the one side and Suliman Murshid on the other. The Political Officer has obtained from the latter a definite promise that there will be no further disturbances, but an effort to patch up relations between him and the Mohafez were less successful. Ancient tribal rivalries as well as personal jealousies are at the bottom of the dispute.

9. Tribal.

Owing to the abnormally hard winter, the customary time-table of tribal migration has been upset this year, with the result that an ugly situation has arisen between the Sba'a tribes and the Hadidiyin and Muwali. The latter semi-nomad tribes have combined to dispute the passage of the Sba'a over certain portions of the desert north of Palmyra, which the Sba'a likewise claim historical right to. The conflict, if allowed to develop, might well involve the whole of the Aneizah against the semi-nomads of the Mamurah.

Free French Contrôle Bédouin officers with the units of the Light Desert Company have been separating the contestants—each capable of mustering several thousand armed men and a few automatic weapons—and arranging discussions, at which the Political Officer of Homs has been present. As it was found impossible to get agreement, the leading sheikhs on both sides have been taken to Damascus to see General Collet, when it is hoped a settlement will be reached. Although the dispute is purely an inter-tribal one, each side has endeavoured to show that the other was supported by an Allied Power (the semi-nomads by the French, the Sba'a by the British). It appears, however, that such intrigues have not been able to gain a hold, as Anglo-French co-operation in tribal matters is happily now close.

10. Lebanon.

A minor crisis in the Lebanese Government occurred during the week, as both the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Ravitaillement tendered their resignations. The latter had been implicated in a scandal at Tripoli, where a large-scale theft of Ravitaillement flour was found to have been taking place in a mill owned by him and a judicial enquiry had to be instituted. The President seemed disposed to accept his resignation, but was later induced somewhat weakly to consent to an arrangement whereby the Ministers of Ravitaillement and of Commerce and Industry exchanged portfolios. The Minister of the Interior, who seemed principally animated by the desire to leave a sinking ship, was induced by the President to withhold his resignation for the moment, though it seems probable that it will subsequently be accepted. The President seems not yet to have made up his mind whether to embark on any further ministerial changes.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has obtained the President's consent to discussing the question of "Intérêts communs" with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, despite having received an intimation from General Catroux that he wished them to remain under French control.

The Maronite Patriarch cancelled the traditional Easter Monday Maronite Mass in order to mark his differences with General Catroux, who as the successor of the French High Commissioner would have had to have been asked to it. The Greek Orthodox Mass for Easter Tuesday has similarly been cancelled. These signs of divergence between religious dignitaries and the Free French are not unmarked locally.

Local political parties are still in process of drafting memoranda for submission to His Majesty's Minister, setting out their dissatisfaction for the present political state of the Lebanon. Most parties agree that a return to some form of representative and constitutional government is essential. His Majesty's Minister discussed this question with General Catroux on the 4th April and found, as was to be expected, that the latter's ideas for improving the situation lay merely in the institution of a nominated chamber. It was impressed on him that this would be worse than useless and that a definite promise of elections before the end of the year might enable the present Government to continue.

The Government's measures for enforcing the declaration of wheat stocks and for fixing the price of wheat seem to have been generally welcomed. Road blocks have been established on all main roads to control the movement of wheat from place to place, which is now subject to licence.

11. Press and Propaganda.

On the occasion of the presentation of the letters of credence by Sir Edward Spears to the Syrian President, all Syrian papers devoted several columns to detailed description of the ceremony, expressing at the same time the deep and sincere affection which the people entertain for the British Minister and also the gratitude of Syria for this signal mark of recognition by His Majesty's Government.

Apart from this important political event, the press continued to concentrate on economic questions and to find fault with the Supply Services, the censor

being kept busy by articles which overstepped the mark on the latter subject. The scandal of the two Tripoli corn-mills caused a howl of indignation from the Lebanese press. Many pointed remarks, such as: "We demand the punishment of the guilty parties, whoever they may be," being directed against Wassef Izzeddine, the Minister of Supplies, who was involved in the affair. The hue and cry has now somewhat died down, but grumbling against the high cost of living and against the Supply Services continues, especially in Syrian papers, which are developing the habit of holding up the efforts of the Lebanese Government as an example to the Syrian Government.

There was no noteworthy comment on the war during the week.

Diversity was again the key-note of enemy broadcast propaganda, but it was noticeable that broadcasters gave an increased number of news items, often utterly fantastic, of interest to Syrians and Lebanese, all aimed at spreading mistrust, contempt and hatred of the British among the local populations.

Two isolated items from enemy broadcasts are worthy of mention. The first from Berlin on the 5th April advised Arabs that England's domination over Arab countries would last only a few more days. The second was a regretful admission on the part of the "Free Arabs" that Nahas Pasha had failed to live up to expectations in that he was "carrying out the orders of the British to the detriment of his fellow-countrymen's interests." The announcement of Nahas Pasha's coming to power was originally hailed with particular fervour by this station.

[E 2406/207/89]

No. 31.

Weekly Political Summary No. 2, issued by Spears Mission, Syria and the Lebanon, April 16, 1942. (Received in Foreign Office, May 2.)

1. General.

WITH the advent of the campaigning season a feeling of suspense has settled over the "thinking" sections of the population. Fear that the war is about to sweep into the Levant—a fear heightened by enemy propaganda and fed on speculations in the press—is dominant, especially among the propertied classes. Opposition political voices are hushed and politicians feel inclined to keep out of the way until they can be sure of spotting the winner.

In the absence of co-ordinated and directed opposition the Governments of both States drag out a more or less discredited existence. Changes in the Cabinets in Syria and the Lebanon are pending, but continue to hang fire owing to disagreements and indecisions. General Catroux and his advisers are examining means of re-forming and bolstering up the Governments.

The belated arrest and deportation of sixteen undesirable Frenchmen has had a salutary effect. Although the move had the outward appearance of being a purely French affair, it is generally appreciated that the initiative came from the British, and the step is regarded as proof that the latter are determined to eliminate untrustworthy elements. General Catroux has issued a communiqué stating that, while he is fully prepared to exercise tolerance, the presence of persons conducting subversive activities in the Levant will not be permitted.

The Czechoslovak Government have decided to recognise the independence of the two Republics of Syria and the Lebanon, and a formal exchange of messages with the Lebanese Government took place in Beirut on the 11th April.

2. Economic.

Economic matters and the high cost of living, especially of food-stuffs, continue to be the focus of public attention. An abrupt fall in the market prices of many imported manufactured goods and woven materials took place during the week. This was the result of the continued restriction of credit by the banks, which has had the effect of forcing many speculators out of their favourite markets. Although the reflection in retail prices is only slight, the downward trend, accompanied by varying reductions in the prices of wheat and vegetables, has been widely welcomed.

The Syrian Government have at last issued a decree in practically the same terms as that of the Lebanon, designed to prevent the hoarding of wheat and facilitate the discovery of hidden stocks. The immediate result has been a reduction in wheat prices to the level fixed, £S. 350 a ton. It remains to be

seen, however, whether any effective measures of enforcement will be taken or whether an important black market will again come into existence. With the approach of what promises to be an unusually good harvest, the position is more favourable than it has been hitherto; but the possibility of acute shortages in the intervening period cannot yet be overlooked. Measures for the control of the new crop have now been prepared, and their publication is becoming a matter of urgency.

3. Syria-Damascus.

The Shahbandar party, which originally supported the Sheikh Taj Government, if only passively, are now actively working against the President. The reasons given are, firstly, that they understood the President was going to invite certain Nationalists into his Government, and, secondly, that the most blatant corruption is being indulged in, allegedly by the President himself, and certainly by his sons. Zeki Bey el Khatib, the Minister of Justice, was the representative of this party in the Cabinet. He has resigned from the party following a quarrel over his inability, or unwillingness, to secure office for other party members.

The Prime Minister continues to reiterate his complaints against the President—his interference in ministerial matters, his weakness with the French, his unwillingness to levy taxes, his seeking (in vain) for popularity by means of intrigue instead of firmness and honesty, and he is now even hinting—as it were reluctantly—at the above-mentioned accusations of corruption. He is still considering the possible course of resigning and, if asked, forming a complete new Cabinet. In the meanwhile, however, he has put forward five names of possible candidates—none of whom are of any real political importance—to be appointed to fill the two vacancies in the Cabinet and also to replace existing Ministers.

It is not yet known if Soltan Pasha el Atrash will accept the Ministry of Defence. He has been asked to expedite his decision, and informed that, in the event of his refusal, Emir Hassan el Atrash would be acceptable, provided he were replaced as Mohafez of Jebel Druze by a Syrian.

An interesting viewpoint was brought to light when Nazib Bey Muayyad el Azm (brother-in-law of the late Dr. Shahbandar) visited the political officer. He said that Sheikh Kamel Qasseb, who formerly supported Sheikh Taj, was not only of the opinion that Sheikh Taj should go, but that the whole form of government should be changed for the duration of the war. He recommended that the present expensive form of Political Government should be replaced by a Council of Directors, such as administered the country from the spring of 1939 to the spring of 1941.

On the evening of the 8th April a Syrian medical student was shot dead in the station buffet at Damascus, and the bar-tender was also seriously wounded. A rumour immediately circulated that the shooting was done by a British soldier. Evidence so far produced is scant, and the enquiry is proceeding. Students went on strike on the 11th and organised a demonstration, which presented a protest to the political officer, who received a delegation of the leaders.

4. Aleppo.

There was no special activity in political circles during the week, though the filling of the vacancies in the Cabinet was much discussed. It is generally considered very unlikely that any prominent local man would accept office now.

Dr. Hassan Fouad Ibrahim Pasha, who is still regarded as the chief leader of the Nationalists in the north, has spoken to the political officer of his fear of being pressed by the population to support demonstrations against the authorities on the food question. Dr. Hassan Fouad—who has exercised a restraining influence hitherto—though unwilling to work for better administration under Sheikh Taj, is clearly anxious to avoid disturbances and the risk of being blamed for them by the British.

A well-organised parade of Allied forces through Aleppo on the 9th April attracted large crowds of Moslems and Christians, who were always friendly and definitely impressed.

Wheat continues to arrive from the Jezireh in appreciable quantities. Nearly all of it goes to Damascus and Aleppo, and an acute shortage continues to be felt in the northern villages. The fall in the prices of various food-stuffs, textiles and other goods, coinciding with the new decree on wheat, has been welcomed. When the period for declaring wheat stocks has expired, a few raids on well-known hoarders would be likely to have a very good effect.

No important incidents are reported from the frontier. As a means of checking smuggling across into Syria, the Turks have apparently forbidden the usual cattle market held at Rihanieh. Though some troops have moved inland from Alexandretta, the force in the Hatay is still considerable, if ill-equipped.

The removal of certain non-rallied French officials was accepted in French circles as timely, and has had an encouraging effect on genuine Allied supporters. They were also heartened by the parade of Allied troops and the specially warm reception given to the Foreign Legion.

5. Homs and Hama.

There is nothing of importance to report from Homs or Hama this week.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The question of food supplies is now the dominant interest. Except in the Jezireh, harvesting normally starts in May, so that each town and village needs to be certain of having sufficient stocks of wheat to supply the poor for another six weeks or so.

The recently-published Government decree has had the immediate effect of reducing the price of the little wheat still available, but some firm measures may be necessary to cover the intervening period. A helping factor is that dates are now arriving in quantity from Iraq. All arrangements have been made for the Anglo-French distribution of wheat and dates to the tribes in the area, and supplies are expected in the near future.

In the course of extensive exercises in the Jezireh, the passage of troops and vehicles has produced a wholesome effect on the populace, some of whom were heard to declare that they had no idea the British army had so many lorries! There was naturally intense speculation as to the destination of the troops, the most popular theory being that they were on their way to Alexandretta to anticipate an Axis landing.

The situation in the Assyrian settlements in the Khabour is, as usual, unsatisfactory, because the Assyrians are not given to organising co-operative efforts to help themselves. The Délégué adjoint intends to appoint an S.S. officer for the settlement to provide guidance and encouragement, and has in mind a man who was, in civilian life, an agricultural expert. When appointed, the S.S. officer will command a small body of troops; in the meantime protection is in the hands of the Gardes mobiles, with fairly frequent British patrols in the vicinity.

A Hadfield-Spears Ambulance Unit has been posted to Hassatche to dispense treatment in the Khabour Valley and further afield, depending on the work to be done. Two other units have been operating in the Beka'a and in the villages around Damascus for some six months. It is proposed to send a further unit to Palmyra.

A considerable outbreak of small-pox is reported from the Jezireh, in the neighbourhood of Hassatche. Vaccination work has been begun among the surrounding tribes, and steps are being taken to prevent, as far as possible, the spread of the epidemic.

7. Jebel Druze.

The political officer has accompanied the Délégué adjoint and senior French officers from Beirut on a visit to Kafer and Salkhad in the Jebel, where inspections of the local squadrons took place and receptions were held by the notables. The atmosphere at these gatherings was thoroughly cordial, and speeches from all parties coupled the names of Britain with that of Free France. It would seem as though the deep suspicion of the Free French of the British that has so long prevailed in this area were giving way to a more satisfactory relationship.

It has recently been reported that a band of armed Druzes had assembled on the frontier with the object of attacking the Sardiya tribe of Transjordan, but were dispersed by a Druze squadron under orders of the Free French local authorities.

8. Alaouite Territory.

There are no events of political importance to report. The dispute between the Mohafez and Suliman Murshid continues, but a further effort at reconciliation is being made through the intermediary of the political officer.

9. Tribal.

It is reported that the trouble between the Sba'a and the Hadidiyin and Muwali is in a fair way to being settled. After much preliminary discussion, arbitrators have at last been agreed upon and both parties have given an undertaking to abide by the decision, which will be given after the scene of the dispute has been visited and the conditions prevailing examined on the spot. The general state of security in the Shamieh is far from being as good as could be desired, but the settlement of this major dispute should go a long way towards calming the restlessness that is apparent among the tribesmen.

10. The Lebanon.

Wassef Izzeddine, the former Minister of Ravitaillement, resigned from the Lebanese Government on the 9th April, a few days after exchanging portfolios with the former Minister of Commerce, Alfred Skaf. The latter, who is an energetic and honest, though not very intelligent, little man, has found the supply services in a hopelessly disorganised state and is having a hard task to keep the Lebanon supplied with bread and reorganise his department at the same time. The Minister of the Interior has definitely withdrawn his resignation, which he seems to have put forward merely to draw attention to certain of his grievances.

The whole question of the future form of government of the Lebanon is at present in the melting-pot. General Catroux was found to be contemplating the institution of a nominated Senate, with an elected Chamber, which would, however, remain on paper until elections were found to be possible (probably not until after the war), but has been disabused of the idea he professed to hold that this scheme would be acceptable to the British authorities. He made an attempt to secure a reconciliation with the Maronite Patriarch, whose attitude of hostility to the French remains unchanged, by offering him a voice in the choice of Senators to be nominated, but the Patriarch is stated to have replied that he could only consent if whatever body was finally nominated then proceeded to elect a President. This condition could hardly please General Catroux, as it would have the effect of bringing about a change of President (M. Naccache having too little influence and being too unpopular to stand a chance of being elected) and would thus give the impression that the Patriarch's hostility to M. Naccache had triumphed over General Catroux's support of him.

As a result of the arrest and deportation of the French director of the Banque de Syrie, the Délégation générale, without consulting the British authorities, issued a decree placing the bank under its direct control, with an administrative board composed of the Conseiller financier and the Syrian and Lebanese members of the original council. The two latter, however, declined to serve on the board on the grounds that they had responsibilities towards the head office in France, and the Lebanese Government also raised violent objections to the bank being thus placed directly under Free French control. The Free French and British members are now studying a modified arrangement which would place the existing management of the bank under an Anglo-French-Syro-Lebanese council.

The marked fall in the prices of commodities of all sorts which has resulted from the restriction of banking credit is now tending to affect even the price of food-stuffs and has given considerable satisfaction. There have not been any bankruptcies, though three or four Beirut firms are said to be about to go into voluntary liquidation.

His Majesty the King of Greece, who was the guest of His Majesty's Minister from the 9th to 12th April, took the opportunity of his visit to visit the Greek refugee camp at Souk el Gharb, where he was received with all signs of devotion by the 1,300 refugees. He put forward a scheme for scattering these refugees throughout the Lebanon so as to increase the chance of their obtaining work, but security reasons will probably prevent it from materialising.

11. Press and Propaganda.

There was a dearth of articles of political interest in the press during the week, the most remarkable feature being one of omission. General de Gaulle's speech to the National Defence Committee, while reported in full and under large head-lines in the French press, was passed by with hardly any comment. This may be due to the fact that the public is satiated with the publicity lavished on all pronouncements by the general, and that consequently this noteworthy address was skimmed through without arousing much interest. On the other hand, the scarcity of newsprint is compelling papers to restrict themselves more

and more to official war news, and many articles are mere reproductions of commentaries by Reuter, Gram Swing, &c.

In addition, the press has been greatly preoccupied with the new measures taken by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to combat speculation and hoarding. Damascus papers are particularly jubilant at the discomfiture of speculators, and the press in general expresses satisfaction that these persons are reaping the just reward of their nefarious activities. One or two faint voices have been raised in favour of the merchants, but these have been quickly stifled. The publication of these measures, coupled with the concurrent fall in market prices, appears to have reacted very favourably on public morale.

The resignation of Wassef Izzeddine gave rise to some comment, which, if of a speculative variety, was pounced upon by the censors. On the whole, however, press censorship in both Syria and the Lebanon fails to show the desired improvement and still needs tightening up.

The enemy wireless continues to malign Allied and Arab leaders, both individually and collectively, General MacArthur being selected for especially virulent attacks from all Axis stations and in all languages throughout the week, on the grounds that he had deserted his men in the face of the enemy. Another theme which is on the increase is the comparison of the present "oppression" of the Arab countries with the veritable paradise which would be accorded them in the event of an Axis victory.

It is also interesting to note that the most time-worn stand-by of Axis commentators, the Jewish Menace, is in danger of being supplanted by the Bolshevik Bogey, who, according to the Axis, having already seized most of Persia, is now stretching out his gory talons over Iraq, while even Syria is not out of his reach.

[E 2555/207/89]

No. 32.

Weekly Political Summary: Syria and the Lebanon, April 23, 1942.—(Received in Foreign Office, May 7.)

1. General.

THE long-expected break-up of the Syrian Ministry took place on the night of the 17th-18th April, when the President accepted Hassan el Hakim's resignation and called on Husni Barazi to form a new Cabinet, which has taken shape as follows:—

Prime Minister and Interior: Husni Barazi.
Foreign Affairs and Finance: Fayez el Khoury.
National Economy: Mohammed el Ayash.
Ravitaillement: Hikmet Horaki.
Propaganda and Youth: Munir Ajlani.
Public Works: Munir Abbas.
National Defence: Hassan el Atrash.
Justice: Ragheb Kekhia.
Education: Still vacant.

The new Prime Minister, who is of a well-known Kurdish landed family of Hama, has not hitherto played a prominent part in Syrian politics. He was a member of the Sheikh Taj Government of 1934-36, and was recently appointed Mohafez of Damascus. Four Ministers remain from the last Government. Munir Ajlani is generally considered a tool of Sheikh Taj and was lately his secretary. Hassan el Atrash has recently been Mohafez of the Jebel Druze. Ragheb Kekhia is a lawyer and a native of Aleppo.

It is generally considered that Sheikh Taj has dealt himself a new hand, but that it is likely to prove even weaker than the last. Whereas Hassan el Hakim had a reputation for honesty, some doubts are expressed regarding the integrity of the new Prime Minister. Husni Barazi, Fayez Khoury and Munir Ajlani are normally accounted Nationalists, but the more important politicians of the National bloc—with the shadow of the war looming over the stage—continue to remain discreetly in the wings.

2. Wheat.

Little change has taken place in the wheat position in Syria and the Lebanon. The time-limit for the declaration of stocks under the anti-hoarding laws for both States has expired; yet, as was to be expected, major stocks remain hidden.

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Although measures of enforcement would be welcomed by the populace and the local authorities alike, it is now clear that neither of the Governments have the intention or the energy to enforce the laws. British supplies continue to go into consumption through the State and Municipal Ravitaillement organisations supplemented, in the case of Syria, by Government purchases. Meanwhile, information that the black market price is soaring in Turkey is likely to give a fillip to the black markets that have sprung up in both States since the fixing of prices.

Decrees establishing the machinery for handling the new harvest are about to be promulgated by General Catroux. An "Office du Blé" with the necessary powers is being set up, which will have subordinate offices in the producing areas. Control will rest with an Anglo-French committee, on which the States' Governments will also be represented. Finance will ultimately depend on a British guarantee.

It is estimated that the minimum quantity of wheat to be purchased for subsequent distribution to non-growing areas is 270,000 tons, though any balance after growers' requirements and seed reserves have been allowed for will also be taken up. It is intended to fix the price of requisition at a level favourable to the cultivators, when the time of harvesting approaches. The scheme virtually means the control of the whole crop and consequently its efficient distribution will become a matter of great importance.

3. Syria: Damascus.

The circumstances surrounding the change in the Ministry are somewhat obscure. Apparently Hassan el Hakim played his cards badly as, when his long-standing dispute with the President came to a head, the other members of the Cabinet left him in the lurch. Bahij al Khatib and Hikmet Horaki handed in their resignations to the President on the grounds that they could no longer work with the Prime Minister, and their resignation was followed by those of other Ministers. The President then dismissed Hassan el Hakim and called upon Husni Barazi to form a Cabinet. Simultaneously, the Syrian police were sent to arrest certain of Hassan el Hakim's particular friends who were believed to have considerable influence over him. It would seem that Sheikh Taj—with the approval certainly of General Collet—has astutely substituted for the old Cabinet a new one which he expects to find more amenable.

King George of the Hellenes, accompanied by M. Tsouderos, the Greek Prime Minister, visited Damascus on the 12th April. He called on the President and on the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and was received by the populace with considerable enthusiasm.

On the 14th April the Czechoslovak Consul-General at Beirut called on the President to notify his Government's official recognition of Syrian independence. Appropriate speeches were made.

Sir Frank Nixon, director of U.K.C.C., visited Damascus on the 16th April and met members of the Syrian Government and General Collet. The Syrian authorities expressed gratitude for the treatment given to the country by the corporation, but intimated that they looked for further help to meet their difficulties. They lamented the great increase in Government expenditure caused by subsidising bread and claimed that this policy of weakness resulted from Allied insistence that there should be no political disturbances, especially in Damascus. They went on to predict trouble were bread to be sold at an economic price. As a reward for shouldering so manfully the heavy burden, they would appreciate a loan or, even better, a gift of £1 million sterling from His Majesty's Government on the lines of the gift made to Egypt for the construction of air raid shelters.

4. Aleppo.

It is too early to measure local reactions to the new Cabinet, but it is unlikely that it will inspire much confidence. Without any real Nationalist or Shahbandarist co-operation, the new team will probably be regarded as the instrument of Sheikh Taj—in his turn considered the man of General Collet. Except in so far as it affects supplies, Damascus politics at present do not count for much with the general populace in Aleppo, as the Nationalists are keeping quiet and not trying to press their cause.

On the 14th April a well-organised meeting of the Anti-Fascist League was held. The attendance of over 400 was encouraging, and among the youths of various types there were as many Moslems, including Nationalists, as Christians and Jews.

The bread situation in Aleppo is reported to be easier and the rationing system has been extended. Government purchases from the Jezireh, however, are not large enough for the local authorities to build up a reserve of any size. Moreover, purchases are being hindered by the news from Turkey, where, despite the severity of the black-market control, prices well above the Syrian level are now apparently being offered. Smuggling from Syria is reported to have begun, which the frontier authorities are doing their best to control.

Crop prospects continue to be fairly satisfactory, though more rain is hoped for. Following the recent considerable fall in the price of manufactured goods due to the redemption of sixty-day bills negotiated before the restriction on bank credit, there has again been some rise in prices. Two contrary trends are apparent on the markets: Moslems, who pay the most attention to the threatening Axis broadcasts, consider that gold is their safest investment, while Christians and Jews are showing more confidence in buying goods.

5. Homs and Hama.

This area has continued to be quiet, though voices are, as usual, raised against the Government and Sheikh Taj. Reports on the local reaction to the new Cabinet have not yet been received. Considerable troop movements through both towns have had an excellent effect.

6. Jezireh and Euphrates.

Although the general situation among the Jezireh tribes is fairly quiet, two outbreaks of trouble are reported: the first between several semi-sedentary tribes in the neighbourhood of Derbessiyeh and the Baggara (Zor) of that region; the second between the Sherabiyyin and the Baggara (Jabl). Both cases are within the jurisdiction of the Mohafez of the province, since they concern disputes between semi-sedentary tribes. The Free French authorities and the Political Officer are making enquiries with a view to assisting in the settlement.

Unconfirmed reports have been received of a meeting of Kurdish leaders in Northern Jezireh, supposedly to discuss word received from the Kurds in Iraq. Whatever the feeling of the latter, there is no evidence of anti-British propaganda among the Kurds in the Jezireh, though few conceal their dislike of the Turkish alliance. There is no doubt, however, that the Kurds are at least as anxious to arm themselves as the other tribes: rifles are more than ever in demand and the price is said to have risen in the last few months from £S. 250 to £S. 500 for a rifle from Persia (of German origin).

On the 6th April a decree was issued by the Central Government granting an amnesty to all the Agaidat and others concerned in the disturbances of last year, with the exception of three recalcitrant individuals.

It is reported that Christians who have had recent contacts across the frontier say they find no change in the attitude of the Turks to the Allies. Wireless broadcasts are also reported to be friendly.

Wheat in Turkey is said to fetch on the black market as much as £S. 1,000 a ton. Numerous reports have been received of smuggling, which, perforce, is done by animal transport at night and has therefore not yet assumed large proportions. Syrian and French authorities have increased patrols along the border.

The growth of Kamishlié in recent years has been astonishing and the process is still continuing, even though smuggling, which attracted many of the immigrants, is generally on the decline. The population is officially about 8,000, but no census has been taken for some time, and estimates put the figure much higher. Even at a very conservative figure the population is 20,000, whereas that of Hassetché is 6,000–7,000 and declining. Kamishlié is likely to continue to grow, because it is the centre of the wheat belt and agriculture is the main occupation of the inhabitants of the Jezireh. It is also on the railway and can offer immigrants better living conditions than Hassetché. For this reason it is beginning to attract Christians from the Aleppo district as well as refugees from Turkey.

7. Jebel Druze.

Only minor incidents without political significance are reported from the Jebel. There is further evidence of anti-Atrash activity and some meetings have been held. Employment provided by military works has caused general satisfaction.

In the Hauran frequent meetings have been held recently among local notables with the object of urging the Government to include one of their number in the Cabinet and to press for all the local administrative officials to be Hauranis.

The Bedouin are returning via the Hauran some six weeks earlier than usual this year, as the grazing in the Nejd is abnormally poor. There have been a few minor incidents between them and the landowners, but the local S.S. officer appears to have matters well in hand.

8. *Alaouite Territory.*

There are no developments of political importance to report.

9. *Tribal.*

The settlement of the trouble between the Sba'a and the Hadidiyin and the Muwali has unfortunately been interrupted by a serious minor incident. Just when the various parties to the arbitration were assembled at the site of the dispute, news was received that a body of Sba'a horsemen had happened to ride into a fight, when five of them were killed, including Sufuq el Ali, a cousin of Raikan Ibn Mursheid of the Sba'a. All chance of immediate reconciliation between the disputants consequently vanished and the arbitration has been postponed for a fortnight or so.

Security in the Syrian Desert continues to be unsatisfactory. Raiding and counter-raiding is an annual occurrence when the nomads return to their summer pastures, but this year, owing to the abnormal winter, the tribes are coming back together, which greatly increases the possibilities of trouble. The Contrôle Bédouin officers, supported by the Light Desert Company and the Gardes mobiles, are having their work cut out in trying to prevent serious clashes. A flag march through the area by an armoured-car regiment should have a good effect, and it is noteworthy that the officer in charge of the Contrôle Bédouin has said that he would welcome a visit from Colonel Glubb, should he be in the vicinity.

10. *The Lebanon.*

No further changes in the Lebanese Government have yet come about, despite numerous rumours and much political activity on all sides. The Free French have been pressing hard for an agreement with the Maronite Patriarch on the basis of allowing him to submit a list of candidates for a nominated Chamber, but the Patriarch, who has been made aware of British views in the matter, is so far refusing to play. Both the President and the Prime Minister have expressed anxiety about the present turn of political events, the former feeling that any change of Government made in agreement with the Patriarch would render his own position impossible in view of the Patriarch's open hostility to himself, and the latter being chiefly nervous that he will be eclipsed by some nominee of Béchara el Khoury. The feeling that elections some time in the not too far distant future are both desirable and inevitable is gaining ground.

Nervousness about the war situation amongst the population has been increased by the sinking of a tanker within sight of the town and one or two air-raid alarms, and the rents of houses in the Lebanon have increased proportionately.

Alfred Bey Skaf, the new Minister of Ravitaillement, is meeting with both obstruction and opposition from his own services in his rather tactless attempts to reorganise them. His attempt to obtain supplies of wheat from Damascus was a complete failure and he is making heavy weather of his attempts to supply the Lebanon with the amounts he is receiving from the U.K.C.C.

11. *Press and Propaganda.*

The Izzeddine affair is dying hard in the memories of Lebanese pressmen, and the censor was busily engaged last week on the speculative and critical articles which it evoked. Besides attacking the ex-Minister personally, several papers took the opportunity to air their grievances against the Government in general, one paper going so far as to demand the resignation of the whole Cabinet and their replacement by "competent persons." On the whole, there was a marked current of contempt for the present members of the Cabinet throughout the Lebanese press.

There were more articles on the war and on world politics than has been usual of late, although no marked change in public opinion was noticeable. For example, Moslems were warned of the bitter hatred of the Nazis for all forms of religion, the difficulties of a Japanese attack on India were set forth, and appreciation of the work of the Allies for Syria and the Lebanon was expressed.

In the economic field, the high optimism occasioned by the publication of the new regulations concerning the declaration of wheat stocks appears to have

abated to a considerable extent. The Lebanese press now argues that only a few unimportant individuals have been affected, and meagre quantities come to light, while the real hoarders have so far remained unscathed. In general, the grumbling at the high cost of living and at the activities of speculators has recommenced.

Military operations were the mainstay of enemy wireless propaganda during the week, stress being laid on Japanese successes, real and imaginary. Among Arab affairs, the arrest of Aly Maher Pasha seems to have provoked great indignation. Very little reference was made to purely local affairs, preference being given to Palestine and the Jewish question.

[E 2691/207/89]

No. 33.

Weekly Political Summary No. 4, Syria and the Lebanon, April 30, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, May 18.)

1. *General.*

THERE has been no pronounced popular reaction to the change in the Syrian Government, nor have the Opposition parties attempted to arouse public feeling. It is taken for granted generally that Sheikh Taj ed Din has succeeded in bringing to office a group that will be even more amenable to himself than the last Cabinet. In other words, people feel that things are very much what they were.

The new Government appears to be feeling its way, and up to the present there have been no indications of a change of policy. In a statement to the press the Prime Minister declared that the foreign policy of the Cabinet will be one of co-operation with, and loyalty to, the Allies. The Government will use every effort to strengthen the ties of friendship which unite Syria with Arab countries and other neighbouring States. Internal policy will be based on a determination to restore the authority of the Government and the dignity of public office.

The general political situation in the two Levant States remains unsatisfactory. After some nine months of Allied occupation, it is apparent to Syrians and Lebanese that the Free French have established themselves in the place of the Vichy French and are determined to maintain their position by means of more or less subservient State Governments. The British refusal to take a hand in internal political affairs is a disappointment to them, but has not so far resulted in a loss of prestige. Except among the Christian minorities of Syria who would like strong foreign control, hopes are still placed in the British guarantee of independence, which, it is felt, will only really be operative after the war, and then only if Britain has her way in the Levant and the French are virtually ousted.

Yet, in spite of existing political dissatisfaction, it cannot be said that any section or community really looks for important changes at the present time. All eyes are on the war, striving to determine what will be the outcome. In these circumstances a definite indication that resort will be had to a constitutional form of government in the fairly near future would probably go a long way towards satisfying the aspirations of the majority of the politically conscious.

2. *Economic.*

The cost of living, bread and employment—these matters absorb the attention of the populations locally. There is a great demand for the improvement of the Ravitaillement services, which are inefficient and corrupt. Disappointment is widespread at the failure of the Governments to take action against the hoarders of wheat. Declarations of stocks under the recent decrees were in most places derisory and so far very little wheat has been confiscated—all from smallholders.

On the 21st April, by decree of General Catroux, a Wheat Board for Syria and the Lebanon was set up, with a civil status and financial autonomy. Its purpose will be the provision of wheat necessary for local consumption, to which end it has been granted a monopoly of purchase and transport of the 1942 wheat crop, purchase and transport of flour and other wheat derivatives and the importation of all kinds of cereals convertible to bread. A Wheat Office operated by the Free French, with British participation and under the supervision of the Wheat Board, is to provide the machinery of execution. Active opposition of the Syrian Government to the proposal in this form may necessitate certain changes.

Any administration which is in the hands of local officials is, *ipso facto*, expected to be inefficient and corrupt. French administration in the Levant is largely discredited. British reputation alone stands high in popular esteem. It follows, therefore, that active British participation is essential to the full success of the wheat scheme; and it is satisfactory to note that the principle of British officers serving on all local commissions has been not only accepted, but welcomed, by the Free French senior officials concerned.

The recent slump in the prices of imported commodities and, more especially, of woven materials, which amounted almost to a panic, has now come to an end. Payments to the banks are generally being made punctually. This recovery in the markets has probably saved many merchants from bankruptcy. It has, however, been amply shown that the policy of credit restriction inaugurated by the banks at the end of January has been remarkably successful in clipping the wings of speculators and preventing the development of an altogether harmful boom on the commodities markets.

3. Syria: Damascus.

Damascenes are asking themselves to what extent the new Government can be considered to be under French domination, to what extent it is under Sheikh Taj ed Din, and what strength it can achieve from its own internal cohesion and from Allied support. The fact that the change was engineered by Sheikh Taj ed Din—with the knowledge and probably the encouragement of General Collet—at the expense of Hassan el Hakim indicates that it is likely to be more under French domination than the last Government. Evidence of Sheikh Taj ed Din's hold on the Cabinet is also provided by the creation of the new portfolio of Propaganda and Youth for his protégé, Munir Ajlani.

As regards external support the Government will presumably have the backing of the Free French authorities, who gave it birth. During the past week the solicitation of British support seems to have been its chief concern. In conversations with the Political Officer, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs have been very anxious to point out that the new Cabinet is well disposed to the British, in all of which a feeling of guilt at the abrupt removal of Hassan el Hakim is detectable and some anxiety about the British attitude.

It is now apparent that Hassan el Hakim displayed a lack of political acumen in the recent Cabinet crisis. For instance, he judged the time very badly to put into practice his ideas that the new Government should be one of the people, and not of the feudal families. Above all, he should have realised that, in the last resort, he would be worsted by Sheikh Taj ed Din, in view of the support the latter receives from General Collet. It now remains to be seen how far the complete confidence which General Collet professes to have in Husni Barazi will be justified, and whether the latter's friendship with Sheikh Taj ed Din will survive the President's continual interference in the work of the Prime Minister.

The Political Officer has drawn General Collet's attention forcibly to three instances where Anglo-French collaboration was not so complete as it might be. These occasions were, firstly, that the Political Officer was not informed by the French of the change of Government. Secondly, Bekri Kaddoura, who was arrested on the 28th February by the French, with British collaboration, has been released without consultation with our Security or Political Officers. Thirdly, only very tardy and sketchy information was given to the British about the conversations which General Catroux had with certain prominent Syrians on the 14th and 15th April. Among those interviewed were Jamil Mardam and Ata Bey Ayoubi, and the purpose was allegedly to find out (a) if at some future date elections should be held or the old Parliament recalled, and (b) if a Senate, partly elected and partly nominated, would strengthen the Government in the meantime. General Collet admitted that he had not collaborated as closely as could be desired.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has written a letter to General Collet asking him to take steps to obtain Iraqi recognition of Syrian independence, so that the Syrian Government "might define the official attitude to be taken with regard to the Iraqi Vice-Consul in Damascus." Similarly, the *Echos de Syrie* has taken advantage of the presence on sick leave in Damascus of Abdullah el Damlouji, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, to address to him some pointed remarks on Iraq's failure to recognise the independence of her sister Arab State.

4. Aleppo.

The Barazi Cabinet has been accepted with indifference by the general public. Though the new Minister has a reputation for energy, some discreditable reports about him are also known, and little confidence is placed in his ability to improve

the administration. The Aleppo representative, Ragheb Kekhia, belongs to a respected family, but he has spent many years in the judiciary in Damascus and is not regarded as a forceful advocate of Aleppine interests. What the people specially want the Government to change is the inequity of food prices, for the main tax-paying areas object to the subsidising, at the general expense, of the Damascus bread, which has been kept at a considerably lower price than that which people elsewhere have had to pay.

The Nationalists consider that the new Cabinet is too weak to last long and that the Prime Minister, who has apparently always kept on friendly terms with Saadallah Jabri and others here, will soon invite Nationalist co-operation on their own terms.

The only order of the new Government known here so far was for the postponement of the application of the recent law to combat hoarding and speculation in wheat, and this weakness caused general disappointment. A seizure of undeclared hoarded wheat actually made by the police was cancelled and prices again rose to over £S. 600 the ton.

There has been a sufficiency of medium bread in Aleppo at 32 Syrian piastres the kilogramme, and small amounts of grain have been sent to the most needy districts. The situation has therefore remained quiet, yet it is by no means satisfactory and the risk of acute shortage remains. Supplies from the Jezireh have only been small and purchases there at the official price are increasingly difficult now that the owners of grain realise that nearly double the price is again obtainable in Aleppo and also in Turkey. Special precautions against smuggling over the border have been taken.

There have been further reports of the inadequacy of tribal control in the area south of Aleppo, where uneasiness is general. Despite promises made by the Emir Mujhem Ibn Muheid following recent incidents, it is reported that the Fedaan have been staging more raids on villages, in one of which a woman was killed. The Free French authorities have again been urged to make their control more effective and the question is being discussed with them in Damascus.

From the frontier the only trouble of any importance that has been reported concerns the smuggling of cattle from Turkey by a member of the well-known Barmada family. The Turks were more than usually annoyed and careful enquiries are being made.

5. Homs and Hama.

It was to be expected that the appointment of Husni Bey Barazi of Hama as Prime Minister would cause some excitement in the area. The reaction, however, has been negligible. This lack of interest is probably because there is no confidence locally in Sheikh Taj ed Din's Government and every Minister chosen by him is considered to be a bigger "stooge" than the last. It is generally thought that Husni Bey will not retain his post for long.

A strike of some 200 workmen occurred in the railway station at Homs on the 23rd April on the grounds that army contractors were employing cheaper labour from the neighbouring villages rather than from Homs. After enquiry, it appeared that the claim was unfounded and that the only "outsiders" employed were specialists. This was explained to the men, who dispersed quietly. Reliable information, since received, indicates that the trouble was caused by agitators working for Sheikh Taj ed Din. Apparently their object was to stir up trouble against the Mohafez, Haidar Mardam, one of the influential Mardam family, whom it is reported Sheikh Taj ed Din would like to replace. The Délégué adjoint has threatened to arrest the agents if any more trouble is caused.

At the beginning of the week the tribal situation north of Semelieh looked serious. Small inter-tribal raids were reported and it was thought that the security of the area might be threatened. When the Délégué adjoint visited the area, however, he found the situation had been much exaggerated and that the measures taken locally were sufficient to maintain security.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

No outbreaks have been signalled from this area and detailed reports have not yet been received.

7. Jebel Druze.

The Emir Hassan el Atrash has accepted the post of Minister of National Defence and been replaced by Tewfik Bey el Atrash, former Director of Public Instruction at Suweida, as Acting Mohafez. To a gathering of notables assembled

to congratulate him, the Emir Hassan stressed that, now he was Minister, he hoped to serve both Druzes and Syrians, for he could see no difference between them since Free France and Great Britain had fulfilled their promises by making them a united nation. His ideal was the democratic ideal, and he would fight against tyranny and the agents of evil. He referred to his successor, Tewfik Bey, as a member of the Atrash family, known for its impartiality.

As mentioned in recent Summaries, there is a growing opposition to the Emir and his family, and such speeches do nothing to reconcile the lesser families to the Atrash oligarchy. There is no doubt that the Atrash family is too powerful to be in opposition, but it is becoming clear that the smaller families are impatient at not having a finger in the pie.

Meanwhile, the following Atrashes each has a finger crooked round a plum: Hassan (Minister of Defence and part-time Mohafez), Tewfik (part-time Mohafez and said to be taking a third of the salary for his work as "Wakil"), Yussef (Director of P.W.D.—there is no such department, but the post carries a salary from the Druze budget), Sayah (Kaïmakam of Salkhad), Hail (Chief of Gendarmerie), Zaid (Commandant of Gendarmerie at Damascus), Mohammed el Abdallah (Director of Agriculture), Fawzi (magistrate), Muteb (Vice-President of Administrative Council), and so on. Moreover, the payment of secret allowances to Soltan Pasha and Okla el Kutami by the Damascus Government also causes jealousy.

While there is no immediate danger of trouble breaking out, the Political Officer considers that it is not in the interests of Allied security that the opposition should grow more discontented and perhaps become a forcing ground for enemy propaganda. Should Tewfik Bey be confirmed as Mohafez, the situation might well deteriorate. Although there is no suitable candidate among the Druzes of the Jebel, the appointment of a Syrian might be acceptable and furthermore would tend to prevent a union of autonomists and Nationalists.

A further opposition group is also in existence. It consists of the religious heads, who resent Sheikh Taj ed Din's projected decree altering the method of nominating the religious judges. Under the new plan the Minister of Justice would appoint a Kadi, out of three nominated by the (Atrash) Administrative Council of Suweida, and would take away the right of appeal to the Supreme Druze Religious Council. The members of the council have written a letter in strong terms to Damascus stating that the Druzes are prepared at all costs to resist such an attack on Druze religious tradition.

In agreement with the Free French, an attempt was made recently to raise 3,000 men from the Hauran and Jebel to work in Palestine. However, the wage of 10 piastres with food, or 15 without, did not tempt the labourers, who obtain better pay at harvest-time and are disinclined to move from their villages for the short period remaining before the harvest.

8. *Alaouite Territory.*

There are no political events of importance to report and the recent political crisis in Damascus, with the changes of office holders, has aroused little interest. The opinion in circles interested in politics is that, in the present circumstances, any Government is bound to be weak.

During the week the Political and Economic Officers paid a visit to the island of Rouad. Although the people there were reported to be hostile, they were received with considerable warmth. The people of Rouad are using their schooners for British war purposes and the question of allowing them a special ration of wheat during their sea trips is being considered, on security as well as political grounds. The populations are naturally disturbed by the recent sinking of schooners by enemy action.

9. *The Lebanon.*

It seems certain that the dissolution of the present Cabinet cannot be delayed much longer. It is not clear how far the Maronite Patriarch has yielded to the blandishments of the Free French, and, in particular, how far he has agreed to be represented in an Administration presided over by M. Naccache. The latter, however, at a recent interview with His Majesty's Minister, indicated that there was an imminent possibility of the formation of a new Cabinet of six Ministers only (one for each of the principal communities), and that, General Catroux having declined to accept his resignation, he would preside over the new Administration himself. The proposed reduction in the size of the Cabinet is all to the good; and, although it would hardly pass muster as a "Government of

affairs," it is probably true, as M. Naccache maintains, that representation by communities is essential in the Lebanon.

At the same interview the President, while professing to agree in principle with the necessity for a promise of elections by a given date, showed clearly that he was very unwilling to make any such promise until the new Cabinet had been formed and that he hoped to shelter behind the opposition of his future colleagues.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hamid Frangie, has for some months been incurring the growing disapproval of the Free French authorities owing to his independent attitude and his frequent contacts with the British. At the same time, he has been finding it increasingly difficult to co-operate with his colleagues, notably with the Prime Minister and the President, whose policy he considers ineffective and subservient. He has consequently sent in his resignation.

In Tripoli the Moslem element, who form nearly 75 per cent. of the population, are becoming more active in voicing their grievances: their chief complaint being that they have been given no adequate representation either in the local Government or the Cabinet. A deputation of notables has visited Beirut to present their demands to General Catroux and the President. The latter is reported to have promised them a representative from Tripoli would be given a ministerial post, but gave no undertaking that any of their other demands would be met. The Tripoli Moslems are now talking of agitating for the Caza of Tripoli to be attached to Syria, which has always been their ultimate aim.

10. *Press and Propaganda.*

The bombing of Tokyo, the raid on Boulogne and various encouraging speeches by Allied leaders caused the attention of the press to be directed in the main to hopeful speculations of an Allied spring offensive, preferably against the European mainland. The recent offensives have undoubtedly given the press a much-needed tonic and news from Russia, which held the head-lines during the period of lack of other successes, has given way to announcements of Commando raids, the American aerial bombardment, &c. The recent manoeuvres of Vichy and the Germans were greeted by the French press with large head-lines fiercely denouncing the complicity of Laval and Darlan, but almost all the subsequent articles emanated from Reuter's and A.F.I. The Arabic press took the line that Laval would never be able to impose his own will or that of the Germans on the masses of France. Pro-Allied articles from the Turkish press have been given prominence in Damascus papers, while other papers continue to lavish praise on the Allies for having solved the unemployment problem in Syria and the Lebanon.

The present state of the Lebanese Government has been widely discussed. Censored passages envisaged a complete Cabinet reshuffle, one paper taking so much for granted that it hoped that "the change will take place with as little fuss as in Syria and Egypt." The Government also had to take some severe punishment as a result of the present economic situation, the recent declaration of stocks scheme being declared ineffective by several papers, while the absence of flour gave rise to further adverse comment, censored according to its degree of virulence.

The enemy's broadcasts this week appear mainly to have been directed at causing contempt for the British, both as fighting men and governors. Japanese victories and British shipping losses were to the fore, also the old story of the British finding someone else to fight their battles for them, the Chinese in Burma being the victims on this occasion.

The enemy seemed to be puzzled at the arrival in London of the High Commissioner for Palestine, for, while one station suggested that the handing over of the Crown of Syria to the Emir Abdullah was the object of the visit, another darkly remarked that the welfare of the Palestine Jews was to be discussed. It is also to be noted that the Germans are still hunting for vestiges of Jewish blood among the Allied leaders.

[E 3135/279/89]

No. 34.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 6.)

Sir,

Syria and the Lebanon, April 15, 1942.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegrams Nos. 7 and 16, I presented my letters of credence to the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents respectively on the 27th and 31st March, as the first British Minister to the Levant States. It may

be useful for purposes of record to set down briefly the procedure followed in each capital; but I would emphasise at the outset that both the local Governments, and the Syrian in particular, were actuated by the desire to mark especially what was for them an historic occasion, I being not only the first British Minister, but also the first diplomatic representative accredited to their countries. The procedure should not therefore be taken as creating a precedent.

2. As I came by car from Palestine and the hour of my arrival was uncertain, it was not possible for the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to follow the usual custom by sending his "chef du protocole" to meet me; and as in point of fact there is no presentable official filling that function at the moment, M. Hamid Franjeh himself visited me a few hours after my arrival without waiting for me to call first. The members of my diplomatic staff were present, the Minister was received by a British military guard of honour outside my house, and an interesting conversation of considerable length and covering a number of political subjects ensued. I returned the call on the following morning at M. Franjeh's official place of business, being received in my turn by a guard of honour at the door, and we continued our conversation of the day before: the Minister for Foreign Affairs was clearly anxious to get down to business at once, and I saw no reason to dissuade him, though such conversations were, of course, a departure from the strict protocol.

3. At 10.30 A.M. on the 27th March I was called for by M. Franjeh at my house, and after a brief reception we proceeded together, in an open car supplied by the Lebanese authorities, to the "Petit Sérail," the official headquarters of the Lebanese Government. The members of my diplomatic staff, Colonel Furlonge, the Political Officer at Beirut, and representatives of the three fighting services, followed in their own cars, and the procession was escorted by Lebanese gendarmes on motor-bicycles. The population had been informed in advance of the route to be followed, but it was decided for some reason to change it at the last moment, so the crowd was not as large as it would otherwise have been. Nevertheless, quite a fair number of people lined the streets and showed their enthusiasm by clapping and occasionally cheering. Outside the Petit Sérail a very smart guard of honour was drawn up, and the two national anthems were played.

4. The actual ceremony of the presentation of my letters was slightly marred by the fact that the Lebanese authorities (who, of course, had no knowledge of the procedure, though they had been primed by us on most points) allowed the room to be invaded by a jostling crowd of minor officials and journalists which swamped my staff and the service representatives. The ceremony was, however, very cordial and otherwise successful. Copies of the speeches exchanged between M. Naccache and myself are enclosed herewith⁽¹⁾; the text of mine had, of course, been communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in advance, and the President was good enough to let me have a copy of his before the ceremony took place. After the formal introduction of my staff to the President and a "vin d'honneur" at a heavily-laden buffet, I returned with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to my house; the same formalities being observed as on my arrival, with the addition that outside the Sérail a grotesquely stout little man, evidently a cross between a town crier and a court poet, pranced up and down in front of the crowd, yelling and waving an enormous stick like an American college cheer-leader. After we had drunk a glass of champagne in honour of the occasion, M. Franjeh took his leave. The Lebanese had been at great pains to organise what to them was an entirely new ritual, and the result was on the whole very creditable.

5. Before this ceremony took place in Beirut, and within a day of my arrival there, I had received a friendly telegram from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs welcoming my arrival "in Syria." I replied at once in suitable terms, instructing Colonel Gardener, the Political Officer at Damascus, to explain, when conveying the message, the practical reasons which had made it inevitable that I should present my letters to the Lebanese Government first. Colonel Gardener reported, however, that Faiz Bey el Khuri and other members of the Syrian Government had expressed their deep disappointment at the order chosen, maintaining that it should have been reversed in view of the fact that Syrian independence had been proclaimed first.

6. This attitude was in the main a reflection of the chronic resentment felt by the Syrians that their country, though intrinsically by far the more important of the two, has never been treated as such by the French, who are firmly ensconced at Beirut. Being also established at Beirut for the present, I could not have proceeded thence to present my letters at Damascus first without giving the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Lebanese a far more real cause for resentment; but I did my best—I think with some success eventually—to console and reassure the Syrians on this score.

7. The ceremonies attending my visit to Damascus differed but slightly from those at Beirut. Before my arrival the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had got hold of some book on the protocol, told Colonel Gardener privately that he considered it quite irregular (as indeed it was) for him to call on me first. I replied through the same channel that I was quite ready to call on him first if he preferred it so, and that the procedure followed at Beirut, of which he had been informed unofficially at his own request, was simply an expression of the Lebanese Government's wish to do special honour to the first British Minister to their country. Faiz Bey did, in fact, call on me first, having explained to Colonel Gardener beforehand that he was concerned solely to avoid creating a precedent; and neither he nor the President gave any sign during my visit of the pique which they had felt before it. They were, indeed, extremely cordial, and my two conversations with Faiz Bey before the official ceremony were nearly as long and quite as unorthodoxly businesslike as the corresponding visits had been at Beirut.

8. On the morning following my arrival at Damascus I went in procession to the residence of the President of the Republic accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the same British party, with the substitution of Colonel Gardener for Colonel Furlonge and the addition of Major Beaumont and two other members of the Political Officer's staff. The residence lies on the extreme outskirts of the town, and as we were escorted by mounted Syrian troops (very well turned out in a picturesque uniform closely resembling that of a French garde républicain) the journey took upwards of forty minutes each way. Over such a long distance it was not to be expected that the crowd would anywhere be large, but the streets were fairly well lined, and the presence of large contingents from schools and orphanages showed that the Syrian authorities had done their best for us. A troop of Syrian boy scouts with an excellent brass band had greeted my departure from the consulate. There was very little cheering among the crowd; the Syrians are more politically conscious than the Lebanese, and their attitude seemed to be one of polite interest in a ceremony which might or might not mean something in terms of real independence.

9. Outside the residence of Sheikh Taj ed Din I inspected the guard of honour and was presented with a bouquet by a bevy of small girls each of whom bore a banner inscribed with the name of the district she came from. The actual presentation of my letters was a more orderly affair than at Beirut, as we had been at pains to ensure that none but the members of the Cabinet and a few senior officials should be present. I enclose copies of my speech and of the President's reply⁽¹⁾ which, in contrast with that of President Naccache, was delivered in Arabic. The members of my party having been officially introduced, we were regaled with lemonade (Syria being a genuinely Mahometan country); and after listening to an ecstatic harangue by another and even stouter "cheer-leader," we returned in procession to the consulate accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

10. Before my departure from Damascus, which took place on the afternoon of the same day, I and my party were entertained by the President and most of the members of his Cabinet at an official luncheon which was the occasion for informal speeches, of which no record was made. In mine I took the opportunity to emphasise my desire to reside as much as possible at the Syrian capital; and Sheikh Taj ed Din's reply was couched in most friendly and appreciative terms.

11. I need not trouble you with extracts from the local press accounts of these ceremonies, some of which I have already sent unofficially to Mr. Caccia; with the exception of a couple of disaffected Free French newspapers, with which I dealt firmly through the Press Section of Spears Mission, the press of both countries was uniformly satisfactory, and, indeed, displayed a very high degree of appreciation of the fact that His Majesty's Government had been the first to give tangible expression to their recognition of the independence of the Levant States.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State at Cairo.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Syria and the Lebanon, April 28, 1942.

IN confirmation of my telegrams Nos. 66 and 70 of the 18th and 19th April, I have the honour to inform you that the new Syrian Cabinet, formed as a result of the fall of Hassan Bey el Hakim, is constituted as follows:—

Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Acting Minister of Education: Husni Bey el Barazi.
Foreign Affairs and Finance (Acting): Faiz Bey el Khuri.
National Defence: Hassan Bey el Atrash.
Public Works: Munir Bey Abbas.
National Economy: Mahmud Bey el Ayesli.
Supply: Hikmet Bey el Horaki.
Propaganda and Youth: Munir Bey Ajlani.
Justice: Raghib Bey Kekhia.

2. I enclose herewith (Enclosure A)(¹) an account of the Prime Minister's past career as furnished by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Immediately before his appointment he was Muhafiz of Damascus, but had not served in that capacity for many weeks. He is a Kurd, an influential landowner of the Hama district and a Nationalist—though probably of the milder sort. As stated in my telegram No. 70, the political officer at Homs speaks well of him; but his career has not been as blameless as Faiz Bey el Khuri's account of it would lead one to suppose. In 1935, while serving under Sheikh Taj ed Din as Minister of Education, he was accused of planting large crops of hashish on his estates, and as a result became involved in a scandal which was brought to the notice of the League of Nations. The semi-official explanation now being circulated is that his brother was the real culprit. At the present time he is reliably reported to be heavily in debt. The political officer at Damascus, while reserving judgment on his appointment, fears that he is likely to prove a mere tool in the hands of Sheikh Taj; and this, in the light of his past career and present indebtedness, appears intrinsically probable. Nevertheless, Husni Bey el Barazi has lost no time in declaring publicly his fidelity to the Allied cause: I attach (Enclosure B)(¹) a copy of his first press interview of the 21st April, as published in the *Echos de Syrie*. I should add that in the opinion of Colonel Gardener this declaration may well have been inspired by the desire to reassure British observers at the sudden eclipse of the former Prime Minister, who was generally known to be pro-British.

3. Of the new Ministers, nothing much is known either for or against Raghib Bey Kekhia, who takes charge of the Ministry of Justice. He is a native of Aleppo and a lawyer by profession. The new Minister of Defence was formerly Muhafiz of the Jebel Druze. Munir Bey Ajlani, the new Minister of Propaganda and Youth, was hitherto Sheikh Taj ed Din's "chef de cabinet," and is believed to be completely subservient to him. A comparatively young man, who has studied in Germany, Ajlani first gained notoriety as an ardent advocate of Syrian nationalism, and was largely responsible for the creation of an extremist youth organisation known as the "Iron Shirts" and of the "Syrians' Committee of German Students." Later, however, he went over to Dr. Shahbender, and in 1938 he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the (Nationalist) Syrian Government of that day for subversive activities. It is believed that Sheikh Taj ed Din intends to use him for the recruitment of a youth movement favourable to himself, but the great majority of the existing Syrian youth movements are strongly Nationalist and hostile to the present régime, and it is more than doubtful whether any important section of them can, in fact, be won over.

4. Of the outgoing Ministers, the most competent is undoubtedly Bahij Bey el Khatib, formerly Minister of the Interior. He has agreed to revert for a few weeks to his former post of Director-General of the Interior, in order to help the new Government into the saddle. He is also reported to be angling, so far without success, for appointment thereafter as President of the *Conseil d'Etat*. Bahij Bey, a civil servant of outstanding ability by local standards, has always maintained close and friendly relations with this mission and with the British Political Officer at Damascus, but his reputation has suffered from a too close association with the French in past years. According to one source, his dismissal from office was explained by Sheikh Taj ed Din as having been due to his intrigues with the British; and it is probable that General Collet and the

(¹) Not printed.

President had for some time past regarded him as a man on whom they could no longer rely if it came to a clash between British determination to evolve a constitutional régime and Sheikh Taj's determination to remain in office regardless of the growing discontent with his personal failings and unconstitutional status.

5. I have received several more or less conflicting accounts of the circumstances which precipitated the fall of Hassan Bey el Hakim, and in the absence of any completely reliable evidence I do not propose to trouble you with a long analysis of them. What seems fairly certain, however, is that the immediate cause of the ministerial reshuffle was a visit, paid by General Catroux to Damascus shortly before it took place, in order to consult with the Government and Opposition leaders. General Catroux is reported to have explained to all concerned that the growing dissatisfaction with the present régime, expressed not only by the Opposition leaders, but also, on grounds of security, by the British, made it essential to introduce immediate changes in the Government and to consider the adoption later of some form of constitutional system or façade. Each of the leaders to whom he spoke was asked his views on the merits of three courses, viz., to recall the last Chamber, to elect a new one, or to nominate a Senate as a provisional measure until the end of the war.

6. Sheikh Taj ed Din was, of course, strongly opposed to the first two of these three courses. The great majority of the Opposition leaders, on the other hand, rejected the proposal for a nominated Senate and favoured either the recall of the old Chamber or the holding of fresh elections—Jamil Mardam, in particular, insisting on the latter course. Apart from the President, only two Ministers are said to have accepted unconditionally the idea of a nominated Senate, though certain others were prepared to acquiesce, subject to various reservations regarding Sheikh Taj himself.

7. The political ferment caused by these consultations, and in particular the degree of unwillingness shown on all sides to collaborate with the President, appears to have encouraged the Prime Minister to offer his resignation, in the belief that the latter would not accept it. Hassan el Hakim knew that Sheikh Taj had been complaining of him to General Catroux, and seems to have counted on being able to stultify these complaints by forcing the President to request his continuance in office for lack of other support. In this, however, he miscalculated. All the members of the Cabinet, notably Bahij el Khatib, and Hikmet Bey Horaki, were already indignant with the Prime Minister for a number of reasons. According to Bahij Bey, the chief of these was that Hassan el Hakim had failed completely to take any steps to solve the problem of the budget. (It is certainly true that the finances of Syria are in a deplorable state, though how far the Prime Minister is personally responsible for this is another matter.) Their main real grievance appears, however, to have been that the Prime Minister had been in negotiation with various persons with a view to filling the vacancies in the Cabinet (*i.e.*, the portfolios of Finance, of which he himself had previously been in charge, and Defence, through the death of Ghaffar Pasha el Atrash) and appointing certain civil servants, and had not consulted them. In their turn, therefore, they hastened to tender their resignations; and Sheikh Taj ed Din, who had long been awaiting his chance, promptly dismissed Hassan el Hakim and called in Husni Barazi.

8. From all accounts it is clear that Hassan el Hakim had become very unpopular, both with the President and with his colleagues, who described him as pig-headed and pettyfogging. On the other hand, he had a reputation for honesty, and had shown himself pro-British. His clashes with Sheikh Taj ed Din seem, moreover, to have been largely due to the latter's shifty political practices and venality. (Just how far the President himself is venal remains a matter of doubt, but it is certain that his sons have been making a handsome profit out of their father's official position.)

9. The foregoing, I would emphasise, is a merely tentative analysis of much conflicting material. In a country where politics are outstandingly sordid, the inner history of this particular crisis does not perhaps matter much. What does, however, matter, from our point of view, is the attitude adopted and the part played by the Free French. There can be no doubt that Sheikh Taj ed Din would never have dared to act without their approval; and, although Colonel Gardener has always been on the most intimate personal terms with General Collet, the latter failed completely to consult him, or even to keep him informed, at any stage of what was going on. A particularly disquieting feature of the whole business is that Husni Barazi, shortly after assuming office, spoke publicly of his intention

to secure the release of political *détenus*; and that General Collet, who had himself, by a questionable manoeuvre, secured British co-operation in the arrest of these persons in the first instance, is reliably reported to have put it about that the arrests had been entirely our doing.

10. When reproached by Colonel Gardener on both these scores, General Collet appears to have been considerably embarrassed, and my conclusion is that, although he is a firm friend of Sheikh Taj and would probably not hesitate to confront us with a *fait accompli* if he thought his friend's position necessitated such action, he was on this occasion told by General Catroux to keep the British out of the picture. In other words, the Délégué Général was determined to show us that he considered the internal politics of the Levant States to be his own affair and nobody else's. In my opinion, this conclusion is in no way weakened by the fact that after the event General Catroux sent the head of his diplomatic bureau to inform Mr. Hamilton—I myself being absent in Cairo—of what had happened. (M. Baelen, needless to say, sought to give the impression that the whole business was an inevitable and spontaneous process, and maintained that the change was definitely for the better.)

11. If my conclusion is correct—and it is borne out by all I hear of the present activities of the Délégation Générale in connexion with the formation of a new Lebanese Government—the symptom is decidedly disquieting. I propose to discuss the remedies available to us in telegrams which will reach you before this despatch.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Acting Minister of State at Cairo.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

[E 2922/207/89]

No. 36.

Weekly Political Summary No. 5: Syria and the Lebanon, May 7, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, May 30.)

1. General.

POLITICAL activity has been slight during the past week. An important step has, however, been taken by the two States, acting together, in demanding from General Catroux the handing over of control of the *Intérêts Communs* funds.

The war, and rumours of war, are the main items of public attention, satisfaction being expressed at the position in Russia, the presence of American warships in the Mediterranean, and the evidence of a growing British air offensive. Hitler's speech is generally considered to have done the Axis more harm than good.

In the economic field discontent persists at the high prices current, especially of bread, and the shortage of certain imported commodities.

In some areas the tribal position has given cause for anxiety, but there are now indications that matters are improving after the taking of suitable action by the authorities.

2. Economic.

Plans for the wheat crop control have been halted by a conflict between the French and Syrian authorities on a point of authority.

The status of the "Office du Blé," appointed by General Catroux by an *arrêté* of the Délégation Générale has been declared unacceptable to the Syrian Government, which denies the French right to legislate for Syrian affairs.

A solution was hoped for on the lines of a Franco-Syrian-Lebanese Control Committee with British membership, endowed with plenary powers, including the use of national territorial forces under a Syrian president operating the plan under powers delegated by all three authorities.

A last-minute breakdown occurred which, to date, is not repaired, and the whole question is, owing to the dangerous consequences of further delay, under urgent discussion.

3. Syria: Damascus.

The new Government has so far shown no particular administrative activity and it is early yet to judge its potentialities.

Concern is being felt in Government circles over the financial situation. The Minister of Finance has pointed out that the Syrian budget is now £10 million in

deficit. One of the reasons for this is the subsidy for bread for the poor, which for Damascus alone amounts to £S. 14,000 per day, and for which no new taxation has been introduced. The Finance Minister recently hinted that perhaps the British could arrange a loan, but he was given no encouragement.

Criticism is being heard in Damascus about our alleged failure to find the persons responsible for the shooting of a Syrian medical student on the 8th April. After it was established that the assailant was wearing battle-dress, the Syrian police withdrew from the investigation, but there is no evidence to prove that the assailant was British, and the matter is now being again pursued by the local security authorities.

4. Aleppo.

The atmosphere seems to be more than ever one of expectancy. The shadow of the long-announced spring offensive remains heavy, though fear of it has been considerably lightened by the news that Hitler has now started to threaten his people as well as the Allies. Locally, there is considerable anxiety regarding the wheat crop, which is in need of rain.

Efforts are still being made to get more support in Aleppo for the new Government. The friendly relations between the Prime Minister and Saadallah Jabri have previously been mentioned: as a sign of collaboration with the Jabri family, there has been talk of appointing Dr. Cheikil Jabri to fill the vacant portfolio of Public Instruction. Though the press has been producing well-disciplined praise of the Barasi Cabinet, such praise is generally regarded with cynicism.

Wheat prices were very high until the last day of April, when they fell on the prospect of the Government enforcing the recent law at this postponed date. Better supplies of grain have arrived from the Jezireh, and the sale of bread in fair quantities at 32 piastres the kilogram, has continued in Aleppo itself, though there is still distress in the frontier regions. Some small distributions have been made there.

There were no serious incidents on the Turkish frontier during the week, and the general feeling was reported to be friendly. Turkish officials visited Harim for a first-degree frontier commission, and a number of complaints about smuggling and raids were discussed amicably.

5. Homs and Hama.

Hitler's speech has had a striking effect in this area. The date of the Allied victory is now discussed rather than the date of the Axis offensive. Reports received of conversations which have taken place in Nationalist circles show that an Axis victory is no longer considered a probability.

Six more cases of typhus have been reported from two villages near Homs. It was found that in one of these villages the population had paid the Syrian sanitary authorities £S. 2,000 in order to stop them putting a sanitary cordon round the village. This cordon had been ordered by the Délégué.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The Muwali-Sha'a dispute has been causing grave anxiety as it was feared that the tension would develop into a general conflagration between riverains and nomads. With the harvest at hand the agricultural tribes are by no means desirous of a clash, but the nomads have suffered heavy losses in stock this winter, and as but few of their leaders are owners of land and crops there is a constant danger of their looting all and sundry. At the moment the two rival groups comprise, on the one hand, the Muwali, Hadidiyin, Lubaib, with some sections of the Agaidat, Buggara and Abu-Sha'ban; and, on the other hand, the nomads, namely, the Sha'a, Feda'an Wuld, Dhan Kuhail sections of the Amarat. There has been some looting already by the Feda'an. Fortunately, everyone is alive to the present danger, and it is hoped that, as a result of discussions held at Deir ez Zor between the French and British authorities, the measures agreed upon will cause an improvement in the situation.

The Deir ez Zor Festival opened on the morning of the 25th April with speeches by Mohamed al Ayish, the Minister of National Economy; Jawad Bey, the Mohafez of Deir ez Zor; Colonel Brosset, the Délégué Adjoint; and Colonel Jago, the area Commander. It closed on the night of the 28th, having been a great success.

7. *Jebel Druze.*

There have been signs of growing opposition amongst rival families to the power of the Atrash clan, and there are some indications that the opposition is being engineered by interested parties outside the Jebel.

8. *Alaouite Territory.*

There are no political events of importance to record this week.

9. *The Lebanon.*

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has withdrawn his resignation in view of the imminence of discussions with the Free French on the question of the "Intérêts Communs," in which he takes a keen interest. At the President's instance, he saw General Catroux, whose hostility to himself has been causing embarrassment to the President, and appears to have reached some basis of co-operation without abandoning his standpoint in regard to the full implementation of Lebanese independence and the cessation of French interference in Lebanese internal affairs.

The Lebanese Minister of the Interior resigned again on the 30th April, and this time his resignation was accepted, the Minister of Justice temporarily assuming his functions.

The Government now seems more confident of survival. The recent departure of two of its weakest members has served to strengthen its position, and the apparent failure of the Free French attempts to come to terms with the Maronite Patriarch have encouraged the President. Moreover, the soundings taken by the French with the Constitutional party, with a view to the formation of a "gouvernement d'union," have merely shown that this party would be unwilling to co-operate except at the price of a larger share in the new Ministry than would be agreeable either to the French or to the President.

The question of the "Intérêts Communs" was carried an unexpectedly long step further on the 1st May, when the Syrian and Lebanese Finance Ministers were invited by General Catroux to visit him and give their formal approval of the 1942 budget of the "Intérêts Communs." Such an invitation was an innovation and a concession to the independent status of the countries. It failed in its purpose, however, for the two Ministers, by previous arrangement, refused to approve the budget, and instead a joint note was handed to General Catroux asking that, pending the definite handing over of the "Intérêts Communs" to the States, the budget should be left in suspense and that monthly credits should be opened for the sums necessary to ensure the working of the services concerned. General Catroux refused this proposal and enlarged on the international agreements which would have to be modified or revoked before the handing over could be accomplished. The Ministers therefore withdrew and agreed provisionally between themselves that a detailed scheme for the handing over should be prepared, under which the Lebanon would take 37 per cent. of the revenues and Syria 53 per cent, the remaining 10 per cent. being put into a Suspense Account, the division of which between the States would be settled some years hence on the basis of statistics to be drawn up. It remains to be seen whether the two Governments will definitely agree on this basis and, in that event, whether General Catroux will then bow to their combined pressure. Such a result, if achieved, might well suffice to keep the Lebanese Government in power until the autumn.

A decree published by the Lebanese Government on the 2nd May, promulgating arrangements for the purchase by His Majesty's Government of the Lebanese silk crop, has aroused widespread satisfaction.

The Belgian Government has announced its intention of raising its consulate-general at Beirut to the status of a legation. It is understood that a chargé d'affaires from London has been appointed.

10. *Press and Propaganda.*

Mr. Roosevelt's speech, and especially the references to units of the United States fleet serving in the Mediterranean, caused a wave of optimism in the press, where editorial writers have been greatly preoccupied in speculating on the possible whereabouts of an Allied invasion of Europe, the likelihood of which now appears to have developed into a certainty in editorial eyes. The newspapers have been lavish in praise of General Giraud.

Most papers commented on Hitler's latest speech and found in it signs of weakness and despair.

The Lebanese press continues to speak, in censored passages, of an imminent Cabinet crisis. The Government are accused of general incompetence and failure to cope with the food situation. The fall of meat prices, owing to the high price and scarcity of bread, has passed almost unnoticed.

In other fields the press continued on its two useful stock lines—"The advent of the Allies has solved the unemployment problem in Syria and the Lebanon," and "How much better off we are under the Allies than we would be under the Germans."

The Syrian press continues to make unfavourable comparisons between its own Government and that of the Lebanon, particularly in matters relating to supply.

The enemy broadcasts in Arabic may, roughly, be divided into three classes. As might be expected, on the anniversary of Rashid Ali's rebellion, both he and the ex-Mufti made violently anti-British speeches, which were given great prominence in all enemy Arabic transmissions, as was also Hitler's speech earlier in the week. The other two subjects given special place were the threat of bolshevism in Arab countries and the troubles of the British in Burma and India. There were hardly any references to the local affairs of Syria and the Lebanon, except for a few remarks on the unhappy food situation, for which, as usual, the British were blamed.

[E 3062/207/89]

No. 37.

Weekly Political Summary No. 6: Syria and the Lebanon, May 14, 1942.—(Received in Foreign Office, June 1.)

1. *General.*

AS summer approaches, the course of the war tends increasingly to absorb the attention of the population. In this regard, however, a notable change is reported from most areas. Whereas, until quite recently, intelligent public opinion was largely undecided as to the outcome, a marked swing-over to a belief in Allied victory has now taken place. No doubt this is due to a combination of factors, but a main cause seems to be Hitler's speech, which has been widely taken to show signs of desperation and therefore of weakness. Although fears of invasion have somewhat died down, they are likely to flare up again as soon as the Axis Powers make any move in the Mediterranean.

2. *Syria.*

The growing tension which has been developing between the Syrian Government and the Free French authorities has produced a deadlock, the Syrians insisting on their right to various administrative attributions and the French resisting.

At the beginning of the week it appeared as if a compromise might be reached over the basic organisation of the Office du Blé, but prolonged discussions in Damascus and Beirut only resulted in increasing the tension. It is apparent now that General Catroux and his advisers have decided to make a test case of the control of the new wheat crop, to decide who has the last word in internal policy. As the success of the scheme primarily depends upon full co-operation between the Syrians, French and British, the present *impasse* has very serious implications which require that a solution be found without delay.

There have been no further developments in the question of the "Intérêts Communs" described on page 4 of *Summary No. 5* of the 7th May.

Another shot in the Franco-Syrian struggle has been fired by the Syrian Government, in the form of a note dated the 1st May to General Collet, demanding that the control of the concessionary companies be handed over. The two chief organisations concerned are the Damas, Hama et Prolongement Railway Company and the Tobacco Monopoly.

Perhaps the most striking feature of these developments is that such a subservient Government as the present one should venture to oppose the French in this manner. The leader of the opposition is undoubtedly Favez el Khoury, Minister for Foreign Affairs and of Finance. So far he has apparently been supported by the President, who may be aiming at ensuring his own popularity in the event of elections—the prospects of which were discussed in a recent visit paid by General Catroux to Damascus. One infallible way of achieving popularity in Syria is to appear to stand up to the French and Sheikh Taj has embarked on this course, but very prudently.

[24205]

3. Damascus.

The President of the Lebanese Republic, accompanied by some of his Ministers and staff, paid an official visit to Damascus on the 3rd May. There was an appropriate ceremony, when he was received amidst acclamation by the President of the Syrian Republic. A return visit of Sheikh Taj to the Lebanon was arranged for the 8th May, but has had to be postponed. The purpose of these visits, apart from their general publicity value, is to demonstrate to the French the solidarity of Syria and the Lebanon, especially over the question of the "Intérêts Communs."

On the 5th May British aircraft flew over the city dropping pamphlets in the form of a "V" for victory. There was a great scramble to pick them up, and the propaganda value was reported to have been considerable.

4. Aleppo.

Mention of the possibility of elections has been received with mingled interest and scepticism, as it is generally considered that a Government in power can rig elections for its own advantage. Dr. Hassan Fouad, the venerable Nationalist leader, when visiting the Political Officer, remarked that a fair administration was all that was wanted in war time and that independence was not practicable till more settled times returned.

Ragheb Kekhia, the Minister for Justice, is in Aleppo re-establishing local connexions, after long residence in Damascus.

On the night of the 5th-6th May about 15 swastikas were painted on walls in the town. This is thought to be merely a recrudescence of activity on the part of a few enemy agents, who have been quiet for some time. Recently, and especially since Hitler's last speech, sympathy with or fear of the Axis has tended to decrease, and the general situation in Aleppo has been satisfactory.

Wheat arrivals from the Jezireh continue to suffice for immediate needs, and bread has been on sale in reasonable quantities. Owing to lack of rain it is estimated that the wheat crop around Aleppo will only be half that of last year.

The arrival of Transjordan Frontier Force units in frontier areas, which had previously been inadequately controlled by French-commanded patrols, has given rise to inevitable jealousy, but feeling is already improving.

5. Homs and Hama.

There has been little political activity in the area, apart from a reorganisation of the *Partie Populaire Syrienne*, which has little influence at the moment.

The Political Officer visited Selimiyeh on the 4th May to witness the arrival of Prince Ali Khan. The fanatical way in which he was received by his people seems to bear out the belief that they will fight for the Allies, even after invasion. A visit was paid by the Political Officer to the Cherkesse villages in the area. The Moukhtars of each village, speaking for inhabitants, avowed their loyalty to the Allied cause.

The poor list in Homs has risen to 55,000, and it is feared that trouble may arise before the harvest, which is not expected to be more than average owing to lack of rain.

There has been an increase in arms traffic due to mutual distrust between the bedouin and villagers. 800 rounds of French ammunition were found concealed in baskets of fruit in Homs.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

A "Communication Orale" has been received through His Majesty's Embassy, Angora, from the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs accusing local authorities of distributing arms to Syrian villages near the frontier. There is nothing whatever to support the Turkish complaint, which, as far as is known, has never been made to frontier officials on this side. Relations generally have much improved between French and Turkish officials, as evidenced by friendly social visits each month.

A system of passes instituted in Iraq should tighten control on the Syro-Iraqi frontier, and keep a check on Iraqi clerks and police who in the past have aired their sympathies for Rashid Ali's rebel party.

The repair of the pipe-line has involved sealing 750 punctures caused by rifle bullets. The damage must be attributed primarily to the Agaidat in the Abu-Kemal area.

The heat wave at the beginning of this month has given rise to the gloomiest forebodings about the prospects of the wheat crop in the Jezireh; and the uncertainty as to the rate which will be fixed by the Wheat Board when purchasing the new crop has still further increased uneasiness.

7. Jebel Druze and Alaouite Territory.

There are no political events to report from these areas. The following brief appreciation of the political situation among the Alaouites is, however, of interest.

Political activities in the Alaouite Territory are subordinate to religious interests, and are not determined by political principles or programmes. Nevertheless, the position taken by the Alaouites in Syrian politics, especially *vis-à-vis* the Nationalist party, is of great importance. This compact minority, in addition to being well-armed and tenacious as fighters, controls the whole coastline of Syria, and could, under French pressure, put forward separatist claims backed by breaches of public order, thus giving the French an excuse to impose direct rule again in Syria. The Alaouites have played a similar rôle before, and are aware of the key position they hold in Franco-Syrian politics. It is, therefore, of interest to study their present attitude and their possible reactions to the advent of a Nationalist Government.

The two major political parties in the territory are the Nationalist and the Shaabist. (The *Partie Populaire Syrienne* exists, but is suppressed as an illegal organisation.)

The Nationalist party, with some Christian and Alaouite adherents, is the one to which most Moslems belong; and the Shaabist party, despite its Moslem followers, is locally in the main an Alaouite party with separatist sentiments.

The former controls the main coastal towns, most of the Kurds and the total Arab and strongly anti-French population of the Sahyoun District. Most of the Christians, jealous of local Alaouite control of the administration now that French influence is less strong, back the Nationalists, or would support any candidates who would uphold their minority rights.

The Shaabist party has a small following in the coastal towns and is backed, for personal reasons, by Nouri-el-Hajj, the Kurdish chief. This party would be weak in the Alaouite territory but for the fact that it is, in addition, supported by certain influential families, with particularist and, in some cases, separatist claims, especially the families of Abbas, Kinj and Murshid. These tribal leaders remember what happened between 1936 and 1939, when a Nationalist Government filled all the important offices with Damascene Sunnis. If these families can keep together, and even more if they can get other Alaouite leaders to join them, the Shaabist party will become the strongest in the Alaouite territory.

In the 1926 Parliament the Alaouites had ten seats out of sixteen, the others being divided equally between Moslems and Christians, and such a position would be likely to occur again. If, however, they could make an arrangement with the Nationalists whereby their local autonomy in administrative and financial matters were guaranteed to them, they might throw in their lot with that party.

The Kinj-Murshid group would like to occupy a position midway between France and Syria, but the hostile attitude of the *Délégué* has turned them into an anti-French camp. They might therefore decide to throw in their lot with the Nationalists.

The Alaouite leaders, without exception, place little faith in France, and less in the Frenchmen now ruling Syria. They realise that Sheikh Taj's weak Government is backed by General Collet, and believe that when it falls it will be replaced by a Nationalist Government. Therefore, openly or clandestinely, contact is being made with Nationalist notables.

All persons in the Alaouite territory, irrespective of creed or party, would like to see British rule established in some form. This applies to the minorities more than to the Moslems, but even they would like some indirect British control at the present time. All would like to see a united Syria under a strong and popular Government, and the feeling appears to be growing stronger that such a Government can only be formed from the Nationalist ranks.

8. Tribal.

Shamieh.—After a number of difficulties and alarms, the Hadidiyin and Muwali have at last been prevailed upon to move north and north-west to the edge of the cultivated lands, whence, failing further clashes, they should disperse to their villages for the summer. The Sba'a also are still proving difficult, and the French authorities are trying to get recent outstanding disputes settled. For the moment the situation is calmer, and it is hoped to arrange for arbitration in accordance with Bedouin custom.

Reports continue to be received of raids and robberies along the borders of the cultivated areas in the north and north-west, some of which are undoubtedly the

work of professional robbers and gangs rather than of the nomads. Efforts are being made, by means of patrols, to limit the trouble as far as possible.

In contrast to the lack of public security prevailing in the northern Syrian Desert, no incidents of any importance are reported from the south and south-west, where the Ruwalleh are quiet and orderly and provide a valuable buffer between the unrest of the north and the Transjordan tribes.

Jezireh.—The dispute between the Shammar of Zor, Kikiyeh and Milli, on the one hand, and the Baggara (Zor) on the other (referred to on page 6, *Summary* No. 3, of the 23rd April), suddenly came to a head, and an armed conflict was only prevented by the intervention of the S.S. Inspector, supported by a platoon of the Light Desert Company. The headmen have been brought to Hassatche with a view to arriving at a settlement.

This incident throws light on the workings of the Syrian administration in the Jezireh. The dispute, originating in a question of land, was within the competence of the Syrian executive. Yet the latter, even supposing they possessed the energy and ability to make a settlement, lack the force and prestige to implement it. A few gendarmes are no match for hordes of armed tribesmen, who are generally better mounted and often better armed. In existing circumstances, therefore, the Syrian authorities naturally tend to leave all troublesome matters to the Free French, at the same time complaining bitterly that the latter will never implement the declaration of Syrian independence.

9. The Lebanon.

Apart from the visit of the President to Damascus, referred to in paragraph 3, there is nothing of interest to report. Political activity has for the moment ceased, the main public interest being confined to the war and to internal economic questions.

Tripoli.—This area has remained quiet during the week, but a general feeling of discontent regarding the present administration is still noticeable. The Moslems fear that changes may be effected in the Ministry without their being consulted, and are doing all they can to press the Government for more adequate representation.

10. Press and Propaganda.

The tone of the press as a whole has been quiet, with food and supply problems continuing to be the main local theme of the Arabic press.

The visit of the President of the Lebanon to Damascus has been greeted with favour, and there is a general repetition of the demand that Syria and the Lebanon should become one country, economically, if not politically.

Little comment has so far appeared on the subject of Madagascar, apart from the official communiqués and extracts from radio broadcasts.

Enemy broadcasts are still harping on the Jewish "menace." The Americans are being accused of interfering in the Middle East with a view to favouring Jewish interests, and the British are accused of bribing the tribal chiefs in Syria and the Lebanon for their own purposes.

[E 3231/207/89]

No. 38.

Weekly Political Summary No. 7: Syria and the Lebanon, May 21, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 2.)

1. General.

LITTLE political activity has marked the week, although there have been comings and goings among opposition political leaders and a recrudescence of Axis-inspired propaganda is reported from Homs and Hama. One of the reasons for this lull is doubtless the prolonged negotiations which arose over the control of the new wheat crop; another is that the Governments of both States have been largely preoccupied with the arrangements for the return visit of Syrian Government functionaries to the Lebanon.

The Syrian President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Beirut from the 15th–18th May. They were greeted with considerable ceremony and enthusiasm and were made to work extremely hard during their stay. They caused considerable perturbation in accepting an invitation to a lunch with the Maronite Patriarch, to which the Lebanese President, for obvious reasons, was not invited, but they took every occasion of speaking soothing words about Syria's brotherly feelings for the Lebanon. They also brought with them

detailed proposals for the handing over of the "Intérêts communs," which are now to be considered by the Lebanese Government and, if approved, to be presented by the two Governments jointly to General Catroux.

Mr. Churchill's speech at Leeds received a good write-up in the press, and the contrast between his tone of confidence and Hitler's recent speech has had a reassuring effect generally.

On the 14th May four members of a spy ring, who were recently convicted by a French military court in Aleppo, were shot. The fact was published in all the local papers, although the names were withheld. No public reactions have been reported from any area, and it is hoped that the case will provide a salutary deterrent to the numerous individuals in the Levant States who are readily disposed to adopt the profession of agent.

2. Syria: Damascus.

Concern continues to be felt over the budget. Certain Syrians visited the Political Officer and spoke extremely despondently of the budget situation, of the failure to effect economies, and of lack of adequate taxation. They even said that the French were deliberately abetting a spendthrift policy since they thought it was in their interest to have a bankrupt Syria at the time of the peace conference. Apart from such ingenious theories, however, there is a distinct feeling amongst thinking people that now is the time for the Government to get down to the problems, not only of finance, but of administration. Fears are expressed of Sheikh Taj's propensities to seek popularity by the easiest way, and it is remarked that his new Government has yet to show any signs of determination to solve the problem by the only possible methods, namely, a reform of the Administration and the introduction of a rational system of taxation.

Considerable interest was aroused in all quarters by a demonstration, made in front of the Sérail in Damascus on the 11th May by some 200 people, against the laxity of public morals. This was occasioned by the visit to Damascus of an Egyptian troupe of players who gave a theatrical show in the town. The Prime Minister received a deputation of Ulema who were leading the demonstration, and who presented to him a petition containing twenty-two points. The first point demanded that women should not be allowed in cinemas or theatres, and the following ones demanded, in short, that they return to their traditional Islamic code of behaviour and dress. Other demands were equally strict on the subject of drink and Moslem education. The twenty-two points were printed in full in both the Arabic and the French press, and aroused protest in the latter. Some ladies of leading Damascus Moslem families subsequently saw the Prime Minister to dissociate themselves from the ideas put forward by the Ulema.

In Damascus there are two associations of Moslem Sheikhs—the Jam'eat al Ulema and the Jam'eat al Gharra, the first-named being a stronger and more influential body. The Jam'eat al Gharra, who organised the aforementioned demonstration, is notorious for its exploitation of religion to serve political ends, and there is no doubt that the present demonstration was staged as an attack against the Government. It is significant that the development towards independence of countries in the Near East tends to be accompanied by reactionary movements on the part of religious leaders, who seek to encourage xenophobia and fanaticism.

3. Aleppo.

The visit of the Minister of Justice, Ragheb Kekhia, aroused some interest. The dismay he expressed at the ineffectiveness of the Mohafez, and his outspoken objection to the original French decree setting up the "Office du Blé," seems to indicate that he is aiming at some collaboration with the Nationalists as represented by the Jabri family.

On the 12th May twenty-seven leading merchants telegraphed an exaggerated account of the food situation to Damascus. Actually there is stated to be three weeks' reserve of grain in Aleppo. The wire, however, produced a brief visit from the Minister of Ravitaillement, as a result of which there is to be a reversion to bread instead of flour issues.

Crop prospects continue to be a source of worry, and there is a growing demand for a larger degree of British control in the Ravitaillement.

In connexion with the painting of swastikas on walls in the town (reference paragraph 4 of *Summary* No. 6), arrests have been made of some youths who are believed to have been responsible for this incident.

The Turkish authorities have at last allowed the return of the two Australians and the lorry in which they crossed the frontier last December. An

officer and a small patrol of the T.J.F.F. who crossed the frontier in error on the 15th May have been detained, but their early return is being pressed for.

4. Homs and Hama.

There has been some renewal of Nationalist activity, and Hassan el Khayat, a politician of the Nationalist *bloc* from Damascus, has visited Homs, where he met Hashim Bey Atassi and other local leaders. The *Partie Populaire Syrienne* has also held a secret meeting. In general, it may be said that there is no confidence in the present Government and little interest in its activities.

In the absence of any events of political importance to occupy the public mind there has been a revival of anti-Allied rumour in this area, which has always been receptive to Axis-inspired propaganda. The more important rumours are given below. It will be observed that they fall into four main categories:—

(1) *Panic*—

The British will use gas when the Germans enter Syria and as a result thousands of civilians will be killed.

The British have used gas during air raids on the Germans.

The Germans are using twenty-five armoured divisions and 20,000 bombers in the Crimea.

The Allies have no forces of importance in Syria.

Syrians who befriend the Allies will suffer when the Germans come.

Take note of A.R.P.: it will be peeded when the Germans come.

(2) *Jews*—

The British have agreed to the settlement of 3 million Jews in Syria.

Jewish infiltration in Syria has already begun, the army contractors being the first-comers.

(3) *Allied Relations*—

Generals Catroux and de Gaulle have had a quarrel with General Wilson, and have decided to go over to Vichy.

The British have decided not to allow the Free French any powers in Madagascar.

(4) *Ravitaillement*—

The "Office du Blé" will be a repetition of the Minister of State's Plan. The rich will gain, the poor will starve.

The British have no more wheat. They will therefore requisition 50 per cent. of the new crop for the army.

5. Euphrates and Jezireh.

No important developments have taken place and detailed reports have not yet been received.

6. Jebel Druze.

The Jebel appears to be quiet. The Emir Hassan, accompanied by the Emira, visited Soueida during the week.

7. Alaouite Territory.

There are no events of political importance to record. The existing tension between the Syrian Government and the Free French authorities is having its local reactions, and there is an increasing tendency to place the responsibility for the present unsettled state of affairs on the British.

8. Tribal.

There has been no serious development in the dispute, reported in recent summaries, between the Sba'a and the Muwali-Hadidiyin tribes. The possibility of an immediate clash has been reduced by the dispersion of the tribes towards their normal summer locations, and urgent steps are now being taken to settle the quarrel by arbitration.

The number of raids during the past week is greatly reduced. The offer of some British mobile patrols, equipped with wireless, was received with enthusiasm by General Collet, and they have been successfully used to police the area north and east of Homs.

The distribution of dates and wheat to the tribes is almost completed. This assistance has made a good impression, and messages of gratitude have been received, notably from the important Ruwalla and Fedaan tribes. Distribution to the Sba'a had been held up on account of their dispute with the Muwali and Hadidiyin, but, as a settlement of this quarrel is now in sight, orders have been given for the distribution to be carried out.

Near the frontier north-east of Aleppo the rivalry between the Berazi chiefs, Basrowi Agha and the Shahins, has led the former to petition for the removal of the Kaimakam of Arab Pounar, whom Basrowi accuses of being in the pay of the Shahins.

9. The Lebanon.

The impression that elections would be held in the Lebanon in a not too far distant future has rapidly gained ground in political circles during the past fortnight, and a great deal of talk and intrigue has thereby been caused. Béchara el Khoury's Constitutional party were first in the field, but ex-President Eddé has been hard at work rallying supporters in Beirut and Tripoli, while many other small groups are forming and re-forming themselves. The situation is far too fluid as yet for any clear picture of the future to emerge.

It is generally understood that elections cannot take place until the autumn at the earliest, when the local economic and the general military positions will be clearer and the summer season over. In the meantime, the most immediate interest is the question whether the present Lebanese Government will or will not be replaced by another temporarily nominated Government for the interim period. M. Eddé, who has some influence on the President, seems to be pushing him to change his Government as soon as the 1942 budget, which has still not been passed, is complete. The argument used is that the present Government has lost the confidence of the country. This may be true, but a truer reason is probably to increase his influence by placing some of his nominees in a new Government and thus to be in a better position to influence the course of the elections.

The composition of the elected Chamber is also causing much discussion. The Electoral Law of the Lebanon has been many times altered in the past twenty years, but has always made provision for a certain number of nominated Deputies in the Chamber, usually about one-third of the total seats. The President is naturally in favour of the continuance of this practice as a means of strengthening his own position; most progressive elements feel, however, that there is no place for nominated Deputies in an independent State.

Lieutenant-General His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester arrived in Beirut on the 18th May on a visit to IXth Army headquarters, and was ceremonially received at the airport by British and Free French authorities.

The Lebanese Minister of Ravitaillement left Beirut for Bagdad by air on the 17th May in order to try and obtain barley for the Lebanon to eke out the existing stocks of wheat.

General dissatisfaction with the methods of the Lebanese Ravitaillement authorities in distributing flour to the poorer section of the population has led to protest meetings in Tripoli and threats of demonstrations in Beirut, but is not yet sufficiently general to foreshadow serious trouble.

10. Wheat.

The Syrian Government having categorically refused to accord General Catroux the right to veto decisions of the commission, the whole matter was discussed in Cairo at conferences attended by His Majesty's Minister and the Délégué-Général, and it was agreed on the 13th May that a Higher Committee composed of these two should be set up as the final authority. This committee would endorse the decisions of the commission, and would have the right to modify them, or to take direct action in regard to any matter within the competence of the commission, at the demand of any one of its members. It was further agreed that in the event of the plan failing for any reason, General Catroux would hand over the necessary powers to the Commander-in-chief, IXth Army. This agreement constituted an important admission by the Free French of our power to prevent any action on their part which we regarded as contrary to our interests.

As members of the Syrian Government had frequently emphasised their desire for British participation in the scheme, particularly at the highest level, it was hoped that this arrangement would prove acceptable to them, and everything possible was done to explain it to them, privately and in advance, in the

most favourable light. When, however, the Syrian President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs came to Beirut to discuss it with the British and French on the 16th May, they proved very difficult to persuade, maintaining that although the principle involved was acceptable, the manner of its presentation was so damaging to Syrian prestige as to invite active popular opposition. The British members of the conference therefore proposed certain emendations, the gist of which was that so long as the commission functioned harmoniously, the endorsement of its decisions by the Higher Committee (involving "arrêts" by General Catroux) would not be required; only in the event of disagreement, and consequent risk of a set-back to the plan, would the Higher Committee be called upon to emerge from the background.

These emendations, while sacrificing nothing essential, rendered the scheme rather more palatable to the Syrians, who eventually accepted it; and the protocol embodying the agreement was signed by the Syrian Prime Minister, His Majesty's Minister and General Catroux late on the evening of the 16th May, the signature of the Lebanese Prime Minister being affixed the following day.

The Control Committee are now trying to make up for lost time, getting the wheat purchasing organisation working. Owing to drought and heat waves, the total crop is estimated at not more than normal, i.e., 500,000-550,000 tons. Harvesting in the South Lebanon has already begun.

There is a movement among those who are afraid of losing money as a result of the wheat monopoly to get together to see how they can evade the law. A congress of Syrian farmers from many districts assembled in Damascus on the 15th May to study the proposed Government monopoly in wheat, the tithe law and the question of assuring labour for the harvest. Speakers in the General Assembly, with one exception, violently attacked the monopoly scheme and the Office du Blé, and a committee was appointed to study the question and report to the General Assembly on the 17th.

As far as is known at present, the committee, which held its first meeting on the evening of the 15th, is believed to have agreed eventually to the principle of monopoly up to the point at which the Government would be assured of a reasonable quantity of wheat for the supply of bread in Syria during the coming year. It has repudiated, however, the idea of a French-run monopoly and of a monopoly which would take Syrian wheat for the Lebanon at low prices, because it was felt that the Lebanese merchants who supplied Syrian farmers with necessary manufactured goods, &c., were being placed under no price restrictions and that therefore the Lebanese would benefit unduly from a monopoly scheme to supply both countries.

11. Press and Propaganda.

The Syrian press, both French and Arabic, has commented at great length on the twenty-two demands of the Ulema (see section 2 above). Most of the comments were unfavourable and pointed out that the demands were impracticable in view of the varied creeds and races in the country.

The Lebanese press made much of the Syrian President's visit to Beirut. A lot of the comment appeared "forced" in tone, but there was a certain amount of spontaneous comment about the closer collaboration between the two countries, and several papers emphasised the fact that economically the two countries were one.

Mr. Churchill's speech was received with very favourable comment and apparently made a deep impression on the press.

Enemy propaganda has distorted Mr. Churchill's speech as regards the use of gas. The speech as a whole was referred to as "empty words, optimistically uttered." There was some reference to Lord Gort's appointment as General Officer Commanding, Malta, with unfavourable references to his career as General Officer Commanding in France.

[R 3679/23/44]

No. 39.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 133. Secret.)

Sir,

Angora, May 22, 1942.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 814 of the 20th April regarding the claim for rectification of the Syrian frontier put forward by the Turkish Government in connexion with the proposal to construct a railway between Diyarbakir

and Arada, I have the honour to inform you that on the 22nd April the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me orally his regret that we had found it necessary to oppose a definite refusal to the Turkish desiderata as regards the frontier, and suggested that the matter might have been reserved like that of the Soviet-Polish frontier for direct discussion between the two Governments concerned. (His Excellency apparently overlooked the fact that this would involve the Turkish Government in recognition of the Syrian Government, which they have hitherto consistently refused.)

2. In view of the statement in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 605 of the 20th April that the construction of the Diyarbakir-Arada railway link was no longer of vital urgency, I have not reverted to the question of the railway or to the suggestion of frontier rectification. On the 20th May, however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that he had had my communication under review and had been considering an answer with the object of leaving the matter open against future possibilities. He then showed me a *communication orale*, which he said he intended to hand to me. The original text read at the end of paragraph 3 "exploitation politique"—to which I objected—instead of "certains intérêts politiques" (which Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently inserted as an amendment). The original version also concluded with a paragraph to the effect that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had read my communication as meaning that I myself wished to leave the matter open. This I asked him to delete, as misleading. I informed his Excellency that, subject to the alterations which I had suggested as above, I was prepared to receive his communication (which is clearly designed to keep the Turkish point of view alive), but that it was unlikely that he would receive an answer. He appeared to understand the position. I enclose a copy of the communication as finally amended.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State, Cairo.

I have, &c.

H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Communication orale.

DES le début de l'ère nouvelle qui a commencé pour la Turquie à la proclamation de la république, le Gouvernement n'a éprouvé des difficultés au point de vue des relations de bon voisinage qu'à la frontière turco-syrienne.

L'anomalie du tracé qui sépare la Turquie des territoires syriens ne constitue certainement pas le seul motif des difficultés éprouvées, dont la raison profonde réside plutôt dans la situation même de la Syrie où l'indépendance complète préconisée et promise à différentes reprises n'a jamais été instaurée.

Les intérêts de la Turquie et d'une Syrie entièrement maîtresse de ses actes s'harmonisent parfaitement; et il est évident qu'aucune difficulté frontalière n'aurait surgi entre ces deux pays si la Syrie n'avait été asservie à certains intérêts politiques.

Dans le cas où l'indépendance dont il est question dans la communication orale de son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique se traduirait par la reconnaissance inconditionnelle de la pleine souveraineté syrienne, la Turquie ne pourrait que se réjouir d'une telle solution. Mais si tel n'était pas le cas et si l'indépendance syrienne restait hypothétique, le Gouvernement turc serait en droit d'en déduire que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique serait d'accord avec lui pour considérer la question ouverte à une conversation entre les deux pays amis et alliés.

Ankara, le 20 mai 1942.

[E 3331/207/89]

No. 40.

Weekly Political Summary No. 8: Syria and the Lebanon, May 28, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, June 11.)

1. General.

THERE is no change in the political situation and all the settled areas are quiet. The improvement in the general attitude towards the war has been maintained, with interest centred on events in Russia. In the towns reports of

the use of gas and of new weapons have excited some alarm. Speculation about the proposed wheat plan is rife throughout the wheat-producing areas and among merchants.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester paid a visit to the Lebanon on the 18th-20th May and Damascus on the 21st May, when he called on the Presidents of the two republics. Much interest was shown in his visit and public reactions were uniformly favourable.

2. Wheat.

A last-minute hitch occurred in the development of the new wheat plan when the Syrian Government refused to ratify the protocol which had been accepted by the Presidents and Prime Ministers of both States. In the subsequent negotiations concessions to the Syrian point of view were made, and accepted by the French, which enabled agreement to be reached. These modifications were:—

- (a) The chairmen of local committees would be the mohafazes, and not S.S. officers.
- (b) The courts dealing with offences against the wheat regulations would be local, and not military.
- (c) The secretary-general of the Control Committee would be a Syrian.
- (d) There would be Syrian and Lebanese, as well as French and British, inspectors-general.

The Syrian Government accepted the plan only after strong pressure by His Majesty's Minister. They said they did so out of regard to his wishes, but what probably influenced their decision was the assurance that there would be British officers present at every stage of its application, especially in the villages, for the protection of the producers.

The Syrian Government's uneasiness over the scheme has been more pronounced since the assembly of farmers in Damascus (Summary No. 7 of the 21st May, paragraph 10), which showed that pronounced opposition from land-owners and merchants is to be expected.

Subsequent to the meeting, the Syrian President received a deputation, when he is reported to have explained that the British, and not the French, would supervise the scheme, as it formed part of a general British supply scheme covering the whole of the Middle East. Its aim, he said, was to keep up supplies in this part of the world during the whole year, which might be one of the most difficult of the war, and his hearers could be assured that he and the Government would see to it that Syria secured a fair deal. The deputation is believed to have left somewhat mollified.

It is clear that the Government are apprehensive of public opinion. Most of the Arabic press, to judge by censorship, are opposed to the wheat office. An energetic propaganda campaign throughout the country is called for and this is now being devised.

3. Syria: Damascus.

The capital has been quiet. There were no reactions to the announcement that four men had been shot in Aleppo after conviction as enemy agents. This affords a contrast to the small strike of schoolboys which took place on the occasion of the recent execution of the three Iraqi rebels.

4. Aleppo.

In Aleppo also the situation has been tranquil and there are still no signs of ill-feeling as the result of the aforementioned executions.

The prospect of elections has been much discussed and the possibility of a boycott by the Nationalists has been raised. Even if control makes elections in the main centres reasonably fair, it is expected that the Government in power will manage to swing the results in the country districts.

Husni Barazi, the Prime Minister, is proposing to visit Aleppo shortly, probably with the idea of increasing his contacts with the Nationalists.

The bread problem continues most pressing and the question of tiding over the period until the new crop is on the market is giving anxiety. Locally known stocks are now very small and, according to reports from the Jezireh, further supplies are not available there. However, if there is a serious shortage during the next few weeks, the barley that is now being harvested, also spring vegetables, should mitigate the hardship.

There is expected to be a meeting shortly between the Délégué at Aleppo, who is the Free French representative for the whole Turkish frontier, and the Vali of Antioch. This will be the first meeting in the second degree (under the *Bon-Voisinage* Agreement which was never ratified) and it denotes a further mark of Turkish willingness to settle frontier disputes.

All the staff of the large Lycée français at Aleppo have now rallied to the Free French, mainly as a result of the return to power of Laval. The teaching profession, with its important influence over youth, has hitherto stood aloof from the Free French Movement. The religious bodies, however, continue to do so, though some individuals are enthusiastic Allied supporters.

5. Euphrates and Jezireh.

Jawad Bey Murabet, Mohafez of Euphrates Province, has left Deir ez Zor. Compelled to accept the post of governor in a tribal area, he has found that his studies at a French university, crowned with a degree of law and philosophy and backed by a long period of Government posts in Damascus, do not make up for experience. Pitched into a welter of intrigue, completely ignorant of tribes, their organisation and blood-feuds, with no inspiring force of personality, he has found the task too much for him, in spite of possessing one asset, rare in the East, that of unquestioned integrity.

Interest in the Jezireh during recent weeks has centred mainly on tribal affairs, particularly on date distribution, and the Abu Ma'eesh dispute (referred to in section 7). In spite of the fact that the date distribution was unfortunately delayed beyond the period of greatest need, the general effect on the tribes here as elsewhere, has been beneficial.

Various independent sources report a marked swing-over of "coffee-shop opinion" in the Jezireh about the war. Pro-British sentiments are now proclaimed even by persons who were previously convinced of an Axis victory. It is a little difficult to establish the cause of this change as newspapers are almost non-existent and radios rare in this area. Probably a consciousness of Germany's difficulties is gaining ground, with the delay in the spring offensive and maintained Russian pressure.

Even more curious in some ways has been the lack of interest shown in the execution of the three Iraqi traitors. The only unusual topic of conversation reported is a rumour that the Jezireh is shortly to be declared a British mandate, independent of Syria, to be thrown open to refugees from Turkey and elsewhere, in fact, to be made a national home for Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians.

6. Other Areas.

There have been no events of importance and detailed reports have not been received owing to the Conference of Political Officers referred to in section 9.

7. Tribal.

Shamieh.—No further serious developments have occurred in the dispute between the Sba'a and the Muwali-Haddidiyin tribes. Arbitrators have been agreed upon and sittings are to begin in Damascus on the 1st June. It is proposed also to convene the sheikhs of several other tribes, including Emir Mujhem of the Feda'an, whose men have taken a hand in the troubles.

In the northern areas round Aleppo, where tribal bands have done an unusual amount of harm to the crops and flocks of the villagers, great resentment is felt against the ineffectiveness of the controlling authorities. The Emir Mujhem has been called in and has given a further assurance that he will pay for the damage done by his men in the Sfireh district.

Jezireh.—In the Jezireh district no further developments are reported in the dispute between the Abu Ma'eesh and the Baggara of Zor on the one hand and the Milli, Kikieh and Shammar of Zor on the other (reference Summary No. 6 of the 14th May, section 8). As semi-sedentary tribes are involved, the case has been handed over to the civil authorities to investigate. Though organised fighting is unlikely to occur, the position is unsatisfactory and the civil authorities are unlikely to take any strong action. In the meantime, it is hoped to arrange for a British patrol to "show the flag" in the area of dispute.

Among the Kurds, the recent arrest in error of Jamil Hajo Agha is still a disturbing factor. However, suitable assurances from the Political Officer and the award of some military works, which is likely to go to the Hajo family, should succeed in soothing wounded feelings.

8. The Lebanon.

Much political discussion in the Lebanon continues to centre on the prospect of elections, as it is now generally understood that these will take place in the autumn. The President, who dislikes the prospect, as he fears that it will lead to his own eclipse, attempted on the 22nd May to convince the Political Officer that elections engendered popular excitement and did not lead to the formation of a properly representative Chamber. It was represented to him that, while these defects might be true, elections were, in the British view, desirable in order to regularise the Government's position and to provide a safety-valve for popular criticism, and he finally appeared resigned to the prospect. The chief feature of the electoral campaign up to date is the growing power of Emile Eddé's party, though this may well be temporary. A brisk controversy is also taking place in political circles as to whether the new Chamber will be composed entirely of elected members, or whether the system hitherto in force, whereby two-thirds of the total number of Deputies was elected and one-third was nominated by the President, is to be maintained. The President, who realises that his lack of personal popularity would mitigate against his chances of being elected President by a wholly elected Chamber, clearly hopes that it will.

On the 22nd May President Naccache broadcast a message to Lebanese abroad from the Beirut station. He described his pride at their achievements abroad and his hope that after the war many of them would return to the Lebanon to assist in its development.

A serious explosion took place at the Tripoli Topping Plant on the 23rd May, in which seven persons, including the French manager, lost their lives. The plant, which was hastily constructed of used material from many sources during the Vichy régime, has already had two previous accidents of this nature and it is not thought that there was any question of sabotage. The plant may be out of action for some time.

The Lebanese Minister of Ravitaillement returned to Beirut from Bagdad on the 23rd May, apparently well pleased with his reception by the British and Iraqi authorities and with the success of his mission.

There has been no further news of any impending change in the Lebanese Government; in any case, it seems that no such change can take place until the 1942 budget has been passed. The Tripoli Moslems continue to be exercised by the lack of any representative in the Government since the resignation of Wassif Izzeddin, but the President, whose idea seems to be at present to reduce rather than to increase the size of his Ministry, has made no move towards satisfying their demands.

9. Political Officers.

A Conference of Political Officers was held on the 22nd and 23rd May at the Mission Headquarters. The opportunity was taken to discuss a large range of subjects and to obtain a useful exchange of views.

Political Officers have recently been appointed at Tell Abiad, in the Jezireh, and at Zahlé, in the Beka'a. The distribution of Political Officers is now as follows:—

Syria—		Area.
Damascus	...	Northern area.
Aleppo	...	
Homs	...	Central area.
Deir ez Zor	...	
Hassetche	...	Euphrates and Jezireh.
Tell Abiad	...	
Soueida	...	Jebel Druze.
Lattakia	...	
The Lebanon—		Alaouite territory.
Beirut	...	Northern Lebanon.
Tripoli	...	
Zahlé	...	Beka'a or East Lebanon.

10. Press and Propaganda.

The great event of the week was the visit of His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, on whom the Beirut Arabic papers lavished great praise. They took

the occasion as an opportunity to stress the loyalty of the Arabs to the democracies and their appreciation of the British Royal family, represented in the person of the Duke.

Economic matters continue to fill a good deal of space in all the papers and censored items still deal in the main with criticisms of the supply services and complaints at the high cost of bread.

Enemy Propaganda.—The new line of enemy wireless propaganda concerning the desire of America to seize the Near East with the help of the Jews continues to be developed, though it appears to conflict with the other refrain, which has by no means died out, that the British are to colonise Syria and the Lebanon.

Other enemy broadcasts dealt in detail with the German successes in the fighting in Southern Russia, while, on the occasion of the executions in Iraq and Syria, Arabs were repeatedly called upon to "avenge their murdered brethren."

The food situation in both Syria and the Lebanon is insistently and gloomily described by most enemy Arabic broadcasters.

[E 4009/183/89]

No. 41.

WRITTEN AGREEMENTS WITH FIGHTING FRENCH COVERING DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ETAT DE SIEGE MAY BE PROCLAIMED AND POWERS CONFERRED ON THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN THE LEVANT STATES.

[E 2415/183/89]

I.—AGREEMENT COVERING CASE OF TROUBLES STARTING IN THE DESERT AREA AND THREATENING TO SPREAD.

Extract from paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Catroux's Letter of November 25, 1941, to Commander-in-chief, Middle East.

GENERAL CATROUX'S views are as follows:—

Etat de siège will be immediately proclaimed in the two following cases:—

- In the case of troubles starting in an area and threatening to spread.
- In the case of attack by the enemy on Syrian territory.

The procedure to be followed in proclaiming *état de siège* would be:—

In the case envisaged in paragraph (a) General Wilson and General Catroux would consult together and, after agreement, General Catroux would delegate to the British Commander at Deir ez Zor the power of proclaiming in his name *état de siège*.

In the second case, acting merely upon the opinion of General Wilson or of the commander-in-chief, General Catroux would have *état de siège* proclaimed in the form shown below.

It would be understood that, if *état de siège* was proclaimed for reasons of disturbances, it would cease as soon as these disturbances had come to an end. The decision that the disturbances had ceased would be made by a commission similar to that which has just functioned on the Euphrates.

General Catroux is of the opinion that he is at one with the commander-in-chief in stipulating that, if *état de siège* results in political powers passing to the local British Commander, this same *état de siège* does not mean that the French political and administrative personnel serving in the area under consideration shall be deprived of their own powers and attributes. It must be understood that, on the contrary, this personnel retains those attributes and prerogatives and that it continues its task whilst coming under the direct authority of the local British Commander.

It must be emphasised, moreover, that the delegation of power which the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Délégué Général, makes to the British Commander by reason of *état de siège* does not constitute a rupture of the essential principles of government. As General Catroux exercises the political power over the whole of the Levant, it is to him that the local British Commander refers from the political point of view.

[24205]

[E 8098/62/89]

II.—AGREEMENT COVERING THE CASE OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN ANY GIVEN AREA IN THE LEVANT STATES.

Memorandum from the Free French National Committee to the Foreign Office.

A PROPOS des incidents du Djézireh qui ont fait l'objet d'une communication du Foreign Office en date du 28 octobre, le Gouvernement britannique a bien voulu, par un mémoire en date du 22 novembre, poser certaines questions de principe relatives à la collaboration entre les autorités françaises et les autorités militaires britanniques au Levant dans le cadre tracé par l'acte du Mandat et par les accords Lyttelton-de Gaulle du 25 juillet.

2. Tout en se ralliant à la solution adoptée par le Comité National pour la liquidation des incidents de Abu-Kemal et de Meyadine, le Gouvernement britannique suggère que, dans certaines circonstances, les autorités françaises pourraient utiliser les droits qu'elles tiennent du Mandat et, éventuellement, les pouvoirs que comporte l'état de siège, pour conférer à un officier britannique l'autorité nécessaire au rétablissement de l'ordre dans une zone déterminée.

Le Gouvernement britannique envisage, en outre, certaines éventualités où les autorités françaises au Levant pourraient demander l'assistance du Haut Commandement britannique dans l'intérêt de la sécurité publique, et prendre en considération les recommandations qui pourraient lui être présentées à ce sujet par les autorités militaires britanniques.

3. Le Comité National est disposé à admettre que, dans certains cas exceptionnels, le Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire de France puisse, à titre temporaire et s'il le juge utile, déléguer à un officier britannique l'autorité nécessaire pour rétablir l'ordre dans une zone délimitée. Il appartiendrait alors au Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire de France de déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles s'exercerait cette délégation.

D'autre part, des événements peuvent se produire qui conduiraient le Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire à faire appel au concours des autorités militaires britanniques pour la répression de troubles éventuels. Dans ce cas, le Comité National ne doute pas que le Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire et le Haut Commandement britannique ne s'entendent à cet égard dans un esprit de confiance mutuelle et d'étroite collaboration.

4. Toutefois, le Comité National ne pense pas qu'il soit possible, comme pourrait le laisser supposer le paragraphe 7 du mémorandum, d'établir une analogie quelconque entre la situation de l'Egypte par rapport à l'autorité militaire britannique et celle de la France dans les Etats du Levant.

Le 5 décembre 1941.

[E 3941/183/89]

III.—AGREEMENT OF JUNE 5, 1942, BETWEEN GENERAL CATROUX AND GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, IXTH ARMY, COVERING THE WHOLE OF THE LEVANT STATES IN THE CASE OF AN ATTACK OR THREAT OF ATTACK.

Exposé des Principes de Réalisation de l'Etat de Siège et des Circonstances dans lesquelles il serait à déclarer.

NOTA.—La réussite de la mise en marche de l'état de siège dépend de la confiance mutuelle, de la coopération, de la collaboration des officiers alliés chargés de son exécution, ainsi que d'une claire compréhension de leur tâche. Certaines phrases insérées dans le texte ci-dessous peuvent ne pas apparaître comme indispensables, elles ont été néanmoins maintenues afin que les officiers responsables n'aient aucun doute quant à l'interprétation des diverses clauses de l'exposé.

Paragraphe 1. Si le Général Commandant en Chef la IX^e Armée estime qu'à cause d'une attaque, ou d'une menace d'attaque, sur le Levant il est nécessaire d'établir l'état de siège, il en informera le Général d'Armée Commandant en Chef. Ce dernier proclamera aussitôt l'état de siège par arrêté.

En demandant cette proclamation le Général Commandant la IX^e Armée communiquera au Délégué Général tous les renseignements qu'il possède justifiant cette décision.

La proclamation de l'état de siège pourra être demandée au Général Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général, dans les mêmes conditions par le Commandant en Chef du Middle East aux lieux et place du Commandant de la IX^e Armée.

Il est bien entendu que le mot "attaque" employé ci-dessus est pris seulement dans le sens d'une menace réelle d'invasion, et ne se rapporte pas à des opérations de détail, ou, par exemple, à un simple raid sur la côte.

Paragraphe 2. Dans le cas d'une telle proclamation, le Général d'Armée Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire, se placera, en tant que commandant territorial, avec tous les organes relevant à ce but de son commandement (service de sécurité, police, gendarmerie, services publics, exploitation des ressources locales, &c.) sous les ordres du Général Commandant la IX^e Armée. Cette subordination ne concerne pas les pouvoirs administratifs et politiques dont le Général d'Armée est investi en tant que Délégué Général. Toutefois, à ce titre, il déférera aux demandes du Général Commandant la IX^e Armée pour tout ce qui concerne les besoins des opérations militaires et de la sécurité.

Paragraphe 3. Pour assurer l'exercice du commandement territorial, le territoire sera divisé en un certain nombre de commandements et de sous-commandements militaires subordonnés dont les limites coïncideront avec celles des circonscriptions administratives, étant entendu que la limite entre le territoire des Alaouites et le Liban Nord sera reportée à une ligne correspondant approximativement au parallèle el Hiché-Krack des Chevaliers, de manière à rattacher la zone de la route Homs-Tripoli au territoire de Tripoli.

Les chefs de ces commandements et sous-commandements porteront le titre de gouverneurs et sous-gouverneurs militaires et recevront le commandement territorial. Tous les gouverneurs et sous-gouverneurs seront français, y compris à Alep et Deir-ez-Zor, et sauf dans ces deux derniers territoires il leur sera adjoint un officier britannique. Dans chacun des territoires d'Alep et Deir-ez-Zor, il sera nommé un commissaire militaire britannique.

Ce commissaire aura autorité sur le gouverneur militaire et sera placé sous les ordres du Commandant de la IX^e Armée par l'intermédiaire du Général d'Armée Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général, exception faite des cas d'extrême urgence. Dans ce dernier cas, les ordres seront transmis directement par le Général Commandant la IX^e Armée qui tiendra au courant le Général d'Armée, Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire.

Ces commissaires s'occuperont plus particulièrement de toutes les affaires extérieures telles que :

Négociations avec les Turcs;
La X^e Armée;
Irak, &c.

Pour mettre en vigueur les mesures relatives à l'état de siège sur leur territoire, ils exerceront leurs pouvoirs par l'intermédiaire du gouverneur militaire à qui appartient l'administration territoriale de la région et qui donnera suite aux demandes du commissaire militaire britannique.

Il est bien entendu que, sauf le cas d'impossibilité reconnue, lorsque le commissaire militaire britannique a à donner des instructions aux Délégués civils du territoire, il s'adressera au gouverneur militaire responsable.

En cas d'indisponibilité de longue durée, le commissaire militaire, le gouverneur ou son adjoint seront remplacés par un officier de même nationalité. En cas d'absence temporaire ou pendant l'intervalle qui pourrait s'écouler avant qu'ils soient remplacés, ces pouvoirs pourront être assurés par son adjoint s'il s'agit du gouverneur militaire, par le gouverneur militaire s'il s'agit du commissaire militaire britannique.

Lorsque ce serait nécessaire des grades fictifs pourront être créés de manière à maintenir la hiérarchie normale des grades.

Paragraphe 4. Les gouverneurs militaires seront responsables devant le Général Commandant la IX^e Armée par l'intermédiaire du Général Commandant en Chef les Forces Françaises Libres, Délégué Général.

Paragraphe 5. Les gouverneurs militaires auront autorité sur les fonctionnaires civils français et autochtones en service dans leur zone de commandement pour tout ce qui a trait à l'exercice du commandement territorial et aux besoins des armées.

Il est précisé que les gouverneurs militaires n'exerceront pas les pouvoirs politiques et administratifs, qui demeurent la prérogative des fonctionnaires

désignés ci-dessus. Les gouverneurs militaires devront toujours être tenus soigneusement au courant de la situation de la région.

Paragraphe 6. En cas d'urgence, soit sur leur initiative, soit sur requête des généraux commandant les troupes en opérations, les gouverneurs militaires prendront sans en référer au préalable au Général Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général, les mesures qu'exigerait la situation. Ils devront en informer aussitôt le Général d'Armée Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général.

Paragraphe 7. L'organisation des gouvernements militaires ne modifiera en rien le mécanisme et les pouvoirs politiques et administratifs des services français en Syrie et au Liban (Délégué Général, Délégués auprès des États, Délégués adjoints, Conseillers administratifs).

Beyrouth, le 5 juin 1942.

Instructions déterminant les Attributions des Gouverneurs militaires.

Paragraphe 1. Les circonstances qui doivent motiver la déclaration de l'état de siège ont fait l'objet d'un accord conclu au Caire entre les autorités supérieures britanniques et le Général d'Armée Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général et Plénipotentiaire de la France Libre au Levant.

Paragraphe 2. Dès la déclaration de l'état de siège, les territoires de la République libanaise et de la République syrienne sont divisés en régions militaires, commandées chacune par un gouverneur militaire français assisté d'un adjoint britannique (sauf à Deir-ez-Zor et Alep), d'un officier de sécurité français (britannique à Deir-ez-Zor et Alep) et d'un état-major.

Certaines régions militaires sont subdivisées en sous-régions militaires commandées par un sous-gouverneur français assisté d'un adjoint britannique.

Paragraphe 3. Le gouverneur militaire exerce le commandement des troupes spéciales ou autres troupes alliées, et les établissements militaires qui ne sont pas des formations de campagne. Ce commandement s'exercera par l'intermédiaire des échelons de commandement organiques, c'est-à-dire, en ce qui concerne les troupes britanniques le commandant des territoires (area), des sous-territoires (sub-area) ou de la place (station). Il n'intervient pas dans l'organisation et le travail particulier des ateliers, parcs et services.

Le gouverneur militaire peut demander assistance à tout commandant militaire des forces alliées ne relevant pas de son commandement se trouvant sur son territoire; ce dernier reste juge de la possibilité de faire droit à cette demande.

Dans les places il exerce en outre les fonctions de Commandant d'Armes à l'égard des troupes françaises.

Paragraphe 4. Le gouverneur militaire a autorité dans sa région:

Sur les services français de sécurité: sûreté générale, gendarmerie, police, service de renseignements, services spéciaux;

Sur les polices et gendarmeries locales, ainsi que sur les chasseurs douaniers;

Sur les services publics: transport, éclairage, ravitaillement, transmissions, y compris les services téléphoniques des gendarmeries locales.

Il coordonne l'action des services britanniques de sécurité avec celle des services français correspondants.

Le gouverneur militaire a également autorité sur les fonctionnaires civils français (et autochtones) pour tout ce qui a trait à l'exercice du commandement territorial, aux besoins des armées et de la sécurité. Sous le bénéfice de cette dernière disposition il n'intervient pas dans l'action politique et administrative de l'autorité française; cette dernière demeure, sauf le cas d'urgence motivée, l'intermédiaire obligée de ces rapports et de ceux des commandants de troupes en opérations avec l'autorité autochtone.

L'autorité civile française est tenue d'informer soigneusement les gouverneurs militaires de la situation de la région.

Paragraphe 5. Le gouverneur militaire est responsable de l'exécution des plans de protection intérieure, du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité de sa région.

Il a l'exercice de l'action publique devant les tribunaux militaires et les cours martiales françaises.

Il prend les arrêtés qu'il juge nécessaires pour assurer la sûreté de la région. L'autorité civile ne rend aucune ordonnance de police sans son approbation.

Paragraphe 6. En cas d'urgence, ou lorsque sa région est directement menacée par l'ennemi, le gouverneur militaire prendra, sur la demande du

commandant des troupes en opérations ou, à défaut, de sa propre initiative, les mesures de sécurité ou de défense dictées par les circonstances.

Paragraphe 7. Les sous-gouverneurs militaires relèvent du gouverneur militaire de leur région; ils reçoivent ses ordres et sont responsables devant lui. Ils exercent leur commandement suivant les règles posées au paragraphe 3 ci-dessus concernant l'exercice du commandement par les gouverneurs militaires.

Paragraphe 8. Dans les territoires d'Alep et de Deir-ez-Zor le gouverneur militaire français est placé sous les ordres d'un commissaire militaire britannique. Ce commissaire reçoit ses ordres du Commandant de la IX^e Armée par l'intermédiaire du Général Commandant en Chef, Délégué Général, exception faite des cas d'extrême urgence.

Le commissaire britannique sera, de plus, entièrement responsable des questions extérieures, telles que:

Négociations avec les Turcs, rapports de la X^e Armée, avec l'Irak, &c.

Pour mettre en vigueur les mesures relatives à l'état de siège sur son territoire, le commissaire britannique exerce ses pouvoirs par l'intermédiaire du gouverneur militaire.

Paragraphe 9. En cas d'indisponibilité de longue durée, le commissaire militaire, le gouverneur, le sous-gouverneur ou l'adjoint seront remplacés par un officier de même nationalité. En cas d'absence temporaire ou pendant l'intervalle qui pourrait s'écouler avant qu'ils soient remplacés, les pouvoirs pourront être assurés par un adjoint s'il s'agit du gouverneur militaire, par le gouverneur militaire s'il s'agit du commissaire britannique.

Paragraphe 10. Les gouverneurs militaires sont responsables devant le Général Commandant la IX^e Armée par l'intermédiaire du Général Commandant en Chef les Forces Françaises Libres, le Délégué Général. Ceci s'applique également aux commissaires militaires britanniques.

Beyrouth, le 5 juin 1942.

Captain Quentin Hogg to Captain de Courlon, Délégation Générale, Beirut.

(Secret.)

*Allied Liaison Office,
Rear Headquarters, Ninth Army,
June 12, 1942.*

Dear de Courlon,

I ENCLOSE herewith a copy of the *exposé* duly signed by General Wilson. In signing it he desires to make the two following observations:—

1. In promising in paragraph 1 to give General Catroux all information, he desires to make it clear that this information (which may be of a secret character) will not necessarily be contained in a document containing the request, but may at his discretion be imparted privately to General Catroux or by other means, and receipt of the information is not to be treated as a condition precedent to the proclamation.
2. The amended text of the instructions to military governors does not verbally follow the text of the comparable passage in the *exposé* which was not amended following the last meeting, but it must be taken as deciding the interpretation of the *exposé*.

QUENTIN HOGG.

[Copy to A.D.C.]

Captain de Courlon to Captain Quentin Hogg.

(Secret.)

Mon cher Hogg,

JE vous remercie de votre lettre du 12 juin.

Je transmettrai au Général Catroux les deux observations du Général Wilson. En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement le No. 2 je croyais cette question de texte enfin réglée.

Puis-je considérer, néanmoins, comme définitif le texte des instructions aux gouverneurs?

Dès le retour du Général Catroux je soumettrai à sa signature l'exposé des principes et vous ferai parvenir l'exemplaire signé. Pour gagner du temps je vous serais reconnaissant de m'indiquer dès maintenant combien d'exemplaires en français vous désirez de l'exposé et des instructions aux gouverneurs.

DE COURLON.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 2596/204/93]

No. 42.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 55.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 8, 1942.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to submit a review of events in Iraq during 1941.

2. In the closing paragraph of his review for 1940, Sir Basil Newton foreshadowed the relinquishment of office by Rashid Ali, who, in despite of increasing pressure not only from His Majesty's Government but also from the Regent and from political elements both within and without his own Cabinet, had maintained himself as Prime Minister since April. Supported by the army leaders (Colonels Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamal Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman, *alias* the "Golden Square") he continued during the month of January to cling to power, while Nuri Said, still in theory a member of the Cabinet, although his resignation was in the hands of the Regent, strove to persuade his colleagues that the ship was sinking, and that they should abandon it. Eventually, the continued firm attitude of His Majesty's Government and the obstruction of public business by the Regent led to the resignation of Naji Shaukat, Minister of Justice (published on the 25th January) and of Naji Suwaidi, Minister of Finance (28th January). General Taha-al-Hashimi's resignation being also extant, this reduced the number of Ministers below the constitutional minimum of six. Rashid Ali, however, flouted constitutional precedent by refusing to resign and coerced the Regent into signing decrees for the appointment of four new Ministers—Ali Mahmud-al-Sheikh Ali, Yunis Sabawi, Musa Shahbandar and Muhammad Ali Mahmud. He must, none the less, have feared the prospect of parliamentary criticism which had been growing increasingly outspoken, for he also unsuccessfully endeavoured by threats of force to obtain the Regent's signature to an iradah dissolving the Chamber. At this juncture the Regent prudently disappeared from Bagdad and took refuge with loyal elements of the army at Diwaniyah, where he also had the support of the tribes. Faced with this *impasse* and lacking the full support even of his own Cabinet, Rashid Ali eventually resigned on the 31st January.

3. On the 1st February General Taha, who had followed the Regent by air to Diwaniyah, accepted an invitation to form a Government. The claims of Jamil Madfai and Ali Jaudat, the foci of resistance in Parliament to Rashid Ali, who had proceeded by car, seem to have been outweighed by the Regent's belief that General Taha could control the army, for whose entry into politics he had been so largely responsible; the chances of Jamil Madfai being able to do so were certainly slender. In forming his Cabinet General Taha retained two members of Rashid Ali's team, Umar Nadhmi, who took over the Ministries of Interior and Justice, and Sadiq Bassam, who remained Minister of Education; the new Ministers were Taufiq Suwaidi (Foreign Affairs), Ali Mumtaz (Finance and Communications), Abdul Mahdi (Economics) and Hamdi-al-Pachachi (Social Affairs), the portfolio of defence being retained by General Taha himself.

4. In some ways the new Government entered upon office under favourable auspices, for the behaviour of Rashid Ali had aroused considerable opposition in circles which, while not necessarily pro-British, had viewed with apprehension the activities of the "Golden Square" and behind them of the ex-Mufti. The Prime Minister was well received in Parliament when he made his statement of policy and took the occasion to refute some of the accusations contained in Rashid Ali's letter of resignation, including that of foreign interference in Iraqi affairs. He was unfortunately not the man to deal with the fundamental issues which could no longer be burked. It was, perhaps, his hope that the mere departure of Rashid Ali would satisfy His Majesty's Government; if so, he was speedily disabused, and the forthright language held by President Roosevelt's emissary, Colonel Donovan, when he visited Bagdad on the 12th February cannot but have impressed him with the determination of the United States to support Great Britain. There were minor improvements, it is true, for example, in the tone of the press, but despite my predecessor's repeated representations General Taha remained resolutely irresolute in regard to any attempt to establish Anglo-Iraqi relations on a satisfactory basis. A weak character and the slave

of his past, his personal desires (assuming them to have been on the right lines) and the influence of his more energetic Foreign Minister could not decide him to brave the antagonism of Rashid Ali and of that army clique which, having created it as a means to his own ends, he had had the mortification of seeing turn against him. To conciliate Rashid Ali (whom he actually consulted on his statement of policy), Parliament (where increasingly outspoken criticism was being levelled at Rashid Ali and the army in politics) and His Majesty's Government (who were no longer disposed to be accommodating) was an impossible feat even for an Iraqi politician. The plain words which you spoke to Taufiq Suwaidi when he flew to see you in Cairo on the 7th March and the Regent's insistence on action against the "Golden Square" seem finally to have determined General Taha to positive action.

5. On the 26th March orders were issued for the transfer of Colonel Kamal Shabib from Bagdad to Diwaniyah and for the removal of Colonel Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh's headquarters from Bagdad to Qaraghan. The officers, supported by their two associates, refused to obey, and General Taha was unable, or too irresolute, to enforce the order. As a weak compromise he pressed the Regent to accept an apology from the four officers for their conduct in January, which was to be regarded as closing that incident. His Highness's refusal to do so (though in the absence of support he agreed, when it was already too late) must be held to have precipitated events. On the evening of the 1st April the Golden Square seized, without encountering resistance, military control of Bagdad and forced the Prime Minister to indite his resignation. Their intention to force the Regent to accept this resignation (or eliminate him if he refused, in preparation for which they are said to have been forearmed with a death certificate) and reinstate Rashid Ali was frustrated by a second *hegira*, this time via the United States Legation and Habbaniya to Basra. Without the Regent there could be no legal change of Government, and the position was thus still fluid when I arrived in Bagdad on the 2nd April to take up my duties. General Taha was not, however, the man to attempt any opposition to the rebels, who lost no time in consolidating their position. The Regent, indeed, had hoped to be able to reassert himself in Basra, but the army there turned against him, and he had to take refuge in a British gunboat, together with Jamil Madfai and Ali Jaudat; they were later conveyed to Palestine by aeroplane.

6. Although Rashid Ali, with the Mufti at his elbow, had been the protagonist of rapprochement with the Axis Powers and was recognised by the latter as their principal tool in Iraq, it is significant that the army now publicly took the initiative. It was by proclamation over the signature of General Amin Zaki, Chief of the General Staff, that a "Government of National Defence" was set up and its provisional direction entrusted to Rashid Ali; and the High Defence Council which was constituted consisted of the Chief of the General Staff and two other officers in addition to the "Golden Square," as against only three civilians—Rashid Ali, Yunus Sabawi and Ali Mahmud. In the light of later events it may reasonably be concluded that the rebel Government was the Government of the Golden Square, and not a Government of Rashid Ali relying on the unqualified support of the army. As a politician of practised cunning with a considerable following he was certainly more than a figure-head; as such a politician, indeed, he was indispensable, but at the same time far from all-powerful. The exact shape of Axis plans for utilising Rashid Ali can at present be only a matter of speculation, but the *coup d'Etat* seems at least to have been preconcerted. From the first Rashid Ali did his best to play for time. From the first he was scrupulous to present the *coup* as a purely internal matter, to invest the "election" by a forcibly convened Assembly of a new "Regent" in the person of Sherif Sharaf, a poor relation of the Royal family, with the greatest possible semblance of legality, and to profess to me—at first through intermediaries and subsequently in person—his ardent wish to implement the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty both in letter and in spirit. The Cabinet which he gathered round him consisted of Musa Shahbandar, Naji Shaukat, Naji Suwaidi, Ali Mahmud, Rauf Bahrani, Yunus Sabawi, Hassan Salman and Muhammad Ali Mahmud.

7. In retrospect our exchanges in the first two weeks of April seem strangely irrelevant, almost unreal. No doubt Rashid Ali hoped against hope that protestations and promises would once again impose upon the credulous British until German and Italian military support could become effective. His policy suited us well, for it was of great importance that we should have a respite for the maturing of our plans. The landing of a British force at Basra was feared from the first, though the Golden Square seem to have had some confidence in

their ability to frustrate this and made their dispositions to do so. No opposition was, however, offered on the 13th April to the arrival, of which only the very briefest notice was given, of the cruiser H.M.S. *Emerald* at Basra. On the same day I received news of the despatch of British troops to Basra in order to open up—by force if need be—the line of communication to which we had a treaty right. Secrecy was preserved for so long as possible, and it was not until the evening of the 16th April that I informed Rashid Ali that air-borne troops were due on the following day and a convoy of sea-borne troops on the 18th. He received the news without apparent perturbation and promptly agreed to afford all facilities, only expressing the hope that in return His Majesty's Government would be speedy to accord to the new régime the recognition which they had so far withheld. He carried the army leaders with him, instructions were sent to Basra not to offer resistance, and the arrival of the troops took place without incident.

8. Whatever may have been Rashid Ali's intentions (and his persistence in seeking recognition argues that for the time being he desired to avert an open breach) the Golden Square was full of confidence. I was informed officially that the disembarkation of further forces would not be permitted until those who had landed had passed through the country. When, on the 28th April, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs were notified of the forthcoming arrival of three further ships carrying men belonging to the formations already landed, this decision was maintained and later confirmed to me by Rashid Ali. His attitude at our meeting was, indeed, so menacing that I decided on the immediate evacuation of British women and children and received from him a promise that they would be allowed to leave the country in safety. The next afternoon they were conveyed to Habbaniya with the help of the Iraqi authorities, but that same night the movement of considerable Iraqi forces to positions commanding our air base at Habbaniya began and at dawn on the 2nd May the Air Officer Commanding was compelled to attack.

9. This movement of Iraqi troops also decided me to put into action the pre-arranged plan for the protection of the remaining British subjects in Bagdad and elsewhere. Accordingly, on the 30th April, all male British subjects and the few remaining ladies were concentrated either in the embassy grounds, or, thanks to the generous co-operation of the late Mr. Paul Knabenshue, in the United States Legation: a number of British subjects who had come into town from outlying districts joined us, as did also a few friendly neutrals. His Majesty's Consul at Mosul was simultaneously warned of the situation, and he succeeded in gathering the greater part of his scattered colony within the limited precincts of the consulate. Throughout the month of May over 350 British subjects were housed and fed in the embassy, over 150 in the United States Legation and about 100 in His Majesty's Consulate at Mosul. A comparatively small number of British subjects in the outlying districts were apprehended and interned either locally or in Bagdad. They met with varying treatment, which in some cases was inexcusably bad and called for representations. So far as the embassy and the legation were concerned, I am happy to say that, apart from a natural anxiety, the "internees" were of good heart and seemed none the worse for the experience, but at Habbaniyah many of the women and children were subjected to the bombardment of the Iraqi forces for several days and the aerodrome was being fired upon when they were assembling for evacuation by air to Basra. In spite of this, their evacuation was effected without casualties.

10. Iraqi resistance was unexpectedly vigorous and, though it cannot be said that the country as a whole rose in arms "to defend its independence" (as Bagdad broadcasts claimed) for the active support given by the tribes was negligible, feeling in the towns ran high in support of the movement. Fortunately, the material assistance which Germany and Italy could supply, being then heavily engaged in Greece and later in Crete, was very limited. Small numbers of technical personnel arrived in the country, some few aeroplanes were sent and the Vichy authorities in Syria were induced to despatch some war material. After some anxious days the measure of the Iraqi forces on the "western front" was taken, and our troops, who had advanced from Palestine, were repulsed each time by the broadcast war communiqués at shorter and shorter distances from Bagdad. On the 29th May Rashid Ali, his colleagues, the Golden Square and some few of their most prominent supporters fled from Bagdad and crossed into Iran; the Germans and Italians had previously gone north to Mosul, whence they retired to Syria when the movement collapsed. Yunus Sabawi, left behind in Bagdad as military governor to organise the final resistance, found it prudent, after a few hours of office, to follow the others to Tehran, and on the 30th May a temporary "Committee of Internal Security" sued for an armistice. Fighting

ceased on the 31st May, and on the following morning the Regent was ceremonially welcomed back to Bagdad. His Royal Highness, although accompanied by Jamil Madfai, Ali Jaudat, Nuri Said and Daud Haidari, did not succeed for forty-eight hours in constituting a Government, during which time the rabble of Bagdad, actively assisted by sections of the army and police, were able to indulge in the favourite Arab pastimes of rapine and pillage; many Jews were murdered or wounded and much commercial property looted before order was restored.

11. After much persuasion Jamil Madfai was induced to form a Cabinet, to which he appointed Ali Jaudat, Mustafa-al-Umari, Jalal Baban, Ibrahim Kemal, Nasrat-al-Farisi, Ridha Shabibi and Ja'far Hamudi; Nuri Said, as a potential embarrassment, was packed off as Minister to Cairo. The new Administration fell in readily enough with the desiderata of His Majesty's Government, agreeing to the stationing of British troops anywhere in Iraq for the duration of the war, to the establishment of a censorship, to British military participation in the control of Basra and to the expulsion of the Italian Legation. In this respect their intentions were good and, although difficulties arose from time to time over minor points, they proved co-operative and helpful. Jamil Madfai and his colleagues, however, seemed unable to handle the internal situation with which they were confronted. When they came to power the tribes, on the whole, were quiet, and the support of the Kurds, who were stirring fitfully, would have been won over by the satisfaction of some of their grievances. The army, discredited with the public, had not recovered from a sound drubbing. The enemy propaganda machine was disorganised. Rapid and drastic action against known Axis sympathisers and partisans of Rashid Ali could have been carried out without risk of opposition; and such action would have gone far towards convincing the large body of time-servers that it was prudent to identify themselves with the democratic cause. In fact, however, the Madfai Cabinet acted as though the events of May had been comparable to any of the other *coups d'Etat* by which one Government had succeeded another since the death of King Faisal I—one more lamentable episode over which it was charitable to draw a decent veil. A number of Palestinian and Syrian teachers, long an undesirable element, were indeed dismissed; but Iraqi offenders, whether in the service of the State or not, were so tenderly handled as almost to give the impression that the Cabinet themselves lent belief to Rashid Ali's promise to be back shortly with a German army. Nor did the Anglo-Soviet advance into Persia (which led to the capture of three members of the Golden Square and some of the rebel Government, though Rashid Ali and the Mufti escaped) seem to hearten them appreciably. Inevitably the zeal of the mutessarifs and other responsible officials flagged when Ministers themselves interceded on behalf of the worst offenders; inevitably, too, anti-British propaganda grew in volume and in force even though at the same time our own propaganda was being organised in a vastly increased scale. The publication of notices calling upon Rashid Ali and the other rebel leaders to return for trial and dilatory preparations for the opening of a concentration camp at Fao did little to impress the public with any increase of firmness on the part of the Administration, though the arrest of three trouble-makers from the Southern Euphrates area, chief among them being Sheikh Abdul Wahid, had a salutary effect in that part of the country.

12. One member of the Cabinet, Ibrahim Kemal, was outspokenly impatient with the vacillations of his colleagues and eventually resigned early in September. Jamil Madfai found himself unable to carry on much longer in office, but agreed to do so until the Regent could arrange for a successor. From the British point of view Ibrahim Kemal appeared the most satisfactory candidate, but proved unable to form a Cabinet. Eventually Nuri Said was summoned back from Cairo and on the 9th October constituted his Cabinet, consisting of Salih Jabr (Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in addition to being the first Shia Minister of the Interior), Ali Mumtaz, Abdul Mahdi, Sadiq Bassam, Tahsin Ali, Amin Zaki and Jamal Baban: Nuri retaining the portfolio of Defence himself. This was a stronger team than at first seemed likely and, while not entirely composed of harmonious elements and in spite of rumours of dissension, it remained ostensibly united at the close of the year, though Amin Zaki had ceased to attend to public business owing to persistent ill-health. The Prime Minister, before his appointment, promised me full co-operation and announced his determination to pursue a vigorous policy.

13. In the implementation of the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance it must be recorded that the present Administration have been exemplary. They have raised no difficulties over acceding to any of the requests of our military authorities, even though performance, in cases where (as, for example, the requisitioning of land

and buildings) legislation is needed, has tended to lag behind promise. The Prime Minister further indicated his desire to see the Iraqi army allotted a definite rôle in the defence of the country against a German attack, to which His Majesty's Government agreed. In internal affairs, too, he has shown himself more vigorous than his predecessor. A considerable number of the more virulently anti-British officials and others were consigned to the concentration camp at Fao, some being later transferred to a new and less accessible camp at Salman in the desert. The long overdue reform of the Ministry of Education was pushed on with no little energy, and, at the end of the year, negotiations were in progress to obtain the services of Professor Hamley to assist in the work of reorganisation. More power was put into the hands of some of the British officials, notably in the police. Finally, Nuri personally took in hand the reform of the army; conscription (always unpopular with the tribes) is being relaxed outside the towns, the eventual aim being that half the other ranks shall be volunteers; the weeding out of undesirable officers is in progress, though it may be questioned whether anti-British proclivities are here the real touchstone and whether Nuri in certain cases is not primarily concerned with safeguarding his own position. At the end of November the trials of Rashid Ali, his Cabinet, the Golden Square and the Chief of General Staff of the time were begun *in camera* before a military court, but had not been concluded before the end of the year; indications were that the sentences would be satisfactorily severe. It would be foolish to suggest that in three months of office Nuri Said had succeeded in undoing the harm of years or that he had even seriously interfered with the subterranean spate of Nazi intrigue and propaganda, particularly in the towns, which Jamil Madfai's supineness had allowed to regather volume in the summer: that there were not still at large many dangerous men from the British point of view because they were protected by this Minister or that, or even by the Prime Minister himself. Nevertheless, an important start had been made, and it may be anticipated that Nuri Said will continue his efforts. Outside the towns British influence had been strengthened by the work of my political advisory staff, and a very notable improvement in the general atmosphere was achieved over the last six months of the year.

14. A seriously disturbing feature of the Iraqi scene at the end of 1941 was the economic situation. For nearly two years the impact of war on the economic structure of the country had been of the slightest. The period July to December witnessed a grave deterioration: a bad wheat harvest, restriction of imports in general and the virtual cessation of Japanese imports in particular, the large increase in purchasing power resulting from local expenditure by the British forces, led inevitably to a great rise in the price of almost every commodity, accompanied by wholesale profiteering, speculation and hoarding. Despite growing popular outcry, the Administration appeared incapable of coping with the situation. Anti-hoarding legislation of a mild character was indeed promulgated, but little use appears to have been made of it; price fixing for a few commodities was decreed, but not effectively enforced after the first week. Efforts to ensure the supply of bread (the only *essential* of life in Iraq) at reasonable prices to the poorer classes had not overcome the difficulties by the end of the year. Steps were, however, taken to control existing stocks of wheat and to obtain supplies from abroad with the help of His Majesty's Government. No steps were taken to deal with the fundamental problem of draining off surplus purchasing power; indeed, it was naively hoped that His Majesty's Government would grant a loan to cover the anticipated budget deficit and thus further increase the volume of purchasing power and accelerate the upward movement of prices. The inherent unconcern of Iraqi politicians for the people of the country and the fact that many in high places are among the most arrant profiteers and hoarders do not foreshadow the adoption of a sound economic policy, without which British assistance in such matters as the supply of wheat loses much of its practical value, though remaining useful in the field of propaganda. Whether the situation will deteriorate so far as to lead to widespread civil disturbances remains a matter of conjecture, but the outlook in this respect at the end of 1941 was hardly reassuring, though some vicarious comfort might be derived from the fact that popular resentment in this instance was directed mainly against those who were in fact responsible and only fitfully against ourselves. It is, however, to be hoped that the engagement of a British supply expert and other measures of reorganisation will result in effective attention being given to these grave and urgent questions.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 136.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 15, 1942.

THE outstanding political event of the four months that have elapsed since I wrote my last despatch on the general situation in this country was the trial of six of Rashid Ali's principal associates in the *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. They were Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali, Yunis Sabawi, Amin Zaki Sulaiman, Fahmi Said, Mahmud Salman and Sadiq Shanshal. These men, having been sent back from South Africa under escort, arrived at Basra on the 11th March and their trial began a few days later before a military court set up in the Washshash Barracks in Bagdad West. Judgment was delivered unanimously on the 4th May. Yunis Sabawi, Mahmud Salman and Fahmi Said were sentenced to death; Amin Zaki to five years', and Ali Mahmud Sheikh Ali to seven years' imprisonment; Sadiq Shanshal was acquitted but at once interned. The death sentences were carried out by hanging in the early hours of the 5th May.

2. At the beginning the public were generally indifferent, but, towards the end of the trial, press reports on the proceedings stimulated interest and comment. Among the ordinary people the accused had few supporters, and many were heard to declare openly that they richly deserved hanging. The army, which condemned the failure rather than the politics of their erstwhile commanders, allowed them to go to the scaffold without an audible murmur of sympathy or protest. Within the Cabinet two Ministers showed a desire to escape responsibility. Abdullah Damluji, who became Minister for Foreign Affairs early in February, tendered his resignation soon after the trial began, and, when the Regent delayed acceptance, remained ill in his house. His place at the Ministry was taken temporarily by Daud Haidari, the Minister of Justice. Tahsin Ali, Minister of Education, was also fearful of the work which lay ahead, but managed to screw up enough courage to hold on to his seat in the Cabinet. The effect of the trial and executions has been salutary. Official authority has been vindicated, factious politicians have been rebuked, and law-abiding citizens have been encouraged to have greater faith in the stability of the national institutions of the country.

3. Some Cabinet changes were made in February. Amin Zaki, Minister of Communications, finally gave way to ill-health after five months' confinement to his bed, and Sadiq Bassam, Minister of Justice, left in a pet after a personal quarrel with a colleague. Saiyid Abdul Mahdi was thereupon made Minister of Communications (retaining also his portfolio as Minister of Economics). Daud al-Haidari was recalled from the Iraqi Legation in Tehran to be Minister of Justice, and Abdullah Damluji was given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, which had temporarily been held by Salih Jabr. These changes made little or no difference to the policy of the Cabinet, which remained under the influence of the three most forceful members: Nuri Said, Salih Jabr and Ali Mumtaz.

4. The Government have continued to take measures to suppress pro-Axis intrigues and propaganda. On the 3rd February six Palestinians and four Iraqis were arrested. They were members of an organisation which had as its chief aims political murder and the destruction of important links in national communication. Bombs, firearms and treasonable literature were found in their houses. On the 25th February twenty-five serving and pensioned officers of the Iraqi army were arrested and interned, and the next day twenty civilians followed them to Fao. An alternative internment camp capable of accommodating at least 500 persons is now being laid out at Amarah. The General Officer Commanding Xth Army is helping by providing tents and barbed wire. In April the Minister of the Interior suppressed the Muthannah Club and the Rovers' Club, two organisations which for some time before the events of last summer had played a prominent part in all extreme Nationalist and anti-British agitation. Other licensed clubs and associations are being reviewed and several are likely to be closed down.

5. In Iraqi foreign affairs the event of note was the visit to Bagdad in March of Dr. P. C. Chang, the Chinese Minister at Angora, which concluded with the signing of a treaty of friendship between Iraq and China. The treaty provided for perpetual friendship and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. It does not come into force until after the exchange of ratifications. The special position of His Britannic Majesty's representative in Iraq is safeguarded by an exchange of notes stipulating that the provisions of the treaty shall be applied in harmony with the provisions of the

Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930. During his stay of about a fortnight in Bagdad Dr. Chang gave two public lectures on Chinese culture and history which were much appreciated. He flattered his audience by his references to the political and cultural intercourse which the Chinese and Arab Empires had enjoyed in the days of their early greatness and made telling points against Japanese aggression and savagery in China to-day. His scholarship and sincerity raised his lectures far above familiar propaganda and made him an effective advocate of the Allied cause.

6. Iraqi relations with Saudi Arabia were disturbed in early February by the seizure in the Iraqi Customs at Basra of a diplomatic bag brought to Iraq by a Saudi Arabian courier. The Iraqi authorities were slow in dealing with the representations made by the Saudi Legation, and King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud sent an angry message threatening to withdraw his representative unless the bag was immediately released. Having heard of the affair from the Saudi Chargé d'Affaires I brought it to the attention of the Prime Minister, who telephoned orders for the bag to be delivered at once to the Saudi Legation. This having been done with apologies, the incident was closed. Shortly afterwards Shukri Qawatli, the Syrian politician, came to Bagdad on his return from the Haj bringing with him messages of goodwill from Ibn Saud to the Iraqi Government, and proposals for the settlement of the outstanding disputes concerning the demarcation of the Saudi-Iraqi frontier and the disposal of the elusive and tiresome Shammar of Najd. The two aide-memoires with which Shukri Qawatli was furnished amounted to little more than a re-statement of the Saudi claims and a rejection of the proposals for settlement, including neutral arbitration about the frontier, hitherto put forward by the Iraqi Government. They therefore provided no basis for profitable discussions. The indisposition of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to which I have referred above, delayed the informal talks which Shukri Qawatli wished to have about these matters, and his stay in Bagdad has accordingly been unexpectedly prolonged.

7. The Prime Minister postponed until after the trial of Rashid Ali's associates the further consideration of his plan for Iraq's adherence to the Washington anti-Axis Pact and the declaration of a state of war between Iraq and Italy and Germany. He informed me, however, that the unfavourable reception which King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud had given to the suggestion that Saudi Arabia should take similar action would not alter his own views. As reported in my telegram No. 477, paragraph 3 (f), I regard this as a question in which both Nuri and ourselves should step very carefully. There is no doubt that Iraq's participation in the war would be extremely unpopular among the people, and that His Majesty's Government would be blamed for any consequences, such as enemy bombing, the effect of which on popular morale might well be disastrous. Apart from this, neither the General Officer Commanding nor I can see what practical advantage we would derive from Iraqi belligerency at the present time.

8. Mr. Nouri Isfandiari presented his credentials on the 26th January on appointment as Persian Minister at Bagdad. The last of the Japanese Legation left Bagdad for India on the 22nd February, and the Italian Minister and staff from Jedda passed through Iraq on their way to Turkey a day later. Press comment welcomed what was described as the breaking-off of diplomatic relations between the Saudi Arabian and Italian Governments.

9. Mr. Paul Knabenshue, the United States Minister, died suddenly from tetanus after a minor operation on the 1st February. He was popular with the Iraqis and with his colleagues, and the British community held him in high esteem for the asylum which he gave to so many of them in his legation at the time of the troubles of last year. A State funeral was accorded by the Iraqi Government. No successor has yet been appointed. This is regrettable, as Mr. Farrell, the chargé d'affaires, does not inspire confidence, while his staff leave much to be desired.

10. Supplies of flour have improved. Nine thousand tons of wheat have been received from British Imperial sources since the beginning of February, and 4,000 tons more are due to arrive at Basra soon. This wheat is all taken over by the Supplies Committee of the Iraqi Government and is sold at a fixed price to the public and to the bakers, in the form of flour. Distribution arrangements in Bagdad have been taken over by the Supplies Committee from the municipality and have been much improved since I last reported. Both bread and flour are now available without unreasonable hardship; though the price of both remains high. In the provinces distribution is still in the hands of the local officials and holders of wheat in the country remain reluctant to sell. An owner of 3,000 tons of wheat near Mosul refused to sell at I.D. 25 a ton, though Mosul town was at

that time in grave need of wheat. An acute sugar shortage became apparent about the middle of March and a rationing system at the rate of 1 kilog. per person per month is now being put into operation. The registered stocks of sugar amounting to about 13,000 tons are estimated to be enough to meet the country's needs for six months. Prices of other commodities, including all kinds of cloth, fell steeply at the beginning of April with news of the arrival of large new supplies at Basra.

11. To counter the effect of malicious rumours which were being spread abroad that the shortage of supplies was due to the British army's purchases, I published an official statement on the 31st January assuring the people that the British forces had purchased no wheat, ghee, coffee or tea in Iraq, and were, moreover, directly relieving distress by spending over £30,000 a month on the employment of labour.

12. The current session of Parliament, prolonged for a month from the middle of April, ended on the 14th May. A number of useful but minor amendments to laws already enacted were passed and the budget was dealt with, without new taxation. The final figures have not yet been published, but as presented to the Chamber it showed estimated revenue at I.D. 6,458,200, and expenditure at I.D. 7,627,633, leaving a deficit of I.D. 1,169,433. Several important measures for the regulation of the economic life of the country, the control of prices, the prevention of hoarding and the distribution of food-stuffs were also passed. Taxation, it seems to me, remains in some forms at an unduly low level, but here, as elsewhere in the Near and Middle East, the governing classes suffer from a strong reluctance to subject themselves to financial sacrifices.

13. His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester arrived in Bagdad from Cairo on the afternoon of the 6th May and remained until the morning of the 8th May. His purpose was to visit the British forces in this country, but he was good enough to find time, in a heavy programme, to meet the Diplomatic Corps and the British community at a garden party at the embassy and to attend a dinner party which the Regent gave at the Qasr Rihab. It was pleasant to see the warmth of the popular applause given to His Royal Highness whenever he drove through the streets of Bagdad and the whole-hearted co-operation of the Iraqi police and army in all arrangements connected with the Duke's visit was as gratifying as it was significant.

14. In general, I consider that the situation in this country has developed satisfactorily since the date of my last review, especially when one considers the long series of set-backs suffered by our arms at the hands of the Japanese during this period. At the time of writing there is much speculation over the German offensive thought to be imminent. Should the main thrust be launched against the Caucasus and attain its objective, the repercussions among these volatile people will, of course, be great. But a greater and more sudden deterioration in morale would ensue were the enemy to indulge in some unorthodox venture such as an air-borne attack upon, or landing in, Syria. And the fact that up to date there is apparently no evidence of major concentrations against Russia has led to some discussion here of this possibility. But whatever happens the next few months will hold much of interest and not a little of danger.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut; the Minister of State, Cairo; His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan; the Governor-General of India; the Commander-in-chief, India; General Headquarters, Middle East; the Middle East Intelligence Centre; the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; the Political Agent, Koweit; and to His Majesty's Consuls at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

G. H. THOMPSON.

[E 3565/101/93]

No. 44.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 142.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 21, 1942.

I HAD the honour, in paragraph 3 (a) of my telegram No. 477 of the 8th May, to express certain views concerning the Iraqi army. It occurred to me after the despatch of that telegram that it might be useful to amplify my observations by obtaining from the head of the British Military Mission in this country

a written appreciation on the morale and attitude of the Iraqi army, and I caused Major-General Bromilow to be approached accordingly. I now beg leave to enclose a copy of the report which he was good enough to prepare and which, it seems to me, gives an encouraging account of the progress that has taken place since the regrettable events of a year ago.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Minister of State, the General Officer Commanding, Xth Army, and to Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Morale and Attitude of Iraqi Army on May 14, 1942.

1. Introduction.

MANY of the views here set forth are ones that have already been expressed verbally both to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador and to the General Officer Commanding, Xth Army. But before committing them to writing, as requested in His Britannic Majesty's Embassy letter of the 10th May, 1942, I consulted the officers of the mission under my command. I find that their opinions not only agree with all that I have previously said, but that their views enlarge my own. Included in these officers is one who has recently been attached for a month with sixty Iraqi officers; another whose work is largely in the office, but who has much contact both with officers in the Ministry of Defence and also outside, though mostly in the Bagdad area; and a third who, though new to Iraq has been in the Middle East for three years now, during two of which he worked in close conjunction with the Intelligence branch of the General Staff of the Egyptian army and who was for the last year with Senussi troops (Libyan Arab Force). He has just paid brief visits to all garrisons in Iraq south of Bagdad. Thus the confirmatory views that I have received are from officers of varied experience and cover a wide field.

2. Morale.

I myself have seen all of the Iraqi army in barracks, on the march, and at training. I think that they have now largely forgotten the blow to their prestige suffered in May 1941. They see around them the Xth Army apparently very large and apparently well equipped. The tone of the Arabic press is favourable and stresses British, American and Russian successes, and imported goods are more plentiful. Thus the foundations for a good morale exist amongst the officers and those who can read and write. Added to this there is a good deal of inborn conceit in the Iraqis. They consider that, given favourable conditions, they can be a match for anyone. Both the officers and men work cheerfully and keenly and their physique is on the whole good. However unpopular conscription may be, the men, at all events, seem happy and contented once they are in the army. The improvement seen in the conscripted recruits after two months is most marked, due largely to good feeding. There is a great deal of really good material in the ranks. But although they may feel that they are more than a match for anyone under favourable conditions, morale must inevitably be affected by their shortage of transport and modern equipment. Given this morale would be not merely good but excellent.

3. Attitude.

(a) Like other Eastern nations, the Iraqis are first and foremost pro-Iraqi. Friendship with Britain, if adopted, is only because the Iraqis feel they must for the present have some supporting Power. On the other hand, friendship with Britain's enemies would be merely a means of disposing of the Power that at the moment has the closest hold in Iraq in exchange for another from whom more favourable conditions might be obtained. The Iraqis know that at present they cannot stand alone. The degree to which the British will be those whom they support depends on a number of factors which I set out below. These affect the army as much as the civil population.

(b) Coupled with Nationalist pro-Iraqi sentiment there is possibly a slight sentiment even in the army towards a Pan-Arab movement. Its only danger is if exploited by Britain's enemies.

(c) On the other hand, even Iraq itself is not a united nation. Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shias, Armenians, Assyrians and Jews, not to mention Bagdadis and Mosulawis are divided by so many racial, religious and other distinctions that rivalry and jealousy always exist. This is responsible for a mass of reports, seldom disinterested and often entirely false. It has reached such a stage that to denounce a rival or enemy is almost a national sport, with the result that many officers of the army have been included in various Intelligence reports both as absolutely pro-British and extremely pro-Nazi.

What seldom appears in Intelligence reports is the motives that lead up to any stated Iraqi attitude. The fact that most unit interpreters and the staff of so many British messes, canteens, coffee shops and local hotels are almost entirely Armenians, Assyrians and Jews is undoubtedly responsible for many prejudiced reports.

(d) From the Germans the Iraqis have had a lot. First and foremost, genuine friendship from a small but skilful band of Germans under Herr Doktor Grobba. Not just a few "sticky" tea parties and a few organised "set-piece" entertainments, but genuine social intercourse. Such few Germans as were here were "good mixers," in marked contrast to the British insularity and aloofness.

Moreover, when the British were talking and promising goods at some distant date, the Germans were able to, and actually did, supply goods and equipment, and did so without haggling over the price. Why shouldn't they, as if they win the war they get it all back and more. As a result of deliveries actually received from Germany and those arranged from elsewhere by Germany, including Turkey, Vichy, Syria, Italy earlier on, and from Japan (regarded for long as an Axis Power), German promises were regarded with good favour. Added to this a long tale of unparalleled success on land, and it is scarcely to be wondered at that a nation whose seaboard is limited to the head of the Persian Gulf should accept German propaganda at its face value, the more so as British propaganda was virtually non-existent. But the story now changes.

(e) In May 1941 Iraq received no appreciable help from the Axis, and the German elements were completely discredited in consequence of the disastrous failure of the attempted *coup*. Since then the British have secured Persia on one side and Syria on the other, whilst Turkey is defiant and, in Iraqi opinion, likely to resist any aggression that can at present come about. The Japanese, though successful, are regarded as an inferior nation and their successes do not offset the German failure in Russia. The press over a prolonged period has been giving prominence to British successes and to British views. Our publicity is now good without being blatant—in fact, the average Iraqi now feels that Germany will ultimately be defeated. This belief is of primary importance, since orientals must always be on the winning side: in spite of all their faults and defects, it is the British who are winning.

(f) Yet another and potent factor in the conviction that Germany will be defeated is the participation in the war of America. Deeds speak louder than words. No longer is the Iraqi impressed by the braying that 88 million people must be right. It is 120 million who can outproduce the 88 million and are evidently doing so. Quantities of American aircraft are passing (with United States markings) through Basra airport. American ships are in the Shatt-el-Arab. American technicians are much in evidence, and quantities of American goods are now appearing in the market. And, finally, above all, there is the inclusion of Iraq in the provisions of the Lease and Lend Act. The British may fail to keep promises to deliver war material, but now the wealth of American output is available to them on the same terms as to others.

At last the army of a country that is not rich sees itself able to have a modern, well-equipped army and is prepared to run and perhaps fall again though hardly past the walking stage.

(g) Lastly, there is the attitude of Turkey. Most of the senior and older officers received their military education in Turkey, and through being in the Turkish army in the last war have already seen an apparently invincible German army suffer final defeat. Though as Iraqis they were prompt to throw off the Turkish yoke and themselves assume all the privileges of the Turkish ruling classes, they no longer have any hatred of the new Turkey nor of its people, with whom so many of them are closely connected. Angora radio is widely listened to in Iraq, though perhaps largely because reception from Bagdad is often bad, and whatever Turkey does will have an enormous effect. If a large and relatively powerful Turkey finds herself later as the result of German successes in such a position to be unable or unwilling to offer resistance to Germany, even with the British behind her, what can the Iraqis hope to achieve?

(h) Such then are the motives that may guide the mind of the average thinking Iraqi, both in and out of the army—and they do think—think a lot. What is his character? Besides intelligence and love of being on the winning side, they are stolid and cheerful, can endure hardship and, especially in the north, have military instincts. Regimentally they fought well last year. But above all, like Arabs, they have a great sense of hospitality and friendship. The average Iraqi officer is only too willing to be friendly with the average British officer. But most British officers arrive in the country with a strong anti-Iraqi prejudice, which is further strengthened by the fact that their only regular contact is with interpreters, &c., mostly Christians and Jews, all biassed against the Iraq Moslems, of which the Iraq army largely consists. If they would only take a little trouble it could be achieved, but, alas, I continually receive reports showing how difficult the Iraqis find it. Not only do they feel that the British officers in general are making little or no effort (apart from a few British commanders and a few individuals, as well as the British Military Mission), they are even made to feel that they are not being trusted. It is difficult for a man who knows he is not trusted and who knows that his attempts at friendship are not reciprocated to fight gladly with the British, especially when invited to do so deficient of transport, A.A. artillery and A/T equipment.

4. Attitude of Army.

The improvement in the whole feeling of the army since October has been most marked. I consider this largely due to Nuri Said and Ismail Namiq, the Chief of General Staff, who have undoubtedly cleared out the majority of the doubtful elements and put in officers who wish to co-operate with us. The British officers of the military mission (several of whom now speak Arabic) have found their efforts to establish confidence readily responded to and there is a considerable feeling of *camaraderie* between the British and Iraqi branches of the Iraq army which has directly influenced the spirit to co-operate which now undoubtedly exists.

5. Conclusions.

Were Turkey to collapse under German threats after a successful Caucasus campaign and were it evident that the British, besides carrying out their rehearsed plans of extensive withdrawals from Mosul, intended to or were likely to be forced south of Bagdad, it is quite possible that Iraq would be as compliant to German demands as Roumania, Bulgaria or Hungary: that is to say, they would perhaps fail to resist. This, I think, is the worst that would happen. Actually, even under these conditions, I think it possible that part of the Iraq army would fight with us. The junior officers are following the lead of their seniors, and I do not believe there is now any leader in the army who would try to lead them against their Ally, Great Britain. Morale is good. They want to be our friends. All that is wanted is a little encouragement, both moral and material.

D. G. BROMILOW, *Major-General.*

[E 3792/3792/93]

No. 45.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 10, 1942.

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, and to Sir Basil Newton's despatch No. 310 of the 29th June, 1940, I have the honour to transmit herewith a combined report on the leading personalities of Iraq for the years 1941 and 1942.

2. The report for the year 1941, which was being prepared at the time of the outbreak of Rashid Ali's rebellion last year, was destroyed together with all previous reports on personalities. In view, therefore, of the delay which the preparation of a new report would have necessitated, I considered that it would be more practical to bring the report for the year 1941 up to date by including it in the report for the year 1942.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 45.

Report on Leading Personalities of Iraq for 1941 and 1942.

THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *King Feisal II.*—Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Illah. He has an English nurse and also an English governess.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum (Arbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a bright, intelligent child.

2. *Abdul Illah, His Royal Highness the Amir.*—Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria. He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and grand-daughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939. Although in Iraq he only enjoys the title of Highness, it is considered proper for foreigners to refer to him as His Royal Highness.

He shows a promising capacity for his official duties.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwanayah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding, Iraq Army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir.*—Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have

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inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1933 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. This *mésalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and has remained, living quietly in a small house.

OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha*.—Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi*.—Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

3. *Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements.

4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and

well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaidi.

5. *Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri*.—Ex-cadet in the Turkish army and second lieutenant in the Sharifian army.

Since 1920 has been editor of the Nationalist newspaper, the *Istiqlal*. This journal has been suspended many times for its violent attacks on the British Government and on British officials in Iraq.

Elected Deputy for Diyala 1933. Re-elected for Kut in the general election of 1934. Lost his seat in August 1935. His paper, the *Istiqlal*, was suspended in November 1936 for one year by Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet for publishing articles defending Yasin-al-Hashimi's administration.

This order was cancelled when Jamil-al-Madfai succeeded Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937.

Elected Deputy for Kut, December 1937.

In October 1938 he was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for publishing unfounded allegation against the Government in his paper the *Istiqlal*. Released when Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister on the 25th December, 1938, and returned for Kut in the elections of June 1939.

The anti-British tone of his paper continued after the outbreak of war in September 1939. He was generally suspected of being in Axis pay and with the advent to power of Rashid Ali in March 1940 his paper became the principal mouthpiece of the rebel Government. It was suspended after Rashid Ali's collapse at the end of May 1941 and has not published since.

Abdul Ghafur escaped punishment because of his old comradeship with Nuri Said, but he has been lying very low since June 1941.

6. *Abdul Latif Nuri*.—Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *aqid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941.

7. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)*.—Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al Said in October 1941.

8. *Abdul Qadir-al-Gilani*.—Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Bagdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with Rashid Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia.

9. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid*.—Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

10. *Abdul Wahid, Shaikh*.—Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikhs on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

11. *Abdullah-al-Damluji*.—Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations; but when Nuri Pasha visited Jedda in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931.

Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

12. *Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan*.—A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. He finds it very hard to maintain a large family on the allowance of 30 Iraqi dinars a month that he receives from the Iraqi Government.

13. *Ahmad-al-Shaikh Dawd, Saiyid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Aqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937.

His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

14. *Ahmad-i-Taufiq*.—A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

15. *Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat*.—Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places, Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

16. *Akram Mushtaq*.—Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (*q.v.*). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud in spring of 1940.

17. *Ali Jaudat*.—Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sharif. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923–July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

18. *Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali*.—Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqlal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutessarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Kuwait. After holding this appointment for about a year he was transferred to Bagdad to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutessarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fled to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942.

19. *Ali Mumtaz*.—Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

20. *Amin-al-Umari*.—Born Mosul 1889 of the notable family of the Umaris. Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople, where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in Samawa, Abu Sukhair and Rumaitha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912. Fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chitaljah lines. After the war of 1914–17 he took part (with Jamil-al-Madfai) in the Arab insurrections at Deir-ez-Zor and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this successful defiance brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas. Was relieved of his command and placed on pension in February 1940 because of the influence which he endeavoured to exercise in political matters outside his proper sphere.

Appointed C.G.S. in June 1941.

Placed on pension in November 1941 because it seemed that he was endeavouring to organise a new military clique to interfere in politics.

21. *Amin Zaki Sulaiman*.—A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwanayah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C., the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

He is now 53 years old and is the senior officer now serving in the Iraq army. Is a staunch supporter of Taha-al-Hashimi, and is considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but is generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men. (Written in 1940.)

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Ahwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942.

22. *Arshad-al-Umari*.—Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. Believed to be pro-British.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

23. *Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid*.—The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

24. *Ata Amin*.—Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, the Iraqi Minister in Angora and younger brother of King Faisal. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires.

25. *Babekr Agha*.—A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Sulaimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

26. *Daud-al-Haidari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shah and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April–November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942.

27. *Daud-al-Sadi, Saiyid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment.

28. *Fadhil Jamali, Dr.*—Born Kadhmain 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921–27. Columbia University, New York, 1927–29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he poses as pro-British and has generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He is determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and has opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control.

29. *Fahmi-al-Mudarris*.—Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return

to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

Appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College in 1937. Was placed on pension a year later.

30. *Faris Agha*.—Chieftain of the Zibar tribe (Kurds), who lives at Huki in the Aqra district. From the time of the British occupation of the Mosul liwa in 1918-19 until 1923, he has a stormy record of hostility towards the authority of the Government. Since 1923 he has been quieter, though he and his tribesmen are always a perpetual danger to the peace of the Aqra district, and the local authorities have little real authority among his villages. He has an old feud with Ahmad of Barzan, whose territory lies adjacent to that of Faris on the opposite side of the Greater Zab River. Elected Deputy in February 1937, but lost his seat in the elections of June 1939.

31. *Hanna Khaiyat*.—Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

32. *Hikmat Sulaiman*.—Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Bagdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

33. *Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan*.—Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum,

India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

34. *Ibrahim Kamal*.—Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfai in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military *coup* made against them by Nuri-al-Said.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar and acquitted.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. A realist with strong views, he became dissatisfied with the Government's weakness and vacillation in dealing with the removal of pro-Nazi elements in the army and Administration and resigned from the Cabinet in September 1941.

35. *Jafar Abu Timman*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al-Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity

of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwaniyah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June 1937 he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa. Made a Senator in February 1937, but lost his seat in the summer of the same year under article 31 of the Constitution.

36. *Jafar Hamandi*.—Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939, to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Bagdad in December 1941.

37. *Jalal Baban*.—Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister for Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister for Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason) that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

38. *Jamal Baban*.—A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

39. *Jamil-al-Rawi*.—A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and now unemployed.

40. *Jamil-al-Madfai*.—Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

41. *Jamil-al-Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed

Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

42. *Kamil Chadirji*.—Sunni, born Bagdad, 1901, brother of Rauf Chadirji. His sister is the wife of Mahmud Subhi-al-Daftari. Educated locally and graduated at the Law School. For a short time he held a minor post in the Ministry of Finance, but soon gave up the civil service for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha-al-Watani*, and his paper was suppressed for its attacks on Nuri Said's Government. He later edited *Al Akhbar*, which suffered the same fate as *Al Ikha-al-Watani*. In May 1934 he was convicted and fined £20 for publishing false news in a third newspaper, *Sawt-al-Ahali*, of which he was the responsible editor. In September of the same year he was arrested and charged with the publication of pamphlets attacking King Ghazi, but he was released a few days later as there was no evidence against him. He holds left wing views on social and political questions. He was appointed Minister for Economics and Communications in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936.

He resigned in June 1937 on account of his disapproval of the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and left the country for several months. Since his return in the autumn he has been suspected of encouraging communistic propaganda.

43. *Khalid Sulaiman*.—Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

44. *Khalil Ismail*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutassarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

45. *Khushaba, Malik*.—Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village.

46. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon

quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet.

Made a Senator in 1940.

47. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh*.—Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

48. *Mahmud, Shaikh*.—Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstalled as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraq Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

His properties in Sulaimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Bagdad, and in company with Abbas-i-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (*q.v.*) he raised a tribal force to attack Sulaimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzian. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, who is restless and unreliable, was brought to Bagdad to keep him out of mischief.

49. *Mar Shimun*.—Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholikos of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal

authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

50. *Maulud Mukhlis*.—Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected President of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939.

Was not re-elected in November 1941.

51. *Muaffaq-al-Alousi*.—Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as *chargé d'affaires*. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

52. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud*.—Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General

of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia.

53. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*.—A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill-health.

54. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid)*.—Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahmad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao.

55. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi*. Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

56. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz*.—Bagdad Mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour

employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Baghdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released.

57. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid*.—Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhmain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1937, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941.

58. *Musa Shabandar*.—Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment.

59. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government.

60. *Mustafa-al-Umari*.—Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

61. *Dr. Naji-al-Asil*.—Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence.

62. *Naji Shaukat*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsuring with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941, but was appointed Minister of Defence

n the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

63. *Nadhif Shawi*.—Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-1918. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and fought at Maisalun, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

64. *Naji al-Suwaidi*.—Born in Bagdad 1883. Educated at Bagdad and in the school of law at Constantinople. Speaks French and English. Public Prosecutor in the Yaman 1905; president of the Commercial Tribunal, Basra, 1908; member of the Bagdad Court of Appeal 1910; Kaïmakam of Kadhmain 1910-11; of Najaf 1911; and of Hindiyah 1912; Civil Inspector for Diarbekr, Urfa and Mardin, 1913; Inspector for the Eastern Region (Adana to Mosul) 1915; Civil Inspector of the Adana Vilayet 1916, whence he was transferred to Konia; Civil Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, Constantinople, 1917. Returned to Syria after the armistice and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Bagdad, but resigned the appointment after a few days and returned to his former post in Aleppo. Returned to Bagdad in March 1921, and was active in the preparations for the reception of the Amir Feisal. Was appointed Minister of Justice in September 1921 and held the post till November 1923, having served for a short time also as Minister of Interior. Deputy for Bagdad in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924. He opposed the treaty and voted against it. Became Prime Minister in November 1929. His Cabinet resigned in March 1930. Re-elected for Bagdad in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931 as a protest against the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the Government. Accompanied King Feisal to Tehran in April 1932. Appointed Senator January 1933. Joined Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in February 1934 as Minister for Finance, and resigned with his colleagues in August 1934. He presided over the Arab Congress held at Bludan (Syria) in August 1937, to protest against the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, and on returning to Iraq reorganised and strengthened the Palestine Defence League.

In 1938 he did useful work on Government committees.

Became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali al-Gilani in March 1940.

Resigned in January 1941. Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Saudi Arabia to try and enlist the support of Ibn Saud for Rashid Ali's cause. On the collapse of the rebellion fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwas and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment.

65. *Nasrat al-Farisi*.—Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

66. *Nishat al-Sanawi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

67. *Nuri al-Said*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha al-Hashimi and Husain Fauzi overthrew Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri al-Said into office as

Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March, when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941.

68. *Rashid Ali-al-Gilani*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfai as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military *coup d'Etat* on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

69. *Rashid-al-Khojah*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jeddah, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfai. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

70. *Rauf-al-Bahrani*.—A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941.

71. *Rauf-al-Chadirji*.—Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937. Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

72. *Rauf-al-Kubaisi*.—Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed

Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Auqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

73. *Sabih Najib*.—Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfai Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

74. *Sadiq-al-Bassam*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939. Became Minister of Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

75. *Said-bin-Ali*.—Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to depose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been strong enough to keep Said in his position.

76. *Salah-al-Din Ali-al-Sabbagh*.—Born about 1896. Educated at Istanbul and graduated as an officer from the Turkish Military College. Taken prisoner in the war 1914-18 and released to join the Amir Feisal's army. Gazetted second-lieutenant in the Iraqi army 1921. Has done courses at Belgam and Sheerness and also attached to British units. Instructor at Bagdad Military College 1924. Appointed Director of Operations in the Ministry of Defence September 1937, and became O.C. 3rd Division March 1940. Is an efficient officer, but has the reputation of being a careerist with ambition.

Belongs to the group of senior officers who are particularly active in politics.

With Fahmi Said, Kamil Shabib and Mahmud Salman he formed the group of officers known as the Golden Square, which dominated Iraqi politics in 1940, and, in company with Rashid Ali, brought about the *coup d'Etat* of the 1st April, 1941. He fled to Tehran with Rashid Ali at the end of May 1941 and evaded arrest and disappeared when British forces entered Persia in August.

77. *Salman-al-Barrak*.—A tribal notable of Hillah. Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

78. *Salman-al-Sheikh Daud*.—Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He is the one person of note in Iraq who has openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

In December 1941 he gave £20 to the local fund for comforts and amenities for British troops in Iraq.

79. *Salih Jabr*.—Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfai formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwaniyah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutessarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

80. *Sami Shaukat*.—Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denies these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

81. *Shakir-al-Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941.

82. *Sufuq-al-Ajil*.—Of the Shammur Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammur in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's eldest brother, Ahmad (born about 1923) is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

83. *Taha-al-Hashimi*.—Brother of the late Yasin-el-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *faris* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfai resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

84. *Tahsin Ali*.—A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussain of the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Faisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sabunchi faction and transferred to the Dulaim area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutassarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutassarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his *coup d'Etat* in May. Was restored when the Madfai Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

85. *Tahsin Qadri*.—Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

86. *Talib Mushtaq*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraqi Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned at Fao.

87. *Taufiq-al-Suwaidi*.—Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935, and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but

failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

88. *Thabit Abdul Nur*.—Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he helps in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

89. *Umar Nazmi*.—Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hillah 1925; President, Civil Courts, DIALA; Mutessarif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927. Mutessarif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutessarif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

90. *Yunis Bahri*.—Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts are a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

91. *Yusuf Ghanimah*.—An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party)

and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941.

92. *Yusuf Iz-al-Din*.—Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

Obituary.

The following persons included in the personalities for 1940 have since died:—

Ajil al Yawar.
Hussain Afnan.
Ibrahim Hilmi-al-Umar.
Said-al-Haji Thabit

CHAPTER IV.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 2810/218/97]

No. 46.

Sir F. Wylie to Mr. Eden.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

Sir,

Kabul, March 7, 1942.

WITH reference to Lord Halifax's circular despatch dated the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to forward as an enclosure to this despatch a brief review of political tendencies in Afghanistan during the year 1941.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. V. WYLIE.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Political Review for 1941.

IN his review of political tendencies in Afghanistan during the year 1940 Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler reduced the main influences governing the external relations of the country to—

- (a) A determination to pursue their frequently declared policy of complete neutrality;
- (b) A desire to adhere to their policy of the last ten years of close friendship with His Majesty's Government;
- (c) Fear of Russian aggression; and
- (d) A wish to maintain close commercial relations with Germany, relations which ever since 1936 had been the main plank in their platform of economic progress.

To explain how the Afghan Government with this somewhat ill-assorted equipment in the way of first principles faced up to the stupendous events of 1941 will be the purpose of the present review.

2. Viewed from this part of Central Asia, the outstanding event of a thoroughly startling year was the invasion of Russia by Germany—22nd June, 1941. Statecraft in Afghanistan had, for as long as living memory could go back, consisted principally in the maintenance of a faintly trembling balance between Britain and Russia. Afghan arrogance had been fostered through the years by their own conceit of their importance as a buffer State lying between two great and mutually jealous Powers, while the needs of an impoverished Government could often be met cheaply by the sale of nebulous favours which the same two Powers—sometimes Britain and sometimes Russia—seemed willing enough to accept at their face-value. During the last decade, on the other hand, there had arisen in Europe a Power which by its methods and policies commended itself strongly to the Afghan mind. The resurgence of Germany was a fact of world importance; with her mighty armaments and strident militarism, where might she not finish up? By comparison, England seemed set on a policy of flabby pacifism. She had made no real attempt to arm herself for the struggle which seemed manifestly to be coming; her policy in India was both weak and uncertain, and her democratic futilities compared with the rigorous concentration of German power in the hands of an outstanding personality seemed to the Afghan mind to betray a fundamental weakness, if not mere ineptitude. Russia, on the other hand, was hated and feared by all. Behind the impenetrable barrier of secrecy which surrounded her no one knew exactly what was going on, but the Communist doctrine was so odious in itself that there must be internal discontent and a counter-revolution was always a possibility. Anyway, the Soviet Government was known to be inefficient, and the Red Army, compared with the disciplined might of Germany, a mere rabble lacking in modern equipment and riddled with corruption and disloyalty. When in the summer of 1939 Russia

seemed to have gone over to Germany, the shape of things to come was surely obvious. At any rate, where was the harm in a closer relationship with this wonderful country—Germany—which, apart from the fact that it seemed likely to acquire and maintain a dominant place in world politics perhaps for a long time to come, was willing to grant credits almost for the asking and, in addition, had the sovereign merit of being a long way away from Afghanistan.

3. And so we find that when 1941 opened, German agencies were dominant in the new economic and industrial activities of the Afghan Government. A German expert had been appointed as chief adviser to the Minister of Works—the department which was responsible for handling a large proportion of the development schemes made possible by the facile credits furnished by the German Government. Another German was in charge of road development in Northern Afghanistan. The new textile installations at Pul-i-Khumri were in charge of Germans, and German advisers were active in practically every branch of Afghan administrative activity. And these Germans—so the Afghans thought—were good people too. They worked very hard; they accepted with apparent meekness the arrogant pretensions of their Afghan superiors, they took living conditions in Afghanistan as a matter of course, and they showed no signs of the *de haut en bas* attitude which too often characterised British experts, most of whom came from India with the traditional Anglo-Indian contempt for oriental races.

4. But the Government of India were a nuisance. They seemed not to understand the realities of the world situation, and they expected the Afghan Government to behave as if it thought that the British Government and their so-called Allies—who were they, anyway?—were going to win the war. How could they expect, for instance, the world situation being as it was, that the Afghan Government would accept their proposal for the appointment of British teachers in Afghan schools, or agree to recognise a Polish Consul in Kabul, when the whole of Poland was already partitioned between Germany and Russia? As for their credit scheme, it was hedged round with safeguards which showed clearly that the Afghan Government was being treated like some Indian State. If you wanted credits, the place to go was Germany, where no humiliating conditions were imposed, Germany which could supply on demand any number of those expert technicians who had made the name of German industry a byword for efficiency. And it was not as if the present Afghan Government had not done all their devoir by the British Government and the Government of India. They had kept an administration going in the country and they had not intrigued unduly with the Indian frontier tribes. They quite liked Britain as a neighbour in spite of the unfortunate incidents of the 19th century. England already owned so much of the earth's surface that she was unlikely ever to covert the barren hills of Afghanistan. Her methods on the North-West Frontier were, of course, deplorable, but, nevertheless, the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know. Any other Great Power in control in India might not be so sated with conquest, while an indigenous democratic Government with Hindus ruling over a large Moslem population—miscalled a minority—would be a really intolerable situation. And quite apart from the peace which the present Government had maintained on the Indian border and in Afghanistan, had they not in the middle of June 1940, when everybody expected that the conquest of England—the heart of the Empire—was a mere matter of days, taken a Cabinet decision and, greatly daring, informed the British Minister that they would not depart from their policy of friendship for His Majesty's Government and that they would continue to do their utmost to preserve internal stability and the peace of the border?

5. But this was apparently not enough. Here were His Majesty's Government in March 1941, when they had hardly an effective friend in the world, protesting against German penetration in Afghanistan, when these very Germans—apart from the fact that they might very well be the world conquerors of to-morrow—had given the Afghan Government so much help in the execution of their precious schemes for the industrial development of the country. And what had the British Government done to help Afghanistan, anyway? The present Afghan Government had been in power for eleven years, during which time they had—so they said—sought unceasingly to develop close relations with His Majesty's Government. In 1932 they had asked for a guarantee against external aggression and nothing had come of it. Lacking that guarantee, how could the Government take a strong line now either with Russia or with Germany? In more recent years Afghan inability to respond to British advances had been due partly to fear of Russian reactions and partly to the intolerable conditions

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imposed by the British Government on all proposals made by them. The Afghan Government again, ever since the war began, had done everything that could possibly be done to ensure the neutrality of Afghanistan and the peace of the border. In all the circumstances what more could the British Government expect? The Afghan Government would certainly not agree to break the contracts into which they had entered with German organisations, although in pursuance of their declared policy of complete neutrality they would enter into no fresh contracts and would permit no increase in Axis penetration. The professed basis of their policy, however, remained as before and His Royal Highness the Prime Minister would give an absolute guarantee to His Majesty's Government that, "provided Afghanistan was not invaded by armed forces, Afghan attitude would not, while he was alive, be a cause of embarrassment to the British Government during the course of the war." His Majesty's Government accepted this guarantee warily and took the opportunity to reiterate their dissatisfaction with the existing situation in Afghanistan. They realised the Prime Minister's difficulties, however, and were prepared to maintain their previous relations with his Government—particularly on the economic side—provided that it was understood that the normal procedure in all such matters must prevail in Afghanistan as elsewhere. This was in April 1941 and so, broadly speaking, matters still stood in June when the German armies marched into Russia.

6. It is time here to consider with half the year gone which of the various influences isolated by Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler was bearing most heavily on the Afghan Government in the conduct of their external relations. It seems clear that most of all they wished to maintain a complete neutrality. Not for them a too conspicuous friendship—even if it was mostly a matter of words—with any of the belligerent Powers. In particular, there must be no overt friendship with England lest Russia, now in concert with Germany, should bear down upon their Oxus frontier and deprive Afghanistan of her fairest provinces. Previous contacts with Germany would be maintained, but on the neutrality plea and to satisfy England they would not be increased. With Russia an attitude of extreme correctness was indicated in the hope that the preoccupations of the Soviet Government on their western border might incline them to forget Afghanistan. The desire to adhere to the so-called policy of "close friendship" with England, while it cannot be said to have been absent, had, however, to be construed with reference to the special circumstances of the time. It is not, in fact, certain that this so frequently professed desire for "close friendship" was ever much more than a matter of words. A desire to be on friendly terms with England and also to get as much out of her as possible was certainly there, but "close friendship" is strong language, and it is remarkable how often when His Majesty's Government had made some concrete advance in the way of a closer relationship the Afghan Government eluded their efforts and the position remained monotonously the same as before. Fear of Russian aggression was also still present as well as the wish to retain close commercial relations with Germany. The most powerful influence of all was, however, undoubtedly the first, viz., the desire by hook or by crook to keep out of the war.

7. When towards the end of June Germany fell upon Russia it became necessary for the Afghan Government to take original stock of their position. Obviously for a time at any rate their importance as a buffer State would completely disappear. For Afghan Ministers trained in the traditional Afghan statecraft this was no light matter. The basic principle in accordance with which they had regulated their limited external relations for so long had disappeared overnight and in a world which was rapidly becoming enveloped in the flames of total war where was any adequate substitute to be sought? But there were compensations. There need obviously, for instance, be no fear of Russian aggression for some considerable time to come. The Russian armies would be no match for the all-conquering Germans, the defeat of Russia would only be a matter of time—probably a short time—when the Soviet system might disintegrate and the northern menace be removed from the Afghan horizon perhaps for generations to come. To reinsure with the Germans must therefore surely still be good policy, although trade relations with that country might now become difficult except by the long and expensive route via Persia and Turkey. And what of England? If trade with Germany—and perhaps with Russia as well—became impossible, it might be necessary to move closer to Britain, but carefully, for the Germans, even if they seemed to be far away, must soon defeat the Russians and then who was going to stop them, and where?

8. And there was a comparatively minor matter which presently was to assume serious proportions. At the time when the German armies invaded Russia

there were in Afghanistan some eighty German nationals not inclusive of the staff of the German Legation. These people fell into certain categories:—

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Obviously, if close trade relations with Germany, due to developments in the war situation, were to become impossible, the technicians and the representatives of German firms at any rate would become unemployed. As such they were a danger to Afghanistan in a twofold sense, viz.:—

- (a) They might attempt to intrigue with the tribes of the Indian frontier or even, if it suited them, foment a revolution in favour of ex-King Amanullah; and
- (b) They would almost certainly attract the unfavourable notice of His Majesty's Government and of the Government of India.

And this latter was, in fact, what happened. In the earlier paragraphs of this review it has been described how the most important exchanges which took place between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Afghanistan during the first six months of 1941 had to do with increased German penetration and with Afghan reluctance to recognise the manifest dangers which this involved not only to the internal security of Afghanistan itself but to the peace of the Indian border. The most important event of the second half of the year—perhaps the most important incident in all our relations with Afghanistan since the signing of the treaty of 1921—was concerned with this very question of non-official German and Italian nationals in the country. In addition to the eighty Germans already mentioned, there were nine non-official Italian nationals in Afghanistan, and, including women and children, the total non-official Axis population in the country came to something over 200 persons.

9. His Majesty's Government very shortly made up their minds that these people must leave Afghanistan. Upon closer examination, however, the problem was seen to be one of no little delicacy. The first principal issue which fell to be decided was whether the non-official Axis population only should go, or whether a demand should be made for the removal of the Axis Legations as well. It was decided that, particularly in view of Afghan susceptibilities in the matter of hospitality and so on, it would be well, for the time being at any rate, to confine the demand to non-officials only. Then there was the question of safe-conduct. His Majesty's Government decided that, in view of the urgent necessity of securing the removal of these potential enemy agents, a guarantee of safe-conduct to Axis-controlled territory must be given. Not only this, but it was decided that they should be transported to such territory free of charge. These and numerous other subsidiary issues having been cleared out of the way, on the 9th October His Majesty's Minister, at an interview with His Royal Highness the Prime Minister, tendered a friendly request on behalf of His Majesty's Government for the expulsion of all non-official German and Italian nationals from Afghanistan within a period of one month. On the 11th October the Soviet Ambassador tendered a similar request on behalf of his Government.

10. To both representations the Prime Minister adopted the same attitude. He agreed by implication that the individuals in question should be removed. The difference had to do with the method. If he was left to do it in his own way, he would on one plea or another have all non-official Axis nationals out of Afghanistan in at the most three months. Compliance in terms with the request of the Allied Governments would, however, mean that the whole question would have to be put to the Cabinet and afterwards to the Afghan Parliament for decision. There followed various exchanges, but by the 17th October the Afghan Government had decided to comply with the Anglo-Russian request. As was inevitable, there were last-minute hitches—numbers of them—but in the end 206 German and Italian nationals left Afghanistan in two batches, the first on the 29th October and the second on the following day.

11. The matter did not, however, end there. When the Prime Minister spoke of entrusting a decision in this important matter to Cabinet and Parliament he spoke not much less than the truth. The actual decision was taken after

discussions in the Cabinet and after consulting those members of the Loe Jirga (National Assembly) who lived in or near the capital. At the same time, however, it was decided to summon the National Assembly in order that the Government might have an opportunity of explaining their action to the country. No meeting of this Assembly had been held since 1930, when it was called in order that it might ratify the accession of His late Majesty King Nadir Shah to the Throne of Afghanistan. The importance which the Government attached to the matter of the expulsion of the Axis nationals is amply illustrated by this one fact alone. The delegates duly arrived in Kabul—it was said that they had all been carefully hand-picked—and the Assembly duly went into session in the early days of November. The formal proceedings were of the briefest, the real business having obviously been transacted outside. The action of the Government in expelling the non-official German and Italian nationals was defended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, almost the only other speakers being the leading mullahs of the country—a second proof, if such were needed, that the Government were well seized of the dangers inherent in the situation. Finally, a single resolution was passed which purported to embody the advice of the Assembly to the Executive Government of the country. After endorsing and approving the action of the Government in expelling the Axis nationals, the resolution recited—

- (a) That occupation of the whole or of any part of Afghanistan by any Power would in no circumstances be tolerated;
- (b) That the use of land or air routes in or through Afghanistan must in no circumstances be conceded;
- (c) That no treaty should be entered into with any Power which might prejudice the neutrality of Afghanistan; and
- (d) That the right of Afghanistan to have diplomatic relations with any country she chose must in all circumstances be preserved.

For some days after this resolution had been made public the local press and radio were utilised for the dissemination of some typical Afghan heroics, when gradually the whole incident faded away and shortly, with the onrush of exciting news from other quarters of the world, was almost, if not entirely, forgotten.

12. Much might be written about the motives which animated the Afghan Government in acceding to the Anglo-Russian *démarche* and in summoning the National Assembly to endorse their action, and incidentally provide them with a public and also somewhat minatory foreign policy. That the principal object of the Allied Governments—the removal of potentially dangerous enemy agents—was achieved rather more easily than might have been expected will be clear from the above necessarily brief description of the incident. The principal factors with a bearing on the decision taken—and for them taken quickly—by the Afghan Government perhaps were—

- (a) Knowledge on the part of the Prime Minister that the Anglo-Russian demand was not, in fact, without justification;
- (b) The heavy weight of joint Anglo-Russian pressure—a thing which had never happened before in history;
- (c) The certainty that the two Great Powers acting together would never accept the heavy diplomatic rebuff involved if the Afghan Government attempted a refusal;
- (d) The further knowledge that any step beyond diplomatic pressure was likely to be crushing;
- (e) The fate of Persia—particularly of Reza Shah;
- (f) The very considerate form in which the request was presented; and
- (g) The fact that many of the persons concerned were genuinely idle and an unnecessary charge on the country, and so on.

13. But what was all this business going on in Russia? During the first months of the Russo-German war it seemed that the prophets of an early Russian defeat—the wish here was very much the parent of the thought—would prove to be correct, and that before the notorious northern winter set in Russia would lie prostrate before Germany, her armies scattered, and her political system possibly disintegrated. Then, confounding all these so prescient observers, the Russian armies, as winter was all but closing in, turned on the German invader and began to handle him very roughly indeed. It looked, in fact, as if the famous German war machine had most surprisingly met its match. Here with a vengeance was food for thought for Afghan statesmen. Only a few months before they had flattered themselves that the Russian menace might disappear from

their northern horizon, perhaps for an indefinite period. What, however, was to be their fate if the Russians, having defeated the Germans, stood forth as immeasurably the greatest military Power, not only in Europe, but in the whole world? All the more reason now for Afghans to pursue a policy of almost truculent neutrality and watch events. Fear of Russian aggression had therefore become very much alive again; the question of commercial relations with Germany had passed into abeyance; the policy of close friendship with England, on the other hand, could be kept alive at the cost of occasional tactful remarks to the British Minister. Even more than during the first half of the year a somewhat harassed pursuit of neutrality was therefore the mainspring of foreign policy in Afghanistan.

14. But 1941 had not finished with its surprises yet. On the 7th December Japan declared war on America, whereupon England declared war upon Japan and Germany and Italy declared war on America. Afghans do not like the Japanese. The causes of this dislike are obscure, but the fact of the dislike is certain. There is some notion that the Japanese are akin to the Hindus of India, a race whom the Afghans cordially despise. This nebulous connexion is, however, hardly sufficient to explain the whole of the Afghan feeling for Japan. Perhaps the leaders of Afghan opinion see in the Japanese the only possible challenge to the British position in the East; a hungry and ambitious nation on their eastern border would be a much more unpleasant neighbour than England with her traditional sympathy for Islam, past her expansionist period and proved times without number to harbour no designs on Afghan independence. The early successes of the Japanese in the Pacific therefore evoked no particular admiration, and the general feeling was that Pearl Harbour and Hong Kong were a mere flash in the pan and that presently the Americans and the British would gather their strength and retrieve the situation. Towards the very close of the year, however, the rapid Japanese advance in Malaya caused serious misgivings in the inner circle of the Government—misgivings which found public expression in criticism of the British for their lack of foresight in the matter of the protection of their Far Eastern possessions and in denigration of the Americans as an effeminate and unwarlike people. Mingled with this was a sense of relief that such threat as the British power in India represented to their eastern frontier—there had been ill-informed rumours of a British invasion of Afghanistan during most of the autumn and early winter—was removed and that, Russia being heavily involved with Germany and England with Japan, Afghanistan might yet, with skilful guidance, endure the years of the war with her neutrality unscathed.

15. The principal preoccupation of the Afghan Government during the year 1941 was, therefore, the maintenance—if it could be done—of a most complete neutrality. Set against this background, it is easy to see how awkward the persistent Anglo-Russian efforts to counter Axis penetration in the country must have been. But it was not only matters of high policy that were coloured by the neutrality approach. Afghanistan being Afghanistan, trivial incidents of everyday life came to be regulated by the same considerations. Entertainment of members of foreign missions is, for instance, a thing of the past. And not only this, but attendance by Afghans of status at social functions at the various embassies and legations in the capital is closely overlooked by the Foreign Office. The King, on the other hand, is never seen, and there are no Court functions. The Prime Minister himself has also become a recluse. He makes a dignified and aloof appearance at the national celebration which each foreign mission holds once a year, but otherwise appears not to go out at all. The seclusion of the King and of the Prime Minister may in part have to do with the fear of assassination, but it suits the neutrality policy as well, and it is very rigid. Over propaganda by foreign missions, again, the Afghan Government have taken a very definite line. The Prime Minister himself hates all propaganda and would much prefer that the dissemination of news should be left entirely to Afghan—*sc.* Government—agency. Very early in the year the Afghan Government began to protest against British propaganda. In the British Legation a practice had been started of holding frequent cinema performances which were very popular in a benighted capital like Kabul, where there is only one public cinema, and that of the most primitive sort. By April the Afghan Government had decided that the British Legation cinema required attention, and Afghans were forbidden to accept invitations to attend the performances except for a carefully chosen few from the Foreign Office. The same restriction was imposed on German and Russian cinema performances. This was still the position at the end of the year, and so—unusual events apart—it is likely to remain till the end of the war. In

May the Government decided to place a complete ban on the dissemination of all propaganda material in the country, but in the end, so far as British propaganda material was concerned, a somewhat uneasy *modus vivendi* was reached whereby the legation was permitted to issue a daily bulletin to foreigners and to British nationals residing in the capital. The Foreign Office agreed to receive a copy of this bulletin, but otherwise its dissemination among Afghans was completely prohibited. Towards the end of the year the Afghan Post Office—of course, under the orders of the Afghan Government—started a practice of holding up all recognisable propaganda material sent from India to addresses in Afghanistan. This last aspect of the problem still awaits discussion and settlement with the Afghan authorities.

16. The outbreak of Rashid Ali's rebellion in Iraq in May 1941 and the subsequent events in that country aroused no serious reactions in Afghanistan. And this, although the Iraqi Minister—M. El Khedairy—who had previously professed ardent pro-British sympathies, began, the moment fighting started in Iraq, to spread violent anti-British propaganda, and even had the audacity to attempt to incite Afghan sympathy with Iraq on religious grounds. This was followed by the issue from the Iraqi Legation of a daily bulletin which was violently anti-British in tone and which openly incited Moslems to declare a holy war against Britain. M. El Khedairy was presently (July) recalled by his Government and is reported to have since been dismissed. In the same month M. El Hout, the Egyptian Minister in Kabul, was also required by his Government to demit his post and return to Egypt. M. El Hout, during his short tenure of the post of Egyptian Minister in Kabul—he arrived in the country only in September 1940—had displayed strong pro-Axis leanings and was known to be in close touch with the German Legation in Kabul.

17. The entry of Russian and British forces into Persia in August had also rather less repercussions in Afghanistan than might have been expected. The countryside took the incident calmly, but in the inner circles of the Government the fate of Reza Shah is said to have caused a considerable flutter and, as already noted, the example of Persia may have had an important bearing on the decision of the Afghan Government to accede to the Anglo-Russian *démarche* and expel the German and Italian colonies from Kabul.

18. In July occurred what has come to be known as the "Logar incident." Two Germans were discovered at night in the Logar Valley, presumably heading for Khost and the Indian frontier. They were accompanied—whether as guides or escort—by some Jajis and Wazirs. The party was intercepted by Afghan police or troops, and in the subsequent affray one of the Germans—Berdoffer—was shot dead. This gentleman had been introduced to Afghan society as a leprosy expert, while his companion—one Brandt—was by way of being an entomologist of the lepidopteran persuasion. The latter was also slightly wounded in the scuffle. For some time after this incident Kabul was rife with rumours, and that the two Germans were up to mischief seems certain. How the matter was finally adjusted with the German Legation is not known, but Brandt finally left Afghanistan with the other non-official Axis nationals at the end of October. That he was interested in butterflies appears to have been true, but he was also a colonel in the German Air Force. It seems probable that this incident also had a considerable bearing on the decision taken by the Afghan Government to accede to the Anglo-Russian request and expel all non-official German and Italian nationals from Afghanistan.

19. On the internal side the year was one—for Afghanistan—of almost complete peace. No serious challenge to the authority of the Government appeared from any quarter, and in the opinion of competent observers the Yahya Khel Government, after the session of the National Assembly, had, in spite of its action in expelling the German and Italian colonies, actually strengthened its position in the country. The truth, perhaps, is that there is no leader in the country at present competent to challenge the personal position of the Prime Minister, while the smaller fry are so impressed with the scale of the world events that they prefer to leave the present Government to deal with the situation, putting their personal ambitions and so on aside till better times supervene. The Prime Minister himself is still reported to be unpopular in the country, but his grip on affairs appears to be as competent as ever and, untoward events apart, there seems to be no reason why he should not see Afghanistan through the war. His health, it is true, is not what it was and he complains that his long tenure of power has worn him out, but the old skill is still there and he remains the outstanding member of the small headquarters clique which controls the inner counsels of the Government of Afghanistan. Rumours are still not wanting of dissensions between the various

members of the Royal family, but it seems possible that the extent of these differences is being exaggerated. The Minister for National Defence—His Royal Highness Sirdar Shah Mahmud Khan—is sometimes reported to be at loggerheads with his half-brother, about this or about that, but during the crisis over the expulsion of the Axis nationals he stood loyally by the Prime Minister, and it seems probable that the pressure of events during war time is such that the Yahya Khel will keep their ranks closed rather than risk the extrusion of the dynasty and the resultant possibility of the dissolution of Afghanistan into its mutually dissident elements.

20. If the main guiding principle of Afghan foreign policy right from the beginning of the present war has been a determination to pursue—almost at any cost—a policy of complete neutrality, are there any conceivable circumstances in which the Government might be brought to abandon this policy and, *e.g.*, throw in their lot with the Allied Powers against the Axis? After the National Assembly had dispersed, the Prime Minister told His Majesty's Minister, in response to a direct question, that under the terms of the resolution passed by the Assembly, the Afghan Government would resist aggression from whatever quarter it might come, and His Royal Highness earnestly requested that His Majesty's Government be informed that the resolution was to be interpreted in this sense and not as especially directed either against Britain or against Russia. That this was the intention when the resolution was framed and passed may very well be true. Whether, if the need arises, it will be translated into action will probably depend very much on the circumstances of the time. For the Afghans are, it is feared, all too likely—if they are forced to make a decision at all—to go over to the side which seems to them at the time to be the more likely to win. On the other hand, the men who nowadays control the government of the country realise very well that the existence of Afghanistan as an independent State and—more important still—the survival of the present dynasty are inextricably bound up with victory on the part of the Allies and the survival of the British power in the East. Nothing less than a direct Axis threat to their western border seems likely to bring them into the war at all, but if that threat should materialise and if, through the chances of war, Turkey at the time had actually joined the Allies, then the chances of Afghanistan throwing in her lot with those who oppose the Axis plan of world domination are not perhaps entirely illusory.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

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(16292)

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respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

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CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 50.—JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1942.

CHAPTER I.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[W 9694/255/802]

No. 1.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Kuibyshev).

(No. 194.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 7, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador asked to see me this morning and brought me the attached letter on the subject of the Tehran aerodromes. His Excellency said that he had been instructed to add some oral explanations. His Government had been guided by the principle that these aerodromes should be jointly used. They had therefore agreed without demur to the construction by the British of concrete runways at Qualeh Murgheh, when asked to do so by Sir R. Bullard. Early in the year, however, the British authorities had closed the approaches to the Mehrabad and Dushan-Tape aerodromes and had taken over the workshops at the latter. In February the Soviet Government had taken over Qualeh Murgheh in order to secure the transfer of their bombers which were now arriving, as I knew, from the United States at the Persian Gulf. They were also using the aerodrome to train pilots. As the flow of bombers increased the Soviet authorities had felt it necessary to stop the passenger planes using the aerodrome and to institute a system of passes. It appeared that our authorities had protested at the system of passes. His Excellency assured me, however, that the Soviet authorities had never requested our personnel to leave, nor had they ever refused facilities to our aircraft. Nor would they do so until the whole question of these aerodromes was settled, as they hoped it would be settled, by diplomatic conversations between us.

2. The Ambassador said that the Soviet Government were open to receive any other proposals we liked to make if we could not accept those of the Soviet Government. For instance, they did not object to the division of aerodromes between the British and the Soviet command, so that Mehrabad and Dushan-Tape should remain under British control and Qualeh Murgheh should remain under Soviet command. Then the repair shop at Dushan-Tape would have to serve us both. This was an alternative to the joint use of the aerodromes.

3. I told the Ambassador that this problem was clearly one that must now be solved. I would consider the suggestions he had made with our advisers, and communicate to him again shortly.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

Enclosure in No. 1.

Mr. Maisky to Mr. Eden.

My dear Foreign Secretary,

July 6, 1942.

IN connexion with your letter of the 17th June No. W. 8283/355/602, on the instructions of my Government I have the honour to communicate that the Soviet Government is prepared to accept the principle put forward by you that the Iranian aerodromes situated in the neutral zone should be used jointly by the Soviet and British authorities. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that this principle should be extended to all Teheran aerodromes, i.e., Qualeh Murgheh, Mehrabad and Dushan-Tape. The Soviet Government thinks, however, that the joint administration of these aerodromes would be difficult to carry out in practice and might lead to some serious organisational difficulties which is clearly undesirable, inasmuch as the matter concerns the administration of military aerodromes.

Taking these circumstances into consideration the Soviet Government is inclined to think that the best possible solution of this question would be to establish the following system in the administration and use of the Teheran aerodromes:—

- (1) The Qualeh Murgheh aerodrome to be jointly used by both parties for Soviet and British military planes but to be under Soviet administration.
- (2) The Mehrabad aerodrome to remain under British administration but should be used jointly by both parties for passenger planes.
- (3) The Dushan-Tape aerodrome to remain under British administration but the aircraft repair and assembly shop situated on this aerodrome should, if necessary, serve the needs of Soviet planes.

The necessity to create a joint aerodrome for passenger planes is clearly indicated by the contemplated establishment of air lines which will link up Kuibyshev and Moscow with London and Washington via Teheran, which will be served by British as well as Soviet planes. In addition, on the grounds of military consideration, the Soviet Command feels it necessary to reserve the Qualeh Murgheh aerodrome solely for military planes. With regard to the joint use of the aircraft repair and assembly shop at Dushan-Tape aerodrome, the need for this is evident in view of the fact that a considerable number of bombers are being transferred to the Soviet Union via Teheran, a certain proportion of which will undoubtedly require some adjustment or repairs.

Yours sincerely,

I. MAISKY.

[E 4095/14/34]

No. 2.

Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 881.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 8, 1942.

OWING to growing unpopularity the position of Prime Minister has been steadily deteriorating. Further, he has become the object of attack by the Majlis, many of whom are anxious to obtain ministerial posts and feel they are being deprived of the spoils of office. During the last few days it seemed almost certain that the Government would fall, but Prime Minister told me last night that for the time being he had surmounted the crisis. He added, however, that the wheat situation was causing him grave anxiety and that, unless we could help him out, he might find himself forced to resign (see my telegram No. 872). Possible successors appear to be Taddayoun, Said, Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai and Qawam-us-Sultaneh. The latter is at present strongly favoured by the Soviet Ambassador, with whom I am maintaining close touch. My United States and Turkish colleagues appear to hold no strong views.

2. Now that the posts of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Interior have been filled, it would seem natural that question of dissolution of Majlis and the holding of new election should come to the fore again. I doubt, however, whether present Prime Minister would in existing circumstances be strong enough to cope with such a situation, particularly as he has been told by the Soviet Ambassador that, owing to present situation on the war fronts, the

moment is not opportune. My Turkish colleague, who is always intensely nervous of Russian intentions, is anxious that the Majlis should be placed on a constitutional basis as soon as possible. Otherwise, he fears that the Soviet Government will set up strong pro-Soviet Administration here under their own nominee, dissolve Majlis, and then do as they like without hindrance.

3. Situation, of course, needs watching closely, but I am not impressed by the fears of my Turkish colleague, nor do I think that dissolution and renewal of Majlis at the moment by a Government as unpopular or as weak as that of Soheily is practicable, however desirable it may be from our point of view and in the interests of efficient government.

[E 4074/163/34]

No. 3.

Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 191.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a confidential report on the Internal Situation at Tabriz, by His Majesty's Consul-General, Tabriz, No. 17 of the 10th June, 1942.

Tehran, June 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Consul-General Urquhart to Mr. Holman.

(No. 17. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tabriz, June 10, 1942.

I HAVE reported to you certain vague rumours about trouble between the Persian authorities and the Shahsevans, but until to-day I have not met anyone who was able and willing to tell me exactly what the trouble was. This morning I had a visit from the Governor of Khoi, and I now have the honour to put before you the gist of what he said. I would earnestly request that he should not be quoted to anyone as the source of the following information, because the quotation would probably be repeated to him and almost certainly make him less communicative in future.

2. Mr. Kabiri has no Shahsevans in the area under his charge, but he is a member of a leading Maragha family and himself owns property there. He has every interest to keep himself informed of what takes place in the Maragha district, and he has the best sources of information to draw upon.

3. Eastwards of Maragha lies Hastarud, a mountainous district largely unsurveyed as yet, where live pastoral tribes, half Kurd, half Shahsevan. These, like all the tribes of Azerbaijan, acquired fire-arms when the Persian army was defeated, and, according to the Governor of Khoi, it was decided to apply to them the Hashimi method, the same which has had such disastrous results around Rezaieh. A force of gendarmes was organised to go against them, and civilians from the Maragha district were armed to strengthen and support the gendarmes. The landlords of Maragha and their men combined readily with the gendarmes for this expedition, because the tribes are relatively weak and because there was a definite prospect of acquiring something in the way of loot. The tribes at first did not resist; they surrendered some weapons. When, however, the gendarmes used violence to the extent of beating the women, in order to make them hand over more guns, the tribesmen turned on them and routed them. Thereupon a larger force of gendarmes, with more armed civilians, was despatched, and this time the tribesmen were beaten. Their families were scattered, their goods pillaged and their sheep, to the number of 30,000, according to the Governor, were driven away. All this happened soon after Novruz, say two months ago. Now a band of sixty dispossessed but armed men are at large, looting wherever they find anything to loot. Recently they had a fight with gendarmes, and it is said that they were chased away in the direction of Kurdistan, a region where there are already more than its share of lawless men with rifles in their hands.

4. The Governor was not able to tell me anything about the trouble reported from Ardebil, but I find it easy to believe that the authorities may be at logger-heads with the tribes in Ardebil and in Khalkhal. There was always trouble in

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the old days, when the tribes began moving in the spring and early summer, and it is evident that for the time being Persia has reverted to the old days of tribal unruliness and insecurity.

5. I took this opportunity to ask the Governor what was the sequel to the killing of two Russians by Kurds, of which he had informed me when I visited him at Khoi on the 20th May (see the penultimate sub-paragraph of my despatch No. 15 of the 24th May). He confirmed that the Russians took no steps to punish the killers, that they had chosen the way of negotiation. The leaders concerned had been brought to Khoi to meet him and had agreed to return the stolen animals. Now, he says, all is quiet.

6. Having thus, with obvious satisfaction, described the state of affairs in his district the Governor spoiled the effect by confessing that when he had invited the chiefs to tell them about the passage of the Persian troops through Khoi to Rezaieh, one of them, the important Kotas Agha, did not respond. More than that, his men pillaged a village in the neighbourhood on the 31st May, just after the troops had passed. Gendarmes from Salmas had later managed to kill three of Kotas Agha's men (in some cowardly ambush, according to another informant), and after some negotiation the Russians had permitted the Kurds to recover the bodies. The Governor of Tabriz, who called on me immediately afterwards, continued the story from this point. He had just received a telegram reporting that Kotas Agha was planning an attack on the town of Salmas itself, and stating that the commander of the Soviet detachment there had given the warning to the local commander of the gendarmerie. Reinforcements had been sent. It hardly seems likely that the Kurds would attack a town where Russian troops are quartered.

7. I mentioned to Mr. Kabiri a telegram which the Governor of Tabriz received two days ago, and which stated that some Maku Kurds had begun to pillage. Mr. Kabiri was not able to say much about it beyond the fact that some Jalili Kurds, the same whom Reza Shah exiled to Kazvin and who moved back, empty-handed, as soon as he had gone, were known to have started looting. But he was anxious to tell me a frontier story concerning a Kurd, a Mullah Mahmud, who lives in a village some 8 miles from the Turkish border. Being involved in a feud with some other Kurds, he and his family invited relatives from across the frontier to come and help them. A fight took place, and Mahmud's side was worsted. Some fifty animals were driven away from his village across the frontier and sold in Turkey, but, more serious, one of the Kurds from Turkey was killed. Mahmud subsequently received a visit from a Turkish bimbashi and two gendarme officers, who, according to the Governor, offered to arrange that Mahmud should have further help from Turkey against his enemies in Persia. The Turks withdrew when the Kathoda protested against their intrusion into Persian territory. The Governor's deduction was that the Turks, or some of them, are interested to feed the fires of Kurdish unrest in this country, but I think it more likely that they were concerned to investigate the death of a Turkish citizen and that if they offered help it probably meant that they would try to recover the stolen animals. The story illustrates the state of disorganisation in the frontier zone.

8. I questioned the Governor about smuggling across the Turkish frontier, and he said that without doubt a great deal was being illegally exported, and particularly grain and animals. The Russians were buying a good deal, but more than twice what they were taking from the Khoi and Maku regions was going to Turkey. There are tribes who have kinsmen in Turkey, and it is easy for them to organise this traffic. The Governor went so far as to say that the peasants around Maku had sold to the extent that they had not enough left for themselves. Until recently Maku was in the district of the Governor of Khoi; now a separate governorate has been set up, and Mr. Kabiri professed to be anxious to have Maku put back under his control. He said that he had told Tehran that unless this was done he could accept no responsibility for the leakage into Turkey of the produce of his district. I doubt whether he could do much, as things are, to stop that leakage, even if Maku were in his district again, and I suspect that his protest to Tehran was more of an intimation that they must not expect him to do anything to remedy matters, rather than a genuine request for the restoration of Maku.

9. It surprised me to hear a Persian Governor place the blame for the trouble with the Shahsevars so squarely on the shoulders of the gendarmes and their civilian helpers. Mr. Kabiri bluntly accused them of using the order to disarm the tribes as an opportunity for seizing the tribesmen's flocks. I think that perhaps he forgot he was an official and spoke as a property-owner, with a

good deal to lose if serious trouble ensues in the Maragha district. His statement is in direct contrast with the official Persian version, which always begins with the accusation that the tribes were guilty of looting, but it corresponds closely with the Russian explanation of how the trouble began in the Rezaieh district. You will recollect that Serhang Hashimi recruited gendarmes and armed civilians there for the purpose of disarming the Kurds and that the first, and virtually the only, achievement of the gendarmes was to kill and rob some Kurds bound for Mehabad on business. Indeed, Mr. Kabiri's remarks were so un-Persian in their form that I wondered at one stage whether he might not have come under Russian influence, or be giving me a prepared story for quotation to the Russians. I think the chances are that he was sincere, but I was careful to make suitable remarks which could bear repetition either to Persians or to Russians.

10. Assuming that there is truth in what the Governor said, Mr. Kabiri's version of the proceedings against the tribes east of Maragha provides one more illustration of the utter worthlessness of the gendarmerie, as well as proving the Russian case that in the matter of looting there is little to choose between the Moslems and the Kurds, except that the Kurds are more effective. The only remedy which I can suggest is a reconstituted gendarmerie under foreign officers. The present force has no health in it whatsoever; it is rotten throughout. It does not matter that the orders given to it are in the public interest, because when entrusted with their execution it perverts them into occasions for brutality and robbery. Honest Persians admit this. I understand that an attempt is being made to secure order in Kurdistan by giving the Kurds the responsibility for guarding the roads, but this cannot be entirely satisfactory, or more than a temporary solution at best. Foreign officers of the right type might make something of these same Kurds, however, and, being free from all taint of racial or religious feud, they might be able to secure co-operation between disciplined Kurds and a rehabilitated Persian gendarmerie where no Persian officer can hope to succeed.

I have, &c.

R. W. URQUHART.

[E 4078/3655/34]

No. 4.

Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 197.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 21, 1942.

IT might have been supposed that after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty on the 29th January, 1942, the relations between Persia and her new Allies would improve in an orderly and peaceful manner. It is regrettable that this has not been the case. Such has been the complete lack of power of decision of the Persian Government and their ill-conceived resistance to the relatively moderate demands which we have made upon them, that in April steps had to be taken to move up British troops in the direction of Tehran in conjunction with the Russians and to let it be inferred that force might have to be employed a second time. In this despatch I have the honour to review and analyse the causes of this state of affairs.

2. Without any doubt the two principal causes were:—

- (1) British military and naval set-backs at the beginning of the year in Africa and in the Far East, and
- (2) The continued presence of the Japanese Legation in Tehran.

So long as our interests were suffering in the various theatres of war, it was only natural that Axis propaganda and activities should take on a new lease of life here and that Persians, who might otherwise be well disposed towards us, should assume that old profession of "fence-sitting." The flames of anti-British feeling were at the same time fanned by the Japanese Legation, who with their network of financed propaganda and intelligence activities played on the fears and feelings of the public, who were led to believe that all their sufferings, particularly economic, were due to the Allies. The rupture of relations between Persia and Japan accordingly became one of our primary objectives, on which progress in every other sphere depended. The Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty could naturally not be quoted in support of any representation to the Persian

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Government, owing to the fact that Japan was still in diplomatic relations with Russia. It was accordingly urged upon the Persian Government that the closing of the Japanese Legation could reasonably be expected as an earnest of goodwill as between Allies on account of Japan's unprovoked aggression; that it would not harm Persian interests in Japan or Japanese interests in Persia, both of which were to all practical purposes non-existent; that the continued presence of the Japanese Legation could serve no useful purpose, as all communication facilities had been denied them, and that the Japanese Legation was, in fact, nothing more than a centre from which military intelligence reports were sent to the enemy. Indeed, the Japanese were suspected of using a secret wireless transmitter, and their agents were known to be distributing large sums of money and quantities of subversive literature.

3. I need not recount at length the history of the long and repeated representations to the Persian Government begun early in February. Suffice it to say that no progress could be achieved with this question for about two months. It was necessary to use every possible form of inducement and pressure. The United States Government were persuaded to make the grant of lease-lend facilities for the Persian Government and the provision of expert advisers dependent on the rupture of relations between Persia and Japan. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the Persian Government that they had no objection to their breaking off relations with Japan. His Majesty's Legation collected all evidence from secret and other sources to prove that the Japanese Legation were indulging in undiplomatic and subversive activities and this information was communicated to the Persian authorities. Finally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister and His Majesty the Shah himself were warned in no uncertain terms that the situation would seriously deteriorate, unless early satisfaction were received.

4. Notwithstanding these representations, every conceivable form of prevarication was indulged in by the Persian Government to keep the Japanese Legation, which they probably regarded as their last re-insurance link with the Axis. The question was even discussed at a secret session of the Majlis, where, according to the Prime Minister, members were strongly in favour of the maintenance of relations with Japan. But the patience of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom was exhausted. In Foreign Office telegram No. 506, of the 12th April, to Kuibyshev, it was explained that His Majesty's Government had decided to concentrate troops outside Tehran to be able to occupy the capital, if necessary, and enforce the closing of the Japanese Legation. It was arranged that Sir Reader Bullard would then demand an immediate audience with the Shah and insist on the rupture of relations with Japan. The Soviet Ambassador in London had been informed of our intention and told that, if British forces were eventually obliged to occupy Tehran, and if the situation should so develop as to render other measures necessary, the Soviet Government might wish to be associated in the occupation of the capital. His Majesty's Government would welcome such a decision. The Persian Government, however, sensing, no doubt, that His Majesty's Government had made up their minds to take forceful action, finally gave up the unequal struggle and on the 12th April instructed the Japanese Minister to leave Persia with his staff in one week. Eventually the legation left Tehran on the 23rd April.

5. Meanwhile, there existed other acute causes for dissatisfaction with the Persian Government:—

- (a) It was proving increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient rial currency in exchange for sterling to finance the expenditure of the British military authorities on road, rail and aerodrome developments in Persia. The statutory limit of the note-issue had been reached and the Persian Government were unwilling or unable to persuade the Majlis to increase it. Yet clearly the work of developing communications with Russia had to proceed.
- (b) No effective measures had been taken by the Persian Government to stop Axis propaganda or even to make it illegal.
- (c) For weeks His Majesty's Legation had been demanding, without success, the internment of the six most notorious Persian pro-Axis propagandists.

6. It appeared to His Majesty's Minister desirable to clear the air by insisting at once that all these eminently reasonable desiderata should be met and should be included in representations to the Shah, backed by the threat of force, and that, if possible, similar action should be taken by the Russians. In Foreign

Office telegram No. 527 it was agreed that Sir R. Bullard should seek an audience with the Shah, but that, if satisfaction had been obtained over the departure of the Japanese Legation by then, less drastic representations should be made.

7. The audience eventually took place on the 22nd April. It was apparent that the movements of Russian and British troops which had taken place, and the warnings which had been previously delivered, had been reported to His Majesty, who was evidently aware of the possibility of the strongest action by His Majesty's Government. The Shah expressed the keenest desire for the settlement of the currency question. Further, as the result of repeated and insistent representations, a proclamation, making enemy propaganda illegal, had been issued and published in the press. Similarly, satisfaction had also been given that very morning over the arrest of most of the six Axis supporters; it was, therefore, unnecessary for His Majesty's Minister to utter any direct threat. The negotiations on the financial issue actually culminated on the 26th May in the signature of a financial agreement which should settle the question of rial requirements for the duration of the war.

8. This episode certainly had the desired effect of clearing the atmosphere, and since then considerable progress has been made in almost all respects with the Persian Government, though insistence and much wrangling has frequently been required. Axis sympathisers have not generally been dealt with satisfactorily, and His Majesty's Legation have had to arrange themselves for their internment, first at Kermanshah and later at Ahwaz. Thanks, however, to the general co-operative attitude of the Persian police, under pressure from His Majesty's Legation, many suspects, including Germans, have been arrested, both in Tehran and in the provinces, and the task of the fifth column, for the time being, may have been rendered somewhat more hazardous. We still have, however, a long and difficult road to travel before we can say that it no longer constitutes a real menace. Enemy propaganda has, during the period under review, to some extent been driven underground, though it still exists in strength and is likely to show its head again, whenever the war situation becomes unfavourable for the Allies. At the present moment there is a noticeable recrudescence of Axis activities here which have, no doubt, been staged to coincide with German military operations in Libya and Russia. The Berlin and Rome broadcasts are, fortunately, jammed and the Prime Minister attributes much of the easing of his own position to this fact. As the result of further representations by His Majesty's Minister the local authorities have been instructed to allow all public broadcasting sets to be only used for listening to Allied broadcasts, including those organised nightly from the Tehran station by the Public Relations Bureau of this legation. This, of course, is of distinct advantage to the Allied cause.

9. The noteworthy increase in co-operation on the part of the Persian Government since the April crisis has also shown itself in a number of subsequent issues. For instance, the tribal situation has given considerable cause for anxiety owing to the ineptitude of the Persian civil and military authorities. It has no longer been possible for His Majesty's Legation to adopt an attitude of complete detachment regarding internal affairs in the tribal areas which lie athwart the supply route to Russia and the British lines of communications. Largely as the result of repeated representations by His Majesty's Minister, the Prime Minister had made, on the 31st March, a declaration to the Majlis promising to remedy genuine injustices and grievances of tribesmen and setting up a commission for their investigation. The declaration was couched in vague terms and it seemed unlikely to create the desired effect in tribal areas. With your concurrence, His Majesty's Minister, in May, pressed the Prime Minister to make his offer a reality and offered to place our good offices at the disposal of the Persian Government, in areas where our interests might be affected, in connexion with land grievances. The Prime Minister readily consented to His Majesty's Legation being furnished with any information which might be required from records in the possession of the Persian Government. The Government of India very kindly placed at the disposal of this legation the services of Colonel Galloway, Political Adviser at Sultanabad, and of Colonel Fletcher, Political Adviser at Kermanshah, for the purpose of investigating tribal grievances, and Colonel Galloway has for the last month been working here as liaison officer with the Tribal Lands Commission at the Ministry of Justice. He has received a very satisfactory degree of co-operation. Members of the legation have also visited Kurdistan to investigate tribal complaints.

10. Meanwhile, the Persian army has, fortunately, shown itself less incapable of dealing with tribal disturbances than was feared. An armed revolt in Khorassan by Yusuf Hezara'i (Saulat-us-Saltaneh) was suppressed by Persian

troops. In Kurdistan the situation is at present well in hand. In the south the situation is fairly satisfactory for the time being, but potential trouble-makers have not yet been challenged by the Persian forces. The Persian army is, however, a source of considerable preoccupation in view of its known Axis sympathisers. In any case, it cannot be expected that so soon after the events of last September it would rally to our cause. It is possible that under the influence of the Shah it may become better disposed, but I feel that it is up to us to try and quicken the pace by assisting it as far as may be possible with its military requirements, particularly transport, and in compensating it fully for such military equipment as we have removed or purchased in the past. The arrival of an American Mission should also improve the situation.

11. In the economic sphere, too, it has been found necessary for this legation to interfere more and more in the internal affairs of Persia. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to continue to import large quantities of wheat into the country, and steps have accordingly had to be taken to encourage greater local production and to ensure the proper distribution of wheat, whether grown locally or imported. It has required repeated and insistent representations to get the Anti-Hoarding Law put into effect; and it has now become essential to strengthen consular staffs by the appointment of special consular liaison officers to watch wheat distribution and check hoarding in the provinces. This scheme should be in operation shortly. Meanwhile it is a sign of the times that it has been welcomed by the Persian Government. The wheat and internal transport issues are at present, however, far from a satisfactory solution. It is impossible to say as yet whether the Anti-Hoarding Law will be effectively administered, and, in spite of all our efforts, the increased production and proper distribution of wheat are still problematical.

12. Much the same considerations apply to Persia's foreign trade in general. In order to bring Persia within the framework of the Middle East Supply Centre, Persian imports must be licensed and the licences related to quotas approved by the Middle East Supply Centre. The machinery necessary to bring this about is now beginning to operate, and it means in effect that the Commercial Section of this legation will direct and control the whole overseas trade of Persia except with Russia.

13. It will be seen that a considerable degree of co-operation on the part of the Persian Government has been achieved in every sphere, political, economic and financial. I attribute this partly to the idea which may at last be spreading here that the chances of a final Axis victory are receding, partly to the rather stronger policy which is being adopted by His Majesty's Government towards Persia, and partly to the directive given by the Shah to the Government to co-operate as closely as possible with His Majesty's Legation. Personally, in the last few weeks I have found the Prime Minister generally ready to give as much satisfaction as he can on any questions which I raise with him.

14. A most impressive encouragement to this improvement in our relations was given by the visit of His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester to Tehran from the 10th to the 13th May. His Majesty's Minister has reported separately on the results of the visit, and I would only record here that it greatly confirmed the friendly feelings of His Majesty the Shah, who often repeats that he decided, when he came to the throne, definitely to adopt a policy of co-operation with the Allies, and that it profoundly flattered the Persian Government and people at a most opportune moment.

15. Our relations with the Court might be better, were it not for the influence of the Queen-Mother, who is bitterly anti-British and makes things most difficult for the second ex-Queen, Ismat Pahlevi. How far the Queen-Mother's influence extends over the Shah I am unable to say, but my private relations with His Majesty are of the closest and in my private conversations with him he is completely frank and seems to be only too pleased to unburden his heart with full confidence. What he needs, I am sure, is an experienced adviser around him, with political sense and no axe to grind, whom he can completely trust. At present he seems to suffer from a feeling of isolation.

16. To turn to the internal political situation, the Government of M. Soheily was at first far from satisfactory. Soon after he had taken office it became clear that he was as incapable as his predecessors of obtaining swift decisions on matters of vital interest to us. The question of finding a better Prime Minister was taken up with the Foreign Office, but it was decided that for the moment no more suitable candidate was available, and he was, therefore, allowed to stay. This was a happy decision, as from the preceding paragraphs it will be evident that co-operation with the Prime Minister has considerably improved. He may

not be an ideal Prime Minister and may be more untrustworthy and corrupt than most, but his retention for the time being probably serves our purpose.

17. The obstructionist tactics of the Majlis have, however, not decreased. The question of dissolving that somewhat absurd institution and proceeding to new elections has been discussed with the Foreign Office. Dissolution, of course, has the advantage of accelerating the Government's business and preventing the Prime Minister from using the Majlis as an excuse for procrastination. It is possible that with the temporary disappearance of the Majlis co-operation between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government might be improved. It has, however, been considered preferable that the pace should not be forced, at least pending the ratification of the recently signed Financial Agreement and the appointment of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior.

18. The trial of the ex-Chief of Police, Mukhtari, is proceeding and seems likely to reveal a good deal of scandal concerning events which were much better buried. The accused is being given the benefit of counsel to defend him. Application has accordingly been made by the counsel for the production of certain dossiers connected with the ex-Shah's part in the murders for which Mukhtari is accused. The application had to be referred to the Palace, as the dossiers were kept there. The Shah's secretary recommended that they should not be produced, but the Minister of Court, Feroughi, is said to have advised the Shah that the course of justice should not be interrupted, an opinion which may cause His Majesty a good deal of embarrassment.

19. A former Governor of Khorassan, named Pakravan, has recently been arrested and is to be tried on similar charges, as he was Governor of the province in the ex-Shah's reign at the time of the massacres in the shrine and of the execution of the keeper of the shrine, Asadi. In view of the number of people who suffered under the régime of Shah Reza, some head-hunting seems almost inevitable, though we shall do our best to see that our interests are not adversely affected.

20. To sum up, it would be idle to suppose that the Persian Government or people have turned, or could turn, pro-Ally overnight. Their principal reaction to every event is based on fear and self-interest. If the Germans appeared to be advancing towards Persia successfully, the attitude of the Persian Government would, of course, change for the worse. But for the present the going is better than might be expected. The Persians have discovered again that we mean business. They have also discovered that, if our main desiderata are granted, they are treated with decency and consideration and do not suffer the fate of countries under Axis domination.

21. Throughout the negotiations for the departure of the Japanese Legation this legation preserved an outward attitude of cordiality and never sought to humiliate the Persian Government or the Shah. This has, I think, been duly appreciated, and for once has not been misconstrued as weakness.

22. In general, the period of co-operation during the last four weeks must be exploited to the maximum possible extent. There is a vast field to be covered, as will be seen from the preceding paragraphs. The better we can cover it, the better we shall be able to face trouble if the military situation in Russia deteriorates during the summer, and the better we shall be able, if all remains normal, to lay a sound basis for close and friendly relations with Persia.

I have, &c.

ADRIAN HOLMAN, *Chargé d'Affaires*.

[E 4117/4117/34]

No. 5.

Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 201. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 25, 1942.

WITH reference to Sir R. Bullard's despatch No. 92 of the 3rd July, 1941, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on heads of missions at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ADRIAN HOLMAN.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Tehran.

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Afghanistan (Ambassador): Mohammed Nowruz Khan (April 17, 1939.)

*Related to the present ruling family of Afghanistan. Was for some years chief secretary to the present King before being appointed to his first diplomatic post, Tehran. Likes to express the opinion of friendship with Great Britain should be the main plank in Afghan policy. Does not appear to be a man of great energy or ability, but is friendly and popular. Speaks some English. Is a very inadequate doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. Born about 1900. (Written in 1940.)

Belgium (Minister): M. Egbert Graeffe (January 17, 1937.)

*M. Graeffe is somewhat of a specialist in commercial and financial affairs, with which, I gather, he dealt while employed in Berlin before his appointment to Tehran. He has a considerable amount of energy and determination, and is outspoken in his discussions with the Persian Government. I have never heard him admit ignorance of any subject, official or unofficial, and his claims to omniscience are apt to make people underrate his ability. Both he and his wife speak very excellent English. (Written in 1938.)

*When the King of the Belgians surrendered to the Germans, M. Graeffe, though a keen Royalist, supported the Belgian Government in exile, and he is still doing so, in spite of the collapse of France.

*M. Graeffe was probably born about 1885. He talks almost perfect English, as does his wife, who is half-American. (Written in 1940.)

China (Minister): Mr. Li Tieh-tseng (June 28, 1942.)

Mr. Li is the first Chinese Minister to Persia. He was born in 1905 and started his official career as a district magistrate in Nanchang. Since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service and has served in London for four years, during which period he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference, and was also secretary to the Chinese delegation to the League Assembly in 1934 and 1935. He was a member of the Chinese delegation in the abortive negotiations for an immigration agreement in Burma in 1941.

Czechoslovakia (Chargé d'Affaires): Dr. F. Bachtik (December 1941.)

Born 1885 in Martinica in Bohemia, educated as engineer. Served as volunteer in the Serbian army in 1914; was in the retreat through Albania and the Salonika campaign. After the war entered the Czechoslovak diplomatic service. He was counsellor in Belgrade when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, but escaped through Istanbul. He has been in Tehran since December 1941 and has recently been informally recognised as Czech Chargé d'Affaires, though his *agrément* has not yet been formally asked for or granted. Dr. Bachtik's principal duties consist in straightening out the affairs of his colony of 600—mostly engineers and technicians—and in settling the numerous difficulties which have arisen over the Skoda Works, which were previously under German influence.

Dr. Bachtik is somewhat reproached locally for having allowed the Skoda Works to fall under strong Russian influence.

Dr. Bachtik seems to lack the human graces. He, however, expresses the greatest gratitude for the help which His Majesty's Minister was able to give to him and to his community at different times, and there is no reason to doubt his complete loyalty to the Allied cause. He speaks some English.

Denmark (Chargé d'Affaires): M. A. E. C. Fensmark (April 13, 1939.)

*Formerly the Danish Minister in Stockholm, was accredited to Tehran also, but M. Fensmark is chargé d'affaires *en pied*.

Born about 1890. Formerly in Angora, and before that was attached to the Danish Court. Speaks excellent English (has an English wife). Energetic, able, helpful and straightforward. Very strongly pro-Ally and detests the Germans and their policy towards his country. It was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the German Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1941.) He maintained close relations with the Allied Legations and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty, when it was certain that Persia was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him.

Egypt (Ambassador): Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha.

Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha's appointment has been announced, but he has not yet reached Tehran.

He was educated at the Jesuit Fathers' College in Cairo and the Egyptian School of Law; has served in the magistracy in Egypt, in the Royal Household of King Fuad and in the Egyptian Legations at The Hague and Madrid. He was Minister in Persia in 1938 and was withdrawn when Zulfiar Pasha was appointed first ambassador in March 1939.

The chargé d'affaires, M. Fadel, is most friendly and helpful on every occasion.

France (Delegate of Free French National Committee): M. André Godard (May 18, 1942.)

M. Godard, the head of the National Museum and an official of the Persian Government, was recognised in May 1942 as delegate. He is a charming and cultured old gentleman, but has not yet shown signs of real political activity or organising ability. Consequently, the Free French movement in Persia is rather inert. He is assisted in his propagandist activities by his wife. His staff includes the former French Assistant Military Attaché, Commandant Jouvel.

Greece (Chargé d'Affaires): M. Dimitri Lambros (April 7, 1942.)

Born in Alexandria 1903. Educated at Athens University. Entered the Greek Foreign Office 1926, as private secretary to Prime Minister Venizelos 1928-33. Vice-consul in Constantinople 1933-35. Consul in Bourgas (Bulgaria) 1935-37. First secretary to the Greek Legation in Cairo 1937-40. First secretary Greek Legation in London 1940-41. Secretary-General of Greek Ministry of Information in London 1941-42. Chargé d'affaires in Tehran 1942. M. Lambros speaks excellent English and is most friendly and helpful.

Holy See (Apostolic Delegate): Mgr. A. Marina (October 29, 1936.)

*The position of the apostolic delegate is rather anomalous. His diplomatic status is not fully recognised by the Persian Government, and his name is not included in the diplomatic list. He is, however, invited by the Persian authorities to gatherings attended by "chefs de missions." Mgr. Marina appears to be mainly interested in the religious and charitable side of his functions. He has a friendly and sympathetic character. (Written in 1938.)

Mgr. Marina was bitterly disappointed when Italy entered the war. Very friendly to us and openly shows his disapproval of the Nazi attitude towards religion. (Written in 1940.)

Iraq (Chargé d'Affaires): Sayid Abdul Melik al Khedari (May 18, 1942.)

Sayid Daud al Haidari returned to Iraq in May 1942 on his appointment as Minister of Justice in the Iraqi Government. The legation is at present in charge of the second secretary, Sayid Abdul Melik al Khedari, who is a friendly, although somewhat colourless, individual. He speaks fairly good English.

Netherlands (Chargé d'Affaires): Jonkheer de Brauw (March 11, 1942.)

Baron François van Aerssen Beyeren left Tehran on the 11th March, 1942, on his appointment as Netherlands Minister to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia. The legation is at present in charge of Jonkheer de Brauw, who speaks English and shows every desire to be on friendly terms with this legation.

Norway (Minister): M. Rolf Otto Andvord (April 20, 1942.)

Born 1890. M. Andvord is also Minister in Kuibyshev. He was for seven years a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. He is a friendly, sociable colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visit to Tehran is likely to be a short one and most of his time will be spent in Kuibyshev.

Poland (Minister): M. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski (February 21, 1939.)

*M. Siedlewski is small, very young-looking for his age (48), an animated and continuous conversationalist, and a bachelor; in every respect the antithesis of his predecessor. His previous service has been almost entirely in Central Europe and Russia. His work here is mainly commercial. I have had little opportunity of forming an opinion of his abilities, but should suppose him to be quite effective. (Written in 1939.)

M. Siedlewski claims to have been in the Polish intelligence service. He has, at any rate, a private passion for secret service business, and, as this is coupled

with a loud voice and an indiscretion which his vanity prevents his seeing, he is an embarrassing colleague, in spite of his desire to be helpful. (Written in 1941.) He is expected to be transferred shortly.

Sweden (Chargé d'Affaires): M. Sven Haralds Pousette (October 14, 1941).

M. Pousette, who is in charge of German, Bulgarian and Hungarian interests, was previously counsellor at the Swedish Legation in London. In view of the delicacy of his task here he has, whatever may be his own feelings, to adopt rather a neutral attitude, and is therefore sometimes the object of criticism by his colleagues. On the other hand, I have always found him a most helpful and sympathetic colleague, and I am sure that at heart he is a real friend of our country. He, of course, speaks excellent English. His wife and family are at present in Sweden. He is an enthusiastic dancer and tennis player, but excels at neither.

Switzerland (Chargé d'Affaires): Dr. Armin Daeniker (June 6, 1936).

A sound and sensible official. Plays no great part in Tehran life. Is distinctly pro-Ally, but needs to go to great pains to be polite to the Axis missions, as a neutral. His wife, whom he married in 1938, is believed to have been the secretary of an anti-Nazi society in Switzerland. (Written in 1941.) He is in charge of Italian interests.

Turkey (Ambassador): M. Cemal Hüsnü Taray (December 7, 1941).

Born about 1890. Formerly ambassador in Warsaw and afterwards in Athens. He wields considerable influence in Tehran as the representative of the principal neutral Power in the Near East and of the senior partner of the Saadabad Pact. He is a friendly, if occasionally independent, colleague, though his lack of contact with the Soviet Embassy and mistrust of the Russians is hard to overcome and sometimes proves an embarrassment in the peculiar conditions of Persia. He is acquiring some notoriety by his passion, if only platonic, for the fair sex.

United States (Minister): Mr. Louis Goethe Dreyfus, Jr. (December 18, 1940).

Mr. Dreyfus is a professional diplomat with long service. He was probably born about 1890. He is not a year ahead of his Government in his pro-Ally opinions as his predecessor, Mr. Engert, was, but he is very friendly and pro-Ally, and a very frank and loyal colleague. He admits complete ignorance of the Near and Middle East, where he was never posted before, and comes in periodically for information and advice. In return he is always ready to impart any interesting information he may obtain. (Written in 1941.)

Since the entry of the United States into the war Mr. Dreyfus has been obliged to adopt a more co-operative attitude. He is by nature not a strong personality and suffers, I think, from an inferiority complex. In his heart of hearts I think that he would have been happier if the United States had not become involved in the war. However, during the last few months he has shown far more readiness to work in as closely as possible with this legation. He has, unfortunately, not a strong staff and is not as well informed as he should be. Mrs. Dreyfus, who is stone-deaf, is always ready to be most friendly towards this legation.

U.S.S.R. (Ambassador): M. Andrée Andreevitch Smirnov (July 5, 1941).

Before coming to Tehran M. Smirnov was in charge of the Press Attachés' Department at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, where he remained until the outbreak of war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, he and his wife speak nothing but Russian and German. He is a very friendly and sympathetic colleague, with great charm, and from his appearance and manner certainly does not emanate from the working classes. He has no easy task in his dealings with the Persian Government. Both M. and Mme. Smirnov seem to entertain most friendly feelings for our country. As is generally the case in Soviet missions abroad, M. Smirnov possesses little power of decision and all questions at issue have to be referred to the Soviet Government and military authorities for consideration, with the inevitable delays involved.

Yugoslavia (Chargé d'Affaires): Dr. Louis Koser (August 17, 1939).

Born about 1895. Has always been friendly towards His Majesty's Legation, and detests the Germans and despises the Italians. Showed great spirit at the time of the Axis attack on his country. Talks English very fairly. Plays an inconsiderable rôle in Tehran. (Written in 1941.)

[E 4095/14/34]

No. 6.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 1015.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 15, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 881 [of 8th July: Political situation].

If Soheily's position should be so weakened that he is forced to resign, I do not think that we need make any effort to keep him in office. But if there is a change of Government, and provided the new Prime Minister is someone acceptable to us, the Shah might well feel that the moment had also come to dissolve the Majlis in preparation for elections at some future date.

[E 4279/35/34]

No. 7.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 162.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 17, 1942.

THE Persian Minister came to see me to-day to explain his Government's urgent need for supplies of wheat and also lorries and tyres with which to distribute their food supplies.

2. I reminded the Minister that Persia normally grew sufficient wheat to cover her own needs and even had a surplus for export in good years. Mr. Taqizadeh explained that, owing to lack of rain, this year's crops had failed in many districts, while in others the area sown last autumn had been much reduced owing to the insecurity resulting from the Allied occupation. I replied that, according to my information, the present shortage was chiefly due to the Persian Government's failure to collect sufficient wheat from the cultivators to put their anti-hoarding legislation into practice. But, whatever the causes of the present shortage might be, it was almost impossible for us to help Persia if we were only told at the very last moment that Tehran, for instance, had less than twenty-four hours' supply of wheat. I assured the Minister that we would do our best to help the Persian Government out of their present difficulty, though it was impossible for anyone to supply large quantities of wheat at a moment's notice. In return we expected the Persian Government to make a really serious effort to tackle the problem of collection and distribution of food supplies and to deal effectively with hoarders.

3. Mr. Taqizadeh then explained that his Government were very short of lorries, on which their system of food distribution depended. This shortage was accentuated by the action of the U.K.C.C., who had taken over a large proportion of the country's lorry fleet. The Persian Government also needed tyres badly. They hoped to get a number of tyres from the United States, but understood that the U.K.C.C. intended to distribute these tyres. This proposal was unwelcome to the Persian Government, who wished to distribute the tyres themselves.

4. I reminded the Minister that both lorries and tyres were in short supply all over the world. Nevertheless, I agreed that the Persian Government had a good claim to any lorries and tyres which could be spared, and I undertook to do what I could to help them.

5. Finally, Mr. Taqizadeh suggested that the most efficient means of handling problems connected with the supply of food-stuffs for Persia would be to set up a committee in Tehran on which His Majesty's Government and the United States Government would be represented. I promised to consider this idea, which at first sight seemed useful.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 4357/14/34]

No. 8.

Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 222.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 9, 1942.

I REFRAINED, owing to the length of my despatch No. 197 of the 21st June, from commenting in further detail on the present internal political structure, which is extremely amorphous and confused. I now have the honour to

transmit to you herewith a short note prepared by the Oriental Secretary and Miss Lambton on various political parties or groups which have recently come into prominence at Tehran. This is rather more complete than the list enclosed in the Military Attaché's Summary No. 25 (see my despatch No. 200 of the 23rd June). Most of them are of an ephemeral nature, and none of them are really parties in the same sense as the word is used in European countries. The Prime Minister regards them as quite unimportant, and considers that most of their members are merely hoping to secure lucrative posts by means of the political pressure which their party hopes to exercise. A past Minister of Education, Tadayyun, regards them as an instance of history repeating itself: meaning that in the earliest days of the constitutional movement in 1904 and 1905 a large number, amounting to as much as 100 of such ephemeral parties, sprang up. They were known as "anjumans," and they all disappeared when the Majlis was bombarded and forcibly closed by the reactionary party.

2. Mr. Trott's note contains in summary all the information which I have been able to collect, but the groups are so fluid and liable to change that it may well be that some of the names and details are out of date already. It is also possible that other groups exist which have not yet come to my notice.

3. Only three of the parties mentioned, Adalat, Sa'Adat and Vahdat-i-Mellie, have any representation in the Majlis, where there exists no serious party organisation. There are only a few fractions which are composed of most of the Deputies, but they are almost as fluid as the parties described in the enclosure to this despatch, and have a personal rather than a political basis. The Government is politically inexperienced in handling the Majlis, and appears to have an innate fear of its members. Thus neither local party organisation, which bears no relation to the Majlis "fractions" nor personal capacity and experience of Ministers, serve to rescue the Government from its numerous embarrassments due to the irresponsibility of the deputies.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Baghdad and His Majesty's Minister of State, Cairo.

I have, &c.

ADRIAN HOLMAN.

Chargé d'Affaires.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Note on the Political Parties and Groups now in Existence in Persia.

1. The "Tuda" (People) party may be described as Socialist and anti-Fascist. It is popularly supposed to be Communist, and certainly shows a movement towards the Left. The controllers of the party deny that they are Communists, but it is hardly possible to doubt that the party, and its organ the newspaper *Siyasat*, is supported and subsidised by the Soviet Embassy. Its president is Suleiman Mirza, and its most active member, and the editor of its newspaper, is Abbas Iskanderi. Its members fall roughly into two groups, firstly rather theoretical pseudo-Communists and a few Social Democrats, and secondly a number of place-hunters. The party cultivates a Democratic outlook and supports the Tripartite Treaty generally, though its public utterances are very cautious. It is almost the only party with any semblance of local organisation in the country, mostly in the north, though the organisation is believed to be very sketchy.

2. Most of the rest of the parties seem to have arisen in order to combat the Tuda party. The most important at the moment seems to be the "Adalat" (Justice) party, launched by the ex-newspaper proprietor and firebrand editor Sheikh Ali Dashti, supported by a number of Majlis Deputies and others. Its official organ is the newspaper *Mehr-i-Iran*, edited by Majid Muwaqqar. It poses as Liberal and Progressive, but seems to have achieved its present prominence by securing two or three lucrative appointments for members. It has attempted to form branches at Tabriz and Isfahan.

3. The party presided over by Tadayyun, an ex-Minister of Education and ex-Leader of the Majlis, is known as the "Milli" (National) party. It appears to be the only party which can boast of local headquarters, as it possesses club-rooms where its members meet twice per week. Its programme is Democratic and Constitutional, and it is perhaps less exclusively interested in obtaining office than the other parties.

4. "Mihan Parastan" (Lovers of the Fatherland) is the name of another anti-Tuda party, which is said to be one of the strongest. Its members include Dr. Abdul Hassan Sheikh.

5. The "Paikar" (War) party is a group of youngish men headed by one Iqbal, a judge, who edits the newspaper *Bahar* (Spring), which is the party organ. Apart from opposition to the Tuda, they have no clearly defined policy.

6. "Vahdat-i-Milli" (National Unity) has recently been started with the blessing of the present Prime Minister as a combined National party with a programme of sound national reform. Internal dissensions soon split it into several parts, and it is doubtful whether it still exists in any real sense. Its members included one Abbas Massoudi, the editor of the *Ittilâ'ât*, and Safavi, the editor of the *Kushish* newspaper.

7. "Iran-i-Javan" (Young Persia), unlike most of the above-mentioned parties, has existed, at any rate in name, for many years, having been sponsored in 1921 by the French Legation. As it at one time included Dr. Musharraf Nafici, Abol Hassan Abtehaj and Mustafa Fateh, it was popularly supposed to be pro-British. It has recently been reorganised with a vague programme of reform, but shows no recent activity.

8. "Iran" is one of the names, and "Sa'Adat" is another, of a party the leading spirits of which are Sheikh Ahmed Behbehani, Dadvar, Moayyad Agmedi, all Majlis Deputies. Their programme is moral regeneration, resistance to dictatorship, encouragement of the small holder and other admirable projects.

9. The poet Malik-Ush-Shuara Bahar is said to be endeavouring to resuscitate the ancient "Democratic" party, which was prominent during the last war. One of the main objects of this party is said to be to support Qawam-es-Sultaneh.

10. Another well-known historical party-name, "Taraqqi" (Progress), is appropriated by a group of friends headed by Hakim-ul-Mulk and Zarin Fafsh, who meet once a week and discuss political problems.

11. A secret organisation named the "Kâr" (Work) party, headed by Lissan Sipih and organised on the lines of the Freemasons, also exists. Its programme includes free housing schemes for the poor, foreign advisers and longer hours of work.

12. Certain parties in the provinces have been started, such as a group of Azerbaijan Deputies, and an organisation known as "Mohammadi" in Tabriz. A group of "Mullahs" is said to be forming an "Islam" party, but not much progress has been made hitherto.

13. "Hizb-i-U" or "Hisb-i-Shah" (His party, or the Shah's party) was started soon after the present Shah's accession with a vague policy of loyalty to the Shah as saviour of the country. It was probably an attempt by the Shah's entourage and the military to retain the influence they held under the old régime. Both General Nakhjavan and General Radsar may have been mixed up in it, but popular opposition caused the party to cease outward activity and recently very little has been heard of it.

[E 4404/163/34]

No. 9.

Tabriz Diary No. 1, of 1942.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 24.)

I ARRIVED back in Tabriz on the 25th April and re-established the consulate-general on the 27th April, 1942. This diary covers the months of May and June. In future it will be written up fortnightly. I apologise for the length of this number.

2. *Azerbaijan revisited.*—I had left Tabriz in 1937. The intervening years have brought no great changes to the outward appearance of this province or of its inhabitants, but they have given reality to that nightmare of all politically-minded Persians: the Russians are here. I had heard so much before leaving London, at various points on the way, and at Tehran, of Russian intransigence, of their machinations and unscrupulous methods, that I approached my consular district warily, ready for trouble at the first post. I met with none. If anyone wishes to learn from my two months' experience in Russian-occupied Azerbaijan let him register that the Russians, certainly no angels, are equally certainly no ogres.

3. *Weather.*—In the early spring of every year millions of tons of water rush away to waste in Azerbaijan, much of it through narrow defiles where it

could be conserved with relatively little effort. Every late spring and early summer bring hot, dusty winds and a period of anxiety for the peasants. If there is rain at frequent and regular intervals, all is well. If one or more of these necessary rains fail the crops may be parched beyond recovery. This year all is well with the crops. The thunderstorms of May and June were regular and frequent over the whole area and the harvest ought to be good. In Western Azerbaijan in particular, the peasants are now beginning to cut their best crops in twenty years. It is thought that the Kurds will not interfere before the grain has been threshed, at least, but there is some anxiety as to what may happen when the granaries are full.

4. *Agriculture*.—The Finance Department is preparing for me and for my Soviet colleague a statement which will, I hope, show how this year's sowings compare with last year's, the estimated yield, and the stocks of grain, &c. remaining over from last year.

5. *Food Supplies*.—Legation circulars exhorting consular officers to ensure proper distribution of food supplies make somewhat academic reading at this post, particularly as regards bread supplies. There is no shortage of food in Azerbaijan so far. The quality, too, is good, generally speaking, although for a period in June there was complaint that the cheapest type of bread had been adulterated. Prices, however, are high for poor people, as the following figures show:—

Commodity.	June 1938	June 1941	June 1942
	Rials.	Rials.	Rials.
Wheat, per kilo	0.59	1.65	1.10
Bread	0.96	1.50	1.10
Rice	3.00	3.30	6.00
Sugar, moist	4.00	5.95	7.50
Sugar, loaf	4.30	7.00	8.50
Mutton	2.60	5.20	6.00
Ghee	10.80	16.00	36.00
Tea	44.00	70.00	120.00
Kerosine	1.35	1.65	2.65
Firewood	0.21	0.30	0.30
Charcoal	0.50	0.80	1.20
Milk	0.83	1.25	1.60
Potatoes	...	1.00	1.60
Fowls, each	4.00	10.00	14.00
Eggs, each	0.10	0.175	0.30

Prices have, of course, been rising for years, but the rate of increase has quickened sharply since the occupation and the occupying powers are blamed accordingly. The most spectacular recent increase was in the price of ghee, which rocketed during the first half of June to a record figure of 160 rials a batman. The highest figure last year was 80 rials. The popular explanation is that the Russians are buying large quantities.

It may well be that Azerbaijan will not remain until the end of the war in this relatively happy food situation. Our allies to the north may become hungry if, as seems likely, there will be smaller than normal crops in the Caucasus. They are already buying more livestock than before the war. The Governor alleges that they are paying such attractive prices for horses, donkeys, cattle and sheep that the short-sighted peasant is over-selling, to his own future disadvantage, but anything the Governor says about the Russians is suspect. Again, there is a serious leakage of grain, through Kurdish channels, into Iraq, where the price of wheat is much higher than here. There seems also to be a certain exportation to the eastern provinces of Turkey.

The Governor assures me that all necessary steps have been taken to ensure that the peasants will not conceal their grain.

6. *Transport*.—The Governor assures me that due attention is being given to the use of animals where motor-transport was formerly used. I propose presently to enquire more closely into the steps actually taken.

The war has not, of course, deprived Azerbaijan to the use of the tugs and barges on Lake Urumieh or of the Tabriz-Julfa railway. It is possible to bring supplies from Western Azerbaijan to Tabriz without using any motor-transport.

There seems to be a certain reluctance to go back to animal transport for bulk or long-distance movement of commodities. Having just risen above that stage it probably seems like real retrogression, and not merely an emergency

arrangement, to have camels and pack-horses on the main roads again. Anyhow, it is so much easier to appeal to munificent America, or kind Great Britain, for lorries. Seeing so many pass through to Russia, Persians probably think that a few hundreds for Persia will eventually be forthcoming.

7. *Local Government*.—The Persian Government is short of trained civil servants and those it does possess do not want to serve in Azerbaijan. Persian speech, Persian manners and the bright lights of Tehran are what everybody aspires to now; that is one of Reza Shah's minor achievements. Azerbaijan has lost pride in itself, considers Turkey the mark of vulgarity, feels itself to be outlandish and crude. The officials from the south agree most heartily. They find Tabriz and Rezaieh nothing more than dull villages. Their main idea is to make money and get back to Tehran, or anyhow, down south, where there are no Russians, where they really feel at home.

The post of Governor-General at Rezaieh had been too long vacant before the Persian Government was able to persuade Dr. Marzaban at the beginning of May to set out for Western Azerbaijan. He left his family behind, as indeed all of these officials do, and arrived full of fright. Unhappy and lonely, distrusting even his own servants, without competent assistants, he cuts rather a pathetic figure, but he is doing well in very difficult circumstances.

Mr. Halil Fahimy, the Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan, left Tabriz on the 27th May for Tehran and was still absent at the end of June. This was a great pity, because he fills the post very well, whereas the Governor, who is acting for him in his absence, would be a poor substitute even if he did not smoke opium. It is realised that Mr. Fahimy had important business to discuss in Tehran, notably the Kurdish problem, but people have been seeking other explanations for his prolonged absence. At one moment the rumour ran that he was to become Minister of the Interior, and a number of prominent citizens at once sent a telegram urging that Eastern Azerbaijan be not deprived of his services. Another explanation is that he needs better medical attention than he can get in Tabriz these days.

I have reported at length to His Majesty's Legation on the Governor, Mr. Muvassaghi. He is ambitious, but stupid, and gives signs of being pro-German. At my first meeting with him he suggested that, if I would deal with him, he could give me better information than the Governor-General could supply. Now that he temporarily occupies the Governor-General's position he has sought to distinguish himself in various ways, notably by clumsy attempts to get me and my American and Soviet colleagues to comment on each other. Unfortunately for Mr. Muvassaghi, we have compared notes. Then when the American technicians here got drunk one June night and created an uproar, he thought he had a chance to take a firm line with these foreign troops. Unfortunately for him he thought they were British, and was in too great a hurry to stop to verify his facts. He telephoned this office and tried to bully the munshi, demanding that steps be taken to prevent a recurrence of such behaviour by British troops. I gave him ample opportunity to pull gracefully out of his blunder, but there is no grace in him, and five days after the incident I had to write him a firm letter. Faced with firmness he gave me satisfaction at once and has since made very friendly approaches. But he is no friend of the Allies at heart. My Soviet colleague had reached this decision before I had, and both of us would be glad to see him removed.

In the first months of fright and disorganisation following the occupation, Persian officials were glad to visit the British and other non-Russian Consulates in search of reassurance and comfort. They are still polite and obliging, but my impression is that they are becoming rather more stand-offish again. It may be that with time their fears of the Russians have diminished, but it is also possible that they are returning gradually to Reza Shah's policy of aloofness. I know that Mr. Mahvi, sent from Tehran to administer funds for the relief of the pillaged villagers at Rezaieh, wanted to come and see me, but was prevented by Mr. Muvassaghi, the Governor.

8. *Consular Colleagues*.—The Consular Corps does not function as such, but, if it did, the Turkish Consul-General would be doyen. He has two vice-consuls, one of whom is a special service man. The other is being transferred to Tehran, and it is said that a consul from the Foreign Office at Angora will take his place.

With such a staff, the consul-general has little to do. He spends many hours a day listening to the wireless, and is soaked with German propaganda. In one of his more excited moments he offered to give me a written guarantee, and to back it with any sum, that the Germans would reach Tabriz this summer, and

that Azerbaijan would suffer even worse vicissitudes than during the last war. Always nervous and much addicted to medicaments and injections, he spent the latter half of June in transports of excitement over German progress in Russia and in Libya, but the end of the month found him prostrate in great pain from an apparently inoperable abscess in the rectum.

The Soviet Consul-General is in the ranks of progressive Russian officials. His countenance does occasionally become heavy, but he is generally responsive, and I think has become increasingly so since the treaty was signed. I consider myself fortunate in having such a colleague.

The American Consul arrived in Tabriz a few days ahead of me. We have much in common. He travelled part of the way by air, possesses two suits until his heavy baggage arrives, occupies a partly-furnished house in lonely discomfort and has a quite inadequate staff. He talks Russian well.

Since the death of the Iraqi Consul at the time of the Russian entry into Tabriz the Iraqi Government has kept here a timid and very junior vice-consul. He would dearly like to get away, but apparently no consul can be persuaded to come here. He is well disposed and gave a very good feast on the birthday of his King.

At Rezaieh the Russians had only a very green vice-consul until after the Kurdish trouble, when they sent a senior vice-consul from Tabriz, Mr. Maximoff, with the rank of consul. Mr. Maximoff is a good man, with a sense of humour, but he has to contend with some troublesome Caucasian political officers, who are attached to the consulate and who tend to make him less forthcoming than he otherwise might be.

The only other consular representative at Rezaieh is the Turkish. Normally the post is held by a consul, a sick man still absent despite reports recently that he was being sent back. The post is therefore in the charge of an ardent and excitable man who is referred to here as a vice-consul, although I note that the ambassador calls him a chancellor. He makes no secret of his distrust of the Russians, and his favourite remark is "Moi, je suis le seul témoin de leurs crimes!" He is given to exaggeration and indiscretion in speech. He lives with a machine gun and a whole series of other firearms in his bedroom.

The Russians have a vice-consul at Maku, but I have not met him.

9. *Public Health*.—Nothing unusual to report. Drugs are supposed to be very scarce, but the American doctor tells me that good stocks do exist, but that they are deliberately being held back in order to secure higher and still higher prices.

10. *Public Order*.—My munshi reports that, following the Kurdish trouble in Rezaieh, people were sighing for the good days of Reza Shah and wishing he might return and re-establish his wonderful order and security. I deal with the Kurdish rising elsewhere.

No European has suffered violence since Mrs. Burdett, the wife of an American journalist and a journalist herself, was killed on the Mehabad road on the 24th April.

There has been in Tabriz itself a series of brawls between Moslems and Armenians. There have been several cases of wounding with knives, but no deaths recently. The police are reported to be singularly apathetic; when trouble of any kind starts they prefer to stand aside and let the Russian patrols deal with it.

Within the last month the Russians have strengthened these street patrols, some of whom carry tommy-guns. There is no doubt that, but for their presence, the hostility which has again become acute between Moslems and Armenians would find expression in many serious incidents.

Apart from some fighting between gendarmes, aided by armed civilians, and some off-shoots of the Shahsevans in the Hashtarud area, public order has been generally well maintained in Eastern Azerbaijan.

11. *Morale*.—The morale of the local population is thoroughly bad. On my way from Tehran to Tabriz the only non-Russian lorries which I met were carrying household effects to Tehran. Fear prevails everywhere. Those who can afford to do so have left this zone, or have at least sent their wives and children away. This fear complex has possibilities of violent reaction, from the Moslems particularly, many of whom now possess firearms.

Russian morale here may not be quite as good as it was. Twice during June circumstantial reports were spread of the arrest of German spies. Actually, the arrests were first of two, then of three, Russian deserters. Many of the troops are from the Caucasus and speak the local language. It is therefore easy for them to disappear among the local population.

A Persian who has business dealings with the Russian departments here tells me that many of the officials seem to be ill or depressed because their homes are in territory under German occupation.

It is reported that Russian troops have been seen collecting cigarette-ends off the streets, that others have begged for money, cigarettes and bread from the local population.

The general behaviour of the troops remains admirable. In my opinion, however, the Russians I meet were almost over-excited by the news of our thousand-bomber raids, by the Anglo-Soviet treaty, and I could wish that they did not cherish such high expectations of the early opening of a second front. There must be a reaction if it is not opened before long.

12. *Propaganda*.—British propaganda material is now arriving in good quantity. It takes so long on the way that occasionally it is no longer interesting, or effective, but on the whole the quality is good. The pictures and posters are popular.

Mr. Cook expressed the view that the propaganda methods applied in Persia generally require some modification in the Russian zone, and I entirely agree. Full and frank co-operation with the Russians must be our guiding principle. I have therefore started a routine whereby copies of all our material are sent to the Soviet Consul-General as soon as it arrives. He is pleased by the loyalty towards his country which our material shows; the picture of Stalin, in particular, was most successful. After some discussions M. Koulagenkov has offered to help with the distribution and exhibition of our pictures and posters, not only in Tabriz, but in other towns. He has started a news-sheet in Persian and Russian, will submit daily to us for approval any item of British news received, and will publish such items for us as we may wish to supply. He will also secure, on occasions, the use of the shop-window where Russian books and papers are shown.

Russian propaganda is limited to posters, to the recently started news-sheet and to the sale by a friendly Armenian of some Russian books. Their effort is small compared with ours.

Axis propaganda, apart from wireless broadcasts, which I need not describe, consists in rumour-mongering by friendly-to-the-Axis Persians, by the chalking up of swastika signs, by the posting of notices unfriendly to the Allies and by devices whereby pieces of paper can be folded to represent the swastika. One I saw was said to have come from Tehran. It bore phrases such as "Come, dear Adolph," in Persian. But these things are trifling compared with the propaganda value of German military successes. Although the Persian broadcast from Berlin is jammed people here receive and understand the German broadcasts in Turkish.

13. *Trade*.—Azerbaijan had come to depend for her prosperity on the German market, and the closing of that market has meant heavy loss. Tabriz, the Tabrizis say, is at the blind end of a *cul-de-sac* so far as trade is concerned.

The following notes are based on information supplied by the manager here of the Imperial Bank of Iran:—

All bazaars have been quiet except for a period of some ten days at the beginning of June, when there were active dealings, especially in imported goods. All commodities registered a rise of up to 30 per cent., but there have been reactions since then, and in the last week of June there was a general fall in values of about 10 per cent.

Dealings in carpets have been greatly impeded by the recent law requiring exporters to guarantee the import of foreign goods to the value of their exports. The export and import trades are handled by quite different sets of merchants; a carpet exporter knows nothing of the import trade and cannot guarantee the import of goods unless he is able, and permitted, to have an arrangement whereby an importer will take over the obligation to import.

There is no market now except Russia for the dried fruits, wool, cotton and skins which formerly went to Germany. The Russians are taking advantage of their buying monopoly to fix prices as low as possible, and exporters say the Russian prices yield little profit and sometimes involve loss. They do not therefore want to supply Russia.

The only imports during recent months have come from Russia, consisting mainly of sugar, earthenware, medicinal and piece goods.

14. *Consular Visits and Tours*.—It is now an established routine for consular officers in Tabriz, the Iraqi excepted, to see each other every few days. These exchanges are sometimes useful, but quite frequently they are a waste of time. And the way in which men like the Turkish Consul-General discuss world politics would be entirely ludicrous if it were not at times so dangerous.

The Soviet Consul-General visited Rezaieh during the Kurdish disorders there in May. He has recently made short tours to points nearer Tabriz, where Russian posts are established to deal with points arising between the military and the Persian civil authorities.

I have made only one sortie from Tabriz so far, namely, to Rezaieh, from the 15th until the 20th May, ostensibly to call on the new Governor-General, but in reality to find out what was behind the commotion over there. I stayed with the French Mission, where I was fed with good food, good wine of the country and stories of massacre and doom. In the course of my visit I exchanged calls with the various authorities, received visits from Moslems, Armenians and Assyrians, and heard their tales of persecution and fear, visited some of the pillaged villages and generally tried to show myself at places where there was supposed to be danger from the Kurds, a danger which I knew to be almost non-existent.

When I got to Rezaieh I found the Persians and Russians at a deadlock. Each was waiting for the other to make the first move for the establishment of mixed military and gendarme posts, and neither was doing anything effective towards getting the peasants back to their villages. I was able to bring them together and to make a beginning.

In other ways I felt less satisfaction over the results of my visit. I did my best to steer a middle course between Russians and Persians, but inevitably my actions had some semblance of investigating what the Russians were doing, what games they were playing with the Kurds. Although the Russian commandant put on a concert in the town theatre at seven hours' notice, and although the consul was very cordial and helpful, I had less success with the political officers, who kept a close watch on my movements.

I have a somewhat indefinite promise of a vice-consul later on. If it is kept I propose, subject to approval, to go to Baku in company with the Soviet Consul-General in August, and I would like to go to Angora, too, just to see the conditions on both sides of the frontier, in so far as they have a bearing on smuggling and possible movement of goods from Persia to Germany through Turkey. I am not satisfied that the Russians are sufficiently alert in this matter.

15. The following notes are based on local observation only. I see no print and have no means of following the trend of relations, in the wide sense of the term, between the countries represented in Azerbaijan:—

Russo-Persian Relations.—The main points of difficulty during the past two months have arisen from—

- (a) The Kurdish question.
- (b) Persian desire to increase their local military strength.
- (c) Alleged Soviet attempts at political penetration.
- (d) Commercial matters.

(a) It will be recalled that at the end of April four smallish Kurdish tribes inhabiting the frontier district west of Rezaieh descended on the Shiah villages, routed the Persian gendarmes, advanced on Rezaieh itself and for weeks held control of the surrounding region. They did not touch the Kara-Sunni or the Christian villages. They generally began by demanding the surrender of the weapons alleged to have been given to the Shiahs by the Government or obtained when the Persian army was dissolved; they always ended by pillaging.

The Persians made the most of the revolt in order to gain as much sympathy as possible against the Russians and in order to strengthen their case for being allowed to send more troops to Azerbaijan. They accused the Russians of having instigated the revolt and of having supplied the Kurds with arms and ammunition. They accused the Kurds of atrocities which were never committed. Various suggestions that the Kurds, the Christians and the Russians were in league against the Shiah Moslems served the purposes of Persian solidarity, but may have sown seeds of serious trouble for the now relatively small Christian minorities later on.

It seems quite clear that the Russians have reasons of their own for favouring the Kurds. The Shahsevans in Eastern Azerbaijan are quite as unruly as the Kurds, but they have not been permitted to revert to the old practice of pillage in the springtime. I think it is probably true that it is the Turkish frontier which makes the difference in the Russian attitude in Western Azerbaijan. I do not think that the Russians are playing any political game with the Kurds, who are too divided, while the Christians are too few, to form

the foundation on which a separate State could be engineered. My belief is that the Russians are now fully preoccupied with military, short-term considerations, and that they fear a stab in the back from Turkey and Persia. They must, after all, remember what happened to Poland. For that reason they fear to allow the Persians to build up a large military strength and they want the Kurds to be strong so long as there is, in their view, any chance that the Turks may join the Axis, relying on them to put up some sort of fight against the Turks in defence of their own territory. Thus, when they saw that the Persian Government had bought over the more important Kurdish tribes, and was planning to crush the others with armed civilians helping the gendarmes, they did not like the look of things at all. They probably felt they could not afford to count for nothing among the Kurds. At the least, they were guilty of standing aside and doing nothing to help the Persians; they may have given the Kurds help and encouragement, but I am quite sure they did not at any time intend matters to go as far as they did. The panic which swept through the villages was largely created by the Persians themselves.

Whatever their relations with the Kurds, the Russians to-day stand condemned in the minds of the Shiah peasantry and indeed of the bulk of the population of Azerbaijan of being responsible for the Kurdish rising and all the loss it has entailed for the very peasants who had expected the Russians to be their champions. I think we can put at rest for the duration of the war at least our fears about Russian political penetration here and I repeat what I wished to convey in one of my telegrams to the Foreign Office—that we shall be foolish if we allow the Turks, or the Persians either for that matter, to keep on playing that much-thumbed card.

(b) The Russians do not seem to mind the presence of Persian troops at Ardabil, but they do dislike having them at Tabriz or Rezaieh. The Persians complain that the force which recently went to Rezaieh is so hedged about as to be more or less powerless. A Persian general is shortly coming to Tabriz and no doubt Persian troops will shortly be stationed here.

From Ardabil and Rezaieh it is reported that the Russians keep a close check on the type and numbers of weapons held by the troops and gendarmes.

The Soviet Consul-General has expressed concern about the reported arming of more bands of villagers in various parts of Azerbaijan.

(c) The Persians allege that the Russians have sought to undermine the authority of their Government by encouraging the formation of political clubs and by enrolling candidates for Russian citizenship. They have made much of a remark attributed to the young Russian Vice-Consul at Rezaieh, who, when a deputation of leading Moslems approached him at the time of the Kurdish attack, is quoted as asking: "And where have you been these eight months?" Thus, the Persians say, do the Russians bring pressure on local people to put their names on the consulate books.

The fact is that the political clubs which sprang up after the occupation are as good as dead to-day, and that the Russians have refused them financial support. I have no doubt that the Russians would have been quite pleased to see these clubs grow strong, but they do not appear to have taken any great trouble to keep them alive. As regards enrolment of candidates for citizenship, I still keep an open mind. It is at least possible that the initiative has come from persons anxious to curry favour and that ignorant persons have given inaccurate accounts of what takes place as regards enrolment.

More important still is the fact that patriotism, as usual, is thriving under adversity. I have been impressed by the increased sense of solidarity among the Moslems, not merely religious solidarity, but rather political. The threat of becoming detached by Russia has quickened the desire for Persian unity which Reza Shah sought to foster. It is a threat which has been exaggerated, and which the Persians would have been wise to invent even if the Russians had not given them some justification. The Kurdish disorders were similarly exaggerated to exploit national, and if possible foreign, feeling against the Russians and the Kurds. It is a matter of great interest that when a Deputy, Tabatabay, said that the trouble at Rezaieh had been greatly exaggerated, the Chamber showed every sign of wrath, to the extent, I believe, of violence; but from the meagre reports at my disposal he was nearer the truth than any other speaker in the Chamber.

The Persian Government has many difficulties, but apart from the Kurds there is more loyalty to it in Azerbaijan to-day than when Reza Shah was in power, and the Persianisation which he sought to impose is progressing faster to-day with the Russians here than he was able to make it. The people want it now; they didn't then.

(d) The Chief of the Customs here has told me that he reproached M. Agronoff with making enormous profit from the resale of the sugar supplied by the British, and that the Soviet trade delegate replied simply to the effect that there was a war on and that Russia needs rials.

One constant Persian complaint is that the Russian frontier is virtually open since the Russians do not allow the Persian customs officials to control exports and imports properly.

Russo-Turkish Relations.—I have His Majesty's Minister's instructions to do everything possible to improve relations between the Russians and the Turks here. I accordingly see my Turkish colleague frequently, too frequently for my liking in view of his propensity for distorted and sensational reporting.

The Turks I have met in Azerbaijan fear and obstinately distrust the Russians. I hold out little hope of being able to convert them and, indeed, I have to confess that a good deal of my effort has to go in resisting the Turk's attempt to persuade me that his view of the Russians is held by many British officials.

For their part the Russians know that the Turkish Consul-General makes no secret of his conviction that the Germans are bound to break through, and they suspect that he has even talked with the local authorities about the situation which might arise if the Russians did have to leave. I have done my best to persuade my Russian colleague that M. Ramazanoglou's anxieties are exaggerated by the abnormal state of his health, that they are primarily for the safety of his own country, that he is not pro-German; but it is at such talk that M. Koulagenkov's face goes wooden.

All the courtesies are, of course, observed. When the Turkish Vice-Consul fell sick at Rezaieh the Russians sent a military doctor to see him, there being no qualified local doctor available, and the Turks were very grateful.

Anglo-Russian Relations.—A set of negative ideas such as I possessed about the Russians when I came here (see paragraph 2) was poor equipment for anyone hoping to develop cordial and fruitful relations. Something positive was most desirable. Admiration for the performance of the Russian army, for the discipline and behaviour of the troops here offered an obvious and easy beginning. One's inward confidence of being able to make some progress increased with the realisation that there is a distinction to be made here between pure Russians such as General Melnik and M. Koulagenkov, and Caucasians, who are more Communist than the real Russians and who must take a good deal of the blame for the less reassuring aspects of Russian policy here. I am glad to say that the political agents seem to be losing power, and that the general and the consul-general seem freer now to take decisions of their own. Then as regards Russian methods, e.g., the resale of our sugar, they are certainly not Bank of England; but then the Russians have a sharper awareness than we British of the sternness of the times and their needs are keener; and there is merit in a realism which knows what is necessary and goes straight after it. And so in the end I came to examine critically the ideas with which I was originally furnished and found no difficulty in discarding or modifying them.

At the end of May, however, certain incidents which need not be described again seemed to block the way towards better understanding with the Russians. They were the typical fruit of that negative outlook which I have found it necessary to discard and which must damn the chances of success with the Russians for anyone who holds it. The question was how to get clear of the morass of mutual suspicion and lack of frankness with which so many British and Russians, the soldiers particularly, regarded each other. I was completely at a loss how to proceed until, after a blank week or two, the signature of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was announced. I at once exchanged congratulations with my Soviet colleague and sought an interview with the general. I saw him next day and he instantly accepted my suggestion that, as a gesture of friendliness, he should invite the General Officer Commanding, Tenth Army, to Tabriz. General Quinan came here on the 24th June and left on the 27th June. I am leaving it entirely to him to report on his visit, but I can say that it has been helpful for me and, I trust, will prove to have been useful both for the Tenth Army and for the Royal Air Force Command in Iraq.

R. W. URQUHART.

Tabriz, July 6, 1942.

[E 4445/14/34]

No. 10.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 946.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 26, 1942.

SHAH, whom I saw to-day for the first time since my return, was gloomy about Persian statesmen and officials. He says, if he invites statesmen of good reputation to assist, they all refuse, whence he induces [*sic*: ? deduces] that they have acquired good reputation by doing nothing. Dishonest officials seem to depress him. I took the opportunity to say that, unless the Government and officials took strong measures against big landowners and merchants who hold up wheat, not only might there be serious discontent now, but it might lead to justified revolt later. Shah agreed.

2. There has been criticism lately that the Shah tries to run the army through the Chief of Staff behind the back of the Minister of War, and that he deals direct from the chief of police. The Shah was presumably referring to this when he said that if he only gave an order the people shouted "dictatorship."

In effect, the Shah probably does try to exercise influence which is not strictly constitutional, but, in view of the gravity of the situation, the quality of Ministers and Deputies and inexperience of the people, we should not be justified in advising him against this at present. I am, however, watching the tendency closely.

3. The Shah professed to be undisturbed about Egypt, but anxious about the situation in Russia. It was doubtless with the latter in mind that he said, as I left, that it might be necessary for us to have even closer relations.

[E 4485/14/34]

No. 11.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 955.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 28, 1942.

THE Cabinet is very shaky. Owing to the incompetence and corruption of local officials the bread situation is bad in many districts, and there have been bread riots at Burujird and Malayir, and I know no one who now expects that Soheily, who is himself considered both corrupt and afraid to act, can reform his Cabinet in such a way as to be able to deal with this crisis. The Shah sounded Pirnia (Personalities 156) about forming Cabinet, but he refused. The general opinion seems to be that Qawam-es-Sultaneh is the only man on the spot who could hope to make some headway against the difficulties which beset the Persian Government. The Russian Ambassador would like me to join him in putting Qawam into power, but I have told him that, apart from the fact that my latest instructions are to put up with Soheily for the present, our policy is to accept any Government which the Persians set up, provided that it will work energetically with the Allies. I added that if Qawam was put forward as Prime Minister at this juncture I should certainly not feel justified in objecting.

2. The Russian Ambassador saw Soheily to-day and, I gathered, complained of the Government's failure to deal with the food and transport problems and the Fifth Column (the ambassador declares that the commandant of the Persian troops in Rezaieh gave a party to celebrate the fall of Rostov). Soheily said that he must either resign or remodel his Cabinet by 2nd August. He mentioned several possible candidates for places in his Cabinet, but only one likely to be at all popular and to reinforce the Cabinet is Tadayyun, about whom the ambassador still seems doubtful. The food situation and the German advance in Russia have created problems which I fear are beyond Soheily's powers, and the Russian Ambassador and I have both come to the conclusion that his weakness and inactivity constitute a serious danger for the Allies.

I am to see the Prime Minister to-morrow, and I shall tell him that I have reported to you about his Government in most pessimistic terms.

[E 4485/14/34]

No. 12.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 1070.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1942.

YOUR telegram 955 [of 28th July: Political situation].

I agree that we should accept any Government which the Persians set up, provided that it will co-operate energetically with the Allies. We can accept Qawam [es-Sultaneh] as Prime Minister, though we need make no effort to put him into power.

2. You are no doubt keeping in close touch with your United States colleague in regard to these developments.

[E 4499/14/34]

No. 13.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 962.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 29, 1942.

MY telegram No. 955.

The Shah sent message this morning that he was thinking of sending for Qawam-es-Sultaneh. I replied that we had no objection to him as Prime Minister.

2. News going round was that neither Qawam-es-Sultaneh nor any other man of consequence would accept office at this difficult moment, but Qawam told the Oriental Secretary to-day that, however unattractive the prospect, he would accept the premiership if it was offered to him. He said that Persia's interests were bound up with those of Great Britain, and that he hoped he could count on our support. Oriental Secretary replied that he could. Qawam already knows that Soviet Embassy are in his favour, though he declares that he has no particular relations with them. United States Minister thinks Soheily is finished, and Qawam as good alternative as any.

3. Qawam indicated that he would consult the Allies about the members of the Cabinet. This I consider essential at this moment. I had an interview with Soheily this morning, and informed him that I had been obliged to inform His Majesty's Government that His Majesty's Legation were greatly disappointed by the failure of the Government to deal with the wheat situation. The Prime Minister blamed Tudez party (see my despatch No. 248, 28th July) for wheat riots, but this is absurd. It is far from the interests of Soviet Embassy to encourage riots at this juncture. The Prime Minister seemed undecided about everything, and I felt that the urgent current affairs which I had to discuss would not receive serious attention.

[E 4519/14/34]

No. 14.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 965.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 30, 1942.

MY telegram No. 962.

Soheily informed Parliament 30th July that his colleagues had placed their resignations in his hands. Pending formation of new Cabinet, he was carrying on administration. He gave as reasons lack of sympathy by Parliament and press to Government measures dealing with current problems which he recounted at length.

[E 4550/14/34]

No. 15.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 966.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 31, 1942.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Prime Minister's statement to Majlis to-day reviewed achievement of Government in its four months of office in restoring order, increasing sowing, balancing budget and settling question of foreign exchange satisfactorily by

agreement with His Majesty's Government. Statement continues as follows: Policy of encouraging exports of food-stuffs followed recent years has been reversed and Government, with approval of Majlis, has taken steps to forbid export and facilitate food-stuffs. Our Allies have co-operated with us in commercial matters, but naturally fulfilment of Government's plans depends on further assistance which we expect. Most important of all, good understanding between Persia and her neighbours which was created by Three-Power Treaty has been confirmed during this period and relations between us have been strengthened so that we can say that there is no cause for anxiety left in this direction. Our relations with America have fortunately become relations of close co-operation and assistance of American Government has been obtained for engagement of civil and military advisers.

My Government has tried to keep Majlis and press informed what doing and has tried consult Deputies and press representatives; unfortunately, it has received no corresponding confidence from Majlis and press and its attempt to behave constitutionally has been misinterpreted as weakness.

Indeed, volume of press criticism of Government became such as to affect adversely working of whole administration.

I and my colleagues would have liked stand up this criticism and continue serve our country but become clear our patience and forbearance is causing decline in state of public order and we have decided that in interests of country I must inform Majlis that Government decided resign since impossible carry on in present circumstances. Need is national unity without which no Government can carry on. Majlis and press must see it is created.

2. Please pass urgently to Ministry of Information.

[E 4549/14/34]

No. 16.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 970.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 31, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1070.

I conveyed this assurance to the Shah yesterday. My Soviet and American colleagues had authorised me to convey similar assurance on their behalf and I did so. Shah seemed relieved. He expressed approval of my suggestion that it would be well that a new Prime Minister should not simply bring in a crowd of personal supporters but choose each Minister carefully for integrity and energy.

2. Pirnia refused again and choice seems to be between Qawam-es-Sultaneh and a remodelled Cabinet under Soheily. Informed opinion is that Soheily would only be appealed to if Qawam refused or failed to form Government. I think the Shah regrets Soheily's want of success as Prime Minister, but I said nothing to encourage the belief that we should like Soheily to continue, for he has done badly lately and even if he still has support in Majlis he is discredited outside.

3. The Shah promised to do what he could to expedite the solution of the crisis, but Deputies are not meeting until 8 A.M., 1st August, when they will presumably select the name for presentation to the Shah.

[E 4564/14/34]

No. 17.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 2)

(No. 973.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 2, 1942.

MY telegram No. 970, 31st July.

Qawam having received necessary majority in Parliament has been summoned by the Shah. We are doing all we can to ensure that he chooses good colleagues.

[E 4610/14/34]

No. 18.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 980.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 5, 1942.

MY telegram No. 973.

The new Prime Minister seems to be having some difficulty in forming Cabinet which, it is believed, may not be presented to Parliament for several days. Several members of the late Cabinet are likely to be retained, viz., Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Communications and Minister of Agriculture, all of whom are satisfactory. It is rumoured that Persian Minister in London is being offered a portfolio.

[E 4611/122/34]

No. 19.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 981.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 5, 1942.

MY telegram No. 968.

In my first interview with the Prime Minister this morning, I spoke about the threat to Persian as well as Allied interests which the intrigues of certain Persians against us constitute. I told him I would furnish very shortly list of some thirty or forty persons, mostly Persians, inculpated by the examination of the Germans and Persians in our hands, and that I must ask for them to be arrested without delay and, as far as possible, simultaneously. He promised to do this and to give general instructions to the chief of police at once without waiting for the list.

2. I then said that I had the strictest instructions from you that such people should then be handed over to us for interrogation and internment. The Prime Minister said he could not be expected to accede to such a request at the beginning of his administration, and that he would be unable to justify such an action to the public. I said that nothing less than handing over to us would satisfy His Majesty's Government, and gave him some reasons why we could not count upon the Persian authorities to guard suspects properly, *e.g.*, that we ourselves had had to discover four Germans here and another German who had been operating wireless transmitter at Sarakhs on the Soviet border, that one of the Germans had admitted having been hidden for six months in the house of a policeman, and that the German whose evidence when secured by us has been most valuable revealed nothing when examined by the Persian police. The Prime Minister talked about joint examination of suspects, but I said that I had no authority even to discuss such a proposal and must repeat your request for them to be handed over to us. The Prime Minister gave no undertaking in that sense, but repeated his promise to have the persons on the list arrested as soon as I gave it to him.

3. The fact that we have prepared the list after the examination of known persons strengthens our case. I have even promised to give the Prime Minister copy of a signed statement made by one of the Germans as specimen, but have warned him that, as a rule, it will not be possible to produce our evidence for obvious reasons. List referred to in paragraph 1 will include several Persians who were on the list of eighteen. Subsidiary list will be presented as soon as possible, including the rest of the eighteen and probably some others.

4. Soviet Ambassador, who has hitherto been lukewarm about such matters, is more inclined to co-operate to secure arrests, if necessary. Change of attitude may be due to our discovery of a German at Sarakhs, which alarmed him, or perhaps to the military situation. On the other hand, he is inclined to hedge about handing over Persians to us, and even to suggest futile procedure of their trial by Persians by Persian law. As far as possible I shall enlist his help. Nothing is to be expected from my United States colleague, I fear.

5. In accordance with your instructions I shall continue to demand that all suspects arrested at our instance be handed over to us, but it should be easier to secure co-operation of the Prime Minister in this essential and urgent task if we could make some such concession as proposed in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 968. Point is given to Persian objection to Ahwaz by the death of a Persian named Nabbizada, who was arrested and sent there by the British authorities

(Persian Government protested against arrest of this man, who, they said, was employed by them for purchase of wheat). I consider that our military authorities are fully justified in arresting and detaining any person in their area whom they consider dangerous, but the death of this man whose age is given as 70 or over, soon after his despatch to Ahwaz, and our explanation that he died of old age, seems to create unnecessary complication for us.

6. If the Prime Minister declines or delays to hand over suspects to us we shall have to consider arresting suspects ourselves. I should be reluctant to have recourse to this method, not only because it would require large organisation which does not exist at present, but also because the co-operation of the Persian Government would lend greater force to the procedure, but, even if you agreed with this suggestion, I should not mention the possibility to the Prime Minister, at present, lest he should accept it as easier than delivering Persian subjects to us by the Persian authorities.

[E 4636/14/34]

No. 20.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 984.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 5, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1015.

I am confident Majlis constitutes serious danger. In case of immediate threat from north, Deputies might, *e.g.*, make nationalistic declaration and perhaps cancel their ratification of treaty.

Soviet Ambassador agrees generally and promised to ask his Government not to oppose dissolution if the Shah and new Prime Minister should desire it. Shah has recently spoken against Majlis and Prime Minister is not a man to accept its dictation. If either of them propose dissolution, I shall tell them on the strength of your above-mentioned telegram that His Majesty's Government have no objection.

[E 4619/3655/34]

No. 21.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 248.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 28, 1942.

IN his despatch No. 197 of the 21st June Mr. Holman gave a general review of the events of the past three months and of the situation in Persia. Subsequent events, I regret to say, have demonstrated only too clearly that the situation here cannot be separated altogether from the fortunes of war. The German successes in South Russia and in Libya have inevitably affected public opinion and encouraged a tendency to sit on the fence, which enemy propaganda has certainly increased.

2. Early in June it became apparent that an enemy propaganda drive was being conducted in Persia, and reports also came in of enemy agents passing through Turkey into Persia via Kurdistan. Our attention was drawn at the same time to a series of accidents, some serious, some slight, which were taking place at the ports and on the Trans-Iranian railway, some of which could only be attributed to sabotage. On the 20th June Mr. Holman made three requests to the Prime Minister: (a) That visas to enter and leave Persia should only be granted after reference to this legation—in practice to the representative of Cici; (b) that the proclamation making Axis propaganda illegal should be made more specific by laying down the precise penalties which infraction of it would entail; and (c) that eighteen persons suspected on good grounds of Axis activities should be handed over to us for interrogation and, in fact, detention.

3. The Prime Minister granted the first request without demur; and arrangements have also been made to control the issue of transit visas via Iraq. Nevertheless, the frontiers of Persia cannot possibly be closed to all unwanted travellers, and we must certainly expect that enemy agents will continue to travel with relatively little hindrance from Turkey through the disturbed areas of Kurdistan into the interior of Persia.

4. The second request also, regarding the proclamation on Axis activities and propaganda, was granted, though there may well be loopholes in the articles

of the penal and military codes now referred to as applying to infractions of the proclamation, by which a clever person could elude punishment. Although Axis propaganda continues and has undoubtedly increased, the means to combat it should now exist if only the Persian Government can be induced to take the necessary action against any offenders caught.

5. The third request, for eighteen suspects to be handed over for interrogation, has, as you are aware, been met by the Prime Minister with a request that interrogation should not take place at Ahwaz. The idea of being sent to Ahwaz in summer is, to a Persian, peculiarly horrible, but until recently 10th Army have felt unable to arrange for detention and interrogation elsewhere. It is now hoped to arrange a camp at Kermanshah for the purpose, but the Prime Minister is most unwilling to hand over any more Persians to us, and has, in fact, gone back on a promise he made to hand over eleven of the eighteen on the 25th July. His selection of the eleven was itself designed to obviate trouble for himself and to create it for us; the eleven were either persons of no importance, or else men connected with the army whose arrest would tend to arouse yet more anti-British feeling in that on the whole distinctly pro-Axis force.

6. A demand for the handing over of Persians in Persia to the British military authorities is a very far reaching one. But it is unfortunately all too clear that no other solution offers the smallest security that the detained persons will be properly isolated. Of the first six most notorious Axis sympathisers arrested last April, several were sent to Yezd to be kept under close surveillance, but were, in fact, left at liberty; and one, Vasiri, escaped and has been at large near Isfahan ever since in spite of frequent representations. In deference to our representations they were then sent to Kermanshah to be kept under joint guard; but this was also very unsatisfactory, and subsequently all were sent to Ahwaz for internment by the British military authorities. We shall be more likely to get further suspects handed over if such suspects are kept by us at Kermanshah or some other town where the climate is less hot.

7. There are undoubtedly many Persians who would be glad to see the Germans come and put an end to the presence of Russian and British troops on Persian soil. This feeling is to be attributed partly to the not unreasonable nationalism, partly to a widespread belief that the Allies are responsible for the present régime of short supplies of bread, sugar, piece-goods and other necessities coupled with very high prices. Our energetic propaganda is not without effect, but without an Allied victory now and then at some point nearer to Persia than Midway Island, to offset the traditional suspicion of Great Britain and Russia, it has a heavy task. We cannot at present hope to make the Allies popular, but we must try to make the espousal of the Axis cause dangerous, even at the risk of driving the movement underground. It is believed that as the Germans approach nearer to Persia, some of the more sensible of those who have hitherto sighed for their coming begin to have doubts; but it would be dangerous to regard this as a very important factor in our favour, though there are many Persians who do not wish their country to become a battlefield or to be turned into scorched earth.

8. The question which has undoubtedly worried Persian opinion most in the last two months is whether there will not shortly be another famine here as in the last war. Already in the winter 1940 and the following spring there was a wheat shortage which, although relieved by imports from India, left Persia with no reserves. Our entry into the country just when last year's harvest operations were in full swing led to the collapse of Government authority, especially in the main producing areas, and little effort was consequently made to collect the share of the wheat crop on which the Government usually relies for the feeding of the capital and principal towns. Stocks were pillaged and either eaten or secreted by peasants, while the rich clung to what they might require and speculated with what they did not. Those near the western frontier took advantage of the high prices in Iraq and Turkey to smuggle their ill-gotten gains and any other surplus grain they might have across the border. The Persian Government, urged to tackle seriously the problem of hoarded stocks by the simple method of raising prices, have obstinately refused to try this obvious expedient for fear of its effect on their future policy and on the economic life of the country as a whole. They have been content to let matters take their course, to blame the Russians for not letting the wheat surplus in Azerbaijan find its normal market in Tehran, and to rely on His Majesty's Government to make up the wheat deficit by imports from abroad. This we have done to the tune of over 70,000 tons or one-fifth of the whole of the Persian Government's requirements for the year.

9. These imports have now come to an end; the new harvest is being reaped, and henceforth the Persian Government must stand on their own feet. The prospect is not encouraging. The Government price for the new crop has indeed been raised to about £12 a ton, which is apparently the price current in India, but though in some districts, notably those in East Persia, the new prices are considered adequate, in others further concessions will be necessary if the farmers are to be induced willingly to surrender their surplus. These the Government are unwilling to grant as they consider the prices are fair and that they will be able to collect the proprietors' surplus, if necessary, by the use of force. After much delay the Government has secured from the Majlis wide powers to proceed against hoarding, which is the logical result of their attitude as regards price; but so far practically nothing has been done to exercise these powers except for a few local raids, notably in Khuzistan.

10. The consular liaison officer scheme which has been separately reported and which is now being put into execution as and when officers become available was devised to assist the Persian Government in their efforts; but difficulties in getting officers to operate the scheme before the crops have all been harvested must seriously prejudice the chances of its success. The next two months will show whether the moral influence which is all that we can at present exercise in this enormous and most difficult problem is sufficient to overcome to a sufficient degree the lethargy and corruption of Persian officialdom. The scales are certainly loaded heavily against us, but we are doing our best.

11. The general uncertainty and uneasiness of the general public concerning the food supply has been reflected in a series of anti-Government intrigues in the Majlis. At about the beginning of July the opposition of the Adalat party, headed by a Sheikh Ali Dashti, became prominent, and was said by the party to be based on two things: first, the vacillation of the Prime Minister, who had promised a number of Deputies certain favours which he never performed; and secondly, by the weakness of the Government resulting in its inability to solve the transport and the food-supply problem. One of the members of the Adalat party, Farajullah Bahrami, had been practically selected as Minister of the Interior, but on the 2nd July everyone was surprised to hear that Seyyid Mehdi Farrukh, Governor-General of Kerman, had been appointed to that Ministry. This appointment angered a number of Deputies, including some who were not members of the Adalat party, and also the Deputies from Kerman who had quarrelled with Farrukh. Meanwhile, rumours of a quarrel between Soheily and his Minister of Justice, Ahy, concerning the latter's departure as ambassador to the Soviet Union helped to spread the general feeling that the Cabinet was on its last legs. The number of candidates for the post of Prime Minister was considerable. A group of Deputies proposed Mustafa Quli Bayat (Saham us Sultan) as their candidate, but with little hope of success as Bayat has had little experience in Government Office and would not command general respect. Another group supported Ali Mansour, who was Prime Minister at the time of the occupation last August and is now Governor-General at Meshed. Tadayyun was also active, and went so far as to sound the Soviet Embassy as to their views on his candidature; according to his own story the answer was that he was too pro-British, but the Soviet Ambassador made no comment when I subsequently spoke to him about Tadayyun as a possible candidate for ministerial office. Qawam es Saltaneh (Ahmed Qawam) was perhaps the most serious candidate, and there is no doubt that he had a considerable following, moreover, the Russians appear to regard him as strong enough to ensure a stable Government. Bagher Kazemy is also on the prowl. In conversation with the Oriental Secretary on the 7th July he made a bitter personal attack on Soheily, accused him of neglecting to tackle the vital problems of the country, and advocated an immediate change of Government; one of his suggestions was that a Senate, on the lines laid down in the Constitution, should at last be formed, or that at any rate a number of eminent though aged elder statesmen, such as Mu'tamin ul Mulk, Hakim ul Mulk and Mustashar ed Douleh, should be taken into the Government as ministers without portfolio in order to give the Government that authority which is so lacking in the present Administration. Finally, there is Seyyid Zia ed Din Tabatabai, whom some Tehran politicians still regard as the one person who can save the country from its present ills; one suggestion being that Qawam es Saltaneh should form a Government to prepare the way for the Seyyid's drastic purge.

12. It was feared that when Seyyid Mehdi Farrukh was introduced to the Majlis as the new Minister of the Interior there might be an interpellation which would unseat Soheily. That, however, did not happen; the explanation being,

perhaps, that I was expected back in Tehran soon, and the word had gone out that nothing drastic should be done until the British Minister arrived. Since my arrival on the 13th July the Majlis crisis seems to have simmered down, for reasons which are not very clear. One reason may be that there are so many rival candidates and proposals. Soheily is no doubt playing one "party" in the Majlis against another; and he seems to be giving in to the general clamour against the unpopular Press Bill which would severely limit the freedom of the Tehran newspaper-writers. It may also be that the Majlis Deputies are themselves feeling a little insecure; talk of dissolution is in the air, and Dr. Malekzadeh, a senior Deputy, expressed to one of my staff his horror at the rumour which had reached him to the effect that Soheily had asked the Soviet Ambassador whether the latter thought the Majlis ought to be dissolved; Dr. Malekzadeh's point being not that the Majlis elections could not be reheld, but that it was wrong for a Prime Minister to discuss such a step with a foreign Power. The position, as I write, is that Soheily appears to be contemplating a reshuffle of Government posts, with the introduction of some new men. When Ahly goes to Moscow, Soheily may bring in Tadayyun in his place; though Ahly shows little sign of preparing himself for departure, a fact which may be the source of the rumour that he hopes himself to secure the premiership one of these days. Meanwhile, rumours of a military *coup* sponsored by a few prominent generals tend to increase the prevalent uneasiness.

13. By and large it may be said that Soheily has only survived because no obvious successor was available, and that being so, neither the Shah nor the Russian Embassy nor this legation wished to bring about a change. Meanwhile the Deputies have earned much popular disapproval by their obstruction and irresponsibility, and the Majlis might well have been dissolved had it not been for the rather unexpected opposition of the Russian Ambassador, who said the "moment was inopportune."

14. It is not easy to assess precisely what is the extent of Russian influence in Persia at present. The Shah told Mr. Holman early in July that he appreciated the way we made our influence felt, because we did not absolutely insist on certain appointments being made as some others did. Whether he was referring to the appointment of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was previously ambassador in Moscow, I do not know. But if this was so, both Persians and Russians were very discreet about the negotiations. Our own method, viz., not to ask for the appointment of particular officials, but to prevent the appointment of very bad officials and occasionally to demur at the removal of good ones, seems to be better than the method attributed to the Russians.

15. Generally speaking I doubt whether the Russians exert much influence over the affairs of the Central Government at present. They are alleged to support the Tuda party, but, in spite of some allegations to the contrary, they do not seem to carry on any serious internal political activity either in Tehran, or, for that matter, in the zone where Russian troops are stationed, though they do seem to show, or to have shown, some favour to the Kurds. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz has suggested, and I agree, that they seem to be following a somewhat hand-to-mouth policy and are solely interested in the war with Germany. Their economic activities are greatly hampered by a lack of rials, and they have allowed the British military authorities to make up the road from Tehran to Qazvin and on to Tabriz. They will only allow small quantities of the excess of cereals in North Persia to come south and east, where it is badly needed, and are also taking cattle and horses away into Russia, but as there is a most difficult food situation in South Russia that is hardly surprising. They have allowed Persian troops to return to Rezaieh, but they treat them with great suspicion—indeed, the Persians are like prisoners, and the conditions of the return to Tabriz are, I believe, not yet settled. Nevertheless, the situation is certainly a little easier.

16. Relations between ourselves and the Russians have gone through a most difficult stage, owing to the dispute regarding the use of the four aerodromes in the Tehran area. At Qaleh Murghi aerodrome we had built a cement runway and installed D/F facilities, but the Russians claimed its exclusive use for the reception of American bombers. The dispute ended in an agreement signed between the R.A.F. and the Soviet Transportation Administration in Persia, on the 30th June, by which the Russians will administer Qaleh Murghi and we will administer the others, each granting the other rights of use as required.

17. Another source of tension was an incident on the 30th May when a British military reconnaissance party, finding a road impassable in North Kurdistan, turned without previous notification and went through the Soviet

zone. Fortunately the Anglo-Soviet Treaty had been signed only a few days previously and, no doubt, owing to that fact and also largely owing to the efforts of Mr. Urquhart, His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz, the incident ended in an invitation by the Soviet Commander, General Melnik, to General Quinan to visit Tabriz. General Melnik would not agree to various measures which 10th Army desired in order to prepare the way for possible military operations in the area, but excellent personal relations were established and General Melnik is to pay a return visit to Bagdad very shortly.

18. Doubtless the Russians will never quite get rid of that suspicion of us which is so characteristic of them, but our relations have certainly been much more cordial since the signature of the Anglo-Soviet alliance.

19. The war is beginning to throw long shadows over Persia. It is strange that this country should have escaped for so long. But now problems are arising with which the ineffably corrupt and inefficient Administration is obviously incompetent to deal. To an increasing degree we are having to interfere in the administration of the country. Under the new C.S.C. system the overseas trade of Persia is planned by the M.E.S.C. in Cairo and controlled from this legation. I have already mentioned the constant representations which we have made about hoarding and the appointment of C.L.C.s to supervise wheat collection and distribution in the principal areas. In addition we are proposing to take on lease large areas of irrigated land in Khuzistan, of which the Persians have failed to make adequate use, in order to supplement the country's supplies of wheat and vegetables. Proposals are also on foot for a Food Board and for a Transport Board to put some measure of energy and, if possible, honesty into Persian administration in those spheres under British, Russian and American supervision. It is proposed that British and United States representatives should sit on these boards, and the required executive energy will, it is hoped, be provided to a large extent by the American advisers. A number of American experts with, it is hoped, executive powers will arrive shortly to help in the administration of the army, police, finance and supplies and in other spheres. General Greely is already working as unofficial adviser to the Intendent-General of the Army, and Professor Winsor has been working for some time in the Ministry of Agriculture as irrigation expert.

20. A.R.P. is non-existent here, and a P.A.D. officer from 10th Army has recently conducted an examination of the question on the spot and made recommendations to the Persian Government. A survey of minerals of value to the Allied war effort is being made by Mr. Barnett, a member of the M.E.S.C. staff, and development work under our direction may well result. Meanwhile, we do not forget, in the midst of this constructive effort, measures lying at the other end of the scale of usefulness, such as air raid precautions and plans for evacuation to be put into effect if the worst comes to the worst.

21. In the areas occupied by British troops, our intervention to secure the removal of undesirable officials and the appointment of suitable successors is becoming increasingly frequent. I am reporting separately on the question of the Tribal Lands Commission with which Colonel Galloway maintains special contact. Meanwhile it is only fair to say that in spite of gloomy forecasts the Persian army has succeeded in maintaining a fair degree of security on our lines of communication and supply routes to Russia. Mohamed Rashid in Kurdistan only has a few followers left, and rather desultory negotiations are proceeding. In the Bakhtiari country an appearance of order has been restored; only in Fars does the situation cause anxiety as Nasir Khan has not made his peace with the Persian Government and is said to be harbouring some German agents. The Qashgai and Kuhgilu countries are closed to Government troops.

22. To conclude this rather lengthy review, there is, I fear, no doubt that we are in for a most difficult time. The food-stuffs and transport situation alone is most complex, and we have to work through a maze of corruption and inefficiency in the administration in our efforts to deal with it. The deterioration in the military situation in recent weeks has made our task a good deal more difficult. But we shall live from day to day and try to meet these problems as they arise.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 4681/14/34]

No. 22.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 996.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 8, 1942.

MY telegram No. 980.

New Cabinet not yet announced as the Prime Minister still awaits reply of Taqizadeh, whom he wants for Minister of Finance. With that exception and, barring accidents, he has composed Cabinet which is much better than any of its predecessors since August 1941. Innovation is the appointment of civilian as Minister of War—probably Kazemy No. 105.

[E 4682/122/34]

No. 23.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 994.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 8, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1735 to Minister of State and Minister of State's telegram No. 1231.

New Prime Minister acted with great promptitude on my request for the arrest of about forty-five suspects. Within 24 hours nearly all had been arrested and others have been arrested since. I wrote asking that they should be handed over to the British authorities and followed up my letter by a visit to the Prime Minister who had with him Minister for Foreign Affairs in last Cabinet who is to hold the same office in the new one. Prime Minister, while friendly and ready to co-operate, was not prepared to hand over suspects (except few non-Persians) since that he considers against Persia sovereignty and therefore contrary to article 1 of the treaty. He said that he could not at the outset [?group omitted: ? of] his administration add to his many difficulties the hostility which handing over suspects would arouse. He proposed suspects should be detained in Tehran under Persian and British supervision and that interrogation should be carried out by a mixed commission, the Persian members to be approved by us.

2. I said my instructions were to ask for suspects to be handed over to us. In view of our experience of Persian police this was the only procedure which would afford us proper protection. He would incur little, if any, more odium for handing over than he had already done for arresting suspects. As to the treaty, I said as British were combatant and Persians non-combatant ally it was his duty to give us maximum assistance. It seemed clear, however, that Prime Minister would not change his opinion, so to avoid awkward *impasse*, I suggested on the strength of your telegram No. 1735 which I had just seen, that I should explore the possibility of detention under joint supervision at Kermanshah or some other place on the plateau but in the area occupied by our troops. Prime Minister held out for detention at Tehran. I objected that whichever place might be selected Tehran would not do because it is a centre of intrigue and to avoid communication between suspects and friends outside would be impossible. Prime Minister offered to allow us to post as many guards as we wished from the present moment. He also said that if we were not satisfied with the result of a joint enquiry we could subsequently conduct another one on our own and he would leave it to us to decide whether any given suspect should be released or retained.

3. Later the Prime Minister sent for the Oriental Secretary whom ?group omitted: ? he] knows well and said that if His Majesty's Government insisted on handing over suspects his only course could be to resign. He would find some other pretext and keep the real cause secret to us, himself and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called this morning with similar message.

4. I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that I had suggested the possibility of detention under joint supervision at some place such as Kermanshah: Tehran would not do because we kept no troops here. I also said that I had now received telegram showing that a senior officer to discuss security was apparently to come from Bagdad shortly though I did not say how narrow his terms of reference were. I said I realised that new Government had many problems to solve and that our general desire was to help, but I had no authority to agree to any policy but handing over and I must refer to you.

5. At present the matter stands thus:—

- (a) Non-Persian suspects are being handed over to us at once and we are free to do what we like with them;
- (b) Persian suspects are to remain under detention. Persian watch on them is to be strict (this promise is worthless);
- (c) British guards in any number we like may take part in surveillance from now on.
- (d) Minister for Foreign Affairs notes that His Majesty's Minister has no authority to accept any policy but handing over and that arrival of a senior British Officer from Bagdad to discuss security is expected [group undecipherable] see my immediately following telegram.

[E 4682/122/34]

No. 24.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 995.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 8, 1942.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Suspects procedure is subject to law of diminishing returns. It was possible to secure the handing over of half a dozen people, though even that required constant pressure on the Prime Minister and the police, but we are now dealing with large numbers, including military and police officers and an ex-Prime Minister, and (though we have not yet told the Persian Government) the General Officer Commanding, Isfahan. At the same time, we have to deal with a new Prime Minister who has taken office at a time when the office is much less attractive than usual.

2. It is for His Majesty's Government to say whether they wish to insist that all Persian suspects whose arrest we demand must not only be arrested but handed over to us. It is possible that Prime Minister is bluffing and would not, in fact, resign, but I do not think so. The attitude of my Soviet colleague and my United States colleague suggest we could expect little or no support from their Governments. Procedure proposed by the Prime Minister is not so favourable to us as it looks at first sight, but more favourable than that followed by the Iraqi Government and accepted by us, though it is true that the internment camp at Amara is behind the British lines. Great difficulty of providing guards in Tehran is realised and the participation of Persians—even Persians chosen by us—in interrogation might embarrass us and greatly diminish its utility. I think, however, that we should discuss the question of detention and interrogation with Persian authorities with the assistance of proposed senior officer from the 10th Army. If we cannot secure arrangement satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, we should be in a stronger position in having discussed instead of merely dictated, and in that event the Prime Minister would find it less easy to resign when his Government was working than now when there is no Cabinet.

3. If the Prime Minister does resign, I cannot think of any civilian of value to the Allies who would take office with such an issue unsettled.

[E 4690/17/34]

No. 25.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 1003.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 9, 1942.

MY telegram No. 996.

Prime Minister introduced following Cabinet to Majlis to-day:—

Ministers without portfolio: Hakim-ul-Mulk and Sadiq Sadiqi

(Mustashar-ed-Dowley).

Foreign Affairs: Said.

Interior: Kazemi.

Industry and Commerce: Hajhir.

Communications: Azudi.

Posts: Hamid Sayyah.

Agriculture: Hussein Adl.

Education: Ali Akbar Siasi.

Justice: Baha-ul-Mulk Gharagozlou.

Health: Ismail Marzuban.

Finance: Taqizadeh.

War: To be appointed later.

[24801]

2. Prime Minister announced programme of assuring food supplies, internal security, action against hoarders and co-operation with Allies in accordance with the treaty. He welcomed friendly relations existing with United States. Food Ministry to be formed.

[W 10894/255/802]

No. 26.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 237.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 22, 1942.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 687 of the 21st May, 1942, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from the air attaché, together with certified copies of the British and Russian texts of the agreement concluded on the 30th June between representatives of the Royal Air Force and of the Soviet Transport Administration in Persia, regarding the use and administration of aerodromes in the Tehran area. The delay in forwarding the text is due to it having had to be sent to Bagdad to be signed in its final form by Air Commodore Coleman.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo, to the Air Officer Commanding (without enclosures), the Government of India, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Group Captain Greenlaw to Sir R. Bullard.

Sir,

Tehran, July 18, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith for your Excellency's information and communication to the authorities concerned, six copies of the text of a protocol of agreement concerning the administration and use of aerodromes in the Tehran area, concluded between representatives of the Royal Air Force and representatives of the Soviet Transportation Administration in Persia, at Tehran on the 30th June, 1942.

The first original, which includes both the English and Russian texts, has been placed in the hand of General Koroleff, head of the Soviet Transportation Administration. The second original in Russian and English has been retained by the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq Command.

I have, &c.

ROBERT R. GREENLAW.

Air Attaché.

Sub-Enclosure in No. 26.

Protocol of an Agreement for the administration and use of Aerodromes in the Tehran Area concluded between Representatives of the Royal Air Force and Representatives of the Soviet Transport Administration in Persia at Tehran on Tuesday, June 30, 1942.

IT is agreed that—

1. Use and administration of aerodromes in the Tehran area shall be joint.
2. The responsibility for aviation services in the Tehran area shall include and be as follows:—

- Control of flying on each aerodrome from the point of view of safety shall be vested in the force administering that particular aerodrome.
- The control of the personnel entering aerodromes from the point of view of security shall be the responsibility of the force administering that particular aerodrome.
- To ensure safety of flying, British and Soviet authorities shall mutually exchange meteorological and air-route information.
- With the same object of safety in view it is considered necessary to set up corridors of access to the aerodromes, and flying regulations generally in the Tehran area, and also an air raid warning organisation. The British and Soviet forces will appoint specially qualified officers to confer and work out details of such organisation.

3. The following order of use and administration of aerodromes in the Tehran area shall apply:—

A.—Quali Morghi.

(i) The Soviet forces will continue to be responsible for the general administration of the aerodrome of Quali Morghi, including guarding. The Soviet authorities will arrange that personnel of the British air forces shall have free access to and from their places of duty on the aerodrome at all times in accordance with rules established on the aerodrome of which the British forces shall be kept fully informed.

(ii) The Soviet authorities will afford full facilities for the operation of British Airways on the aerodrome of Quali Morghi. All visiting British aircraft will land at Quali Morghi.

(iii) The British forces will have the unrestricted use of three hangars (one large and two small) for the housing of British Airways' aircraft, a flight of six Baltimore aircraft (photographic survey) and visiting British aircraft. The Soviet authorities will provide sufficient accommodation to house the British personnel of the photographic survey party in addition to the accommodation at present occupied by the British forces.

Remark.—The use of hangars for six Baltimore aircraft (photographic survey) is only of a temporary nature until such time as these aircraft can be transferred to the aerodrome of Mehrabad when the work of building runways is completed.

(iv) The British forces, if required, will provide accommodation for Persian stores now occupying space needed by the Soviet authorities at the aerodrome of Quali Morghi.

B.—Doshan Tappeh.

The British forces will continue to be responsible for the administration of Doshan Tappeh. The British forces, in case of necessity, will allow Soviet aircraft to land on the aerodrome of Doshan Tappeh and will carry out necessary repair of Soviet aircraft and engines within the capacity of the factory.

C.—Mehrabad and Bashgah.

The British forces will undertake the administration of Mehrabad and Bashgah in conjunction with the Persian forces. These aerodromes will be regarded as "satellite" aerodromes. The British forces, in case of necessity, will allow Soviet aircraft to land on Mehrabad and Bashgah.

4. A small committee shall be set up under the guidance of the British Legation and Soviet Embassy consisting of British and Soviet representatives. This sub-committee will be charged with implementing the details of this agreement and will be available for consultation on any problems affecting the administration and use of aerodromes in the area of Tehran.

5. Finally both sides agree to use the available aviation resources in Persia to the best advantage and in full consultation with one another. Any points of difficulty will be referred in the first instance to the sub-committee mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

Representatives of the Royal Air Force:—

Air Officer-in-Charge Administration, Iraq Command. Air Commodore.

COLEMAN.

Air Attaché, British Legation, Tehran. Group Captain.

GREENLAW.

Representatives of the Soviet Transport Administration in Persia:—

Chief of Administration, Major-General of Technical Troops.

KOROLEFF.

Chief of Aviation Department.

LAURENTIEFF.

Certified the text of this agreement corresponds as regards translation exactly with the Russian text.

PAROHONSKY.

I hereby certify this to be a true copy of the original.

R. M. A. HANKEY, *First Secretary.*

British Legation,

Tehran, July 15, 1942.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 270.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 14, 1942.

WITH reference to my telegrams describing the day-to-day development of the recent Cabinet crisis here, ending in my telegrams Nos. 1003 and 1004, I have the honour to inform you that the fall of Ali Soheily's Cabinet on the 30th July came as a surprise to many observers. I propose in this despatch to attempt to analyse the reasons for Soheily's resignation, as well as to describe shortly the political events which followed it, culminating in Ahmad Qawam's presentation of his new Cabinet to the Shah and the Majlis on the 9th August.

2. The ex-Prime Minister, in his farewell statement to the Majlis, a summary⁽¹⁾ of which I enclose herein, attributed his resignation to the lack of sympathy shown by the Majlis and the press to his Government's efforts to deal with current problems. There is no doubt that a number of Deputies, chief among whom were Ali Dashti, Saham-us-Sultan Bayat and Dr. Malik-Zadeh, were opposed to Soheily and did their best to make difficulties for him. Their explanation of their conduct was that Soheily, in order to obtain their support, had made a number of promises to them which he did not fulfil; for instance, he had promised to award the post of Minister of the Interior to Farajullah Bahramy (Dabir-A'zam), but had not kept his promise. Bayat was openly working for the post of Prime Minister, and Dr. Malik-Zadeh was hoping for a lucrative appointment in the university. Soheily was forced by the Majlis to attend endless secret sessions in person, after which the same subjects were often discussed in public without any regard for any decisions that may have been taken in secret session. To many observers Soheily appeared to be afraid of the Majlis. Nevertheless, the public, such as it is, seems to have recognised that the Majlis were unreasonably obstructive, and there has been much criticism of the Deputies.

3. As for the press, there were certainly a number of attacks on various members of the Cabinet and on the Cabinet's policy as a whole in certain Tehran newspapers, and an attempt to control the press by a new law evoked so much opposition that Soheily felt obliged to abandon the struggle. Certain Majlis Deputies were of the opinion that, if he had been courageous enough to use the powers which were already at the disposal of the Government in virtue of the state of military law which still exists at Tehran, he could have checked this irresponsible criticism without recourse to new legislation. But, most important of all, there was much criticism of the Government for failing to deal adequately with the question of food distribution. Adequate powers had, admittedly after much delay, been given to Government by the Majlis, but nothing effective had been done to check hoarding, and the occasion, if not the cause, of the crisis ending in the downfall of the Government was rioting in towns such as Malayir and Burujird, where the new harvest is already available, and there was no excuse for bread shortage. It is only fair to add that there are some grounds for believing that the riots were not spontaneous. But it is an undoubted fact that the Government were unwilling to deal with hoarders, and many people hinted darkly that prominent officials, and even Ministers, were in the racket themselves. The Government certainly did little, if anything, to suppress the widespread corruption of the country, and there were a number of scandalous rumours about financial and moral irregularities committed by the Prime Minister himself.

4. The unfortunate incident of M. Ahy's appointment as ambassador to the Soviet Union may also have helped to undermine Soheily's self-confidence. When Mohammad Saed Maragha'i was brought from Kuibyshev to take over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it appears that Ahy's appointment to replace him was decided by the Shah, Soheily and the Soviet Ambassador without any formal notification to Ahy, the result being that the latter became annoyed, hinted that he would not go, and finally resigned from the Cabinet three days before Soheily gave up his task. M. Ahy had a certain capacity for making trouble, though he enjoys no great prestige in the Majlis, and his intrigues added to Soheily's difficulties.

5. But the most effective factor which caused Soheily to resign was probably his feeling that he had lost the confidence both of the Russians and of ourselves. The Soviet Ambassador complained to Soheily, I understand, on the 28th July that his Government had failed to deal with the food, transport and

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

fifth column problems. At that time Soheily was proposing to remodel his Cabinet by introducing some new members, but finally decided to resign altogether. It may have been that my own action in informing him on the 29th July that we were greatly disappointed by the failure of the Government to deal with the wheat situation was the deciding factor. The Minister of the Interior had been to Khuzistan to settle the wheat question there, but had failed completely to extract any but the smallest quantities of wheat from landowners known to have many hundreds of tons to spare. The labourers working for the British military authorities and the towns of Ahwaz and Khorramshahr were meanwhile going short. The Prime Minister knew quite well that we were gravely concerned at this ineffective handling of the situation in an area where our interests were closely affected. Further, we were pressing for the arrest and handing over to us of a number of Germans and Persians implicated in the evidence obtained by the British military authorities from a number of Germans in their custody. The knowledge that this demand could not indefinitely be put off may have decided him to resign before an unpopular decision had to be taken.

6. After his resignation Soheily, at the Shah's request, carried on the functions of Government for three days. During that time the Majlis sent delegates to the well-known elder statesman, Hussein Pirnia (Mu'tamih-ul-Mulk), asking him to form a new Cabinet, but Pirnia told them in no uncertain terms that he refused to take office with such an intriguing and obstinate Majlis. On the 1st August a ballot of the Majlis gave 53 votes to Qawam against 22 to Soheily, and the former agreed to form a Cabinet on the understanding that he was to have a completely free hand in the selection of his Ministers. He proved willing, if not anxious, to discuss this question with us, and cancelled several names immediately he heard that we did not approve of them. His Cabinet as presented to the Majlis on the 9th August contains four satisfactory members of the previous Cabinet (Said, Hajhir, Azodi and Hussein Adl); two old gentlemen (Hakim-ul-Mulk and Mustashar-ud-Dowleh) in an advisory capacity; an active new Minister of Education, Siasi; a benevolent old oculist (Ismail Marzuban) as Minister of Health; and the energetic Kazemy as Minister of the Interior. Hamid Sayyad, the new Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, has occupied that appointment recently to our satisfaction and is acceptable to the Russians. The selection of Ali Reza Gharagozlou (Baha-ul-Mulk) for the Ministry of Justice is a surprise, as the new Minister has not held office for a long time and cannot know very much about the details of the Ministry to which he is appointed; but he has the reputation of being an honest, well-meaning man. The Ministry of War was at first offered to M. Ala, who preferred to retain his non-political post as general manager of the Banque Mellié, and then to Kazemy, who refused it as too difficult; the Prime Minister himself is therefore looking after that Ministry; and Taghi-Zadeh's Ministry, that of Finance, is also in the Prime Minister's charge pending Taghi-Zadeh's reply. It is also proposed to appoint a Minister or Controller of Food with wide powers, and I hear that Amanullah Ardalan (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik) is to be given that post; he has formerly had ministerial rank, though he has recently served in provincial appointment, such as Governor-General at Kerman, at Rezaieh and at Isfahan.

7. I enclose herein a summary⁽¹⁾ of the new Prime Minister's speech to the Majlis in introduction of the new Cabinet.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch and of its enclosures to the Minister of State in Cairo, to the embassy in Bagdad with a copy for the General Officer Commanding the Tenth Army, and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 1182.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 24, 1942.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 1015, 1042 and 1056 [of 12th-21st August: Arrest of Axis agents].

I approve your action.

2. Persian Minister raised matter here on 17th August and again on 19th August. On second occasion he said his Prime Minister wished us to know

that, if we persisted in our demand that the suspects should be sent to Arak, he might be forced to resign. He therefore begged that the matter should be reconsidered. Minister did not imply that Prime Minister would necessarily resign and we are not disposed to take this threat too seriously.

3. In our reply, we have told the Minister that we are unable to agree to detention at Tehran and trust that he will urge his Government to agree without delay that the suspects should be sent to Arak, where their interrogation would take place and the Persian authorities could take part in guarding them.

4. I do not altogether understand why joint interrogation should be impracticable.

[E 5055/—/34]

No. 29.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 267.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 12, 1942.

THE trial of the former Chief of Police, General Rukn-ud-Din Mukhtari, on various charges, including complicity in murder, has caused a considerable sensation at Tehran during the past few weeks. Although the sentence has not yet been pronounced, I have the honour to forward in this despatch a short report on the trial up to the moment of writing. I hope to submit a further report when the sentence of the court is pronounced.

2. Mukhtari, who became acting head of police on the departure of Muhammad Hussein Ayrum in 1936, held that post from that date until the abdication of Reza Shah in September 1941. During the last few days of Reza Shah's reign, Mukhtari fled to Kerman and was popularly supposed to have been entrusted by the late Shah with the Crown Jewels, which were to be sent abroad. However, when it became apparent that the Russian troops were not to occupy Tehran to the exclusion of British troops, Mukhtari returned to the capital. It appears that the story of the jewels was false. Mukhtari's own story is that he was told by the Shah to make his escape from the Russians while he could. Mukhtari always maintained that he had had to carry out so many of the Shah's orders against Soviet nationals or suspected Soviet agents in this country that he felt his life would be in grave danger if he found himself at the mercy of the Soviet authorities.

3. Towards the end of 1941 it was decided to arrest him, and he has been a prisoner in Tehran ever since. News of the progress of his trial has been published in the press from time to time, and articles, mostly of an abusive nature, have appeared in various papers, describing with gradually increasing severity the charges which were being made against him. The general impression which these articles sought to create was that Mukhtari had been responsible for the oppression, the imprisonments and the various acts of tyranny against persons which had been committed during his tenure of office.

4. The indictment against Mukhtari, prepared by the Public Prosecutor, is an extremely long document and deals in detail with a great number of different charges. The principal accusations are of complicity in the execution, or murder, of the following well-known persons: Seyyid Hassan Mudarris, Prince Firouz (Nusrat ed Douleh), Abdul Hussein Diba, and Sheikh Khazal, the Sheikh of Muhammerah. Other charges included the detention in prison of several prisoners after the expiry of their proper term of imprisonment, and irregularities in the trial of certain persons suspected of spying for the Soviet Government. In several places the indictment contained the statement that "in this matter Mukhtari misled the Shah" (*i.e.*, the ex-Shah Reza), and also the argument that Mukhtari's defence that he was acting under orders of the late Shah was inadmissible, usually because the Shah had not given *written* orders. A number of other prisoners were cited in the indictment, all of whom appear to have been police officers or persons employed by the police, the most important of them being Captain Abdullah Miqdadi of the Tehran "Police de Sûreté." It appeared to many readers of the indictment that it was drawn up with the object of visiting on Mukhtari the sins of the ex-Shah—in fact, with the suggestion that the late Shah was a benevolent ruler deceived by unworthy and evil subordinates. Such a complete perversion of the truth ought not to have deceived even the most simple-minded persons; but it is clear that a great deal of popular indignation had been worked up against Mukhtari before the trial started. It must be remembered that the relatives of Mudarris, of Nusrat ed

Douleh, of Diba, and of the considerable number of landowners and suspects who had suffered under the Pahlevi were all longing for revenge, and it was not unnatural that their hatred and thirst for revenge should be concentrated on the executive head of police under Reza Shah. It is easy to forget, in these days of free speech, the iron discipline of Reza's reign. The ex-Shah took a close personal interest in every detail of the work of the police, and it is inconceivable that Mukhtari would have dared to do the smallest thing without making a full report to Reza Shah, who was so far above any kind of criticism or control that if Mukhtari had ventured to ask his Royal master to put anything in writing the most probable result would have been a severe kick from the Royal boot. Nor is it convenient for the public to remember that, if Mukhtari was guilty of slavish obedience to the Shah, his guilt in that respect was shared by a very large number of other Government servants who vied with one another in expressing the most fulsome praise for whatever the Shah did.

5. The trial began on the 25th July. The court was the tribunal created for the hearing of charges against Government servants, and Mukhtari's numerous enemies were not long in discovering that that court was not empowered to award a capital sentence. There was a considerable outcry on this point; a Bill was introduced in the Majlis on the 4th August for the purpose of ensuring that in future all persons accused of complicity in the crime of murder should be tried before the criminal courts which *could* award a death sentence; but it was soon realised that to pass this Bill would take too long for it to affect the present trial.

6. The first day of the trial was the occasion of long and highly coloured articles in all the Tehran papers, full of phrases such as the following: "Mukhtari, the agent of Reza Shah, foremost in working the machinery of tyranny, and a shedder of blood comparable to Jenghiz Khan or Tamurlane, appeared trembling at the seat of justice. . . . There was Mukhtari, who used to be able to ruin a hundred families with one stroke of his pen, now trembling before the inexorable retribution which justice is about to exact."

7. I do not think it necessary to weary you with a detailed analysis of the lengthy arguments and cross-examinations which took place during the trial. They were all reported in full in many of the Tehran papers. The depositions of the accused were confused and contradictory, and were for the most part denied by the accused when cross-examined by the court. The case of the murder of Khazal ought perhaps to be mentioned here: the prosecution's argument was that the sheikh was strangled by three or four people at the orders of Mukhtari and with the connivance of one of the sheikh's sons, and that after the strangling had taken place one of the murderers pierced his forehead with a knife to make some blood flow. Mukhtari's defence was that the sheikh died a natural death, as was certified by a Tehran doctor at the time. It seems peculiarly pointless for the aged sheikh to have been murdered at all, for he was a bedridden old man, very ill with diabetes and incapable of doing any harm; in fact, it was common knowledge that he was dying in any case.

8. Mukhtari's defence was a denial of all the charges, particularly the charge that he had kept persons in prison after their term had expired: he had invariably sent reports to the judicial authorities (and no doubt also to the Shah); not one of the Ministers of Justice had ever made any comments or raised any questions concerning anything he had done. He had merely executed the orders he received.

9. One of the Majlis Deputies, named Siqat-ul-Islami, spoke in the Majlis on the 4th August to the following effect: Everyone who had participated in the Government and the administration of the last régime ought to be put on trial; if Mukhtari was evil, so was the whole former Government; all the Ministers and responsible officials of those days ought to be brought to trial as Mukhtari's accomplices. And one of the defending advocates, named Dr. Muhit, caused bitter criticism from many of those who are thirsting for revenge by his statement that in the days of Reza Shah there was no real law and no real Executive except in the person of the Shah himself.

10. A good deal of popular feeling is being whipped up by various interested parties for their own ends. Printed slips of paper bearing the following statements, in Persian, have reached this legation: "Mukhtari has made children fatherless, wives husbandless," &c., "Hundreds of innocent women have expired under the kicks of Mukhtari's jack-boots; to-day the judges of the criminal court must avenge them." As usual, the British are, obscurely, sometimes supposed to be mixed up in the trial. For reasons which are not obvious this legation is accused of shielding and protecting Mukhtari. Anonymous letters have been written to this legation warning us that if we

protect Mukhtari not only will the "hate of the Persians increase against the British, but it might lead to other things which might not have a good effect."

11. It seems inevitable that Mukhtari will be sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. One thing appears to be in Mukhtari's favour, though it is not likely that the court will take it into consideration; it is the fact that no one has accused him of lining his pockets, as he might easily have done; in fact, he seems to be a comparatively poor man, though had he wished to do so he could have followed the example of his predecessor Ayrum and accumulated a large fortune.

12. The two chief workers against Mukhtari have been Muzaffar Firouz, the son of Nusrat ed Douleh, and a person named Pur-Reza. The latest development arising out of the trial is a notice which appeared in the press of the 9th August saying that Muhammad Nasir Khan, the eldest son of Ismail Khan Soulat ed Douleh Qashqai, demanded that the assassination of his father should be the subject of judicial enquiry: a strange demand from a man who has been defying the Persian Government ever since he fled from its custody during the confusion of the events of last August. In actual fact, there is hardly any doubt that Soulat ed Douleh was killed, probably poisoned, by direct order of Reza Shah; but that would not prevent that charge being brought against Mukhtari as well.

13. I have reported at some length on this trial because it has aroused so much public interest here, and because, as it brings the misdeeds of the ex-Shah into the public eye, it cannot be altogether without its effect on the position of the dynasty. Indeed, the Shah is known to be embarrassed by the feeling which has found expression against his father. It is, however, to be hoped that the trial will not begin a series of retributory executions or sentences of imprisonment, and in the interests of all parties I propose to use my influence discreetly to encourage people, so far as possible, to let bygones be bygones.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister of State, Cairo, the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, and to the General Officer Commanding, Xth Army, Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 5200/122/34]

No. 30.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 1118.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 1, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1,182.

Half-hearted nature of reference to possible resignation of Prime Minister in the Persian Minister's communication to the Foreign Office gave us a hint which was strengthened by the fact that the Prime Minister had proposed to appoint his brother ambassador to Turkey. It seemed certain that he did not wish to resign. I found Minister for Foreign Affairs vacillating, however, owing to ambiguous reply he had received from the Persian Minister in London, and I urged him to realise the mind of His Majesty's Government was made up on the question of suspects and a secure agreement of the Persian Government without further delay. I followed up this talk with a letter to the Prime Minister, in which I said that His Majesty's Government would regard solution of the problem in the sense of our suggested compromise as a test of the sincerity of his policy towards the Allies.

2. The following day the Prime Minister summoned me, and assured me that His Majesty's Government had no cause to doubt the sincerity of the present Government. Co-operation with the Allies had been adopted as essential part of its programme, and His Majesty's Government ought to have confidence in him. I said that confidence required to be kept alive by acts deserving of confidence, and that only complete collaboration with us in essentials would justify hopes which we had built on his reputation and the fact that he had appointed Said (who was [group undecipherable: ? present]) as his Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was then that the Prime Minister stated that he had decided to accept our proposals about suspects, and would tell his Cabinet and the Majlis that that was his policy to be taken or left. I said that I was sure that both

the Majlis and the people would follow so strong a lead. (In fact, only two members of the Cabinet had ever threatened to resign, and they changed their minds, while the Majlis listened obediently, said that they had already given the Prime Minister their confidence, and begged him not to resign. Doubtless the reminder, having been already given in the press, about the powers of the Military Governor helped to bring about this wise attitude.)

3. At the same interview I told the Prime Minister that there were other questions also which we regarded as essential, in particular the rate of exchange. We had concluded a financial agreement in May which provided that we should be supplied automatically with rials, whereas I had already had to ask him personally on two occasions during his short period of office to effect the exchange of sterling for our immediate military needs. Prime Minister said that, apart from the fact that the agreement existed, he did not wish to spend his time carrying out details which ought to be effected automatically, and he promised that we should have no further grounds of complaint. I have now sent him a letter setting forth our grievances on this head, and have asked for written assurances that the agreement will be carried out.

4. I have been too long in the East to build solid hopes on any Persian statesman, but there are a few encouraging signs.

(a) It seems certain that the Prime Minister wishes to remain in office and to make a success of his Government. Moreover, his decision was taken before the news from Russia became more favourable to the Allies.

(b) It is already clear that the Prime Minister possesses authority far greater than that of his two immediate predecessors. Firuzhi, besides being in poor health, despised political intrigue, while Soheily was little known, and was considered weak and corrupt. Qawam even seems to have settled to his satisfaction the dispute between the army and civilians, and will probably keep the Ministry of War in his own hands.

(c) Qawam has checked the press, and is showing and instilling into his colleagues activity in the all-important treaty question.

5. Qawam seems, therefore, to deserve support, the more so as we know him to be acceptable to the Russians, but he can only receive our support, which it is now clear he values, so long as he complies with our wishes in essential matters without the delays which have hitherto endangered our interests from time to time. (See my immediately following telegram.)

6. I am keeping my Soviet colleague and my United States colleague informed. United States Minister agreed that he could support me on the question of rials, which affect American interests too, and that he could go so far as to say that Fifth Column was a real menace which the Persian Government ought to help us to remove. He has since informed me that he has spoken to the Prime Minister in this sense, though it was after the Prime Minister had, in fact, promised to accept our demands on both questions. Soviet Chargé d'Affaires is unable, as I informed you in my telegram No. 1,105, to take any serious action without instructions, but he promised to telegraph his Government about these two subjects.

[E 5244/122/34]

No. 31.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 201.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 5, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador discussed with me on the 1st September the difficulties arising from our recent request to the Persian Government that they should arrest some forty-five suspected Axis agents and hand them over to our military authorities for internment.

2. M. Maisky brought with him a letter in which he quoted at length from representations made by the Persian Chargé d'Affaires in Kuibyshev on the 21st August. These representations rather naturally gave an inaccurate account of what actually happened, and concluded with a request for the Soviet Government's support. The letter stated that similar representations had been made

to your Soviet colleague by the Persian Prime Minister, who had threatened to resign if His Majesty's Government persisted in their demands. Meanwhile, the Persian press was conducting a campaign against the arrests, for which it blamed the Soviet Government as well as His Majesty's Government. As was well known, the Soviet Government had made no demands of this kind to the Persian Government, their knowledge of the problem being limited to what you had told your Soviet colleague in general terms. Since the question had a certain importance for their relations with Persia, the Soviet Government would be glad to receive full information about the points at issue.

3. I gave M. Maisky some account of the back history of this question, explaining that our previous experience had shown only too clearly that, if we allowed suspected Axis agents to be guarded by the Persian police alone, many of them succeeded in escaping. When it became necessary to request the Persian Government to arrest these forty-five suspects we therefore asked that they should be handed over to the British military authorities for internment. It was true that the Persian Government, while agreeing to hand over the foreign suspects, had objected to sending Persian subjects to be interned at Arak, and that the Persian Prime Minister had even spoken of resigning. But you had reported on the 29th August that the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs had both assured you that they accepted our view and agreed that our military authorities should begin to make arrangements for the reception of the suspects at Arak.

4. The question therefore appeared to be settled, and I hoped his Excellency would appreciate the importance, from the Soviet as much as from the British point of view, of taking effective action against these Axis agents, who could do so much harm to our vitally important lines of communication.

5. M. Maisky, who had at first been perhaps inclined to take the line that we had gone too far in the demands we had put to the Persian Government, changed his tune on hearing that the crisis had apparently been resolved and that there was no longer any question of the Prime Minister resigning. He finally asked me to let him have an account of the whole question; this I am doing.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

[E 5274/173/34]

No. 32.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 277.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a six-monthly situation report from Meshed, dated the 21st July, 1942.

Tehran, August 18, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Six-Monthly Political Situation Report.

THE first half of 1942 has been a period of gradual restoration of security and public confidence in the stability of the régime. Towards the end of January Agha Ali Mansur, a former Prime Minister of Persia, was appointed Ustandar (Governor-General) of the Ninth Ustan (Khorasan and the Qainat). He soon showed himself an administrator of a very different type from his predecessor, the notorious Pakrevan, whose indictment shortly afterwards for various offences, including murder, was hailed with delight by everyone in Khorasan except the officials. Not long before his arrival a dispossessed tribal leader, Saulat-us-Saltana, had raised the standard of revolt in the Bakharz region and gained a considerable number of adherents. Armed with rifles and other equipment jettisoned by the Meshed garrison in their headlong flight from the Russians in August 1941, the rebels, with Fariman as their base, blocked the Zahidan

road south of Meshed, while another force, led by the Saulat's brother Muntasar, threatened Turbat-i-Haidari from the east. Claiming Russian support and British goodwill, the rebel leaders announced their object to be the liberation of the peasantry from the oppressive and corrupt rule of Tehran, but it soon became obvious that the Saulat's real aim was to blackmail the Government into restoring the properties taken from him by the late Shah. The arrival of Government forces from Tehran with tanks and trench-mortars quickly restored the situation; the main rebel force was routed 25 miles south of Meshed and pushed right back to the Afghan frontier. Saulat-us-Saltana took refuge in the famous mountain fastness of Kalat-i-Nadiri north of Meshed, but was eventually persuaded to surrender and taken to Tehran. His disillusioned adherents were treated with statesmanlike lenience by the Governor-General and have given no further trouble.

This success restored the prestige of the administration, not so much because of the military defeat of the undisciplined and badly-equipped rebels, but because of the Russian, British and Afghan goodwill which facilitated it. Sporadic raiding by Baluch tribesmen continued, however, in the districts adjoining the Afghan frontier and on the Meshed-Zahidan road, where lorries of the East Persian Auxiliary Transport Service, among others, were held up and the drivers fired on and robbed on several occasions. Efforts are being made to improve the personnel and equipment of the Gendarmerie (Amnieh), and considerable progress in this respect has been made in the Qainat, thanks to the personal interest taken by the Shaukat-ul-Mulk in the local administration; elsewhere, however, no very striking results can be expected, as the men are of poor fighting quality and the officers corrupt.

Another part of the province in which the Government's writ does not yet run is the Kurd and Turcoman tribal area to the north of Kuchan and Bujnurd. Faraj Beg, the Kurd leader, came back from his exile at Gulpaigan early in February and proceeded to disarm the local Amnieh, demanding of the Khorasan Government that he should be entrusted with the maintenance of security in his area. The defeat of Saulat-us-Saltana enabled the Ustandar to call Faraj Beg's bluff, and a compromise was eventually reached whereby the posts along the main roads were to be manned by Amnieh and the adjoining mountain regions left to the Kurd leader. In the extreme north-eastern end of the province the attitude of the Yomut Turcomans is very doubtful and there is much raiding. The Goklan Turcomans are quiet.

Next to security the chief preoccupation of the local government has been the provisioning of Meshed and other towns. The arrogant and tyrannous character of the late régime and its waste of the nation's assets in unproductive expenditure impoverished the masses while enriching a minority of unscrupulous officials, merchants and landowners, who in turn were relieved of part of their ill-gotten gains by the Shah and his agents. There is no doubt that by August 1941 Khorasan, like the rest of Persia, was well on the road to economic chaos and financial ruin, a fate from which the country was saved, temporarily at any rate, by the abdication of the monarch and the influx of money and supplies from Allied sources. Government wheat collection sank from 32,000 tons in 1939-40 to 26,900 tons in 1940-41 and 23,000 in 1941-42, although in neither of these two latter years were climatic conditions over the province as a whole below the average. The causes of these short collections were: (1) Short sowings due to economic weakness; (2) the corrupt and oppressive methods of the grain collectors; (3) hoarding and "black market" operations by profiteers, including many of the revenue officials themselves. Speculation in wheat futures became rife, and it was only by adulterating the bread sold to the public with barley, raising prices so as to limit consumption, buying stocks at famine prices from hoarders and importing from Russia and India that the Administration was able to keep the poorer population of the towns alive.⁽¹⁾

In other ways also the masses are exploited and impoverished by speculation, hoarding and profiteering on the part of officials and their confederates among the less scrupulous merchants and landholders. The monopoly and exchange control system developed during the late régime has not only enriched these

⁽¹⁾ From figures recently furnished (under considerable pressure) by the Economic Department, it appears that, of the 14,700 tons of wheat consumed in Meshed (population about 100,000) during the year 1941-42, only 5,050 tons were collected locally at the Government rate; the balance, excluding 1,260 tons imported from Russia and India, was purchased by the Economic Department at prices varying from one and a half to three times the Government rate. It can be imagined what scope this system affords for dishonesty in the department responsible for collection and distribution of food grains.

classes, but strengthened their hold upon the people. Apart from them and from the hordes of soldiery, gendarmerie, farrashes, policemen, bailiffs and secret agents they employ, the masses are quite unorganised, and therefore without power or influence. Feeble bleats are heard in the teashops and in the press, but nothing is done. The officials are too strongly entrenched, thanks to their control of the elaborate machinery of administration and of the courts. Their only serious rivals are the big merchants, and these they either accept as partners or break.

When a country has had for years an illiterate bandit for its king it is not surprising that its administration should have developed into one vast racket. Nothing but bold, honest and wise leadership at the top can remedy Persia's ills. Pouring in money and cheap supplies acts as a palliative, but accentuates the processes at work.

Anglo-Persian Relations.

In East Persia anti-British feeling is unmistakable, but it is confined to the official class, the merchants and landowners who made money out of Germany before the Occupation, and the officers of the army and gendarmerie. The man in the street and the cultivator have nothing against us; if anything, they would like to see us in control, curbing the rapacity of the officials and gendarmerie, and keeping the Russian wolf from the fold. Unfortunately, as pointed out above, the man in the street and the cultivator do not count. With the notable exception of the powerful and united Alam and Khozaima families in the Qainat, headed by that staunch Anglophile the Shaukat-ul-Mulk, "society" consists of the officer class, civil and military, and it is anti-British. The remainder of the upper class follows its lead. This regrettable state of affairs is ascribed to several different causes. One is the catastrophic increase in the cost of living, for which the Allied occupation is blamed. Another is our known disapproval of Persian methods and standards; we are suspected of contemplating annexation or partition with Russia, which, it is feared, would be the doom of the vested interests that control public opinion. A third, we are told, is our "unholy alliance" with Russia. However this may be, the problem of improving Anglo-Persian relations is a difficult one, and it must be faced; for by no means all the upper classes are interested in keeping us out, and their goodwill is worth cultivating. The problem is *social* as much as political and economic. As a result of the prolonged boycott under Reza Pahlevi the Persians simply do not know what we are like. They have the most extraordinary ideas about us, derived partly from old animosities and partly, no doubt, from German whispering campaigns and radio propaganda. One way to supplant Germany in the hearts of the Persians is to show some signs of beginning to win the war. Another is to go about among them and let them find out for themselves that we are more likeable and human, more genuinely appreciative of their virtues, culture, and achievements, more "smart" and up to date (for Persian society is as snobbish as that of any other country in the world) than the Germans who have flattered and played up to them for years.

Russo-Persian Relations.

At the beginning of the period under review the Soviet Consulate-General had been closed for four years. After the Occupation, apart from the Trade Agent and a few underlings, the authorities with whom we and the local Government had to deal were the commandant of the garrison and the political commissar. Relations were cordial, but the official position was difficult in many ways. Matters improved when General M. A. Maximoff, formerly of the Soviet Legation at Kabul, was appointed Consul-General early in January. This courteous, cultured, and friendly official and his staff have done much to soften the blow of the Occupation to local *amour propre*. Russia's stock has also risen thanks to the admirable discipline of the troops, the honesty and forbearance of their officers, and the efforts of the Soviet Government to provide bread and circuses for the Meshed public in the shape of several hundred tons of flour from Transcaspia and various excellent films, concert parties, and variety shows. Gradually, opinion in Khorasan is veering round in favour of the Russians, and we as their allies gain thereby. Elsewhere, in Birjand, Mekran, and Zabul, the old dislike and fear of Russia are as strong as ever.

Anglo-Russian Relations.

As stated above intercourse was at first difficult owing to the fact that all communications had to be addressed to military officers who were already fully preoccupied with other matters. But with the re-opening of the Consulate-General and the arrival of General Maximoff and his competent staff, relations at once improved and have remained excellent, both socially and politically. Even the disappointment of the Russians at the paucity of the supplies which have reached them by this route has been conveyed with the politest of hints. In security matters there has been fruitful co-operation between the two Consulates-General.

C. P. SKRINE, *Consul-General.*

July 21, 1942.

[E 5579/14/34]

No. 33.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 1,204.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 20, 1942.

PRIME Minister broadcast on evening 16th September, on anniversary of Shah's accession.

Prime Minister opened with unusually eloquent tribute to Shah's "purity of intentions and steadfastness of will" which had given encouragement to all public servants. Owing to his efforts in disciplining the army, Government had been able to establish security. His Majesty had indeed become the rallying point of the Government and nation.

After reaffirming his intention to do everything possible to assure welfare of the Persian people in present difficult circumstances, Prime Minister continued that Persian public could not know in detail what real interests of country were, and interference by them only confused opinion and hindered administration.

He asked for public support and confidence in Government's policy, which was based solely on national interest. He denied that the Government were tainted with "foreigner worship."

As long as he was in power bribery and corruption would be severely punished. A special inspectorate had been set up under his personal supervision to punish such crimes.

Government intended to reform Government's Departments, and American advisers were to be employed to assist. Methods of business would be made quicker and simpler, and young men would be given trial.

He adumbrated plan of public works, including irrigation, roads and railways. As regards food supplies, he could assure his countrymen he would not fail. He hoped the Government's measures would secure full quantity of grain. Severe anti-hoarding measures would be enforced speedily and effectively under his personal supervision. Prime Minister concluded with appeal for national unity.

[E 5621/35/34]

No. 34.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 304 E.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 14, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Persian Customs Administration have recently published the annual trade statistics for the financial year 1320, which corresponds to the period from the 21st March, 1941, to the 20th March, 1942. This publication is in Persian. The French edition is expected to be published soon and copies will be sent to you as soon as they are available.

2. Persia's total foreign trade during this period amounted to 2,659,634,719 rials in value, divided up as is shown in the following table:—

Imports—	Rials.
Commercial imports	613,853,988
Imports exempt from payment of customs duties	177,241,664
Total	791,095,652
Exports—	
Commercial exports	811,910,558
Oil products of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company	1,011,336,866
Fishery products of the Caspian Fishery Company	13,662,144
Total	1,836,909,568
Transit traffic—	
Goods that have passed through in conformity with transit regulations or have been returned to the country of origin ...	22,253,296
Goods that have not passed in transit in conformity with the regulations and have been returned to the country of origin or re-exported to another country	518,282
Goods transhipped in Persian waters ...	8,857,921

3. The Tehran newspapers remark with satisfaction that in spite of the difficult period covered by the statistics—it includes events liable to interrupt commerce temporarily, such as the Anglo-Russian occupation, after which many importers had to change over from Axis to Allied sources of supply—Persian foreign trade has not suffered overmuch from the effects of the war.

4. In fact this country is in the fortunate position of having considerable stocks of certain goods of which a shortage might have been expected because of the war. On the other hand, there is no more than a semblance of price control.

5. The opportunity which Persian traders have enjoyed until quite recently, of continuing to place orders (and consequently open credits) abroad and of obtaining shipping space for other than essential goods, has had its favourable effect on the exchange situation, counteracting in some degree the heavy expenditure of the British military authorities and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in this country.

6. On the other hand, a system of import control based on that of the Middle East Supply Centre has now been imposed by the Persian Government. It remains to be seen whether Persian trade circles will adjust themselves easily to the new conditions, under which they will no longer be able to deal in the more profitable superfluities, but will nevertheless receive every assistance in trading in essential commodities and articles. The gain to the Allied war effort is to be measured by the consequent saving of shipping space.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Department of Overseas Trade and to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 4081/19/34]

No. 35.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 200. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 25, the 17th–23rd June, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, June 23, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the Period
June 17–23, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Economic.

THE price of wheat in the Tehran district has been fixed by the Government at 1,800 rials per ton in the close neighbourhood of Tehran and at lesser prices as the distance from Tehran increases. But these prices will hold good until October only. Subsequently to that the price is reduced by 100 rials per ton per month until March 1943, when it is stabilised at Tehran at 1,200 rials per ton. The price of barley has been fixed at three-quarters of the price of wheat.

2. There have been excellent crops in the Russian Zone, in Northern Khorassan, Gilan, Mazanderan and Azerbaijan. Normally these areas have a considerable surplus available for export to less-favoured parts of Persia, but hitherto the Soviet authorities have shown no indication of any intention to allow the removal of any considerable quantities of grain or fodder. It is generally Soviet policy to keep the poor in their zone contented and fed, and their retention of food-stuffs may be as much for this purpose as for their own needs. They do, in fact, import from Russia all their fodder requirements.

Political.

3. The publication of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty has been received well, but without great enthusiasm, in Persia. It may have done something to allay the fears that, if the Allies win the war, Persian Azerbaijan will be incorporated in the Soviet Union.

4. A list and brief description of political parties in Tehran is attached as an Appendix to this Summary.

5. The Shah professes to be much concerned by the situation of the Persian troops recently sent to Rezaieh. The Governor-General and military commander have reported that the troops are practically interned in the town and that they are allowed to train only in areas indicated by the Soviet Military Commander. Their arrival had, it is claimed, restored some of the lost prestige of the Persian Government and had raised hopes in the non-Kurdish population that security would be established. But the invidious position in which they were placed by the Russian authorities had, in the opinion of the Shah, reduced the prestige of the Government to less than it was before.

Appointments—Civil.

6.—(i) Abdul Majid Ahi (M.A. 7) (F.O. 5), now Minister for Justice, to be Persian Ambassador in Moscow.

(ii) Mohamed Sa'id (M.A. 252) (F.O. 182), lately Persian Ambassador in Moscow, to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

7. In Western Azerbaijan, in the area Shahpur (Dilman)-Rezaieh, there is still a lack of security. Peasants are afraid to go afield to harvest their crops. The military posts that had been established by the Soviet authorities in villages to give confidence to the inhabitants have, according to reports of the Governor-General, been withdrawn. The Persian troops are confined to the town of Rezaieh (see paragraph 5 above). The Persian Government is now asking the Soviet authorities to agree to the posting of mixed detachments for the protection of villages. They fear that small detachments of Persian troops alone would be overwhelmed by the Kurds and believe that the association with them of even a few Russians would deter the Kurds from attacking.

Bakhtiari.

8. There are reports of unrest in Bakhtiari, but there does not as yet seem to be much foundation for them.

Kermanshah Province.

9. There has been fighting between the Babajani and Guran tribes in the Shahabad district. It appears to be purely an inter-tribal squabble.

10. The Khalkhani tribe is also said to be restless after the murder of the Sub-Governor of Gilan (West) near Shahabad.

Kerman.

11. Insecurity is also reported on the Kerman-Bandar Abbas road and a convoy of U.K.C.C. lorries was recently held up and looted by bandits.

Bushire and Gulf Ports.

12. The operations in Dashti are progressing favourably. Most of the rebel leaders have submitted, though Ali Ismail is still at large.

Persian Forces.

13. The Soviet military authorities have invited a mission of Persian officers to visit Russia. This mission is to be headed by Sartip Ansari, lately Director of the Third Bureau of the General Staff, a very good choice.

Appointments—Military.

- 14.—(i) Sarhang Amidi to be Chief of Staff of the 1st (Tehran) Division.
(ii) Sarhang Mushiri to be Assistant Director of the Officers' School.

15. The United States has decided not to send a military mission to Persia for the reorganisation of the Persian army. This is much to be regretted, as only in such a mission was there hope of making any substantial improvement in the elimination of corruption and of pro-Axis sentiments.

Russian Interests.

16. A Russian geological mission under Colonel Polkolnik is reported by the Persian press to be working in the vicinity of Semnan.

Chinese Interests.

17. Mr. Li Ti-sing, Chinese Minister in Persia, has arrived in Tehran.

Iraqi Interests.

18. The Iraqi Minister-Designate to Afghanistan, Seyyid Jamil Alravi, has passed through Tehran on his way to Kabul.

Appendix.

THE following is a list of the principal political parties in Tehran:—

Name of Party.	Leaders.	Newspapers.	Aims.
Tudah...	Suleiman Iskandari ...	<i>Siasat</i> ...	Social reform, with vague Communist tendencies. Support of Tripartite Treaty.
Adalat (Justice) ...	Sheikh Ali Dashti ... Farajollah Bahramy (Dabir-i-A'zam) Reza Hikmat (Sardar Fakhir) Ibrahim Khadjeh-Noury ... Hassan Ali Kemal-Hedayat (Nasr-ul-Mulk) Mustafa Quli Kemal-Hedayat (Fahim-ud-Douleh) Saeedi (Ministry of Roads) ... Usanlou (Under-Secretary to Municipality) Ighbal Jelal-ud-Din Imami Khoi Liqvani Majid Muwaqqar Ittihad (editor of <i>Umid</i>) Faramarzi (editor of <i>Keihan</i>) Tabatabai (editor of <i>Tajaddud</i>) Amini (Rais Kuli Parsh) Sigbat-ul-Islami Fardudeh (Deputy for Mes-hed) Rigi (Deputy for Baluchistan)	<i>Mehr-i-Iran</i> ...	Professedly Liberal. Practically job-seeking.
Milli (National) ...	Tadayyun ...	Nil ...	More or less inactive at present.
Maihan Parastan (Patriots)	Dr. Abdul Hassan Shaikh ... Dr. Baatam Muhandis Humayun Khusrau Diba Karim Isfahani Muhandis Ruhani	Nil ...	Anti-Tudah.
Vahdat-i-Milli (National Unity)	Jehangir (Ministry of Finance) Farhudi (Ministry of Education) Tihrani Sami'i (Ambassador to Afghanistan) Yamin Esfandiary Prime Minister is said to have given the party his blessing	<i>Ittila'at</i> ...	Little but preservation of vested interests.
Iran-i-Javan (Young Persia)	Musharrraf Naficy ... Furughi Ahi Mustafa Fateh Abdul Hassan Ibtehaj	Nil ...	At first thought (erroneously) to be sponsored by British Legation because of number of members connected with A.I.O.C. Now reorganised, but no definite programme issued.
Iran (Persia) ...	Saadat Fraction in the Majlis Deputies Muayyad Ahmadi, Dadvar, &c.	<i>Namah-i-Iran</i> . (Not yet founded)	Preservation of Iranian independence, resistance to any return to dictatorship, economic reform.
Hizb-i-U. or Hizb-i-Shah ("His Party," or "The Shah's Party")	Unknown, but one Firdaus, an employee of the Court, is thought to have been responsible for most of the organisation.	Nil ...	Loyalty to the Shah as "Saviour of the Country."

Tehran, June 23, 1942.

[E 4124/19/34]

No. 36.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 211.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 26, the 24th-30th June, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, June 30, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 36.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the Period
June 24-30, 1942.*

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Economic.* (See Summary No. 25/42, paragraph 1.)

THE Persian Government is becoming more and more anxious lest their wheat policy should be a failure. The current belief that there is a shortage encourages hoarding, partly as an insurance, and partly for sales on the black market, where the rate is double the Government rate. They also realise that the widespread corruption among their subordinate officials handicaps any honest efforts. The alternatives open to the Persian Government is to raise the price of wheat, which would necessitate either subsidising bread, which they say they cannot afford to do, or raising the price of bread, thus arousing a popular clamour which they have not the courage to face. The Government's idea of an ideal solution is that imports of wheat should continue to arrive and that hoarders should be forced to disgorge their stocks by economic necessity rather than by compulsion by Government.

2. In order that close touch may be maintained with the position regarding the country's wheat supplies so that estimates can be made of the further economic assistance required in accordance with the terms of the treaty, His Majesty's Legation has attached officers to the consulates in such numbers as have been considered advisable, for the purpose of assisting in the collection of the greatest possible quantity of wheat from the districts. These officers will have no executive authority, nor will they interfere in any way with the working of arrangements made by the Ministry of Finance. Officers of that Ministry, however, will give them any information that they may require regarding the assessment and collection of wheat in their areas. These officers will tour freely and make any investigations as they may think necessary, and will also visit the collecting depots. Should any avoidance of delivery or other malpractices come to their notice, they will, after such investigations as they may think fit to make, report the matter to the British Legation for the information of the Ministry of Finance.

3. In an endeavour to prevent hoarding and smuggled export to neighbouring countries, cigarettes in Tehran have been rationed at the rate of 2½ per head per day.

Currency.

4. The Persian Government, having decided to mint additional coins, has applied to the United States for the purchase of the necessary silver. The American Government is said to have sanctioned the sale, payment for which will be made in dollars.

Foreign Exchange.

5. Owing to the removal by the Persian Government of restrictions on the purchase of foreign exchange, the black market in Basra, on which a rate of 144 rials to the pound sterling was ruling, has ceased to function. Dollars are still being bought in this market.

Appointments—Civil. (See Summary No. 25/42, paragraph 6 (i).)

6.—(i) Abdul Majid Ahi has not yet accepted the post of Persian Ambassador in Moscow even though his *agrément* has been obtained from the Russian Government. The Prime Minister is said to be embarrassed by his refusal.

(ii) Rukn-ud-Din Ashtiani, of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be consul-general *ad interim* in Palestine. He is to be succeeded by Ahmad Qadimi Navai, second secretary of the Persian Embassy in Ankara.

Census Figures—Christian.

7. The following census figures of Christians in the larger towns have been supplied by an official of the Ministry of the Interior to the oriental secretary of this legation. They are not guaranteed as accurate:—

	Armenians.	Assyrians.	Chaldeans.	Other Christians.	Unclassified Christians.
Tehran	15,831	388	217	9,541	...
Meshed	626
Isfahan	5,405	141	...
Tabriz	7,746	99	47	322	...
Ardebil	19	5	...
Kermanshah	450	868	29	598	...
Kerman	1	47	...
Hamadan	945	1,244	71	1,263	...

Census Figures—Yezd.

8. According to the economic census, which is believed to be more accurate than the recent official census of certain large towns, the population of Yezd and surroundings to a radius of 6 kilom., is as follows:—

Mahometans	49,866
Zoroastrians	6,700
Jews	3,500

As Yezd and Kerman are the chief centres of the Zoroastrians, their total is surprisingly small and that of the Jews surprisingly large.

*Persian Army.**Appointments—Military.*

9. Sartip Abul Hassan Purzand to the General Officer Commanding, 3rd Division, Azerbaijan.

10. The Persian Ministry of War has decided to close the secondary military schools in the provinces. Pupils now under instruction will be able to pursue their studies at the Military College in Tehran.

General Greely.

11. General Greely has taken up his appointment as adviser to the Intendant-General's Department of the Persian Ministry of War. He originally came to Persia as head of an American Military Mission to Russia which, for various reasons, did not proceed. Its members have now dispersed.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.* (See Summary No. 25/42, paragraph 7.)

12. The situation generally remains unchanged. No fresh cases of looting by Kurds on a large scale are reported, but the villagers are still afraid to go far afield. With the exception of five small detachments, the Persian forces are still confined to Rezaieh by the Russians. The Persian Government is pressing the Russians to allow the posting of mixed detachments of Russian and Persian troops up to a total of twenty to protect villages in the affected areas.

Fars.

13. The Boir Ahmadi are still raiding and are a cause of unrest and anxiety in both Fars and Isfahan provinces. They have a disturbing effect on

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Bakhtiari and Qashgai and other Kuhgilu tribes. It is fully realised by the Persian authorities that they must be dealt with by force. (See Summary No. 24/42, paragraph 14.)

Bakhtiari.

14. Nadir Quli Bakhtiari has surrendered and is now in Isfahan. (See Summary No. 21/42, paragraph 13.)

British Interests.

Transport.

15. The U.K.C.C. is taking over, with effect from the 8th July, the work of the East Persian Auxiliary Transport Service in carrying supplies for Russia from Zahedan to Meshed. They are putting 150 lorries on the road at once and are prepared to increase their transport if required.

16. The General Officer Commanding, Tenth Army, arrived by air in Tehran on the 23rd June. On the 24th June, accompanied by the military attaché, he went to Tabriz at the invitation of General Melnik, commanding Russian forces in North-West Persia. He travelled to Tabriz and back in a Russian plane. The general officer commanding returned to Tehran on the 27th June.

Communications.

17. During the past fortnight there has been more interference with British military telephone lines in the Kermanshah area. Some of the acts, such as causing a short-circuit by binding a loop round two military wires, are clearly sabotage. There have, in addition, been ordinary thefts of wire by villagers.

Czechoslovak Interests.

18. General Sergei Ingers, Minister of National Defence, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Kalla, military attaché in London, arrived by air in Tehran on the 24th June. They have proceeded to Russia.

Russian Interests.

19. Two parties of entomologists are leaving shortly for locust research work in the south and west. Their routes are as follows:—

First party: Isfahan-Bushire-Bandar Abbas-Kerman and Zahedan.

Second party: Isfahan-Bushire-Ahwaz-Irano-Iraqi frontier.

They are working in collaboration with the British Imperial Institute of Entomology.

Greek Interests.

20. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires has received instructions from his Government to call up for military service all Greek nationals of the 1914-21 classes who are fit for military service. He has been instructed to seek the assistance of the Persian Government in rounding-up any objectors. His task is rendered more difficult by the absence of Greek representation in Persia in the past and the consequent lack of complete registers of his nationals. He has also been instructed to ask the Persian Government to register as Greek subjects all the Dodecanese in Persia, who up till now have been Italian subjects.

Polish Interests.

21. About 1,305 women refugees have been enlisted into the A.T.S. and a large number of refugee boys as "Boy Soldiers."

The location as on the 29th June in Persia was as follows:—

Military—	Pahlevi.	Tehran.
Men	337	713
	(Rear party)	
Women	153	1,600

In hospital in Tehran (all classes): 200 approximately.

Tehran, June 30, 1942.

[E 4355/19/34]

No. 37.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 219.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of military attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27, the 1st-7th July, 1942.

Tehran, July 7, 1942.

(Secret.)

Enclosure in No. 37.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the Period
July 1-7, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

DISCONTENT with the present Cabinet is increasing, the usual charges being nepotism, corruption and incapacity. Rightly or wrongly, Ministers are accused of being deeply involved in hoarding and other plans for profiteering. The supporters of Sayyid Ziaeddin Tabatabai (Personalities: M.A. 256, F.O. 206) are being more active in endeavouring to increase their numbers. Sayyid Ziaeddin has now informed his brother in Tehran that he is willing to return to Persia when the opportunity is considered favourable. He would want to be assured of the approval of the Shah and of the British and Soviet representatives.

Public Opinion.

2. Public opinion has been much affected by the defeats of the British army in Libya, and particularly in military circles the Prime Minister's statement that the VIIIth Army had generally superiority in numbers has increased the prestige of Rommel and the German army. On the other hand, it has also roused respect for British frankness.

Police Regulations.

3. Reference Summary No. 17/42, paragraph 2. The police have now issued a further proclamation announcing the laws under which action will be taken against persons accused of pro-Axis activities.

Appointments—Civil.

4.—(i) Seyed Mehdi Farrukh (M.A. 85, F.O. 66), lately Governor-General of Kerman, to be Minister of the Interior.

(ii) Abdul Hussein Sadiqi Nejad to be Director-General in the Ministry of Education.

(iii) Colonel Shaker Tabatabai (M.A. 287) to be Governor of Shahabad.

Persian Forces.

Army.

5. The Bill for the amendment of the Conscription Law (see Summary No. 24/42, paragraph 10) is now before the Majlis. The principle of conscription has been generally approved by Deputies. Criticism has been directed against the corruption of officers applying the law and against the period of service, particularly as regards conscripts with dependants.

6. The Minister for War, during the debate on the Bill for the amendment of the Conscription Law, stated that the annual intake of recruits could not in present circumstances exceed 45,000.

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7. The divisions and brigades of the army will be numbered and located as follows when the new organisation is complete:—

Division.	Brigades.	Location.
1st (Tehran)	1st	Tehran.
	2nd	Tehran.
	3rd	Tehran (Intended for Resht).
	One Mixed Ind. Mechanised Bde.	Tehran.
	One Independent Cavalry Brigade	Tehran.
2nd (Tehran)	4th	Tehran.
	5th	Tehran.
	6th	Tehran (Intended for Gorgan).
3rd (Azerbaijan)	7th	Tabriz (Divnl. H.Q.).
	8th	Rezaieh.
	9th	Ardebil.
4th (Kurdistan and Kermanshah)	10th	Senneh.
	11th	Saqqiz.
	12th	Kermanshah (Divnl. H.Q.).
5th (Luristan and Khuzestan) ...	13th	Khorramabad (Divnl. H.Q.).
	14th	Ahwaz.
6th (Fars)	15th	Shiraz (Divnl. H.Q.).
	16th	Kazerun.
	17th	Jahrum.
7th (Kerman and Persian Baluchistan)	18th	Kerman (Divnl. H.Q.).
	19th	Khwash.
	20th	Birjand (H.Q.: Zabol).
8th (Khorassan)	21st	Mashed (Divnl. H.Q.).
	22nd	Bujnurd.
	23rd	Turbat-i-Jam.
9th (Isfahan)	24th	Isfahan (Divnl. H.Q.).

Appointments—Military.

8.—(i) Sarhang Mansur Muzaini, from Director of 4th Bureau, General Staff, to be Second-in-Command of 6th (Fars) Division.

(ii) Sartip Seyvid Mahmoud Mirjalali, from command of the Independent Mechanised Brigade, to be Commander of 8th (Khorassan) Division.

(iii) Sargurd Mohamed Mushiri to be Chief of Staff of the Khuzestan Brigade.

(iv) Sartip Abul Hassan Purzand's appointment to command 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division (see Summary No. 26/42, paragraph 9) has been cancelled, as he is unacceptable to the Russians.

Air Force.

9. The units of the Persian air force hitherto located at the Qaleh Morgeh aerodrome are now obliged to find accommodation elsewhere as the aerodrome has been taken over by the Russian air force (see paragraph 11 below). The 1st Regiment of the Persian air force, consisting of—

- 20 Hawker Hinds,
- 14 Tiger Moths,
- 14 Hawker Furies,

a total of forty-eight aircraft, has been transferred to Isfahan. The move has been completed.

Internal Security.

10. There is little to report: a certain amount of highway robbery and looting of flocks in Fars and Yazd; apprehensions of further Kurdish pillaging in Western Azerbaijan; no further developments in Southern Kurdistan and Bakhtiari.

British Interests.

11. An agreement has been come to between the Royal Air Force and the Soviet authorities regarding the use of aerodromes in Tehran. The Russians are to have administrative control of the Qaleh Morgeh aerodrome, the British, in conjunction with the Persians, of the aerodromes at Doshan Tappeh and Mehra-bad. All aerodromes may be used by both parties.

Russian Interests.

12. General Pavlovsky, reported to be an expert on tropical diseases, lectured recently at the Tehran University and was subsequently elected an honorary member of the Persian Academy.

13. The prestige of the Russian army now stands relatively high in Persian opinion. This is due partly to their military achievements, notably to the defence of Sebastopol, which has commanded Persian military admiration, and partly to the generally admirable behaviour of their troops. Better relations are noticeable between Persian and Russian officers.

Czechoslovak Interests.

14. The Persian Government has recognised the Government of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Legation was formally opened on the 24th June by General Ingr (see Summary No. 26/42, paragraph 18), with Dr. Bachtik as chargé d'affaires.

Polish Interests.

15. General Sikorski has telegraphed to General Anders to the effect that the Soviet Government has agreed to the evacuation of all Polish troops from Russia. The Polish authorities in Tehran estimate that the numbers will amount to 50,000-70,000. They are likely to be accompanied by a large number of families.

Foreign Officials.

16. A list of foreign consuls in Persia is attached as an Appendix.⁽¹⁾

Tehran, July 7, 1942.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

[E 4360/19/34]

No. 38.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 229.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 28, the 8th-14th July, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, July 14, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period July 8-14, 1942. (Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE position of the Cabinet grows more shaky and the resignation of the Prime Minister is commonly believed to be imminent. Criticism and discontent are more openly expressed and are concentrated chiefly on the Government's failure to inspire confidence that they are capable of ensuring the country's wheat supplies. In the Majlis there is opposition chiefly from the Adalat party (see Appendix to Summary No. 25/42), who are annoyed because they have not secured representation in the Cabinet. The two local candidates for the premiership, Tadayyun (M.A. 288; F.O. 207) and Qawam-es-Sultaneh (M.A. 295; F.O. 213), are very active.

2. There are rumours that certain generals are plotting a *coup d'Etat* which will establish a military dictatorship with the Shah as a figure-head. These rumours are probably not without foundation, but there is little indication that plans are very far advanced or that the Shah knows of, or could be persuaded to agree to, such a project. He has, however, made remarks that indicate a weakening faith in the virtues of democracy and the liberty of the subject. He continues to associate himself closely with the army, regards himself not only as its constitutional head, but also as in fact its commander-in-chief, and is inclined to sympathise with the generals, who desire to reduce to the minimum

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control over the army by Government and Parliament. The record of Parliament and Cabinets since the abolition of the dictatorship is sufficient justification for a modification of the Shah's previous views. Few generals have any faith in Persian politicians.

3. The Government is, indeed, being very ineffective. It has as yet made no use of the full powers given to it by the Majlis to deal with the collection and distribution of food-stuffs. Although pro-Axis and anti-Ally propaganda is very active, it has in no case taken action except under pressure from His Majesty's Legation. The proclamation issued (see Summary No. 27/42, paragraph 3) seems to have been just eyewash for the Allies, as the Anti-Hoarding Law seems to have been eyewash for the people.

Economic.

4. The position of the wheat supplies in the country is still obscure. Not even an approximate estimate has been made of what is available. It is, however, clear that wheat will not voluntarily be surrendered at the prices now being offered by Government. Some pressure is being brought on the Government to free the price of wheat.

5. Some weeks ago in Isfahan an experiment was tried whereby the bakers were permitted to purchase half their requirements of flour in the black market, the other half being allotted from the Government grain stores. The result was a rise of nearly 60 per cent. in the price of bread, but at the same time supplies became plentiful. More recently in Shiraz the market for flour has been freed of Government control. There also the previous shortage has given way to an abundance of bread, though the price has nearly doubled.

6. There is much public anxiety regarding the food supplies of the country, which is being aggravated by all those hostile to the Allies and the Government. The Allies are accused of exporting large quantities of food-stuffs without consideration of the needs of the Persian people. Food riots have occurred in Resht, where Russian troops had to intervene to restore order. Over 100 arrests are reported to have been made. Riots may break out in other towns, and they will easily be turned into anti-Ally demonstrations.

Pro-Axis Propaganda.

7. German agents and sympathisers are very active. The situation in Egypt and in Russia gives them ample opportunity for rousing anxiety in all those who have in any way supported the Allies. There is naturally a reluctance to take action that is openly anti-German.

Appointments—Civil.

8. Muhammad Agha Diwanbegi (M.A. 79; F.O. 64) to be Ustandar of Khuzistan.

Kurdistan.

Internal Security.

9. The Persian Government showed some resentment at the migration from Iraq to Persia of some families of the Jaf tribe. This migration used to occur regularly and with little restriction before the days of Reza Shah. He for a time endeavoured to prevent it, but in latter years had allowed it subject to certain restrictions; arms had to be left at the frontier and a grazing tax paid. This year, in the absence of any effective Persian Administration, the Jaf crossed the frontier without permission, and with their arms. The Persian Government addressed a note to the Iraqi Government threatening reprisals against the Jaf, but it is unlikely that they will take any punitive action against the Jaf as long as the latter behave.

10. Hama Rashid still remains near the Iraqi frontier. Iraqi Government pressure, if any has been applied, has as yet failed to induce him to withdraw into Iraq.

Khorassan.

11. Baluch raiders held up three East Persia auxiliary transport lorries some 50 miles south of Meshed. Two of these lorries managed to escape, even though one of the drivers was severely wounded. The third lorry failed to escape and the driver was stripped and robbed of all he had. All the drivers were Indians.

General.

12. Main roads are moderately safe. There are no serious disturbances, but many minor robberies.

British Interests.

13. His Majesty's Minister returned to Tehran from the United Kingdom on the 13th July.

American Interests.

14. It is reported in the press that the American Government has presented to the Persian Government the name of an adviser for the reorganisation of the Persian police.

Czechoslovak Interests.

15. General Ingr (see Summary No. 26/42, paragraph 18) has returned from Russia and will leave for Cairo and London on the 15th July.

Polish Interests.

16. His Excellency M. J. Karszo-Siedlewski, Polish Minister in Tehran since February 1939 (also accredited to Iraq and Afghanistan), is leaving shortly to take up the appointment of Polish Minister in Beirut. The present incumbent of that post is relieving M. Karszo-Siedlewski in Tehran.

Tehran, July 14, 1942.

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No. 39.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 235.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 29, the 15th–21st July, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, July 21, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the Period July 15–21, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

ALTHOUGH the Prime Minister is said to have improved his own position *vis-à-vis* his critics, opposition to and criticism of him, his Government and its lack of achievement continue. The Prime Minister has invited Tadayyun (M.A. 288, F.O. 207) to join the Cabinet as Minister of Justice in place of Ahi (M.A. 7, F.O. 5), who has been appointed ambassador to Moscow (see Summary No. 25/42, paragraph 6 (i)). He refuses, however, to give up his portfolio. Nor has Tadayyun yet agreed to accept office. A new candidate for the premiership has appeared in Bayat (M.A. 65, F.O. 50), the Vice-President of the Majlis, but, as the law stands, no Deputy can become a Cabinet Minister until three months have elapsed since his resignation from Parliament.

2. It is not yet clear whether the Prime Minister, Soheily, will be forced to resign or whether he will attempt to gain a reprieve by changing members of his Cabinet.

Economic.

3. Anxiety about the wheat situation is increasing and the Government is inclined to panic. They appealed to His Majesty's Legation for an import of 10,000 tons of wheat per month for three months to tide them over the crisis created largely by their own vacillation. They have been promised 5,000 tons, as the situation appeared to be critical. But they have been warned that they will get no more. That, however, does not greatly impress the Government, who continue to tell the people that they are confident that the Allies will implement their promises to give such economic help as is required.

4. As an indication of the weakness of the Government may be cited the shortage of wheat in Ahwaz for daily consumption. The Khuzestan wheat crop is already harvested and the Government stores should be filling up, but a ring of would-be profiteers, headed by the Deputy for Ahwaz, are holding up supplies

while pressure is brought on the Government to free the price of wheat from Government control. The Government appears to be unwilling to apply the Anti-Hoarding Law, although there is here a clear case for doing so. There has as yet been no prosecution under that law.

Attitude towards the War.

5. The belief grows that the Germans will reach the Caucasus and Persia, the result being a reluctance to be openly identified with a pro-Ally policy, still less with an anti-Axis policy. The tone of the press, however, remains, on the whole, satisfactory. In spite of the experience of other countries, many Persians appear not to fear a German occupation, some to be ready to welcome it. Existing maladministration and anxiety about food supplies incline some people to accept the opinion that things could not be much worse under the Germans. All, however, fear Persia becoming a battle-ground. It is hoped that hostilities would be confined to Western Persia, and it is not impossible that in the minds of some Persians, notably some generals, and possibly the Shah, plans are maturing for the eventual establishment of a Government in Isfahan or further East that would come to terms with the Germans. There is, however, as yet little more than surmise to support this theory.

Appointments: Civil.

- 6.—(i) Zain-ul-Abidin Qiami to be Farmandar of Kazvin.
- (ii) Nasrullah Mustashiri to be Farmandar of Kermanshah and Deputy Governor-General of the 5th Ustan.
- (iii) Amir Hikmat to be Director-General of the Medical Department of the Ministry of Health.
- (iv) Nasrullah Saifpur Fatimi, Head of Shiraz Municipality, to be Farmandar of Shiraz.

NOTE.—The officials quoted under (i) and (ii) above are exchanging appointments.

Fars.

Internal Security.

7. The Qashqai chief, Nasir, and his brother Khosrow have not yet made submission to the Persian Government. Nasir is in the neighbourhood of Firuzabad (Degree sheet H-39.W) with an armed following estimated at several hundred. Frequent unconfirmed reports are received of the presence with him of two or more Germans. He is reported to be apprehensive of an attack by Government troops, but the general officer commanding is also apprehensive of the dangers of such an attack. His brother Khosrow is with part of the tribe in their summer quarters near Samirum (Degree sheet H-39.D-W.5496), in fairly close contact with troops of the Isfahan Brigade. Both sides appear to have agreed to observe an indefinite armistice.

8. Meanwhile, there are reports of an intended or existing combination of these Qashqai chiefs with the rebel chiefs of Kuhgalu, notably Abdullah Boirahmadi and Hussein Quli Mamassani. Such a combination has for some time been reported as the aim of German agents. Abdullah Boirahmadi appears to be trying to get himself recognised as their chief by the several sections of the Boir Ahmadi, who rarely manage to avoid quarrelling with each other for long.

9. Although the only tribe in Fars in active rebellion to the Government is the Boir Ahmadi, the situation is not satisfactory. The Persian Government has not yet dared to attempt to impose its authority over the Qashqai and Kuhgalu tribes, and in large parts of Fars there is no Persian administration. These tribes have never been friendly to Great Britain and they are a potential danger, which is, however, not likely to develop seriously unless the military situation deteriorates considerably.

Bakhtiari.

10. The Minister for War has recently visited Isfahan and reports that he considers that the situation in Bakhtiari is satisfactory. Chiefs of the Chahar Lang had come in to Isfahan to assure him of their loyalty to Government.

Kurdistan.

11. Hama Rashid has sent his son to General Arfa, commanding Persian troops in Kurdistan.

Azerbaijan.

12. The press reports that on the 11th July 100 Kurdish chiefs of Western Azerbaijan had accepted the invitation of the Governor-General to visit him.

He addressed them in the presence of the Soviet Consul, reminded them of their duty and exhorted them to be good subjects. The Soviet Consul also advised them to do nothing to disturb the peace.

13. Confidence has not yet been fully restored in Western Azerbaijan. There are still refugees from the towns in the villages, but they are gradually going back.

British Interests.

14. The U.K.C.C. has now taken over the operation of motor transport on the road Zahidan-Meshed, and the East Persian Auxiliary Transport Service has been dissolved.

Polish Interests.

15. M. Karol Bader, the new Polish Minister in Tehran, has presented his credentials (see Summary No. 28/42, paragraph 16).

16. The Polish civilian refugees now in Persia are to be evacuated to East Africa.

Census Figures.

17. Census figures of the more important towns of Persia are given as an appendix to this Summary.

Tehran, July 21, 1942.

Appendix.

*Population of Thirty-five Persian Towns, Census of which has been taken.
(At various dates, 1940-42.)*

Official Government Figures as at July 10, 1942.

No.	Town.	Male.	Female.	Total.	Number of Families.
1.	Kashan	22,001	22,993	44,994	9,938
2.	Tehran	312,038	228,049	540,087	128,323
3.	Tabriz	109,629	103,913	213,342	44,036
4.	Meshed	92,476	83,995	176,471	42,284
5.	Ardabil	31,700	31,706	64,406	12,738
6.	Isfahan	104,505	100,093	204,598	47,230
7.	Hamadan	51,757	52,117	103,874	22,453
8.	Shiraz	70,007	59,016	129,023	28,327
9.	Kermanshah	47,265	41,357	88,622	19,665
10.	Kerman	25,654	24,394	50,048	12,000
11.	Yezd	28,822	31,244	60,066	14,518
12.	Pahlevi	19,481	18,030	37,511	7,928
13.	Resht	61,409	60,216	121,625	24,490
14.	Ardestan	2,644	3,025	5,669	1,305
15.	Demavand	4,915	5,083	9,998	1,737
16.	Kazvin	27,008	28,143	55,151	12,082
17.	Gulpaigan	10,376	10,468	20,844	4,320
18.	Qum	24,765	27,872	52,367	11,987
19.	Quchan	20,646	11,037	31,683	4,960
20.	Fizurkuh	1,554	1,487	3,041	648
21.	Na'in	3,081	3,709	6,790	1,718
22.	Saveh	7,430	7,935	15,365	3,517
23.	Aligudarz	4,273	4,186	8,459	1,875
24.	Bujnurd	8,518	6,775	15,293	3,195
25.	Mahallat	4,324	4,924	9,248	2,061
26.	Rafsinjan	6,927	7,940	14,867	3,742
27.	Zinjan	19,814	19,636	39,450	9,235
28.	Semnan	10,367	12,511	23,078	5,413
29.	Khunsar	9,319	10,072	19,291	3,712
30.	Feridan	4,654	4,604	9,258	1,879
31.	Zarand Kerman	2,209	2,284	4,493	1,143
32.	Damghan	5,477	6,758	12,235	2,798
33.	Sultanabad	24,928	26,437	51,365	11,509
34.	Gunbad-i-Kabus	5,603	4,034	9,637	1,668
35.	Shahrud	11,348	11,784	23,132	5,483

[E 4604/19/34]

No. 40.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 246.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period from the 22nd to the 28th July, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, July 28, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 40.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period
July 22 to 28, 1942.*

*Persian Affairs**Political.*

THE situation is deteriorating. The Prime Minister has little authority or prestige left; there are dissensions in the Cabinet; Ahi, the Minister of Justice, is in open revolt and refuses to vacate his seat; Tadayyun is reluctant to accept office. The people are excited by intrigue and propaganda, by rumours of *coup d'Etat* and new dictatorships, and anxious about food supplies. The Government is too unstable to reach any decision, still less to put it into effect.

Economic.

2. No effective steps have yet been taken to secure the wheat supply of the towns. The Government considers, perhaps rightly, that to raise the price to be paid by Government for the wheat that proprietors are bound to sell would be no solution and would merely result in a corresponding rise in the black market. Moreover, the Government maintains that it cannot afford to subsidise bread to the extent that would be required if the price of wheat were raised. On the other hand, the Government has not the courage to use the full powers given to it by the Majlis and to force proprietors to give up their wheat, nor would they find much support in the Majlis for strong measures, many of the members being themselves proprietors. The Anti-Hoarding Law remains a dead letter.

3. In the muddle created by inefficiency, vested interests, greed and cowardice, the food situation for the poor man is likely to become critical. The creation of a Ministry of Food has been discussed, but a horde of additional officials is likely only to make matters worse. The appointment of a Food Board, which might include representatives of the Allies, is now under consideration.

4. The Ministry of Finance publishes the following information:—

	<i>Rials.</i>
Notes issued to the 16th July	2,400,000,000
Notes in circulation on the 16th July	1,998,245,935
Value of gold and silver cover	67,034,886,095

Communications.

5. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs is buying some of the Rearwin machines belonging to the Tehran Aero Club for the purpose of establishing postal air services on the lines—

Tehran-Shiraz;
Tehran-Meshed;
Tehran-Tabriz.

Appointments—Civil.

- 6.—(i) Abdul Azim Ahmadi, to be Farmandar of Tabriz.
- (ii) Mohamed Ali Oveisi, to be Under-Secretary of State for Commerce.
- (iii) Baqir Fahimi, to be Persian Consul at Damascus.
- (iv) Amir Assad is reported to have resigned his appointment as Governor of Mahabad.
- (v) Mansur Rahmani, to be Farmandar of Bam.

Persian Army.

7. There is much secret intrigue in the army at present. Senior officers are suspicious of each other; some fear pro-German plots, others fear *coups d'Etat*. Those who are not pro-German are beginning to worry about the fate that would befall them if the Germans were to reach to Persia.

Appointments—Military.

8. Sarwan Seyyid Ali Khan, Amir Sadri, to be Military Governor of the Khamseh tribes.

Internal Security.

9. The prevailing lack of confidence in, and of respect for, the Government, which is generally regarded as a British puppet, combined with a growing belief that the war will reach Persia and anxiety regarding food supplies, all of which provide excellent material for anti-Ally propaganda, are having a disturbing effect on the country. Riots have occurred in Nahavend and Tuisarkhan and are likely to occur in other places as demonstrations against the high prices and scarcity of foodstuffs. The Allies, particularly the British, are blamed; where there is misery feeling is easily aroused against the British and against the corrupt Government which they are popularly supposed to support. The atmosphere generally is favourable for attempts against British interests.

Fars.

10. Unconfirmed reports have been received that Nasir Qashgai is making a landing ground near Firuzabad (degree sheet H. 39-W). Endeavour is being made to clear up these reports and those of the presence with him of some Germans. The approaches to Firuzabad are reported to be well guarded by Nasir's men.

11. The Qashgai tribes, who for a time were moderately well-behaved, are showing an increasing tendency to plunder crops and herds. This may indicate a growing confidence that they can do so with impunity.

Other Tribal Areas.

12. There are no new developments in Bakhtiari or Kurdistan. There are reports that in Lurestan the chiefs are forming an anti-Government or anti-British combination.

British Interests.

13. The Persian Government shows increasing reluctance to take action even against well-known pro-Axis propagandists or suspected agents. The recent arrest of certain Germans, who were in hiding, owed little to the action of the Persian authorities, many, if not most, of whom are now engaged in protecting rather than exposing friends of Germany.

Russian Interests.

14. Russians in Tehran do not conceal their opinion of the gravity of the situation in Russia, but claim that they have grounds for confidence that they will be able to prevent the Germans from gaining any decisive success before the second front in Europe is opened. Russians in Persia appear to have understood statements made in London after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty to mean that a second front would be opened this year.

15. The Soviet Consul at Rezaieh has toured the villages in the area Rezaieh-Ushnu, has addressed both villagers and Kurds, reassuring the former and expressing to the latter Soviet disapproval of lawlessness. His Majesty's Consul in Azerbaijan reports that co-operation between Russians and Persians in the Rezaieh area now appears to be good.

Tehran, July 28, 1942.

[E 4985/19/34]

No. 41.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 24.)
(No. 257.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 31, 29th July-4th August, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, August 4, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 41.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the Period July 29 to August 4, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government resigned on the 30th July. On the 2nd August the Majlis voted in favour of the premiership being offered to Qavam es Sultaneh, who received fifty-five votes; Soheily, the retiring Prime Minister, being next with twenty-seven votes.

2. Ahmad Qavam, Qavam es Sultaneh (Persia, F.O. 213, M.A. 295), was a very well-known figure in Persian political life until twenty years ago when, on the rise to power of Reza Shah, he withdrew into private life after a period of exile. He has held many portfolios and has had some administrative experience as a governor-general. He had energy, some force of character, cleverness and guile. It remains to be seen how twenty years of absence from political life have affected his character. His selection is a disappointment to the small class of honest young Persians anxious for reform. To them he represents the old school of corrupt politician drawn from the land-owning classes. Incongruously enough, his candidature was discreetly supported by the Soviet Embassy. He had many enemies and will inevitably make many more if he genuinely attempts to solve the problems before him.

3. The new Government will find a formidable task in front of it. Its predecessor did little to solve the problem of the country's food supplies. If it takes the drastic steps that are essential, the new Government will arouse the hostility of the landowners (to which class the new Prime Minister belongs) and of the number of merchants now hoping to profiteer in grain and other food-stuffs. If it fails it may be faced with riots that will have to be suppressed by force. Necessary measures to economise and to make the best use of the country's transport resources will also bring it much unpopularity, while a policy of blatant co-operation with the Allies in such matters as the surrender to British custody of prominent persons suspected of Germanophil sentiments, and the organisation of A.R.P. measures would in the present atmosphere of dislike for the alliance and of the Allies make its position very precarious in the absence of active and more than moral support. Add to these difficulties an army determined to restrict to the minimum Cabinet and parliamentary control, and having at least the passive sympathy of the Shah.

4. The outgoing Prime Minister, in a speech to the Majlis in which he announced his resignation, claimed that during the four and a half months of his tenure of office order had been restored throughout the country; recent riots were due to intrigues and not to natural causes. Every effort had been made to encourage spring sowings with unprecedentedly successful results. His Government was not to blame for the short showings of the autumn. There were no grounds for anxiety about food supplies. The question of exchange had been settled with the British authorities to the advantage of Persia. Good relations had been maintained with the Allies on the basis of the Tripartite Treaty, and a real collaboration had been achieved with America.

5. There have been food riots at Burujird and Gulpaigan, resulting in damage to Government property and injury to the rioters. There are grounds for suspecting that these riots are instigated by parties hostile to the Government. See also Summary No. 28/42, paragraph 6.

6. The trial of Colonel Mukhtari, the head of the police in the later years of Reza Shah's reign, is arousing much interest in Tehran. He, with several associates, is charged with a long list of crimes, including the murder of Modarris, Prince Nusrat ed Dowleh, Sheikh Kazal and other prominent Persians who had incurred the dislike or distrust of Reza Shah. The present Shah is, naturally, considerably interested in the proceedings as it is well known that Mukhtari acted on the orders of his father.

Economic.

7. The Minister of Finance recently laid before the Majlis a Bill for the abolition of the 3 per cent. tax that is now imposed on all produce entering towns and the substitution of the land tax that was previously in force. In theory the measure is sound, but in practice the land tax led to many abuses, was expensive to collect and uncollectable in areas where Government authority was weak, as happened in the past in tribal areas, and as is the case to-day in some areas. The Bill is, as was to be expected, meeting with opposition from the landowners.

8. No progress has been made in the matter of the collection of wheat for the feeding of the towns. Rather the landowners and hoarders have strengthened their position *vis-à-vis* the local authorities, whose natural inclination to do nothing has probably been strengthened by financial inducements from the interested parties, whose object is firstly to persuade the local officials to agree that they have no surplus wheat, and secondly to secure the abolition of price restriction so that they may sell their surplus stocks at high prices on a carefully managed market.

9. In the course of a speech to the Majlis the late Prime Minister said that from the beginning of the financial year to the 22nd July revenue had been 864 million rials and expenditure 874 million rials.

Appointments—Civil.

10. Abdullah Adl Isfandiari, to be Farmandar and Assistant Ustandar of Isfahan Province.

Persian Army.

11. The Shah's military Cabinet has been abolished. This Cabinet, which was instituted by Reza Shah, was in reality a body of officers whose duty it was to visit formations and units and to make reports direct to the Shah. It was, in fact, an intelligence organisation to spy on commanding officers. Its last chief was Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakehevan, a former Minister of War. Its existence was resented by the Chief of the General Staff.

12. The Chief of the General Staff has gradually eliminated from among his assistants those officers who favoured a foreign mission for the reorganisation of the army, and has substituted officers of pronounced nationalistic tendencies. They are relatively honest and efficient and there is no reason to assume that as a body they are pro-German. They are probably guided mainly by consideration for the interests of Persia, as seen by them, and particularly of the Persian army.

13. General Greely of the United States army, adviser to the Intendant-General's Department of the Persian War Office, has returned to America by air accompanied by his assistant, Colonel Gillespie. It is understood from General Greely that he intends to report to Washington that he considers that America would be justified in sending a Military Mission to Persia, and to represent the Persian army's deficiencies in transport and other equipment.

Internal Security.

14. There is little to report; some hold-ups on the Shiraz-Kazarun road, food riots at Burujird; no change in the Qashgai, Boir Ahmadi or Kurdish situations.

Dashti.

15. The town of Daiyyer, Ali Ismail's stronghold, has been occupied by Persian forces. Ali Ismail has taken to the hills. See Summary No. 25/42, paragraph 12.

Azerbaijan.

16. A statement in the press by the General Staff is to the effect that order has now been completely restored in the Rezaieh area; villagers have returned to their homes; the Soviet authorities are co-operating fully with the Persian.

Polish Interests.

17. Information has been received from Russian and Polish sources that the further evacuation of Poles is to begin shortly. Some 2,600 men of the 7th Polish Division are due to arrive at Pahlevi on the 9th August, to be followed by approximately equal numbers daily for from twenty to thirty days up to a total of about 44,000. The Russians estimate that the last party will leave Krasnovodsk on the 25th August. It is likely that women and children to the number of 20,000 will accompany these parties. Whether in view of the situation in Russia rail and sea transport will be available to carry out this programme seems doubtful.

18. General Wolikowski, Polish Military Attaché in Russia, has arrived in Tehran from Kuibyshev. He is not returning.

American Interests.

19. An American, Hamburger, has been engaged to direct the Department of Construction in the Ministry of Industry and Mines.

Tehran, August 4, 1942.

[E 4991/19/34]

No. 42.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 266.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 32, the 5th–11th August, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, August 11, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 42.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the Period August 5–11, 1942.

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE new Cabinet has been introduced to Parliament as follows:—

Prime Minister: Qavam-es-Sultaneh (295, 213).

Ministers without Portfolio: Sadiq Sadiq (Mustashar-ed-Dowleh) (248, 179). Ebrahim Hakimi (Hakim-ul-Mulk) (106, 81).

Finance: Offered to Taqizadeh (294, 210), Minister in London, who has not yet replied. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister holds this portfolio.

*Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Said (252, 182).

*Ways and Communications: Yadullah Azudi (—, 39).

Education: Dr. Ali Akbar Siassi.

*Industry, Mines and Commerce: Abdul Hussein Hajhir (104, 80).

Interior: Bagher Kazimi (142, 105).

Posts and Telegraphs: Hamid Sayyah (187, 258).

Justice: Ali Reza Qaraguzlu (Baha-ul-Mulk) (225, 160).

Public Health: Ismail Marzuban (Amin-ul-Mulk).

War: Not yet appointed.

NOTE.—

The first number refers to Military Attaché's, the second to Foreign Office, Personalities.

Those marked * held the same posts in the last Cabinet.

Dr. Siassi and Ismail Marzuban are newcomers to ministerial posts. Personality notes are given in Appendix A.

2. The Prime Minister summed up his address to the Majlis outlining his programme as follows:—

- (a) In foreign policy, to give full consideration to the interests of Persia, to execute treaties and agreements in force, and, in particular, to co-operate closely with those countries whose interests were closely linked with those of Persia.
- (b) To improve and maintain security.
- (c) To ensure supplies of food and drugs for the whole population.

Other points stressed by the Prime Minister during his address were:—

The Government would not fail to persist in demanding the delivery of the full quota of food supplies the Allies had promised.

It was the intention to set up a Ministry of Food.

The rights and liberty of the individual would be respected.

3. The delay in the appointment of the Minister for War may be due to disagreement between the Shah and the Prime Minister as to whether the nominee should be a civilian or a military officer. The Prime Minister is believed strongly to favour the former. It is some years since there has been a civilian Minister for War. In the time of Reza Shah the Minister for War, whether soldier or civilian, counted for little, the Shah issuing all orders concerning the army direct to the Chief of the General Staff. Since the abdication there has been some confusion as to the spheres of responsibility of the Ministry for War and the General Staff. The position has been tending to revert to that existing in Reza Shah's time, the present Shah issuing orders direct to the Chief of the General Staff without reference to the Ministry for War, even on matters for which the Minister is answerable to the Majlis. This has created dissatisfaction in the Majlis and anxiety lest the army should again become the instrument of an autocratic Shah. It is believed that it is the present Prime Minister's intention to endeavour to establish Cabinet control over the army and that he has considered taking the portfolio himself.

4. Strong rumours have been current during the past week, which seem to have been circulated by interested persons, that a disturbance amounting, according to rumour, almost to rebellion, was to be created by Assyrians, Armenians and the lower classes. These were said to have been armed and encouraged by the Russians. Military patrols in Tehran were doubled and other precautions taken. It is not clear whether the source of these rumours was Axis agents or Persians who desire to see repressive action taken against the classes who might revolt against the existing corruption in the governing classes.

5. On the 5th August was celebrated the anniversary of the granting of the Constitution. The Shah broadcast a speech in which he extolled the benefits of constitutional government and expressed his devotion to its principles. At the same time he reminded his listeners that constitutional government imposed a heavy responsibility on the individual.

Economic.

6. It is proposed to set up a transport board, on which there would be Persian, British and American representatives, for the purpose of controlling and developing Persian civil transport, particularly as regards the rationing and distribution of tyres and petrol and the use of motor transport for purposes not essential to the economy of the country.

7. The Anti-Hoarding Department has proclaimed that owners of tyres must declare all their stocks within ten days. Any undeclared tyres or tubes discovered after that date would lead to prosecution of the owner. Only persons approved by the Tyre Distribution Department may hold tyres. All other stocks must be surrendered.

8. The note issue up to the 30th July was 2,400 million rials, and notes in circulation amounted to 2,059,739,960 rials.

Appointments—Civil.

9.—(i) Masud Vadad to be Farmandar of Rezaieh.

(ii) Mir Ali Zahir Humayun, the Farmandar of Bushire, has died.

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Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

10. The Persian Government proposes to make Amir Assad, until recently Governor of Mahabad, Governor of the Saqqiz-Baneh area. A new Governor is to be appointed for Mahabad. Hama Rashid is to be paid for maintaining order in the Baneh area.

Bakhtiari.

11. Mr. Harris, Vice-Consul, Isfahan, accompanied by Dr. Griffiths, of the C.M.S. Mission, and the latter's 12-year-old son, was travelling from Isfahan to Dorud (D.S. 9G, Sq. 07879). From Sehkhuneh (D.S. 9G, Sq. P2493) the party appears to have turned aside to see a crashed Soviet aeroplane which disappeared some months ago on a flight from Basra to Tehran with nine passengers and was recently reported to be lying on the slopes of the Ushturnan Kuh (D.S. 9G, Sq. 09768). Information given by a servant who was with the party is that, after visiting the ruins of the machine, the party was ambushed on or about the 3rd August by tribesmen. Mr. Harris and Dr. Griffiths killed, and that the son of the latter had disappeared. The tribesmen concerned are reported to be of the Hiwudi section of Lurs. The district is a notoriously dangerous one and is outside the limits of Bakhtiari proper.

Azerbaijan.

12. The press publishes a despatch from the Officer Commanding the Persian garrison at Rezaieh, which states that there is now complete calm in the district and requests landowners to return to their villages.

Polish Interests.

13. The first batch of Poles to be evacuated from Russia, which was due at Pahlevi on the 9th August (see Summary No. 31/42, paragraph 17), did not arrive, and is now said to be due on the 11th August.

14. General Anders, Commanding Polish Forces in Russia, is expected to arrive in Tehran by air from Yangi Youli on the 10th or 11th August.

Appendix A.

1. Dr. Ali Akbar Siassi.

Born 1893. Educated in France 1911, and stayed in France till the outbreak of the 1914 war. Took a course in pedagogy. Employed as Dragoman and Persian Secretary at the French Legation from about 1917 to April 1941. At the same time he was Instructor in Psychology and Law at the University of Tehran; later Professor. Went to Europe in 1927 and took a further course in France, obtaining a doctorate in philosophy. Married the daughter of the late Bayat, and so acquired wealth. One of the founders of the French-sponsored "Young Persian Club" in 1921. An intelligent man with a perfect command of French; his outlook is more French than Persian in some respects. Always polite and agreeable to talk to.

2. Dr. Ismail Marzuban (Amin-ul-Mulk).

Born about 1875 at Resht. Studied medicine in France, and has practised as an oculist in Tehran for about the last forty years. Has had several excursions into politics, having been Minister of Posts and Telegraphs whenever his fellow-citizen, the late Sipahdar, was in power. President of the Iran Club after Jam, a post which he still holds. Universally liked and respected as an honest old gentleman. Owns a little property in Resht, but is not rich, and still practised up to his present appointment as Minister of Public Health (August 1942). Nephew is Dr. Hussein Marzuban, now Governor-General at Rezaieh. One son, Manuchir, is now in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Has been a member of the "Taraqqi" party for some years, but has never done much active political work. Unlikely to do much, either right or wrong. Benevolent and agreeable manner. Speaks French.

Tehran, August 11, 1942.

[E 5060/19/34]

No. 43.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 27.)
(No. 276.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 33, the 12th-18th August, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, August 18, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 43.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the Period August 12-18, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE name of Ahmad Adl, Minister of Agriculture, was inadvertently omitted from the list of Cabinet Ministers given in paragraph 1 of last summary. He held the same portfolio in the last Cabinet.

2. The programme of the new Government was approved by the Majlis by 109 votes out of 116. The Cabinet has as yet given no indication of the quality of its performance.

3. It is now confirmed that the delay in appointing the Minister for War is due to disagreement between the Shah and the Prime Minister regarding the degree of authority over the army that should be exercised by the Minister for War. The Shah, encouraged by the Chief of the General Staff, wishes to maintain a right to issue orders regarding the army direct to the Chief of the General Staff, the concurrence of the Minister for War, if necessary at all, to be an automatic formality. He argues that that is the only way to preserve continuity and to protect the army from the evils that would result if military policy were to be at the mercy of a succession of short-lived Cabinets. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, wishes to establish complete Cabinet control of the army, through the Minister for War, who, he argues, should be a civilian, so that questions of military seniority should not arise as regards the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff. The Belgian Military Attaché has, at the request of the Shah, drawn up a note explaining the relative constitutional positions of the King, the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff in the army in Belgium.

Economic.

4. Estimates of the wheat supplies available are being made by Persian authorities in the provinces. Reports hitherto available indicate that these officials have been persuaded by landowners to state that supplies are little more than sufficient for local needs, and that, consequently, there is little surplus available for sale to Government at the controlled price, for the feeding of towns such as Tehran, for making up local deficits—as for example in Fars, where there is a definite shortage, and for supplying abnormal needs such as large concentrations of labourers, who would normally be fed in their own villages. Apart from the fact that a fairly brisk trade is being carried on in the black market, reports by competent observers were to the effect that the harvests in certain areas, notably Khuzistan and Kermanshah, were such as to produce an appreciable surplus. His Majesty's Consul-General in Khorassan reports, after a recent tour in the Kuchan-Darajaz area, that harvests there are first class and he is optimistic that Khorassan should have a considerable surplus. It is evident that the greater part of the harvest surplus to the needs of the cultivator, and possibly a good deal of what he should hold for food and seed, has already got into the hands of profiteers and is being concealed from Government with or without the connivance of local officials. There is considerable smuggling into Iraq, where the price of wheat is much higher than in Persia.

5. A separate administration is being formed to control the collection and distribution of grain, the distribution of tea, sugar and piece-goods, the employment of transport and the application of the hoarding laws. The staff will be

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found from the existing staffs of other administrations. The administration will be independent of all ministries. The Director will apparently not have the status of a Cabinet Minister, but may be summoned to Cabinet meetings.

6. The press reports that the Government is negotiating the purchase of 1,500 camels in India.

Appointments—Civil.

7.—(i) Amanullah Ardalan (33/27) from Director-General of the Ministry of Finance to be Director-General of the newly formed Supply Department (see paragraph 5 above).

(ii) Loqman Nafisi to be Director-General of the Ministry of Finance.

(iii) Sarhang Katvuzian to be Chief of Police in Khorassan.

Internal Security.

Fars.

8. Robbers from the Qashgai tribes are being increasingly active. U.K.C.C. lorries, which have for some time not been interfered with, have recently been held up on the Shiraz-Bushire road, and in one case the driver was shot dead. So far as is known, the robbers have contented themselves with stripping drivers and carrying off only small portable articles.

Bakhtiari.

9. Further reports confirm in general the details given in Summary No. 32, paragraph 11, of the murder of Mr. Harris and Dr. Griffiths. No trace has yet been found of Dr. Griffiths' son. The Hiwadi (or Hivedi) tribe, who are accused of being the assailants, are a sub-section of the Hajivand, a tribe of Bakhtiari origin, but now said to be no longer included in Bakhtiari.

American Affairs.

10. The following American advisers have been nominated by the United States Government or suggested as suitable:—

General Greely, with Colonel Gillespie as his assistant, as Adviser to the Intendant-General's Department of the War Office.

Schwarzkopf, former head of the New Jersey State Police, as adviser for the Gendarmerie.

Tinneman as adviser for the Police.

Davis, formerly a member of the Milspaugh Mission, as Financial Adviser. Sheridan as Food and Supply Controller.

In addition, the United States Government has been invited to send an educational mission.

Interested parties have recently been trying to work up opposition to the appointment of American advisers, and derogatory articles have appeared in a paper which is widely believed to have the financial support of the Shah. Enthusiasm for American advisers has rather waned since it has been realised that their appointment will not bring a flood of Lease-Lend supplies to Persia.

11. The Americans are unfortunately highly susceptible to opposition and even irresponsible criticism, and are inclined to adopt the inconsistent attitude that their advisers should not come unless they are going to be universally welcomed. It is, of course, inevitable that they should be opposed by the upholders of those abuses which the advisers are required to reform.

Russian Affairs.

12. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports a change in the previous very friendly attitude of local Russian officials, civil and military. The "second front" is frequently referred to with some sourness; depression and anxiety regarding conditions in the Caucasus are evident. Tales are current, emanating, it is reported, from Armenian soldiers who have been at the front, of hostility between the different races who make up the armies of South Russia, of wholesale desertions and of unrest among the peoples of the Caucasus. Tales of this sort would in any case be spread about by Axis sympathisers, and they may have no better foundation than that. In Tehran, Russian officials remain as friendly as before, but here, too, depression and anxiety are sometimes noticeable.

13. For a time the Soviet officials in Tabriz appeared to be in some doubt whether American supplies should continue to be despatched to the Caucasus, but on the 13th August His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reported that his American colleague, after a visit to Julfa, had ascertained that supplies were being sent north again via Baku to Petrovsk and thence by a new road along the Caspian shore to Astrakhan. The completion of this road lacks confirmation here. The American Consul had formed the impression that the Russians might be contemplating the possibility of having to withdraw eastwards along the southern shore of the Caspian. This possibility has been discussed by American officers for some time.

14. Supplies for Russia via the Zahidan-Meshed route are now being carried by U.K.C.C. lorries as far as Kuchan owing to shortage of Russian transport.

15. A Polish source recently arrived from Krasnovodak reported the movement of horsed cavalry from Krasnovodak to Baku, and a further movement of troops is reported from a South Caspian port in Persia to Baku.

16. M. Smirnoff, Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, has gone to Moscow on leave.

Polish Affairs.

17. The evacuation of Poles from Russia has been in progress during the past week. Up to the 14th August approximately 10,600 military and 7,400 civilian Poles had arrived in Pahlevi. General Anders has not yet arrived.

Tehran, August 18, 1942.

[E 5276/19/34]

No. 44.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 283.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 34, 19th to 25th August, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, August 25, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 44.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the period August 19 to 25, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

CONSEQUENT on Taqizadeh's having refused the invitation to become Minister of Finance, Bagher Kazimi has been transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to Finance, and Javad Amiri (F.O. 20, M.A. 15) has been appointed Minister of the Interior. The post of Minister for War remains unfilled. The Prime Minister wishes to take it himself, but hesitates to do so while doubtful of the Shah's approval. The Shah is reported to suspect that his father's treatment of the Prime Minister may not have disposed the latter to devoted loyalty to the Royal House. Consequently he views with some apprehension a situation where Qavam es Sultaneh would control the army.

2. Some ten days ago, on the demand of His Majesty's Minister, a number of Persian subjects suspected of pro-Axis activities were arrested by order of the Prime Minister. Owing to the unwillingness of the Persian Government to agree to the procedure for their interrogation considered essential by the British security authorities, they are still in detention in Tehran. During the past week there has been an almost unanimous outcry by the Tehran press against the illegality of detaining in custody persons against whom no charge has been made. The Allies, of whom America is always mentioned first, are upbraided for their abandonment of the principles of democracy, of liberty, and of the sanctity of the law. The Dictator, it is said, has gone, but his methods have been adopted by the Allies. It is clear that the press has been inspired, and it is probable

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that the inspiration comes from the Government, and perhaps, also, from the enemies of the Government. So much publicity has been given to the matter and so much public feeling aroused that it will be difficult for the Government to yield to British demands and at the same time save its face before the public and Parliament. It may result in the resignation of some Ministers, if not in another Cabinet crisis.

Economic.

3. The Government has not yet demonstrated any greater determination in the collection of wheat than its predecessor. But it is early yet to despair. The new Department of Supply has been too recently formed to allow of an appreciation of its strength and zeal. It will need a good measure of both to clean up the corruption prevailing among officials connected with food supplies.

4. The Government has issued a list of supplies classed as essential to the life of the country which it is an offence under the Anti-Hoarding Law to corner or hoard. The list includes cereals, peas and beans, potatoes and onions, tinned provisions, oils and fats and their products, sugar, fuel, matches, dried fruits and nuts, motor vehicles, tyres and tubes, cotton, wool, jute and hemp products, cotton and woollen materials, threads and yarns, paper, dyes, drugs, tobacco.

Currency Situation.

5. A crisis developed last week when the Persian Government declined to accept further deliveries of sterling on the grounds that they were short of rials. They also complained that they had not, as yet, received any benefit from the gold conversion clause of the Financial Agreement of May 1942. Of the 700 million rials additional note issue authorised last March, 400 million rials was put into circulation, but the Government did not specifically take up the 300 million rials credit authorised for internal purchases. The shortage therefore is due to the failure of the Persian Government to take appropriate action. Pressure has been brought to bear on them and they have now agreed to release a substantial amount of currency, sufficient to tide over the present difficulties. His Majesty's Government, on their part, are willing to make available a gold equivalent of £2 million.

Attitude towards the War.

6. The Government, officials and the public are much concerned with the question of what is to be done if (most Persians say "when") the Germans reach Persia. Will they treat Persia as an enemy by virtue of the Treaty of Alliance with the Allies? Should the Government remain in Tehran and make the best possible terms with Germany? What should be the rôle of the Persian forces, committed as they are by the treaty to maintain internal security? The Alliance is not popular and the Allies increasingly unpopular. Persians hanker for the conditions of the last war when, in spite of being invaded by both sides, Persia was committed to neither.

Appointments—Civil.

7.—(i) Abul Qasim Bakhtiari (son of Amir Mufakham), to be Governor of Lurdekan.

(ii) Manushir Assad Bakhtiari (a younger brother of Sardar Assad, a former Minister of War, murdered in prison by order of Reza Shah), to be Governor of Chahar Mahal.

(iii) Dr. Ali Amini (F.O. 14, M.A. 20), Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance, to be Under-Secretary of State to the President of the Council.

(iv) Abbas Iskandari, editor of the *Siasat*, the organ of the Tudeh party, to be a director of the Iran Insurance Company.

The last appointment may indicate a desire on the part of the Prime Minister to placate the Tudeh party.

Persian Army.

8. In Summary No. 31/42, paragraph 11, the abolition of the Shah's Military Cabinet was reported. It has now been announced that Sarlashkar Amanullah Jahanbani, Minister for War in Soheily's Cabinet, has been appointed its chief. The Military Cabinet is still non-existent, and it is supposed that the appointment has been made solely to provide a livelihood for the honest and agreeable ex-Minister.

9. There has again been some abusive criticism of the army in the press, and a number of Deputies have presented to the Majlis a Bill which, if it were approved, would reduce the present strength of the army and to a greater degree the strength of the reserves. It has been suggested that the object of this is to reduce the possibility of Persia being drawn into the war.

10. Brigadier Seifullah Shihap, Commandant of the Military Cadet School, was assassinated by a cadet whom he had recently expelled from the school with a number of others. He was one of the best qualified officers in the Persian army, and one of the very few who are genuinely pro-Ally. He was exerting an excellent influence in the cadet school, and might in time have produced a greatly improved type of young officer. He served in the South Persia Rifles.

Appointments—Military.

11.—(i) Sartip Mahmud Baharmast, to command the Mechanised Brigade.
(ii) Sarhang Mahmud Ahmad Sartipi, to be Second in Command of the Mechanised Brigade.

(iii) Sarhang Bahrami, to be Second in Command of the 2nd Division.

(iv) Sartip Mir Jalali, from command of the 8th Division to be attached to the General Staff.

Internal Security.

12. There is little to report. Minor robberies continue in Fars; there is incipient lawlessness in the Kermanshah area; two minor attacks, probably by Lurs, have been made on the railway near Safid Dasht, about 30 miles south of Dorud. The Persian Ministry for War says that the Kurds of Western Azerbaijan are showing signs of an intention to break out again, but that the Soviet authorities still confine Persian troops to the town of Rezaieh. The appointment of two minor Bakhtiari chiefs to positions of authority in Bakhtiari country (see paragraph 7 above) is satisfying to those chiefs, but is not likely to affect greatly the situation in Bakhtiari.

Russian Affairs.

13. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that General Melnik, commanding Soviet forces in North-West Persia, returned from a visit to the Caucasus in confident mood. He scorned any idea of withdrawal from the Caucasus and claimed that the Russian forces there were not only strong enough to hold the Germans but also to throw them back. He did, however, admit some disaffection in the civil population in the Caucasus.

14. The United States liaison officer with the Polish troops reports considerable movement of anti-tank units from Krasnovodsk to Baku and a flow of civilians evacuated from North Caucasia from Baku eastwards.

15. Two hundred and thirty-four American trucks were recently taken over by the Russians at Tabriz for despatch northwards.

16. One hundred and twenty-nine tons of jute and 20 tons of gunny were recently delivered to the Russians at Meshed, and 371 tons of jute and 65 tons of gunny at Kuchan, all from Nokkundi. The U.K.C.C. are now operating 150 trucks between Zahidan and Kuchan.

American Affairs.

17. The Prime Minister and the Under-Secretary of State for War have asked the United States Minister whether America would send a military mission to reorganise the Persian army.

Polish Interests.

18. General Anders passed through Tehran on his way to Cairo by air.

19. The number of Poles landed in Pahlevi from Russia up to the 24th August is 31,131 military and 17,150 civilian. Medical officers report that there is worse malnutrition among these Poles than among those of the first evacuation. Of the civilian Poles of the first evacuation, 4,536 have now been sent from Tehran to Ahwaz for shipment to East Africa.

Tehran, August 25, 1942.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 14.)
(No. 291.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 35, 26th August to 1st September, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, September 1, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 45.

(No. 42/35. Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the Period August 26 to September 1, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government has agreed to the demand made by His Majesty's Minister (see Summary No. 34/42, paragraph 2) that the Persian subjects already arrested by the Persian authorities on suspicion of being engaged in anti-Ally or pro-Axis activities should be handed over for interrogation to the custody of British military authorities at Sultanabad. Public agitation about this matter has been suppressed.

2. The Government has issued a proclamation which, while calling on the nation to close its ranks in this time of crisis, gives a plain warning to the press and others that activities likely to interfere with the functioning of the machinery of Government or to lead to disorder will be severely repressed in Tehran by the strict application of martial law. At the same time the police have distributed leaflets reminding the public of certain articles of the Code of Martial Law relating to subversive activities against the Constitution or the policy of the established Government and particularly to the law which allows of persons suspected of such activities being detained, even though their guilt has not been proved.

3. Simultaneous with this proclamation there was a complete cessation of the press agitation against the arrest and detention of those suspected of pro-Axis activities (see Summary No. 34/42, paragraph 2). It seems that the Government, having realised that this popular clamour was not only unlikely to be effective in persuading His Majesty's Minister to withdraw his demand for their surrender, but which was producing a situation which made their surrender more difficult for the Government, decided to find justification in existing laws for the detention without trial of the suspects.

4. It now seems probable that the Prime Minister will himself accept the portfolio of the Ministry for War. Certain regulations have been drawn up to govern the relations between the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister for War, which are likely to be acceptable to both parties. Orders by the Chief of the General Staff regarding organisation, training operations and promotions must be approved and countersigned by the Minister for War before being submitted to the Shah. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the Shah, who will decide whether to over-rule the Chief of the General Staff or accept the resignation of the Minister for War.

Economic.

5. The new Minister of Finance has relieved a number of the more notoriously dishonest senior officials of the Finance Department of their appointments. This has slightly raised the stock of the new Government. He has also issued orders to all heads of Finance Ministry Departments in the provinces that the collection of wheat is to have priority over all other work.

6. The Department-General of Food Supply has authorised the purchase of the peasant's share of the grain crop at the official price, half to be paid in cash and half in monopoly goods—sugar, tea, piece-goods and cigarettes, which the peasant is now unable to obtain except at the exorbitant rates of the black market.

7. The time-limit imposed under the Anti-Hoarding Regulations for the declaration of stocks of essential goods (see Summary No. 34/42, paragraph 4) expired on the 25th August. Investigations are said to be now in progress to discover undeclared stocks. The press states that already concealed tyres and wheat have been found.

8. The Press Bureau of His Majesty's Legation had a statement published in the press to counteract current propaganda, which says that there are large quantities of wheat still to be imported in accordance with the undertaking of the Allies. The statement points out that the Allies made no promise to import any specified quantity of wheat and that their liability extends no further than the undertaking in article 7 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance to give to Persia such economic assistance as they can. The British had, in fact, since August 1941 imported 70,000 tons of wheat and the Russians 23,000 tons. Moreover, neither British troops nor Polish troops or civilians consumed any Persian wheat. All wheat consumed by them was imported. Some wheat was being purchased by British agency for the feeding of Persian labourers employed by the British on roads, railways, &c. The propaganda to the effect that there were still quantities of wheat to be imported by the Allies was encouraged by the Government in the hope that it would induce hoarders to part with their stocks.

9. The Government has announced its intention of introducing bread rationing in Tehran. As a census of the population has first to be taken, there is likely to be some delay.

10. Further reports have been received from Khorassan of the excellent harvests there, particularly in Turbat i Haidari, Gunabad, Kashmar and Kuchan. Undertakings from land-owners in Khorassan for the delivery of grain to Government now amount to 13,351 tons of wheat and 3,669 tons of barley.

Transport.

11. His Majesty's Consul-General in Khorassan gives the following estimate of motor transport resources in Khorassan:—

Registered in Meshed, which is the registration centre for all Eastern Iran: 388 cars, 498 lorries and buses.

Actually working on roads from Meshed: 45-55 lorries and buses.

Laid up owing to lack of tyres, in Meshed or other centres: 300 lorries and buses.

Laid up owing to lack of spare parts: 100 lorries and buses.

Unrepairable: 45 lorries and buses.

No cars are now available for hire in Meshed.

Lorry freight rates are:—

Zahidan to Meshed: 900 rials per 650 lb.

Meshed to Zahidan: 850 rials per 650 lb.

Appointments—Civil.

12. Haji Muhammad Hassan Amir Nazmi Afshar (Nazm Sultaneh) to be Farmandar of Rezaieh and Assistant Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan.

Persian Forces.

13. The much-hated Amnieh is to seek popularity under another name and another dress. It will in future be called "Gendarmerie," and the detested blue uniform is to be replaced by grey-green. Meanwhile, in the provinces it shows no improvement. It remains oppressive to the weak and cowardly before the strong. Its numbers are being reduced by desertion and lack of recruits to take the place of time-expired men. The rates of pay are insufficient to attract volunteers.

14. Mr. Schwartzkopf, the American Adviser for the Gendarmerie, has arrived. He has, as yet, no executive authority and will for the time being remain in the pay of the American Government. He is a police official, and it is reported that he is known in the American police as the "Gang Smasher."

Appointments—Military.

15.—(i) Sartip Mustafa Asa, to the Inspection Department of the General Staff.

(ii) Sarhang Nasrullah Saif to be head of the 3rd Section, IVth Bureau, General Staff.

(iii) Sarhang Abul Fazl Amini to be 1st Adjutant of the General Staff.

- (iv) Sarhang Amidi, Chief of Staff of the 1st Division, to command a brigade of 1st Division.
- (v) Sarhang Shahrughshahi to be Chief of Staff of 1st Division.
- (vi) Sarhang Ahmad Janpulad to command the Ardebil Mixed Brigade.
- (vii) Sarhang Ali Shahid Nurai to be C.R.A. of 2nd Division.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan. (See Summary No. 34/42, paragraph 12.)

16. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz has also had reports of Kurdish lawlessness in Western Azerbaijan. The Jalili tribe is said to have resumed looting, and in the Mahabad (Sanj Bulagh) district the adherents of the Kurdish ex-Governor, Amir Assad (see Summary No. 32/42, paragraph 10), are causing anxiety.

Kurdistan.

17. It was reported in Summary No. 32/42, paragraph 10, that the Persian Government were subsidising Hama Rashid to keep order in the Baneh area. In order to preserve appearances, Hama Rashid's brother, Amir Qadir, has been appointed Chief of Amnieh and he will draw pay for a theoretical number of Kurdish gendarmes who are to supply their own arms. (Deserting Persian soldiers supplied these arms to the Kurds in the first instance.) It is also reported that certain other Begzadehs and their relations have been appointed to certain other posts, such as Bakshdar, Director of Customs, Chief of Police, &c. It is improbable that they have any qualifications for these posts, and it seems that this is merely a face-saving method of paying them subsidies to be good. It is extremely unlikely that the Kurdish gendarmerie or the Kurdish Director of Customs will interfere, except to facilitate, with the smuggling of Persian wheat to Iraq.

Fars.

18. Security deteriorated during August. There were hold-ups of lorries on the Bushire-Shiraz road, drivers were robbed, tyres removed in one case, but the contents of the lorries left untouched. There has been raiding of crops and sheep by Qashgai and Boir Ahmadi tribesmen; small gendarmerie posts have been disarmed, and the tribes appear to be treating the Government forces with some contempt.

Kerman.

19. His Majesty's Consul reports that action is being taken to improve the situation in the Jask area by compelling the sons of the late Mir Barkat to settle down near old Jask—possibly with a subsidy or some nominal Government appointment—or to put them under effective restraint. These men are believed to have been responsible for much of the recent piracy and slave traffic.

Isfahan.

20. There has been a strike of workers in the woollen factories in Isfahan. These factories are making large quantities of blankets for British troops, but the strike seems to have no political significance, but to have been organised solely to secure better conditions for the workers. The strikers have returned to work.

Russian Affairs.

Russian Troops.

21. A fairly steady withdrawal of troops from Meshed is reported. Over 2,000 infantry and 600 cavalry have recently left for Kuchan and presumably further north. The Russian garrison at Meshed is now reported not to exceed 1,000.

Caucasus.

22. General Anders, of the Polish army, has information from Polish sources that N.K.V.D. units have been moved via the Transcaspian Railway to Krasnovodsk, and thence to Baku. In his opinion, these troops are for the purpose of suppressing fifth-column movements among the people of the Caucasus and locally enlisted troops. General Anders, like most Poles who have spent some time in Russia, usually takes a gloomy view of the military situation in Russia.

23. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz states that reports are locally current that an assembly of Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus voted to resist the Germans to the last man.

24. Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Flodstrom, Swedish Military Attaché in Kuibyshev, who left that place on the 28th August, states that, in the opinion of certain foreign military attachés, there were not more than ten Russian divisions in the Caucasus. He also reports that the atmosphere in Baku, where he spent one night, was calm, that the Soviet plane in which he flew had a fighter escort when approaching and leaving Baku, and that German aircraft had been over Baku reconnoitring and dropping leaflets.

Supplies to Russia.

25. During the week ending the 22nd August 195 tons of jute and 26 tons of gunny were handed over to the Russians at Kuchan. Owing to the Indus floods, supplies are not now arriving at Zahidan, where stocks have now been cleared.

Polish Affairs.

26. General Anders has returned to Tehran after a visit to Cairo. He intends to locate his headquarters in Tehran for the time being.

27. Up to the 30th August 39,074 military and 20,416 civilian Poles had arrived at Pahlevi.

Tehran, September 1, 1942.

[E 5549/19/34]

No. 46.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 301.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 36, the 2nd-8th September, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, September 8, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 36, for the Period September 2 to 8, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. THE Prime Minister has issued a denial of rumours that were being energetically circulated in Tehran to the effect that the Allies had demanded a declaration of war by Persia against Germany and the mobilisation of the Persian army.

2. The Prime Minister has shown some indications of the strong hand. He has suppressed six or seven newspapers, instructed the chief of police that he is no longer to make reports to the Shah, as he has been accustomed to do, has had some hoarders and profiteers arrested, succeeded in limiting the independent powers of the Chief of the General Staff, and aroused some fear among officials. He has surprisingly managed to secure the acceptance by the Cabinet of the British demands for the surrender of suspects (see Summary No. 35/42, paragraph 1) without the resignation of any Ministers. It is regrettable that he is still regarded with some suspicion by the Shah (see Summary No. 34/42, paragraph 1), and it is the knowledge of that lack of confidence that prevents the Prime Minister from proposing himself as Minister for War.

Economic.

3. The following extracts from the annual report of the Customs Administration for the year March 1941–March 1942 are published in the press:—

	<i>Rials.</i>
Imports	741,095,652
Exports (excluding A.I.O.C. and Fisheries)	811,910,558
Estimated export of mineral oils	1,000,000,000
Estimated value of Fisheries exports	13,500,000
Local production of sugar (of refineries)...	22,616 tons
	(35,365 in previous year)
Local production of tea	1,295 tons
	(1,021 in previous year)
Local production of matches	1,429,790 kgs.
	(1,013,886 in previous year)

4. The following statement regarding the note circulation has been published:—

	<i>Rials.</i>
Notes issued to National Bank	260,000,000
In hands of public	218,924,900
In National Bank	41,075,100
Percentage of metallic cover—	
For notes handed to bank	25.80
For notes in the hands of the public	30.75

5. It is estimated that the rial requirements during the month of September for British army, U.K.C.C., A.I.O.C. and Polish needs will amount to the equivalent of £1,700,000. Against this it is estimated that sales of sterling to the public will amount to £700,000. In addition, there will be substantial sales of dollars on American account.

6. The Government has decided that landowners selling wheat to Government under obligation will receive the price officially fixed for the purchase of such wheat in the provincial capital irrespective of the distance from the capital at which the wheat is delivered to Government agents. Hitherto the cost of transport from the place of delivery to the Government depots has been deducted from the price paid to the seller.

7. It is understood that the Government's policy as regards the price to be paid for grain is likely to be considerably modified. The A.I.O.C. have already been authorised to buy grain in Khuzestan on Persian Government account at any price that may be necessary to secure the maximum amount. This may solve the problem in Khuzestan, but it seems likely to draw wheat from other areas, notably Fars, where there is already an estimated deficiency of 4,000 tons, and ultimately to aggravate the problem of distribution. Instructions are shortly to be issued freeing the price of wheat on the western border in the hope that this will put an end to smuggling into Iraq. When all the proprietors' undertakings to supply wheat to the Government at the fixed official price are completed it is probable that the price for purchase by Government of any other wheat available will be freed.

8. The Prime Minister has sent a circular to all Governors-General, Governors and Directors of Finances in the Provinces which stresses the necessity for the most energetic measures in the collection of grain, which is to be regarded as the primary task of all. Government intends to use all the powers it possesses to secure the grain to which it is entitled. Hoarders will be punished, even with death. Persons claiming to be buying on behalf of the British military authorities are to be arrested, as the British military authorities are not buying grain.

9. His Majesty's Consul in Kerman reports that the crop assessment for the province is now complete and shows an estimated deficit of 3,500 tons before next harvest.

10. Government has raised the price of sugar by 2.50 rials a kilog. Loaf sugar is now 11 rials and soft sugar 10 rials a kilog., but little is obtainable at that price.

11. The Anti-Hoarding Department appears to be showing some activity and reports that it has discovered and impounded a quantity of hoarded drugs.

Appointments—Civil.

12.—(i) Hassan Vossuq (Vossuq-ed-Douleh) (F.O. 214, M.A. 296) to be Persian Ambassador in Angora. He is now in Switzerland.

(ii) Muhammad Ali Feroughi (Zuka-ul-Mulk) (F.O. 71, M.A. 88) to be Persian Ambassador in Washington.

(iii) Nasrullah Saba (Mukhtar-ul-Mulk) to be Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, *vice* Loqman Nafisi.

(iv) Majid Ahi (F.O. 5, M.A. 7), Persian Ambassador designate in Russia, has reached Kuibishev.

(v) The press reports that Hussein Ala (F.O. 7, M.A. 11), now president of the National Bank, is to be Minister of the Court.

(vi) The press reports that the Afghan Government has been asked to agree to the appointment of Soheily (F.O. 203, M.A. 283) as Persian Ambassador in Kabul.

Persian Forces.

13. The Under-Secretary of State for War has stated that the Prime Minister has persuaded the Shah to accept, with some reluctance, the idea of an American military mission for the Persian army. The argument said to have been used was that this was the most effective step the Persian Government could take to increase the confidence of the Allies in the Persian army. Another argument probably used, with both the Shah and the Chief of the General Staff, who has hitherto opposed a foreign mission, was that an American mission might procure supplies from America for the Persian army.

The Under-Secretary of State for War was instructed to prepare an estimate of the number of officers required. He considers that a minimum of three per division, with four at headquarters, is necessary. For the seven divisions now formed the total is twenty-five officers. A formal demand has not yet been presented to the American Government.

14. The formation of the Meshed and Turbat-i-Jam Brigades of the 8th (Khorassan) Division is proceeding. Rifles and equipment, officers and non-commissioned officers have been recently sent from Tehran. Men who were discharged, or who discharged themselves, after the Russian invasion are being recalled to service.

15. The Persian forces remain heavily handicapped by their almost complete lack of transport. Operations which are due, or overdue, but are being delayed for this reason, are the establishment of Government authority in Fars, the punishment of the tribe responsible for the murders of Messrs. Harris and Griffiths, and measures for the maintenance of security in Khuzestan. Local commanders are reluctant to embark on operations with the knowledge that reinforcements, if required, cannot reach them in reasonable time.

Appointments—Military.

16.—(i) Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari (F.O.—, M.A. 28) to be Commander of the Military Cadet School.

(ii) Sartip Mustafa Asa to command the 4th (Kurdistan) Division, *vice* Sartip Ibrahim Arfa.

(iii) Sartip Muhammad Nakchevan to be head of the air force.

(iv) Sarhang Assadullah Gulshayan to command the 12th (Kermanshah) Brigade.

(v) Sartip Mahdavi to be attached to the General Staff for the special purpose of settling overdue Ministry of War accounts.

Personality notes on (i), (ii) and (iii) above are attached as an appendix.

*Internal Security.**Khuzestan.*

17. Viewed in relation to possibilities, and having regard to the many important undertakings located in that province, security in Khuzestan gives some cause for anxiety. The problems are many and complicated: protection of ships, ports, railway installations and A.I.O.C. plant against sabotage; protection of large dumps of stores against thieving; and general security against possible tribal lawlessness. It would be optimistic to expect the Persian authorities to ensure full security in all these matters. At present, although there is considerable thieving and some raiding by Arabs in the Dizful-Shushtar area, there is no considerable disturbance. The Beni Turuf appear to be prepared to behave

provided the Persian military authorities do not attempt to keep them in order. The Persian commander in Khuzestan recently assured them that he was prepared to leave the security of their area to a large extent in their own hands. It is when the Kuhgalu, particularly the Boir Ahmadi, and Qashgai tribes move down to their winter quarters that tribal disturbance is expected. The Persian General Staff propose to send an extra battalion to Behbahan, but, with their other commitments, they are hard put to find this additional battalion.

Kerman.

18. In addition to the operations in the Jask area reported in Summary No. 35/42, paragraph 19, the Kerman Division has also commenced operations against the Buchakchi tribe living in the East Sirjan district, who have recently been raiding the Kerman-Bandar Abbas road and elsewhere. This tribe is still led by Hussein Khan, who was a great trouble to the South Persia Rifles. It is reported, but lacks confirmation, that in the first encounter seventy-five tribesmen and twenty-five Persian soldiers were killed.

19. Two columns from the Kerman Division are operating in the Basjakird district (1/1 million, N.G.-40, Bandar Abbas) and along the Biyaban coast for the suppression of outlaws and the collection of arms.

Fars.

20. The situation remains unsatisfactory, although no further serious interference with traffic on the main road has been reported. But neither have the Government forces shown any energy in the pursuit of raiding bands. The garrison at Kamfiruz (1/1 million, Sheet H. 39) was recently attacked by a band of Qashgais. It is reported that the attack was driven off. Numerous sensational rumours are current of Qashgai collusion with pro-German elements, abetted, it is said, by Persian officers, and of the acquisition by the Qashgai of numbers of Persian army rifles. These rumours are unconfirmed, and, although many of them are probably being circulated by interested persons, they cannot at present be dismissed as entirely baseless. Nasir Qashgai is clearly anxious to avert any action against himself by Persian forces, at least until the tribes have reached their winter quarters around Firuzabad, when he could hope for more support. He has telegraphed to the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff assuring them of his loyalty to Government and promising to come to Tehran in forty days. It is unlikely that he has any such intention, but in forty days the tribes will be around him and the war situation will be clearer. He has also been at some pains recently to convey to the British authorities assurances of his friendship.

Russian Affairs.

21. His Majesty's Consul-General in Meshed states that the Russian garrison in Meshed now consists of about 1,300 infantry and cavalry and sixty-seven aircraft.

22. On the 16th August fifty lorries arrived in Meshed from Askhabad carrying Russian civilians, including women and children. These lorries returned to Kuchan carrying loads of barley, of which the Russians have recently bought 2,000 tons in Khorassan.

23. During the week ending the 29th August 140 tons of jute and 14 tons of gunnies were delivered to the Russians at Kuchan.

24. In reply to a request addressed by His Majesty's Legation to the Soviet Embassy for permission for a reconnaissance to be made of the route from Rowanduz to the southern end of Lake Urmia, and thence by barge across the lake to the railway at Sherif Khaneh, with a view to its being used as an alternative route for supplies to Russia, the Soviet Embassy has answered that "in existing conditions the flow of supplies to Russia cannot be effected towards the north-west, and that consequently the route proposed would not serve the required purpose." Supplies are, however, still being sent to Tabriz, and there is as yet no other indication here that it is intended to abandon this route. In fact, the Soviet Vice-Consul in Tabriz stated that American supplies were now being sent to the Caucasian front.

Caucasus.

25. A leading Armenian in touch with Soviet officers has informed His Majesty's Consul-General in Tabriz that his information is that the majority of troops in the Caucasus are from Russia proper, that there are large forces in the Caucasus, and that he believes they are experienced troops. On the other hand,

the United States Consul-General in Tabriz—not a reliable authority—has reported that all recruits called up in the Caucasus since June have been enlisted in units stationed in the Caucasus, that they are unreliable material, and that the defection of a Georgian division was responsible for the success of a German break-through on the Stalingrad front.

26. An officer in the Fighting French Air Force has arrived Tehran on his way to Russia. He says that he is to be followed by a mission of fifteen pilots and forty mechanics who are to join the Soviet Air Force.

American Affairs.

27. Bills have been laid before the Majlis to authorise the engagement of the Americans, Sheridan and Timmerman, as advisers to the Departments of Food and Police respectively. The former is to receive 12,500 dollars and the latter 8,000 dollars a year.

28. Schwartzkopf, mentioned in Summary No. 35/42, paragraph 14, as adviser for the gendarmerie, has the rank of colonel.

Polish Affairs.

29. 43,416 military and 25,699 civilian Poles had arrived in Pahlevi by the 1st September. It is understood that there are to be no more arrivals.

Tehran.

Appendix.

1. Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari.

Aged about 45. Promoted to present rank in 1941. Previous staff employ as Director-General of Administration and Artillery. Chief of 3rd Bureau of General Staff. An intelligent, capable officer with pleasing manners. Speaks English, French and Russian. Acted for a short time in 1942 as assistant to General Greely, the American adviser to the Intendant-General's Department.

2. Sartip Mustafa Asa.

Served in the S.P.R., where he was an active, capable and courageous young cavalry officer. On its disbandment, joined the gendarmerie, and later the army. Was in the operations against Simko, served eight years in Lurestan and some years in Southern Kurdistan. He does not seek the limelight and has the reputation of avoiding foreign society.

3. Sartip Muhammad Nakchevan.

(Not to be confused with Military Attaché's Personalities No. 194, to whom he is only a remote connexion.)

As Commandant of the Persian Forces in the campaign against the Sarhad tribes in 1929 he showed considerable military skill. He was consistently helpful and friendly to the British officers in that area. A protégé of General Amanullah Mirza Jehanbani, late Minister for War. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Khorassan Division, in 1942, but was soon recalled owing to disagreement with Ali Mansur, the Governor-General. Since then nominally employed on the General Staff.

Tehran, September 8, 1942.

[E 5615/19/34]

No. 47.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 306.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 37, 9th-15th September, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, September 15, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 47.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37, for the period
September 9-15, 1942.**Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. There are indications that the Prime Minister is improving his position in the country. The atmosphere is certainly calmer, and while in the north there is considerable anxiety about the war situation, signs of confidence that there is now an experienced hand at the helm are beginning to be evident. Orders by the Prime Minister prohibiting any public breaking of the fast during the month of Ramadan have pleased the uneducated classes, who still value the observance of religious formalities. The suppression of certain newspapers has had a very sobering effect on the remainder. Something also is hoped for from the appointment of a body of inspectors to be attached to the Prime Minister's office, who are to be selected from men of good reputation. They are to investigate complaints made against Ministries, Departments or their staffs, and will have the right to visit all administrations at any time to investigate whether work is being carried out in accordance with the orders of Government.

Medical.

2. The Ministry of Hygiene has decided that there are too many doctors in the capital and too few in the provinces. All doctors in Government employ will in future serve for at least two years in the provinces. An establishment of doctors, pharmacists and midwives has been laid down for the services of the Ministry of Hygiene in the capital, and all those in Government employ surplus to this establishment will be transferred to the provinces. This is a very necessary measure, as the provinces are disgracefully neglected in the matter of medical services.

Economic.

3. All provinces except Khorassan and Azerbaijan make serious reports on the wheat situation. In the provinces of Khuzestan and Kermanshah at least the seriousness is not due to lack of wheat but to its having been to a large extent concealed. His Majesty's Consul-General in Khorassan estimates that the collection of grain for Government in that province will total 27,000 tons of wheat and 8,000 tons of barley. The Soviet Consul-General in Azerbaijan estimates that the province should have 35,000 tons of wheat surplus for export to the south. The Governor-General considers that this estimate should be halved.

Transport.

4. The Government has agreed to set up a Joint Transport Board, to include British, American and Persian representatives, to control the import and distribution of motor tyres and spare parts for the use of all Persian-owned motor transport other than that controlled by the U.K.C.C. Tyres and spare parts imported to Persia will now be consigned to and handled by either the U.K.C.C. or the Joint Transport Board. As a first step, the Government has ordered the reregistration and renumbering of all motor transport in the country.

Finance.

5. The additional issue of notes to the value of 700 million rials sanctioned by the Majlis in April (see Summary No. 14/42, paragraph 2) having proved insufficient, the Government, under considerable pressure from His Majesty's Legation, forced a Bill through the Majlis authorising the further issue of notes to the value of 300 million rials.

Appointments—Civil.

6.—(i) Abbas Feronhar (F.O. 73), to be representative of the Persian Government in Syria and the Lebanon.

(ii) Assad Bahadur (F.O. 34, M.A. 44) to be head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(iii) Sultan Ahmad Rad (M.A. 234) to be Governor-General of the Kerman Province.

(iv) The Portuguese Government has been asked to approve the appointment of Jawad Sineki (F.O. 202, M.A. 280) as Persian Minister to Portugal.

Persian Forces.

7. The 4th Kermanshah Division is to be renamed the 4th *Kurdistan* Division, and is to consist of two brigades only: the 10th at Senneh and the 11th at Saqqiz. The 12th Kermanshah Brigade is either to be an independent brigade directly under Sipahbod Shahbakhti, the G.O.C. of the Western Forces, or is to be included in the 5th South-Western Division.

8. The Government has agreed to the exemption from liability for further military service of the classes of the Persian years 1284-1290, both inclusive. The corresponding Christian years are 1905 and 1911. This reduces by a theoretical 100,000-150,000 the potential strength of the reserve.

Appointments—Military.

9. Sarhang Bayendor, to command the 10th Senneh Brigade.

*Internal Security.**Azerbaijan.*

10. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports further looting by Jalali tribesmen as a protest against the non-payment of a promised subvention (see also Summary No. 35/42, paragraph 16). If the report mentioned in paragraph 16 below, to the effect that the Russians have warned the Kurds that they will themselves take action to suppress disorder, is true, there should be an early improvement in the situation.

Lurestan.

11. The situation in the area bordering the railway south of Dorud is disquieting. In addition to the Harris-Griffiths murder, there have been two attacks by brigands on small parties of Indian troops patrolling the railway, one resulting in the death of two Indian soldiers and the loss of their rifles. A further report without details has just been received of an attack by brigands on the British hospital area near Dorud. The identity of the brigands has not yet been established. The attacks on the railway patrols may have been inspired by the desire to acquire arms, but the attack on the hospital area arouses suspicion of instigation.

Fars.

12. There have been further hold-ups on the road between Bushire and Shiraz, including the robbery of an American officer. This should give Colonel Schwartzkopf, the American adviser to the gendarmerie, an added incentive to improve the force. No steps have yet been taken to bring Nazir Qashgai to heel.

Dashti.

13. Ali Ismail of Daiyyir has made nominal submission to the Persian Government and is reported to have been given twenty rifles for the maintenance of order in his area.

Khuzestan.

14. The Persian General Staff are planning somewhat elaborate operations, to be based on Behbahan, against the Boir Ahmadi, who, as previously reported, do not make even outward pretence of recognising the authority of the Persian Government. It is too early yet to be sure that operations on the scale projected will ever take place.

Russian Affairs.

15. Reinforcements of about 2,000 troops reached Meshed from Semnan and Askhabad. The Russian garrison at Meshed is now estimated to be about 3,000, exclusive of air force.

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16. The Soviet authorities have recently shown a delicate consideration for Persian susceptibilities. Anything savouring of interference in Persia's internal affairs is in the capital officially tabooed. They have even written polite notes to the Persian War Office asking for permission to use certain installations of which they had already some time previously taken possession. They recently summoned Kurdish leaders to Ushnu and, according to the reports of Kurds who were present, warned them against creating disorder and threatened to take their own measures to suppress it. This may indicate increased confidence in the situation on the Turkish frontier as much as a desire to help the Persian Government. Although they still keep Persian troops practically interned in Rezaieh, they have allowed the Persian authorities to import extra rifles to Western Azerbaijan for the purpose of arming an additional force of 400 gendarmes, who are to be recruited for the prevention of smuggling.

Caucasus.

17. Newspapers from Erivan report the trials of persons guilty of preparing to help the enemy.

Afghan Affairs.

18. The Afghan General, Abdul Ahad Khan, recently passed through Tehran on his way to Angora, allegedly for medical treatment.

German Affairs.

19. On the 9th September, at about 1430 hours local time, a German aeroplane dropped leaflets on Pahlevi. The pamphlets were in Azerbaijani Turkish and appear to have been intended for the Caucasian people, who were promised early deliverance and were asked to give no assistance to the nearly-defeated Russian armies. Some commotion was caused in the area. Some local inhabitants showed pleasure; some contractors working for British authorities in connexion with the Polish evacuation demanded immediate payment of their money, but there was little sign of panic. The incident has received no publicity in the Persian press. A report from Russian sources says that the aircraft was forced down near Tiflis on its homeward flight.

Tehran, September 15, 1942.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 3923/204/93]

No. 48.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 670.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 30, 1942.

MY telegram No. 656 and my despatch No. 152, Most Secret, paragraphs 8 and 9.

2. On 29th June I asked the Minister of the Interior to see me in order to discuss the present situation. I warned his Excellency that it would be wise to be prepared for the worse news from Egypt and to take all precautions in Iraq from now on. I advised him in the first place to examine the list of his provincial officials, including Commandant and Assistant-Commandant of Police and to rid himself of any whom he did not trust.

3. The Minister replied that action on these lines had already occurred to him and he would proceed as suggested; certain changes would have to be made. He was more worried about big cities than about provincial districts, and I think that he is right. He had changed police officers and constables in Bagdad and there were very few now who had been here in May 1941. The Minister felt that Bagdad police were now strong, and, in addition to them, he had a mobile force of 2,000 men available. There was naturally a great deal of pessimistic talk and pro-Axis groups were exploiting it. There were, however, no signs at present of any impending trouble. Orders had, nevertheless, been issued for [group omitted] to be strengthened and for the police to be on the alert, especially in Jewish quarters.

4. The Minister of the Interior expressed his wish to proceed at once with internments (see my telegram No. 477). He had discussed this with the Regent and it would be taken up with the Prime Minister immediately on the latter's return on 2nd July. He felt it necessary to await the Prime Minister as he was anxious to detain some of the "big men," but was not certain that Nuri Pasha would agree to all he had in mind. I urged his Excellency to watch the situation very closely and, if there were any signs of trouble, to take immediate action. If the Prime Minister had not returned he must be recalled. The Minister agreed. He anticipated making the arrests by the night of 3rd July at the latest.

5. As regards possible future developments the Minister, in reply to a question from me, expressed the opinion that if the Government were resolute they would be able to keep the country quiet until actual invasion began; after that he could not say. It would naturally depend a great deal on the strength of the British forces. If the latter could not hold the Germans it was hardly reasonable to expect that Iraqis would be able to do so. He thought that the Iraqi army was all right for the moment but he had no faith in its fighting qualities if it came to actual war (this confirms exactly the opinion which I have previously expressed). On this subject the Minister considered the Prime Minister was over-optimistic. The former went on to say that the Cabinet was at present strong and united, but his Excellency foresaw that when it came to internment certain prominent persons he might find it difficult to avoid "offending" some of his colleagues. However, he was not unduly pessimistic on this score.

6. In general, I found the Minister full of energy and apparently determined to get a move on. This is gratifying because the bad news from the Western Desert has undoubtedly caused great nervousness amongst our friends here. They are inclined to take the line (and this is understandable) that while no doubt Germany will ultimately be overthrown they will suffer at the hands of their own people if the Nazis should first over-run Iraq.

[E 4019/204/93]

No. 49.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 695.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 5, 1942.

I HAVE had several long talks in the last few days with Regent, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. They have all shown determined front.

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Prime Minister, indeed, seemed to me over-optimistic, and having proved to his own satisfaction that situation in Egypt and Mediterranean is not likely to prove dangerous to Iraq may be inclined to take things too easily. I have impressed on them all the great importance of being realistic and taking every possible precaution in advance.

2. Although there is so much loose and nervous [group undecipherable]ing population have stood up to recent bad news better than I had expected and up to the present there have been no hostile moves which cause me anxiety.

[E 4155/204/93]

No. 50.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 718.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 10, 1942.

MY telegram No. 699, last sentence.

Yesterday the Minister of Finance called to inform me that he had submitted his resignation. He gave his reasons at length. Briefly they were, firstly, that for some time he felt he had not been accorded the help and co-operation to which he was entitled [group undecipherable: ? from] certain of his colleagues and notably the Minister of the Interior, and secondly, that he had not been informed in advance of recent arrests of "fifth-columnists." Minister protested that he was not opposed to internments nor did he expect to be consulted, but he was entitled to be treated with confidence.

2. I advised him strongly against resigning at this moment and did not mince my words, which will be reported in greater detail by despatch. He finally consented to withhold action until he had seen the Prime Minister, to whom I at once telephoned.

3. To-day Nuri Pasha informed me he had had a long conversation with the Minister of Finance, but had failed to persuade the latter to withdraw his resignation. Ali Muntaz, he declared, was tired, heartily disliked the Ministers of Interior and of Communications, and was "annoyed" over internment of at least two of those lately detained. It is certainly a fact that Minister of Finance has been at loggerheads with the other two Ministers mentioned for some time, but I agree that arrests were probably the last straw, although this he will not admit.

4. Prime Minister has informed Minister of Finance that he hopes the latter will yet think better of his decision, and that, in any case, he must continue at his post until the Regent returns to Bagdad.

5. I told Nuri Pasha that it would be deplorable if a Minister resigned because he failed to obtain "co-operation" of two colleagues, and still more deplorable if the said colleagues on hearing accusations failed to do all in their power to remove misunderstanding. I urged him to see both and obtain fullest assurance of their willingness to "co-operate" in future. The Prime Minister agreed. But if as I fear may be anticipated, no result is achieved, he will ask the Regent to return at once.

6. We had some discussion over possible successor to Minister of Finance should he prove adamant. I said Ibrahim Kemal was obviously the most capable candidate, and that he would strengthen the Cabinet if only he and the rest could pull together. Nuri Pasha answered he was quite ready to try. He would sound his colleagues if it became necessary, and I agreed for my part to find out discreetly how Ibrahim Kemal would react. There matters stand for the moment.

[E 4241/204/93]

No. 51.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 16.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 28. Saving. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 1, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 637.

Perhaps I should have explained the situation in greater detail, but it did not appear to me to be of sufficient importance to justify a long telegram.

2. In speaking to the Regent and Prime Minister, I took the line that the attitude of Tewfik Suwaidi towards the Allied cause had been sympathetic and helpful since his return from Persia, and that therefore his appointment as

Minister for Foreign Affairs would be acceptable to His Majesty's Government. I told them that I regarded the matter as one for them to decide. If they considered that his colleagues would regard Tewfik as in sympathy with them, he would undoubtedly be a source of strength to the Cabinet.

3. At the same time I pointed out that the strength of the Cabinet lay in its unity, and that it was important not to introduce any disruptive influence.

4. I sounded this warning because I knew that (a) the Minister of Justice and Tewfik are old enemies, (b) Tewfik had been openly speaking against the Minister of Interior who is the most efficient holder of that office there has been for years, (c) Tewfik is never content to play second fiddle, and he and Nuri have never trusted each other, (d) Tewfik is opposed to any growth of Shia influence, and would be likely to upset Shia feelings.

5. Although the Regent and the Prime Minister kept me fully informed of the progress of the affair, I studiously refrained from any intervention. The Regent was opposed to the proposal from the start. He personally dislikes Tewfik who, he says, insulted him on a very important occasion some fifteen months ago and thereby forfeited his confidence. I learnt that Tewfik had proposed to Nuri the transfer of the Minister of Interior to Communications and Works, of the Minister of Communications and Works to Minister of Economics (which would have led to the resignation of both but was promptly vetoed by Nuri) and the appointment of two Sunni Ministers of most indifferent calibre. There was a strong opinion in the town against the appointment of a Minister whose brother is interned in Southern Rhodesia.

6. In the end the Ministers of Justice, Interior and Communications and Works voiced their disapproval, and as the Regent backed them, Nuri withdrew his proposal. I think he was secretly relieved, for he confessed to me that he did not trust Tewfik an inch. He was very tired at the time and thought he could make use of someone who was nimble-witted and experienced.

7. It is a pity that Iraqis can so seldom agree however hard one tries to bring them together, but in this case I feel that the inclusion of Tewfik would have made for disunity and not strength. He has his good points, but the appointment would not have been popular for he is one of the old gang with all its failings and has no realisation nor sympathy with the ambitions of the younger educated Iraqis to play their part in the government of the country. I therefore think that the Regent was right in his action.

8. We might have to fall back on Tewfik, *faute de mieux*, as Prime Minister at some future date, but he has so many indifferent friends whom he would like to put into office that I hope the occasion will not arise. I do not think he would be content with a subordinate position in any Cabinet for long. It is a pity, for he undoubtedly possesses some resolution. But his attempt to oust Saleh Jabr, who is obviously best Minister of Interior available, is a shocking instance of the irresponsibility of responsible Iraqis at a critical time.

[E 4337/204/93]

No. 52.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 753.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 21, 1942.

MY telegram No. 735.

Position within the Government here has unfortunately deteriorated with some suddenness during the last forty-eight hours. Although the Minister of Finance has now withdrawn his resignation, at any rate for the time being, and while reasonably efficient Director-General of Revenue has been appointed Minister of Economics, it is clear that the Cabinet are in a very unhappy state.

2. Immediate cause is the action of the Minister of Communications, who on 20th July confronted Nuri Pasha with a demand for appointment within a day or two of another Shia Minister, failing which he [? group omitted] resign. Of the six candidates proposed by his Excellency four were disputable and the other two men of little weight. Regrettable as it is that "Sunni-Shia" issue should be raised at this moment, the Prime Minister has no objection to increasing the number of Shia Ministers (there are only two at present) but he resented being rushed and a quarrel ensued.

3. Since then I have had long interviews with the Regent, Nuri Pasha and Minister of the Interior. In each case I have emphasised the grave consequences of a Cabinet crisis and the consequent importance of avoiding hasty action. I

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have endeavoured to smooth down the Prime Minister, who is still incensed, and I have urged the Regent to use his influence with the Minister of Communications. It is possible that these representations may lead to some compromise, but of course each wrangle amongst the Ministers leaves its mark. Nuri would like to resign and reform his Cabinet but is deterred by the knowledge that suitable alternative Ministers, whether Sunni or Shia, do not exist.

4. Should the Minister of Communications withdraw from the Cabinet the Minister of the Interior has assured me that he would remain loyal to the Prime Minister. He points out, however, that a crisis on a sectarian issue would cause a very bad impression and would subject him to strong attacks from Shia and make it difficult for him to carry out any bold policy. He is suffering from dysentery and claims that he needs a rest.

5. These tiresome and indeed potential[ly] dangerous complications are due, I believe to nervous tension arising from bad war news, great heat of recent weeks, uneasiness over internal problems such as wheat and, as previous experience has repeatedly shown, the inability of any Iraqi Cabinet to work together for more than a few months. I suspect, too, that enemy subversive organisation operated by Paula Koch from Afana, Turkey has been inordinately active since the offensive in North Africa began, and that evidence of its work may be found in present uneasiness here and sudden strikes in Syria. This is supposition on my part but of one thing I am certain and that is that our difficulties here are now bound to increase until we score some military success somewhere.

6. I will report all developments.

[E 4408/204/93]

No. 53.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 758.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 23, 1942.

MY telegram No. 753.

Position has improved slightly through Prime Minister's decision to strengthen his Cabinet by appointing both a "Shia" and a "Sunni" Minister. For the latter he would like Tahsin Askari, while for the former he has put forward alternative candidates to those proposed by Minister of Communications.

2. Nuri Pasha, having asked me to explain his decision to the Minister of the Interior, I did so to-day to the latter's great satisfaction. His Excellency observed that the situation had completely changed through the question of principle having been settled. No doubt the Minister of Communications would now hold up his resignation. We exchanged views at considerable length on personalities involved, and I urged the Minister of the Interior to be patient and do his utmost to smooth the ruffled feathers of his colleague and so prevent him from precipitating a real hot-weather crisis at this important juncture. But until agreement is reached on individuality [*sic*] we will not emerge from the wood.

[E 4467/204/93]

No. 54.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 772.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, July 27, 1942.

MY telegram No. 758.

Prime Minister told me to-day that for unquestionable reasons (with which I need not weary you) it had proved impossible to find at the moment a suitable Shia candidate for Cabinet, and abandoned his idea of completing it at the present time. At their meeting to-day the Ministers, influenced by his decision to appoint a third Shia when possible, had, indeed, agreed unanimously to carry on until the end of August. Nuri Pasha described this decision as an "armistice," but observed that all his colleagues seemed happy.

2. It therefore appears that, in the absence of untoward events elsewhere causing repercussions here, we may hope for some weeks of quiet within the Government.

[E 4722/204/93]

No. 55.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 207.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 2, 1942.

THE two and a-half months which have elapsed since I wrote my last general despatch contained no outstanding feature nor any coherent pattern of events to invest them with special significance or importance. The political, economic and social life of the country continued to effervesce quietly, but without movement in any definable direction, and I fear that little of sensational interest can be instilled into an account of so formless a period.

2. From the middle of May onwards much of my time was taken up with ministrations to the senile ailments of a Government that shows signs of approaching the end of its expectation of life. As I related in my last despatch, the trouble began with the strain imposed upon the cohesion of the members of the Cabinet by the trial and execution of three of Rashid Ali's colleagues, and the subsequent difficulties which the Cabinet had to face caused further stresses which tended to be cumulative in effect.

3. Soon after the executions the Prime Minister had a physical collapse and the doctors ordered rest and change. Nuri Pasha thought of a holiday in Syria or Transjordan, and there at once arose the question of who should act as Prime Minister during his absence. Subtle questions of seniority and sensitive jealousies made the choice of a *locum tenens* from among his colleagues more than difficult. Nuri Pasha therefore favoured the solution of bringing Taufiq Suwaidi into the Cabinet. As a former Prime Minister, Taufiq Beg would, without question, have presided over Cabinet meetings while the Prime Minister was away. The other Ministers were not, however, well disposed towards this idea. They suspected that the Prime Minister was trying to put through a cunning reinsurance deal with the other side, and foresaw that Taufiq Suwaidi's presence in the Cabinet would lead to complications because of his close relationship with Naji Suwaidi, one of the most important of the Iraqi politicians interned in Southern Rhodesia. The Regent for personal reasons also disliked the idea of Taufiq Suwaidi's entering the Cabinet, and Nuri Pasha had to give up his plan. The possibility of inducing Ibrahim Kemal to enter the Cabinet was also examined, but he was found to be still too antagonistic to Nuri Pasha to be willing to accept such a proposal.

4. Fortunately, at this stage it was discovered that the Prime Minister's physical troubles were due not to nerves, as had at first been supposed, but to teeth. The need for him to take prolonged rest outside Iraq passed, and with it the crisis caused by the difficulty of finding an Acting Prime Minister. Nuri Pasha was subjected to a few days' drastic dental treatment, enjoyed ten days' holiday in the Kurdish hills, and then returned to Bagdad at the beginning of July in excellent health.

5. The next crisis came only a week later, when the Minister of Finance, Ali Mumtaz, resigned. He complained that he was not accorded proper help and co-operation by his colleagues (especially the Minister of the Interior) in dealing with the distribution of food supplies, and was upset because he had not been informed in advance about the internments of harmful persons ordered by the Minister of the Interior on the 5th July. The Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and Ali Mumtaz himself all came to me to talk at length and in detail over their troubles. Each one threw a favourable light on his own position, leaving the others in the shadow of doubt, and on each one I impressed the virtue of conciliation and sweet reasonableness. The biggest rift in the lute was clearly caused by the internments. It was not Ali Mumtaz alone who was upset; none of the other Ministers liked to see the Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister in a position to shut up people at discretion without reference to the Cabinet. It was noticed, moreover, that Nuri Pasha always protected his friends, however bad their record, and the other Ministers resented an arrangement which left them powerless to do the same for their own dependants and supporters. They thought that they should have some share in the decisions taken, but opinions varied as to its degree. The Minister of the Interior was, however, clear-sighted enough to see that, if all Ministers were to protect their friends, no one would be interned at all, and he in his turn threatened to resign if such a proposal was adopted. The Prime Minister sought to find a solution on the basis of an arrangement whereby, though the Minister of the Interior would retain unimpaired the power to intern anyone whose activities were

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harmful, other Ministers would be given lists of the internments ordered on the day on which the orders were carried out. Though no final decision has yet been reached, his colleagues are for the moment mollified and some procedure of this kind is likely to be adopted. Meanwhile, the experience has made the Minister of the Interior shy of further drastic internments.

6. The other grievances of the Minister of Finance were assuaged by the results of a good deal of honest brokering by myself and some straight talking to the Minister of the Interior. The result was that Ali Mumtaz agreed to return to his office and resume his work. Another crisis seemed thus to have been averted, but the hoped-for tranquillity did not supervene and a fresh shock came only a few days later.

7. On the 19th July Nuri Pasha appointed Abdul Illah Hafidh (Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance) Minister of Economics, and the next day Abdul Mahdi, the Minister of Communications and Works, demanded the immediate appointment of a third Shiah Minister. The religious tenets of Abdul Illah Hafidh are in doubt, but he is not accepted by the orthodox Shiahs as belonging to their community, and Abdul Mahdi, in pressing for the appointment of another Shiah, took his stand on the principle accepted when Nuri Pasha formed his Cabinet in October 1941, that it should include three Shiah Ministers. Since the resignation of Sadiq Bassam in February there have been only two, and Abdul Mahdi seems to have feared that the Prime Minister was about to ignore the accepted principle and fill up his Cabinet with Sunnis. My intervention again became necessary to save the Cabinet from a fall. The Prime Minister was angry, Abdul Mahdi was obstinate and Salih Jabr, though ready at the last resort to be loyal to his chief, gave strong moral support to Abdul Mahdi. Three days of hard talking in sweltering heat somewhat lessened the tension. The Prime Minister reaffirmed his acceptance of the principle of three Shiah Ministers and, tempers having rather surprisingly cooled, both sides approached the task of finding a suitable candidate for Cabinet office. It was soon found that there are sadly few Shiahs who could be considered eligible, and the choice was quickly narrowed to a very few men. Two alone survived final examination—Abbas Mahdi, the head of the Royal Diwan, and Abdul Muhsin Shallash, who was last in the Cabinet in 1929 as a Minister of Communications and Works. Abbas Mahdi refused to give up his honourable sinecure for the hurly-burly of active politics, and Muhsin-al-Shallash said that he must first go to Palestine for medical treatment, but might agree to take office later if his health permitted. Thereupon the idea of making any further appointments to the Cabinet, whether Sunni or Shiah, was put aside for the time being, and it was agreed by all the Ministers that they should carry on as at present until the end of August. The Prime Minister quite rightly calls this arrangement a truce and not a peace, and it seems likely that changes in the Cabinet will become necessary before long.

8. The internments which started this chain of Cabinet troubles were made as the result of my urgent and reiterated warnings to the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior that there were still many people at large who were dangerously active in the interests of the Axis. On the 24th May I gave the Minister of the Interior, for his guidance, a list of seventy-five such men living in different parts of the country and urged him to send them to the newly established internment camp at Amara. A short period of hesitation, followed by the Prime Minister's illness, resulted in action being undesirably delayed, but by much prodding and prompting the Minister was at last persuaded to move, and during the night of the 5th-6th July over thirty arrests were made. By the end of the month the total had been raised to fifty-six, and, though a number of bad men still remained free, the effect on public security was excellent. Malicious agitation, intrigue and rumour-mongering were sharply checked, and, warned by the fate of their friends, most of the pro-Nazis who retained their liberty became careful to do nothing that might cause them to lose it.

9. Another security measure which was put through successfully with the co-operation of the Iraqi authorities was the rounding-up and despatch to Palestine for internment of the last of the nationals of enemy or enemy-occupied countries remaining in Iraq. In all, nearly a hundred were sent off on the 5th July, mostly Hungarians and Germans, with smaller numbers of Bulgarians and Roumanians.

10. Of the many and varied small events in the internal life of the country which have occurred, the following are all that seem to merit attention:—

11. About the middle of June the endemic enmity between the Shammar of the Northern Jezireh and the Yazidis of the Jabal Sinjar once more threatened

to break out in violence. The trouble arose over the ownership of a village on the borders of the Sinjar, for which, during the past few years, Sufuq, the Sheikh of the Shammar, had obtained legal title-deeds, but to which the Yazidi chieftain, Daud-i-Daud, also laid claim on the ground that before his flight out of Iraq in 1935 he and his forebears had cultivated it for generations. When the villagers had cut and stacked the crops on the threshing floors and the time came for the landlord to collect his share, Yazidis and Shammar gathered in force and a fight was only prevented by official intervention. For both the tribes the matter then became one of prestige (the landlord's share of the crops was not worth more than about £10 15s.) and settlement called for much patience. The first step taken was to call Sufuq and Daud-i-Daud into Mosul and to take into official charge the disputed share of the harvest until it could be disposed of peacefully. Daud-i-Daud, who is wild, quick-tempered and suspicious, was found to be in a dangerously turbulent mood and was sent to Sulaimani to cool his heels. Sufuq was more amenable, though unwilling to yield his legal rights without a satisfactory *quid pro quo*. Efforts are now being made to find an enduring settlement on the basis of the grant of Government land elsewhere to Sufuq in return for his surrender of his title to the disputed village.

12. In the Dohuk district north of Mosul the new mutasarrif, Majid Yacubi, has been taking vigorous action to clear up the gang of bandits which had collected there under Salim Mustafa, an outlaw who some years ago murdered an American missionary. The special police force organised for this work has had successful skirmishes and inflicted casualties on the gang. Operations continue.

13. The Regent made two useful tours. During the last week in May he visited the Hillah Diwaniyah and Muntafiq Liwas. His Royal Highness was most cordially received by the tribes, and he worked hard to make a good impression. Soon afterwards he set out on a tour of the Kirkuk and Sulaimani Liwas, but, unfortunately, after reaching Sulaimani he had to return suddenly for medical treatment as one of his pet dogs was found to have developed rabies. In early July His Royal Highness took a fortnight's holiday in the Kurdish hills near Arbil, where the young King and the Queen Mother are passing the hot weather.

14. On the 18th July the Army Commander, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, handed over forty armoured cars to the Iraqi army. The ceremony was attended by the Prime Minister and Cabinet and, as it was preceded by a drive of the cars through the town, it attracted a good deal of attention. Comment seems to have been divided. Some Iraqi gossips thought that this act showed our goodwill and desire to help the country, while others expressed amazement at the putting of such comparatively up-to-date fighting equipment into the hands of men who had behaved so treacherously only a year ago. On the whole, however, the gesture seems to have been a success, although a number of British officers did their best to ruin it by proclaiming, within the hearing of barmen and others, that the cars were out of date and useless. Renewed attempts are being made, with the co-operation of Tenth Army, to check such loose talk by those who should know better.

15. Professor Hamley has been able to make some progress with the reform of the Ministry of Education, but it seems clear that he will continue to meet with serious obstruction until Dr. Sami Shaukat and Dr. Fadhil Jamali, the joint Directors-General, are removed. The Prime Minister has come reluctantly to realise this fact, and is trying to obtain an eminent Egyptian educationalist as a new head of the department. Meanwhile, Professor Hamley has enhanced his already high reputation by organising a successful summer school for older boys in which he has been able to demonstrate the value of sane, healthy principles of education, while indicating at the same time the opportunities that exist for constructive youthful endeavour within the country. It is hoped in this manner to combat to some extent the pessimism that seems to cloud so many young minds in Iraq.

16. Summer time was officially introduced into Iraq on the 21st June. At 11 P.M. that day all clocks were advanced by one hour, thereby putting Iraq four hours ahead of Greenwich. In a clock-less country where the great mass of the people naturally regulate their habits by the sun such a manipulation of time had little consequence except for the official and commercial classes, and so far as they were concerned the new arrangement was made largely ineffective by putting forward by an hour or half an hour the time of beginning work.

17. Supply problems have on the whole been handled smoothly and so far with enough success to avoid trouble. On the 1st July the wholesale price of wheat was fixed at between I.D. 23/000 and I.D. 25 per ton according to the

district of production, and the Government hope to be able to put into effect a plan for obliging all growers to surrender up to 25 per cent. of their crop at these prices. They expect in this manner to obtain sufficient stocks to ensure supplies to the towns throughout the winter. In most districts there was no unfavourable reaction at the time the prices were announced, though little of the new crop (which on the whole is good) has yet been put on the market; in Mosul, as a result of a misunderstanding of the position combined with scare rumours about the war, the grain sellers suddenly ceased trading, and for a few days about the middle of July the mutasarrif was faced with a tiresome situation in the town. Supplies of wheat were, however, hurried up from Bagdad and the immediate difficulty was overcome, but the wheat holders are still hoarding and sooner or later means will have to be devised to persuade or make them sell. Since our defeat in Libya enemy propaganda has been most vocal in urging all and sundry to hoard wheat and has skilfully played on memories of the famine during the last war. In addition, speculation has been rife and has been favoured by higher prices in adjacent countries. Finally, as has happened on occasion elsewhere, the Government are reluctant to make themselves unpopular with powerful vested interests. I have been urging ministers to face up to the situation and to explain their policy to the people, and my efforts are continuing at the time of writing.

18. Iraq's relations with her neighbours have remained normal. Nothing of interest occurred with Turkey except the protracted negotiations for extradition of Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, the leader of the traitor generals of last year. These have so far yielded no result in spite of the personal visit to Angora of the Iraqi Public Prosecutor.

19. Iraqi recognition of the new Governments in Syria and the Lebanon is still withheld, but the Prime Minister may perhaps be willing to accord recognition after new elections have been carried out and constitutional Governments installed.

20. Relations with Saudi Arabia have become easier. At a meeting which Assad Beg, the Saudi Chargé d'Affaires, and Shukri Quwatli (the Syrian politician who, since his return to Bagdad from the Haj, has been interesting himself in the settlement of outstanding disputes between the two countries) had with Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, on the 22nd June, they told him that Ibn Saud, moved by advice which I had offered to Assad Beg, that the Arab Governments should drop all minor squabbles and concentrate on the larger issues, had sent instructions to his Legation not to press further for a solution of the vexed boundary and Shammir questions but to seek simple satisfaction in a number of trans-border raiding cases, the victims of which were petitioning the King for redress. They explained that lists of these cases had been given to the Iraqi Government and asked for and were readily given an assurance that the Adviser for his part would do all he could to see that each case was properly investigated and settled one way or the other by methods which would satisfy Bedouin standards of fair play.

21. Taking into consideration existing conditions, the Kurdish tribes on the Iraq-Persia frontier have remained surprisingly calm. At the end of May there was some fear that Hama Rashid Khan of Waina might renew hostilities and the Persian Government requested the Iraqi Government to put pressure to bear on him to withdraw to Iraq. The Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior toured the frontier near Panjwin to see what could be done and found that the local Persian authorities were already negotiating with Hama Rashid and other Kurdish chieftains. Details of the result of these negotiations have not reached Bagdad, but fighting between the tribes and the Persians appears to have ceased for some time. In June the Persians complained of the arrival in Iran of the Jaf tribe on their annual migration from Iraq. They seem to have feared that the Jaf would join the insurgent Persian Kurdish tribes and later on threatened to bomb them if they did not withdraw. The Jaf chieftains, however, took the matter in hand themselves, and the situation was eased when they sent presents to the local Persian military commanders.

22. Some months ago the Iraqi Government proposed to the Persian Government that the work of re-erecting, where necessary, the frontier pillars on their common frontier, provided for in the Frontier Treaty of 1937, should be resumed and that, in order to settle technical disputes on the spot, a British arbitrator should be appointed to the joint commission. After a long delay the Persian Government sent an oral reply on the 14th July through their Bagdad Legation stating that they thought the moment inopportune to resume this work and that therefore the question of appointing an arbitrator did not arise. The Persians are not likely to be moved from this non-co-operative attitude unless pressure is applied.

23. Looking back over the period covered by this despatch, I see no developments within the country or on its borders which need cause us anxiety about the future. The Government and the people stood up well to the shock of the unexpectedly bad news from Libya which preceded and followed the fall of Tobruk and reacted with resilient optimism to the eventual stand of the Eighth Army at Al Alamein. The successes achieved by the German offensive on the Don caused and continue to cause anxiety amounting in some quarters to dismay, but there are no signs of any growth of public hostility. On the contrary, thanks in some measure to the work of our Public Relations Department, there is evidence that at last a belief in the rightness of the principles of democracy is beginning to grow. If a resolute Government can be kept in office and an adequate distribution of food supplies be maintained, I feel that on the facts as they are known to us we are justified in feeling confident that, provided the enemy can be kept from her frontiers, Iraq will now stand true to her alliance to the end of the war.

24. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Angora, Cairo, Teheran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State, Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Middle East Intelligence Centre, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent, Koweit, and to His Majesty's Consuls at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.,

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 5448/5448/93]

No. 56.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 239.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 27, 1942.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 311 of the 6th November last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for the year 1942.

I have, &c.,

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.

Afghanistan: Abdur Rahman Khan, Minister (October 21, 1941).

Although an Iraqi mission, headed by a chargé d'affaires, has been established at Kabul since November 1940, I received no warning that it was proposed to appoint an Afghan representative to Bagdad. The arrival of Abdur Rahman Khan, complete with a secretary, on the 11th October, came as a surprise both to my colleagues and myself. The new minister is said to have served as a consul in Bombay and at the Afghan Legation in Paris, but he appears to be somewhat ignorant of diplomatic usage. He speaks English. (Written in 1941.)

Owing to the Court mourning for the late mother of H.M. Zahir Shah, the legation has done no entertaining, but Abdur Rahman has turned up regularly at diplomatic functions and always seems to be friendly and anxious to please, though his stock of conversational topics is small. He appears to have no work to do beyond aiding the occasional student coming home from Europe on his way back to Afghanistan. He has only one hat, a somewhat battered blue Homburg, which has to serve even for funerals.

Egypt: Awadh-al-Bahrawi Bey, Minister (July 13, 1940).

Came to Bagdad from the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was formerly consul at Addis Ababa. He is also minister to Saudi Arabia and created a precedent by presenting his letters of credence at Riyadh by special arrangement. (Written in 1940.)

He has spent little time in Bagdad this year and is said to be a sick man. Immediately after the Rashid Ali rebellion in May (during which period he stayed quietly in his legation), he returned to Cairo on sick leave and has not

been in Bagdad since. I have not a high opinion of his ability, nor do I think he is well-informed on developments in this country. He is verbose and is far more at home discussing questions of protocol. All important work appears to be done by M. Abdul Monem, the counsellor of the legation, who has been chargé d'affaires during the long periods of absence of the minister. (Written in 1941.)

Awadh-al-Bahrawi Bey has not been in Bagdad since June 1941. M. Abdul Monem has been in charge of the legation during this period, except for a few months when ill-health forced him to take sick-leave in Cairo at the beginning of the year. M. Ahmad Bahgat was sent over from Cairo to replace him for the time being. M. Abdul Monem returned to Bagdad with his pleasant wife in June. He is almost embarrassingly pro-British in sentiment and makes no secret of his contempt for the venality of Egyptian politicians and officials. I gather that he is not popular in his own Ministry because of his extremist anti-Italian views and his frequently expressed belief that Egypt is as yet unfit for independence. He can always be relied upon to back us up with an almost too cheerful optimism whenever we suffer any reverses in the Western Desert.

France.

The French Legation was closed in November 1941.

Japan.

The Japanese Legation was closed in November 1941.

Persia: Mr. Moussa Noury Esfandiary, Minister (January 26, 1942).

Mr. Madjdi having been recalled in November, the legation was temporarily in the charge of the counsellor, Mr. Reza Safinia, until Mr. Esfandiary returned to Bagdad in January of this year.

Mr. Esfandiary is well known in Bagdad, having served here as minister for some time up till July 1940, when he was transferred to Berlin. He remained at that post until his Government broke off relations with Germany in September 1941. His sojourn in Germany seems to have done him good in that he has acquired a healthy respect for the Royal Air Force. He was undeniably glad to get back to the doubtful material comforts of Bagdad. Within the somewhat restricted limits of his powers he appears to be anxious to co-operate, though I doubt whether he is to be trusted very far. He is effusive and often almost obsequious when one meets him. He speaks good French.

Saudi Arabia.

Since the departure of Sheikh Hamza-al-Ghoth in April 1940, and the return of Sheikh Yusuf Yassin to Riyadh in the autumn of that year, the legation has remained in the charge of Saiyid Assad-al-Faqih, who is a pleasant but colourless Syrian. During the May rebellion he is reported to have remained pro-British in sympathy, but not to have taken any active part in King Ibn Saud's openly-declared anti-Rashid Ali policy. He speaks French and some English. (Written in 1941.)

The legation has remained in Saiyid Assad's charge through the year. He continues to be friendly and co-operative in the comparatively few matters which jointly concern this mission and the legation. He has a difficult row to hoe, for the Iraqi authorities have a genius for annoying King Abdul Aziz.

Turkey: M. Ahmed Cavad Ustun, Minister (September 1939).

He has served in Vienna and at The Hague. He and his wife are an agreeable couple, but both are congenitally nervous, and it may be said without exaggeration that M. Cavad Ustun is a confirmed hypochondriac. Continued ill-health, whether real or imagined, has not been without its influence on his morale, and he has on several occasions shocked both Iraqis and his colleagues by giving expression to defeatist views. While he may not be fundamentally ill-disposed, I have not found him a helpful colleague in times when robust courage and cheerful confidence are qualities to be desired in the representatives of countries having close relations with ourselves. Nevertheless, he and his wife are at times friendly. (Written in 1940.)

Until the Rashid Ali rebellion he is reported to have made some feeble attempts to dissuade the pro-German politicians from taking the course they had planned. When the final break came he busied himself feverishly in efforts to reconcile the two parties to each other and so stave off an armed conflict. He and his wife still suffer from perpetual fear and ill-health. Two months after the collapse of the rebellion he hurried back to Turkey on sick leave, and has not since returned to Bagdad. (Written in 1941.)

M. Ustun returned to Bagdad in late 1941 with a new phobia—Russia. He made every effort to enlist the sympathy of leading Iraqis, the Persian Chargé d'Affaires and even the late United States Minister in regard to the Russian danger, if Germany should be defeated. He suggested that the Russian zone in Persia should be taken over by the British. His views were not well received generally, and the Iraqi Prime Minister at one time talked of getting him removed, but soundings taken at Angora did not evoke a favourable response.

He has been very busy personally supervising the onward despatch of goods passing through Iraq in transit to Turkey, even to the extent of haunting the railway goods yard, which has tended to keep him out of mischief.

United States of America: (Vacant).

Since the death of the late Mr. Paul Knabenshue on the 1st February this year, the legation has been in the charge of Mr. W. S. Farrell, a junior and corpulent secretary who has spent most of his brief service in Middle Eastern countries and is reported to be a talented linguist and amateur cinematographer. There his capabilities appear to end, and he cannot be said to have handled the increasing volume of the legation's work resulting from the establishment of the American supply route to Russia through this country either competently or wisely. He has also shown himself to be easily influenced by such powerful vested interests as Pan-American Airways, who have been seeking to exploit their present special position to their future and permanent advantage. His relations with members of my staff are most cordial. Despite this ready friendliness he does not impress one favourably, partly, perhaps, on purely physical grounds. Indeed, when the shade temperature is hovering round 115° F. a visit from the damp and long-winded Mr. Farrell is something to be dreaded. It is satisfactory to know that a senior minister is at last being appointed, even though I am told that he will probably fall far short of his predecessor's high standard.

Representatives accredited to Iraq but resident elsewhere.

Belgium: M. Egbert Graeffe, Minister (April 27, 1938).

He is also Belgian Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

He pays periodical visits to Bagdad and always shows a keen desire to co-operate closely with this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

M. Graeffe visited Bagdad this spring. I find him as hearty and keen as ever.

Denmark: Dr. M. A. E. C. Fensmark, Chargé d'Affaires (June 17, 1939).

Resides at Tehran. He struck me as a good and typically friendly Danish type. He is married. (Written in 1939.)

In February the Iraqi Government received a communication from the Danish Government stating that Dr. Fensmark was no longer held to be their representative and that a new minister would be appointed. The Iraqi Government were at first inclined to withdraw their recognition of Dr. Fensmark, but, as the result of my representations, finally agreed to maintain their former attitude towards him. Dr. Fensmark visited Bagdad in April on his way to Syria and the Lebanon. He is undeniably pro-Allied in outlook, but he is rather tiresome to have to deal with. He talks good English, but he talks it too much. He is very gallant.

Netherlands: Dr. P. L. C. Visser, Minister (August 7, 1941).

He is Netherlands Minister at Angora, where he resides. He stayed only a week in Bagdad for the purpose of presenting his credentials, and gave me to understand that he would not often visit this capital. He is a friendly man and created a most favourable impression both in British and Iraqi circles. (Written in 1941.)

Dr. Visser visited Bagdad this spring. He further increased his popularity by a lecture he gave at the British Institute on his mountaineering exploits in the Karakorums. His wife, who accompanied him on this visit, did not create such a good impression, and many people were tempted to label her as pro-German.

Poland: M. Jan Karszo Siedlewski, Minister (March 27, 1939).

He is also Minister at Tehran and Kabul and resides at Tehran.

He has visited Bagdad occasionally during the past year. He seems to be a confused little man, friendly, but weak and gullible. He makes no attempt to look after his nationals, and the greater part of his work in this connexion therefore falls on this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

M. Henryk Malhomme arrived early this year to be counsellor to the legation, with residence in Bagdad. He has served in the Polish Foreign Office and in Japan. A friendly individual who talks French and some English. He is active on behalf of his compatriots who are at present passing through this country on their way from Russia. He likes to "drop in for a chat" with members of my staff, but rarely appears to have anything interesting to say.

Sweden: M. Sven Harald Pousette, Chargé d'Affaires (December 3, 1941).

M. Hugo von Heidenstam was recalled in December last and left the legation at Tehran in the charge of M. Pousette, who was formerly counsellor of the Swedish Legation in London. He has not been here.

[E 5725/204/93]

No. 57.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 973.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, September 26, 1942.

PRIME Minister returned to this theme in conversation with me on 24th September. He said that the time had now come for him to implement his promise of last summer to add a third Shia to the Cabinet, a step which would entail other changes, the extent and scope of which would depend mainly upon relations between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior. If, as he hoped, this problem could be solved on an enduring basis the reshuffling would be simple. But if, as was more than likely, the former had to go, reorganisation would be wider. Assuming that the latter course would be inevitable, he contemplated bringing in Tewfik Suwaidi, although this would mean a tussle with the Regent. He then produced a list of changes he had in mind and invited me to comment on it after consultation with oriental secretary and adviser to Ministry of Interior.

2. Position was duly reviewed with Captain Holt and Mr. Edmonds, our main preoccupation being to ensure, if possible, that somebody with personality and power of decision be appointed to the Ministry of Finance, which has to deal with all supply questions, now rapidly growing in difficulty and importance. Having decided on certain suggestions, we all three conferred again to-day with the Prime Minister, and, as a result, his Excellency declared that, if Ali Mumtaz had to go, he would propose to the Regent the transfer of present Minister of the Interior to Finance with Tewfik Suwaidi as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Abdul Azziz-al-Qassab at Interior, Nuri Pasha himself retaining Defence. The other changes, about three in number, need not be reported in detail, but the net result would be that the Cabinet would contain three Shiah and two Kurds. The Prime Minister attached the utmost importance to having Tewfik Suwaidi in the Cabinet, because the support which he would thus gain in the Senate and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would leave him ample leisure for this work.

3. It remains to be seen how the Regent reacts should it be necessary to consult him on the above basis. Changes would take place at the end of Ramadan, so that the new Administration might have two or three weeks to settle down before the Legislature reassembles on 1st November.

4. I am advised that Abdul Azziz as Minister of the Interior may not show the vigour of Saleh Jabr in dealing with political undesirables. But the internal situation is now much healthier, and, as stated in paragraph 2, supply questions threaten to become the main anxiety of the winter months.

[E 5804/204/93]

No. 58.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 988.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, September 30, 1942.

MY telegram No. 973.

I learn that the Regent has undertaken not to oppose the entry of Tewfik Suwaidi into the Cabinet should circumstances so dictate.

2. In the meantime, the situation has been complicated during the last few days by an angry squabble between Ministry of Finance and the Mutessarif of Bagdad arising out of refusal of the latter to move certain supplies of flour owing

to paucity of his own reserves, which in turn is attributed to his alleged slackness in collecting wheat from the neighbouring growers. This row coincided with the return from a provincial tour of Mr. Lloyd, Director-General of Grains, who is bitter in his denunciations of mutessarifs in general for their widespread failure to compel growers to disgorge. You will appreciate that all this has given a powerful impetus to the accusations against the Minister of the Interior of supposed "non-co-operation" in making the Government grain policies effective. He is being attacked, *inter alia*, for intriguing between Shiah against Minister of Finance.

3. British adviser to the Ministry of the Interior is doing his best to calm both protagonists down and taking steps to a solution. He does not believe there has been any deliberate [group undecipherable]ing on either side, but his task is hampered by introduction of personalities into the debate. It is unfortunate that the tempers of certain British officials (notably the voluble Lloyd) are also ruffled, and I have asked the adviser to the Ministry of Finance to use his influence to soothe the latter especially. Meanwhile Mr. Edmonds's efforts continue.

[E 5725/204/93]

No. 59.

Mr. Eden to Sir K. Cornwallis (Bagdad).

(No. 914.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 973 [of 25th September: Political situation in Iraq].

I hope that means may be found to include Tewfik Suwaidi in the Government, whether present Minister of Finance goes or stays. Please see in this connexion my telegram No. 637 [of 27th June]

CHAPTER III.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 3929/207/89]

No. 60.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 18.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 10, 1942.

SOME weeks ago I requested the Political Officer at Damascus to let me have a report on the existing electoral system in Syria with special reference to the question whether a fresh census would be necessary in order to ensure fair results. I asked Colonel Gardener whether he agreed with the view which had been expressed to me by Bahij Bey el Khatib, at that time Minister of the Interior, that the number of Deputies could be halved with practical advantage and without causing much popular resentment, always assuming the possibility of altering the Electoral Law by constitutional means. (Bahij Bey had suggested for this purpose the prior election of a small Senate, the sole function of which would be the alteration of the Electoral Law as a prelude to the election of a Chamber.)

2. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of Colonel Gardener's report, and of a report subsequently furnished by Lieutenant-Colonel Furlonge on the electoral system in the Lebanon.

3. In neither country has the record of past Parliaments been such as to inspire confidence, but I personally consider Colonel Gardener's report to be in some respects unduly pessimistic. Thus, it was never our intention that elections should be held before the war situation became clearer (as it can scarcely fail to have become by next winter). Again, I do not see why a census should be "unthinkable" for lack of the necessary machinery: it would not be the first census to be held in Syria. The danger of a census giving rise to rumours of conscription has been considered since Colonel Gardener's report was written, and, as you know, my own conclusion was that the risk would have to be faced (see my telegram No. 60 to the Minister of State of the 30th April). There is, however, some force in the argument that a reduction in the number of Deputies (which had been suggested on the grounds of expense, a total of approximately 100 seats being clearly excessive for a country with so small a population) would slightly prejudice the position of the minorities.

4. As regards the Lebanon, the main point which emerges from Lieutenant-Colonel Furlonge's interesting report is that, in view of the extremely chequered history of past Parliaments, there is ample precedent for any changes in the Electoral Law which it may be thought politic to introduce.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State in Cairo, to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Bagdad and Cairo and to the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

Syrian Electoral System.

General.

Despite the provision in article 35 (as revised) of the Syrian Constitution of 1928 (promulgated in 1930) that the Chamber of Deputies would prepare a new Electoral Law, none has been prepared and the law at present in force is to be found in the High Commissioner's Arrêté No. 1889 of the 20th March, 1928, modified to include the Jebel Druse and the Alaouites (see Syrian *Journal Officiel* No. 15 of the 22nd April, 1937). This is based on the following principles:—

- (a) Secret ballot.
- (b) Universal male adult suffrage (including minorities).
- (c) The elections take place in two stages, *i.e.*, there is no direct connexion between the electorate and the Deputies.

Electoral Machinery.

The law provides that the basic electoral unit shall be a nahiya in the country and a quarter in a town. The electoral list for each unit is prepared by a commission, which bases its list on the census returns (if available). The list must be revised annually in January and remains in force until the 31st March of the following year. In these units every hundred voters elect one "électeur du second degré" to represent them. These secondary electors meet in every caza (the towns of Damascus and Aleppo being considered the equivalent of cazas) and elect Deputies from among themselves at the rate of one Deputy for every 6,000 primary electors (*i.e.*, one for every sixty secondary electors) or any portion of that figure in excess of 3,000. The actual number of Deputies for each caza (or equivalent) is laid down by an arrêté. An important exception to this rule are the tribes, who are represented by five Deputies nominated by the tribal sheikhs. The actual number of Deputies in the last Parliament was 105 (including six from Alexandretta but excluding one vacancy in Jebel Druse which appears never to have been filled).

Protection of Minorities.

The original wording of article 37 of the Syrian Constitution provided for the representation of religious minorities. Under this rule anyone belonging to a minority religion could stand for election and take his chance. The wording was subsequently altered to read:—

"La loi électorale instituera le vote secret et la représentation des minorités confessionnelles."

and so a candidate must belong to a given religious sect, who alone can elect him (if they are sufficiently numerous).

The existing law (1928) provides that representation for each religious minority shall be on the same pattern as for Moslems, *i.e.*, one Deputy for each 6,000 primary voters (or any residue over 3,000) in each caza. If the number of the community in any one caza does not qualify it to have a Deputy, the members of that community in several cazas are grouped until they are represented as above. Furthermore, those communities who are insufficiently numerous throughout the State to obtain representation are grouped with other religious communities in a like situation and the number of their Deputies is proportional to the total thus achieved, qualifying at 3,001 votes for one Deputy.

Minorities in this country are therefore in theory on the same footing as the Moslems. In practice, however, they suffer a slight disadvantage because the religious sects are numerous and each of the more numerous ones must have a non-transferable fraction, which, being less than 3,000, does not earn a Deputy.

The various religions were represented in the 1936 Parliament in the following manner:—

Sunnis	73	Greek Catholic	2
Ismailis	1	Armenian Catholic	1
Greek Orthodox	4	Druses	2
Syrian Orthodox	1	Alaouites	13
Jews	1	Minorities not otherwise	
Armenian Orthodox	3	represented	4

An appendix shows the number of Deputies of each religion to be elected in the 1936 elections, together with the modifications necessitated by the incorporation in 1937 of Deputies from Jebel Druse and Alaouites.

Practical Inconveniences.

In his book, "La Constitution de la Syrie," Dr. Munir Ajlani, a Minister in the present Government, stated (1932), "Jusqu'ici les opérations électorales, en Syrie, étaient de véritables batailles où il y a toujours du sang qui coule et des morts." This statement is confirmed by enquiries now made in regard to elections prior to 1936. The 1936 election passed in relative calm.

It may be that the apathy born of the war and the lack of a great major issue may result in calmer elections in present days, but that cannot be counted on and it would, from the point of view of public order, be a rather dangerous experiment until the war issue is clearer.

While generally in favour of the indirect electoral system as being more suited to this country, the same author admits that it has one danger. This is

that the Government can exercise pressure on the secondary electors, since they are few in number. He also quotes other Election Laws which Governments in the past have violated in order to ensure results favourable to themselves. His views are widely held and it has become axiomatic in Syria that the Government in power is in a commanding position to win an election—always assuming it has not become too unpopular.

As stated above, the basis of the electoral list is the census return, if available, otherwise the responsible commission proceeds to prepare its own list. The last census was made in 1928, and, although the information thus available can be partially brought up to date by consulting the records of the Etat Civil, the present situation leaves much to be desired. There are, therefore, two ways of compiling a new electoral list: (a) by a fresh census, and (b) by the work of the appropriate commission. A census at the present time is unthinkable. No machinery exists, and, furthermore, any attempt to make a census would provoke the wildest rumours that we intended to enforce compulsory military service. The preparation of the electoral lists by the appropriate commissions is certainly preferable, but the same rumours of military service would circulate (though to a lesser degree) and the result would certainly be most inaccurate, suffering both from inefficiency and even deliberate falsification.

Reduction in number of Deputies.

Assuming that the number of Deputies could be halved by constitutional means, the practical advantages of such a step are not readily discernible. The main disadvantages of a Parliament are (a) its potential hostility to the Allies and (b) its slowness in enacting legislation. The reduction of the number of Deputies from about 100 (i.e., total loss of Alexandretta Deputies) to 50 would not appear to do anything to obviate these disadvantages. Furthermore, such a step would appear likely to work against the position of the minorities if the basis of representation be changed from 6,000 primary voters to 12,000 to one Deputy.

Some public resentment at such a change is inevitable, for the party or individuals who lost the elections would tend to consider that the defeat was due to the change of electoral basis and would therefore nourish a grievance against the Allies and the present Government in consequence. Furthermore, such countries as Iraq and possibly Egypt, who refuse to acknowledge the independence of Syria on the pretext that the constitutional form of Government is not respected, would still have tenable grounds for withholding their recognition if they so pleased, i.e., that the constitutional change of the electoral basis was not, in fact, constitutional and the resulting Government was a sham.

Appendix.

<i>Circoscription.</i>	<i>Seats.</i>	
Damascus and Suburbs ...	10	Sunnis.
	1	Jew.
	1	Greek Orthodox.
	1	Greek Catholic.
	1	Small communities not assured of representation in the State.
Caza of Kalamoun ...	2	Sunnis.
" " Douma ...	2	"
" " Katana ...	1	"
" " Zabadani ...	1	"
" " Kuneitra ...	2	"
Town of Homs and Suburbs ...	4	"
	1	Alaouite.
	1	Greek Orthodox.
Town of Hama and Suburbs ...	3	Sunnis.
Caza of Salimié ...	1	Ismaili.
Deraa ...	2	Sunnis.
Ezraa ...	2	"
Mouçance of Damascus ...	3	"

<i>Circoscription.</i>	<i>Seats.</i>	
Town of Aleppo ...	6	Sunnis.
	2	Armenian Orthodox.
	1	Catholic.
	1	Greek Catholic.
	1	Communities not assured of representation in the State.
Caza of Jebel Samaan ...	3	Sunnis.
" " Bab ...	1	"
" " Idlib ...	3	"
" " Harem ...	1	"
" " Menbej ...	1	"
" " Jerablous ...	2	"
" " Maarra ...	1	"
" " Azaz ...	1	"
" " Kurd dagh ...	1	"
Mouçance of Aleppo ...	2	"
Deir ez Zor and Suburbs ...	4	"
Abou Kemal ...	1	"
Rekka ...	3	"
Jezirah (Hassetche and Qamishlie) ...	2	"
	1	Syrian Orthodox.
Tribes of the Jezirah and Euphrates ...	2	Sunnis.
Caza of Alexandretta ...	1	Alaouite.
" " Antioch ...	2	Sunnis.
	1	Alaouite.
	1	Armenian Orthodox.
" " Kirk Khan ...	1	Sunni.
Latakia ...	1	Sunni.
	1	Alaouite.
	1	Small communities not assured of representation in the State.
Sahyoun ...	1	Alaouite.
	1	Sunni.
Misyaf ...	1	Alaouite.
Bamias ...	1	Alaouite.
Jabaleh ...	2	Alaouites.
Tartous ...	1	Sunni.
	1	Alaouite.
Safita ...	2	Alaouites.
	1	Greek Orthodox.
Tal Kalakh ...	1	Alaouite.
	1	Greek Orthodox.
Jebel Druse ...	2	Druses.
	1	Small communities not assured of representation in the State.
	1	Tribes.

(No elections were made in Chahba.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

The Lebanese Electoral System.

I.—Historical Survey.

(i) Up till 1918 the autonomous Sanjak of Mount Lebanon, under Turkish domination, possessed a "Grand Administrative Council," which assisted the mutessarif in the management of public business, particularly as regards financial affairs. It was elected in two degrees, its members being elected by the sheikhs-solh (mayors) of villages, who in their turn were elected by citizens who paid the capitation tax.

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(ii) In September 1920, when the State of Greater Lebanon was created, it was given an administrative commission of seven members, representing the main communities, who were nominated by the High Commissioner.

(iii) By Arrêtés Nos. 1304 and 1304 bis of the 8th March, 1922, the High Commissioner created an elected representative council of thirty members, drawn from the different communities. Election was restricted and in two degrees.

(iv) On the 23rd May, 1926, the Lebanese Constitution was promulgated. It constituted a republic with a Chamber of thirty members, elected by universal suffrage and in two degrees, and a Senate of sixteen members, of which seven were nominated by the President and the rest elected. As a purely transitory measure, however, the High Commissioner nominated the first Senate.

(v) On the 17th October, 1927, the Constitution was revised, as it had proved too cumbersome and expensive, and the Senate was suppressed. As it could hardly vote its own extinction, the first step taken was a decree fusing the Senate in the Chamber. Thus the principle of nominated Deputies was first carried into the Chamber from the Senate.

(vi) A new Chamber was formed in 1929, comprising thirty members elected in two degrees and fifteen nominated by the President.

(vii) On the 9th May, 1932, by Arrêté No. 55/LR, the High Commissioner suspended the Constitution and the Chamber.

(viii) On the 1st January, 1934, by Arrêté No. 1/LR, the High Commissioner promulgated a new régime, which comprised—

- (a) A President nominated by the High Commissioner, who held the executive powers, with the assistance of a Secretary of State and a Government Council; and
- (b) A Chamber of Deputies with legislative powers, composed of eighteen Deputies elected by direct universal suffrage and seven nominated by the President.

(ix) By Arrêté No. 1/LR of the 3rd January, 1936, the High Commissioner gave to the Chamber the power to elect the President of the Republic.

(x) On the 4th January, 1937, by Decree No. 1/LR, the High Commissioner cancelled the suspension of the Constitution which had been pronounced in 1932 and parliamentary government was re-established.

(xi) By July 1937 it had become clear that twenty-five members were too few for a parliamentary régime. The Chamber was dissolved and a general election took place, the number of Deputies being increased to forty-two elected by direct suffrage and twenty-one nominated by the President.

(xii) On the 21st September, 1939, on the outbreak of war, the High Commissioner, by Arrêté No. 246/LR, dissolved the Chamber and entrusted its legislative powers to a Secretary of State nominated by him and assisted by a French *conseiller*. The President's executive powers were made subject to the High Commissioner's sanction. Since then the Lebanon has had no Chamber or Popular Assembly.

(xiii) On the 9th April, 1941, after the then President of the Republic had resigned, the High Commissioner, by Arrêté No. 80/LR, laid down that executive powers were henceforth confided to a chief of the Government nominated by him, assisted by a Council of Under-Secretaries of State of not more than five members, nominated by the President and responsible to him. The office of President remained vacant.

(xiv) On the 26th November, 1941, General Catroux, in his proclamation of independence, announced the nomination of a President, who would nominate a Government to be responsible to himself.

II.—Résumé of present Lebanese Electoral Law. (Arrêté No. 2/LR of the 2nd January, 1934, modified by subsequent arrêts.)

The total number of seats in the Chamber is divided amongst the different religious communities by the following process:—

- (i) The total number of the population, divided by the total number of seats, gives a figure known as "the electoral quotient."
- (ii) In each district, if the total number of members of each community, divided by the electoral quotient, gives a result greater than half, that community is entitled to one seat. If the result is a whole number plus a fraction greater than one-half, the community is entitled to one more than that number of representatives.

(Example.—Total population 9 million, number of seats eighteen. Electoral quotient is therefore 50,000. If, therefore, in any district total number of, e.g., Maronites is 126,000, the Maronites are entitled to 126,000 divided by 50,000 = $2\frac{1}{2}$ = 3 seats.)

(iii) One seat is reserved to the minority communities and allotted to Beirut.

(iv) No community may hold more or less seats than the result arrived at by dividing its total number of adherents in all districts by the electoral quotient.

Electoral wards are by districts ("muhafazats").

All the electors of each district, whatever their community, vote for all the Deputies to be elected.

Suffrage is secret, universal, and direct.

Candidates must be Lebanese subjects, electors, over 25 years old, must enjoy full political rights, and be literate. They may stand for only one constituency, but may stand for any.

Election as a Deputy and the holding of a salaried State office are incompatible.

Electoral lists are drawn up in each caza by a commission presided over by an official nominated by the kaimakam and containing a judge and a municipal official, with the local registrar and two electors as advisers. All male Lebanese subjects, over 21 years old, domiciled at least six months in the caza and enjoying full political rights, are entitled to inscription on the electoral list of the caza. No one may be inscribed on more than one list.

Each elector must fill up one voting-paper only, containing the exact number of candidates to be elected. If a paper contains too many names, the names put down first are taken.

On a first count only those candidates who have polled half the number of permissible votes are declared elected. If after this seats still remain to be filled, a second count is taken within eight days in which a relative majority suffices.

The law contains detailed measures for the control of elections, and a schedule of punishments for incorrect or corrupt practices during elections.

III.—Observations.

The following points are worth noting:—

(a) In the Lebanon, unlike Syria, elections have since 1934 been direct; and the electoral wards are muhafazats.

(b) The system under which about one-third of the total number of Deputies are nominated by the President of the Republic arose almost fortuitously in 1927 as a consequence of the abolition of the Senate, but has been retained ever since, no doubt as a means of increasing mandatory control over the Government. It is a source of general criticism and under independence there seems no reason for its continuance, especially as it does not exist in Syria.

(c) The mandatory authorities did not hesitate at any time to set aside any clause of the Constitution, or to suspend the Constitution itself, when it seemed to them desirable. The present régime is, of course, entirely unconstitutional. There would therefore be no practical objection to any change in the Constitution or Electoral Law which circumstances might now dictate, e.g., the abolition of the system of nominated Deputies.

(d) The size of the Chamber has constantly varied, twenty-five being the smallest and sixty-three the largest yet formed. A figure of about forty-five seems generally acceptable.

(e) Since voting is direct, attempts to influence the elections have had in the past to be made on the electors. Such attempts have usually taken the form of the payment of money to voters by individual candidates and the issue of promises of official employment or other favours by Government supporters. The mandatory authorities have also exercised considerable pressure by openly supporting certain candidates or by securing the exclusion of the candidature of persons not agreeable to them.

Weekly Political Summary No. 12: Syria and the Lebanon.—(Received June 25, 1942.)

1. General.

THE political situation in both States is quiet but unstable, with some manoeuvring for position against the prospect of elections at the end of the year. A Cabinet crisis seems probable in Damascus owing to dissension within the Government over recent appointments. In the Lebanon the Minister for Foreign Affairs is again threatening to resign.

There have been further demonstrations at Deir ez Zor owing to the high price of bread, and the population has petitioned the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, and General Catroux to intervene.

In the Jezireh there has been a serious clash between tribesmen and the Gardes Mobiles, but the tribal situation on the whole remains calm.

Public opinion continues to favour the fortunes of the Allies, but it is too early to estimate what the reaction will be to our set-backs in Libya.

2. Wheat.

Satisfactory progress is being made with the Wheat Scheme, although many large cultivators continue to withhold their support until they see whether control will be impartial and effective.

3. Syria: Damascus.

Considerable adverse comment and distrust has been caused by the recent Government appointments. The Government is being accused of favouring the Nationalists, with whom the Prime Minister has latterly been in close contact, so as to strengthen its position in anticipation of elections. Colour is lent to this belief by the fact that gendarmerie officers have been appointed to posts usually held by civilian officials.

Attempts have been made by the President and Prime Minister to discover the British attitude to these changes and to the possible installation of a Nationalist Government. The Political Officer has pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the unpopularity and ill-wisdom of these appointments, which, in view of the inefficiency and political unreliability of certain of the officers concerned, must be regarded as a potential threat to security besides constituting a dangerous precedent.

It is understood that the appointments were made without the foreknowledge of the délégué, who, however, regards them as temporary expedients and does not share the Political Officer's misgivings about them.

The Cabinet is now divided into two camps, composed of the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on the one hand, and the anti-Nationalist land-owners on the other. The split has become more defined since the visit paid to Egypt at Nahas Pasha's invitation by Jamil Bey Mardan and Bushara Bey Khoury, which has aroused wide speculation, and which is being linked in the popular mind with the question of elections.

According to the press, Ahmet Umaar, the new Turkish Consul in Damascus, has made a declaration to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government that the latter desired to cultivate the most friendly relations with Syria, whose progress to independence it observed with pleasure and was prepared to assist.

In an effort to combat the crisis provoked by the lack of small change, paper money to the value of 5, 10 and 25 piastres has been issued.

4. Aleppo.

Following the recent troubles, the Mohafez has been replaced.

Bread supplies are now adequate and the area is quiet. Wheat stocks are still low, but there is confidence that supplies will be forthcoming from the Wheat Office, which is now beginning to function in the district. Control to prevent illegal movement of grain is still far from effective.

Jamil Bey Mardan's recent visit to Egypt has aroused much speculation amongst the Jabri group of Nationalists, but elsewhere there is little interest in politics.

There is some anxiety over the military situation in Libya and Russia, but no incident occurred when the Turkish frontier was recently closed for forty-eight

hours, apart from a mild panic on the local market reflected in the high prices registered by gold. Turkish officials showed no more than mild curiosity.

The Greek refugees referred to in last week's Summary have now arrived and are spreading stories of German and Italian brutality.

5. Homs and Hama.

The area is quiet and there is little activity, although complaints against the Government continue. Satisfactory progress is being made with the Wheat Plan, in which confidence is now growing amongst the population.

6. Euphrates and Jezireh.

A tense situation has arisen following a clash on the 11th June between tribesmen of the Abu Hamdan section of the Baggara of Zor and a patrol of Gardes Mobiles, in which five of the latter were killed and two wounded. Rigorous punitive measures, during which great brutality was displayed, were immediately taken by the French, but were subsequently suspended at the request of the area commander. It is not yet clear what degree, if any, of consultation with the local British authorities took place before the reprisals were carried out, but first reports seem to indicate that action may have been taken by the local French S.S.O.'s on their own initiative. This grave incident is being urgently investigated.

There have been demonstrations in Deir ez Zor to protest against the price of bread, which, despite the fact that the town is the centre of a wheat-growing district, is much higher than in Damascus and Aleppo. On the 12th June a petition addressed to the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, signed by all classes of the community, demanding the provision of cheap wheat for the poor was presented to the Political Officer by a deputation headed by the Mufti. A similar petition has also been sent to General Catroux. The town has since been quiet and temporary measures have been taken to remedy the situation, but the outlook must be regarded as unsatisfactory until permanent arrangements are made to release wheat to the poorer classes at a price comparable with that of other areas and within their means.

The Wheat Plan is beginning to be better understood, although effective co-operation on the part of the local Syrian Government officials is still lacking, a number of them having recently absented themselves from their posts on one pretext or another. Purchasing, however, is proceeding and the outlook is regarded as satisfactory.

With the commencement of the harvest the number of tribesmen crossing into Syria from Turkey is increasing and security is becoming difficult to maintain. It is thought likely that the Milli tribe may migrate into Syria.

7. Jebel Druze.

The situation remains calm, and, although certain of the less responsible members of the Atrash family continue to complain of alleged French intrigue with their rivals, both Soltan Pasha el Atrash and the Emir Hassan are holding aloof from local political activities.

8. Alaouite Territory.

No events of importance to report.

9. Tribal.

Shamieh.—The general situation is quiet as the tribes settle down in their summer quarters.

Mohamed el Faraj, Sheikh of the Wulda, has gone to Damascus charged with the uphill task of collecting from the Syrian Government the sum of £Syr. 37,000 which was awarded to his tribe three months ago in settlement of the Fedaan-Wulda dispute.

Jezireh.—The crossing into the Jezireh of the Fedaan-Wulda is now completed, and, although minor incidents have taken place, there have been no serious clashes and tension has begun to slacken.

The danger of a dispute between the Shammar and Jabbour, to which reference was made in Summary No. 9 (the 4th June, 1942), has been averted and the Jabbour are now working peacefully on their summer cultivations, having now received reassurances from the Chief of the Iraqi Shammar that it is intended to maintain the peace.

It is reported that the Hoybun (Kurdish Independent party) and the Dashnak (Armenian "Federation" party) have resumed activity with future plans to work in collaboration.

10. *The Lebanon.*

The Government is becoming increasingly disorganised, with the President attempting to win personal popularity, in view of the impending elections, by acting independently of his Ministers. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, disgusted with the situation and disappointed by his failure to secure the transfer of wider powers to the Government and to obtain recognition of Lebanese independence by Egypt, Iraq and the United States, is again threatening to resign.

The Lebanese Minister of Ravitaillement, Alfred Bey Skaf, has now returned from a visit to Cairo. He had less success in his attempts to get rice from Egypt than he had in Bagdad, and secured only a half-promise of an option on some of the autumn crop.

Milhem Kassim and his two sons, the bandits who have been making a nuisance of themselves in the Bekaa, were arrested in Zahlé on the 22nd June by the French S.S.O. and were brought to Beirut pending their transfer to Palestine.

The recent release from internment of Aref Nakad, a prominent Druze, has caused some excitement in Druze circles, as he heads a movement designed to unify the Druzes and the Sunni Moslems, and is therefore opposed by many orthodox Druzes. The release has also excited hopes that several other much more dangerous Druzes who are still interned will also be liberated.

Mr. C. van Engert, United States Consul-General at Beirut, left on the 21st June on transfer to Kabul. His departure will be keenly felt and his many services to the British army and community will long be remembered with gratitude.

11. *Press and Propaganda.*

The main news of the week has been Mr. Churchill's visit to the United States, which the press has interpreted as indication of the imminence of the opening of a second front. It is as yet too early to judge the reaction of our set-backs in Libya.

The Wheat Plan has had a favourable press.

Mr. Churchill's visit to the United States is depicted by the enemy wireless as a gesture of despair. The Free Arab Station continues to exhort the population to frustrate the Wheat Scheme, and alleges that the sum of 2 million fr. has been stolen from the Syrian Treasury by General Catroux and sent to General de Gaulle.

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No. 62.

Weekly Political Summary No. 14, Syria and the Lebanon.—(Received July 16.)1. *General.*

WITH the halting of the German advance west of Alexandria there has been a slight recovery in public morale, which in places had been tending towards hysteria. It remains a fact, however, that confidence in Allied victory—and consequently British prestige—which had been steadily growing prior to the fall of Tobruk, has been severely shaken.

In general, there has been much less gloating over Allied discomfiture than might have been expected; on the contrary, a surprising amount of pro-Allied sympathy has been expressed, sometimes in unexpected quarters. Among a population in whom the necessity of fawning on the strong is ingrained, this is probably due not so much to real political sympathies as to a preference for the "devil we know" and to fear of the unknown.

Another significant fact that has emerged from the recent weeks of strain is that the Syrian Nationalists, as a whole, have not shown signs of jubilation over the prospect of Axis "liberation." The feeling among Nationalist leaders that they are soon due for a political innings under the Allies has no doubt contributed to this result.

The Libyan crisis has once more confirmed the presence of "bad" areas in the Levant, notably Homs and Hama and, to a less extent, Tripoli, where popular reactions have been least favourable towards the Allies. Yet it cannot be said that public security has been seriously threatened anywhere, or that it is likely to be unless the Axis threat becomes imminent. In Tripoli and Damascus a few notices have appeared inciting Moslems to rise. Certain unimportant individuals who have tried to stir up anti-Allied sentiment, chiefly by rumour-mongering, have been arrested in Aleppo, and similar action in Homs and Tripoli is under

consideration. In addition, flag marches by Allied troops, which can be counted on to produce a steadying effect, have been arranged in several areas.

In Syria, as in the Lebanon, overt political activity, which until recently had been encouraged by the talk of elections, has temporarily ceased. As a result of further joint enquiry, it was established beyond doubt that Jamil Mardam took advantage of his visit to Nahas Pasha in Egypt to start, on his return, a dangerous political intrigue. He has been invited to retire to his house in the Lebanon for a period, and a communiqué, agreed between General Catroux and General Spears, has been published in the press designed to show Allied solidarity and to discourage local politicians from fishing in troubled waters.

2. *Wheat.*

Although progress has been made in most areas, the Wheat Organisation continues to face the grave difficulties outlined in last week's Summary. Chief among these is the effect of the Libyan campaign in creating alarm and encouraging the already widespread tendency among growers to hoard, through motives of fear or greed. With a view to overcoming the opposition of large landowners, who are naturally inclined to take their line from important land-owning members of the Government, a joint note has been addressed to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs by General Catroux and His Majesty's Minister, calling attention to the seriousness of the situation and the importance of showing as much energy as possible in the prosecution of the plan.

On his recent visit to Homs and Hama the Prime Minister himself, it is reported, took occasion to encourage local opposition to the scheme, and further steps to meet this situation are being considered.

The basic maximum price of best-quality wheat has been fixed at £S. 350 a ton, delivered into stores at Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus. Since very little of the wheat is of this highest quality, and since cost of transport, which is undertaken by O.C.P., is deducted from the price paid to the grower, the latter probably rarely receives more than £S. 280 to £S. 320.

The present Syrian price is higher than in Palestine or Iraq, but much lower than in Turkey, where it is reported that prices in the neighbourhood of £S. 1,000 are still being offered on the black market. Smuggling from Syria into Turkey and from Iraq into Turkey through Syria is likely to become a problem, and the attention of the frontier authorities has been drawn to the necessity of exercising a close control.

3. *Currency and Gold.*

On the 26th June the exchange authorities in Syria and the Lebanon offered to sell any Sterling Area exchange without formality to anyone paying for it in Syrian or Lebanese banknotes. The object of this offer was to bring hoarded notes into circulation and thus to relieve in some measure the present acute note shortage, which is likely to persist until the notes which are on their way from England arrive. Failure to receive these notes in time will add to the difficulties of the Wheat Plan.

The poor response to this offer, which in normal times would have been considered extremely attractive by the public, is yet another proof of the lack of confidence in the Allied cause which the events in Egypt have engendered here. Further evidence is provided by that most sensitive barometer of public confidence, the price of gold. This has followed from day to day and almost hourly the fortunes of our forces in Libya and Egypt, the price rising with our reverses and falling as soon as the news became slightly more hopeful. In fact, the communications of the Beirut gold market with Egypt seem to be so efficient that changes in the price of gold very often forestall the receipt of official news here.

The price of the sovereign in Beirut, which had been for some time hovering between £S. 39 and 40, had risen by the 2nd July to £S. 49.50. By the morning of the 4th July it had dropped to £S. 43.50, but rose that evening to £S. 46.50 dropping again on the 7th July to £S. 44.50. These recent rises do not represent an "all-time high," for on the 11th April, 1940, £S. 50.50 was touched; but since that period (when France was collapsing) nothing approaching the levels of the last few days had been attained.

4. *Syria: Damascus.*

A low point in public morale was reached during the week, when the belief became general that the Germans were soon to enter the city, and rumours of the imminent return of Hajj Amin Husseini, Rashid Ali and other Arab "patriots" were rife. Several Ministers called on the Political Officer to be reassured.

In many Syrian circles it is fashionable to be pro-German, but the tendency to rejoice in Allied discomfiture was noticeably modified by fear as the German armed threat developed. One or two of the moribund pro-Axis movements have shown signs of life and are being closely watched by the French.

The German advance was brought forcibly home to the people of the capital by a flight over Damascus of enemy aircraft (probably one machine: still unconfirmed) in the early hours of the 1st July and the dropping of pamphlets. As propaganda, the pamphlets, which depicted the destruction of British sea power, were of doubtful value, but as proof of the fact that the enemy was "at the gates" their effect was great. The news of the "raid" spread rapidly throughout the country and was much exaggerated.

The Minister of Youth and Propaganda has given out that he has taken over the whole movement of Boy Scouts in Syria, which claims to embrace 15,000 boys of all religions. This abrupt action has elicited a protest to the Political Officer by the leaders of the Scout movement, who claim that by their charter they are forbidden to put themselves under the control of, or to accept subsidies from, a Government. The Political Officer has pointed out to General Collet that such action may result in breaking up a useful movement and may also, in view of Dr. Munir Ajlani's past record, infect the movement with Fascist tendencies. The matter is now under consideration.

The Syrian Government has appointed as Minister of Education Khalil Bey Mardam, who has no political past, but is greatly respected in Damascus for his wealth, literary gifts and upright character.

5. Aleppo.

Nervousness over the military situation in Egypt continues, although confidence has been somewhat restored now that the Axis advance has been checked. The fall of Sebastopol had been long expected, and has provoked no reaction. The security situation is being carefully watched, but there are so far no signs of hostile activity on the part of any political leaders. The situation is, however, militating against the success of the Wheat Plan, and supplies are coming in very slowly.

There are signs that the friendship between Jamil Mardam and Saadallah Jabri is inducing the Nationalist adherents of Dr. Hassan Fouad Ibrahim Pasha and Dr. Kayali to seek closer contact with the Jabris; none of them want to be left out of any Nationalist Government that may be planned. The new Mohafez is getting very little support from the Nationalists.

The presence in Aleppo of some eighteen hundred Greek refugees is creating a difficult problem for the authorities, and it is becoming urgently necessary to transfer them elsewhere.

6. Homs and Hama.

There is a marked deterioration in the general atmosphere in this area, which is particularly sensitive to enemy influence. Recent events in Egypt have delivered a serious blow to Allied prestige, and this has been exploited by local pro-Axis propagandists and rumour-mongers. Events are being anxiously watched by the Christians, and apprehension is also visible amongst Moslems, who are now realising that a German occupation might not be an unmixed blessing. A certain fear of being associated with Allied officers is also noticeable. The banned Parti Populaire syrien has held a secret meeting, attended by some fifty members, at which confidence in a German victory was expressed.

The situation is also being exploited by the opponents of the Wheat Plan to hinder the collection of grain.

7. Jebel Druze.

Following the Axis advance into Egypt, many rumours are in circulation in Soueida, notably that the return of the Vichy French is imminent. People from the country districts, however, seem to be little affected and are showing a surprising sense of proportion about the Libyan campaign.

The Emir Hassan has now left Soueida after spending a week in the Jebel. His visit caused no incidents, although he continues to complain of alleged French intrigue against his family.

8. Alaouite Territory.

The general atmosphere in this area is reassuring. The Alaouite chiefs are maintaining a loyal and sympathetic attitude towards events, and are not considered likely to embarrass us in an emergency. A possible exception about

whom some misgivings might be felt is Suliman Murshid. There have been a number of complaints, in some cases not unfounded, about acts of brigandage committed by his agents and about the impossibility of obtaining justice in disputes with him. He is not, however, thought to be contemplating at the moment any action likely to cause a serious breach of security.

The Moslem leaders, if tactfully handled, may be expected to keep order amongst their followers.

On the other hand, there is continual friction between the French Délégué and the local Syrian authorities, who are irritated by what is considered the unwarrantable interference of the Délégué and the S.S.Os. in the purely internal affairs of the Administration. This situation is being closely watched.

9. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The enemy advance into Egypt has shaken civilian morale and there is much anxiety over the outcome of the operations in progress. There have, however, been no serious incidents, nor are there any indications that a German success would be welcomed. The Chief of Police at Deir ez Zor, who has chosen this moment to apply for three weeks' leave on urgent private affairs, reports that all wireless sets throughout the area are now tuned in constantly to Angora.

An Anglo-French Commission of two members (General Serres and Colonel Stirling) is now investigating the recent incident at Tell Habou. Three of the tribesmen concerned in the attack on the Gardes Mobiles, out of which the affair arose, have been arrested in Turkey, and a request for their extradition has been made to the Turkish authorities.

Progress with the Wheat Scheme continues to be slow owing to administrative difficulties, but prospects on the whole are considered good.

The new bridge across the Euphrates, which was officially opened on the 1st July in the presence of British, French and Syrian representatives, is likely to have a far-reaching effect on communications in this region by diverting from Deir ez Zor a large part of the traffic between the Northern Jezireh, and therefore Mosul, and the rest of Syria.

10. Tribal.

No major tribal incidents have been reported, the more important current disputes having been settled by arbitration. An undercurrent of ill-feeling persists, however, in some cases, especially in regard to the recently settled Sha'a-Muwalli-Hadidiyin dispute, where the solution arrived at has not given real satisfaction to either side.

Recent events in North Africa have made little impression upon the individual Bedu, but their significance is appreciated by their leaders. Worthy of record is the declaration of loyalty to the Allies and offers of service and assistance which have been made by the Emir Fawwaz Shallan, who, following the death of his grandfather, the late Emir Nuri Shaalan, which took place on the 1st July, is now paramount chief of the Ruwallah tribe and leader of the important Dhana Muslim Group. The Emir Fawwaz has much influence over his tribe, whose affairs he has handled skilfully for the last six years, and his succession is unlikely to be contested. The funeral of the late Emir Nuri was attended by General Catroux and General Collet in person, and by representatives of the general officer commanding and His Majesty's Minister.

A similar offer of service has also been received from Jaladet Bedir Khan, the most respected feudal leader of the Kurds in Syria.

11. Frontier Relations.

Aleppo Province.—A friendly atmosphere prevails. The Vali of Antioch is to visit Aleppo on the 9th July to return unofficial calls by the Délégué and the Political Officer. He also intends to visit Beirut and Latakia. This will, it is understood, be the first visit to Syria of a Turkish frontier official of importance during the last three years.

Euphrates Province.—Here the situation is less satisfactory. An attack is reported to have been made on the 28th June on the village of Ziaret by some fifty Turkish soldiers armed with machine guns, who stole live-stock, looted houses and took away an alleged Turkish deserter. A strong protest has been lodged with the Turkish authorities and the incident is being investigated.

12. The Lebanon.

The war news from Libya pushed all other interests into the background during the past week. It was interesting to note that even those circles who are

generally believed to be pro-Axis displayed no enthusiasm at the prospect of a German occupation, when their quick imaginations and the spread of alarmist rumours led them to believe that this might be imminent. It is clear that, for a hundred Moslems who admire Hitler from a distance, hardly one longs to be under his direct domination.

President Naccache made a somewhat feeble attempt to rehabilitate himself with General Catroux by ordering a requiem mass on the 6th July for the Free French who fell at Bir Hakim, having previously addressed a telegram of congratulation to General Catroux on the Free French showing in this battle.

Press reports state that the Lebanese Government has agreed on the terms of the tax on war profits, but the relevant legislation has not yet appeared.

The press also states that the new Polish representative at Beirut is to have the rank of minister; he will thus be second minister to be appointed. The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires has not yet arrived.

About 200 Free French refugees from Cairo arrived in Beirut on the 5th July. All movements of refugees to Egypt have, not unnaturally, been stopped, and the 750 Greek refugees still remaining at Souk el-Gharb cannot therefore be moved on.

13. Press and Propaganda.

Throughout the week the local press has made valiant efforts to assuage the fears of the population as regards military events in Egypt, and has faithfully presented the position in its most favourable light. The occasion has been taken to publish several articles expressing fidelity to the Allies.

In the economic field, the press continues to praise the efforts of the Wheat Office, but almost every paper has expressed indignation at the disregard of authority for enforcing the food tariffs.

Enemy Arab broadcasters have naturally concentrated on Egypt, and Syrian and Lebanese affairs were passed over practically without comment.

July 8, 1942.

[E 4247/207/89]

No. 63.

Weekly Political Summary No. 15—Syria and the Lebanon, July 15, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, July 23.)

1. General.

ALTHOUGH public confidence has been deeply shaken by the events of the last few weeks, belief is gaining ground that the Allies will succeed in keeping the Axis forces at a distance and thus prevent the Levant from coming directly into the orbit of the war. (The Lebanon and parts of Syria have never forgotten the terrible famine that occurred during the last war.) Political activity remains subdued, in an atmosphere that is at once uneasy and expectant. Alarmist rumours continue to be prevalent.

2. Wheat.

The O.C.P. (Office des Céréales Panifiables) is still contending with the major difficulties described in last week's Summary. Progress has been made in some districts, but the wheat is still coming in at a disappointingly slow rate. The effect of the Libyan campaign continues to be seen in the absence of public confidence in the Wheat Scheme and the Ravitaillement Services. In particular, the non-producing public's time-honoured custom of purchasing and hoarding its annual requirements in the summer is tending to drive up the black market prices and to encourage internal contraband. The French and British authorities, together with the Syrian Administration, are examining possible measures to assist the Wheat Scheme through this difficult and perhaps critical period.

3. Syria: Damascus.

The joint Franco-British action taken to counteract rumours arising out of Jamil Mardam's visit to Egypt (reference last week's Summary) has pleased General Collet. The Taj ed-Din Government also feel much reassured and "moderate" elements have assumed that the British are not, after all, planning an immediate return to power of the Nationalists. It is interesting to note that Jamil Mardam's supporters, despite their alleged strength, have not so far reacted in any significant manner.

Encouraged by the stabilisation of the situation in Egypt, and desiring to profit by what they regard as a set-back for Jamil Mardam, some leaders of the Shahbandarist party have called on the Political Officer with protestations of friendship.

A strike, which began on the 12th July by a partial closing of the bazaars and was later extended, without, however, becoming general, is still in progress. Ostensibly a movement against the undoubtedly bad quality of the bread (the responsibility of the local Ravitaillement), its underlying motives are reported to be:—

- (a) Rumours that wheat is being sent to the Lebanon and to the British army.
- (b) Resentment at the new income tax and agricultural tax, and at the refusal of permits to export vegetables to Palestine.
- (c) An indirect attack on the Government.

In all probability the real cause of the strike has been the action of dissatisfied merchants.

Up to the present there have been no disorders, and the Syrian Government are seeking ways and means of reassuring dissatisfied elements. The latest information indicates that the situation has considerably eased, and it is understood that General Collet is making certain recommendations to improve the working of the local Ravitaillement.

The question of the local Boy Scout Movement, over which the Syrian Government are attempting to obtain direct control, has not yet been settled and its solution is complicated by the unfavourable antecedents of some members of the proposed new committee. It seems probable that a compromise will be found by General Collet, whereby a committee would be appointed by the Minister of Education to supervise the Scouts in a general way, leaving the actual management of the movement to selected scoutmasters. Meanwhile, there is a tendency for the movement to break up, and this is having an adverse effect on the A.R.P. service.

4. Aleppo.

Confidence in the war situation has been somewhat restored by the stand in Egypt, and, although hostile talk and alarmist rumour are still prevalent, they have been checked by the arrest, on the 4th July, of seven journalists and pro-Axis propagandists.

There is much nervousness over the supply position, as wheat purchases are still small, the only arrivals of importance being from the Euphrates, and no stocks for Aleppo have yet been built up. Opposition to the Wheat Plan continues to be strong.

The action taken against intriguers on behalf of Jamil Mardam has reduced his following in this area, although any news from Saadallah Jabri, who has joined him in the Lebanon, is eagerly discussed. The cleavage in the Jabri clan has become more marked, and Ihsan and Saadeddine are thought to be the leaders of that section of the family which must be regarded as pro-Axis.

5. Homs and Hama.

There has been a movement to close the shops in Homs, but no disorders have been reported.

6. Jebel Druze.

The military situation has given rise to a certain amount of defeatist talk in Suweida, but nowhere is there any general conviction that an Allied withdrawal is likely.

The latent cleavages in this area have, however, widened, and the antagonism existing on the one hand between the Atrashes and the Free French, and on the other between the former and their local opponents, has been aggravated. The Halabi faction, notably, have been seeking to avail themselves of this opportunity to improve their position. The fact that Mohamed Pasha Izzeddine el-Halabi has secured appointment as inspector of the three Wheat Commissions in the Jebel should help to keep him quiet.

7. Alaouite Territory.

There are no political events of importance to record, but relations between the Free French and the local authorities remain difficult.

The general situation continues satisfactory, with no indications of serious alarm or expressions of pro-Axis feeling, although the attitude towards the Allies is somewhat more critical than formerly.

The extension to this territory of the destruction of hashish crops, which is being undertaken in other parts of the country, is now being considered. It will, however, be difficult to effect thoroughly and impartially in the Alaouite mountains, and the possible political consequences of such action and its effect on security must be taken into account.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

The Franco-British Commission on the Tell Habou affair and the reprisals which followed has concluded its work and its findings are now being considered.

At Deir ez Zor the supply situation is still disquieting. A subsidy scheme has been elaborated for the distribution of bread to the poor and middle classes on a ration basis at special prices, and was due to become operative on the 15th July, but financial sanction has been delayed by the Syrian Government. It is considered essential, if a recrudescence of disturbances is to be avoided, that the scheme should come into force without delay.

Measures necessary for assuring the adequate arming of the Assyrians for self-protection are being considered by the British and French authorities at Deir ez Zor. As an initial step, an examination is being made to determine the number of able-bodied men in each settlement and the number and condition of their arms.

9. *Tribal.*

Shamieh.—Only minor incidents have been reported, and the position generally is regarded as more reassuring than it has been for some time past, although, as long as the wheat remains on the threshing floors, the possibility of tribal raids, out of which there is always the danger of serious clashes arising, cannot be overlooked. The passage of the Sba'a into the Mamurah through Mawalli-Hadidiyin lands has taken place without untoward incident, though feeling between these tribes continues to run high, in spite of the recent settlement.

Unusual enterprise is shown in the request made by Bedouin chiefs, under the Aleppo Bedouin Control, for the foundation of a tribal boarding school, to be exclusive to the sons of sheikhs and tribal notables. The Bedouin Control has also been asked to provide eight tutors to accompany the tribes on migration. Provided the tutors are carefully selected, and the scheme as a whole is developed along sound lines, it should be advantageous both to the authorities and to the tribes.

Jezireh.—It is reported that the Braij and Alyan sections of the Shammar have returned to Syria from Iraq and appear to have transferred their allegiance to Sheikh Daham el-Hadi, of the Syrian Shammar.

10. *Frontier.*

Aleppo.—A Turkish patrol crossed inadvertently into Syria near Azaz on the 8th July and was arrested by the French. As on a similar occasion recently a British patrol was released by the Turks, it is not intended to detain this patrol as a bargaining counter for some British other ranks who crossed the frontier recently in the Jezireh and who have not yet been released.

The Vali of Antioch came to Aleppo on the 9th July and met the Délégué. Questions of frontier passes and smuggling were discussed, and also the old claim for the return of the notorious brigand, Ali Bagi. The Vali also called on the Political Officer. He had no troubles to air and later left for Beirut, proposing to return via Lattakia.

Euphrates.—The incident at Ziarit referred to in last week's Summary is being investigated by the Turkish kaimakam concerned. There are a crop of unconfirmed reports and rumours of increasing numbers of Germans, military and civilian, across the frontier.

11. *Lebanon.*

The holding up of the German advance in Libya has calmed Lebanese public opinion to a greater extent even than the present military situation would seem to warrant. Political activity is, however, still submerged by the military situation and, now that the summer season has started and most politicians are scattered in the various hill resorts, is likely to remain quiescent, at least until a definite announcement of elections is made. The French Délégué, M. David,

appears to have been assiduously spreading the belief that the idea of elections has been given up, at least for the time being.

The one political subject which continues to be discussed at all times and in all circles is the incompetence of the Lebanese President and of his Government, examples of which are quoted on all sides. If and when the Minister for Foreign Affairs resigns (as he is still thinking of doing in the near future), it is possible that popular discontent with the Government will focus on some issue or other and force the Government to resign; though the summer inertia, which is always very markedly evident in the Lebanon, may well enable the Government to hang on if no particular internal crisis develops.

The Beirut lawyers have been on strike for the past week because the Finance Ministry decided to cancel certain concessions hitherto made to them in the application of the "temmettu" (professional) tax. Latest indications are that the President proposes to knuckle under and restore the concession, a typical example of his weakness in the face of opposition.

A further 500 Greeks recently expelled from Turkey are now being installed at Souk el-Gharb, bringing the total number there to about 1,300, with some hundreds more to come.

The Persian Consul-General has been transferred by his Government to Tehran, and the Iraqi Consul-General, who is highly co-operative, although slightly suspect in some circles, becomes doyen of the Consular Corps in his stead.

12. *Press and Propaganda.*

The press gave a heartfelt sigh of relief at the check of the German advance in Egypt, and took the occasion to extol the merits of the British, General Auchinleck coming in for a specially large meed of praise. Arab fidelity to the Allied cause was stoutly reaffirmed.

Several papers launched an attack on the rumour-mongers of the Beirut Stock Exchange, who were rightly accused of deliberately creating a panic for the purpose of filling their own pockets. As is usual in local affairs, the most interesting comments came from the censored portions of the press, from which it can be gathered that there is a great deal of opposition to the decision of the Lebanese Government to impose a tax on war profits, on the grounds that such a measure is unfair to the honest merchant. Also, there is still an undercurrent of speculation as to the time and suitability of general elections in the Lebanon, and a good deal of grumbling in the all-important matter of food supply, mainly directed at the scarcity and high price of flour.

Enemy broadcasters continued loudly to trumpet Rommel's successes, both real and imaginary, and to stress the consequent alarm felt by pro-British rulers of Arab countries.

[E 4378/207/89]

No. 64.

Weekly Political Summary No. 16: Syria and the Lebanon.—(Received July 30.)

(Secret.)

1. *General.*

DESPITE the news of German advances in Russia, there has been a further increase of confidence in the military situation. As is normal at the season of hot weather and harvesting, political activity has been slight.

The burning question in both States is still that of wheat. In the urban and non-producing areas latent public anxiety over the supply and price of bread has flared up as a result of the shortcomings and rank inefficiencies of the Ravitaillement services. Closely following the shutting of shops in Damascus last week, a very complete strike took place in Beirut, and movements of protest are also reported from other towns. The demonstrations in Beirut were most efficiently organised—by whom it has not yet been possible to determine—and started as a protest against the price of bread, but rapidly developed into a political agitation against the all-round incompetence of the Government.

2. *Wheat.*

Purchases continue on a satisfactory scale in the Hauran, but have elsewhere been sporadic. Steps are being taken to strengthen the external organisation with a view to obtaining a regular rhythm of supplies from all areas in proportion to the allocations made to them.

3. Syria.

Damascus.—Although the strike of shops reported in last week's Summary was brought to an end on the 14th July, after a delegation of merchants had received assurances and promises from the President, the situation remains far from satisfactory. Events have made the landowners of the Damascus area unwilling to co-operate in the Wheat Scheme; the reputation of the President and the Government has sunk very low; and the town is full of rumours, apprehensions and complaints. If some improvement is not forthcoming, particularly in the Ravitaillement Service, further troubles are likely to be engineered by dissatisfied elements against the Government.

Attempts are still being made to settle, by compromise, the dispute over the future control of the Scout Movement. It appears probable, however, that no solution will be found and that the scouts belonging to schools (numbering over 80 per cent. of the total of some 15,000) will be transferred back to the supervision of the Ministry of Education, retaining their international affiliation. The other organisations may be dissolved.

The Anti-Fascist League held a series of meetings in Damascus during the week-end the 11th-13th July. Speeches were made in praise of the Allies, and especially of Russia, since many of the members are Communists, and in condemnation of the Axis and its ideology. Resolutions were drawn up and submitted to the Syrian Government pressing for a clean-up of the fifth-column elements in Syria, but they remained unanswered.

The Fourteenth of July celebrations this year were the occasion of special enthusiasm on the part of the French community, which contrasted with the rather subdued and "frustrated" attitude common during the last year or more. The opportune visit of General Legentilhomme and his infectious optimism added to the zest and tended to do away with the multitude of misgivings lurking in the minds of the less robust Free Frenchmen. As a result, signs of renewed Franco-British cordiality have been apparent.

4. Aleppo.

This area has remained quiet; bread has been obtainable and the war remains at a distance. Reports of disturbances elsewhere have not proved infectious. As yet, however, no important wheat reserves have been accumulated.

The Wheat Scheme continues to make progress. Following a recent speech by the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs attacking its opponents, six leading Nationalist landowners called on the Political Officer to protest their support for the scheme, certain aspects of which, however, they strongly criticised.

The Fourteenth of July celebrations were successful, but it is noteworthy that two leading ex-Ministers, Mohammed Khalil Moudarres and Dr. Abdulrahman Kayali, hitherto rivals, who are moderate Nationalists, absented themselves as a gesture of protest against continued French support of the Taj ed Din Government. Their action is believed to have been inspired from Damascus.

5. Homs and Hama.

The souks were closed for two days in Homs as a protest against the Government's failure to tackle seriously the severe malaria epidemic from which the town is suffering as a result of dilatoriness in carrying out drainage and sanitation schemes. Arrangements have been made for a British anti-malaria unit to visit the town twice weekly (with the maximum of publicity), and meanwhile the British Medical Officer is grappling with the problem, but is handicapped by shortage of medical supplies.

The Fourteenth of July celebrations were well attended, though no particular enthusiasm was shown. The population is very critical of the Government and the Allies. The general lowering of morale which resulted from our recent reverses in North Africa was particularly marked in this always unsatisfactory area, where any news or rumour detrimental to the Allies easily gains credence, whilst favourable news is at once criticised and counteracted.

In this area also the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs' recent speech attacking the attitude of the wealthy landowners towards the Wheat Scheme has provoked criticism, and on the 17th July a deputation of notables waited on the Political Officer to protest against it. They also sent a telegram of protest to His Majesty's Minister.

6. Jebel Druze.

Reports from this area have been delayed *en route*.

7. Alaouite Territory.

Though there are no positive political developments, signs are not lacking of a slowly increasing uneasiness in this area, attributable less to recent events in Egypt than to a progressive diminution of faith in the present administrative machinery and personnel and in the Government's will or ability to enforce justice. The high-handedness and pretensions of Suleiman Nurshid, which are a challenge to public order, have undoubtedly contributed much towards this state of mind. It is not considered that there is any threat to security at present, but the situation which is developing is being carefully watched.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

There have been no outstanding incidents. Anxiety about the progress of the war has decreased and the Wheat Scheme is again absorbing the interest of the population. The Fourteenth of July was celebrated in a friendly atmosphere by civil and military ceremonies and reviews.

The Syrian administration in the Jezireh is becoming increasingly confused and ineffectual owing to the absence of central direction. There has been no Mohafez in this area for over a month, and a number of Kaza officials have been absent from their posts. Some have now returned, but the non-co-operative attitude of the French special service officers is tending to impair the administration still further, and it is not surprising that against this background it is proving difficult to find a candidate for the post of Mohafez. This unfortunate state of affairs is impeding the progress of the Wheat Scheme.

9. Tribal.

Shamieh.—The Syrian tribes as a whole are in a less turbulent frame of mind than for some time past, although minor incidents continue to occur, stimulated by the unsettled outlook brought about by the proximity of the war. At the present moment, the temptation to rob the threshing floors of the semi-sedentary and settled tribes is causing thieving raids.

Jezireh.—The repercussions of the Bou Hamdan incident have now largely died away, and the Sheikhs of the Baggara Zor appear to be satisfied with the assurances of the Commission of Enquiry that they will receive full compensation for looted or damaged property.

In Summary No. 10 of the 11th June, 1942, it was reported that a state of tension existed between the Shammar and the Miran (Kurds), but it would now appear that this may have been a somewhat exaggerated view of normal tribal raids. There are, however, indications that the already powerful Sheikh Daham el-Hadi, of the Syrian Shammar, is seeking to profit by dissensions amongst the Miran to gain Kurdish support for his aim of extending his influence over the entire Duck's Bill. While his attitude towards the authorities has so far been correct, the extension of his already considerable influence in this area may have disquieting consequences.

An outbreak of smallpox has been reported among the Shammar. The local medical authorities are taking measures to prevent its spread.

10. Frontier Relations.

West.—Following the recent visit of the Vali of Antioch, reported in last week's Summary, there have been renewed rumours that the Aleppo area is to be handed over to Turkey—a prospect which is viewed with alarm.

Small amounts of grain are reported to be moving over the frontier.

East.—An apology has been received from the Turkish authorities for the incident at Ziaret, referred to in previous Summaries, but no restitution of, or compensation for the stolen property has been made. No further incidents have been reported.

There is evidence that wheat and other commodities from Iraq are being smuggled through the Duck's Bill in transit to Turkey, and an increase in arms traffic is also reported. The Iraqi authorities are being requested to exercise a stricter control.

11. Lebanon.

On the 16th July, without warning, a well-organised strike took place in Beirut. All shops were closed and transport services ceased. On the first day there were demonstrations by youths, and rioting occurred in the centre of the town, in the course of which the police used their firearms, fortunately without

hurting anyone. There were no disorders after the first day, and trams and taxis were running again on the 17th July. The shops gradually reopened on the following day and by the morning of the 19th all was again normal.

It is not yet clear who was responsible for the strike, but to some extent undoubtedly it was a spontaneous ebullition of feeling. The most immediate and widespread cause of discontent was the failure of the inefficient Lebanese Supply Service to distribute flour for over five weeks, with the result that black-market prices had risen to an impossible figure. In addition, the commercial community was exercised at the impending imposition of a War Profits Tax with retroactive effect, the terms of which had leaked out and were considered unfair.

A distribution of flour was hastily organised on the 17th July, and it is generally thought that the War Profits Tax is now a dead letter. The immediate causes of the strike are thus removed, but the underlying contempt for the Lebanese President and for his spineless and inefficient Government remains. Trouble is therefore liable to break out again at any time on some other issue unless and until a more generally acceptable Government comes into power.

A Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, the second diplomatic representative to be appointed to the States, has arrived. The highly suspect Swiss Consul has at last been replaced by a career vice-consul who is known to be very pro-British. A new Polish representative, with the rank of Minister, has also been appointed.

The Fourteenth of July was widely celebrated throughout the Lebanon, and the Free French seem to have been pleased with the co-operation they received from the British authorities on the occasion.

12. Press and Propaganda.

The predominant theme throughout both the French and the Arabic press has been the unsatisfactory economic situation. Criticism has been unusually outspoken, and censored articles include direct demands to the Government to alleviate an intolerable situation. The war news has been interpreted favourably, much attention being devoted to the Russian theatre, where the enemy is regarded as making his last desperate efforts to stave off inevitable defeat. The Fourteenth of July celebrations were well reported.

After a short period, during which the Levant received scant attention, enemy propaganda has renewed its attack on the Wheat Plan, and sensational descriptions of demonstrations throughout the country by hungry crowds have been broadcast.

July 22, 1942.

[E 4507/207/89]

No. 65.

Weekly Political Summary (No. 17), The Lebanon.—(Received in Foreign Office August 7.)

General.

THE main event of the week has been the fall of the Lebanese Government, on the 23rd July. Its final disintegration was hastened by its incapacity to deal with the pressing supply situation. A new Government has been formed under Sami Bey Solh.

By the 22nd July it had become clear that another strike in Beirut was impending, and might this time be accompanied by deputations and demonstrations from the three Lebanese provinces which produce no wheat, as the distribution made by the Ravitaillement during the previous week had not reached them.

Faced by this crisis, the Lebanese Government promptly disintegrated. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had already resigned. The Minister of Ravitaillement threw his hand in on the morning of the 22nd July. The remainder of the Ministers followed after the Prime Minister had returned from an undignified and fruitless dash to Damascus to beg for larger supplies of wheat from Syria.

The fall of the Government was generally welcomed in Beirut, Tripoli and elsewhere, but the disillusioned population had little hope that its successor, whatever its composition, would improve the supply position unless British control over the ravitaillement, for which there has for many months been a general demand, were instituted.

General Catroux and President Naccache at once began consultations for the formation of a new Government. Their first idea was to choose a Ministry composed of equal numbers of representatives of the two principal political parties, those of Emile Eddé and Béchara el-Khoury. The former, however, soon decided not to participate in any coalition Government, while the latter put forward obviously unacceptable conditions as the price of its participation. The formula was therefore abandoned in favour of a Ministry of "neutrals," who belonged to neither party. Steps were at once taken to make it clear in all quarters that the British authorities, who would in all probability be called upon by the new Government for support in solving the many urgent problems confronting it, notably that of wheat, were not prepared to afford such support unless previously consulted on the composition of the Ministry.

The Free French authorities, despite requests for information, failed to keep His Majesty's Legation informed as to the progress of negotiations (full reports of which, however, reached the Political Officer from the Lebanese side). President Naccache, feeling himself once again between several hammers and the anvil, disclosed to the Political Officer the list of candidates which, it is presumed, he had finally agreed with General Catroux, and asked whether the British authorities had objections to any of these candidates. The list contained four of the weakest members of the outgoing Ministry, including Ahmed el-Assad, who had recently made a determined attempt to defeat the operation of the wheat plan in his district. Objection was accordingly made to this man and to two of the remainder.

Sami Bey Solh, a cousin of the better-known Riadh Solh, was finally charged with the formation of a Ministry, and at once took steps to ascertain that he would be personally acceptable to the British. Reassured on this point, he embarked on the formation of a Ministry, but found himself in an unenviable position in view of the refusal of several persons to participate except on unacceptable terms and by the objections to other suitable persons formulated either by the French or by the President, in addition to our own objections. He finally produced, on the evening of the 27th July, the following list:—

Sami Bey Solh (Prime Minister, Finance, Supply, Commerce and Industry), (Sunni).

Musa Nammur (Vice-President, Interior, Posts and Telegraphs), (Maronite).

Ahmed Hussein (Justice and Agriculture), (Shia).

Philippe Boulos (Foreign Affairs and Public Works), (Greek Orthodox).

Hikmat Jumblat (National Defence and Public Health), (Druze).

George Kfoury (Education), (Greek Catholic).

The new Cabinet is composed chiefly of nonentities and is unlikely to last long.

July 29, 1942.

[E 4899/207/89]

No. 66.

Weekly Political Summary No. 20: The Lebanon, August 19, 1942.—(Received in Foreign Office, August 29.)

(Secret.)

THERE is no political movement in any definable direction to report. The visit of General de Gaulle has naturally aroused interest, but has so far produced no significant or important developments. The prospects of the wheat scheme have improved. Public morale is steady.

The visit of General de Gaulle has aroused little enthusiasm and the reactions of the French have been by no means uniform. His attitude towards the local populations has been frigid, and in the course of his first reception of French officials he reaffirmed the continued existence of the mandate over Syria and the Lebanon and thanked his hearers for their successful efforts in maintaining the position of France in the Levant. The Lebanese Government took exception to this, but were deterred from any attempt to arrange for an official protest by the knowledge that the President could never be brought to agree. They therefore immediately published a general declaration of policy, which

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has hitherto been held up, and inserted in it numerous references to the independence which the Lebanon had been granted. The implied criticism was not lost on General de Gaulle, who on the 15th August informed the Prime Minister somewhat testily that the independence of the Lebanon was secured, but that certain juridical formalities had yet to be accomplished.

General de Gaulle has also let it be inferred in conversation that, as a result of consultations he has had with His Majesty's Government, elections in Syria and the Lebanon are unlikely to be held for an indefinite period. The Prime Minister proposes to point out to him that the Lebanon demands a return to constitutional life as a basis on which to further its independence.

On the 15th August, after several months of incessant wooing of the Maronite Patriarch, General Catroux succeeded in effecting a reconciliation with him. On that day they both accepted an invitation to lunch with an obscure and none too reputable Maronite lawyer, and the same afternoon Generals Catroux and de Gaulle both attended a tea-party offered in their honour by the Patriarch at his summer residence, at which a large number of Lebanese politicians and other notables were present. It had for several months been obvious that the Patriarch, who is guided by no principles except that of pursuing his own interests and those of his community, would not indefinitely stand out against the French once he was certain that he could not hope to enlist British support against them. The last important stronghold of active Lebanese opposition to the French has thus fallen. The Patriarch's prestige is likely to suffer by this surrender in view of his solemn oaths last December to have nothing more to do with the French.

The Lebanese President was entirely left out of the ceremony of reconciliation between General Catroux and the Patriarch, and the latter is believed to have included a demand for the resignation of M. Naccache amongst a list of requests which he presented to General Catroux when they met. Ex-President Emile Eddé and Béchara el Khoury nowadays agree in common opposition to the unfortunate President, who seems to have no friends left except the Jesuits.

The treatment by the French of their creature Naccache is cruel in the extreme. For instance, he was only told of the Mass on the 15th August, to which the Government was convened, at 8 P.M. on the 14th at his home in the country. The Mass took place at 9 A.M. in the morning at Beirut. I received my invitation by noon on the 14th.

The Prime Minister has dismissed M. Antoine Eddé, the unpopular and shifty Director-General of Supplies, stating that his reason for so doing was the systematic obstruction which he found M. Antoine Eddé was practising against the British authorities. The Lebanese supply services are in so chaotic a state that M. Antoine Eddé's successor will have a hard task ahead of him. Meantime, the population have been temporarily pacified by a further distribution of flour to the poor on the 11th August. The demand for the control of the distribution of wheat and flour by the British is growing.

[E 5098/207/89]

No. 67.

Weekly Political Summary, No. 21, Syria and the Lebanon, August 26, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, September 4.)

(Secret.)

1. General.

NO perceptible change in the situation has occurred. There is a growing awareness of the gravity of the situation in Russia, but no sign that public morale is affected.

General de Gaulle has completed his tour of the two States. His reception has on the whole been lukewarm. The visit has been devoted almost exclusively to political and propaganda activities designed to increase French influence in the Levant States. To the disappointment of the better elements of the Fighting French, he has shown little interest in improving the unsatisfactory organisation of the Fighting French machine, and has paid scant heed to the numerous petitions addressed to him on this subject. On the other hand, everything possible has been done to stress French interest and French control, especially in the Lebanon, and to stage appropriate demonstrations wherever he went.

Details of the ceremonies which took place in the various centres visited are given in the relevant sections below.

2. Wheat.

The recent improvement in the wheat collections has been maintained. The Jezireh and the Hauran at the moment present certain difficulties, but it is anticipated that the prompt action taken, resulting in the strengthening of the organisation in these areas, will have the desired effect. There is no indication of a falling-away in the impetus of the scheme.

3. Syria.

Damascus.—There has been a slight revival of political activity as a result of the visit of General de Gaulle, who has had talks with a number of Syrian politicians and ex-Ministers, mostly of a moderate Nationalist tendency. His apparent support of the present Government and avoidance of contacts with its more outspoken opponents is taken to indicate that no change of régime is to be expected in the immediate future.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has protested verbally to General de Gaulle about his reaffirmation of the mandate. The General replied, according to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that full liberty had already been granted, and that some legal formalities alone stood in the way of absolute freedom.

The effect of the visit has not been very marked either on the Syrian population or on the French colony. British and Allied officers were present at the reception given to the Government and Consular Corps, but no Allied troops were invited to participate in the ceremonies which took place. The General's speeches contained no mention of the Allied war effort or the benefits which the Levant States have derived from British occupation.

A significant odd incident arose out of this visit. The President, doubtless to curry favour, arranged for a camel bearing a Mahmal (used, it is believed, in the 1916 pilgrimage) to parade the streets. This has caused a great deal of adverse comment, as the Mahmal has not been paraded since the days of the Emir Feisal, and its appearance on this occasion for a Frenchman is talked of as improper.

The supply situation is easier, although arrivals of wheat from the Hauran have fallen sharply. The Syrian Prime Minister attributes this to a French intrigue against himself. The facts are not yet known, but the Prime Minister was somewhat high-handed to a deputation of landowners who complained to him about the rather overbearing attitude of the gendarmerie.

Mr. Bagher Fahimi has taken over the Persian Consulate at Damascus from Mr. Mohsen Atabeki, who has been recalled to Persia. Mr. Fahimi has recently been serving in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Tehran and was previously at Karachi.

The raid on Dieppe in the middle of this week was hailed by the ill-informed as the opening of a second front, in spite of communiqués to the contrary. Prices fell sharply until the population were convinced that the attack was only a raid.

4. Aleppo.

Despite special publicity and other measures which had been taken to ensure the success of the visit of General de Gaulle to Aleppo, his reception was rather apathetic. No British contingent was invited to participate in the military review, and at least one shopkeeper was advised to reduce his display of British flags. It was generally realised that the General was out to stress the continuance of French influence, and his failure to indicate any likelihood of a change of Government in the near future caused disappointment. Although at an Anglo-French dinner he spoke pleasantly of collaboration, his attitude towards the British Political Officer was throughout offensive.

Following a recent meeting of prominent local Nationalists, Saadullah Jabri is believed to have been recognised as the leader of the Nationalist *bloc* in North Syria, although his position may be opposed by Dr. Kayali. The latter, whose boycott of the 14th July celebrations was reported in Summary No. 16 of the 22nd July, has now reinstated himself with the French.

Wheat collection in this area is still disappointing. The stocks envisaged for Aleppo are only adequate if distribution is made on a carefully supervised ration basis.

The arrival of the former Vichy Ambassador to Turkey to join the Fighting French has made a big impression.

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5. Homs and Hama.

General de Gaulle visited the area on the 21st August in company with Generals Catroux and Collet. Special measures were taken to obtain a show of loyalty and crowds were paid to applaud, but the population showed a noticeable lack of enthusiasm and the visit had little effect. General de Gaulle's cold reception of the British officers who were presented to him did not pass unnoticed.

A private visit which the General paid to Hashim Bey Atassi is believed to be connected with negotiations which are suspected to have been going on for some time between the French and Hashim Bey for the formation of a mildly Nationalist Government later in the year. In conversation with the British Political Officer, General Catroux openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the present Government and especially with the Prime Minister.

A private visit was also paid by General de Gaulle to the Syrian Catholic Patriarch.

There has been a return of confidence in the wheat scheme as a result of the recent visit of the Syrian Prime Minister and officials of the Wheat Office, and the increases subsequently made in the quotas required from villages belonging to large landowners. As was to be expected, however, daily collections of wheat have declined considerably since the 15th August.

6. Jebel Druze.

General de Gaulle, accompanied by General Catroux and the Délégué, visited Suweida on the 18th August. He received Druze notables and attended a reception given by the Emir Hassan el Atrash and the Emira. He was well received, but subsequent comment has revealed an attitude of indifference and grudging resignation to French authority in the Jebel. The General's speeches contained nothing of note, and references to the war and to the Allies were few. The British Political Officer was not invited to the luncheon given at the *Résidence* nor to the Emir Hassan's reception, the arrangements for which were in French hands.

The area is quiet on the whole, but there is a general feeling of lack of authority, and minor incidents continue to occur. The response to the propaganda campaign in favour of the wheat plan, referred to last week, has been negligible.

7. Alaouite Territory.

Suleiman Murshid's activities in this area, to which reference has previously been made, have now reached proportions which constitute a grave danger to security. He has a private force of some 300 partly uniformed followers, which he uses to terrorise those who attempt to oppose his exactions. Although serious disorders have recently occurred, the Free French authorities continue to give him every support, regarding him as their political ally in the territory.

A few days before General de Gaulle was due to visit the area General Catroux was requested by the army commander to consider taking action to restrain Suleiman Murshid's activities. This request has had no visible effect, as during General de Gaulle's visit Suleiman Murshid was given a prominent part in the proceedings. He was not only received by the General with other Alaouite notables, but was also given a private interview and a position of honour at the official lunch, to which the British Political Officer was not invited. General Catroux's reply to the army commander's letter is still awaited.

General de Gaulle's visit did not produce much enthusiasm, and his emphasis on the position of France in Syria gave some offence. A deputation of Moslem notables presented him with a memorandum protesting against the present state of affairs.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

There is no political activity to report. As far as can be judged, the visit of General de Gaulle, who spent a few hours in Deir-ez-Zor on the 19th August, produced little or no effect on the population.

The valuation of the property stolen in the Tell Habou affair has now been completed and a committee, presided over by the Délégué adjoint (Capitaine Auboire, who is shortly to be removed), will shortly meet to award compensation.

The assistant political officer at Mosul visited Kamishlieh to examine measures for restricting arms smuggling from Iraq. Arrangements were discussed for the removal from the frontier area of two of the principal smugglers.

9. Tribal.

A fairly large raid by Fedaan tribesmen has occurred in the Shams-ed-Dine area, provoked by a boundary dispute with the Wulda. Prompt action was taken by the French authorities and casualties were slight. The looted property is being returned.

There have also been minor clashes between the Afadla and Fedaan Khrossa, and the Shammar and Jubbour. These appear to have been local affairs only and are unlikely to have repercussions.

Such incidents indicate the general uneasiness existing among the semi-sedentary tribes in the Euphrates valley, which is intensified by the impending move into the Jezireh of a section of the Shammar Sba'a (see Summary No. 20 of the 19th August).

10. Frontier Relations.

There are no incidents to report.

11. The Lebanon.

General de Gaulle has already seen the leaders of the two principal Lebanese parties, Emile Eddé and Béchara el Khoury, and is seeing certain of their principal followers before he leaves. He has categorically announced his "decision" that there will be no elections in the Lebanon this year, and is now asking the opinion of these politicians as to what modifications, if any, should be made in the present political régime. The Eddé party have decided to recommend unanimously a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, i.e., the replacement of M. Naccache by M. Eddé as President and the recall of the former Lebanese Chamber of 63 members (one-third of whom were nominated by the then French High Commissioner). The attitude of Béchara el Khoury's party is uncertain. Most of its members have now shown themselves quite as determined as their opponents to achieve office at all costs, and are likely to accept with docility any views General de Gaulle may propound.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, whose monopoly of the powers of the Government becomes more and more manifest, are trying to screw up their courage to follow up their somewhat defiant declaration of policy by formally demanding from General Catroux the cession of (a) the control of the concessionary companies and the "intérêts communs," and (b) the Grand Sérail building in which the Délégation générale is housed. The President and some of the other members of the Government are far from enthusiastic at the idea of this intrepid *démarche*, which, although fully justified as a partial implementation of Lebanese independence, will undoubtedly meet with a blunt refusal from the Fighting French. The Prime Minister also wishes to press for the holding of elections, on the grounds that a return to a constitutional régime is essential, and to protest against General Catroux's recent action in promulgating a decree concerning Lebanese currency instead of requesting the Lebanese Government to do so. In view of the timidity of the President and of some of his colleagues, it is not surprising that the Prime Minister should angle for a measure of British sympathy, if not of support. He has been given to understand these are in the main questions to be settled between his Government and the Fighting French. We were, however, interested, and would be glad to be kept in touch with developments, and would be ready to tender advice on matters concerning our interests.

The Maronite Patriarch has been trying to reaffirm his own position, both with the British authorities and with the population, by putting about the story that his recent meeting with General Catroux did not, in fact, lead to any reconciliation and that he maintains his previous position. It is certain that at their meeting at Dimane the Patriarch reproached General Catroux with having failed to grant effective independence to the Lebanon, demanded the dismissal of President Naccache, and presented to General Catroux a 22-page memorandum recounting various grievances, chiefly concerning the Maronite community; nevertheless, having once got to the point of meeting the French, the Patriarch will probably find it best for his own and his community's interests to play with them in future. He came to Beirut on the 23rd August for an official luncheon with General Catroux, afterwards calling at my house (I had left that morning for Cairo at short notice), with his attendant bevy of archbishops and bishops.

Mutterings of discontent at the supply position are being heard in various parts of the Lebanon, and there have been small demonstrations in Tripoli and Zahlé against the insufficiency of the municipal distributions of flour. Wheat

purchases are proceeding fairly well in the Bekaa, less well in South Lebanon. A start has been made in coercing the recalcitrant Moslem notables of North Lebanon by seizing and confiscating some 50 tons of wheat belonging to the well-known leader Abdul-Hamid Kerami, and this should have a good influence in the district.

M. Jean Helleu, former Vichy Ambassador at Angora, has arrived in Beirut with some members of his staff to join the Fighting French, who have displayed considerable satisfaction at this important accession to their ranks.

12. Press and Propaganda.

The Damascus papers continue to give most of their space to General de Gaulle, but elsewhere news from Russia, the Kremlin meeting, the Dieppe raid and changes in the Middle East Command were well reported. War commentaries in the Arabic press are scarce, the main interest still being the local supply question.

Censored articles were mainly concerned with the wheat problem, but the Lebanese Government's recent declaration of policy has produced demands for elections, general suffrage and the transfer of certain privileges from the French to the Lebanese Government.

Enemy broadcast propaganda was principally concerned with India and Egypt.

[E 5411/207/89]

No. 68.

Weekly Political Summary No. 23, Syria and the Lebanon, September 9, 1942.
(Received September 18.)

1. General.

OUTWARDLY the internal situation remains calm. The failure of the Axis forces to achieve any measure of success in their attack on the Allied position in Egypt has had a reassuring effect on the public, whose interest in the war news is largely centred on that theatre. The significance of events in Russia is appreciated only by very few.

The main public preoccupations continue to be the supply problem and the visit of General de Gaulle. There is a general realisation that Anglo-French relations are strained and a growing demand for increased British participation in the government of the country and for British action to curtail French attempts to reimpose their political influence. There is considerable speculation regarding the causes of General de Gaulle's prolonged stay.

2. Wheat.

Little change has occurred in the wheat situation in so far as collections are concerned. The average daily collecting figure shows little fluctuation. The collection of cereals to date amounts to approximately 90,000 tons towards a target figure of 260,000 tons.

The Lebanese Prime Minister is at present on a tour of the Lebanon wheat centres, accompanied by British and French representatives, and the Prime Minister of Syria commences a tour of Northern Syria accompanied by British and French representatives on Saturday, the 12th September.

3. Syria.

Damascus.—There has been some slight political activity in ministerial circles, but outside the Government conditions are calm, and with the approach of Ramadan are likely to remain so provided that there is no deterioration in the supply situation or disturbing news from Egypt. On the 3rd September the Syrian Prime Minister visited Beirut and presented to General de Gaulle the Grand Cordon of the Ommayyed Order. The occasion was marked by an exchange of letters in which the President spoke of the friendship between France and Syria, and General de Gaulle described the "new" Syrian independence as "the pledge that this friendship cannot but be strengthened in the alliance of our two countries." In neither letter was there reference to Fighting France as distinct from France.

In a speech which he delivered at a banquet given in his honour by M. Darwish Ajlani on the 1st September, the President again spoke of Syrian

independence. He said that he proposed on the anniversary of Syrian independence (27th September) to review the stages of the development of that independence through which the country had passed during the year. He then declared that, although owing to the war there was no parliamentary régime in Syria, he and his colleagues considered themselves responsible before the people and felt themselves to be working at unity with the nation and for right.

In an interview given to a British journalist representing a number of United States newspapers, the Syrian President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs complained of the non-recognition of Syrian independence by the United States. The President also dictated a statement in favour of eventual Arab unity. It is most noticeable how anxious both the French and Syrians are to obtain publicity in the United States.

The Syrian Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have expressed to the British Political Officer their irritation at having been convened to Beirut to listen to General de Gaulle's *mise au point*, referred to in last week's Summary, which they considered should have been given in Damascus. They regarded the whole affair as nothing more than another French "demonstration" and considered that the declaration made by General de Gaulle had little political importance.

4. Aleppo.

The supply situation continues to be unsatisfactory, and more than half the population are still without ration cards. The shops were closed for four days during the week until the Mohafez promised increased facilities for the provision of family stocks. The strike was made an occasion for a trial of strength between the Ulema and Nationalists, in which the former seemed to have scored, as they were the only body to negotiate with the Mohafez and persuaded the shops to reopen, whereas the Nationalists advised a continuation of the strike. The support of the Ulema in this case was very useful to the authorities, but is considered to be due to loyalty to Sheikh Kamel Kassab, who is much respected and not to the religious influence of Sheikh Taj or to support of his Government. The Mohafez has now gone to Damascus and is stated to be refusing to return until the Government have arranged to refund to Aleppo the 3,000 tons of Euphrates wheat which were recently diverted for the Lebanon and Damascus.

A proposal to transfer the efficient and friendly head of the Sûreté was cancelled on representations being made by headquarters of the B.S.M.

The S.S. officer at Jerablus complains of the reduction in the number of his Gardes Mobiles from seventy-one to sixty-two. This may be the beginning of the reforms promised by General Catroux.

Further cases have occurred of the return here on leave of Syrians who had left this country irregularly to enlist in British units in Palestine. Though a satisfactory arrangement was made some months ago with the French that the British military authorities would, when informed, send such men back to Palestine, it is now learned that the French authorities subsequently received instructions from their headquarters that they should themselves make arrests and only deliver the men over to us at the Palestine frontier.

There has been a further influx of Greek refugees from Turkey.

5. Homs and Hama.

There are indications of a setback in Anglo-French relations, probably as a result of General de Gaulle's visit. In Fighting French circles it is felt that British popularity is increasing at the expense of their own. In agreement with the British Political Officer, the Fighting French Délégué has decided, with the object of re-establishing Anglo-French relations on their erstwhile excellent footing, to give a talk to all Allied officers in the area on the political situation in Syria and the need for Anglo-French co-operation.

6. Jebel Druze.

There are no events of political importance to report, but there are indications that any enthusiasm for the Fighting French which may have been stimulated by General de Gaulle's recent visit to the Jebel has been more than offset by the unfavourable impression created by his speech in Beirut referred to elsewhere.

The British Political Officer received visits from notables representing all shades of political opinion offering their condolences on the occasion of the death

of His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent. All made speeches in favour of Great Britain.

The outlook for the wheat plan has improved in this area and daily collections are increasing.

7. Alaouite Territory.

Discussions are still proceeding between General Catroux and the British military authorities with regard to some form of joint enquiry into incidents arising out of Suleiman Murshid's activities. Suleiman Murshid himself has been summoned to Damascus by the Syrian authorities and has received a severe warning from the Syrian President to cease his depredations. It is reported by the Mohafez that he is in a somewhat chastened mood. Satisfaction is being expressed locally that at last some effort has been made to curb Suleiman Murshid's activities.

There has been some enemy submarine activity off the coast resulting in the sinking of a steamer and three schooners flying the Palestinian flag.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

No detailed reports have been received from this area.

9. Tribal.

Sheikh Khalil ibn Hatchim el Muheid, leader of the Fedaan tribesmen, who were the aggressors in the recent raid in the Shams ed Dine area, reference to which has been made in previous Summaries, is under arrest in Damascus pending consideration of his case by General Catroux. It is possible that he will be placed in *résidence forcée* outside the Euphrates Mohafezat.

Sheikh Daham el Hadi, who, as stated in Summary No. 17 of the 29th July, recently came to an understanding with his cousin, Sfuq ibn Ajil el Yawar, regarding the division of their authority over the Shammar in Syria and Iraq, is now reported to be seeking to act as arbiter in regard to certain matters in dispute between Sfuq and Abdul Aziz el Muslat of the Jubbour. His action is suspected to be dictated by motives of personal ambition.

10. Frontier.

West.—No incidents have been reported. The Turks have promised the S.S. officer at Jerablus that they will arrest the three men who are suspected of complicity in the attack on a car carrying a British officer and others. (See Summary No. 20 of the 19th August.)

East.—No incidents have been reported.

11. The Lebanon.

A number of reports have now been received indicating the remarkable pressure exercised by the French Conseillers to secure the appearance of large and enthusiastic crowds in each town when General de Gaulle visited Tripoli and Sidon. In Tripoli, however, the result was a failure; the small crowd which gathered there was mainly to see the show and the applause was lacking. The Sidon crowds were more demonstrative, as Ahmed el Asad, who owes his exclusion from the present Government to British objections, had been at pains to import a large band of followers from the Jebel Amel to obtain a good mark with the French.

The Lebanese Prime Minister's visits to Tripoli and Zahlé have been very successful. His Tripoli visit was partly spoiled because the President insisted on accompanying him and Abdul Hamid Kerami's faction therefore stood aloof; but the population in general showed considerable enthusiasm, as did the people of Zahlé.

On the 30th August the Lebanese Prime Minister saw General de Gaulle and, apparently of his own initiative, made a series of demands to him for the extension of the powers of his Government. His demands were far-reaching, including the transfer of almost the whole of the *intérêts communs* and the drastic reduction in the number of French advisers, whom Sami Beyh Solh described as mostly redundant and many of them pro-Vichy. Beyond a vague promise to study the questions raised, General de Gaulle returned no reply, and his future action seems more likely to be directed towards the elimination of Sami Solh than towards giving him satisfaction. The Prime Minister, totally inexperienced in administration and determined at all costs to enhance his personal popularity, has already annoyed the Minister of Interior by a series of undepartmental

decisions designed to favour his influential supporters. This Minister is now tending to range himself on the side of the Lebanese President, hoping thereby to play him off against Sami Solh and thus hold the balance of power himself. Serious friction may be expected, as Sami Solh is too vain and too unintelligent to see where his interests lie.

The Iraqi Consul-General at Beirut, who is an ardent Arab Nationalist with some influence in Syrian Nationalist circles, saw General de Gaulle on the 3rd September, and bluntly reproached him for his failure to make effective the independence of the Levant States, adding a denunciation of Sheikh Taj-ed-Din as a man without principles or authority. In his reply, General de Gaulle made no attempt to promise a greater implementation of the declaration of independence and merely justified his present attitude on the grounds of the military situation. The interview appears to have ended in a strained atmosphere.

There are signs that the Lebanese population, particularly in regions where no wheat is grown, is beginning to get alarmed over the wheat situation. The fears of the population are aggravated by the knowledge that this time there can be no shipments from abroad to help them, that the cost of living is now double what it was a year ago, that the military works which give bread to so many labourers are gradually ending, and that the British authorities, in whom alone there is any trust, are not intervening directly in the administration. The wheat plan is widely believed to be a failure, and rumours of despatches of wheat to Turkey still circulate. The Lebanese supply distributions are irregular and insufficient, especially in the rural districts. In connexion with this the Maronite Archbishop has expressed to the British Political Officer his great and increasing concern at the position in these areas and has begged for British intervention to enable sufficient supplies to be made available before the rainy season interrupts communications.

12. Press and Propaganda.

War comment in the press was largely devoted to operations on the Russian front, but was subordinated to lengthy eulogies of General de Gaulle and reports of the ceremonies attending his movements.

Dissatisfaction and uneasiness regarding the supply situation continue to be expressed, although less emphatically than in recent weeks.

Enemy broadcasts in Arabic followed the usual lines.

[E 5559/183/G]

No. 69.

General de Gaulle to Mr. Casey.—(Communicated by the Office of the Minister of State, Cairo, September 11; received in Foreign Office, September 19.)

M. le Ministre d'Etat,

Beyrouth, le 7 septembre 1942.

J'AI chargé M. Helleu, Ambassadeur de France, de vous remettre le mémorandum joint à la présente lettre.

Ce document consigne un certain nombre de faits qui montrent clairement que les rapports franco-britanniques n'ont pas été maintenus ici dans des conditions conformes à nos accords et même à notre alliance. Du côté français on peut relever des concessions, sans doute provisoires mais nombreuses et importantes, sur les prérogatives qui nous appartiennent et que la Grande-Bretagne nous a reconnues par ces accords. On doit malheureusement constater que, du côté britannique, ces concessions ont simplement servi d'encouragement ou de prétexte à de nouveaux empiètements sur les droits de la France et sur ceux des Etats du Levant.

Indépendamment d'actes ou textes britanniques, tels que discours ou promesses, qui, par leur caractère unilatéral, n'engagent ni ne lient en rien la France, l'action britannique a voulu trouver sa justification dans deux arguments sans cesse invoqués. Le premier est l'indépendance des Etats du Levant, le second prend le nom de nécessités militaires. L'indépendance des Etats du Levant a été opposée au Délégué Général et plénipotentiaire de France lorsqu'il voulait faire usage de ses pouvoirs politiques et administratifs, pouvoirs qui lui appartiennent jusqu'à la fin du régime mandataire. Les nécessités militaires ont été invoquées du côté britannique pour justifier des interventions qui usurpaient sur des domaines réservés à la France, et notamment sur le domaine de "l'exploitation des ressources locales."

Je tiens à vous déclarer très nettement que le Gouvernement et les autorités britanniques ne sont nullement fondés à invoquer et à utiliser contre nous ni l'un ni l'autre de ces arguments.

L'indépendance de la Syrie et du Liban a été instituée par la France. Elle ne pouvait l'être que par la France. La parole de la France n'a pas à être garantie. L'exécution des promesses de la France n'a pas à être contrôlée. Les informations et même les avis du Gouvernement britannique peuvent nous être utiles dans l'appréciation générale de la situation. Mais nous ne saurions accepter d'ingérence quant à notre droit de prendre et d'appliquer ici les décisions que nous jugeons conformes aux intérêts des Etats du Levant et aux intérêts de la France.

En ce qui concerne les nécessités de la guerre nous les connaissons et apprécions aussi bien que quiconque. D'ailleurs, sur le théâtre commun d'opérations en Orient, la sécurité militaire française n'est nullement distincte de la sécurité militaire alliée, mais se confond avec elle. Au surplus, la collaboration militaire franco-britannique au Levant repose sur des bases nettement définies par les accords Lyttelton-de Gaulle, accords strictement respectés du côté français.

J'ai dit et je répète que nous entendons, pour notre part, pratiquer en Orient la plus étroite collaboration franco-britannique pour le succès de la guerre où nous combattons côte à côte.

C'est un fait que la politique britannique, telle qu'elle est représentée ici, substitue la pression à la collaboration.

C'est ainsi que, pour faire triompher ses vues à l'encontre de nos droits, la politique britannique a recouru en différentes circonstances à des menaces variées telles que :

Perspective de faire connaître par des actes publics la désolidarisation du Gouvernement britannique;

Suspension des avances financières faites à la France par la Grande-Bretagne;

Et même simplement argument de la force.

Vous comprendrez, j'en suis sûr, que je n'admette pas cette méthode qui ruine par avance toute coopération, revêt, aux yeux des populations orientales et devant l'opinion mondiale, l'aspect de la rivalité et va jusqu'à compromettre l'alliance franco-britannique dans le présent et dans l'avenir.

C'est pour moi un devoir de redresser cette situation.

Je sais gré au Premier Ministre des assurances de principe qu'il a bien voulu me renouveler tout récemment, mais je relève ici une pratique et des faits qui sont en désaccord avec ces assurances. Ne désirant que le retour à l'exécution sincère des conventions qui nous lient, j'ai l'espoir de vous trouver disposé comme moi-même à éclaircir et à assainir les rapports franco-britanniques en Orient.

Je prie, &c.

C. DE GAULLE.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Mémoire.

IL est nécessaire de préciser que les affaires résumées ci-après ne représentent qu'un choix d'exemples.

D'autre part, il n'est fait qu'une mention générale des interventions abusives d'agents britanniques subalternes. Mais ces interventions n'en constituent pas moins une gêne constante qui met durement à l'épreuve les agents français et autochtones et compromet, en définitive, l'administration des Etats.

Attitude du Représentant de la Grande-Bretagne lors de la Déclaration de l'Indépendance du Liban.

L'intervention britannique s'est manifestée une première fois de façon claire sur le terrain politique au moment des échanges de vues relatifs à la proclamation de l'indépendance libanaise. Le Général Spears éleva deux objections fondamentales contre le projet français de déclaration : la première avait trait à l'évocation, dans cette déclaration, des principes consignés dans le traité franco-

libanais de 1936. Cette référence s'inspirait d'un acte contractuel qui avait été accepté en son temps par les deux parties, qui conservait la faveur du Liban et qui ne pouvait porter, en aucune façon, atteinte aux intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne. Il consacrait simplement la situation particulière de la France au Liban, situation reconnue pourtant du côté britannique. La deuxième objection était dirigée contre l'affirmation que l'Etat libanais constitue une unité politique-ment et territorialement indivisible. On évoquait, du côté anglais, les susceptibilités de la Syrie, alors que les Syriens avaient été clairement avertis par la déclaration de Damas, le 27 septembre 1941, de la position qu'adoptait la France au regard des affaires syro-libanaises.

Il s'ensuivit de longues et pénibles discussions. D'autre part, on ne peut oublier, en ce qui concerne les méthodes de négociation, que, pour obtenir *in extremis* deux retouches à la déclaration, le Général Spears s'est livré, la veille même des cérémonies d'indépendance, à une pression d'un caractère comminatoire, menaçant :

1° De remettre une note de réserve sur les termes dans lesquels l'indépendance était déclarée;

2° De s'abstenir de toute participation aux cérémonies de la Déclaration d'Indépendance, afin de manifester publiquement, devant les autorités et les populations locales, le désaccord entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne.

Le Général Spears exploitait ainsi une première fois le sonci de la France Libre de ne pas laisser apparaître une divergence entre Alliés.

Interventions du Général Spears dans le Domaine politique.

Des interventions constantes du Général Spears dans la politique intérieure des Etats, interventions directement contraires aux obligations d'un représentant diplomatique, on peut se borner à relever quelques démarches récentes et significatives.

A trois reprises, en avril et mai 1942, le Général Spears a fait des interventions pressantes auprès du Président de la République libanaise, M. Alfred Naccache, pour lui demander d'admettre le principe d'une prochaine consultation électorale et d'en arrêter la date. M. Naccache, jugeant que la situation générale déconseillait d'ajouter au trouble de l'opinion l'agitation d'une campagne électorale, refusa de prendre un engagement à ce sujet. Il envisagea même de se retirer si la pression dont il était l'objet devenait trop forte.

Mécontent de l'attitude du Président, le Général Spears manifesta publiquement son hostilité à M. Naccache et au Gouvernement, notamment au cours de visites au Patriarche maronite, à l'Archevêque grec-catholique de Beyrouth et au Mufti de la République libanaise (juin 1942).

Dans une allocution au Rotary Club, le Général Spears fit entendre clairement qu'il recommandait des élections prochaines.

Lors de la crise ministérielle du mois de juillet 1942, la pression de la mission Spears s'exerça pleinement. Le 25 juillet, le Colonel Furlong, Political Officer, vint informer le Président du veto de la Mission Spears à l'encontre d'un Ministre du Cabinet démissionnaire : Ahmed Bey el Assad, chef chiite du Liban sud. Les griefs britanniques contre Ahmed Bey étaient d'ailleurs futiles. Le fait était que ce Ministre entretenait des rapports amicaux avec l'Administration française.

Notons enfin des démarches pressantes du Général Spears auprès du Président Naccache pour faire admettre à celui-ci un programme d'irrigation établi par les services britanniques, intervention dans un domaine qui relève des Etats et de la Délégation Générale et qui s'inscrit dans les tentatives variées de prises de gages sur le Liban.

Office du Blé.

En 1941, l'intervention britannique dans le problème du pain s'est présentée sous la forme du "plan Spears". Ce plan partait d'une idée théorique juste : faire baisser le prix du blé et faire sortir les stocks, en jetant sur le marché des quantités de céréales importées, à prix dégressifs. Ce plan négligeait malheureusement deux facteurs :

1° Le pouvoir d'achat et de stockage des populations du Levant, point sur lequel le Général Catroux avait prodigué des avertissements;

2° La franchise éventuelle des routes maritimes. Il en résulta un complet échec : accaparement par la spéculation des quantités importées, renouveau de hardiesse chez les spéculateurs et montée en flèche des prix.

Pour éviter le renouvellement de ces difficultés, à l'occasion de la campagne 1942-43, le Général Catroux, Délégué Général de France au Levant, prit à la date du 21 avril 1942 un arrêté, 229/F.L., instituant l'Office du Blé.

Le texte de cet arrêté avait été montré aux autorités britanniques intéressées, dans le souci constamment présent aux autorités françaises d'une communauté de vues et d'action.

Il restait à passer aux modalités d'application.

C'est à ce moment que se manifeste l'opposition du Gouvernement syrien. Il avait pourtant été tenu jusqu'alors très étroitement au courant tant par de nombreuses conversations que par une lettre du 13 avril qui lui avait été adressée par le Délégué Général.

Pour essayer d'aplanir toutes difficultés un projet de protocole franco-syro-libanais fut envisagé, instituant une commission supérieure des blés et céréales composée de quatre membres (un membre de chaque pays intéressé et, par désir de manifester l'accord des Alliés, un membre britannique).

Dans le projet en question, la présidence de la commission était assurée par le représentant du Gouvernement syrien, les décisions étant prises à la majorité, le Délégué Général limitant son pouvoir dans ce domaine à cette seule réserve que les décisions de la commission n'auraient force réglementaire dans les deux États qu'après son agrément. Des conversations furent engagées pour réaliser l'accord sur ce programme entièrement communiqué aux autorités britanniques (Mission Spears). Il apparut bientôt que le Gouvernement de Damas montrait de la répugnance à collaborer à l'exécution d'un programme fondé sur l'Office du Blé, organisme indépendant de toute discrimination politique et destiné à résoudre les difficultés éventuelles entre Syrie et Liban. Les contestations portèrent sur divers points. Les autorités britanniques en ont eu connaissance puisque le 7 mai MM. Rosa et Gent de la Mission Spears indiquaient eux-mêmes à MM. Boncenne et Baelen, de la Délégation Générale, qu'à leur connaissance les Syriens :

- 1° Contestaient que le protocole d'exécution de l'Office du Blé pût se référer à l'arrêté de principe 229 F.L.
- 2° Refusaient que les décisions de la commission fussent être sanctionnées par le Délégué Général, commandant en chef.
- 3° Exigeaient la signature des autorités anglaises au bas du protocole.

Renseignements pris à Damas il était constaté d'ailleurs qu'à ce même moment le Président du Conseil n'avait pas étendu ses demandes aux trois points cités. Il n'ait notamment d'une façon formelle avoir exigé une signature britannique au bas du protocole. On est ainsi amené à constater que les membres de la Mission Spears se trouvaient avoir des entretiens avec ceux-là même des membres du Gouvernement syrien—dont ils n'ont pas cité les noms—qui avaient l'attitude d'opposition la plus forte aux demandes du Général Catroux—et qu'ils s'en faisaient les interprètes.

Les atermoiements apportés à cette première mesure d'application de l'Office du Blé apparurent ainsi au Général Catroux comme un exemple des dangereuses lenteurs que pourrait souffrir l'exécution d'un plan capital pour l'existence des pays du Levant et pour la sécurité des Alliés dans le Proche-Orient.

En conséquence, l'accord sur le protocole n'ayant pu être obtenu avec Damas le 8 mai, date fixée pour une réponse définitive, et les opérations d'achat de blé, réalisées sous la forme d'avances faites aux agriculteurs pour couvrir leurs frais de moisson, se faisant extrêmement urgentes, le Général Catroux délégua auprès de la Mission Spears MM. Boncenne et Baelen, qui présentèrent à MM. Rosa et Gent les remarques suivantes :

L'opposition du Gouvernement de Damas à la procédure d'exécution de l'Office du Blé ne peut avoir pour effet de paralyser l'exécution de l'arrêté de base 229 F.L. pris depuis de deux semaines ;

En raison du caractère vital et urgent de l'affaire, le Général commandant en chef envisage—sans attendre la fin de la discussion de procédure instaurée à Damas—de passer aux mesures d'achat par l'Office du Blé ;

Le Général Catroux tient à affirmer qu'il désire rechercher en cette affaire la collaboration des autorités militaires britanniques stationnées au Levant.

Ces indications ayant été communiquées au Général Spears, celui-ci reçut les deux collaborateurs du Général Catroux qui les lui répétèrent.

Le Général Spears se déclara en complet désaccord. Il ne pourrait que transmettre avec avis défavorable un programme d'achat de blé par collaboration franco-britannique qui n'aurait pas l'agrément préalable de la République syrienne indépendante, État que la Grande-Bretagne entend traiter sur le même pied que tout autre État.

Le Général Spears fait entendre qu'il déconseille au Général Catroux de procéder aux achats envisagés, car les crédits britanniques nécessaires seraient vraisemblablement coupés.

Le Général Spears ajoute que même au cas où les Syriens auraient accepté un pouvoir de veto du Général Catroux sur les décisions de la commission, il s'y opposerait pour sa part.

Le Général Spears ne se montre pas préoccupé par l'argument fondé sur les fuites probables du blé et la nécessité d'agir vite car il estime que, si l'affaire n'est pas réglée par les négociations en cours, l'armée britannique procédera toute seule, par voie de commission d'achats, aux acquisitions qui lui paraîtront nécessaires ainsi qu'elle procède déjà pour d'autres produits. En cas d'échec de ces commissions d'achats aimables, l'armée britannique passerait simplement aux mesures de réquisition.

C'était simplement l'argument de force.

La discussion fut transportée au Caire. Le Général Catroux fit valoir devant Mr. Casey les arguments suivants :

1° Les rapports de la Grande-Bretagne avec les États ne sont nullement les mêmes que ceux de la France avec ces États, tant en raison de la permanence du mandat français que de la position spéciale reconnue à la France, pour le présent et pour l'avenir, par le Gouvernement britannique lui-même.

2° Plus spécialement, le Général Catroux tint à affirmer qu'il considérait comme appartenant à ses prérogatives le droit de contrôler les décisions d'une commission créée pour appliquer les dispositions d'un arrêté antérieur. Il tint accessoirement à rappeler que cet arrêté, communiqué à la Mission Spears, avait, comme il a été dit ci-dessus, l'approbation de celle-ci.

3° Que s'il s'agit, par extension, de contester les pouvoirs réglementaires du Général Catroux, celui-ci fait remarquer que ces pouvoirs, non abolis par les déclarations d'indépendance, ont été depuis lors mis journellement en usage, du consentement et parfois à la demande des Gouvernements intéressés et même des autorités britanniques, et que cette prétention serait particulièrement abusive dans un domaine qui touche aux deux domaines réservés des intérêts communs et de la sécurité.

4° Sans s'arrêter au point de savoir si les mesures d'achat par commission ou de réquisition envisagées par le Général Spears cadrent avec ses affirmations précédentes sur le respect de l'indépendance des États, le Général Catroux se voit au regret de contester le légitime exercice de ces pouvoirs par l'autorité britannique : l'article IV de l'accord Lyttelton-de Gaulle, qui est la charte des rapports franco-britanniques en la matière, réserve en effet à l'autorité française l'exploitation des ressources locales.

Toutefois, dans un esprit d'extrême conciliation, et pour éviter le maintien d'une opposition qui pouvait être catastrophique dans une question de salut public, d'une extrême urgence, le Général Catroux admit, à la fin des discussions du Caire, la création d'un Comité supérieur du Blé où le Général Spears siégeait à côté de lui. C'est à ce prix qu'était écartée la menace d'un encouragement britannique à la résistance des Syriens contre l'Office du Blé.

Cette concession n'a pas paru suffisante au Général Spears, et, lorsque se posa la question du remplacement du directeur français de l'Office, le représentant britannique exigea que le principe de parité fût étendu à ce poste administratif, malgré les inconvénients d'une dualité de direction.

Quoi qu'il en soit de ces concessions, il est nécessaire de préciser :

- 1° Qu'elles ne viennent préjuger en rien contre les accords généraux qui définissent les positions respectives de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne au Levant ;

2° Qu'elles sont purement circonstanciées, et par conséquent révocables au moment où les autorités françaises considéreront qu'un autre système est préférable pour assurer le ravitaillement des populations dont elles ont la charge.

Question du Chemin de Fer Haifa-Beyrouth-Tripoli.

Par une lettre en date du 14 octobre 1941 la Mission Spears informait la Délégation Générale que le Grand Quartier général britannique au Moyen-Orient avait décidé d'entreprendre la construction d'une ligne de chemin de fer Haifa-Beyrouth-Tripoli, ligne qui, ajoutait la communication, "fera partie des lignes de communication de Syrie et, en les reliant à la ligne de chemin de fer à voie normale de Palestine, établira ainsi une communication directe." Cette ligne devait être construite par l'armée britannique et à ses frais, mais la Mission Spears nous priait d'intervenir pour obtenir la main d'œuvre nécessaire aux travaux sur le tronçon libanais.

Tout en donnant notre accord au projet de construction, et en mettant à la disposition du commandement britannique les services compétents de la Délégation Générale, le Général Catroux réservait toutefois expressément les droits de la France sur la nouvelle ligne. Ce dernier point, auquel devait bientôt s'ajouter la question de l'exploitation de ladite ligne, devait soulever une longue controverse.

1° Question de la Propriété.

Du côté britannique, au premier abord, on parut décidé à admettre le principe que les droits de la France sur la ligne seraient expressément réservés. Cependant, à mesure que nous nous efforcions d'obtenir des assurances précises à ce sujet, nous nous heurtions à des réticences et à des arguties sans cesse renouvelées. Dans une communication du 21 mars dernier, M. Hamilton, conseiller de la Mission Spears, précisait que la ligne ainsi que les terrains expropriés pour sa construction seraient propriété du Gouvernement britannique et, qu'après la guerre, le Gouvernement français ou le Gouvernement libanais, ou toute personne désignée par l'un de ces Gouvernements se verrait accorder une option pour un temps restant à déterminer. Lorsque le Comité National chercha à obtenir à Londres des précisions à ce sujet, il lui fut répondu que le délai d'option commencerait à courir au moins deux ans après la fin de toute hostilité menaçant le Levant, et que seul un Gouvernement français "reconnu par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté comme un gouvernement exerçant dans les Etats du Levant une responsabilité déterminée" pourrait en bénéficier.

En somme, la France n'avait plus aucune garantie, le Gouvernement britannique prétendant garder ligne et terrain, et ne rien promettre. Au cours de nouvelles démarches auprès du Foreign Office, le Comité National se fit promettre que le délai d'option commencerait à courir à partir de la signature de l'armistice ou du dernier armistice qui mettra fin aux hostilités avec l'Allemagne ou l'Italie. Mais le Gouvernement britannique refusait toujours de revenir sur la définition précitée du gouvernement français susceptible de bénéficier de l'option. Dans ces conditions, le Comité National décida de persister dans son attitude négative. Depuis lors, la question est au point mort. Au cours de conversations qui eurent lieu à Beyrouth entre le Général Cole, Inspector of Land, et la Délégation Générale, on ne put que constater que le désaccord subsistait. Une telle constatation n'implique naturellement pas que la France soit disposée à accepter la construction de la ligne comme un fait accompli.

2° Question de l'Exploitation.

Sur ce point, les autorités britanniques adoptent un point de vue analogue : la nouvelle ligne répondant à des nécessités militaires, étant construite par l'armée britannique et à ses frais, l'exploitation doit en être assurée par l'armée britannique. Dans la lettre ci-après du Général Catroux au Général Spears, le Délégué Général a exposé toutes les raisons de droit et de fait qui vont à l'encontre de cette théorie.

"Mon cher Général,

Par votre lettre No. 55/119A en date du 17 juin dernier, vous avez bien voulu me faire connaître les principes généraux qui vous semblent devoir servir de base à notre collaboration dans l'exploitation du chemin de fer Haifa-Beyrouth-Tripoli.

Comme vous, j'estime qu'il est nécessaire d'éclaircir les malentendus qui se sont élevés à ce sujet. J'ai donc procédé à un examen complet de la question depuis son origine.

1° Ainsi que vous l'indiquez dans votre lettre le point essentiel qui domine tout le débat est que cette ligne de chemin de fer a un caractère essentiellement stratégique, et que sa construction a été entreprise pour faire face à des nécessités militaires. Nous sommes parfaitement d'accord à ce sujet. Toutefois, ni dans mon esprit, ni, me semble-t-il, dans l'esprit des autorités britanniques, il n'était prévu que cette ligne formerait en territoire libanais un réseau absolument à part, complètement détaché des autres réseaux du territoire syro-libanais et, comme tel, appelé à faire l'objet d'une exploitation absolument distincte. Au contraire, il était bien dans l'intention des autorités britanniques d'inclure la ligne en question dans le système de communications syro-libanais et d'établir par là un lien direct entre ce système et le réseau palestinien. Permettez-moi de vous citer, sur ce point, les propres termes de la lettre adressée le 14 octobre dernier, par le Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Dorrien au directeur de mon Cabinet :

"Le Grand Quartier général britannique du Middle East nous demande de vous informer qu'il a l'intention de faire construire, pour nécessité militaire urgente, une ligne de chemin de fer à voie normale Haifa-Beyrouth-Tripoli : cette ligne fera partie des lignes de communication de Syrie, et, en les reliant à la ligne de chemin de fer à voie normale de Palestine, établira ainsi une communication directe."

L'objet de la nouvelle ligne me semble être ainsi très clairement défini : conçue dans un but stratégique, elle ne peut remplir l'usage que l'on en attend que si elle vient compléter le réseau de communications existant dans ces pays. Son utilité essentiellement militaire ne paraissait donc pas devoir exclure *a priori* tout trafic d'ordre civil.

En outre, comment, en temps de guerre, distinguer entre ce qui est trafic civil et trafic militaire ? Dans la guerre moderne, il est peu de marchandises qui n'aient pas, exclusivement ou subsidiairement, un caractère d'utilité militaire. C'est en tout cas la thèse du Gouvernement britannique lui-même en ce qui concerne le blocus appliqué aux pays ennemis. Je rappelle en outre les nombreuses difficultés qui se sont élevées, dans le passé, touchant la définition des marchandises à considérer comme contrebande de guerre. Est-il cependant dans l'intention des autorités britanniques de réduire l'usage de la ligne au transport de troupes et du matériel de guerre ? Ce serait, je crois, limiter dans une grande mesure les services qu'elle est appelée à rendre. S'agit-il au contraire, comme le prévoit le paragraphe 3 de votre lettre, de n'autoriser de trafic civil que si les nécessités militaires le permettent ? Cette réserve est sans doute pleinement justifiée mais je ne vois pas qu'il y ait là une différence entre la ligne Haifa-Tripoli et toute autre ligne de chemin de fer, dans quelque pays que ce soit, les nécessités militaires ayant partout et naturellement la priorité en temps de guerre.

En un mot, le caractère stratégique de la nouvelle ligne ne me paraît pas devoir justifier un régime d'exploitation spécial purement militaire, tel que celui que vous suggérez.

Je vous rappelle en outre que les autres lignes du territoire syro-libanais sont soumises, conformément aux termes des proclamations d'indépendance, à un contrôle du commandement allié qui vous donne toutes les garanties nécessaires, et fonctionne d'une manière très satisfaisante. Ce même contrôle, éventuellement renforcé, serait naturellement étendu au chemin de fer Haifa-Beyrouth-Tripoli.

2° La difficulté d'établir une distinction nette entre le trafic civil m'amène à une remarque d'ordre plus général : la nouvelle ligne va modifier dans une mesure qu'il est encore difficile de déterminer l'équilibre général du trafic sur les lignes de chemin de fer des Etats du Levant. Il importe donc que la Société D.H.P. soit en mesure de maintenir l'harmonie nécessaire au sein du nouvel état de choses créé par l'ouverture d'une ligne aussi importante que celle qui reliera Haifa à Beyrouth.

Cette légitime exigence ne me semble pas suffisamment garantie par la conférence que vous proposez au paragraphe 7 de votre lettre, si l'on part de ce principe que l'autorité britannique est absolument maîtresse de l'exploitation de la nouvelle ligne.

3° Le problème qui doit cependant retenir le plus notre attention est celui des modalités d'exploitation qui seront à la fois les plus simples et les plus efficaces dans les circonstances actuelles. Dans votre lettre précitée et dans la lettre du Major Shapland en date du 4 mai dernier, je vois exposées les différentes raisons d'ordre pratique qui commanderaient que l'exploitation de la ligne fût remise à l'armée britannique. Permettez-moi de les reprendre une à une en rappelant les remarques qu'elles m'ont suggérées :

(a) Question du matériel roulant. Votre lettre, dans son paragraphe 4, suggère que le D.H.P. ne posséderait pas le matériel roulant lui permettant l'exploitation de la ligne et que les locomotives du Département de la Guerre ne pourraient pas circuler sur le réseau D.H.P.

S'il est vrai que les locomotives du Département de la Guerre ne pourraient être mises en service sur le réseau D.H.P., en revanche, il est inexact de dire que le D.H.P. ne dispose pas d'un nombre de locomotives et de wagons suffisants pour assurer son propre trafic. En ce qui concerne les locomotives, je vous rappelle que le D.H.P. a actuellement en service sur les Iraqi State Railways dix locomotives G8 mises à la disposition de ce réseau à la demande des autorités britanniques, et qu'en outre, toutes les locomotives du D.H.P. pourront circuler sur la nouvelle ligne. Il en est de même pour les wagons, le trafic de la Palestine avec l'Irak étant assuré, pour la plus grande part, à l'aide de wagons D.H.P.—L.S.B.

(b) Question des tarifs. Dans sa lettre du 4 mai dernier, le Major Shapland faisait valoir que, dans le cas où l'exploitation de la nouvelle ligne serait assurée par le D.H.P., il serait difficile d'établir une tarification pour le transport des marchandises.

Il a déjà été répondu à ce sujet que le D.H.P. pourrait aisément établir des tarifs qui tiendraient compte des conditions spéciales de la construction de la ligne, en particulier du fait que le financement est assuré par la Trésorerie britannique.

(c) Séjour du personnel à Az-Zib. Sur ce point encore, pas de difficultés particulières. La même situation existe à Samak où le séjour du personnel syrien ne donne lieu à aucune difficulté spéciale, et en Europe dans de nombreuses gares frontières internationales situées sur le territoire d'un des deux États limitrophes, où le personnel ferroviaire de l'autre État est autorisé à séjourner selon des dispositions conventionnelles dont les principales ont d'ailleurs été codifiées par le Droit international.

Vous me pardonnerez d'être ainsi entré dans des considérations d'un caractère aussi technique. Elles sont cependant nécessaires car elles soulignent qu'il n'existe aucune objection pratique à l'exploitation de la nouvelle ligne par le D.H.P. Bien au contraire, l'exploitation par le D.H.P. constituerait de loin le meilleur système.

Je ne vois pas en effet pourquoi les raisons qui ont amené les autorités britanniques à abandonner l'exploitation du tronçon palestinien aux Palestinian Railways ne seraient pas applicables, au bénéfice du D.H.P., au tronçon libanais. Aux termes de la lettre précitée du Major Shapland, le système adopté par les autorités britanniques pour le tronçon palestinien répondrait aux considérations suivantes :

- (1) Désir d'éviter l'existence de deux directions indépendantes pour l'exploitation du chemin de fer dans la zone de Haifa;
- (2) Economie de matériel et de personnel.

Ces deux raisons me semblent également valables pour le tronçon libanais. En ce qui concerne le matériel, je crois avoir déjà indiqué que le D.H.P. peut répondre aux besoins de la nouvelle ligne. D'autre part, l'emploi du personnel du D.H.P. permettra à l'armée britannique de faire une sérieuse économie de main d'œuvre. Il lui évitera en outre de devoir recourir au recrutement sur place d'un nouveau personnel civil qui n'aurait sans doute pas les mêmes capacités que le personnel du D.H.P. Enfin, il me semble également inopportun d'avoir deux directions indépendantes pour la ligne dans la zone du port de Beyrouth. D'une façon plus générale d'ailleurs, le système d'exploitation par le D.H.P. n'entraînerait que la conclusion de trois accords entre cette compagnie et les Palestinian Railways, à savoir :

- Une convention d'échange de matériel;
- Une entente de trafic;
- Un traité d'exploitation de gare commune pour la gare de Az-Zib.

Au contraire, dans l'hypothèse de l'exploitation par l'autorité militaire britannique, celle-ci devrait conclure les accords suivants :

Avec le D.H.P.—

- Une convention d'échange de matériel à Tripoli;
- Une convention pour le trafic échangé par transbordement à Beyrouth;
- Un traité d'exploitation de gare commune pour Tripoli;
- Un traité d'exploitation de gare commune pour Beyrouth.

Avec le port de Beyrouth—

- Un traité pour l'exploitation des voies du port.

Avec les services des douanes—

- Un traité pour endosser les charges du transit international.

Je crois, sur ces différents points d'ordre pratique, m'être suffisamment expliqué. J'admets que les autorités militaires britanniques aient prévu le personnel et le matériel nécessaires pour l'exploitation de la ligne par l'armée britannique. C'est là un point qui les concerne seules. Mais je me crois fondé à insister pour que l'on adopte le système à la fois le plus simple, le plus souple et le plus conforme aux exigences et aux ressources locales, et non un autre qui ne se justifierait par aucune considération d'ordre pratique.

4° Reste un argument qui a été développé à mes services, d'abord par la lettre précitée du Major Shapland, puis par le Brigadier Hutchins, et selon lequel l'armée britannique est en droit de se réserver l'exploitation de la ligne puisque c'est elle qui en assure le financement.

Permettez-moi de vous dire franchement ma pensée à ce sujet. Je ne crois pas qu'un tel argument réponde à l'esprit de notre alliance. De plus, s'il était établi que celui qui paie, c'est-à-dire le plus riche, acquiert par là-même des droits, notamment des droits de propriété, en proportion des capitaux qu'il fournit, et si c'était là un principe généralement admis au sein de la coalition des Nations unies, je ne doute pas que la France n'ait beaucoup à en souffrir, mais il est possible que la Grande-Bretagne puisse elle-même sentir l'inconvénient de cette thèse.

Vous me pardonnerez d'avoir été aussi long, mais j'ai cru nécessaire, pour vous mettre à même de connaître complètement mon point de vue dans cette affaire, d'en envisager tous les aspects aussi bien économiques et techniques que militaires. La question est complexe. Elle demande donc une solution simple. J'espère avoir réussi à vous en indiquer la voie, et souhaite vivement que nous puissions très prochainement nous mettre complètement d'accord.

Bien sincèrement vôtre,
CATROUX."

Répondant à cette lettre, le Général Spears en reconnut le poids mais ajouta que la décision de l'armée britannique était prise et que, malgré les regrets qu'il éprouvait de constater notre désaccord, cette décision serait appliquée dès que le tronçon Haifa-Beyrouth serait terminé.

Là encore, la politique du fait accompli ne peut que faire naître le regrettable soupçon qu'on désire, du côté britannique, obtenir en pays libanais un gage dont l'histoire du développement des communications ferroviaires en Orient permet de mesurer l'importance, non seulement économique, mais politique.

Dans ces conditions, le Comité National est décidé à s'opposer à l'ouverture du trafic Haifa-Tripoli tant que ce litige n'aura pas reçu une solution qui respecte les droits de la France.

Note au sujet de la Raffinerie de Tripoli.

La question du transfert de la raffinerie de Tripoli à la Syria Petroleum Company a été officiellement ouverte par une lettre adressée le 16 juin dernier, par le Général Spears au Délégué Général.

Les arguments du Général Spears pour justifier cette prétention ont été réfutés par le Contrôleur de Sociétés concessionnaires et Travaux publics à la Délégation Générale qui, résumant brièvement l'affaire depuis sa genèse, exposait ce qui suit :

"Le 4 août 1939, en contre-partie de garanties données par l'Administration dans un autre domaine, la compagnie anglaise, Syria Petroleum

Company (S.P.C.), qui s'appelait alors 'Petroleum Concessions Syria and Lebanon (Limited) (P.S.L.)', s'engageait à approvisionner au Liban, dès accord de l'Administration et le plus rapidement possible, le matériel d'un topping plant pouvant traiter 80.000 tonnes de pétrole brut par an. Elle s'engageait en outre à procéder au montage et à la mise en service de cette installation dans le cas de guerre ou de blocus gênant l'approvisionnement de la Syrie et du Liban en hydrocarbures.

L'accord de l'Administration à ces dispositions présentées par la compagnie fut donné dès le 7 août, et le 7 septembre 1939 il lui était demandé de prévoir l'installation effective du topping plant.

De nouvelles et pressantes lettres lui furent adressées le 31 octobre 1939, le 24 janvier, le 7 avril et le 22 mai 1940. Elles n'eurent d'autre résultat qu'une discussion stérile sur l'emplacement à adopter pour la construction de la raffinerie et la présentation des plans de la future installation. Aucun matériel ne fut approvisionné ni même probablement commandé.

En juin 1940, le ravitaillement en hydrocarbures des États n'était plus assuré, la situation s'annonçait critique pour un proche avenir et l'Administration décidait en juillet de tenter de construire elle-même une raffinerie à Tripoli. Parallèlement, elle faisait connaître, le 22 juillet, à la S.P.C. qu'elle faisait toutes réserves concernant la responsabilité encourue par la compagnie du fait qu'elle n'avait pas tenu ses engagements. Le 30 août enfin, avant de commencer les travaux, elle avisait la compagnie que les dépenses qu'elle se trouvait dans l'obligation d'assurer seraient mises à sa charge.

Le 12 novembre 1940, alors que la première tranche des travaux de construction était sur le point d'être terminée, la S.P.C. offrait à l'Administration 25.000 tonnes de pétrole brut en manière de paiement des frais de construction de la raffinerie, et précisait que, faute de posséder dans le pays des techniciens compétents, elle ne faisait pas d'objection à l'exploitation de la raffinerie par l'Administration jusqu'à ce que *des conditions économiques plus normales aient succédé au présent état de guerre.*

Cette offre fut acceptée le 19 mars 1941, mais il fut précisé que les droits de la compagnie ne portaient que sur le matériel monté et payé à la date du 30 avril 1941, à l'exclusion du matériel emprunté et devant être restitué en fin d'exploitation ou du matériel réquisitionné et non évalué à cette date. Entrent notamment dans ces dernières catégories des éléments essentiels tels que les quatre chaudières de production de vapeur, les pompes à vapeur prêtées par la Marine ou réquisitionnées, certains des réservoirs métalliques, etc. Il était, en outre, nettement précisé que *l'Inspection générale des Travaux publics continuerait à exploiter directement jusqu'au retour à des conjonctures normales.*

Enfin un dernier échange de lettres intervenait, le 9 juin 1941 lettre de la compagnie, et 10 juillet réponse de l'Administration, touchant des précisions au sujet de quelques points particuliers.

Ces éléments indispensables étant rappelés, nous pouvons maintenant examiner la lettre du Général Spears dans le détail.

Le Général indique qu'il a reçu des instructions de son Gouvernement d'avoir à discuter la question du transfert de la raffinerie à ses propriétaires : la Syrian Petroleum Company. La question de propriété n'est pas discutée pas plus que l'intention des parties contractantes de rendre dès que possible l'exploitation à la S.P.C.

De l'exposé qui a été fait plus haut, il ressort :

Que la S.P.C. n'est propriétaire que d'une partie seulement de l'installation, vraisemblablement un peu moins de la moitié;

Que l'intention des parties contractantes n'a jamais été de modifier les modalités actuelles d'exploitation, mais bien que l'une comme l'autre ont toujours été d'accord pour que l'exploitation reste assurée par l'Administration jusqu'au retour à *des conjonctures normales succédant à l'état de guerre actuel.* Cette unanimité de vues s'explique parfaitement : d'une part, la compagnie jugeait la tâche entreprise par l'Administration presque *irréalisable* dans les conditions du moment et ne se souciait pas de prendre une exploitation qui s'avérerait pleine de vicissitudes et de dangers; d'autre part, l'Administration, en raison de la carence de la compagnie à tenir ses engagements, *se refusait* à lui confier l'exploitation d'une installation qu'elle avait été incapable de construire.

L'argumentation développée dans la lettre du Général Spears se trouve ainsi en contradiction avec les faits.

Le Général Spears expose ensuite que dans l'intérêt de la cause alliée, il est désirable que le transfert soit fait immédiatement pour permettre l'augmentation de la production, ce qui suppose la reconstruction et l'extension de l'usine et son exploitation par des experts en raffinage. L'outillage et le matériel ne peuvent être trouvés que dans les autres raffineries du Moyen-Orient, qui ne peuvent en accepter le transfert dans une raffinerie qui n'est pas sous leur contrôle technique et qui ne possède pas le degré de sécurité désirable, cet outillage et ce matériel étant pratiquement irremplaçables. De même, le personnel compétent ne peut être trouvé que dans les raffineries du Moyen-Orient.

Nous sommes pleinement d'accord avec le Général Spears, surtout dans les circonstances actuelles, sur la nécessité de développer la production de la Raffinerie de Tripoli, et nous n'avons cessé de défendre ce point de vue auprès de toutes les autorités britanniques avec lesquelles nous avons eu à discuter de questions d'hydrocarbures. Peut-être pourrions-nous seulement regretter que près d'un an se soit écoulé sans qu'une question aussi importante n'ait reçu d'autre solution que la visite de deux ingénieurs, l'un de Haïfa en mai 1942, l'autre de Suez en juin dernier.

Par contre, l'augmentation de la production, du moins telle qu'elle a été envisagée jusqu'ici, ne suppose pas la reconstruction de l'usine, mais le renforcement et l'extension des installations existantes. Peut-être conviendrait-il, dans ce domaine, de poser le problème d'une façon claire. Il serait alors possible d'examiner en commun avec les experts anglais les solutions techniques à adopter et les moyens à mettre en œuvre pour réaliser les installations nouvelles. Il n'est nullement prouvé en particulier que le matériel et l'outillage ne peuvent pas être trouvés ailleurs que dans les raffineries du Moyen-Orient.

Peut-être aussi pourrions-nous souhaiter que ces raffineries fassent montre d'un peu plus d'esprit de coopération. La Raffinerie de Tripoli n'a en effet trouvé, après l'accident du 23 mai, aucune aide auprès d'elles et a dû, une fois encore, ne compter que sur elle-même pour sortir d'une situation difficile. Nul ne songe à nier que la sécurité de son exploitation n'est pas complète, mais ne serait-il pas plus constructif au lieu de se borner à le constater de nous aider à améliorer cette sécurité? Ceci ne suppose pas d'ailleurs la réalisation de travaux importants, mais seulement la fourniture de matériel ou de matériaux qui existent en Palestine et en Egypte.

Quant à la question du personnel, nous ne pouvons que protester véhémentement, car, de la lecture de la lettre du Général Spears, on pourrait conclure que notre personnel est insuffisant en qualité et en nombre. La meilleure preuve de la qualité de ce personnel, c'est qu'il a pu mener à bien la construction de la raffinerie que des experts américains et anglais jugeaient irréalisable dans les circonstances où nous nous trouvons placés. La majeure partie d'entre eux vient d'ailleurs de grandes raffineries et possèdent d'excellentes références. Leur nombre est suffisant pour assurer l'exploitation d'une installation beaucoup plus développée que l'actuelle. J'ajouterai qu'il existe encore dans les Forces Françaises Libres quelques spécialistes auxquels nous pourrions avoir recours si nécessaire.

Un autre aspect de la question considéré comme primordial est qu'il faut arriver à un maximum de souplesse pour le traitement du brut par les raffineries de Haïfa, Kirkouk et Tripoli pour adapter la production aux besoins de l'armée. Il serait essentiel pour y arriver que les trois usines soient placées sous une direction technique unique.

De tels problèmes sont uniquement des problèmes de coordination qui peuvent se résoudre aisément par d'autres moyens : conférences, liaisons, comités, commission, &c. Ils ne sont pas spéciaux au pétrole mais se posent dans bien d'autres domaines.

Il ne paraît pas nécessaire d'aborder la discussion de l'aspect financier de la question; le Général Spears reconnaît d'ailleurs qu'il s'agit d'un problème d'une certaine complexité subordonné à la conclusion préalable d'un accord de principe sur le premier point.

Dans ces conditions, le Délégué Général, par une lettre en date du 6 juillet, répondait au Ministre de Grande-Bretagne qu'il convenait d'abord d'entreprendre des conversations techniques entre experts français et britanniques et réservait la question de la propriété et du transfert. Par une lettre en date du

10 juillet, le Général Spears admit le principe de conversations techniques préalables, mais indiquait qu'il serait "criminel" de tolérer que des discussions—sur quelque aspect que ce soit de la question—vinssent retarder la solution du problème.

Depuis lors, l'affaire est au point mort. Les conversations techniques dont le principe avait été reconnu de part et d'autre n'ont pas été entamées, pas plus que la discussion de fond sur la question de la propriété et du transfert.

Exploitation des Lignite.

Très caractéristique encore est l'affaire des lignites de Bechara et Blaouza.

Le 25 juillet 1942 le conseiller économique de la Mission Spears demandait à la Direction du Cabinet de la Délégation Générale de bien vouloir envisager l'exploitation, par l'armée britannique et pour les besoins de l'armée britannique, de ces deux gisements dont on espérait un rendement annuel de 15.000 tonnes.

L'exploitation et la distribution seraient dirigées par un comité. Le conseiller économique britannique proposait un comité de trois membres (un délégué de la IX^e Armée, un délégué de la Mission Spears, un représentant français), tandis que le Directeur du Cabinet et le Contrôleur des Sociétés concessionnaires demandaient un comité paritaire. Sous cette réserve, la négociation ne paraissait pas offrir d'importante difficulté.

Le 24 août 1942, le conseiller économique britannique adressait une lettre au Cabinet du Général Catroux déclarant que : "étant donné que l'exploitation des mines de lignite serait faite exclusivement par l'armée et que la production ne servirait qu'à des besoins militaires, la proposition d'une Commission des Lignite n'était plus utile, du moins pour le moment" et qu'à la suite d'une décision du Grand Quartier Général du Caire on passerait purement et simplement à l'exploitation par l'armée.

Le Général Catroux dut repousser cet argument du "fait accompli" et le Général Spears accepta de revenir à la méthode de libre discussion. Il est évident que cette discussion, tout en tenant compte des nécessités de la guerre, devra respecter le principe fondamental de l'exploitation des ressources locales par la France.

Interventions britanniques en Matière financière.

Les intentions britanniques en matière financière ont été récemment révélées par M. Thomas, Banking Adviser de la Mission Spears : Le 27 août dernier, M. Thomas déclarait en effet à deux agents français, MM. Grollet et Martin, à Damas, qu'il était venu se renseigner sur la situation financière de l'Etat de Syrie, prétendant que le fait pour la Trésorerie britannique d'accorder des avances à la Caisse centrale de la France combattante donnait aux agents britanniques le droit de surveiller l'emploi desdites avances et, par voie de conséquence, de contrôler les finances syriennes.

Cette déclaration simple éclaire une démarche à laquelle procédait dans le même temps M. Rosa, conseiller financier de la Mission Spears : M. Rosa remettait au Président du Conseil libanais une note proposant la création d'une "Commission monétaire, bancaire, des Changes et de la Bourse" qui aurait pour but "la réglementation du contrôle monétaire, bancaire, des changes et de la bourse dans les pays du Levant."

Le Général Catroux dut relever cette démarche par une lettre du 1^{er} septembre adressée au Général Spears.

Le Général Catroux saisisait cette occasion pour faire connaître son point de vue sur le fond de la question :

"Le contrôle des finances locales a été jusqu'à maintenant du seul ressort de l'autorité française. Les échanges de lettres franco-britanniques des 12 et 27 septembre 1941 relatifs, le premier à l'extension à la Syrie et au Liban de l'accord financier du 19 mars de la même année, le deuxième aux mesures à prendre consécutives à l'inclusion des Etats du Levant dans le bloc sterling, reconnaissaient nos droits en la matière. Je ne vois aucune raison de modifier aujourd'hui cet état de choses et j'ajoute que le projet envisagé va directement à l'encontre de l'accord Lyttelton-de Gaulle."

En réponse à cette lettre, le Général Spears précisa le 5 septembre 1942 que M. Rosa n'avait pas remis spontanément une note au Président du Conseil libanais, mais que cette note avait été demandée à M. Rosa par Sami Bey Solh. "De toute évidence, ajoute le Général Spears, le Premier Ministre libanais et

certainement tous les membres du Gouvernement ont toute liberté de s'adresser à moi-même, ou à mes conseillers, pour toutes informations qu'ils désirent recueillir."

Cette déclaration indique de façon frappante la conception erronée que le Général Spears se fait de son rôle puisqu'il estime normal de fournir aux Gouvernements locaux des "informations"—qui sont en fait des projets politiques—sur une question qui fait déjà l'objet d'échanges de vues entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne.

Sur le fond de cette affaire, il est presque inutile de dire que la France repousse l'idée d'une commission de contrôle financier franco-anglo-syro-libanaise. Les organismes de la Délégation Générale continueront à traiter ces matières.

Par ailleurs, des informations répétées et concordantes parvenaient à la Délégation Générale d'après lesquelles les agents britanniques incitaient les Etats à réclamer, comme une prérogative de l'indépendance, la cession de certains services gérés par la Délégation Générale au titre des "Intérêts communs," notamment les Douanes.

Dans le domaine financier, comme dans les autres domaines, la France combattante entend rester maîtresse de son action. Il n'est pas à supposer que le Gouvernement britannique prenne à son compte l'argument de certains de ses agents d'après lequel les avances de Trésorerie créent un droit de contrôle ou d'intervention politique. Ce serait vicier les rapports entre alliés pour autant qu'ils consistent en échanges de prestations et de services.

Interventions britanniques dans le Domaine agricole et industriel.

Dans le domaine agricole, sous couvert de contrats de cultures pour les besoins de l'armée, les agents de la Spears Mission (Major Howard Jones) se mettent directement en contact avec les services agricoles des Etats et les agriculteurs.

Les premiers favorisent ces contacts directs pour des raisons qui ne sont pas toujours d'ordre agricole.

Les particuliers s'adressent à la Mission Spears d'autant plus volontiers que, disposant de moyens financiers importants, d'exclusivités et de priorité d'importation (par l'intermédiaire de la U.K.C.C.), cet organisme est en mesure de fournir directement des semences, des engrais, des produits divers (soufre, ciment, insecticides) et parfois du matériel, avec beaucoup plus de facilité et de libéralité que les services de ravitaillement.

On peut citer comme exemple :

La demande adressée par la Spears Mission aux services agricoles des Etats de lui faire connaître, aux fins d'importation, les quantités de graines de semence potagère dont ils pourraient avoir besoin.

La mise en route et la poursuite directe d'essais de culture de diverses variétés de blé.

La Mission Spears s'est adressée directement à des importateurs de machines agricoles et les a engagés à passer commande sous ses auspices, de matériel tracteur à importer d'Amérique, la Mission Spears fournissant les références nécessaires à l'obtention des autorisations de sortie et du shipping space.

La Mission Spears a donné du ciment sur les dotations réservées à l'armée à un de ses contracteurs qui, travaillant avec l'O.E.G., en percevait ailleurs.

Dans le domaine industriel, il semble que les Economic Officers opèrent également directement, à peu près dans le même sens que les Officiers agricoles.

Ils s'adressent aux producteurs, leur demandant des renseignements sur leurs installations, leurs besoins, dans le but, disent-ils, d'importer les machines et les matières premières nécessaires.

Parfois ces dernières (filés de coton, sucre, graines oléagineuses, fer blanc pour emballages, maïs, &c.) sont distribuées par la U.K.C.C. sans aucune liaison avec les services de coordination existants et dans des conditions qui ne sont pas toujours très profitables à l'intérêt général.

En l'espèce, la U.K.C.C., disposant du shipping space, tant à l'importation qu'à l'exportation, de larges possibilités de financement, de certains monopoles d'importation, agit comme un commerçant particulièrement favorisé, et donne de plus en plus l'impression qu'elle est le canal obligatoire par lequel doivent passer les fournitures industrielles.

D'ailleurs, à la dernière réunion de la Commission supérieure du Ravitaillement qui s'est tenue le 24 août, les représentants des deux Etats ont

protesté contre les agissements de la U.K.C.C., déclarant que cette dernière devait cesser d'agir à la fois comme un organisme officiel et comme un organisme privé. Son caractère d'organisme officiel devrait l'obliger à passer pour la répartition de ses importations par la Commission supérieure du Ravitaillement et lui interdire toute intervention directe sur le marché intérieur.

De ces interventions on peut rapprocher certains exemples d'intrusions arbitraires de l'armée britannique dans l'appropriation et la distribution des matières ou produits ouvrés.

Voici deux cas significatifs :

(1) L'armée britannique ayant réquisitionné un magasin appartenant à un commerçant en matériaux de construction, Monsieur Zabbal, a procédé à l'enlèvement de tous les matériaux entreposés. Elle s'était engagée par écrit à laisser à notre disposition les matériaux contrôlés, parmi lesquels 473 tonnes de fers à béton et 71 tonnes de poutrelles, ainsi que 21 tonnes de tôle noire. Après avoir créé de nombreuses difficultés pour délivrer les bons émis sur ce stock, le service des R.E. Stores vient de nous informer par lettre du 21 août que le stock est entièrement épuisé et qu'en cas de besoins urgents pour les Services publics nous devons adresser une demande au R.G. de la IX^e Armée par l'intermédiaire du conseiller économique de la Mission Spears.

(2) Les stocks de ciment mis chaque mois à la disposition des ravitaillements locaux varient de 100 à 300 tonnes alors que les besoins sont de l'ordre de 1.000 à 1.500 tonnes.

Cependant, l'armée britannique distribue à ses contractants des quantités telles qu'ils peuvent en distraire une partie importante et alimenter ainsi le marché noir qui se trouve abondamment pourvu, mais au prix de 160 L.L.S. la tonne, alors que le prix de taxation est de 73 L.L.S.

(3) Les contractants de l'armée britannique sont également fournis en fers à béton dans des proportions qui leur permettent d'alimenter continuellement le marché noir au prix de 1.000 à 1.200 L.L.S. la tonne, alors que les prix de taxation varient de 410 à 477 L.L.S. selon les diamètres.

Dans ces conditions, il devient très difficile d'alimenter le marché civil, et, comme les services de ravitaillement locaux sont contrôlés par des fonctionnaires français, l'opinion se répand de plus en plus dans le pays que nous sommes incapables d'obtenir des autorités britanniques les produits nécessaires aux besoins du pays.

Ingérences locales des Agents subalternes britanniques.

Sans vouloir ressusciter des questions maintenant réglées et classées, il y a lieu de signaler que les agents subalternes britanniques interviennent fréquemment auprès des autorités ou des populations locales sans passer par l'intermédiaire des services français intéressés, et parfois dans un sens nuisible à la bonne marche des affaires.

Ces interventions concernent plus généralement le domaine politique ou des domaines touchant étroitement à la politique.

Rappelons, pour mémoire, les agissements de certains officiers britanniques auprès des populations de l'Euphrate qui ont abouti aux incidents sanglants de l'automne dernier, agissements sur lesquels le Général Catroux a, à l'époque, attiré l'attention de M. Lyttelton et des Généraux Auchinleck et Wilson.

Plus récemment, les services britanniques, et en particulier le Capitaine Pritchard, se sont livrés aux Alaouites à des manœuvres contre lesquelles le Délégué a élevé une protestation formelle et sur lesquelles une enquête est ouverte.

Dans les questions de sécurité également, il arrive à la "British Security Mission" de prendre des initiatives dans les questions intéressant la Sécurité générale ou d'autres services français, et sans consulter ceux-ci. C'est ainsi, pour ne prendre qu'un exemple entre d'autres, que la B.S.M. de Damas écrivait à la date du 11 mars dernier une lettre au secrétaire général de la Compagnie d'Électricité et de Tramways de Damas pour lui demander une liste complète des membres du conseil d'administration, du directeur et des employés de cette compagnie.

Enfin, dans le domaine économique et financier on a eu à relever des ingérences locales regrettables de la part des agents britanniques.

Voici un des cas les plus récents : celui d'une demande adressée par un particulier au directeur de l'Office des Changes et qui a été visée par le Political Officer d'Alep.

En voici un autre : les travaux d'installation et de distribution d'eau à Deir-ez-Zor ont été exécutés par les Britanniques sans tenir compte des recommandations du conseiller pour les Travaux publics de la République syrienne.

De telles affaires peuvent sembler être de peu d'importance, mais survenant fréquemment, elles entraînent des complications regrettables dans l'administration des deux pays. Plus encore, elles créent un climat peu favorable au développement harmonieux de la collaboration franco-britannique.

[E 5513/207/89]

No. 70.

Weekly Political Summary No. 24: Syria and the Lebanon, September 16, 1942.—
(Received September 24.)

1. General.

THE outstanding event of the week has been the visit of Mr. Wendell Willkie to Beirut on his way from Turkey to Russia (see below under "The Lebanon"). Mr. Willkie and his advisers stayed only twenty-four hours, and he was, unfortunately, prevented from gaining any real insight into native feeling and aspirations at first hand; but he was at great pains to understand the British point of view, and his visit has to some extent offset the despondency caused by General de Gaulle's presence in the Levant.

There has been some increase in political activity as the reactions in political circles to General de Gaulle's visit and his speeches begin to make themselves felt. The resentment aroused by his pronouncements is as strong as ever, though the first outbursts have died down. He is considered to have administered a rebuff to the British as guarantors of Syrian independence; and, although in certain political circles the opinion is being expressed that his actions are of ephemeral interest only, since the future status of Syria and the Lebanon will be decided at the peace conference, the common view is undoubtedly that the British have abandoned the two States to the French.

The return at this juncture of Shukri Quwatli from Iraq, referred to below, is quite possibly without political significance, though it coincides with renewed Nationalist activities.

The progress of the war is regarded with indifference in the absence of any immediate threat from Egypt. The magnitude of the operations in Russia is understood only by very few. India has faded out of the picture completely.

General de Gaulle left Damascus for Fort Lamy on the 14th September. There were no official leave-takings, and it is therefore possible that he intends to return to the Levant States for a brief visit before his final departure for London.

2. Wheat.

Collection of wheat and other cereals continues at about the same rate as for the past weeks.

In pursuance of a stocking programme, 12,000 tons of cereals are in course of transport to the Lebanon for delivery there before the 20th September.

A comprehensive reorganisation of road transport arrangements is under way, and will, it is hoped, result in a speeding-up of transport and a material financial saving.

The Syrian Prime Minister is continuing his "wheat tour," accompanied by British and French representatives, and will visit Aleppo, Deir ez Zor and Kameshlié between the 13th and 17th of this month.

3. Syria.

Damascus.—Shukri Quwatli, the prominent Nationalist leader, has returned to Damascus from Iraq on the pretext (which may be genuine) of visiting his sick daughter. Although he was formerly suspected of pro-Axis leanings, and certainly dislikes the French, he consistently expressed pro-Allied sentiments during his stay in Iraq and showed restraint in discussing Syrian affairs.

The Government of the Yemen has recognised Syrian independence and expressed willingness to exchange official representatives.

4. Aleppo.

There are indications of renewed Nationalist activity. A deputation which visited Saadullah Jabri in the Lebanon returned with assurances of unanimity

amongst Nationalist leaders, and there has been talk of the despatch of an open letter to the Fighting French authorities setting out the grievances of the Nationalist bloc.

The Mohafez, who, as reported in last week's Summary, recently visited Damascus to obtain the restitution of 3,000 tons of Euphrates wheat diverted to the Lebanon and Damascus, has returned with nothing more than vague assurances that the deficiency would be made good.

5. Homs and Hama.

The anti-French reaction and consequent increase in British popularity which have resulted from General de Gaulle's visit to this area continue to have an unfortunate effect on Anglo-French relations. In an attempt to remedy this state of affairs and to explain to local British officers the French point of view, the délégué declared frankly that Fighting French officers felt themselves bound at all costs to maintain their hold over "former French possessions," so as to be able to justify themselves when they returned to France.

Enemy propaganda in this area is now almost exclusively directed against the Fighting French.

6. Jebel Druze.

The Emir Hassan has been in the Jebel throughout the week. His visit is believed to be due to a desire to keep himself in the public eye and to strengthen his position with his own family, several sections of which are extremely jealous of his influence.

Cereal collections are showing a steady improvement and now total about 1,000 tons, including 750 tons of wheat.

7. Alaouite Territory.

There are no events of political importance to report from this area. It now appears unlikely that the Fighting French will agree to any acceptable basis for the proposed joint enquiry into the affair of Suleiman Murshid (see last week's Summary), and a purely British court of enquiry is therefore under consideration.

Enemy submarine activity off the coast continues on a small scale.

8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

An uneasy situation has arisen in the Arab Pounar area, where the high-handed methods of the Basrowi family, who have been given a virtual monopoly for the collection of wheat, have brought them into conflict with their rivals, the Shahin, and intensified the animosity existing between the two families. The Fighting French Délégué is considering what steps can be taken to end the Basrowi's monopoly and at the same time to effect a reconciliation between the two factions.

Rifles and ammunition have been received by the délégué for distribution to the Assyrian villages on the Khabour, and a field security sergeant is being posted to Tel-Tamer.

The removal of a number of steel pipes from Tel-Tamer by the Syrian Public Works Department authorities for use in an important irrigation scheme in another part of the country has created resentment in the settlement. The Assyrians, despite the fact that the pipes have not been used for five years, regard them as one of their assets at Tel-Tamer, and had hoped for a cash remuneration rather than the present promise of replacement by reinforced piping. The removal is being carried out with a section of the Escadrons Légers standing by.

In the Euphrates Province wheat collections are progressing satisfactorily, but they are behind schedule in the Jezireh, where resentment is felt at the heavy quota demanded from this province compared with the lighter contribution required from the Aleppo area.

In Deir ez Zor the scheme for the supply of cheap bread to the poor (reference to which has been made in previous Summaries) has made no progress. The local authorities are still juggling with the lists and trying to decide whether cheap wheat is to be distributed to 5,000, 8,000 or 10,000 poor people. The people themselves have sent a telegram to the Minister of the Interior to the effect that there are at least 12,000 poor in the town. It is hoped by bargaining to induce the authorities in Damascus to relent and to agree to a subsidy for 8,000 poor, as suggested by the Mohafez.

The Mohafez of the Jezireh has drawn up a plan for the feeding of the poor of his area.

Commandant Auboire, Inspecteur des S.S. at Hasssetche, is to be replaced by Capitaine Loheac. This will in all probability prove a change from bad to worse.

9. Tribal.

Following an attack by the Awlad Faisal section of the Iraqi Shammar on a rival section of the same tribe (the Shallah) employed as guards on W.D. road works, the Shallah leader and his party have taken refuge with Daham el Fadi in Syrian territory, where they have since been joined by 60 more tents. Although this incident is purely an internal Iraqi affair, frontier security will be menaced until it has been settled.

Sheikh Khalil ibn Hatchim of the Fedaan (reference paragraph 9 of last week's Summary) has now been released from detention in Damascus and is living at Adra under a guarantee given by the Emir Fawwaz Sha'lan.

The balance of £S 15,000 due to be paid to the Wulda by the Syrian Government in settlement of the Fedaan-Wulda dispute (see paragraph 9 of Summary No. 17, dated the 29th July) has now been received, but a more favourable atmosphere than that existing at present is awaited before handing over the money.

The movement of the Sba'a Abeida, foreshadowed in Summaries 20 and 21 of the 19th and 26th August respectively, has now commenced and has so far proceeded without incident. A party of 110 tents of the Amarat of Iraq, which tried to accompany the Sba'a, was turned back at Rakka.

Difficulty is still being experienced in solving the problem of providing wheat for the nomadic tribes, who will shortly begin their winter migration. The supplies recently made available by the Syrian Government are sufficient for the winter months. The tribal sheikhs, however, are now demanding immediate delivery of the full year's supply, since, despite the assurances of the Syrian Government they fear that their requirements may not be forthcoming when they return next spring. The Emir Fawwaz Sha'lan has threatened the Syrian Prime Minister with tribal risings unless his demands are met.

10. Frontier.

East.—Relations with the local Turkish authorities continue to be satisfactory. On the 31st August, Turkish Independence Day, the British Political Officer represented the Area Commander at an official luncheon given by the Turkish Mudir at Ras el-Ain, at which the local French S.S. officer was also present.

West.—Nothing to report.

11. The Lebanon.

Mr. Wendell Willkie visited Beirut on the 10th September. In addition to lengthy conversations with British and French officials, he gave a press conference to Beirut journalists, in the course of which he stated bluntly that it was the duty of the Levant peoples not merely to accept, but actively to help the Allied authorities. His contacts with local politicians were confined to an awkwardly arranged meeting, during a reception at the American Consul's house, with the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese President and Prime Minister. At this meeting he asked a number of highly controversial questions, such as whether they preferred the British or the French and what were the reasons for the present Anglo-French tension. President Naccache is understood to have replied in a definitely anti-British strain, the others being deterred from any serious attempt to redress the balance by the knowledge that he would report all they said to the French. Mr. Willkie's remarkable frankness and dominating personality greatly impressed those who come in contact with him, but much disappointment was felt that the Syrians and Lebanese were not given better opportunities to explain to him their national desiderata, coupled with fears that the pro-French bias of the American Consul would result in his leaving with a mistaken idea as to what these desiderata really were.

Mr. Willkie's visit has again aroused interest in the question of American recognition of the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. Some months ago the then Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed to the United States Government that they should forthwith accord recognition to the Lebanon, in return for which the Lebanese Government would pledge itself to assume responsibility for all American rights in the country. The United States Government is understood

to have returned recently a temporising reply. The local press and politicians are now again asking whether the United States will not recognise the Lebanon, particularly as they state that one-fifth of all Lebanese are domiciled in the Americas.

During the meeting described in the preceding paragraph the Syrian Ministers took the opportunity to press for Lease-Lend facilities, but Mr. Willkie naturally declined to commit himself on this point.

On the 11th September the Lebanese Prime Minister addressed a formal letter to General Catroux asking for the immediate transfer to the Lebanese Government of most of the services comprised in the *intérêts communs*. He also recalled the previous joint Lebano-Syrian request for the institution of a mixed commission to run the customs administration, and asked that Lebanese supervisors might be appointed to control the working of the concessionary companies. On the same day the Syrian Prime Minister also addressed a letter to General Catroux associating the Syrian Government with Sami Bey's *démarche*. No reply has yet been received, and it is to be expected that the Fighting French will fall back on their usual tactics of procrastination.

Both General de Gaulle and Sami Bey Solh have paid official visits to Sidon. The former's visit aroused little enthusiasm, despite the considerable efforts and pressure exercised by the French *Conseiller* to produce a large-sized demonstration. Sami Bey Solh, whose family comes from Sidon, was received with great enthusiasm, and speeches were made extolling Lebanese independence.

On the 8th September the Lebanese Government freed commerce in rice and sugar from all restrictions on condition that importers should make a gift to the Ministry of Supply of 20 per cent. of the quantities imported. The measure has been favourably commented upon, and local prices of these commodities are said to have dropped by 25 per cent.

Wheat collection in the Lebanon is slowing up, despite the exhortations and admonitions addressed by the Prime Minister to provincial officials during his visits. Only action against the large landowners can now be expected to produce much more wheat and barley, though the French will probably raise political objection to any such action proposed against some of those most guilty of non-co-operation in the wheat plan.

On the 11th September the Lebanese Prime Minister offered a banquet to the Syrian Prime Minister, at which officials of the Wheat Office and many leading merchants and journalists were present. After anodyne speeches from the two Prime Ministers, who assured each other of the brotherly feelings of each republic for the other, a discordant note was struck by a prominent Moslem journalist, who unexpectedly rose and made a short and blunt speech, which can be fairly summarised as: "This brotherhood stuff is all very well, you Syrians, but where's your wheat?"

12. Press and Propaganda.

The outstanding features of the press this week have been: Mr. Wendell Willkie's visit, General de Gaulle's speech on the radio a few hours before his sudden departure, and the changed tone of the Arabic press towards the problems of wheat:—

(a) By Mr. Willkie's declaration of confidence in the Levant States and in their love of democracy, and by his pronouncements on Anglo-American solidarity and that of all the United Nations, he provided the press with material that cannot fail to promote confidence in the Allied cause.

(b) Though less outspoken on the radio, the lines of de Gaulle's address followed very closely those he had taken at a press conference the same afternoon. The striking feature of both addresses has been his obvious effort to allay any suspicion amongst the peoples of the Levant States that there is disunity between the British and the Fighting French. He was at pains to discredit German propaganda to this effect, and to claim that Fighting France is the symbol of Allied unity. This tone contrasts so sharply with his earlier radio address that its significance is certain to be appreciated by the quick and sensitive people of these States, who had made little or no effort to cloak the fact that his visit was unpopular.

(c) The tone of the Arabic press in dealing with the wheat problem has been considerably moderated. This is in large part due to the tour undertaken by the Lebanese Prime Minister for the primary purpose of accelerating supplies of wheat to the Wheat Office.

CHAPTER IV.—ARABIA.

[E 4326/4326/25]

No. 71.

Summary of Events in Saudi Arabia during 1941.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 22.)

IN Saudi Arabia, where the Government is not only centred on the King but where the King, aided by counsellors and advisers with the courtesy title of Ministers, is the Government, the King's attitude dictates that of his subjects and is alone of importance. But though Ibn Saud is an absolute monarch, he is, and is recognised to be, a benevolent despot, and the wisdom of his policy of friendship with and reliance on Britain is appreciated even by those elements who wish that such a policy were unnecessary. Ibn Saud's personal attitude is thus of the greatest importance, for it dictates the attitude, or at least the policy, of the country as a whole. This attitude has been through the year, as will appear from succeeding paragraphs, not only satisfactory but most helpful. Whilst preserving the outward appearance of neutrality, Ibn Saud has never failed to show, by his reactions to events and by his advice to those Arabs who have consulted him, where lay his inclinations and the interests of his country and of the Arabs generally. As the war has progressed and as the wall of British and British-controlled territory has closed around him, and as the scarcity of pilgrims, especially those of the richer class, has driven the country into bankruptcy, he has, of course, become more and more dependent on the goodwill of His Majesty's Government for the very existence of his country. This dependence, coupled with his known friendship, loyalty and confidence, provides ample assurance that his policy of co-operation will be continued. His confidence in British strength and in an ultimate British victory is unshakable. An illustration of his attitude was afforded when H.M.S. *Hood* was lost. His counsellors were inclined to draw the conclusion that not even the British navy could stand up to the Germans. The King invited them to wait for a few days and they would see. When His Majesty's hope was realised and the *Bismarck* was sunk all those in attendance stood up at the King's command and clapped.

2. The year opened with the poorest pilgrimage since the Hejaz-Nejd war. The loss of Javanese and Malays, who alone among pilgrims stay for long periods and spend freely, was especially serious from the standpoint of Saudi finances. The drop in revenue collected from pilgrims, both directly in the shape of quarantine dues and tax on travel by car or camel, and indirectly through taxation of those who had earned money through services to the pilgrims, necessitated frequent appeals to His Majesty's Government, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and the United States Government for financial assistance. In addition to the £400,000 promised for 1941, His Majesty's Government made two further advances of £250,000 each. Ten million Saudi riyals were also minted in India at a cost of roughly £450,000 and presented to Ibn Saud. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company made an advance of 3 million dollars, but the United States Government did not see their way to offering Government assistance to a country so clearly within the British sphere. In spite of this assistance, the Saudi Arabian Government ended the year with a deficit made up of unpaid bills and unpaid salaries of over £1 million. Ibn Saud has already asked for assistance in 1942 on a larger scale, including a credit for the purchase of foodstuffs in India.

3. Whilst little of interest has happened in Saudi Arabia itself, and whilst this report must mainly be a recording of the impact on the country of events outside, the war did for a few days come closer to Saudi Arabia. On the 3rd April a message was received that three Italian destroyers which had escaped from Massawa were making for Jeddah. To the relief of the local authorities, who had received the news of the impending arrival of the ships with consternation, they were driven ashore by combined naval and air action some 10 miles to 15 miles south of Jeddah and scuttled by their crews. In the course of this action Saudi territory was fairly continuously violated for more than an hour by the Royal Air Force. One pilot, mistaking a pilgrim ship at anchor in Jeddah harbour for one of the destroyers, dropped a bomb and, having scored a near miss, machine-gunned the legation launch as it left the pilgrim ship. This activity, though appreciated neither by the captain of the pilgrim ship nor by the five members

of the legation staff on board the launch, was understandable as alongside the British ship was the *Asia*, a burnt-out French pilgrim ship lying on her side, mistaken by the pilot for a damaged destroyer. The captain's wrath was somewhat allayed by a signal from the British destroyer engaged: "Sorry you have been troubled." There were no casualties or damage. Ibn Saud issued a formal official protest to His Majesty's Government explaining privately at the same time that he personally did not mind, but that if he allowed his territory to be violated without protest he would lay himself open to criticism by the "others"—the Axis.

4. As a result of this engagement the entire crews of the three destroyers, unhurt except for sore feet, struggled into Jedda and were interned. The number of the internees was swelled during the following weeks by the arrival of small parties of Italian and German merchant seamen who had fled from Massawa in their ships' boats. Five small parties also arrived by aeroplane from Asmara; these, after short periods of detention, were allowed to proceed. The presence of these internees has been a constant source of annoyance. The Italian Minister protested vigorously against the internment of the civilians as being contrary to international law, but Ibn Saud stood firm on the ground that these men had landed on his territory without permission and could either remain interned or be expelled, pointing out that the latter course would be tantamount to handing them over to a British authority, as they must necessarily pass through British-controlled territory or waters *en route* for their own or a neutral country. Ibn Saud felt himself unable, in the absence of any precedent, to agree to a suggestion that, as his attitude towards His Majesty's Government was that of non-belligerency rather than neutrality, he might hand over all his internees to us. He did not regard the handing over of internees in Iraq as a sufficiently good precedent.

5. Italian stock, never high, fell even lower as a result of the arrival of the tattered crews of the scuttled destroyers. An attempt was made by the Italian Government to replace their inept Minister, Signor Sillitti, by Signor Crolla, but Ibn Saud refused permission for the latter to make the journey by aeroplane. Towards the end of the year the funds of the Italian Legation were exhausted and Signor Sillitti appealed to the Saudi Government for assistance. Ibn Saud, arguing that it was not consistent with his sense of Arab dignity and hospitality to allow a foreign representative, whose function made him an honoured guest, to starve, sanctioned a fairly generous allowance, the amounts so advanced to be deducted from a sum owing from before the war to the Italian Government. It was pointed out to him, however, that His Majesty's Government could not be expected to look favourably on an arrangement whereby a part, however small, of the sum advanced by them was devoted to keeping an Axis Legation in existence, and it was suggested as an alternative that Ibn Saud should invite the Italian Minister to withdraw if he could not find means of providing himself with funds from other than Saudi Government sources. There was clear proof that the Italian Legation were abusing the hospitality of the country by the use of a transmitting set. By the end of the year Ibn Saud had agreed in principle to remove the Italian Legation and, pending their withdrawal, to give them only sufficient cash for their living expenses.

6. The question of the withdrawal of M. Ballereau, the Vichy French Minister, was also discussed, but Ibn Saud was reluctant to remove him. He considered him harmless and the native population thought him mad, for how, otherwise, could his present pro-German and collaborationist views be squared with his previous loud-mouthed boasts that Paris would be defended to the last lamp-post and the struggle continued, if necessary, from North Africa. But Ibn Saud's main reason for wishing to retain M. Ballereau was the problem of the disposal of Fuad Hamza if he, in turn, were removed from Vichy. It was, the King thought, neither in his interest nor in that of His Majesty's Government to have Fuad Hamza back in the Middle East.

7. There was a brief period when it looked as though Fuad Hamza was being influenced by the attention paid to him by Nazi representatives. He addressed long telegrams to Ibn Saud containing accounts of his conversations, from which it was clear that he had neither attempted to counter, nor listened in silence to, the mixture of blandishment, lies and threats to which he was treated. Ibn Saud wasted no time in putting him firmly in his place, pointing out that Saudi Arabia's interests lay solely with Britain and that if Hitler had, as he professed, the interests of the Arabs at heart, he would never have advised Ibn Saud to take any step which might result in the withdrawal of British support.

8. Ibn Saud had, in his relations with the Rashid Ali Government, a difficult course to steer. He found it at first hard to believe that Rashid Ali, for whom he had a personal regard and who had gone further than any other Iraqi statesman in meeting his wishes, notably in the matter of the Shammar chiefs, was taking money from the Axis. He advised Rashid Ali frequently that it was his duty, as it was that of all Arabs, to do nothing to hinder Britain's prosecution of the war. He was unwilling openly to denounce Rashid Ali's Government as unconstitutional, pointing out that by so doing he would be cutting contacts which might be of value to His Majesty's Government and that the Moslem world knew, without any public declaration, on which side his sympathies and interests lay. The age-old differences of opinion between Iraq and Saudi Arabia regarding the Shammar tribes and the erection of frontier posts were again taken up by Ibn Saud with the new Iraqi Government, but the questions were as far as ever from solution at the close of the year.

9. Ibn Saud's pleasure at the entry of British forces into Syria, a step which he had for some months past been advocating, was very great. He was disappointed, though less vocally so than his Syrian advisers, when it was seen that the administration remained in the hands of the French, and an unfortunate incident, in which his son-in-law received scant courtesy from the Free French, did not help to endear the latter, whom he described as "just a slice from the same old loaf." However, following his policy that nothing must be done to hinder Britain's war effort, he has constantly advised Syrian Nationalist leaders, notably Shukri Kuwatli, for whom he has a high regard, to rely on the British declarations of Syrian independence and to keep quiet until the war has been won. He followed the lead of His Majesty's Government in recognising the Syrian Government.

10. As regards Palestine, his policy has followed the same lines, no awkward questions to be raised during the war but confidence in Britain's determination to implement her promises. A Saudi Consul-General was appointed during the year to reside at Jerusalem.

11. Relations with Transjordan were at one moment strained owing to the somewhat tactless action of the Amir Abdullah in combining in one telegram a message of congratulation on the occasion of the Ramadan feast and some gratuitous advice to Ibn Saud as to the manner in which he should deal with members of the Shereefian family in the Hejaz implicated in a childish and futile plot against the Saudi régime. Ibn Saud did not suspect that the Amir Abdullah was implicated in the plot, but felt that he was showing undue sympathy with the guilty. The Amir's alleged intrigues in Syria also aroused Ibn Saud's suspicions, but a visit to Amman by Abdul Aziz Sudairi cleared the air and resulted in an exchange of gifts and protestations of mutual regard.

12. Relations with Egypt were good, though there was some minor departmental squabbling about the completion of and payment for the new Jedda-Mecca road. This road, which has an excellent surface and is metalled for its whole length of 45 miles, was completed by the end of the year. The progress of the campaign in Libya was naturally followed with the closest attention. Ibn Saud's opinion of the attitude of the Egyptians and of the part they are playing in the struggle is not high. The bombing of Cairo—centre of Moslem culture—angered him and he issued a firm protest.

13. Progress was made during the year towards agreement on the final texts of the Koweit-Saudi "Bon-voisinage," Commercial and Extradition Agreements, and there seemed good hope that they would be ready for signature early in the following year.

14. The decision of His Majesty's Government to occupy Persia had Ibn Saud's entire approval. He disapproved of the hospitality accorded by the Persian Government to Axis agents, and from the point of view of his own security realised that the occupation extended the barrier opposing any possible Axis advance towards his territory. A pleasing immediate result of the occupation of Persia and the removal of the Shah was the attendance at the pilgrimage of a greater number of Persian pilgrims than had been seen for many years.

15. The first reaction to the entry of Japan into the war was one of satisfaction that the United States would play a more active part in the war and, in spite of the American reverse at Pearl Harbour, it was felt that the Japanese had no hope of ultimate victory. Ibn Saud had always felt that the United States should be helping us not only with supplies but with men, and had even suggested for His Majesty's Government's consideration an appeal by him to President Roosevelt, in which he would point out that the British could not be expected to maintain strong forces at every point and urging the President to send a strong American force to Egypt.

16. The question of Arab federation was brought up by the Saudi Arabian Minister in London, but Ibn Saud made it clear that this was a personal move on Hafiz Wahba's part. Ibn Saud's view on this subject is that, whilst there is no harm in Arab statesmen thinking and discussing this question among themselves, if they wish to do so, the present is not the time for conferences or declarations. The energies of all should be directed solely towards the assurance of Britain's victory in the war without which not only will there be no question of federation but no question even of independence of any Arab State.

17. Although, as stated in the opening paragraph of this report, the opinion of the population, which cannot as in other countries, affect the policy of the Government, is of minor importance, it is satisfactory to be able to record that by the end of the year the number of Hejazis who evinced sympathy for the Nazi régime had greatly diminished. There has never been any love for the Italians and there is now only contempt. But for the Germans there was the admiration accorded to the top-dog, but the treatment by the Germans of conquered European peoples, especially of the Dutch, so high up in Hitler's list of races, has made many Arabs wonder what they, who are nearly at the bottom, could expect were the Nazis ever to hold a predominant position in the Middle East. The attack on Russia, with whom Hitler had so recently concluded a pact of friendship, was also a serious shock to Arabs, who felt that, if Hitler broke his word and made an unprovoked attack on an avowed friend, who was also a most powerful opponent, no reliance could be placed on any promise made by him to weak Arab States. There was, moreover, towards the end of the year a growing understanding of the debt which the country owes to the British, who, in spite of the difficulties resulting from the war, not only assured the arrival of food ships but even provided shipping, badly needed elsewhere, for a greater number of pilgrims than in the circumstances could reasonably have been expected.

CHAPTER V.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 5634/538/97]

No. 72.

Sir F. Wylie to Mr. Eden.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Sir,

Kabul, July 1, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. V. WYLIE.

Enclosure in No. 72.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul.

Egypt: Chargé d'Affaires, M. Hassan Abdul Ghaffar—since January 28, 1942.

Studied law in Paris. Has held consular or diplomatic posts in London, Abyssinia, Japan and Palestine. Now under orders of transfer to Tehran. Private political approach probably strongly Egyptian Nationalist. In Kabul has, however, been outwardly very friendly with members of the British Legation and gives vent on occasion to extreme pro-Allied views.

Speaks French and fluent, if somewhat incoherent, English. Also a little Japanese, but less Persian.

France (Vichy): Minister, M. Yves Chataigneau.

Presented his credentials on the 14th April, 1941. Was Secretary-General in M. Daladier's Government in 1938-39. Detached from French army by M. Reynaud in June 1940, and sent on mission to Yugoslavia. Returned to Vichy after armistice, when presently he accepted post of Minister in Kabul in preference to alternative offered to him, viz., Paraguay. After his arrival in Kabul he at first ignored orders from Vichy instructing him to call on the German and Italian Ministers. This omission he has now, on repeated orders from his Government, very reluctantly repaired. He still (July 1942) visits the British Legation on private occasions, but avoids public functions of any sort. In private conversation he makes no secret of his personal attitude, which he describes as—

- (a) All-out hostility to Germany.
- (b) Bewilderment about the policies of the Vichy Government.
- (c) Strongly critical of General de Gaulle and the Free French movement generally.
- (d) Undeviatingly pro-Allies—especially pro-British.

He has a son who is a medical student in Paris and no doubt has to walk carefully. Is bitterly criticised by French colony in Kabul, most of whom profess strongly Free French sympathies. A weak man without decision of character and suffers accordingly. Can probably be relied upon, however, to further Allied interests in any way he can, which is perhaps not much. Is something of a student of affairs. Speaks excellent English and is believed to have knowledge of various Balkan tongues in addition.

Germany: Minister, Herr Hans Pilger.

Presented his credentials on the 28th August, 1937.

Iraq: Chargé d'Affaires, M. Ibrahim Fadhli—since October 28, 1941.

Was previously Iraqi Consul in Persia. A young fellow much liked in British Legation circles. Somewhat gauche and inexperienced, but tries hard to improve himself. Has learnt English since he came to Kabul, and has ambitions one day to represent his country in London. Arrival of Iraqi Minister—Saiyid Jamil Al Rawi—is expected shortly, when M. Fadhli will revert as attaché.

Italy: Minister, Commendatore Pietro Quaroni.
Presented his credentials on the 9th December, 1936.

Persia: Ambassador, his Excellency M. Hussain Sam'i.

Presented his credentials on the 5th November, 1940. Was previously Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan. Something of a scholar and has poetic leanings. Has written a poem about President Wilson's "Fourteen Points." A charming old party much given to the playing of poker, a game about the rules of which he is inclined to legislate as he goes along. Has no influence either with the Afghan Government or in diplomatic circles in Kabul. Speaks a little French, but has no English. At present on leave.

Turkey: Ambassador, his Excellency M. Kemal Köprülü.

Presented his credentials on the 1st June, 1942. First secretary Turkish Embassy in London, 1923. Consul at Geneva, 1927. Consul-general at Alexandria, 1929. Acted as adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the Arbitration Board appointed for the settlement of the frontier dispute between the Persian and Afghan Governments in 1934. Appointed legal adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1935. A post which he held continuously until his appointment to Kabul in 1942. It is early days yet to offer any accurate estimate of M. Köprülü. He is, superficially at any rate, friendly and pleasant. A thought self-satisfied, perhaps, and already shows signs of claiming the influence and position in Kabul enjoyed by his predecessor, Memduh Şevket Esendal. Speaks French, but has little Persian and rather less English.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Ambassador, his Excellency M. C. Mikhailov.

Presented his credentials on 23rd March, 1938. Before his appointment to Kabul held some sort of professorial post in Moscow University. A considerable reader in a rather uninspired way; an ardent Communist and very patriotic. The events of the last year have mellowed his attitude to the British Legation out of all recognition. He is now entirely friendly, and under pressure even discovers a not inconsiderable sense of humour. Is doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, a position which he holds in no light esteem, but about the practical side of which he makes little or no effort. His English is adequate but very difficult to follow, which must be a handicap in his official dealings with Afghan Ministers. He carries a very suspicious air also, which does not help to make him popular in such society as can be said to exist in Kabul. A competent man, nevertheless, and very watchful. Although he has been four years in Kabul he has made no effort to improve his linguistic equipment, and, *e.g.*, knows no Persian. Has a profound contempt for the Afghan Government and all its works.

United States of America.

Legation was opened on the 6th June, 1942, with Mr. Charles W. Thayer, lately from Kuibyshev, as chargé d'affaires pending the arrival of the first Minister. Prior to this the United States had been represented in this country by the United States Minister resident at Tehran. Mr. Thayer is very much "all there," speaks French and Russian fluently and knows German as well. He brought letters of introduction from the British Embassy at Kuibyshev and is already on very friendly terms with the British Legation in Kabul.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[A 5491/1699/G]

No. 73.

Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).

(No. 5639.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 17, 1942.

YOU were sent by bag on 8th September an advance copy of aide-mémoire from United States Ambassador, in which our views were sought on proposed American mission to the Middle East under Colonel Hoskins and proposed public declaration of United States policy in regard to the Middle East. My immediately following telegram contains summary of reply which I gave ambassador on 15th September. Copy of text follows by bag.

2. I explained orally to the ambassador that, while our reply would not entirely meet wishes of his Government, we had thought it better to state our views frankly. We should be glad if United States Government would let us see terms of any declaration they might ultimately decide to make. It was most important that we should follow the same policies and, so far as possible, the same practices in the Middle East.

3. I outlined to the ambassador the means by which we had sought to strengthen our diplomacy in this area during the last two years. First, of course, came military strength. Next, practical help in finance and armaments, so far as possible in forms comprehensible to the mass of the people (*e.g.*, the grant of £500,000 sterling for A.R.P. in Iraq and transfer of a number of armoured cars to the Iraqi army). Thirdly, the rounding-up of Axis agents. Considerable progress had been made with this during the last eighteen months and, though work could not be described as completed, position had greatly improved in Persia and Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.

4. Finally, there was propaganda. In this sphere it was all-important that the Americans should say the same things as ourselves. We had proceeded on the principle of "better the devil you know than the devil you don't." We had no reason to be ashamed of our past record in the Middle East. The Arabs could, for instance, contrast our policy in Iraq with German doctrine of racial supremacy and Italian practice in Libya. The simpler our propaganda lessons, the more effective they were likely to be. We thought it essential that in any work that the Americans undertook in the Middle East they should co-operate closely with us. We had had some experience in this part of the world and, despite the varying fortunes of war, we thought we could show a steady record of progress. Indeed, it was remarkable that this area had remained so stable during the last year, when we had suffered many set-backs in the field.

5. The ambassador undertook to report what I had said to his Government when he sent them text of my memorandum, and I think that he will do his best to put our point of view in a favourable light.

[A 5491/4699/G]

No. 74.

Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).

(No. 5640.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 17, 1942.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is summary of my aide-mémoire of September 15:—

2. His Majesty's Government agree that it is desirable that United States Government should make the greatest possible use for the purposes of the war of the reserve of goodwill which the United States have undoubtedly built up in the Middle East by their philanthropic and cultural enterprises and of the influence the United States enjoy for other reasons in this area as elsewhere. His Majesty's Government cordially welcome intention of the United States Government to appoint diplomatic agent in Syria and the Lebanon.

3. Proposed declaration. His Majesty's Government recognise value of any step that would stimulate Middle East peoples to increase degree of their participation in the resistance to the Axis and if United States Government

think that this object could be advanced by issue of a declaration, His Majesty's Government would not wish to raise objection. But His Majesty's Government see considerable dangers in publication of statement in the form proposed to the regions in question. If United States Government are prepared to re-consider wording of the statement His Majesty's Government would like to see any revised formula.

4. Emphasis laid in the draft on promotion of "liberty" and "freedom" seems inappropriate when applied to a region in which all the countries specified, except Palestine and Transjordan and possibly also Syria and the Lebanon, already enjoyed independence, qualified only by the exigencies of the war and the requirements of the Allied forces operating within their boundaries. His Majesty's Government think that issue of such a declaration, accompanied by despatch of special mission, would infallibly be taken in the countries to which it is intended to apply as containing both the implication that "liberty" is being withheld and an assurance that it is the intention of the United States Government to hasten its achievement. This would play into the hands of Axis propaganda, increase tension in the existing situation and threaten security of the Allied command. In Palestine it might be misinterpreted by both Jews and Arabs in a sense which could hardly fail to have dangerous repercussions. As regards Syria and the Lebanon, His Majesty's Government would heartily welcome American help, offered at the right time and in the right manner, in securing fulfilment by the Fighting French of their recognition of independence. But present proposals might provoke popular agitation and excitement which it would be very difficult to meet in present circumstances.

5. His Majesty's Government feel that proposed declaration is hardly appropriate to Turkey. Arrangements which United States Government make for the utilisation and increase of their influence in Turkey are of course a question between the United States and Turkish Governments. But His Majesty's Government, if only because of their treaty with Turkey and delicate political situation there, welcome the evident intention of the United States Government to keep them informed of the action which they may propose to take.

6. *Proposed Mission.* Since we first heard of this proposal, its implications have been fully examined here. While recognising that valuable part might be played by an emissary with local and specialised knowledge and other qualifications, His Majesty's Government feel bound in existing circumstances and in an area the greater part of which is at present included in a British military zone strongly to deprecate despatch of a mission with activities which are both political and diplomatic, propagandist and subversive (post-occupational). As for these last, His Majesty's Government would urge that the *modus vivendi* arrived at by the two departments concerned should be followed, since experience has shown that work of this nature in areas which have not yet fallen under enemy occupation carries grave risks, which can only be met by the acceptance of full control over such work by military command within the area.

7. In respect of the other activities contemplated, His Majesty's Government would welcome appointment of specialised American personnel to work with the appropriate British authorities and in general they welcome intention of United States Government that American propaganda should be greatly and rapidly increased throughout the Middle East.

2. His Majesty's Government agree that it is desirable that United States Government should make the greatest possible use for the purposes of the war of the reserve of goodwill which the United States have undoubtedly built up in the Middle East by their philanthropic and cultural enterprises and of the influence the United States enjoy for other reasons in this area as elsewhere. His Majesty's Government cordially welcome intention of the United States Government to appoint diplomatic agent in Syria and the Lebanon.

3. Proposed declaration. His Majesty's Government recognise value of any step that would stimulate Middle East peoples to increase degree of their participation in the resistance to the Axis and if United States Government

Following is summary of my aide memoir of September 15—

My immediately preceding telegram.

(Telegraphic)

(No 5040)

Mr. Allen to President Roosevelt (Washington).

Foreign Office September 17, 1942.

[A 5191/4009/G] No 14

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(16317)

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respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

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CONFIDENTIAL.FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 51.—OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1942.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 6911/2099/97]

No. 1.

Sir F. Wylie to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 24.)(No. 55.)
Sir,

Kabul, September 10, 1942.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your circular despatch No. L 3603/571/405, dated the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the records of leading personalities in Afghanistan duly corrected up to the end of June 1942.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

F. V. WYLIE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan.

(The references in brackets are to "Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1936," issued by the General Staff in India.)

1. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 4).—Born about 1880. Son of Qazi Ghulam. Brother of W.W. 63. "Sardar-i-Ala," Ismail Khel Ghilzai; owing to long residence in Wardak, is known as "Wardaki." From 1909 to 1916 was Chief Usher (Arzbegi) to the Ameer. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Kataghan. Was arrested with his brother for complicity in the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) and banished, but was later acquitted. In 1922 was appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Sent to Wardak valley during the Mangal rebellion in 1924-25 to maintain loyalty amongst the Wardakis. During Amanullah's absence in Europe was for four months Governor of the Eastern Province, but was relieved and sent to Moscow to meet King Amanullah, it being realised that he was incapable of administering the province. Returned to Kabul July 1928. Officiating Minister of Interior November 1928. Supported Amanullah in his efforts, from Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929 and went to Persia. Returned to Afghanistan December 1929. Elected President of the National Council (Rais-i-Shura) 1930. In November 1931 proceeded to Farah as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Farah and Chakhansur. Returned to Kabul in spring of 1932 and re-elected President, National Council. Is reported to belong to the "Charkhi" family party. Re-elected President of the National Council 1933. Visited Wardak country March 1933 to check pro-Amanullah propaganda.

11971 [25053]

B

Served on a commission on the Helmand water dispute June 1933. In October 1933 visited North Afghanistan with Prime Minister and others. Re-elected President of National Council 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. In 1937 visited Europe for medical treatment. Still President of National Council 1942.

Is apparently friendly to members of the British Legation, but does not convey an impression of sincerity.

2. *Abdul Aziz* (W.W. 10).—"Sardar-i-Ala," Barakzai. Son of Mazullah Khan and nephew of the Ulya Hazrat. Born 1876. Appointed Yawar (equerry) to the Ameer in 1919. Amin-ul-Wajuh (octroi superintendent) 1920. Went to Kandahar in November 1920 to raise new battalions for the Ameer. His recruiting caused much discontent. Returned to Kabul January 1921 and appointed Minister for Home Affairs. Also appointed Ishaq Aghasi Mulki (Civil Chamberlain) to the King. Appointed Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor) of Kandahar in December 1921, relieved early in 1923, but did not return to Kabul until the middle of 1924. Appointed to officiate as Minister of War 1924-25. Appointed Minister of Interior, June 1925. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar in 1929, where he acted as Governor, March and April. Fleed with Amanullah to India 1929. Was one of the few men really trusted by Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Went to Meshed. Returned to Kabul November 1929. As a friend of Muhammad Wali was suspected by Nadir and was deported to Jalalabad the 4th August, 1930; brought back the 20th August and confined in the Arq. Was released in January 1931. Was placed under surveillance in connexion with Ghulam Nabi's plot in November 1932. Still (1942) in Kabul, unemployed. A good Persian scholar and very conceited; suspected to be pro-Amanullah.

3. *Abdul Aziz Khan* (W.W. 13).—Son of the late Ghulam Haidar Charkhi. Born 1891. Brother of Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309). Was a lieutenant-colonel (Kandak Mishar) of artillery. Was on the Asmar front in 1919. Commanding Arandu October 1919. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) and proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif June 1920. General Officer Commanding, Kunar Valley, 1922. Hakim (Governor) of Laghman 1923-24. Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior 1926. Officiated as Home Minister 1927. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Wounded and imprisoned in Mazar-i-Sharif by Saqavis February 1929. Sent to Kabul March 1929 but escaped. Arrived Quetta and left for Meshed July 1929. Returned to Kabul, via India, April 1930. Left Kabul by air on the 20th July, 1930, to visit his brother Ghulam Nabi (deceased) in Angora. Accompanied ex-King Amanullah to Mecca in 1931. One of the Amanullah party in Europe. Lived some time in Constantinople at No. 110, Grande Rue de Sisti, but left for Berlin when Amanullah was in Mecca in 1935. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In September 1935 was at Constantinople, but was expelled from Turkey that month and left for Germany.

4. *Abdul Hadi Khan* (W.W. 38).—Dawi Kakar of Kandahar. Son of Abdul Ahad, a Hakim (Governor) of Kandahar. Member of the Afghan Peace Delegation June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Aman-i-Afghan*. Assistant to the Foreign Minister as Mustashar (counsellor) in charge of Indian Affairs. Member of the Afghan delegation, Mussoorie Conference 1920. Arrived Kushk November 1920 with a mission to enquire into the position of the Afghan consul. Appointed Afghan representative at Bokhara. Returned to Kabul July 1921 and resumed his duties in the Foreign Office. Appointed Minister in London January 1922. Relieved August 1924. On return was appointed Minister of Commerce. Was suspected of "Republican" intrigues during Amanullah's absence in Europe 1928. Went to Russia for three months in 1928 in connexion with Russo-Afghan trade. Retired from Ministry of Commerce in October 1928 to become a candidate for the National Assembly. Joined Amanullah in Kandahar and fled with him to India May 1929. Resided in Karachi and returned to Kabul in November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Berlin December 1929. Resigned in March 1931, as he considered the attitude of the Afghan Government was too friendly to His Majesty's Government. Went to Mecca in 1931. Reported to have met ex-King Amanullah in Venice March 1932. In May 1932 returned to Kabul after performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Was closely watched by Afghan Government, who doubted his loyalty. In 1933 (December) was arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of pro-Amanullah activities. Still (1942) in jail in Kabul. Has the reputation of being an ardent Nationalist and particularly anti-British, but financially honest. Has also been reported to be pro-Russian.

In June 1935 reported to be sending letters from jail to the Republican party in Kabul, advising them to look to Britain rather than Russia for help.

King Zahir Shah is said to have announced grant of money to his relatives who interviewed him towards August 1935.

5. [Nil.]

6. *Abdul Husain Khan* (W.W. 47).—Mirza. Son of late Abdul Aziz. Born and educated in Persia. Accompanied his father to Tehran in 1920. Was Under-Secretary in Charge of Reception and Visa Branch of Afghan Foreign Office January 1924. Dismissed in August 1925, partly for taking heavy commission on goods purchased in India for Afghan Government. Director of Afghan Transport Company, Kabul, 1926. Appointed consul-general, Delhi. In business in Karachi 1929. Returned to Kabul November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome and presented credentials the 17th May, 1930. Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva 1931-32. Attended Disarmament Conference, Geneva, during 1933, and seemed very friendly with Litvinov.

Transferred as Ambassador to Moscow during 1933. Brought the body of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan to Kabul in June 1933 and returned to Moscow in December.

Speaks quite good English and has many friends in India, where he spent some time during the Great War.

Visited Kabul September 1935, then returned to Moscow.

Reported to have pro-Amanullah leanings.

Returned to Kabul July 1938. Appointed Minister of Public Works, October 1938. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1940, a post which he still holds (1942).

7. *Abdul Jamil Khan* (W.W. 49).—Firqa Mishar (major-general), Khwaja of Kulangar, Logar. Cousin of Haji Nawab Khan (W.W. 472).

Held the post of Hakim (Governor) at Asmar for a short time during the reign of Amanullah. Joined Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) during the revolution 1929. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, November 1929. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul, April 1931. In July 1931 was sent to the Hazarajat on temporary duty in connexion with the Ghilzai-Hazara dispute. In November 1931 went to Mukur in connexion with the effort to effect the surrender of Abdur Rahman (W.W. 99), which was successful. Appointed officiating Governor of Mazar, December 1931. Recalled to Kabul in November 1934 owing to complaints of his corruption. 1936 unemployed in Kabul. Said to lack character and ability. His loyalty to the Yahya Khel régime is questionable. Still (1942) unemployed in Kabul.

8. *Abdul Karim Khan* (W.W. 52).—Barakzai. Son of Qazi Saad-ud-din Khan. A grandson of the late Khan-i-Mulah Khan, chief Qazi of Afghanistan.

Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor) of Jalalabad from February 1903 till early in 1905, when he was summoned to Kabul and imprisoned. Was subsequently appointed Inspector-General of Education at Kabul. In 1914 was Governor of Hazarajat. Was unemployed in 1917. Arrested in 1919 with his son, Azim Jan, and accused of having attempted to murder the Ameer. Azim Jan was reported to have been executed. In 1921 promoted civil brigadier and appointed Hakim (Governor) of Ghazni. In January 1922 took over governorship of the Eastern Province. November 1923 appointed Governor of Turkestan. November 1928 appointed Governor of Kandahar. In March 1929 went to Hazarajat and raised a force of Hazaras. Was in Kabul when Nadir Shah entered the city, but absconded to India. In the spring of 1932 returned to Kabul, and was arrested on account of pro-Amanullah activities in November and his property attached. Released in March 1933 and property restored.

Was said to be extremely corrupt and pro-Russian.

Did not come to notice again until 1935, when he was reported to have recently founded a general trading company called the Shirkat-i-Karimi, in Kabul, and to be negotiating for trade facilities with Japanese companies. Trying to live down his reputation of being pro-Amanullah, but is not trusted by the Afghan Government. Unemployed, except as a trader (1942).

9. *Abdul Majid*, alias *Abdul Majidoff* or *Hakimoff* (W.W. 73).—Tarak of Herat. Born about 1902. Son of Abdul Hakim. A man of no important family. Was at one time an official in the customs office in Herat, from where in 1920 he went to Moscow and was at one time attached to the Afghan Embassy there. Started business in Moscow, and made a considerable amount of money by

exporting and importing contraband goods with the connivance of the customs officials. In about 1930 he settled in Berlin. Was recalled to Kabul in 1933 by the Afghan Government to organise and manage the Ashami Company. Prior to proceeding to Berlin he is believed to have had a considerable amount of his property confiscated by the Soviet Government. Believed by some to have Soviet tendencies, but this has been officially denied by the Afghan Government. Has tact and is a capable business man.

In spring 1935 carried out an extensive business tour in Northern Afghanistan. Speaks Russian and German.

Has a wife (German) and four children in Berlin.

In January 1936 managing director of the Afghan National Bank and Ashami Company. In 1936 went to Europe to arrange for trade credits and contacts. Is an ardent Nationalist in his trade negotiations and the most important business man in Afghanistan. Largely responsible for the introduction of the monopoly system and formation of various trading companies. Was also responsible for the propaganda part of the issue of the new currency notes (1935-36). Still in Europe (December 1937) negotiating loans and trade credits and purchasing machinery and armaments. Attended Nazi Congress meeting in Nuremberg in 1937.

Returned to Kabul, March 1938. Appointed Minister of Trade, September 1938. Proceeded to Delhi December 1938 for trade discussions with the Government of India. Appointment changed to Minister for National Economy, April 1939. Still (1942) Minister of National Economy. Believed to be in Germany or Switzerland (1942).

10. *Abdul Tawab Khan* (W.W. 124).—Muhammadzai. Son of late Mahmud Tarzi. Born 1902. Went to Europe for education October 1921. Admitted Saint-Cyr early in 1924 and completed a course of nearly three years' duration there. Spent one year with a French cavalry regiment. Head of Cavalry School, Kabul, 1928. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1928. Escaped from Kabul to Peshawar with Inayatullah (W.W. 366) by British aeroplane January 1929 and went to Europe. Married (1931) in Istanbul Zakiri Khanum, daughter of a retired Turkish naval captain. Still (1942) in Europe and a member of Amanullah's party. Speaks French fluently and is a smart-mannered man, of whom more may be heard in the future. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

11. *Abdul Wahab* (W.W. 126).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Mussoorie Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul was appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went to Kandahar at the time of Amanullah's abdication and acted as Foreign Minister there. Accompanied Amanullah on his flight to India and left India with him. Has since lived in Europe. In Rome September 1934 and in close attendance on the ex-King. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In October 1935 was living in Istanbul. In Rome December 1936.

12. [Nil.]

13. *Abdur Rahim Khan* (W.W. 89).—Naib Salar (general). Safi of Reza, Kohistan. Son of Abdul Qadir Khan. Born about 1886 in Kohistan. Brother-in-law of Muhammad Husain, accountant under Ameer Habibullah Khan, who was executed by King Amanullah Khan.

Appointed to Sar-i-Os (commander of the Royal bodyguard) by Ameer Habibullah at age of 16. Served for five years in Kabul. Afterwards was for ten years supervisor of bridge construction in the Eastern Province. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) (1921) and posted to the Cavalry Kandak of the Herat army. Recalled to Kabul about 1927. Later transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif as Ghund Mishar of the Cavalry Ghund. On outbreak of the 1928 revolution returned to Kabul and joined Bacha-i-Saqao in Charikar during the latter's second attempt to capture Kabul January 1929. Sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Mazar-i-Sharif to organise a revolution. He deposed the Governor and left for Maimana, and thence for Herat, which he reached on the 4th May, 1929, after defeating some Herati forces under Muhammad Ghaus (W.W. 262). In May appointed Civil and Military Governor by Bacha-i-Saqao and reappointed later by Nadir Shah October 1929. Said to be very popular with the Heratis and to be governing his province well. His loyalty to the Central Government was at one time uncertain, while the form of administration he set up in Herat was reported (1930) to show signs of Soviet

influence. After the success of Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in the spring of 1931 in Kataghan and Badakhshan, he seems to have decided to submit to Nadir Shah, and sent his son, Abdul Halim Khan (W.W. 43A), to Kabul in August. He returned in September, accompanied by Firqa Mishar (Major-General) Muhammad Shuaib Khan (W.W. 611A), who had been appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, and a Mustaufi (revenue official). In August 1932 visited Kabul, and in September was confirmed in appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Herat.

Dealt firmly with an attempt to incite the Herat garrison to mutiny in 1933. Met the Prime Minister at Maimana at time of Nadir Shah's assassination and gave his allegiance to King Zahir Shah. Appointed head of Perso-Afghan Boundary Commission September 1934.

In 1935 reported to be anti-Russian. Owns a large estate in Kushk.

Arrived in Kabul in June 1935 and appointed Minister of Public Works. A man of great personality who governed his province well. While he was in Herat rumour was always rife about him: that he was pro-Russian; that he intended to set up an independent kingdom; that he was pro-Republican; that the Afghan Government intended to remove him, &c. His loyalty is doubtful, and he is a man who may play an important rôle should the present régime collapse. In July 1935 awarded 150 acres of land near Kabul. Is being closely watched by the Government (1936), as he is suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies or disloyalty to the Afghan Government. Still Minister of Public Works (1937). The Afghan Government appear to trust him more now (1937).

Reported as being connected with the Republican party. Appointed Assistant to the Prime Minister with status of a Cabinet Minister (1938), which post he still holds (1942).

14. *Abdur Rahman Khan* (W.W. 99).—Tarak, Ghilzai. Son of Sher Jan, who was a refugee in India from Amir Abdur Rahman.

Was a resident of Loralai, Baluchistan, for about forty years, and is known as "Abdur Rahman of Loralai." Received the title of "Khan Sahib" and an allowance of 75 rupees *per mensem* from the Government of India. Applied for permission to proceed to Afghanistan in 1929. This was granted on condition that he obtained the sanction of the Afghan Government of the time. Was given six months' advance of his allowance as final acquittance and left for Afghanistan in the early part of May 1930. Was met by a large body of Ghilzais of all sections, and gave out that he had come to Afghanistan "in order to see that his tribe got their rights." A series of minor hostile acts on the part of the Ghilzais under Abdur Rahman culminated in an attack on Kalat-i-Ghilzai at the beginning of October 1930. This was unsuccessful. After several abortive attempts to persuade Abdur Rahman to come in, it was decided in December 1930 to use force. An attempt was made to capture him at Aoband, but he escaped. He then went into hiding to avoid capture by Nadir Shah's troops. Remained at large until November 1931, when the Afghan Government made determined efforts to effect his surrender and succeeded in getting him to come in under safe conduct without having to resort to the employment of force. Was brought to Kabul by Pir Ali Haidar (W.W. 171A), where he was pardoned by the King, given 6,000 rupees and a house in Kabul, where he now lives.

A man of considerable influence amongst Ghilzais. Reported to be pro-Amanullah, and is still under surveillance on this account. He periodically visits Chaharbagh.

15. *Abdus Samad Khan* (W.W. 118).—Tajik.

Secretary of Afghan Legation in London; returned to Kabul May 1925, visiting Mecca *en route*, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economies of budget of April 1926, and he was thrown out of employment. Appointed a member of Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926. Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926, and left in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary, November 1928; transferred to the Protocol Branch, Foreign Office, Kabul, February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome, and left to take up appointment in February 1936. Represented King Zahir Shah at coronation in London, 1937. Still in Rome, 1942.

An intelligent man possessing good manners. Speaks English.

16. *Ahmad Ali Jan (or Khan)* (W.W. 140).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1899. Son of Suleiman Khan and cousin of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of Ali Shah Khan. Appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1923, but incurred

his displeasure by marrying, without his approval, a daughter of Prince Musa Khan (W.W. 461A). Governor of Jalalabad in 1923-24. Imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in April 1929, but was released in October. Appointed Minister in Paris, November 1929, and transferred to London, June 1931. Represented Afghanistan at the Economic Conference, London, 1933. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Minister of Education. Returned to Kabul in October 1933. In 1936 Minister of Education. Left Kabul in November 1937 on appointment as Ambassador at Tehran.

Is a pleasant man, a keen sportsman, but not very capable. Appears to be lazy. Is said to be pro-British and is always very friendly to members of the British Legation, Kabul. His wife was educated in England and speaks and writes English perfectly. He himself speaks English, French and Urdu. Has a son born about 1926. Appointed Minister in London (1939). Still (1942) Minister in London.

17. *Ahmad Ali Khan* (W.W. 141).—Firqa Mishar (major-general). Tajik. Son of Abdul Wahid Khan. Born 1886. Known as Ahmad Ali Khan "Lodin." Appointed Afghan agent at Bombay January 1917. Was in Kabul March 1919. Appointed Afghan consul in Peshawar November 1919, but was not permitted to enter British territory. Wrote to Ameer saying this was due to his having been Mehmandar (entertainment officer) to the Russians in Kabul. Appointed Sarhaddar (frontier officer) at Dakka September 1920. Relieved in March 1921, but remained as a political officer. Was said to be much trusted by the Ameer, who refused to listen to complaints against him. Relieved and returned to Kabul November 1921. Appointed Hakim-i-Kalan (Governor), Kohistan, December 1921. Was Governor of the Eastern Province during the crisis over the Landi Kotal murders, and organised pursuit of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237). Governed his province harshly and disgraced Mir Zaman of Kunar. Appointed Minister, Berlin, September 1925. Returned to Kabul 1927. Chief of Kabul Municipality, November 1928. Sent to Charikar to raise recruits, December 1928, but failed. Fled with Amanullah to India, May 1929, and with Inayatullah to Persia. Returned to Kabul, December 1929. Officiating Minister of Court, January 1930. Deputy War Minister, April 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Kataghan and Badakhshan, July 1930. Relieved by Naib Salar (General) Muhammad Ghaus Khan (W.W. 262) and went to Mazar-i-Sharif as Deputy Governor. On departure of Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) in May 1931 to Russia for medical treatment, was appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Northern Provinces. Returned to Kabul, January 1932, and appointed First Muin (secretary equivalent to adjutant-general), War Office. Granted (1935) some of the Charki family land.

A clever, capable man, with considerable force of character. Whilst in India proved courteous, able and sensible. Always smartly turned out, and is said to be one of the most capable of the Afghan army officers. Speaks German and is popular with the German instructors, whose methods he is said to prefer to those of the Turkish instructors. His attitude to the British is difficult to gauge, but he is invariably courteous. In 1936 still adjutant-general (the title is now Rais-i-Urdu). Has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Said to be corrupt and a flatterer. Still Rais-i-Urdu (1942).

18. *Ahmad Shah Khan* (W.W. 149).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Asaf Khan. Born at Dehra Dun 1889. Returned to Afghanistan 1901. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah Khan to India in 1907. On the night of the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) was in command of the guard. The sepoy of the Ghund-i-Ardalian (an infantry unit), whose colonel, Ali Shah Reza, was executed as the actual murderer, believed that Ahmad Shah Khan was the real murderer and that their colonel had been made a scapegoat. It is stated, however, on excellent authority that the actual murderer was not Ahmad Shah Khan. Married a sister of the late Shaghassai Ali Ahmad Khan, one time Wali of Kabul. Was an A.D.C. of ex-King Amanullah. Went to Europe via India in 1929 with a message from Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Khan. Returned to Kabul early 1930. Appointed Wazir-i-Darbar (Minister of Court) April 1930. In March 1932 went on pilgrimage to Mecca as representative of the King and negotiated a "Treaty of Friendship" with Saudi Arabia. Visited India in the spring of 1933 for medical treatment, where he married a second wife. His eldest daughter was married to King Zahir Shah in November 1931. Speaks English and Urdu and is a pleasant, well-mannered and easy-going man. In 1934 was

reported to be on bad terms with the Premier. Is perhaps a little bored with his present appointment as Wazir-i-Darbar (1937). Visited India in November 1936. A daughter born to him in December 1937.

His four sisters were married to—

- (a) Late King Nadir Shah.
- (b) Late Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of (a).
- (c) N. S. Abdul Ghani Khan (W.W. 34).
- (d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (W.W. 161).

Went to Tehran for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran (1939). Still Wazir-i-Darbar (1942).

19. *Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza* (W.W. 179).—A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Travelled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1925 promoted Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1927. Was with Amanullah in London March 1928. Minister of Commerce November 1928. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" February 1929. Appointed Minister of Education November 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1935, but was still in London in June 1935. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fourth International Hospital Conference in Rome in May 1935. Summoned to Kabul July 1935, and arrived there the same month via Moscow and Termez. Returned to London via India in October. Speaks English and is intelligent and capable. Is still (1937) Afghan Minister in London.

Represented King Zahir Shah at funeral of King George V in London January 1936.

Returned to Kabul (1938) and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Visited Tehran (1939) for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran and to attend the meeting of the Council of the Saadabad Pact. Is still (1942) Minister for Foreign Affairs.

19A. *Ali Shah Khan* (W.W. 180).—Mohammadzai, Naib Salar and Sardar-i-Ali, son of Muhammad Sulaiman Khan, first cousin of late King Nadir Shah. Son-in-law of S. Musa Khan (W.W. 461A) and brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (W.W. 140). Was Commandant of the Military Schools and College for some years and has served as Governor and G.O.C., Kandahar.

20. *Allah Nawaz* (W.W. 182).—Indian of Multan. Son of Khan Bahadur Rab Nawaz Khan, honorary magistrate, Multan. As a student in Lahore ran away to Afghanistan. In Jalalabad (1920) was an assistant editor of the *Ittihad-i-Mashriqi*. A superintendent of schools, Jalalabad Circle. Was agent of the Indian Revolutionary party in Afghanistan and Tashkent and channel of communication between them and the Hindustani Fanatics. In 1927 was employed by the Deutsch-Afghanische Company as an interpreter. Helped Nadir Shah in his advance on Kabul 1929. Appointed Minister of Court October 1929, and equerry November 1929. Was appointed to supervise the work on Dar-ul-Aman May 1930. In July 1930 accompanied the Minister of Justice (W.W. 256) to Ghazni for negotiations with the Suleiman Khel, in which he is reputed to have done well. Left Kabul for Europe via India in April 1931, ostensibly for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in November 1931. In March 1932 again went to Europe for the same reason, and returned in January 1933. In June 1933 was appointed Minister of Public Works, but spent most of the year in the Southern Province in connexion with the disturbances there. Left Kabul on visit to Europe, ostensibly for medical treatment December 1933, but in reality, it is believed, to enquire about the trial of Said Kemal, the murderer of Sardar Muhammad Aziz, and to discuss affairs of State with Sardar Shah Wali Khan (W.W. 585). Popular rumour in Kabul said he had been sent to assassinate ex-King Amanullah. In spite of rumours that he was returning to Kabul, was still (1935) in Europe. Appointed Minister, Berlin, 1935, but was not at first accepted by the German Government owing to his being the representative at the trial of Said Kemal. Was devotedly attached to the late King Nadir Shah. Does not appear to be violently anti-British. His life has been threatened by the Amanullah party. Still in Berlin in October 1935, where Afghan Government are still anxious to have him accepted as their Minister. Trusted by the Prime Minister (W.W. 337), who considers him very capable. His Berlin appointment has at last been accepted by the German Government.

Still (1937) Afghan Minister in Berlin. Travelled to Kabul by German monoplane (August 1937). Returned to Germany with his family (October 1937).

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany, where he is still Minister (1939). Played an important part in the Government's efforts to quell the Sulaiman Khel rising of 1938. Said to be anti-British. Is still (1942) Minister in Berlin.

21. *Amanullah Khan* (W.W. 183).—Ex-King of Afghanistan, third son of the Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 346). Born the 1st June, 1892. In 1914 married Souriya, daughter of the late Sardar Mahmud Tarzi. In 1916 was reported to be friendly with the German mission in Kabul and in favour of intervention in the war against Britain. When the Court moved to Jalalabad in the winter of 1918-19 he remained behind as Governor of Kabul, and was in a very strong position, with control of the arsenal, treasury and stores, when the Ameer was murdered in February 1919. He proclaimed himself Ameer, declared his uncle Nasrullah a usurper, and accused him of complicity in the murder. The troops in Jalalabad and Kabul sided with him and Nasrullah was compelled to submit. On the 27th February was formally crowned by the Tagao Mullah, and in a speech stated that Inayatullah (W.W. 366) had by his recognition of Nasrullah's usurpation forfeited his claim to the throne. On the 13th April held a special durbar in Kabul for the trial of those accused of the Ameer's murder, and at its conclusion a colonel, named Ali Shah Reza, generally regarded as a mere scapegoat, was sentenced to death and was executed. Sardar Nasrullah and others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. Amanullah soon found his position threatened by intrigue on behalf of Inayatullah and the restiveness of the army, who were not satisfied with the enquiry made into the murder of Habibullah. The army was therefore despatched to the Indian frontier, in order to divert its attention and to take advantage of the disturbances in India should these develop into open rebellion. The Commander-in-chief apparently exceeded his instructions and precipitated hostilities, which resulted in the Third Afghan War. A variety of considerations led to the grant of lenient terms to Afghanistan, including the recognition of her complete independence. As a result Amanullah Khan was able to claim that he had won the freedom of his country by the sword, and, by the conclusion of treaties with a number of European countries, that he had brought about the recognition of Afghanistan on a basis of equality by the Great Powers. These tactics gained him considerable prestige, both in his own country and throughout the East. This prestige tended to increase his natural vanity and render him impatient of advice. Through his wife he had been brought under "Young Turk" influence, and he proceeded to carry out a fantastically rapid programme of reform without regard for the backwardness and prejudice of his people, particularly the mullahs. He failed to profit by the warning sounded by several rebellions, the most serious of which was the Khost rising of 1924, and continued to spend his revenues on schemes for social or educational progress, whilst neglecting his army. These tendencies were exaggerated as a result of his European tour of 1927-28, and particularly, it is believed, as a result of his visit to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. In the autumn of 1928 the Shinwaris rose in revolt and were soon followed by other tribes. Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand of low birth, attacked Kabul in December 1928 and again in January 1929. Amanullah announced his abdication in favour of Inayatullah on the 14th January and fled to Kandahar a day or two later. At Kandahar attempted to rally support for Durrani dynasty and formally rescinded his abdication. In April he advanced on Kabul, but owing to the hostility of the Ghilzais was repulsed near Ghazni and defeated at Mukur. Arrived at Chaman with his family on the 23rd May, and sailed from Bombay for Italy on the 22nd June, 1929. Visited Mustafa Kemal in Angora in February 1930, returning to Italy. Revisited Turkey again for three months in June. Left Constantinople hurriedly for Italy. Returned to Turkey in September, but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jedda to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1931, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or for concerting measures for the recovery of his throne. Published a letter decrying King Nadir and his régime. Left Jedda for Suez, the 9th May, 1931. His Mecca party included Muhammad Adib (W.W. 137), brother of Souriya, Abdul Fateh Tarzi (W.W. 20a), the late Ghulam Nabi, Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612), and two officials of the Angora Embassy, Fazal Ahmad and Abdul Aziz. Returned to Italy, via Alexandria, the 21st May. Left Rome for Switzerland, the 20th June, 1931, stayed at Montreux. Visited Rome in July and returned to Switzerland. Visited Montecatini in September, and was back in Rome by the beginning of November. Left Rome on short visits to Naples in

December 1931 and Venice in March 1932. At Venice reported to have met Afghan Minister from Berlin; more likely it was Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38). Said to have definite understandings with Soviet and Persia and to have many friends in Germany. Constant rumours of his whereabouts and intentions were circulated among the tribes on both sides of the border during 1932, culminating in one, which was put about during the Dare Khel revolt in November, to the effect that he was in Gardez. The ex-King was, however, in Italy or Switzerland throughout the year. He was reported to be writing his autobiography, and to be going to Russia when he had finished it to have it published by the Soviet. This has never materialised. In Europe he has constantly intrigued against the present Afghan régime with a view to regaining his throne. In July 1933 he visited Constantinople and held a meeting of his principal supporters there. Reported to have tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain Soviet support to his efforts. The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Yahya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassinations of King Nadir Shah (Kabul 1933) and his brother Muhammad Aziz (Berlin 1933) and are active in intriguing on Amanullah's behalf. His chief supporter in Europe is Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Receives an annual allowance of about £150 a month from the Italian Government. In March 1935 again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he met a number of sympathisers, especially Indians, but appears to have effected little. Returned to Rome, where he normally lives. Since then his adherents in Europe and Asia have been active in spreading propaganda against the present Afghan régime amongst the North-West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, which he occasionally visits. Has three sons and four daughters. Different opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorates, possibly as the result of further assassinations of members of the present ruling family, or feeling on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably leaves for Switzerland during the summer months, but, in 1935, instead of going to Switzerland he rented a large house in Stresa in Northern Italy, and took with him his family and Hasan Jan Muhammad, his brother-in-law. Returned to Rome after a short visit to Montreux on the 17th August, and believed to be in Rome (1937). Visited Mecca again in 1935. Rumoured to draw an allowance from Russia. Still in Italy (1942).

22. *Asadullah Khan* (W.W. 199).—Sardar, Muhammadzai, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born 1911. Is a son of the late Ameer Habibullah by the Ulya Janab, sister of the late King Nadir Shah. Is thus a half-brother of ex-King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sar-i-Os (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officiate as second secretary (equivalent to quartermaster-general) War Office, in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. In 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Mishar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933. In 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor, Major Christenn. Is still (1937) General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and, as such, in command of the Arq and household troops, including the Hazirbashes (personal bodyguards of the Royal family). He is also in charge of the advanced course for officers. Nervous in manner; appears to be intelligent and to take a keen interest in his command. Is important as the lineal representative of both the "Kabul" and "Peshawar" Sardars. Has a son born in 1934. Unconfirmed reports that he is not entirely loyal to the Yahya Khel have been received from time to time.

Went to Persia to attend the millenary celebrations of the poet Firdausi, October 1934, and returned to Kabul in the same month, having met Reza Shah.

Left Kabul for Europe (March 1937) and represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI. Attended Turkish manoeuvres (August 1937) and returned to Kabul (September 1937).

Appears to take his profession seriously and is popular. Has acquired more *savoir faire* of recent years.

Was commanding the Guards Division in Kabul up to September 1939, when he was appointed Inspector-General in the War Ministry, the appointment he still holds (1940).

23. *Ata Muhammad Khan* (W.W. 207).—Haji, Tokhi. Son of the late Sardar Abdullah Khan, who was Governor of Mazar in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Order of Astor. Quarrelled with Hashim Khan in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Was in Jalalabad when Ameer Habibullah was murdered; was arrested and condemned to death, but was reprieved at last moment. Again arrested on suspicion of complicity in unsuccessful attempt on Amanullah's life at Paghman in 1920, but released at Mahmud Tarzi's request. Appointed diplomatic representative, Bokhara, but his arrival coincided with the Bolshevik revolt (1920) and he returned to Mazar. Was one of Afghan officials ordered to render secret assistance to Enver Pasha in Central Asia (1922). Unemployed for four years. Appointed Governor of Balkh at time of Amanullah's visit to Mazar (1928) just prior to latter's visit to Europe, and awarded the Order of Astor. During the revolution fought against the Saqavi forces of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), was defeated and fled to Tashkent. Accompanied the late Ghulam Nabi in his unsuccessful effort to recapture Northern Afghanistan in April 1929, and again retired to Russian territory. Appears to have returned to Afghanistan soon after Nadir Shah's accession. Was a member of the Commission of Reconstruction sent under Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) to Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1930. Commanded a flying column during operations against Ibrahim Beg 1931. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and awarded the Order of Astor 2nd class, 1931. Appointed a member of the Council of Nobles December 1931. Visited Mecca in 1932. Is still (1940) a member of the Council of Nobles. Has a reputation for courage. Is reported to be pro-Russian. Is now (1942) President of the Council of Nobles.

24. *Ata-ul-Haq* (W.W. 209).—Born about 1885. Eldest son of the late Khwaja Jan of Serai Khwaja, Koh-i-Daman. Brother of the late Sher Jan and the late Muhammad Sadiq Khan, two of the Bacha-i-Saqao's officials. Lived in India until he was 16. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah on his tour in India 1907. In July 1920 appointed to command at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and was suspended in March 1923 for inefficient handling of the Wazirs. Took over command of Kandahar Infantry Brigade April 1923. Spent two years in Moscow in charge of Afghan students. Appointed Foreign Minister by Bacha-i-Saqao June 1929. Arrested with Bacha-i-Saqao November 1929 on capture of Kabul by Nadir Shah. Is still (1936) in jail in Kabul. Is well educated and possesses pleasant manners. Was released from jail in 1938.

25. *Badshah Gul I (Fazl-i-Akbar)* (W.W. 224).—Haji Khel, Mohmand. Eldest son of the late Haji of Turangzai (W.W. 257). One of the leading anti-British Mohmands. Has for several years paid occasional visits to Kabul. Is believed to communicate with the Soviet Embassy and the Ghadr party there. Took a prominent part in the Mohmand disturbances of 1933, and acted as intermediary between the Mohmands and Afghan Government. Supported the Faqir of Alingar in his attacks on Loe-Agra in 1935. Is apparently pro-Yahya Khel. Leader of the Mohmands against us in August 1935. Brought to Kabul by the Afghan Foreign Minister September 1935. Afghan Government are considering settling him in Afghanistan at a distance from the North-West Frontier. Is a personal friend of the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). Has two sons at school in Kabul being educated at State expense.

Left Kabul in March 1936 for his home, and Afghan Prime Minister states that he has undertaken to return to Kabul when asked to do so. Whilst in Kabul the Afghan Prime Minister tried to educate him with a view to broadening his outlook, but allowed him to return to Mohmand country after a few months. The mantle of the Haji of Turangzai has fallen on his shoulders.

Visited Kabul in January 1940, and is reported to be engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda in Mohmand territory on behalf of the Afghan Government.

26. *Faiz Muhammad Khan* (W.W. 243).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan (W.W. 317). Born about 1892. Was secretary to the late Muhammad Aslam Khan, Afghan Envoy, Tashkent. Returned to Kabul March 1920. Adviser to the late Muhammad Wali Khan, Afghan Envoy to Moscow 1920. Returned from Moscow and in charge of arrangements for the Suritz party September 1920. Arrived Tashkent the 5th January, 1921, en route to Moscow. Appointed first counsellor to Muhammad Wali's mission to Europe 1921 which visited London, America, Paris and Rome. First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office 1922. In addition acted as Minister of Education 1923. Appointed Minister of Education March 1924. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" April 1929, although at one time the

Bacha had condemned him to death. Appointed Foreign Minister by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1933. Well educated and intelligent, has a good name for honesty in financial matters. Is friendly, insincere and self indulgent, particularly as regards drugs, the use of which renders him incapable of sustained mental effort. Prefers airy discourse of abstract principles to discussion of practical details, and is tiresome when he feels obliged to live up to his reputation as a humorist. Was sent to Eastern Province in September 1935 to dissuade Afghans from joining Mohmand Lashkars. Held a jirga at Dakka, and appears to have achieved some success in his object. Returned to Kabul the 23rd September, taking Badshah Gul I (W.W. 224) with him. Left Kabul December 1935 for an extended European tour.

Visited Iraq and Turkey, where he was well received. Later went to Paris, where he saw M. Flandin, and Geneva. In London was received in audience by The King and had conversations with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India, Mr. Eden and Lord Zetland. Saw Herr Hitler in Berlin and finally reached Kabul in April 1936 via Moscow. Again visited Europe in 1936, and returned in January 1937. Appointed Ambassador to Turkey (1938). Still (1942) Ambassador to Turkey.

27. *Fazl Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 250).—Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat. Son of Abdul Wahab and grandson of Hazrat Muhammad Umar Jan of the family of Sirhind Pirs. Born 1892 at Bakharz in East Persia, where his father was in exile. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1902. Qualified as a judge in religious matters. Visited Nadir Shah on his accession in 1929, and was appointed Assistant Minister of Justice 1930, and officiating Minister of Justice vice Sher Agha (W.W. 256) in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassination visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in favour of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice 1934. Member of the joint Perso-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorabad (Iran) incident December 1934. His family is influential and receives an allowance from the Afghan Government, but he himself lacks influence and character. He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married in 1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (W.W. 256). Still (1942) Minister of Justice.

28. *Fazal Ilahi* (W.W. 255).—Indian, Maulvi. Born at Wazirabad, Gujranwala 1882. Son of Haji Miran Bakhsh.

After matriculating from the Scottish Mission School, he joined the Canal Department and was later employed on the North-Western Railway. He had always been religiously inclined, and used to receive instructions in Sufism from Sufi Wali Muhammad of Fatuhi Walla in Lahore District. In 1905 he visited Asmas. In 1907 he resigned his post and devoted himself to the study of the Koran. Accompanied a messenger of the Ameer-ul-Mujahidin on a tour through India in 1908, collecting for the Mujahidin cause. Later he was made trustee of the Mujahidin fund for the Punjab. Still continued to pay occasional visits to Asmas, and at the beginning of 1915 he and his brother facilitated the flight of the Lahore students to the Mujahidin colony. During the Mohmand disturbances of 1915 Fazal Ilahi toured India collecting subscriptions for the Mujahidin who were taking part. On his return to Wazirabad was arrested and interned in Jullundur jail. Released in 1918 and confined to the Wazirabad Tehsil. In the middle of 1920 slipped off to Kabul and thence to the Mujahidin colony at Chamarkand, where with the help of the late Maulvi Bashir he worked for the downfall of Niamatullah, Ameer at Asmas. In 1921 proclaimed himself Ameer of Chamarkand. Was chief instigator of the murder of Ameer Niamatullah. In 1923 a dispute arose between Fazal Ilahi and Maulvi Bashir over the Ameeriship at Chamarkand, and in November 1925 Maulvi Bashir persuaded the Ameer of Asmas to join with him in evicting Fazal Ilahi. The latter, realising his weakness, abdicated at the beginning of 1926 and proceeded to Asmas. In March 1926 returned to Chamarkand, but did not take charge, the colony being controlled by a committee. In January 1927 the dispute between Maulvi Bashir and Fazal Ilahi was settled by a jirga of mullahs and the late Haji of Turangzai (W.W. 257) at Chamarkand. The settlement and property were divided equally, but Bashir having the larger following was declared Ameer. Joined the Haji during the Mohmand unrest 1927 and May 1930. Was evicted from Dir in 1931. Took part in the Bajaur disturbances of 1932 and worked on behalf of Congress and redshirt prisoners in India. Was summoned to Kabul in April 1932 and interviewed by King Nadir. Remained a bitter enemy of the late Maulvi Bashir, for whose murder in 1934 Fazal Ilahi was believed to be responsible. He frequently visited Kabul, where he was formerly in touch with the Russian

Embassy and Ghadr party, and according to Afghan official information still is so. In 1934 he was reported to be spreading pro-Amanullah propaganda in Kunar. A friend of Fazal Maksim. Was evicted from Chamarkand in January 1935, since when he has been endeavouring to become Ameer of Chamarkand Colony, but in March 1936 his claim was rejected by a large jirga. Is reported (1939) to have left Chamarkand for Waziristan. The ban on his return to India has been removed by the Government of India.

29. *Fazal-i-Umar (Sher Agha)* (W.W. 256).—A member of the family of Sirhind Pirs established in Kabul. Son of Qayum Khan, deceased, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar on the death of his elder brother, Sher Agha in 1925, the latter having succeeded to the title on his father's death. In 1926 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to Kabul, but eventually went to Dera Ismail Khan, where in 1928 he was intriguing against Amanullah. Was expelled from the North-West Frontier Province in March 1928 under Frontier Security Regulations for preaching against the Afghan Government. In September 1928 Amanullah asked him to return to Afghanistan but he refused. After the abdication of King Amanullah he went to the Southern Province where he assisted Nadir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice November 1929. In July 1930 was sent as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Ghazni area and returned to Kabul at the end of August. In June his daughter married Fazal Ahmad Khan, Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat (W.W. 250). In December 1931 tendered his resignation and ceased working as Minister. He was reported at this time to be spreading anti-Nadir propaganda. His resignation, however, was not accepted until December 1932. Was granted a visa in December 1932 to proceed to India, from whence he was to have proceeded on pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of his mother he returned to Kabul. Visited Sirhind, India, in February 1935, and was instructed by the Afghan Government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. Reactionary and opposed to progressive reforms. His wholehearted support of King Zahir Shah is therefore doubtful, and he is not trusted by the Afghan Government. On the other hand, is probably not pro-Amanullah. He appears to have been in favour of "jihad" on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and brought back to Kabul the principal religious leaders, who, after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jihad." Wields great influence amongst the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Said to favour friendship with the British as opposed to the Soviet. Is said to be on bad terms with Saiyid Hasan (W.W. 546). Prime Minister doubts his loyalty, and would have liked in 1935 to arrest him, but was afraid to do so. Visited Sirhind (Punjab) on pilgrimage in March 1940.

Given a fort and 70 acres of land in Chahardeh by King Zahir Shah (March 1936). Visited Mecca, 1938.

30. [Nil.]

31. *Fazal Rahim* (see *Rasul Jan, Agha*).

32. *Ghaus-ud-Din* (W.W. 264).—Patullah, Ahmadzai, Ghilzai. Son of the late Jehandad Khan, who was implicated in the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt of 1912, and executed for insolence in 1914. In 1915 was concerned in a conspiracy against Ameer Habibullah with Akram Khan and Azam Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in Jubbulpore jail. Given permission to return to Afghanistan by ex-King Amanullah. His father's family lands and property were restored to him in November 1920. Arrested March 1924 and detained in the Arq whilst there was trouble in Khost, but later released and proceeded to Khost, where his handling of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais in the Ameer's favour gained him the title of "Mir Afghan." Awarded 1½ lakhs of rupees for his services. Made overtures to the British Government after the flight of Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Lent his support to Nadir Khan in the Southern Province and raised a lashkar of Ahmadzais. His treachery, on account of a bribe from Bacha-i-Saqao, was the cause of Nadir Khan's defeat in the Logar Valley in April 1929. Again made overtures to the British Government for support of his claim to the throne. Fled from Hariob to Parachinar at the beginning of October 1929 as a result of the discovery by Nadir Khan that he was in communication with Bacha-i-Saqao. In Delhi under surveillance January 1930, from whence he was removed to Jubbulpore. Deported to Burma in May 1930. A deceitful, treacherous and untrustworthy man, who is always intriguing for his own ends. Has since been transferred to Kodai Kanal, Madras Presidency,

from Burma (1936). Requested permission for his family to return to Afghanistan in 1936, on which the Afghan Government offered to allow him to return also, but on conditions which were unacceptable to him.

33. *Ghulam Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 292).—Son of the late Shahghassi Ali Ahmad Jan, and grandson of the late Luinab Khushdil Khan. Married to a niece of Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243) in 1927. Appointed aide-de-camp to his father when the latter was Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province in 1924. Left Kabul for Kandahar via Peshawar and Quetta, the 10th March, 1929. Returned to Quetta on his father's arrest by Bacha-i-Saqao and proceeded to Peshawar, September 1929. Returned to Kabul on the accession of Nadir Khan. Accompanied Shah Wali (W.W. 585) to Bombay, December 1929. Returned to Kabul 1930 (April). In January 1932 visited Lahore for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in March. Went into partnership with Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Company, and managed the petrol business in Kabul. Visited India five times during the period April-December 1932. Assistant manager of the Petrol Company of Afghanistan 1933. In March 1935 appointed Deputy Minister of Court. His stepmother, Suraj-ul-Benat, is a sister of ex-King Amanullah. Assistant manager of the new petrol company in 1936. Relieved of his appointment in the Petrol Company in 1938 and appointed Deputy Court Minister, of which appointment he was relieved in July 1938. Fled to Tirah in September 1939, after discovery of a pro-Amanullah plot, in which he was found to be the ringleader. In November 1939 he was surrendered by a Chamkanni jirga to the political agent, Kurram, and lodged with other leaders in Jamrud Fort. Has since (1940) been transferred to Poona.

34. *Ghulam Faruq Khan* (W.W. 273).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan. Employed in the Afghan Cypher Department 1926. Assistant manager Motorani Company. Arrested with his father at the same time as ex-King Amanullah arrested the Hazrat Sahibs of Shor Bazar, September 1928. Released October 1928. Arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by air February 1929 accompanied by one of the younger Hazrat Sahibs, Sanai Maksim. Returned to Afghanistan with Sardar Hashim Khan March 1929. Later was employed on propaganda work for Hashim Khan in Mohmand country. Arrived Peshawar via Shabkadr, September. Left for Ali Khel via Parachinar October 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior December 1929. Appointed Governor of the Eastern Province December 1930. In January 1932 married the daughter of Ghulam Muhammad (W.W. 289). His first wife, daughter of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan, died some time before. In April 1932 was in touch with Afridis and Mohmands, including Badshah Gul (W.W. 224). In July the Safis of Kunar complained of his harsh treatment. Left Jalalabad on the 1st December, 1932, on relief by Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 506) and took over the Governorship of Kandahar. Returned temporarily to Jalalabad in December 1932 to deal with Hassan Khan (W.W. 344), in which he was successful. Did well as Governor of Kandahar and displayed considerable energy. Was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala in January 1933. In July 1935 appointed Governor of Herat in succession to Abdur Rahim. A great favourite of the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). Still (1937) Governor of Herat. Is capable and hard-working, believed to be loyal to the existing régime. Keen on road and building development (1936). Appointed Governor of Kandahar (1938). Is stated to be in poor health (1939). Relieved of his post of Governor of Kandahar (1939) owing to poor health and appointed officiating Home Minister, the appointment he still holds (1942).

35. *Ghulam Haidar* (W.W. 275).—Mirza, Wardaki. Son of Ghulam Raza, and brother of Mirza Ghulam Muhammad, Wardaki (W.W. 288). Was Afghan Postmaster in Peshawar 1903-19. Trusted by Ameer Habibullah. His office was one of the centres of espionage in India. Held lucrative post of forwarding agent at Peshawar, but relieved in 1916 by Ali Ahmad Khan. Arrested in Peshawar in May 1919 for violent anti-British intrigue and interned in Burma. Released and returned to Afghanistan on conclusion of peace. Left Kabul on the 29th September, 1920, for Bokhara to act as Afghan Envoy there. In November 1920 he was reported to be head clerk to the special mission to Russia. During March 1921 he returned to Bokhara from Tashkent with Abdul Hadi's mission. Arrived Kabul July 1921. Appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan Branch of Foreign Office in 1923. In January 1924 appointed Collector of Customs, Kandahar. Employed as Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Revenue, Kabul, June 1929. Chairman of Trade Disputes in Kabul (1930) and

appointed Deputy-Director Posts and Telegraphs early 1931. Relieved of appointment of chairman of Trade Disputes April 1932, and appointed customs officer, Kabul. The main backer of trading firm called Shirkat-i-Umed (December 1932). Appointed customs officer, Herat, 1934. Is married to a sister of Abdul Karim (W.W. 52). Still (1937) customs officer, Herat. Again appointed customs officer at Kabul (1938). Still (1942) customs officer at Kabul.

36. [Nil.]

37. *Ghulam Siddiq Khan* (W.W. 309).—Sardar-i-Ala. Son of the late Sipah Salar (Commander-in-chief) Ghulam Haider, Charkhi. Brother of the late Ghulam Jilani Khan, late Ghulam Nabi and Abdul Aziz (W.W. 13). Born 1894. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India, October 1919, and a junior member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussoorie Conference. Left Mussoorie with despatches for Kabul June 1920, and was refused readmittance into India owing to his improper behaviour at Mussoorie and intrigues with seditionists. Appointed assistant president to the Muhajarin Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Second counsellor to the Afghan Mission under Wali Muhammad Khan which visited Europe in 1920. Returned from London to Kabul with despatches September 1921. Left again for Europe, via Peshawar, October 1921. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April 1926, when he was relieved by Ahmad Ali (W.W. 141). Visited Angora whilst en route to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed first personal secretary to the King and Minister of Court January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister January 1927 during absence of the late Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. With King Amanullah in Europe in 1928. Appointed Foreign Minister November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with the rebels December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Despatched to Russia by Amanullah on a special mission March 1929. Assumed the duties of Afghan Minister, Moscow, April 1929. Returned Kabul December 1929. In Mecca June 1930. In Berlin 1930 engaged in anti-Nadir activities. Set out for Afghanistan under promise of free pardon from the King. Arrived in Kabul the 7th March, 1931. Suspected distributing agent of Amanullah's letters in Kabul April 1931. Arrived Berlin the 18th July, 1931, to take up the appointment of Afghan Minister. Worked almost openly against his own Government and Britain during his tenure in Berlin, encouraging anti-British propaganda over the Dokalim Boundary question at the beginning of 1932 and granting a visa to Ishar Singh Ghadrte against the wishes of the Afghan Government. Wrote to Nadir professing his loyalty in July 1932. His brother, the late Ghulam Nabi, was staying with him in July 1932 when he was invited to return to Afghanistan by the King. As a result of the plot discovered when Ghulam Nabi was executed in November 1932, Ghulam Siddiq was dismissed from his appointment. Visited Mecca during spring 1933 and in touch with pro-Amanullah Afghan element amongst the pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative, Bovoroi, through his brother, Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. Visited Rome in January 1934. In 1934 married Bibi Khurd (W.W. 230), sister of ex-Queen Souriya (W.W. 623). Lives in Berlin (1936), and frequently visits Rome, where he is believed to be in close touch with Amanullah and working hard on his behalf. Receives an annual allowance from the Italian Government. A close personal friend of ex-King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Speaks French, German and a little English. Bitterly opposed to present Afghan régime, and now ex-King Amanullah's principal adherent in Europe. Stated to be wealthy and to have money invested with Haji Ghulam Haider (W.W. 278). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Believed willing to work for Italian interests in Asia. Believed to have been involved in spring 1940 in a plot to restore Amanullah with German and Russian assistance. Plans said to have miscarried owing to disagreement between Germany and Soviet. Was reported in April 1940 to have arrived in Stalinabad. In 1941 he arrived in Istanbul but the Turkish Government refused him permission to stay there and he returned to Germany.

38. *Ghulam Yahya Khan* (W.W. 311).—Muhammadzai. Born 1898. Son of Habibullah Naib Tarzi, deceased, and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W.W. 199, and cousin of W.W. 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Received Order of Astor, 1st class,

February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by Bacha-i-Saqao's men, but still in the Foreign Office, January 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister, Rome, December 1929. Assistant Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office. Promoted First Secretary, Afghan Foreign Office, 1930. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connexion with Helmand water dispute with Persia. Officiated for the Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1933. Appointed Director (Rais) of Department of Public Health February 1935. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Member of Republican party. A pleasant, well-mannered man of no outstanding ability. He has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Speaks German and Turkish. Still (1939) Minister of Health. Was relieved of his post of Minister of Health in November 1939, and appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Reappointed Minister of Health 1940, a post he still holds (1942).

39. *Gul Agha* (see *Siddiq Agha Muhammad*).

39A. *Gul Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 315).—Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan. Brother of F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about 1897.

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards appointed Assistant Chief Judge. Some time later was placed at the head of the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar, Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1929 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reform led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 575) to Mazar-i-Sharif, June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed President of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif *vice* Abdul Jamil Khan (W.W. 49) in November 1934, which post he still holds (1941). Appointed Minister of Health in 1939 but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan régime. Speaks some English.

40. *Habibullah Khan Tarzi* (W.W. 325).—Muhammadzai. Born 1896. Son of the late Muhammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Cousins, W.W. 100 and W.W. 311. Was a junior Under-Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office 1922-23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Mahmud Tarzi when latter was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under-Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris, November 1928. Relieved by Ahmad Ali Jan (W.W. 140) December 1929 and returned to Kabul. Third secretary in Foreign Office, May 1931. Chief delegate to the Dokalim Boundary Commission, June 1932. Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand Water Commission, October 1932. Visited Herat and Islam Kala, thence to Zulfikar and Chakhansur in this connexion. Completed his work on the Persian boundary survey in June 1933 and returned to Kabul. Appointed Minister at Tokyo in July 1933 and presented his credentials there in October 1933. Speaks English fluently; a pleasant, well-mannered man. Still Minister, Tokyo, 1937. Returned to Kabul June 1939, and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Still (1942) first secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

41. *Hazrat of Shor Bazar* (see *Fazl-i-Umar*).

42. *Inayatullah Khan* (W.W. 366).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Eldest son of Ameer Habibullah Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan Badr-ul-Haram. Born the 20th October, 1888. Visited India in December 1904. Held the appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah ("Helper of the State") under Ameer Habibullah Khan. Created Sardar-i-Ala in 1905. Appointed Minister for Education in 1916. Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death. Married a daughter of the late Mahmud Khan, Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Ameer Habibullah Khan's reign he received an allowance of 1,30,000 rupees per annum. After the murder of Habibullah Khan, Sardar Nasrullah went through the form of offering him the throne. He, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrullah's favour, and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrullah, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of Amanullah, he had to accompany the former to Kabul. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrullah's imprisonment, he was kept under

strict surveillance. At the darbar at which those accused of the murder of Ameer Habibullah were tried, Amanullah decreed that Inayatullah had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrullah's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah, &c. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the Ameer, and to be practically confined to his house until 1922. There was an abortive rising by the Safi regiment in his favour in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men, March 1921. He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure of freedom, which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction. When Bacha-i-Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December, 1928, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arq. Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged in the Arq by Bacha-i-Saqao, abdicated on the 17th January, 1929, on condition that he and his family were sent to Kandahar by air. Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 18th January, 1929, and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to Bombay, the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929. Arrived in Tehran, the 27th July, 1929. Left Tehran for Europe, May 1930, and was in Berlin believed plotting against Nadir Khan. Applied for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1931). Visited England, August 1931, and stayed three weeks in London with his wife and eldest son Khalilullah (W.W. 399). Then joined Amanullah in Rome. Visited Constantinople for his nephew's wedding, December 1931, and then went on to Tehran, where his sister joined him from Kabul. In receipt of 800 tomans per month from Persian Government in February 1932. In August the Persian Government were said to be intending to discontinue this allowance, his sole means. Since then has remained in Tehran, where he now resides. Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that he is living in comparative penury. His sister, who had been with Amanullah in Rome, joined him in the autumn of 1933. Is periodically the subject of rumours in Afghanistan, generally to the effect that he has arrived, or is expected to arrive, in some part of the country. Lacks initiative, intellect and energy, but combines dignity with pleasant manners, and had a reputation for being honourable and straightforward. An agent of Inayatullah was reported to have visited Afghanistan in May 1935. Still (1936) in Tehran. Stated to have been granted a monthly allowance of about 5,000 rupees (Afghani) by the Afghan Government (1939). Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran (1942).

43. *Mahmud Jan* (W.W. 415).—Sardar-i-Ala, Shahgassi, Barakzai. Born 1885. Son of Shah Muhammad Khan, and a distant cousin of Abdul Aziz Khan, and the Ulya Hazrat. Officiated as Minister of Public Security in 1922 and as Governor of Kabul in 1925. Was in charge of the Public Works and Secret Service. Also in charge of the Frontier Tribes Department, of which Haji Muhammad Akbar was Under-Secretary. Was in partnership with Herr Harten, German engineer in charge of Dar-ul-Aman works, and made a lot of money out of public works. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927. Appointed Wali of Kabul, December 1927. Captured by rebels near Jalalabad, December 1928, where he had been sent to restore order. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao, February 1929. Released during the Independence celebrations, August 1929. Was appointed officer in charge State Workshops, November 1929, but was deprived of his appointment the following month. Imprisoned in the Arq on a charge of theft of Government funds and jewels, January 1930. Under trial for being concerned in the Koh-i-Daman revolt of 1930. Released in January 1931, but rearrested with other members of the Shahgassi family in connexion with the Ghulam Nabi and Dare Khel plots in November 1932. His brother Zobain also arrested. His ears are said to have been trimmed as a punishment. Was released in November 1933 and kept under surveillance. A stout, pleasant gentleman; was friendly to foreigners. A great personal friend of ex-King Amanullah. Speaks Pushtu.

Reported to have been arrested in March 1936 for the murder of his own son. Reported to be still in Kabul jail (1942).

44. *Mohendra Pratap Singh* (alias *Raja*) (W.W. 437).—Indian agitator, son of Raja Ghanshyam Singh, Jat, of Mursan, Aligarh, United Provinces, and brother of the Maharani of Jhind. Founder of the Prem Vidyalaya (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915 where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1917. Endeavoured to come to India, but returned owing to our precautions. In 1918 with a party of Afghans left Mazar-i-Sharif for Russian Turkestan, and proceeded to Tashkent. In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went to Petrograd, where he received a warm welcome from Trotsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople, where he delivered Ameer's reply to the Sultan. No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts, but supposed to have gone to Tashkent via Bokhara. Came to Kabul with the Suritz Mission December 1919. Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obaidullah (W.W. 491) found him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party. Left Kabul and arrived at Wakhan, the 14th June, 1920, en route for China. Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to China by the Ameer. He soon returned as passage to China was refused by the Chinese authorities. In September 1920 he was in the Pamirs. Did a tour in China and Japan and returned to Kabul in autumn of 1923. Left Kabul, the 16th September 1924; visited California, China, attempted to enter Tibet, then went to Japan, whence he was deported. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926. His reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid and although he held a number of receptions very few people of importance attended. This was mainly due to the displeasure of the King at Mohendra having styled himself Afghan representative at a Pan-Islamic conference in Japan, photographs describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul for the north, the 31st January, 1927, and arrived Moscow, February 1927. Returned to China but back in Moscow November 1928 preparing to hold "Pan-Asiatic" Conference in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanullah. Went to Tehran January 1929 and returned to Moscow in April 1929. Returned to Kabul from Moscow by air December 1929. Was in close touch with Allah Nawaz (W.W. 182). He was deported by air to Termez in March 1930. Visited Berlin and reached New York on the 27th May, 1930. Is believed to be of some use to the OGPU. Was in China in 1931 and 1932. (His address there was P.O. Box 20, Peking, China). Published two books: *Afghanistan, the Herat of Aryan*, and *Long Live India!* Moved to Japan at the end of 1933 or beginning of 1934, where he was in touch with the Japanese Government. Continued to spread anti-British propaganda. Left Japan secretly for Siam in June 1934, believed at Japanese instigation to further their pan-Asiatic policy. Forbidden to lecture in Siam. Turned out of Siam, arrived Tokyo, August 1934, having been deported from Canton.

Was in Manila in February 1935, back in Japan in April 1935 and left for America in July 1935. Has agitated for his own return to India through the Indian Legislatures. Has been regarded as an Afghan subject since 1934.

In the Far East in 1937. Reported to be in Japan (1942).

45. *Muhammad Afzal Khan* (W.W. 138A).—Malik. Sangu Khel Shinwari. Born about 1885. During the Khost rebellion 1924-25 assisted Amanullah with a party of Shinwaris. One of the leaders of the revolt in the Eastern Province against Amanullah in November 1928. Turned pro-Nadir and during the Shinwari disturbances of February 1930 assisted Government and took an active part in the final settlement and collection of arms. In May 1930 is said to have requested permission, which was refused, to raise a lashkar to assist the late Haji of Turangzai in his attack on British territory. Suspected of intrigue with Russians, March 1932. Deprived of his Khanship, September 1932, but was reinstated after interview with Prime Minister. Early in 1932 was deprived of appointment as Officer Commanding Khassadars but was later reinstated. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. Incited Afridis to resist road scheme in spring of 1935. In 1938 he led a Shinwari rising against the Afghan Government. Later he fled to Tirah, and was pardoned in 1939. The Afghan Government have offered him favourable terms if he will settle in Kabul, where he is at present. In Kabul under surveillance (1942).

45A. *Muhammad Afzal Khan* (W.W. 138).—Firqa Mishar. Born 1892. Son of Naib Salar Ghulam Nabi Khan (W.W. 299). Nasir, Ghilzai of Shakadarra Koh-i-Daman. Sardar-i-Ala.

Trained at Harbiya College, Kabul, and later for two years, 1927-29, in Turkey. Served in the third Afghan War and the Mangal rebellion, 1924, and is capable of handling troops in the field. Was Second Secretary (Q.M.G.), War Office, July 1930. G.O.C., Khanabad, 1931, but relieved in November that year. Accompanied Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) to Gardez, November 1932. Officiated for War Minister during early part of 1933. Appointed Governor and G.O.C., Southern Province, July 1933, which post he held till September 1941 and where he has on the whole done well. On bad terms with Major-General Pir Muhammad (W.W. 500), the G.O.C. and Governor of Urgan (1934-35). Visited Kabul June 1935. Unpopular with certain tribal leaders, who in 1936 tried to get him transferred. Was ordered by Minister of Defence in 1937 to prevent tribesmen crossing into Waziristan. Complied, but ordered district officials not to use force in stopping them, with excuse that force might create anti-Afghan Government feelings. Reported to have supported the Faqir of Ipi's cause and to have financed Ipi propaganda, and encouraged Ghilzais to disobey Government orders, at the same time reporting to his Government that certain sections in his province had anti-Government tendencies. Settled long-standing dispute between Zadrans and Tannis by fining both tribes in 1939. Member of the Republican Party.

Intelligent and keen on his profession. Has personality and is a good disciplinarian and capable of handling troops in the field. Neither very religious nor popular. Is in the good books of the War Minister, under whom he is now (1942) working in the War Ministry. His loyalty to present régime is doubtful.

46. *Muhammad Agha Sami* (W.W. 555).—Brother of Shahgassi Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675). Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a Munshi to Ameer Habibullah. A Mohmand by birth, but the family have settled in Ghazni for some generations. Was Mehmandar to the British mission in Kabul, 1921. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, but was dismissed in 1923, partly due to escape of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237) from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in murder of one Abdul Ali. Appointed Political Officer during Mangal rebellion 1924, and sent to the front, where his services earned appreciation of the Ameer. Appointed Mehmandar to Wakils of Eastern Provinces during Ameer's visit of April 1926. Reappointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, August 1926. Was a trusted personal informer to the Ameer. Efficient, controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul December 1926. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul November 1928. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao February 1929, but escaped and joined Amanullah in Kandahar. Sent to Tashkent as courier by Amanullah, returning again to Kandahar via Duzdap, April 1929. Accompanied Amanullah in his flight as far as Quetta, where he remained. Left for Meshed in August 1929. Later returned to Kabul. Arrested and sentenced to banishment for implication in Koh-i-Daman revolt, July 1930, but subsequently released. Said to be doing propaganda work in favour of Amanullah. On pilgrimage to Mecca, March 1931. Arrived Tehran with W.W. 675 in December 1931. Applied for permission to visit India but was refused. Still in Tehran, where his brother Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) has joined him; also his nephew and niece from Quetta. He and his son, Muhammad Bashir, deprived of Afghan nationality, November 1933. His property in Afghanistan is said to have been confiscated in 1934 and his family deported to Iran. Believed to be in Tehran in 1935.

Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran (1942).

47. *Muhammad Akbar Khan* (W.W. 161).—Muhammadzai. Brother of W.W. 113, Minister of Health 1930. Cousin of the late King Nadir Shah, to whom he was Surgeon-General. Director of Medical Services October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome 1935 and presented his credentials in May 1935.

Relieved of appointment as Minister at Rome, March 1936, and returned to Kabul. Is married to a sister of W.W. 149. Civil A.D.C. to the King, 1942.

48. *Muhammad Alam Khan* (W.W. 164).—Mulki Ghund Mishar (civil brigadier) Alisherzai Shinwari. He is looked upon as the head of the Shinwaris. In 1904 he was deprived of employment for beginning to raise three regiments of Shinwaris without orders. In March 1919 Amanullah issued orders for his arrest, which he contrived to evade, for his support of Sardar Nasrullah Khan. In June 1921 was granted an annual allowance of 3,000 rupees. Was chief instigator

of Shinwari opposition to hasht nafri (conscription of one in eight). Was a great friend of the Sultan Muhammad Khel family, of which King Nadir Shah was the head. A leader of the Shinwari rebellion November 1928. Was one of a delegation sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Shah in April 1929. Appointed Governor, Eastern Province, May 1929. Ordered to raise the Shinwaris against Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) June 1929, but met with little success. Fled to Landi Kotal December 1929, but returned to the Eastern Province early in 1930 and in April 1930 was said to be working on behalf of King Nadir Shah. Was suspected of being in the pay of the Russians. Intrigued with Afridis in 1930. Not trusted by the Afghan Government, he was kept in Kabul under surveillance in autumn 1933. Later he was allowed to return to the Eastern Province, where he helped to persuade the Shinwaris to send their sons to school in Kabul. Early in 1935 was reported to be involved in a conspiracy against the Government. His loyalty is doubtful. He frequently visits Kabul.

Joined Mohmand Lashkar 1935. Said to be friendly with W.W. 138A January 1936, and hostile to the Afghan Government.

Living at his home in the Eastern Province in 1942.

49. [Nil.]

50. *Muhammad Aminullah Jan* (or *Amin Khan*) (W.W. 186).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born the 12th October, 1885. Third surviving son of Amir Abdul Rahman. His mother was a slave girl belonging to the late Bibi Halima, who was said to have adopted him before her own son was born. Was formerly in charge of the Shara (Muhammadan Law) Department at Kabul, and was also in charge of the Jabba Khana (magazine). In 1917 he held the appointment of Sardar-i-Madafia (director of military defence). Has one son born about 1903, and a daughter said to have been married to Sardar Abdul Qudus August 1919 at Kandahar. Appointed A.D.C. to the King 1926. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao in January 1929. Arrived Quetta and left for Lahore the 4th November, 1929. Residing in Tehran 1930 in straitened circumstances. Appealed for an allowance from the Government of India in 1930. Is said to be very eccentric. In Iran 1942.

50A. *Muhammad Atiq Khan* (W.W. 209A).—Muhammadzai. Sardar. Son of Rafiq Khan and son-in-law of Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan (W.W. 149). Court Minister. Brother of Babo Jan alias Zulilkha, widow of late Sardar Hayatullah Khan, step-brother of ex-King Amanullah.

Visited Moscow in 1935. Is an economic expert trained in Germany and holds the post of a Technical Director in the Afghan National Bank. Reported to be pro-Amanullah and kept under surveillance 1939. Reported to have said that, providing no revolution broke out, Afghanistan will be able to check British influence in eight years' time.

Speaks Russian and German fluently. Strongly Germanophile, the present increased German influence in Royal Family said to be due to him.

Brothers are Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 658) and Muhammad Rahim Khan, Assistant to the President of Kabul Municipality.

51. *Muhammad Ayub Khan* (W.W. 211).—Kizilbash. Was head clerk to Ameer. Appointed assistant to Finance Minister April 1924. Awarded (1925) Order of Astor and 2,000 rupees for good service in Khost rebellion. Received Order of Sardar-i-Ala February 1927. Appointed Minister of Finance September 1928, but relieved of his appointment October 1928. Appointed Minister of Finance by King Nadir November 1929. Accused of embezzlement in October 1930. Carried out a tour of inspection in Kataghan and Badakhshan in June 1932. In October 1932 returned to Kabul and resumed appointment of Minister of Revenue December 1932. Dismissed in September 1933 and his son arrested. Pro-Amanullah. Unemployed in Kabul 1942. Is a brother of W.W. 449.

52. *Muhammad Daud Khan* (W.W. 238).—Elder son of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan (brother of King Nadir Shah). Born 1909 in Kabul. Educated at the Amania College, Kabul. Spent nine years in France and returned to Kabul in October 1930. 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, where he worked hard and was well reported on by the senior German instructor. November 1932 promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province. In February 1934 assumed the duties of Governor of the province in addition to his duties as General Officer Commanding. His strictness made him unpopular and he was inclined to be headstrong and hasty. Took a great interest in the training

of his troops and the Eastern Province detachment at the Independence celebrations in 1934 was conspicuous for its smartness. In July 1935 was transferred as Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, and General Officer Commanding of the Farah and Chakhansur Division. A strong personality. A keen soldier and energetic. A favourite of his uncle the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). In 1934 married a sister of King Zahir Shah. Is likely to be much heard of in the future. Speaks excellent French, and is very well-mannered and friendly. Is keen on games. Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1936 and 1937. Warned to be more tactful by the Prime Minister. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province (1938).

Appointed General Officer Commanding Kabul Central Army Corps and Commandant of the Military Schools in Kabul in August 1939, the appointment he still holds (1942).

53. [Nil.]

54. *Muhammad Gul Khan* (W.W. 315A).—Son of Muhammad Khurshid Khan (W.W. 408). Kuchi Mohmand of village Baru (on the Hisarak Rud, about 7 miles west of Batikot). Educated in Turkey. Was a Ghund Mishar (brigadier) in Amanullah's army in 1927. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province, in 1928. In Jalalabad during the Saqavi régime until the burning of Jalalabad, when he returned to his home at Baru. He joined H.R.H. Sardar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in Khugiani country about March 1929. Was Minister of the Interior in Nadir Shah's first Government October 1929. Promoted Naib Salar (general) and appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Eastern Province. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1930 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in pacifying the people. Assumed duties of Minister of Interior in October 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of Kandahar in February 1931, and left for Kandahar via India. Administered the province with firmness and efficiency. Congratulated by the Government on his work January 1932. Visited Kabul for Independence celebrations August 1932; was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala, first class, and a grant of 25,000 Kabuli rupees. Was offered Governorship of Herat in September 1932, but refused owing to his friendship for Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89). Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Mazar, Kataghan and Badakhshan and Maimana. November 1932. Relieved at Kandahar by Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273) in January 1933, and left for Mazar. In 1934 there were rumours that his loyalty to the present régime was doubtful and that he was in favour of a republic. A quiet, well-mannered man, but ruthless. Has a strong personality and is ambitious. He is regarded as one of the most capable officials in Afghanistan. Speaks Urdu, Persian, Pushtu, Russian and Turkish. He was very loyal to the late Nadir Shah. Visited Kabul September 1935. Believed to have asked the Prime Minister to help the Mohmands against the British. Refused to visit Eastern Province to explain Mohmand situation to Afghans, and believed to have quarrelled with Prime Minister (W.W. 337) on this subject. Returned to Mazar about the 1st October. Reported to be on bad terms with W.W. 315. Stated to be connected with the Republican party. Still (1940) in Mazar. Still (1940) Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Northern Provinces. Resigned Governorship of Northern Provinces 1940 and appointed Minister of State 1941, a post he still holds (1942).

55. *H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan* (W.W. 337).—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan (junior) and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of the late King Nadir and of W.W. 414 and W.W. 585. Born 1886. Commanded the Sar-i-Os (bodyguard) at Kabul and accompanied Ameer Habibullah to India in 1907. Appointed Naib Salar (general) of Herat and left Kabul in 1916. Keen on instituting reforms, but checked in this direction by threat of mutiny on the part of the troops. Arrested and sent to Kabul after the murder of Habibullah, but subsequently released. People of Herat refused to have him back after his release and he was relieved. Appointed Governor of Jalalabad December 1919. Governor, Eastern Province, 1920. Went on tour in July 1921 and distributed rewards to the Mohmands and some Bajauri tribesmen, at the same time doing his best to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British; the next month he warned the tribesmen to be ready for "jihad." Summoned jirgas of the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel Afridis to Jalalabad in September 1921. Rewards in the shape of money were doled out to the tribesmen, who were informed that Nadir Khan had

promised to arrange permanent allowances and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Government. Reported in August 1921 to have engineered, in conjunction with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of the British mission mail bags en route from Kabul to India. Went to Kabul from Jalalabad on the 10th November, 1921. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul, January 1922, *vice* Nadir Khan, who proceeded on tour. Went to Europe with his father in 1923. Appointed Minister at Moscow March 1924, when he was unpopular owing to his constant suspicions of Soviet policy. Opposed the military training of Afghans in Russia, and on his views being disclosed by the Afghan Government to the Soviet authorities he resigned and left Moscow 3rd July, 1926, to join his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Offered position of Minister at Tehran, which he refused, October 1926. Nur-us-Siraj, the sister of the King, whom he wished to marry, was betrothed to Amanullah's cousin, Muhammad Hasan Jan (W.W. 342) in October 1926. This was looked upon as an insult by Hashim Khan and his brothers. At Grasse December 1928. Granted diplomatic visa for India en route to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (W.W. 585) on the 8th February, 1929. Left Peshawar for the Eastern Province 6th March, 1929, where he tried to obtain support for Nadir, but met with little success. Was defeated by Bacha-i-Saqao and arrived Parachinar 19th September, 1929. Arrived Quetta 1st October, 1929, where he remained under surveillance until 27th October, 1929, when he was permitted by the Indian Government to proceed to Kandahar. Proceeded to Kabul, 9th November, 1929, on his appointment as Premier and Minister of Interior. This appointment he has since held, insisting on a high standard of work and efficiency. High-handed in his dealings with other Government officials he is consequently both feared and hated. Was on tour in the Northern Provinces when Nadir Shah was assassinated and returned immediately to Kabul. Swore allegiance to Zahir Shah, since whose accession he has been the real ruler of Afghanistan. A real patriot and a tremendous worker, he has laboured to improve the stability of the country. So far as can be judged, genuinely dislikes the Russians and is alarmed by the possibility of the spread of bolshevism in Afghanistan. A quiet, dignified man with charming manners and a keen sense of humour. Is quick-tempered, outspoken and, when roused, ruthless. Trusts very few of his fellow-countrymen and tries to do too much himself. He makes up his mind quickly. Is said to have been lately more tactful in his dealings with other officials, but is still unpopular. The danger of his being assassinated is great. Is very friendly to members of the British Legation in Kabul. Understands English well and speaks it fairly. Still (1937) Prime Minister. Proceeded to Berlin in October 1936 to undergo an operation for tumour. Operation for tumour successful. Visited London January–February and returned to Kabul via India in March 1937. Still (1942) Prime Minister.

56. *Muhammad Hassan Jan* (W.W. 342).—Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 648). A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1926. Created Sardar-i-Ala February 1926. Married to Nur-us-Siraj, Amanullah's sister, October 1927. Was well known to the British Legation at Kabul. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1927–28 as Chamberlain. Also went with Amanullah to Kandahar after his abdication January 1929 and to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy June 1929. Was in Rome from October 1931 to July 1932. Not definitely located between summer 1932 and December 1933, but said to be in Rome with Amanullah and to be verging on lunacy. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Accompanied Amanullah Khan to the Hejaz in 1935. In Rome with Amanullah during summer of 1935.

57. *Muhammad Ihsan Khan* (W.W. 363).—Tajik of Istalif, Koh-i-Daman, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born about 1895, son of Ustad Yusuf, an iron-smith. Related to the late Bacha-i-Saqao. Received three years' aeronautical training in Italy. Appointed to command Afghan Air Force 1924. Visited Western Command manœuvres and carried out a tour in India at the invitation of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief November 1926. Was helpful to the Royal Air Force officers who landed at Sherpur in December 1928. Dismissed from his post by Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929, but was reappointed by Nadir Shah on his accession to the throne. Is keen on his profession and works hard and is keen on flying. Is very fat. Speaks Italian and a little French. Is always very friendly to members of the British Legation. Still (1937) Commandant of the Air Force. Proceeded on tour to India and Europe in September 1936 with a view to purchasing aircraft.

Visited India and Europe 1936-37 with view to purchasing aircraft for Afghan Government. Purchased eight aircraft in Great Britain and twenty-four in Italy. Returned to Kabul in October 1937. Was awarded decoration of "Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy." Received by Herr Hitler during his tour. Still (1942) Commandant of the air force. Resents fact that air force is under War Ministry control, and wishes to have it independent under the King.

58. *Muhammad Khan, Mirza* (W.W. 450).—Sent to Merv on a special mission October 1919. Still in Merv June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent. Left for Moscow July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow 1921 until relieved by the late Ghulam Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1924 was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain Crown jewels. Appointed First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagai Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a broad outlook and was not noticeably pro-Soviet. Under-Secretary in Foreign Office 1928. Remained at Foreign Office under Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary Foreign Office by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1930. In May 1932 was complimented by the King for his work. Was put under secret surveillance as a result of the plot discovered in September 1933. Left Kabul in October, with the Prime Minister, to visit the north. Returned to Kabul in November and swore allegiance to Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937. A man of no great standing or marked ability. Is said to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister, but to be on bad terms with the War Minister. Since he has been in office, the customs revenue of the country has increased considerably. Was one of the prime movers in the formation of the Ashami Company. Is believed to be a heavy bribe taker. His sister, who was a widow of the late Ameer Habibullah, was given in marriage to Abdul Qadir, Bacha-i-Saqao's Governor of Kandahar. Is inclined to be anti-British, but is lately believed to be less so than formerly. His son, Abdullah Khan, was one of six students who were sent to Japan January 1935. Appointed Minister of Revenue (1938). Still (1942) Minister of Revenue.

59. *Muhammad Naim Khan* (W.W. 464A).—Son of the late Muhammad Aziz Khan, Muhammadzai. Born 1911. Visited India in November 1929 with Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199). Appointed Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, October 1930. Appointed Minister, Rome, December 1932; recalled in 1934 and appointed extra secretary in the Foreign Office, Kabul. Appointed First Secretary 1935. Shy in manner, speaks French and is friendly to members of the British Legation. Does not appear to possess great force of character. Is a great favourite of his uncle Sardar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). Married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1935. Officiating Foreign Minister December 1935 and again in 1936 during the absence of Faiz Muhammad in Europe.

Also acting as managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Majid (W.W. 73) in Europe 1936-37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937.

Appointed president of Kabul Literary Society June 1937.

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalalabad in January 1938. Still (1939) Minister of Education. Visited Khanabad as head of an investigation committee (1939).

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister (September 1939), in addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence of W.W. 73 in Europe in addition to his own duties.

59A. *Muhammad Nauroz Khan* (W.W. 470).—Mirza of Logar. Appointed Chief Secretary to King Nadir, November 1929. Was on bad terms with Muhammad Yakub (W.W. 675). More inclined to friendship with Germany than with England and Russia. Accompanied late S. Muhammad Azim to Europe in January 1933 for medical treatment. Returned from Germany May 1933 and resumed appointment of Chief Secretary to King. Was appointed officiating Court Minister in 1936. Appointed Ambassador, Tehran, in 1939. Still (1942) in Iran.

Has influence in the Logar valley. Loyalty to present régime doubtful. Entertains Republican tendencies. Has ability and capacity and speaks a little English.

60. *Muhammad Qasim Khan* (W.W. 506).—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaka. Nephew of the late Sardar Abdul Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273). Born at Lahore about 1900. Served in various minor appointments in Afghan Foreign Office 1921-25. Was a secretary in the Afghan Legation, Rome, in 1926, and also served in a similar capacity in the Afghan Embassy, Tehran, during 1927 and 1928. In 1930 was mudir (assistant secretary) in the Prime Minister's office. Appointed officiating Hakim-i-Ala (Governor), Eastern Province, November 1932, where he found it difficult to get on with the General Officer Commanding, Daud Khan (W.W. 238). Appointed Minister in Rome in February 1934, and left to take up his appointment in March. Recalled in spring 1935 and in June again appointed Governor of the Eastern Province. Is said to be an efficient and capable man, but lacks presence and personality. Speaks English, Urdu, Persian and very good Pushtu. His father died January 1936.

Still (1937) Governor of the Eastern Province.

Appointed Governor of Herat (1938). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds (1942).

61. *Muhammad Sarwar Khan* (W.W. 560).—Barakzai, Naib Salar (general). Son of Muhammad Sidiq Khan. Brothers Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276), Muhammad Shuaib (W.W. 611) and Juma Khan, head clerk in the Afghan Legation, London, in 1935. Formerly a Ghulam Bacha. Was highly esteemed by Ameer Habibullah Khan. Promoted brigadier in 1906, owing to his success in the manufacture of guns, and appointed superintendent, Kabul Arsenal. Promoted major-general 1913. In March 1919 appointed Naib Salar by Ameer Amanullah Khan, and later in the same month left for Mazar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Turkestan. Granted both civil and military powers in his province. Relieved of appointment and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922, where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1923, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior, who, originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at the beginning of 1927. Described by the Ameer, during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1925, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent." Summoned to Kabul June 1926, and well received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1926. Appointed Governor of Badakhshan and Kataghan, 1928, but did not take up appointment. In Kandahar 1929. Appointed Governor of Kabul, February 1930, but relieved in 1931 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned via Meshed and Kandahar. Appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles) December 1931. Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276) at Maruf, Kandahar Province, in February 1932, but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed since 1931. Still (May 1935) believed to be pro-Amanullah. Courteous and friendly, but Amanullah's description (above) fits him. Still (1942) a member of the Council of Nobles.

62. *Muhammad Umar Khan* (W.W. 652).—Firqa Mishar (major-general). Tajik. Born 1898. Appointed Chief of Staff 1924. Visited Delhi manœuvres December 1924 at the invitation of the Commander-in-chief in India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army and study Soviet military methods October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Termez en route to Moscow the 3rd November, 1926. Visited Russia and Italy 1928. Was at one time military attaché in Berlin. Appointed chief of Afghan General Staff early in 1930. In 1932 proceeded to Europe to attend the Disarmament Conference, Geneva. Visited Paris December 1933. Returned to Kabul via India in January 1934; was a spectator of the 1st January parade at Peshawar. Lunched with the officers of the Gordon Highlanders in the Khyber on his way back. Resumed his duties as Chief of Staff, but left once more for Geneva in May 1934. A keen and intelligent officer, but said to have had little experience in the field or handling troops. Has been much in Europe and speaks English, Russian and German fluently. Is also said to speak French and Italian. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. It is said that he will probably be appointed to a diplomatic post in Europe. Has pleasant manners and is friendly. Afghan representative to the League of Nations Disarmament Committee June 1935. Said to have been recalled to Kabul (1936) owing to his immoral conduct in Europe. Still Chief of Staff (1942). Is said to be pro-Russian.

63. *Muhammad Umar Khan* (W.W. 658).—Muhammadzai. Son of Muhammad Rafiq. Was born in India and was at one time a Naib-Tehsildar in the Punjab. Returned to Kabul in June 1916. Was appointed Hakim (Governor) of Charikar in 1926. In March 1932 appointed officiating Wali (Governor) of Kabul. Prior to his appointment as officiating Wali of Kabul was Mudir-i-Gumruk (assistant in charge of customs), Kabul. Toured Kohistan and Koh-i-Daman in 1932. Selected (1934) for the appointment of Minister, Berlin, in succession to the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz, but declined the post. Still (1939) Wali of Kabul. Lacks personality and is neither particularly able nor strong. Speaks English and is believed to hold pro-British views.

Suspended (1939) and ordered to be kept under surveillance in his house in Kabul. Still unemployed but no longer under surveillance (1942).

63A. *Muhammad Usman Khan* (W.W. 661).—Sardar. In 1915 appointed to command at Asmar, where he adopted a friendly attitude towards the British and was taking security from "badmashes" to prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed Brigadier and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Jalalabad in August 1920, reason unknown. He, however, again returned to Asmar and went to Kabul in September 1920. Chief Staff Officer to Naib Salar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in December 1921. Served as Afghan Consul in Bombay in 1927 and as Consul-General, India, in 1928. In Kabul 1929. Counsellor to Afghan Embassy, Tehran, in 1930. Appointed Muin II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Musabid Perso-Afghan Commission 1934-35. Pensioned and unemployed 1935. Member of the Republican Party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanish plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul, since 1937. Relieved of this post July 1942.

A capable man of pleasant manners.

64. *Muhammad Yunus Khan* (W.W. 685).—Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation, London, from 1922-30. Always showed himself helpful and well disposed and was profuse with pro-British sentiments, which were probably sincere. Chargé d'Affaires from February 1929 to January 1930. Energetically opposed Shuja-ud-Danlah's (W.W. 612) attempts to dispose of Legation property July-September 1929. Left London for United States of America on Shah Wali's (W.W. 585) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non-recognition of his work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint him counsellor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1933 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office to return to Afghanistan. Believed to be (1936) in United States of America. Founded and became Director of the Afghan National Association in the United States of America.

65. *Muhammad Zahir Shah* (W.W. 688A).—Muhammadzai. Only surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born 1914. Accompanied his father to France in 1924 and was educated in that country. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1930. In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W.W. 149). Appointed Assistant War Minister 1932. In September 1933 officiated as Education Minister in addition to his other duties. Was proclaimed King on the 8th November, 1933, immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little share in the government of the country, the real power being wielded by his uncle H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), the Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting and tennis. He never spends a night away from Kabul and his excursions, which he makes heavily guarded, are limited to the immediate neighbourhood of the capital. Has three sons, Muhammad Akbar, born in 1933, Ahmad Shah, born in 1934, and Mahamed Nadir, born in 1941, a daughter born in 1932 and a second daughter born in 1936. His birthday will in future be celebrated on the 15th October annually. Is taking an increasing interest in State affairs and is particularly interested in the development of the air force. Is reported (1939) to have expressed a desire to be given the opportunity to take a more active part in the control of State affairs.

66. [Nil.]

67. *Nasrullah Khan* (W.W. 469A).—Born about 1900. Son of Haji Nawab Khan of Kulangar (W.W. 472). Served in various places as Ilaqadar during the reign of Amanullah. Joined Nadir Shah on his arrival in Afghanistan 1929. At the end of 1929 was appointed Commandant of Police, Mazar-i-Sharif.

Appointed Hakim-i-Kalan (Governor) of Ghazni December 1930. Was appointed Governor of the Eastern Province in November 1932, but did not take over as he was engaged in touring his district dealing with repercussions from the Dare Khel rebellion. The appointment was then altered and he became Governor of the Southern Province in December 1932. In Matun in January 1933 attempting to obtain the arrest of the Lewanai Faqir. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Under-Secretary in Ministry of Public Works, an appointment he still (1942) holds. Is believed to be capable and energetic.

An elder brother of (W.W. 244).

68. *Nawab Khan* (W.W. 472).—Haji, Khawaja of Kulangar, Logar. Born about 1865. Was a Hakim (Governor) in Mangal country during the reign of Ameer Habibullah Khan. Dismissed by Amanullah on account of old age. Joined Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in Jaji country during the revolution, and then joined the late King Nadir Shah, becoming his private secretary. In November 1930 was sent to disperse lashkars said to be gathering on the Kurram border. In 1931 proceeded to Mecca as the representative of Nadir Shah. In November 1931 went to Ghazni in connexion with the efforts to effect the surrender of Abdur Rahman (W.W. 198). In late 1932 was attempting to secure the arrest of the Lewanai Faqir (W.W. 412A). Visited Matun during the Khost disturbances 1933 and spent the summer of that year in the Southern Province conciliating the tribes. Was chief delegate to the Turi-Jaji Commission, which met on the Kurram border in June 1933. Was awarded 60 jaribs of land for his service in connexion with Khost disturbances. A man of some influence in the Southern Province and has been useful to the Government. Is now very old. Appointed equerry to King Zahir Shah, whom he frequently accompanies on drives. Has two sons, Firqa Mishar (major-general) Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 244), aide-de-camp to the King, and Nasrullah Khan (W.W. 469A), Muin (Under-Secretary) in the Ministry of Public Works. Abdul Jamil (W.W. 49) is his nephew.

69. *Obeidullah Khan* (W.W. 492).—Son of Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat; younger brother of ex-King Amanullah. Born 1915. Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 646), who employed a German tutor for him. Sent by Amanullah to Kandahar December 1928 with his family. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin with his mother 1930. Still in Berlin, living at the Afghan Legation November 1932. With Amanullah in Rome in December 1933. In October 1935 was living with his mother W.W. 646 in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933.

70. *Qurban Hussain Shah* (W.W. 512).—Known locally as "Shahji," Indian. His real name is Saiyid Abdullah Shah. Naib Salar (general). Son of one Nadir Shah of village Moghal, Fatehjang, Campbellpore district. Was one of the accused in a note-forging case in India, and absconded to Afghanistan in 1923. Was at one time employed by the Deutsch-Afghanische Company in Kabul. Joined Nadir Shah in the Southern Province in 1929. Was appointed in charge of the State workshops in December 1929, and was made an equerry to the King in 1930. For a time commanded the troops in the Koh-i-Daman in the 1930 rebellion. In 1931 started a petrol business, and was one of the main importers; his company was closed down in 1933 owing to a petrol monopoly having been given to a new petrol company, which he joined. Was in touch with the Ghadr party in Kabul and also with the Soviet Embassy (1932). In November 1932 went to the Southern Province to assist in suppressing the Dare Khel Zadran revolt. In 1936 in charge of the State Arsenal, Kabul. He is one of the leading business men of Kabul and deals largely with the War Office, being on good terms with Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414). The Prime Minister (W.W. 337), however, dislikes him. Is said to be extremely able, but dishonest and unscrupulous. Reported to have been deprived of the control of the State Arsenal later in 1936.

Proceedings against him on the forgery charge have been suspended indefinitely by the Punjab Government. Visits India periodically in connexion with the transportation of goods to Kabul for the Afghan Government. Definitely deprived of the control of the State Arsenal in summer of 1942 and appointed A.D.C. to War Minister.

71. *Rahimullah Khan* (W.W. 518).—Tajik. Son of Ataullah. Native of Kabul. Was head clerk in the Russian section of the Foreign Ministry. Became

Foreign Agent in Mazar. Afterwards transferred to Moscow as secretary to the Afghan Legation, and later on in the same capacity to Berlin. Appointed assistant in charge Visa Section, Afghan Foreign Office, December 1930. Relieved July 1931. In July 1932 transferred to the Home Ministry as Director, Posts and Telegraphs, an appointment he still (1939) holds. Appointment raised to a Ministry in June 1935.

Reported to be efficient and gets on well with Marconi's representative in Kabul. Stated to be keen on improvements and modern developments in his Department, but is slack and indifferent in carrying out his duties. His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939. Still holds both appointments (1942). Has pro-German sympathies.

72. *Rahmatullah Jan* (W.W. 519).—Muhammadzai. Eldest son of ex-King Amanullah and Queen Souriya. Born 1922. Proceeded to Europe with King 1928. Declared heir apparent 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and Bombay the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed for Italy with ex-King the 22nd June, 1929. Was still with Amanullah in Italy 1931, and is believed to be there now (1942). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

73. *Rasul Jan Agha* (*Fazl Rahim*) (W.W. 522).—Known as Fazl Rahim. Born about 1896. Son of the late Sher Agha, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar. Also known as Masum Jan. His wife is a sister of Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273). On the death of Sher Agha in June 1925 the title was assumed by his (Sher Agha's) half-brother, Muhammad Siddiq Agha (W.W. 613), although Rasul Jan Agha is the direct claimant by descent. Obtained signatures of 400 mullahs to a manifesto declaring King Amanullah's reforms contrary to Islam. Set out for Khost with Muhammad Siddiq Agha with intention of raising country against Amanullah. Both arrested and brought to Kabul, September 1928. Later released and Rasul Jan Agha was sent to Tagao to try and detach some of Bacha-i-Saqao's adherents December 1928. Was in touch with Bacha-i-Saqao during latter's second attack on Kabul in January 1929 and promised British Legation his protection during the attack. Later was intermediary between Sardar Inayatullah (W.W. 366), Bacha-i-Saqao and the British Legation for removal of Inayatullah to Peshawar by air. In Kabul, unemployed, December 1930. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca February 1933. Now calls himself Mian Jan and lived at Kandahar, where he has much influence, until transferred to Herat July 1935. Transferred to Kandahar 1936. Carries weight with the Ghilzais, especially the Suleiman Khel. Represents eldest branch of the family, but he lacks capacity. Now lives in Kabul (1942).

74. [Nil.]

75. *Saiyid Qasim* (W.W. 548).—Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Saiyid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W.W. 38) and arrival of Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612). Returned to Kabul May 1925, and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah (W.W. 327) February 1926. Appointed Afghan consul-general, Delhi, October 1926, *vice* Haji Muhammad Akbar (W.W. 153) and left Kabul for Delhi, the 20th November, 1926. Awarded Order of Astor, January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January, 1930. In December 1933 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly to members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W.W. 686A.

75A. *Salah-ud-Din Khan* (W.W. 553).—Born about 1893. Son of Mufti Siraj-ud-Din of Herat; native of Herat.

Used to be the editor of *Ittihad-i-Islam*. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612) brought him to Kabul and gave him the editorship of the paper *Tijarat* (*Commerce*). Afterwards became personal diarist to Amanullah. Appointed consul in Bombay 1930. In March 1933 acted as consul, Jeddah, in addition to his Bombay duties. Appointed consul-general in India August 1933. Visited Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar during the autumn of 1933, spreading pro-Nadir propaganda amongst the Ghilzais. His father, Mufti Siraj-ud-Din, left Delhi

for Herat in February 1934. Pays periodical visits to Kabul. Still, 1936, consul-general in India. Maintained one Nur Ahmad Khan in Lahore as propaganda and publicity agent. Took care to maintain his contact and popularity with editors and proprietors of Indian vernacular papers. In 1939 returned to Afghanistan. Appointed Controller of Broadcasting and Propaganda, November 1939. Appointed Director of Press and Publicity in 1940, which post he still (1942) holds.

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was once reported to be pro-Russian and pro-Republican, but appears to be trusted by Afghan Government. Has the reputation of entertaining anti-British sentiments.

76. *Sarbiland Khan* (W.W. 557).—Naib Salar (general). Ada Khel Jaji of Sargal, Hariob, son of Malik Azad Khan. Has only one eye. In Amanullah's reign was made a Kumandan (probably colonel) and for good work in the Khost rebellion was promoted brigadier. Assisted Nadir Shah in 1929, and for his good services was promoted Naib Salar (general). Was sent of Hariob in October 1930 to recruit for the regular army. Returned to Kabul early in December having failed to obtain any recruits. Collected 150 recruits from Bamian in September 1931. Went to his home via Peshawar and Parachinar in January 1932. Was employed to treat with the Suleiman Khel regarding customs dues in June 1932 and at Gardez suppressing the Dare Khel revolt in November 1932. Reported to have been granted property valued at over a lakh of Afghan rupees in 1933. Lives in Kabul. Has much influence with the Ada Khel Jajis, and is looked upon as their "Khan." Has a son, Niza Muhammad Khan, brigadier. Owing to financial difficulty was considering selling his Kabul houses in 1935. Reprimanded in the same year for smuggling silver into India. Left Kabul for Mecca via India December 1937. In Kabul (1942).

77. *H.R.H. Shah Mahmud* (*Mahmud Jan*) (W.W. 414).—Sardar Muhammadzai. Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of W.W. 337 and brother of W.W. 585. Appointed Sar Sar-i-Os, ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front 1919. Was in great favour with the Ameer for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Simat-i-Janubi (Southern Provinces) September 1919. In Khost February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardez December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Ameer. Returned to Gardez soon after. Shah Mahmud was in touch with Muhammad Hasan, B.A., at Makin and Haji Abdur Razaq at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921, and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent convoys of ammunition, rations and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Wana Wazirs and Mahsuds. Arrived in Kabul in October 1921, accompanied by his family. General Officer Commanding, Badakhshan and Kataghan, from 1922 to 1925. Appointed Governor of Eastern Province April 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad April 1926, and promised them similar treatment to that given by his brother, Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province and interviewed Afridis at Morgha July 1926. Visited Kabul to discuss Mohmand unrest with King November 1926. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad January 1927; visited Pesh Bolak and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Transferred from Jalalabad to Kabul February 1928. Appointed second secretary in the Ministry of Interior March 1928. In Kabul February 1929. Commissioned by Bacha-i-Saqao to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Joined Nadir Khan on his arrival in Khost March 1929. Assisted Nadir Khan in his campaign against Bacha-i-Saqao. Appointed War Minister by Nadir Shah November 1929. Left Kabul for Northern Provinces and in January 1931 was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of Northern Afghanistan. Succeeded in driving Ibrahim Beg across the Russian frontier and pacified the country sufficiently for him to be able to return to Kabul in August 1931. Awarded the Almar-i-Ala September 1931 and appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles). He suffered from goitre and hoped to take a cure for it in Germany in the autumn of 1932, but his visit to Europe was postponed owing to the Dare Khel outbreak in November 1932, during which he commanded a force of about two divisions in addition to tribal levies. His success in this affair was perhaps due as much to money as to fighting. Up to December 1932 he was still engaged in settling affairs in the Southern Province and handing over control to Nasrullah (W.W. 469A), the new Governor. Spent the spring and summer of 1933 in the Southern Province, visiting Kabul on one occasion. On

Nadir Shah's murder displayed great presence of mind dealing with the situation in Kabul. Proclaimed Zahir Shah King and swore allegiance to him. Appointed Commander-in-chief and Minister of War. Appears to possess considerable energy and force of character and is believed to be popular with the army. He is probably better fitted for the command of irregulars than of regular troops, having no real military education. He is vain, though at the same time shy and sensitive; is fond of sport and games and friendly to members of the British Legation. In addition to his military duties, is in charge of the Southern Province. He is said to be jealous of H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), his half-brother, and not always to agree with him in matters of policy.

Betrothed his two daughters to the two sons of the late Hayatullah, brother of ex-King Amanullah, December 1935. Sons were born to him in 1932 and 1936. Left for Europe March 1936 for medical treatment and has since been successfully operated upon for goitre in Berlin. Visited England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Returned to Kabul December 1936. Now (1937) said to be taking less interest in his work. Still (1942) War Minister. Son born to him in January 1940.

78. *H.R.H. Shah Wali Khan* (W.W. 585).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1885. Son of Sardar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of W.W. 414 and half-brother of W.W. 337. Was Rikab Bashi (equerry) to Ameer Habibullah. Accompanied him to India in 1907. After the Ameer's murder in February 1919 was arrested and sent to Kabul, but was acquitted and released. Commanded troops on Kharlachi front July–October 1919. Promoted general for good services on the Tochi border. Married a sister of ex-King Amanullah in May 1920. Appointed to command 1st Division in Kabul April 1921. Was on intimate terms with ex-King Amanullah and seemed to be his greatest personal friend. Was one of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Commanded 1st Cavalry Corps December 1921. Appointed to command the Kabul Corps 1923. Appointed Yawar Hazuri (equerry to the King) December 1924. Visited India in May 1925 and again in December 1925, when he persuaded Muhammad Umar (W.W. 648) to return to Afghanistan from Hyderabad. Commanded troops Logar during the Mangal rebellion 1924–25, and for his services was created "Taj-i-Afghan." Left Kabul for Paris September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Was with his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) February 1929, and proceeded with Nadir Khan to Khost March 1929. Captured Kabul the 13th October, 1929. Appointed Regent October 1929. Appointed Minister at London November 1929. Reached England the 10th January, 1930. Transferred to Paris June 1931. Came to Kabul on leave September 1932, bringing with him, under safe conduct, the late Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Paris and resumed his appointment February 1933. Able and quick-witted. A friendly and pleasant man. Very popular in Kabul, and consequently reported to be regarded with jealousy by his brother, the Prime Minister, Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). His popularity has somewhat diminished owing to the execution of Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Kabul February 1935, and appointed Acting Minister of Defence during absence of Shah Mahmud in Europe. His wife refused to accompany him and is still in Paris. Objects to the monopoly system of the Ashami Company. Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Hashim Khan in Europe (1936). Left Kabul in March 1937 to resume his appointment of Minister at Paris. Represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI.

Visited Kabul March 1939, and returned to Paris June 1939. Still (1942) Minister in Paris.

79. *Sher Agha* (see *Fazal-i-Umar*).

80. *Sher Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 598).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan. Born 1885. Acted in the appointment of Ishaq-Aghassi Nizami (Military Chamberlain) 1917. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Andkhui 1920. Suspended and arrived Kabul May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy 1921, and arrived in Peshawar on the 10th October *en route* with a large party of Afghan students who were proceeding to be educated in Europe. Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in negotiations for the purchase of arms until the summer of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expressed distaste for his own country. Appointed President of the Shaura (National Council) 1924. Leader of the party in favour of peaceful tactics during Urta Tagai crisis, January 1926. Cordially detested the late Mahmud Tarzi. With King Amanullah in Europe 1928. Appointed to still-born post of

Prime Minister September 1928, and subsequently to be head of the Public Service Bureau. Held Jalalabad for Amanullah November 1928. Was given full powers to settle the Shinwari rising, but failed and returned to Kabul December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929. Returned to Kabul later and was appointed Privy Counsellor by Nadir Shah December 1929. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran December 1930. A man of some ability, but indolent and corrupt. Said to entertain a profound contempt and dislike for the Persians, and to be very outspoken on the subject. Arrived in Kabul the 18th September, 1935, on a visit. Returned Tehran December 1935. Visited Kabul 1936, using a German aeroplane. Betrothed his nephew Muhammad Umar to Sultan, fourth sister of King Zahir Shah, October 1935.

Relieved by W.W. 140 as Ambassador at Tehran in April 1937. Appointed Minister of State October 1937. Still (1942) Minister of State.

81. *Shuja-ud-Daulah* (W.W. 612) of Ghorband.—Comes of a Trans-Oxus family. Born 1896. Was Ghulam Bacha (page) in 1916, and was employed looking after the German mission in Herat. Appointed Farash Bashi Hazuri (Head Chamberlain to the King) to Ameer Habibullah Khan January 1917. Appointed Kotwal of Kabul and Amin-i-Asas (chief of police) by Amanullah. Commanded 2nd Division in Kabul January 1921. One of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Appointed Minister of Security, and appeared to be a man of considerable ability. In close confidence of the Ameer. Officiated as Governor of Herat January 1921. Relieved and returned to Kabul at the end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in the Southern Province during the Mangal rebellion (1924). Appointed Minister at London August 1924, and arrived in London April 1925. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed to have made a considerable fortune. Gave trouble by failing to settle debts due by the Afghan Legation for rent, &c. Summoned to Kandahar by Amanullah February 1929. Arrived Herat the 28th March, 1929, and assumed duties as Governor on behalf of Amanullah. Fled to Meshed on arrival of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), Bacha-i-Saqao's nominee, May 1929. Returned to London via Tashkent–Moscow, and arrived the 11th July, 1929. Attempted to dispose of Afghan Government property, and on this account was asked to leave the country. In Berlin September 1929. In Moscow November 1929. Accompanied Amanullah to Mecca in 1931, returning to Europe via Beirut. Was in Germany in 1933. One of Amanullah's most active supporters. Is believed to be the actual murderer of the late Ameer Habibullah. Proved himself on all occasions ill-mannered and anti-British. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in pay of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W.W. 289. In Russia February 1936.

82. *Siddiq Agha Muhammad* (*Gul Agha*) (W.W. 613).—Son of Qaiyum Jan Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (W.W. 347), and half-brother of Fazl-i-Umar (Sher Agha) (W.W. 256). On the death of Qaiyum Jan Agha the title was assumed by the eldest son, Sher Agha. On the latter's death in June 1925 the title was assumed by Muhammad Siddiq Agha, in the absence of his half-brother, Sher Agha, then a political refugee in India. Was arrested, with Rasul Jan Agha (W.W. 522), for trying to stir up trouble in Khost, September 1928. Later released, and in February 1929 was reported to have accepted Bacha-i-Saqao's rule. In June 1929 was placed under surveillance in Kabul on account of his intrigues with Sher Agha in the Southern Province. Confined in the Arq, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul, October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt, and passed through Peshawar, *en route*, February 1931. Proceeded to Mecca, April 1931, to watch Amanullah. In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received in a friendly manner by the King and the Prime Minister. Sher Agha (W.W. 256) was reported to be trying to persuade him to resign, but he returned to Egypt in September 1932. Still (1935) Afghan Minister in Egypt. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister, Hejaz, in addition to duties as Minister, Egypt, April 1935. Visited Mecca during pilgrimage (1935), but evinced no sympathy for Amanullah. Will in future reside permanently in Hejaz, relinquishing duties of Minister, Egypt. Still (1937) Minister in Hejaz. Reappointed (1939), in addition, Minister to Egypt, and will reside at Cairo. Visited Kabul in July 1942.

83. *Sultan Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 624).—Son of Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 600). Assistant to Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450). Ambassador at Moscow, August 1920. Head of the Afghan mission to Angora 1921. Arrived in Baku, March 1921. Arrived in Angora in April. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of

Namazie, Angora, in August 1921. The subject of the address was the necessity for unity throughout the whole Moslem world, in order that the encroachments and intrigues of European Powers might be successfully resisted. Prayers were offered for the victory of the Turkish arms, and Sultan Ahmad Khan gave a donation of 2,000 liras to the Red Crescent. The Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul, Raskolnikov, instructed his Government early in September 1921, at the request of the Afghan Government, to provide Sultan Ahmad Khan with 40,000 roubles in gold, payment to be adjusted in Kabul. Returned to Kabul, April 1926, and was appointed third secretary in Foreign Office. Officiated as first secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450) on Urta Tagai Boundary Commission. Appointed second secretary, Foreign Office, June 1926, and first secretary, October 1926. Granted title of "Sardar-i-Ala," February 1927. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran, October 1928. Relieved November 1929 and returned to Kabul. Appointed to be in charge of State guests Kabul, January 1930. Went to Turkey as Ambassador, *vice* the late Ghulam Nabi, in December 1930. Took with him as secretary Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies. Was on intimate terms with the late Ghulam Nabi during his visit to Constantinople in December 1931. Visited Europe in 1933, and, as Afghan representative, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Brazil through their Embassy 1933. Appointed as an Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. Still (1936) Ambassador in Turkey. Visited Kabul, August 1935. To be Minister, Egypt, in addition to his other duties. A conceited, dissolute man, but appears to possess some ability. Represented King of Afghanistan at the funeral of King George V, January 1936. Visited Afghanistan April 1937 and returned to Angora June 1937. Appointed Ambassador at Moscow (1938). Still (1942) Ambassador at Moscow.

84. [Nil.]

85. *Ulya Hazrat* (W.W. 646).—Siraj-ul-Khawatin (Her Majesty the Sun of the Ladies). Step-sister of Luinab Khushdil Khan, daughter of the late Luinab Sherdil Khan, and step-daughter of Ishaq Aghassi Muhammad Sarwar Khan. Her name is Sarwar Sultan. Chief wife of Ameer Habibullah and mother of ex-King Amanullah Khan (W.W. 183). In 1915 said to be strongly in favour of neutrality. Very strong character and dabbled in politics. Said to have refused to help Turco-German mission in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 had numerous quarrels with Ameer Habibullah owing to her interference in political matters, and was eventually said to have been expelled from the Arq. After the murder of Habibullah, left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, Amanullah. Is believed by many to have been, with Amanullah, the organiser of the plot which resulted in the murder of Habibullah. Was said to have been of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a treaty of friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obeidullah, known as Sher Agha (W.W. 492), born 1915. Left for Kandahar with Queen Souriya, December 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise support for the Durrani Dynasty. Was not on good terms with Queen Souriya. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay, May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah, June 1929. In Berlin 1930 intriguing against Nadir Khan in favour of Obeidullah. Has remained in Europe 1929-35, mostly at Amanullah's residence at Rome, but occasionally visits Montreux in Switzerland, and Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Visited Mecca with ex-King Amanullah for 1935 pilgrimage.

In October 1935 was living with Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin.

Still (1942), so far as is known, in Europe.

86. *Yakub Khan* (W.W. 675).—Mohmand. Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of Agha Sami (W.W. 555). Born 1889. Was page to Ameer Habibullah. Numerous favours were conferred on him by Amanullah. Appointed a Musahib-i-Khas (Privy Councillor) in 1920, and Shahgassi Huzuri 1927. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927, and appointed Minister of Court. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar, January 1929, and to Bombay, May 1929. Left Bombay, June 1929, for Duzdap. Arrived Meshed, August 1929. Returned to Kabul 1929. Ordered to be deported for complicity in the Koh-i-Daman revolt 1930, but was detained in Jalalabad and later released. Said to be propagandising in favour of Amanullah. Went to Mecca on pilgrimage, April 1931. Arrived at Tehran with his brother W.W. 555, December 1931. Has a son, Musa Jan, born in 1916, and a daughter, who joined him in Tehran in 1933. Probably still in Persia, May

1935. His property in Afghanistan was confiscated in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Family deported from Kabul to Tehran, August 1935.

87. *Zalmi* (W.W. 691).—Musakhel, Mangal, Malik. A leader of rebels during Khost disturbances of 1924-25. Took refuge in Kurram valley, whence he was deported to Abbottabad 1925. Brought to Kabul with twenty other maliks, Zadran and Mangals, October 1926; treated as a guest and stayed with Ghulam Nabi Khan. Pardoned by the King, and returned to Khost, November 1926. Assisted Nadir Shah in 1929, and appointed Naib Salar (general) in May 1930. In August sent word to his tribe not to interfere in British affairs. Left Kabul in November 1930 to raise recruits in Khost, but was badly received. In June 1932 went to Ghazni to treat with the Ghilzais about customs dues, and arrived at a successful solution. Suspected of being concerned in the murder of Malik Sanak Mangal, and Khan (W.W. 399A), son of Sanak, was said to be plotting his assassination. Accompanied Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) to Gardez to put down the Dare Khel revolt in November 1932. Still an important figure in Mangal country. Usually lives in Kabul and is friendly to members of British Legation. Said, with W.W. 602A, to be trying to cause some unrest amongst the tribes in the Southern Province, January 1936.

88. *Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad* (W.W. 697).—Muhammadzai. Of no important family. Educated at Habibia College, Kabul. Went to France with Afghan students to look after them, and became guardian to Hidayatullah Khan (W.W. 348), son of Amanullah Khan. Was recalled to Kabul by Amanullah, and for some time was unemployed. During the revolution joined Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in the Eastern Province and became his private secretary. Went to Parachinar, where he joined Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (W.W. 585). Counsellor to the Afghan Legation in London 1931. Left London for Paris, with Shah Wali, in June 1931. Returned to Kabul, September 1931, and was appointed assistant to the Prime Minister. A talkative little man, speaks English fluently, and is very friendly towards members of the British Legation, Kabul. Visited Lahore in January and returned to Kabul, April 1936. Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939. Still (1942) Minister at Tokyo.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 5812/204/93]

No. 2.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 992.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, September 30, 1942.

MY telegram No. 988.

While the above was being despatched the Prime Minister called to say that this morning the Minister of the Interior had told him definitely he could no longer work with Minister of Finance. Consequently he, Nuri Pasha, was faced with the necessity of reshuffling the Cabinet as outlined in my telegram No. 973, paragraph 2. The Regent had agreed generally with his proposals except that His Royal Highness had demurred over having Abdul Azziz as Minister of the Interior, preferring that the latter should go to Finance. Before deciding finally, however, the Regent wished to know what His Majesty's Ambassador felt and had asked the Prime Minister to see his Excellency.

2. I had to tell Nuri Pasha that unhappily this could not be permitted. The fact is that the Ambassador had a slight set-back two days ago and has been running a slight temperature at intervals since. This has led the doctors (including the consultant, Colonel Lipscombe) to cut down drastically on visitors and talk. So I told the Prime Minister I would take the responsibility of answering the Regent's question.

3. In the discussion that ensued I told Nuri Pasha that while I was not enthusiastic about having Abdul Azziz as Minister of the Interior, I disliked very much the idea of his being Minister of Finance. He is an elderly politician and, according to my information, finicky and bad about taking decisions. Moreover, he does not know English, a sad handicap in dealing with British experts on supply problems. Finally, the work would be entirely new to him and its growing complexity would lead to inordinate delays. If he was in the Cabinet he would be more at ease as Minister of the Interior (a part he has already occupied, I think, five times) *always provided* he gave assurances to abide by the Government's policy and *not* on sentimental or other grounds let out undesirables now in Amarih concentration camp.

4. The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with these views and undertook to represent them to the Regent. If His Royal Highness agreed he would offer the Ministry of the Interior to Azziz in return for assurances, but say nothing about Finance, which would go to Saleh Jabr. He also agreed that if Azziz refused (which I rather hope he will and I believe Nuri Pasha does, too) then Saleh Jabr would remain Minister of the Interior while Finance would be offered to Abdul Illah Hafiz, now Minister of Economics and late Director-General of Revenue. He is not a very strong personality, but is honest and knows something about supply problems. Personally, I think this would be the best team.

5. I gather from the Prime Minister that Mutessarif of Bagdad will probably have to go.

[E 5818/204/93]

No. 3.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 998.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 2, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 914.

The Prime Minister told me this morning that as the political tempo had quickened somewhat following events of the last few days (my telegram No. 988), he was seeing the Regent this evening with a view to resigning on 3rd October and reforming on 5th October. As Abdul Azziz had declined to enter the proposed new Cabinet, he intended to keep the present Minister of the Interior and appoint Abdul Illah Hafiz to Finance, with Tewfik Suwaidi as Minister for Foreign Affairs. As regards this last appointment, however, he feared pressure was being brought to bear on the Regent to resist.

2. After discussing the position with the oriental counsellor, I decided to see His Royal Highness to let him know that in our view Tewfik Suwaidi would strengthen the Administration, and that we also welcomed the other two key appointments. The Regent seemed quite satisfied and was in excellent humour.

[E 5869/204/93]

No. 4.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 1008.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 5, 1942.

MY telegram No. 998.

Cabinet resigned on 3rd October. Nuri is forming a new Administration, but has not yet got his men together. Above is confidential for the present.

[E 5882/204/93]

No. 5.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 1009.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 6, 1942.

OFFICIALLY announced this morning, 6th October, that Cabinet resigned 3rd October. Prime Minister's resignation letter stated differences of opinion had developed among colleagues, principally on economic questions. These questions caused Minister of Finance's resignation, and Nuri therefore felt obliged to offer Regent Cabinet's resignation.

2. Regent, in reply, thanked Prime Minister and colleagues for good work during difficult period of office, and asked them to remain at posts pending formation of new Cabinet.

[E 5889/204/93]

No. 6.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 1011.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 6, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1008.

Nuri Pasha's efforts to form new Cabinet are apparently being obstructed by Taufiq Suwaidi, who is now trying to obtain the Portfolio of Interior or Finance with the rank of Deputy Prime Minister. He also seems to be trying to squeeze out Salih Jabr altogether.

[E 5908/204/93]

No. 7.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 1015.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 7, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1011.

Yesterday the Regent saw Nuri and Taufiq together in the presence of Muhammad Al Sadr.

Taufiq strongly advocated complete change of Cabinet, and particularly opposed inclusion of Salih Jabr and Abdul Mahdi.

Alternatives which he proposed were such men as Mustapha Al Umari and Umar Nazmi, who are quite unsuitable from our point of view and with whom it would be impossible for Nuri to work.

He also suggested that Nuri had no reason for retaining Salih Jabr except that the English had persuaded him to do so (this view he has apparently spread abroad widely among his political associates).

In addition, Nuri says that he did not at all like the tone in which Taufiq spoke of the late Government's policy towards Great Britain.

In these circumstances Nuri has been obliged to drop Taufiq, and now this being so puts Salih Jabr into Finance and Tahsin Askari (now the Minister at Cairo) into Interior.

He hopes to complete new Cabinet to-day.

[E 5924/204/93]

No. 8.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 1019.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 8, 1942.

FORMATION of following Cabinet announced this morning:—

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence: Nuri Said.

Interior: Tahsin Askari.

Finance: Salih Jabr.

Foreign Affairs: Abdulillah Hafiz.

Communications and Works: Abdul Mahdi.

Justice: Daud-al-Haidari.

Education: Tahsin Ali.

Economics: Muhsin Shallash.

Social Affairs: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.

[E 6356/204/93]

No. 9.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 293.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 14, 1942.

IN his despatch No. 207 of the 2nd August, His Majesty's Ambassador described the signs which suggested that the Cabinet might soon reach the end of its allotted span of life. The Minister of Finance was at odds with the Minister of the Interior and the two "Shia" Ministers were embarrassing their chief with demands for the appointment of another Minister of their sect. The truce which was then accepted by the discordant elements was intended to last until the end of August and, in the event, the Cabinet survived this period by only little over a month.

2. The Prime Minister began with the hope that before Parliament assembled in November he might be able to deal with the situation by making peace between the Ministers of Finance and Interior, adding a third "Shia" to his team and making a few minor changes among the other members. He soon found, however, that, although the Minister of Finance had been in Istanbul during most of August and September, his absence had done little to heal his quarrel with the Minister of the Interior, and soon after returning Ali Mumtaz was once more at loggerheads with Salih Jabr over the difficult matter of the collection and distribution of wheat. He accused Salih Jabr of wilful obstructions, and Salih Jabr retorted by charging him with dishonest speculation and corruption. Nuri Pasha's hopes of an easy settlement of his Cabinet troubles thereupon vanished and, realising that half-measures would be of no avail, he tendered his resignation to the Regent on the 3rd October.

3. He was at once invited to form a new Cabinet, and having already made his plans he embarked on this task with confidence. He had decided (after considerable consultation with this embassy, in the course of which we had consistently emphasised the necessity for a strong personality at the Ministry of Finance) that Salih Jabr must be retained and that Ali Mumtaz would in consequence have to go. He hoped to persuade Taufiq Suwaidi to accept the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and help him to bear the burden of the parliamentary work which he had found so exhausting during the last session, and he had an eye on two or three suitable men to complete the required "Shia" quota. He wanted to replace Tahsin Ali at Education by Amin Zaki, to move Salih Jabr to Finance to grapple with Iraq's economic and supply difficulties and to put Abdul Azziz-al-Qassab into Interior in his stead. The other Ministers, excepting perhaps Jamal Baban, he meant to keep.

4. Unfortunately, his luck seemed to be out. Taufiq Suwaidi, with an irresponsibility that shakes one's confidence in him, made impossible demands. He wanted most of the old Ministers, including Salih Jabr and Abdul Mahdi, to be dropped and to introduce men such as Umar Nazmi and Mustafa-al-Umari, with whom Nuri Pasha knew that it would be impossible for him to work in harmony. Furthermore, he was dissatisfied with the offer of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs unless he could also have the title of Deputy Prime Minister (for which there is no constitutional provision) and asked for either Interior or Finance for himself. He spoke in disparaging terms of the late Government's policy of close co-operation with His Majesty's Government and declared that Nuri Pasha was retaining Salih Jabr only because the British had told him to do so.

5. In these circumstances, Nuri Pasha had no alternative but to give up the idea of including the "Red Fox" in the new Cabinet. Nor did the rest of the Prime Minister's plan work out smoothly. Abdul Azziz-al-Qassab and Amin Zaki both declined office (fortunately, in my view) on account of their poor health, and Tahsin Ali was unexpectedly protected by the Regent, who, for personal reasons which I have not yet fathomed, pressed for his retention. In consequence of these set-backs, the Prime Minister was obliged to modify his original intentions and it was not until the 5th October that he completed his new Cabinet in the following manner:—

Prime Minister and Minister for Defence: Nuri Said.

Foreign Affairs: Abdul Illah Hefidh.

Interior: Tahsin-al-Askari.

Finance: Salih Jabr.

Justice: Daud-al-Haidari.

Communications and Works: Abdul Mahdi.

Education: Tahsin Ali.

Economics: Abdul Muhsin-al-Shallash.

Social Affairs: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.

As you will see, there is no fundamental change in the Cabinet except for the dropping of Ali Mumtaz, and six of the late Ministers return to office. Abdul Muhsin-al-Shallash (the third "Shia") has been a Minister of Finance in former Cabinets, and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, a civil servant, whose last post was Director-General of Supplies, passes as a Kurd in virtue of his membership of the Baban family.

6. The Cabinet has lost vigour by the departure of Ali Mumtaz, and without Taufiq Suwaidi it will, as Nuri Pasha himself foresees, be weak in debate. In political circles it is expected that Taufiq Suwaidi will now join the ranks of those opposed to the Prime Minister and that in the Senate there will be strong criticism of his administration by a compact, hostile group including Jamil Madfai and Mustafa-al-Umari. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether these men wish to assume the responsibility of governing the country in the present difficult circumstances, and they may, therefore, be shy of pressing home their attacks.

7. In a public statement which he made on returning to office the Prime Minister declared that the programme of the new Cabinet would remain unchanged, and that he and his colleagues would devote their attention especially to improving the distribution of essential supplies and the reform of public education. He is without doubt right to give first importance to supplies.

8. The Government's plans for building up stocks of wheat with which to feed the urban population have not yet produced the results hoped for. The supplies needed for the bakeries and for the sale of flour in small quantities at a controlled price have up to the present been maintained in most places, but of the reserve stock of 100,000 tons which it was estimated would be needed to meet the demands of the towns until next harvest only about 40,000 tons have so far been collected. The policy of compelling the owners of large stocks of wheat to sell to the Government at the fixed prices has, however, only been in operation for a little over a month and on the information available it is not unreasonable to hope that, as each month passes, further quantities will be located, bought up and distributed fast enough to keep pace with current consumption.

9. A similar handling of a number of other essentials of life will, however, be necessary if the great mass of the townspeople are to be saved from severe hardship during the coming winter. For a variety of reasons, which it is unnecessary to discuss in this despatch, the prices of all food-stuffs and consumers' goods, including many things of which there is no real shortage, have been rising rapidly and the wage-earning classes are facing the oncoming winter with acute anxiety. In consequence, on all sides demands are being pressed for substantial wage increases, and unless urgent measures are taken to peg down market prices or to ensure rationed supplies of cheap food and clothing we shall soon, I fear, see wages vainly mounting in pursuit of prices until inflation and economic chaos result.

10. Compared with the complex systems of the industrialised countries of Europe, the national economy of Iraq is simple, but the fact has to be faced that the administrative machine is woefully inadequate to deal with current problems even in the elementary form in which they occur in this country. The small group of British officials who are trying to establish a working control over supplies are now, however, beginning to make some slight headway, and I try to hope that

before winter comes the position may have been improved. It is, nevertheless, clear that the feeding, clothing and housing of the people is the most urgent and important problem that the Government have to face, and I would that I could detect some real evidence of a robust determination to tackle these problems. Instead, one has to fight against inertia, lack of public spirit and widespread stupidity on the part of politicians, vested interests and the propertied classes.

11. Hostile war propaganda is now at a low ebb and confidence in an Allied victory steady. Two important factors influencing public opinion were, first, the stories brought back by Iraqi visitors to Turkey that well-informed Turks were convinced of German defeat and, secondly, Stalingrad's stubborn defence in face of Germany's reckless attacks.

12. In tribal affairs the Shammar have been attracting more than usual attention during the last two months. The late Sheikh Ajil-al-Yarwar built up great wealth through his astute exploitation of the opportunities offered to him by the development of oil-fields in the Northern Jezirah and by the construction of the broad-gauge railway through the Shammar *dira*. He also cultivated influential friends in high places and through them acquired much land. This was given to him in order that he might settle his tribe and persuade them to give up their old habits of marauding. What he did, however, was to farm the land for his own profit with hired labour without attempting to settle the Bedouin Shammar. His son Sufuk, who succeeded him after his death not long ago, has not, unhappily, the same strong hold over the tribe as his father and rival scions of the numerous shaikhly house are now competing with him jealously for a share in his inherited wealth and influence. Of these the Aulad Faisal are the most forceful, and one of their most troublesome activities has been their persistent blackmailing of the Iraqi Government and British army contractors. Their practice is to demand large sums from all contractors working in the Shammar *dira* on the pretext of providing local "protection" for the work. Towards the end of August a quarrel flared up between three shaikhs of the Aulad Faisal and a shaikh of another branch of the shaikhly family as to who should enjoy the right of extorting money in this manner from British army contractors working on certain sectors of the Mosul-Tel Kotehek Road, and a fight followed in which one of the Aulad Faisal and a number of the followers on each side were killed. The forces engaged were so large and well-armed that the Iraqi police in a nearby post were afraid to intervene and the contractors in the neighbourhood were so unnerved that they stopped work and for some time refused to go back to this part of the road. Owing to a lack of proper understanding between the Mutasarrif at Mosul and the Minister of the Interior an unduly long delay occurred before this affair was dealt with, and it was not until the 2nd October that the principal participants were brought into Mosul and locked up. So soon as this was done the contractors were able to resume work, but further disciplinary measures will have to be taken before the unruliness of the Shammar is satisfactorily curbed.

13. The cognate quarrel of the Shammar with the Yezidi shaikh Daud-i-Daud has not yet been fully settled by the Iraqi Government, and peace between the two tribes is only preserved by detaining Daud-i-Daud in Sulaimani: an arrangement that cannot be prolonged indefinitely.

14. Dohuk and Armadiyah have not yet been altogether freed from the marauding bands which have intimidated the villagers for so long. On the 25th August fifteen men raided the Assyrian village of Barzangi, in the Armadiyah district, brutally murdered a priest and looted his house. Only one arrest has so far been made for this crime, but about forty men are now awaiting trial for other outrages committed by these gangs.

15. During the latter part of the summer the Diwanayah liwa was the scene of a number of tribal conflicts, the worst of which took place on the 9th September, when a body of men of the Aqra tribe attacked five of the Khazail and, having killed them all, mutilated their bodies. Police intervention stopped the spread of the fighting, but the temper of both tribes remains hot and their future action uncertain. Their quarrel, like so many on the Euphrates, is an old one, and the Aqra state that their treatment of the Khazail dead was retaliation for a similar outrage committed by Khazailis on Aqra men five years ago. These disturbances have no major political significance, but they show how wild and brutish the greater part of the population still is, and give sinister point to the reports which I receive of the large number of rifles and cartridges which the tribes in all parts of the country have secured for themselves during recent years.

16. On the night of the 29-30th August the railway line near Hillah was blown up by a percussion bomb of some kind as a train was passing. Little

damage was done, and no casualties were caused. Those responsible have not yet been traced, and it has not yet been established what type of bomb or mine had been placed under the track.

17. In late September there was a serious outbreak of agrarian trouble in the Hai in the Kut liwa. Men of the Al Aid tribe raided sheep belonging to a neighbouring Sadun landlord who had refused them permission to pass a canal through his land to the river. When he and a relative went with two policemen to recover the sheep the tribesmen ambushed and killed most of the party. The tribal leaders rejected a twenty-four hours' ultimatum to submit, but in a fight with the police that followed the tribesmen were dispersed and are thought to have lost about eighty men killed and seriously wounded. The police casualties were eight men killed and twenty-five wounded.

18. The Regent went to Amman on the 31st August to visit his uncle, the Amir Abdullah, and remained until the 8th September. During his absence a Council of Regency exercised the Royal prerogatives on his behalf. The members were Muhammad-al-Sadr, President of the Senate; Hamdi-al-Pachachi, the President of the Chamber of Deputies; and Jamil Madfai, Senator and former Prime Minister.

19. The Prime Minister's efforts to obtain a suitable Egyptian educationalist to undertake the task of putting through urgently-needed reforms, both in the Ministry of Education and in the whole system of public instruction, have, unhappily, not yet borne fruit. On the 10th October he flew to Cairo with Professor Hamley to make a direct personal appeal to the Egyptian Government to release Professor Gourbal for a year or, failing him, some other suitable senior official from the Egyptian Education Service. A new term has already begun, and the desired changes must be made soon if they are to have any influence on the current year's work of the colleges and schools.

20. The Regent and the Prime Minister were both much disappointed and a little hurt that Mr. Churchill was unable to stop a while in Iraq during the course of his visit to the Middle East in August. Their feelings were eventually assuaged by the encouraging personal message which Mr. Churchill sent to Nuri Pasha on returning to London.

21. Mr. Wendell Willkie visited Iraq in the middle of September as the personal representative of the President of the United States. His stay of two days in Bagdad was filled with a heavy programme, which he worked through with successful vigour and aplomb. He seems to have convinced most Iraqis whom he met that America is now wholeheartedly in the war, and determined to win. Mr. T. Murray Wilson, the newly-appointed Minister Resident of the United States, presented his letters of credence to the Regent on the 26th September. I have not yet had occasion to meet him more than a few times, but my impression is that he wishes to be friendly and helpful.

22. The Saudi Arabian Government have informed the Iraqi Government that they can accept no responsibility for any convoys that may attempt to make the overland journey for the Haj on the Darb Zubaida, which the Iraqis insisted on using last year, and have added that even the alternative route from Zubair through Hafar should only be used by vehicles which the Iraqi authorities are satisfied are fitted for the long journey to Mecca. Motor transport and tyres are becoming scarce, and most serviceable vehicles are profitably engaged on war or other work. The overland pilgrimage from Iraq is therefore likely to be very small this year.

23. There have been no events on the Perso-Iraqi frontier since Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's last general despatch at the beginning of August, and most of the Kurdish tribes on the Persian side of the border now seem to have established some kind of *modus vivendi* with the Persian authorities.

24. The Turkish Government have not yet agreed to extradite Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, the fugitive Iraqi rebel general, and there is now little prospect of their being persuaded to do so.

25. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jeddah and Beirut, the Minister of State at Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Headquarters, Middle East, the Middle East Intelligence Centre, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent, Koweit, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

[E 6384/204/93]

No. 10.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 1095.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 30, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1078, paragraph 2.

We are now threatened with an acute Cabinet crisis, but not over the problem of supply. The Prime Minister called to-day in order to say that the quarrel between the Ministers of Communications (Abdul Mahdi) and of Education (Tahsin Ali) had reached a stage in which it might easily involve the Minister of Finance. The dispute had originated in a complaint by the Minister of Communications—a fanatical Shiah—that, out of eleven candidates from Mosul for Higher Teachers' College, seven had been Christians. Although high words had passed between the two in his presence, the Minister of Education had agreed to investigate the matter, and that should have ended the discussion. Unhappily, however, each Minister had accused the other of having been insulting. Personally, he thought Abdul Mahdi was to blame, and he would willingly accept his resignation were it not for the fact that the Minister of Finance tended to sympathise with his co-religionist. If Saleh Jabr went, the Cabinet would fall to pieces. The Regent had seen the Minister of Communications in the presence of the Minister of Finance, but His Royal Highness's intervention had failed to produce a solution. Nuri Pasha therefore appealed to me to see Saleh Jabr myself, as he thought he might be influenced by any advice I might see fit to extend to him.

2. As I am of the opinion that the collapse of the Cabinet on the very eve of the opening of Parliament, and when the whole country is awaiting some ministerial action on their very real economic discomforts, would be extremely serious, I readily agreed to do what I could.

3. The Minister of Finance received me this morning. I opened the conversation by reminding him that on the 27th October I had confessed my anxiety over the economic difficulties of the country. I was now even more worried over the sudden deterioration in the political situation. All of the information, I added, indicated that the people were becoming increasingly impatient over the failure of the Government to do anything to ensure their food supply, control of prices, &c., and I sympathised with their attitude, for the fact was that no constructive action whatever had been taken since his predecessor went to Turkey on leave at the beginning of August. If a Cabinet crisis were now to supervene over a question of personalities, I feared there might easily be serious trouble. It really was challengeable, I went on, that at this great moment in history personal disputes on trivial matters should menace us all with such grave possibilities.

4. Saleh Jabr said he entirely agreed. Ever since he had heard of the dispute between his two colleagues he had been working to promote a settlement. The trouble had really started last summer, when it had become apparent to most of the Cabinet that the Minister of Education was a complete failure (this is, unfortunately, only too true), but he had been protected by the Regent (also true), and it had only been due to the latter's strong representations that Abdul Mahdi had agreed to serve at all with Tahsin Ali when the present Administration was formed. The Minister of Finance also launched into a long and detailed explanation of the quarrel, which, in a variety of respects, did not coincide with Prime Minister's version. The main point, however, was that, rightly or wrongly, Abdul Mahdi felt that he had been bitterly insulted and was so upset that he had even threatened suicide. Nothing would persuade him to work with Tahsin Ali. If, however, he were to be sacrificed for this reason the effect on the Shiah [group omitted] would be grave. Saleh Jabr could not regard this with any equanimity; any such [group undecipherable: ? outburst]s would weaken his position and give a powerful weapon to the many enemies he had made over his internment policy while Minister of the Interior. (I think there is a lot in this view.) And he needed all the support he could get in his present post (this is certainly a fact). As the result of the intervention, at his request, of Mohammed-al-Sadr (the President of the Senate) last night, the Regent had agreed to the dropping of Tahsin Ali after a decent interval. On hearing this the Minister of Finance had made a further approach to the Minister of Communications, who had outlined this as a solution, *provided* the Prime Minister gave him an assurance that the Minister of Education would resign not to-morrow or the next week, but *soon*. Saleh Jabr hoped very much that Nuri Pasha, whom he would see to-day, would agree.

5. In wishing the Minister of Finance success, I repeated again my warning about the temper of the people, and added that, if these perpetual crises over personalities continued, the world would rapidly come to the conclusion that Iraq was not fit for self-government. He readily agreed, and gave me his personal assurance that, whatever happened, he himself would not take the initiative in resigning. He undertook to let me know the result of his interview with the Prime Minister. If he felt that any action on my part would help he would seek my further intervention.

6. I telephoned the Prime Minister in guarded terms and said that I thought a possible settlement was in sight. I hoped he would listen carefully to what Saleh Jabr had to say. There the matter rests for the moment. I regret the length of this telegram, but felt you should have the facts.

[E 6400/204/93]

No. 11.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 1099.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 31, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1095.

The Prime Minister told me this morning that he had discussed the situation with the Minister of Finance after my interview with the latter yesterday and had informed him that he would agree to solving the crisis by eventually dropping the Minister of Education. This morning Nuri Pasha had so informed the Regent, who, however, denied that he had ever given the President of the Senate any undertaking about Tahsin Ali, so the whole business was once more in the melting-pot. The Prime Minister added that in the circumstances he proposed to await developments, and in the meanwhile not to accept the resignation of the Minister of Communications. The Cabinet would, at any rate, be in existence for to-morrow's opening of Parliament, and, for the rest, he attached importance to the assurance that the Minister of Finance had given me not to take any initiative himself towards resignation.

2. You will also appreciate that the Prime Minister, by showing himself ready to accept the settlement favoured by Saleh Jabr, would seem to have protected himself against any accusation of having ignored "Shiah" interests in this affair.

3. Were it not for the pressing need of early action on the economic front, I should be tempted myself, in the light of all the foregoing, to follow the President's example and "wait and see." The state of the country, however, affords every justification for a continued display of interest, and I therefore contemplate seeing the Regent on the 2nd November to talk over the whole position. His protection of the Minister of Education—whom the Prime Minister to-night described as "within [group undecipherable: ? circle]"—is disturbing and may well stand in the way of the disappearance of both the quarrelsome Ministers, which might be the best solution of all.

[E 6384/204/93]

No. 12.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Thompson (Bagdad).

(No. 1005.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 1, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1095 [of 30th October: Political situation in Iraq].

I approve your language and count on you to continue your efforts to reach solution of this unwelcome dispute.

2. I am most anxious that Shiah community should take their fair share in the administration of the country. In return, it seems to me incumbent upon Shiah Ministers to show discretion in dealing with their colleagues. Tendency to present a united front, regardless of the merits of the case, whenever one of them disagrees with policy pursued in some other Ministry, must lead to constant crises and seems to me calculated to discredit Shiah community as a whole. If you think it useful, you may tell Minister of Finance that these are my views, adding that I welcome assurance reported in paragraph 5 of your telegram and confidently look to him to concentrate his energy on dealing with the really important questions that confront him in regard to supplies.

[E 6422/204/93]

No. 13.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 2.)(No. 1101.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, November 1, 1942.*

PARLIAMENT was opened this morning with customary ceremony. Unique feature of the event was that this is the first time in the history of Iraq that any Legislature has embarked on its fourth and final session. Reception accorded to the Regent and other dignitaries was, I am advised, neither more nor less than on previous occasions.

2. Speech from the Throne was rather unduly concerned with Arab ambitions, &c., and was disappointing in the paucity of its reference to urgent economic [group undecipherable: ? considerations]. Fuller appreciation follows.

3. Minister of Communications did not sit with his colleagues.

[E 6537/204/93]

No. 14.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 7.)(No. 1121.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, November 6, 1942.*

MY telegram No. 1104.

Cabinet dispute drags on. The Prime Minister told me last night that he had been having further talks with Minister of Communications in the hope that the latter might stay, but he was proving obdurate. Meanwhile the Regent was still somewhat cross about dropping the Minister of Education, whom His Royal Highness regarded as the offended party in the present dispute.

2. I urged the Prime Minister to expedite a solution, since the present uncertainty was reacting adversely upon prestige of his administration. While it was no doubt true on this occasion Tahsin Ali had not been the aggressor, the Regent should remember that relations between the two ministers had been bad for some time and this was not the first quarrel between them. The Prime Minister replied that this was so and he had, in fact, advised His Royal Highness that Tahsin Ali had had a long enough innings. [Group undecipherable: ? This] matter would be settled in a day or two.

3. I suspect difficulty of finding successors is holding the matter up to some extent. At present the Prime Minister is considering either Abbas Mahdi or Salman Al Barrak to replace Abdul Mahdi.

[E 6538/204/93]

No. 15.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 7.)(No. 1128.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, November 7, 1942.*

MY telegram No. 1121.

As impatience over persistent deadlock in the Cabinet is now rapidly growing and might very soon lead to resignations of Ministers not directly concerned, I have informed the Prime Minister that unless an immediate solution can be found through the departure of Abdul Mahdi and Tahsin Ali, we may be confronted with the downfall of the Government, which would react adversely upon British and Iraqi interests. I have asked him to represent these views to the Regent.

2. It is difficult to understand Nuri Pasha's hesitations over this issue, but, whatever their cause, they are certainly doing him harm. The Minister of Justice called this morning and expressed his concern over the situation. He hinted that the Prime Minister was "tired" (actually he is looking extremely well). In the course of a long and frank conversation I took the line that a major crisis was to be avoided at the present time when it is so important for the Minister of Finance to tackle the economic problem which daily grows more acute.

3. I have the impression from Daud's observations and from what I hear from other sources that, if the administration should collapse, Nuri Pasha might

not find it easy to form another Cabinet. If the resulting confusion led to nothing worse it would inevitably entail further useless bickering and lack of confidence. So, I feel, in the hope of ensuring some breathing space—if only a month or two—there is every advantage in pressing both the Prime Minister and the Regent to grasp the nettle of ridding themselves of both Ministers of Education and Communications.

[E 6538/204/93]

No. 16.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Thompson (Bagdad).(No. 1027.)
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, November 8, 1942.*

YOUR telegram No. 1128 [of 7th November: Political situation in Iraq].

I am inclined to agree that best solution would be for the Prime Minister to get rid of both Ministers. But I do not greatly care how he settles this dispute so long as he settles it quickly. With supply problems outstanding there is no time for these ridiculous personal quarrels among minor members of the Government.

2. You may make it clear to the Regent, Prime Minister and anyone else you wish that these are my views.

[E 6565/204/93]

No. 17.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 9.)(No. 1134.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, November 9, 1942.*

YOUR telegram No. 1027 arrived most opportunely and was handed to me during my interview with the Prime Minister this morning. I made what I hope was effective use of its contents in support of advice previously given, which I was in process of repeating.

2. Nuri Pasha said that the Regent had made difficulties over Tahsin Ali, and he had also had to argue at length with the Minister of Finance over possible successors. The latter had now chosen his candidate, and he hoped he would now be able to go ahead. He would inform the Regent of your views.

3. Stressing once more the need for urgency, I pointed out that the atmosphere created by the recent war developments should make it easy for him to act decisively and without delay.

[E 6587/204/93]

No. 18.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 10.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 67. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)*Bagdad, November 2, 1942.*

MY telegram No. 1101.

Speech from the Throne at opening of Parliament on 1st November opened with congratulations to Deputies on having reached their fourth consecutive session without a dissolution. War situation was then reviewed and grounds for optimism found in recent addition to ranks of Allied Nations, the decreased chances of the spread of the war from Europe further eastwards and the growing strength of the democratic Powers.

2. The foreign policy of the Government would, it was stated, continue unchanged, based on good relations with Iraq's neighbours, the development of closer ties with kindred Arab States and the fulfilment of the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance. Its aim would also be the realisation of the desires of the Arab States whose achievement of independence had been delayed and to whom satisfaction had been assured in the undertakings given by the British Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The occasion of the visit of Mr. Wendell Willkie had been taken to explain the Arab question to him and to impress on him the necessity for modifying the claims to special rights and privileges in Arab countries put forward by certain States wherever such claims were in conflict with recent world developments.

3. In internal affairs the speech indicated the aims of the Government would be to continue to strengthen the army, to improve education and to find remedies for the existing problem of the control and distribution of essential supplies.

4. As already stated, the speech was disappointing in the paucity of its reference to economic questions, in which the country is more interested than in anything else at the moment, and in general was, in my opinion, a most mediocre effort.

[E 6696/204/93]

No. 19.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 1148.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 13, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1134.

The Prime Minister told me last night that he hoped, in the absence of unforeseen complications, to settle Cabinet deadlock not later than this week-end. His plan is as follows: Abdul Razzag Uzri (Shiah) now Mutessarif of [group undecypherable] yala, to enter the Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs, present incumbent of that post replacing Abdul Mahdi in Communications Department; Salman al Barrak (Shiah) to replace the present Minister of Economics, who is too ill to carry on.

2. As regards the vexed problem of the Minister of Education, the Minister of Health, after much persuasion, had agreed to "invite" him to succeed Abbas Mahdi as head of the Royal Cabinet, the latter having been appointed Minister in Tehran. This move would take place as soon as *agrément* was received from the Persian Government.

3. Nuri Pasha explained that this compromise had been necessitated by the Regent's anxiety to "save the face" of the Minister of Education. Actually, it also fits in well with the desire that the Prime Minister has long entertained to get Abbas Mahdi out of the Palace.

4. It is doubtful if these manoeuvres will please Minister of Finance, and Nuri Pasha asked me to do anything I could to ensure his acceptance. As I am anxious to avoid a major crisis, if possible, since a lull of two or three months is urgently required if any progress is to be made in tackling economic problem, I am taking action accordingly.

[E 6714/204/93]

No. 20.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 1150.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 14, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1148.

The Regent, who is leaving to-morrow for a week's shooting, received me this morning. After His Royal Highness had expressed his great pleasure over the good news from Africa, I informed him that, at the request of the Prime Minister, I had a long interview with [group undecypherable: ? Minister of Finance], to whom I had recommended Nuri Pasha's proposed solution of present Cabinet deadlock. Disth Jabr had agreed to everything except the appointment of Sulman Barraaq and had left me with the intention of suggesting certain alternatives to the Prime Minister, which might or might not be acceptable. With these details, however, I was not concerned. What did interest me, and what was becoming hourly more necessary, was an early settlement, for reasons in last sentence of my telegram under reference. The Regent signified his agreement and intimated that he would be seeing Nuri Pasha later this morning.

2. I took the opportunity to mention that I had been a trifle disconcerted by the suddenness with which the Prime Minister had lately confronted me with a *fait accompli* in the shape of a parliamentary request for Iraqi accession to 26-Power Pact (see my telegram No. 1147). What had troubled me had been Nuri Pasha's admission that he had himself inspired this action. I felt that such a step, on a political issue of major importance, should have been preceded by consultation. This did not mean that I wished to discourage the Iraqi participation, far from it. But I should have liked to have been able to warn His Majesty's Government that this impressive initiative was impending. Apart

from this, it seemed to me dangerous tactics to exploit the Legislature in this manner. For example, some days ago a deputy head raised the question of releases from Amamth camp. I had every reason to suppose that he had done so on [group undecypherable] from Administration. This alarmed me, as I knew that strong influences were at work to let dangerous internees out, and for this I could see no justification at the present time.

3. Finally, I said that I thought it regrettable that, at a moment when there were so many urgent domestic problems awaiting solution, so much time and thought were being devoted to external questions of high policy which were in no way immediate. It was an illusion to suppose that the war was nearly over. On the contrary, I had the impression that we were entering a phase of hard fighting calling for continued effort and maximum skill.

4. His Royal Highness took all this in excellent part. As regards 26-Power Pact, he observed that many people felt that, unless Iraq acted now, she would be accused of hanging back. He appreciated my point about the necessity for consultation, but the Prime Minister no doubt felt that he had discharged his obligations in this respect last spring. For the rest, he thoroughly agreed. He was aware of the move to liberate certain prominent political prisoners and was entirely opposed to it. He also agreed that there was a tendency to concentrate too much on foreign political issues, but this had always been one of the Prime Minister's weaknesses.

5. In taking my leave I emphasised our one desire at the moment was to co-operate with and help Administration in every way possible, and that this was one of the reasons that I was so anxious that a real Cabinet crisis should be avoided. His Royal Highness replied that he fully appreciated our attitude.

[E 6712/204/93]

No. 21.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 1156.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 15, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1148, paragraph 1.

New Cabinet appointments are officially announced to-day.

2. As regards paragraph 2, Prime Minister told me last night that he expected movements to take place very shortly.

[E 6850/204/93]

No. 22.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 1166.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 19, 1942.

MY telegram No. 1150, paragraph 2.

On 16th November, in the Senate, Subih Daftari urged the Government to modify their internment policy and to release political prisoners from Amarah camp. His appeal led to forceful reply from the Minister of Finance who, in assuming full responsibility for the detentions, made while he was Minister of the Interior, declared them to be fully justified.

2. The attitude of the Prime Minister is not, however, so firm. He has told me that he favours releasing number of detainees and allowing them to live "somewhere in the south," with the obligation to report periodically to the police. To this end he has appointed committee, consisting of British Adviser to the Minister of the Interior, British head of C.I.D. and [group undecypherable: ? British] Director-General of Police, to review cases of all prisoners now in Amarah.

3. This is strong committee, and I have impressed on Mr. Edmonds and Major Wilkins the necessity of proceeding with caution, with which they agree. And I shall do my best to ensure that the Prime Minister does not go beyond their recommendations.

4. Unfortunately, his Excellency is in "appeasing" mood and anxious, from all I hear, to "make friends" as widely as possible. I suspect that he is influenced by ambitions connected with future political negotiations in Arab affairs. Be this as it may, his present attitude is regrettable, because it suggests that he is unlikely to support the Minister of Finance in strong measures against

hoarders, speculators and profiteers, the need for which Saleh Jabr is now coming to realise. Nuri Pasha's reluctance to concern himself actively with solving internal economic problems is, in the opinion of British Adviser to Ministry of Finance, one of the main reasons for the present lack of progress. I shall endeavour to the best of my ability to combat this inertia.

[E 6850/204/93]

No. 23.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Thompson (Bagdad).

(No. 1065.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 22, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1166 [of 19th November: Political situation in Iraq].

I am much disturbed by your account of the Prime Minister's attitude. If unnecessary suffering and discontent are to be avoided the Iraqi Government must take vigorous action to deal with the various urgent economic problems awaiting a solution. I had hoped that new spirit of confidence arising from our victories in North Africa would not encourage a man of Nuri's experience to act as if the war was as good as over but, on the contrary, that opportunity would be seized by him for tackling these problems seriously. You may let him know that His Majesty's Government look to him in this matter and may like to draw his attention personally to what Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said on this subject on winding up the debate on the Address on 12th November (text telegraphed to Minister of State). Even from his own point of view Nuri should realise that these economic problems will not vanish the moment the war is over and that his ambitions will require that there should not be economic and financial chaos in his own country.

2. I am also strongly opposed to any slackening in the measures taken against hostile elements in Iraq. The release of even a few of the internees will inevitably encourage the friends of the rest to put increasing pressure on the Iraqi Government to release them too, and these people can be counted upon to make trouble for the Iraqi Government and ourselves at the first favourable opportunity.

3. I am, moreover, doubtful of the wisdom of associating British officials too closely with responsibility for refusing the release of any internees unless greater attention than in the past is paid to their views as to who should be interned. If, as I understand, some of the worst offenders have been saved from internment by friends in high places, Adviser in the Ministry of the Interior, &c., might surely be placed in very difficult position when considering appeals from less dangerous among the internees. I should be glad of your views on this.

[W 15825/411/49]

No. 24.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 317.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 7, 1942.

WITH reference to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's despatch No. 218 of the 10th August, enclosing a copy of the report by His Majesty's Consul at Mosul on the formation in that town of a British Community Council, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Basra regarding the creation of a similar body in his consular district.

2. Mr. Knight is, I consider, to be warmly congratulated on his achievement, since I am persuaded that without his early appreciation of the critical attitude adopted by the greater part of his community towards the scheme and the tactics which he employed to defeat their obstructive tendencies the project would never have materialised.

3. In view, however, of the observations contained in the second paragraph of Mr. Knight's despatch, I feel that I should submit to you the impressions made on myself, and before my arrival on members of my staff, by the British community at Bagdad, lest it be thought that the Basra community are, or were, alone in their "anti-official" attitude with regard to matters affecting their welfare. After serving now for six months at this post I am tending towards the conclusion that some considerable sympathy is due to anyone who is condemned to spend long years in this land which has so little to recommend its climate, its physical appearance, its amenities or the character of its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the great bulk of the British residents in Iraq seem to me to be unnecessarily bitter and to cherish an unduly hostile distrust of their Iraqi allies.

The "Africa begins at Calais" complex is, indeed, stronger among them than any British colony I have known in South America or elsewhere. This attitude may have its roots in the belief, which, I am informed, was fairly commonly held in the early 'twenties, that Iraq was destined to be a sphere of British influence reserved for British commercial exploitation, and that it would thereby gradually develop into a land fit for white men to live in without suffering competition or undue annoyance from its indigenous population. Be this as it may, the policy of His Majesty's Government which bore fruit in Iraq's admission to the League of Nations as a sovereign and independent State in 1932 was framed and carried out, it is widely felt, without consulting the interests of those British enterprises which had decided to invest money in the country and send their agents here to protect it. The natural outcome of this belief has been that, right from its establishment, this embassy has been regarded by a vociferous few as the symbol of the community's defeated hopes and aspirations, and, with the passing of the years, this belief was strengthened both by His Majesty's Government's patient efforts to make Iraq truly independent and—let us face it—from 1935 onwards, by the dreary repercussions on men's minds of "appeasement."

4. The pitiful collapse of the latter on the outbreak of war did not at once influence matters, and I am told that by early in 1941 the gulf fixed between the east and west banks of the Tigris had become so wide that the visits of even British advisers from across the river were becoming less frequent than formerly. The community lacked cohesion and unity of purpose, but all were at one in maintaining that the country was on the verge of chaos and that the embassy was in some way responsible for this state of affairs. British residents seem to have felt that they did not enjoy official confidence, and it was unfortunate that in the tense period preceding the Rashid Ali *coup* discretion should have required that the embassy should devise its policy and adapt it to changing circumstances behind closed doors. Even such matters as schemes for the protection and/or evacuation of the community could only be imparted to a very few selected representatives in the strictest secrecy, since only a very few possessed a discretion which could be trusted. One of their chief complaints was, apparently, that the embassy never gave them a "lead," whereas, in fact, every endeavour was being made at the time to direct their activities towards ways and means by which they might assist the war effort. The "Blimps" of the commercial community, in particular, were prone to consider that the war-time task of the embassy should be to devise means of feathering their nests without regard to the general interests of British trade, and that the chief objects of economic warfare should be the preservation and enhancement of their commercial profits. Imagination is not a striking feature of the British character and the war was a long way from Iraq and amounted, in practice, to little more than the smooth accents of the British Broadcasting Corporation's announcer. As I seem to recall was also the case in many a West-End club, it was only on the advent of such resounding disasters as the collapse of France that complacency became undermined. It seems that before that time attempts were made to interest the community in war work, such as sewing parties or the collection of funds for war charities, but these were usually only successful in so far as it was socially fashionable to give support to them or as petty rivalries and jealousies prompted individual contributions. As soon, however, as Italy entered the war, and more especially during the Battle for Britain, a gradual awakening was discernible among the community, who began to consider how far they could themselves contribute their share. In the winter of 1940-41, thanks to the initiation of a few whose patriotism had been to the fore throughout, they busied themselves with the preparation of the British War Charities Fête, which, under Rashid Ali's nose, realised profits of over I.D. 10,000.

5. I have discussed this attitude at some length in order to illustrate the community's frame of mind when the war eventually arrived in Iraq. The events of April and May 1941 were a rude shock to most of them, and I learn the opinion was frequently expressed that never again would the community leave such matters as the protection of their lives and property solely in official hands. They felt, in short, that they had been "let down," that those responsible had failed in their duty of preparing them for all eventualities, and finally that the actual physical measures taken for their protection were woefully inadequate. It should be borne in mind, however, that these opinions were being expressed at a time when the outcome of the Rashid Ali rebellion was not at all clear and the community had no positive evidence that His Majesty's Government would take sufficiently timely and vigorous action to restore the situation in Iraq. Shortly before the "internees" were released to return to their homes in early

June, His Majesty's Ambassador addressed them briefly on the part he hoped they would play henceforth in the implementation of His Majesty's Government's policy in Iraq. This indication that the embassy would in future suggest on what lines the British community should act was greeted with enthusiasm and relief.

6. This new understanding of the need to co-operate, and the deep-seated sense of personal devotion and respect which the community in general feel towards Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, whom they had known from his previous long service in this country, were happy premises for the establishment of a Community Council in Bagdad. Nevertheless, when the scheme was mooted there were still active centres of opposition and criticism. The first reaction was the characteristic one of carping criticism of embassy initiative, but later saner counsels prevailed, and the work of electing a council was enthusiastically taken up. While conceding the principle of the need for such a body to co-ordinate the efforts of the community, a large number of British residents were determined that the proposed council should not consist of those persons who for various reasons had always been in close touch with official circles in the past and had come to be regarded as the leading representatives among the community of "embassy policy." I refer in this connexion to such persons as Sir Edwin Drower, Mr. C. J. Edmonds, Dr. H. C. Sinderson, Mr. L. M. Swan and others. An intensive propaganda campaign was carried on with the object of securing the election to the council of individuals who had been in less frequent touch with the embassy and had tended to be its principal critics in the past. In the event these persons were elected, and I am convinced that this development was much to be desired. The embassy's most vocal detractors now not only feel a sense of responsibility, but also that they have a line of direct approach to His Majesty's Ambassador, and that they can, at will, explain to him their views and those of the greater part of the community whom they may truly be said to represent. They are flattered by their recognition as an official body and, while it is not true to say that they now whole-heartedly endorse His Majesty's Government's policy in Iraq, they appear to be better disposed to accept Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's advice that constructive co-operation with the Iraqi Government will contribute more to winning the war than any alternative policy. The fact that on at least one occasion when I was present his Excellency has expressed himself extremely bluntly to the council has, I think, been very beneficial. Elements of discontent still persist, of course, for there are those who now attack the council as fiercely as they formerly criticised the embassy, a development which I regard as remarkably wholesome. I believe, however, that these elements are small in number and, though vocal, not seriously to be reckoned with on any major issues.

7. I will not digress into a detailed account of what the council have already accomplished in Bagdad, but I should like to record that they have vigorously taken up the question of encouraging war savings and have been of considerable assistance to the British forces in Iraq in a whole variety of ways, and that their activities are growing. The garden party which they organised for the Minister of State during his recent visit was very successful, and the frank and friendly address which Mr. Casey gave to the community on the occasion has had a heartening effect on their morale. It is gratifying, too, that the chairman of the council, Mr. Reid, frequently drops in to discuss this or that question with me or other members of the staff.

8. It would seem that at Mosul the experiment has not met with quite the same measure of success. The Community Council in that town have busied themselves with protesting in rather unpleasant terms against the decisions of the Claims Committee in connexion with the looting of British property in May 1941, and with recording their distrust of the embassy's ability to lay plans for the evacuation of the community in the event of a new emergency. I have instructed His Majesty's Consul to explain to the council as fully as circumstances may render desirable the principles on which the Claims Committee carried out their onerous task, and should they still remain sullen I have requested that he should tender them my advice that they concern themselves with something less selfish and more constructive towards winning the war.

9. It is too early yet to forecast how smoothly the new council will work at Basra. As Mr. Knight states in his despatch, the community there suffer from a violent form of anti-official complex and, moreover, are perversely attached to the doctrine that, whatever Bagdad does, Basra should do the opposite. I fear that Mr. Knight's task will not be an easy one. For example, during a recent visit to Basra I discovered a widespread feeling that the port should be taken over and administered entirely by the British authorities. What is eminently

satisfactory, however, is the cordial welcome accorded by the members of the Bar Dredging Service to the suggested formation of a council for Fao.

10. I am confident that the experiment of British Community Councils will be a success throughout the country once the initial obstacles to the idea of co-operation have been removed. I have no doubt that the several councils will be immensely useful to this embassy and to His Majesty's consular officers in conveying to the community a fuller interpretation of our policy, which will, I trust, serve to induce a more sympathetic appreciation of the problems and the achievements of His Majesty's Government in Iraq and elsewhere.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Consul-General at Basra and to His Majesty's Consul at Mosul.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Consul-General Knight to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Bagdad).

(No. 43.)

Sir,

Basra, October 17, 1942.

I HAD the honour to inform your Excellency, by my telegram No. 30, Saving, of the 16th October, that the establishment of a British Community Council in Basra had been approved by a large majority at a meeting of the British community held on the previous day, and that all the members for Basra, ten in number, had subsequently been elected, leaving two members to be chosen at Fao to represent the British community there. It is intended, moreover, in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of my circular letter of the 16th September to the British community in this consular district, copy of which is enclosed, that Fao should have a sub-council of its own in view of the large number of its British residents and the difficulty of its communications with Basra.

2. Some indication was given in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 22, dated the 29th June, of the lack of enthusiasm revealed by my first soundings of local opinion on the subject of a British Community Council. It became manifest as time went on that apathy was the rule rather than the exception, that a good deal of cold water was being thrown on the project and that there was a small core of definite and active opposition. There were sceptics and waverers even among the twelve representative members of the community, whom I selected to form an advisory committee, but the chief opposition came from outside, and was perhaps to some extent due to motives of jealousy. It is a fact, however, and it was the first strong impression which I received of Basra on arrival last January, that the British colony here are afflicted with the anti-official complex to an even greater extent than most British business communities abroad. Whether they have any special excuse for this attitude I do not know, but it is clear that the abolition of the mandate over Iraq still rankles intensely. I have heard our official declaration, to the effect that the Iraqi people had reached the stage where they were fit to govern themselves, described as a wicked and deliberate lie. There are, too, other grievances against Government, embassy and consulate—I hardly know which is considered the worst offender—most of them based on alleged obstructiveness or indifference in regard to the commercial interests of the community or of individual firms. It is needless to labour this point, though necessary to make it in order to account for the atmosphere in which the proposal to launch a British Community Council was announced under official auspices some months ago.

3. In these circumstances I was advised, and well advised, to hasten slowly, and I should say here that, despite the few sceptics and waverers referred to above, the members of the colony who constituted the preliminary working committee gave me much willing assistance, and warmed to the work as the weather grew cooler. I received and approved their final recommendations while I was on leave in Tehran, and my circular letter to the community was sent out as soon as possible after my return to my post on the 16th September. The committee's proposals are contained in paragraph 5 of the letter.

4. No further meeting of the committee was necessary, and, indeed, it considered itself to have died in giving birth to its proposals. I had, however, a number of very frank and useful consultations with the two members who were most in favour of the proposed council. From them I learned a great deal about the feeling of the community towards the project, and they were good enough to

advise me how to deal with the criticism and opposition to be expected at the general meeting. I felt that they were so well disposed, so well qualified to offer advice, and so fully agreed as to what should be done and what avoided, that I adopted their suggestions to a great extent in the preparation of the speech with which I inaugurated the proceedings on the 15th October.

5. I enclose a copy of the speech as actually delivered in the British Club to the assembled community. I trust that it will be read in the light of what I have already said about local prejudices and suspicions, and that due allowance will be made, in what was definitely an *argumentum ad hominem*, for the lengths to which I may seem to have gone in meeting the views and forestalling the objections of perhaps the larger and certainly the more vocal section among my listeners. The speech was at least justified by the event, for those who went to scoff remained to approve, all but a mere handful, who attempted to pick holes in the methods of election adopted, such as the means taken to secure the election of two men under 40 and two ladies. I was also called upon to reveal the names of the members of the committee which had drawn up the proposals. This I declined to do, unless the majority of those present so wished, on the ground that it was unnecessary and undesirable, and might be considered a breach of confidence on my part. A show of hands revealed that the objectors had very little support, whereupon they resorted to the more general accusation that there had been, throughout, "a slavish following of Bagdad." This base suggestion I was able easily to refute. Thereupon a prominent member of the colony, who had been expected to give trouble, moved that the British Community Council be formed and the committee's proposals adopted as they stood, and this motion, after having been duly seconded, was approved almost unanimously. I was assured by several people after the meeting that my speech had completely cut the ground from under the opposition's feet, and that the community were now really glad to have their council.

6. The meeting having ended in record time for Basra, the voting was proceeded with there and then. The following eight men and two ladies were declared elected, amid much applause:—

Mr. J. L. Battey.
Mr. J. M. Gibson.
Mr. O. H. Griffiths.
Mrs. Griffiths.
Mr. J. A. Jack.
Captain W. Murchison.
Mr. N. V. Ringrow.
Archdeacon Stewart.
Mrs. Stewart.
Dr. T. Thornton.

7. No second ballot proved necessary, as all ten received the suffrages of well over 25 per cent. of the total number of voters. I consider, and it is generally agreed, that a better and more representative selection could hardly have been made. I have since written to each successful candidate to confirm his or her election and offer my congratulations, and also to suggest that they should concert together for the election of a president and vice-president at an early date.

I have, &c.

W. L. C. KNIGHT.

[E 6975/204/93]

No. 25.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 1182.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 1065.

Views expressed in above will be communicated to the Prime Minister in support of my recent representations at the earliest opportunity. I must confess that I find his whole attitude on the supply problem very disappointing. He appears to be affected by an extreme reluctance to risk offending any powerful interests, as well as by desire to extract valuable *quid pro quo* for co-operation, such as export of [group undecipherable: ? barley] to [? limitrophe] countries whose need to benefit from Iraq's large surplus is acute. It is only fair to add that he is under considerable pressure, of course, from those who contend that now is the time to secure good bargains.

2. As regards internee problem I fear the existence of committee far outweighs possible adverse effect on prestige of its members, should their advice be overruled. [Group undecipherable ? Spence] Edmonds and Company will at least act as a break and up to date have shown no disposition to acquiesce in release of any important agitators. Naturally, however, I cannot guarantee that their recommendations in any given case will not be exceeded. But as against this it seems likely if committee had not been appointed Prime Minister in his present mood might have already acted rashly. So far as smaller personalities are concerned, and while I consider leniency premature, present satisfactory state of internal security makes it hard to contest the view that there is a case for revision of sentences in certain cases. As already reported, however, I have urged committee to proceed cautiously.

3. To some extent our own propaganda is to blame for recent growth of complacency here, for it has over-emphasised immediate possibilities of recent successes. It is a great pity to my mind that a note almost of hysteria seems so easily to upset our publicity, especially that of B.B.C., which is listened to with avidity by the Prime Minister and others. Both the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance have, for example, referred joyfully to the probable easing of supply position through early opening of the Mediterranean.

[E 7331/204/93]

No. 26.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 345.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 25, 1942.

THE reformed Cabinet, of which details were given in my despatch No. 293 of the 14th October last and with which Nuri Said returned to office on the 8th October, was soon found to contain discordant elements. Before a month had passed a violent quarrel broke out between the Minister of Communications, Abdul Mahdi, and the Minister of Education, Tahsin Ali. It is doubtful who was to blame for the insulting language which seems in the end to have been used by both Ministers in the altercation, but I suspect that it was very much a case of the pot calling the kettle black. Peace-making efforts yielded no results, and each Minister insisted that after what had occurred it was impossible for him to remain in the Cabinet with the other. Friends and partisans rallied to each side, and, as one Minister is a Shia and the other a Sunni, the quarrel quickly developed into something of a sectarian tussle. For a few days it seemed that the Shia Minister of Finance, Salih Jabr, the most important of the Prime Minister's collaborators, would become involved, but he showed good sense and courage enough to put country before faction and to stick to the task he had undertaken of finding a solution for Iraq's economic difficulties. The Regent, too, had a personal interest in the matter and once again stood by his protégé, Tahsin Ali.

2. To me it seemed deplorable that, at a time when there are so many urgent questions of public interest to be dealt with, a storm in the tea-cup like this should paralyse the administration, and I lost no opportunity of pressing the Regent and the Prime Minister (and the Minister of Finance) to have done with it quickly. Yet over a fortnight passed before all the moves in the tortuous game were played according to convention and a settlement could be reached. This was that both Abdul Mahdi and Tahsin Ali should leave the Cabinet, but that Tahsin Ali's departure should be deferred until a place could be made for him at the Palace by sending the head of the Royal Diwan, Abbas Mahdi, to Tehran as Minister. Abdul Mahdi's place was taken by Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, who was succeeded at the Ministry of Social Affairs by a Shia, Abdul Razzaq Uzri, formerly a mutessarif. At the same time it was found necessary on account of his ill-health to accept the resignation of the aged and infirm Minister of Economics, Muhsin Shallash, and to appoint in his stead another Shia, Salman-al-Barrak, who for some years has been Deputy President of the Chamber. Peace was in this way restored in the Cabinet, but it is now a thing of makeshifts and patches and cannot be expected to last for more than a few months.

3. Parliament opened, as usual, on the 1st November. This will be the last session of the present Chamber, which, for the first time in Iraq's parliamentary history, is living out its allotted span of four years. The Speech from the Throne was unduly concerned with Arab national ambitions and was disappointing in the paucity of its reference to current economic problems.

[25053]

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4. At the third meeting of the Chamber held on the 12th November a group of Deputies put forward a resolution asking the Government to secure the accession of Iraq to the Declaration of the United Nations made at Washington on the 1st January, 1942. The Prime Minister confessed to me afterwards that he had himself inspired this resolution because he thought that the time had now come for Iraq to take her place openly on the side of the Allies. He feels, no doubt, that, as Iraq is already contributing to the war effort of the United Nations all that is required to qualify her for inclusion in their ranks, she may as well take her place there properly and thereby gain the rights and privileges of full membership, including those set out in the Atlantic Charter. Nuri Pasha is convinced that such action on Iraq's part would have a profound effect in all Near and Middle Eastern countries, and, indeed, among Arabs everywhere. Whether, in the event, Iraq's belligerency will be greeted with joy by the mass of the people—whose pleasure over recent Allied victories was based to an appreciable extent upon the assumption that the danger of war was receding—remains to be seen. I personally think not.

5. More spontaneous interest is being shown by both Houses of Parliament in the question of the control and distribution of supplies and the fate of the political internees. At a meeting held on the 14th November, at which a number of speakers appealed to the Government to show clemency towards these victims of their political views, the Prime Minister stated that the Government had set up a committee to review the cases of individual internees and to classify them in three categories: those who could be set free immediately, those on whom the restraint imposed could be lightened, and those who would have to be kept in internment until such time as they could be released without danger to the public interest.

6. The committee formed for this work is presided over by the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior and includes the (British) Technical Adviser to the Criminal Investigation Department and the Director-General of Police. Mr. Edmonds tells me that, though the committee may recommend the release of a few men interned as a punishment for petty political offences, such as abusive talk in public about the Allies or members of the Iraqi Government, they will not advocate the setting free of any of those who played an important part in anti-British or pro-Axis plotting or agitation. There may, indeed, be something to be said in favour of releasing the nonentities who have been interned for petty offences, and, if it were certain that the Government would not go beyond the committee's recommendations, there would be little need for anxiety. I fear, however, that much pressure is being brought to bear on the Prime Minister to release not the unimportant but the influential and well-connected internees, and, although in the present state of public opinion such people would be far less dangerous than they were at the time of their internment, it is still, in my opinion, premature to release them. It may be true that the political atmosphere is now unfavourable for their activities, but they would find little difficulty in exploiting against ourselves and the present Iraqi régime the economic discontent to be found everywhere in the country, and might well endeavour to do so.

7. I have spoken firmly to the Prime Minister on the folly of yielding to pressure concerning these people, but I have the impression that he is now anxious to try to "appease" his opponents, and I think that he may also have in mind to rally the Nationalists ready for the post-war effort to get something substantial for the Arabs out of the peace.

8. Many Deputies have found occasion to speak about the seriousness of the supply difficulties and the high cost of living now prevailing in the country, but the Government have revealed no considered plan for dealing with these matters. The Minister of Finance is still in the process of studying the elements of his problems, and, though at times he shows courage and determination, at others, noticeably after discussions with the Prime Minister, he is hesitant and disinclined to act firmly.

9. In the meanwhile, he has done little to improve the general economic situation. So far as can be judged in the almost total absence of reliable figures, very little more wheat has been collected, no plan for the control of the sale, export or distribution of barley or rice has yet been adopted, and, apart from sugar, no rationing or other method of price-control of necessities of life has been brought into operation. The only measures that stand to the credit of the Administration are the prohibition of the export of barley and orders for the collection in kind of the land tax on wheat and rice in certain provinces. Fortunately, either because they have stocks of food or are earning wages high enough to compete with current prices, most of the people seem so far to be

managing fairly well, and, apart from one or two minor and easily settled strikes, there has been no disorder caused by economic distress. It is nevertheless noticeable that communism is gaining adherents, particularly among educated young men. The strong appeal which its doctrines now make with their promise of easy panaceas for inequalities of wealth and all economic troubles is, of course, being reinforced by recent Russian military successes and by the strength which has been developed by democratic propaganda. If nazism is destroyed, communism will certainly be a considerable political force in this country after the Allied victory. It is, incidentally, being fanned by the sense of frustration induced among the more youthful of the politically-minded by their persistent inability to break into the charmed circle of public life, the entrances to which remain closely guarded by an ageing group of conservative politicians.

10. It has become a commonplace of current reports from Middle Eastern countries to refer to the profound effect made on public opinion by the victories of the Eighth Army, followed by the Anglo-American occupation of Morocco and Algiers. In Iraq the swing of the pendulum has been so marked that many people seem to think that the war is now all over bar the shouting, and to foster a more balanced appreciation of the facts our local propagandists have had to give up emphasising the good points in our war position and to stress instead the heavy fighting that still lies ahead before victory can be won. For the moment pro-Axis propaganda is silent, floored by the only sort of punch that can really hammer it: a brilliant Allied military success.

11. Iraq's external relations provide in these days little material for comment. Her neighbours are mostly absorbed in their internal affairs and the disturbing competition for influence of the representatives of the European Powers has, for the time being, been eliminated by the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Italy, France and Germany. The Prime Minister, however, like many other statesmen, tends to think of the present war as a sequel to the last and to feel that it is his duty somehow to find in it opportunities to carry on the struggle to create a united and independent Arabia, which was begun by King Hussain in June 1916. He also aims at improving Iraq's international status by uniting in mutual alliance the countries already separately allied to Great Britain. His idea is to form a pro-democratic bloc comprising Iraq, the two other Middle Eastern allies of Great Britain, Egypt and Persia, and the mandated territories of Palestine, Transjordan and the Levant. He wishes to persuade Turkey to come into the bloc too. He regards the Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed at Angora in October 1939 between France, Great Britain and Turkey as establishing relations between Turkey and Great Britain analogous to the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian Alliances, and realises, moreover, that the inclusion of Turkey in the pact would be the only thing to save it from insignificance.

12. The problem of finding a competent man to replace the discredited Drs. Sami Shawkat and Jamali at the head of the Department of Education is still unsolved. No suitable Egyptian officials are willing to undertake the task of reforming Iraqi education, and the Prime Minister remains opposed to what would seem to him to be so retrogressive a step as the appointment of an Englishman to do the work instead. Meantime, Dr. Jamali has sent a circular to all district directors of education urging them to take steps to implant a love of democratic virtues in the hearts of all school-children, and has been hotly attacked for his pains as a humbug by the Left-wing daily, *The Voice of the People*.

13. The Minister of State paid a visit to Iraq in the middle of October. He first went to Basra, and then, after a dash to Tehran by air, returned to Bagdad. His work was largely with the fighting forces, but the Iraqis were anxious to honour him, and he found time in his programme to attend a small dinner-party at the Palace and a banquet and reception given by the Government at the Town Hall. He also gave up an afternoon to meet the British residents at a garden-party given by the newly-formed British Community Council. The visit gave much pleasure to the large number of Iraqis with whom he made acquaintance, and his straight talks on the need to face up to current problems courageously were a most welcome reinforcement to my own efforts to bring responsible Iraqis to take a more realistic view of their present-day problems.

14. The large force of Polish troops with women's ancillaries now in Iraq have been giving rise to special economic and other troubles. When they first camped in the neighbourhood of Khanaqin they descended like locusts on the small bazaar of the town and the unfortunate inhabitants were left almost without supplies. When the town was put out of bounds to Polish troops, contractors

were employed to set up canteens in the camp and began to move large quantities of tinned foods, fresh fruit, meat, vegetables and all kinds of small manufactured articles from Bagdad to Khanaqin. On one occasion two lorries loaded with bread bought in Bagdad were intercepted on their way to the Polish camp. Prices at once rose sharply in Bagdad, as the hungry Poles were willing to pay any price for extra food or small articles of personal luxury, such as watches, socks, handkerchiefs, and so on, and a further serious dislocation of local trading was threatened. With the ready co-operation of the commander-in-chief and the Iraqi authorities, measures were, however, taken to check these inroads into the limited quantity of supplies and goods available for the general public, and the British army is now doing everything possible to supply the Poles with all they need.

15. Accidents due to careless or inefficient driving and intrusion into adjacent villages, with the concomitant complications over women, were other matters that have had to be dealt with. The Polish Commander, General Anders, has lately imposed severe penalties for offences of this kind, and I hope that the effect will be salutary.

16. As matters stand, and in the absence of treaty relations between Poland and Iraq, Polish troops can only come to Iraq as part of the forces maintained by His Majesty's Government under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, but the Polish Chargé d'Affaires has shown a rather natural wish to take them under his own wing and to be the intermediary between them and the Iraqi Government. Both the Prime Minister and myself have in consequence found it necessary to explain to him firmly that the Polish units now in Iraq are part of the British forces and must be treated as such for all official purposes. It has also been impressed upon M. Malhomme that in present circumstances too much publicity in an effort to popularise the Poles with the Iraqis would be unlikely to achieve the object desired.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Cairo, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut; the Minister of State at Cairo; His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan; the Governor-General of India; the Commander-in-chief, India; General Headquarters, Middle East; the Combined Middle East Intelligence Centre; the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; the Political Agent at Koweit; and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 6807/6/31]

No. 27.

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 772.)

Sir,

Washington, November 7, 1942.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5352 of the 30th October, I enclose a copy of the memorandum on the subject of the Balfour Declaration left at this embassy on the 30th October by a delegation of Rabbis. Owing to previous engagements I was unable to see this deputation myself when they called in the morning, and they were accordingly received by Sir Gerald Campbell. On this occasion nothing was said about a message from His Majesty's Government to the meeting to be held in New York on the 1st November to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. But Rabbi Heller, the leader of the deputation, came to see me in the afternoon. He then gave me a copy of Mr. Hull's message, summarised in my telegram No. 5353 (the full text of the Secretary of State's statement is now enclosed herein), and asked whether His Majesty's Government could send any similar message. This suggestion you felt unable to accept.

2. His Majesty's Consul-General reports that he attended the meeting in New York on the 1st November and sat on the right of Rabbi Wise, who was presiding. Messages to the meeting from Mr. Willkie and Senator Wagner were read, and the principal speaker was Senator Thomas of Utah, who asked for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. Mr. Haggard tells me, however, that the general tenor of the speeches was on a high level and that most speakers, especially Nahum Goldman, adopted an understanding and even friendly attitude towards Great Britain and the Balfour Declaration, though this last was generally regarded as out of date.

3. Dr. Weizmann did not attend the meeting. He is now staying at an hotel in upper New York State. The message contained in your telegram No. 6636 was accordingly telegraphed to him on the 2nd November, with an intimation that the Prime Minister had asked that it be treated as private.

I have, &c.

HALIFAX.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Memorandum submitted to Viscount Halifax, Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of Great Britain to the United States, Friday, October 30, 1942, by Rabbi James G. Heller of Cincinnati, Ohio, President of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, Rabbi B. H. Levinthal of Philadelphia, Member of the Presidium of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of America, Rabbi Louis E. Levitsky of Newark, N.J., President of the Rabbinical Assembly of America, and Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein of New York, President of the Rabbinical Council of America.

IN recognition of the issuance of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government on the 2nd November, 1917, the religious leaders of American Jewry beg to give expression to their appreciation of the rôle played by His Majesty's Government in the issuance of this momentous pronouncement, and request of His Majesty's Government the continuance of its good offices for the full and complete implementation of that Declaration.

This memorandum is presented by a group of rabbis, who represent not only themselves but the overwhelming majority of the American Rabbinate, Orthodox, Conservative and Reform. We do not doubt that we also voice the sentiments of the very great majority of American Jewry as a whole.

The Balfour Declaration is regarded by the religious leaders of American Jewry as a document akin in significance to the proclamation by Cyrus, King of Persia, permitting the return of exiles of the Babylonian captivity to the Promised Land. Under its protecting ægis it has been made possible for half a million Jews, many of them homeless, to find security and freedom in the land of their fathers. Thanks to the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish immigration into Palestine which it fostered, there has been a great flowering of the Jewish

spirit in that land to the enrichment not of Palestine Jewry alone but of world Jewry and ultimately of all mankind.

The revival of the Hebrew language and literature, music and art, the incarnation of historic Jewish ethical values in new patterns of social living—all these are a direct consequence of that document issued a quarter of a century ago. For all this American Jewry will remain forever indebted to His Majesty's Government. Whatever the grievances of the Jewish people with respect to the restrictive policies pursued more particularly in recent years and however profound the differences which exist at the moment, the issuance of the Declaration will live in the annals of our people as a memorable act of historic justice and statesmanship performed by a great people at its truest and noblest.

The passage of twenty-five years has not only confirmed the wisdom implicit in the Balfour Declaration; it has given to that document heightened cogency and significance. Because of Axis aggression there are at the present time in Central Europe millions of Jews whose lives have been altogether ruined in the lands which were once their homes. While we look forward with confidence to the return to those Jews of full democratic rights subsequent upon a United Nations' victory, we know full well that great masses of them will desire to leave lands heavy for them in tragic associations and to reconstitute their lives in Palestine. It is the Balfour Declaration which gives them hope and the assurance that, so soon as the international situation permits, the land of their fathers will be ready to receive them. Important, therefore, as the Balfour Declaration has been in the past as the legal warrant for large-scale Jewish resettlement in Palestine, it will be infinitely more important to this end in the future.

And just as in the past twenty-five years a great revival of the Jewish spirit has been made possible because of the Balfour Declaration, so we are confident that an even greater awakening of the Jewish religion and culture lies before us.

If the Balfour Declaration is, as a social document, akin to the proclamation of Cyrus long centuries ago, it is by virtue of the religious and cultural promise implicit within it a first step towards the fulfilment of the prophetic word, "For from Zion shall go forth the law and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem."

Perceiving with clarity the need for the Balfour Declaration as an element in the post-war solution of the Jewish problem, we beseech of His Majesty's Government the continuance of its efforts for the enlarged application of the letter and the spirit of that historic pronouncement. We invoke the aid of Almighty God in our purpose. May He Who guides the destinies of peoples and gives light and deliverance to their rulers infuse into the hearts of the leaders of the British Empire the insight to discern the need for the Jewish homeland in Palestine, both as an answer to the tragedy of Jewish homelessness and as a means to the revival of the soul of the House of Israel.

With full faith in the justice and sanctity of the cause upon which our beloved country, in association with United Nations, is engaged, we invoke the blessing of God upon the gallant defenders of our ideals and our freedoms, and pray for victory, swift and complete, over the dominion of iniquity, in order that out of the agony of this war may arise a new world dedicated to the right and to the ultimate realisation of the Kingdom of God on earth.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Statement by the United States Secretary of State.

IN commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government on the 2nd November, 1917, a memorandum was presented to the Secretary of State by a group of rabbis. Secretary Hull observed that the Balfour Declaration had aroused wide attention in the United States, and that this country had followed with interest and sympathy the work which had been done under it, in which American citizens have played a useful part. He added:—

"This country was shocked and outraged, when tyranny and barbarity again commenced their march, at the brutality which was inflicted on certain races, and particularly on the Jewish populations of Europe. Apparently no form of abuse has been too great, and no form of torture or oppression too vile, to be meted out to these populations by the Nazi despots. And, in taking this attitude towards the Jewish race, they have made it plain by concrete acts that a like attitude would be taken towards any other race against whom they might invent a grievance.

"The Jews have long sought a refuge. I believe that we must have an even wider objective; we must have a world in which Jews, like every other race, are free to abide in peace and in honour.

"We meet to-day when the battle for freedom is being carried on in the East and in the West and our every effort is concentrated on a successful issue. We can with confidence look forward to the victory when liberty shall lift the scourge of persecution and the might of the United Nations free mankind from the threat of oppression.

"Of all the inhuman and tyrannical acts of Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants, their systematic persecution of the Jewish people—men, women and children—is the most debased. The fate of these unhappy people must be ever before us in the efforts we are making to-day for the final victory; at the moment of triumph under the terms of the Atlantic Charter the United Nations will be prepared not only to redeem their hopes of a future world based upon freedom, equality and justice, but to create a world in which such a tragedy will not again occur."

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 5805/14/34]

No. 28.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Kuibyshev).

(No. 304.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 1, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government had been giving some further thought to the political situation in Persia, and would be glad to know how His Majesty's Government would regard the question of dissolving the Majlis and holding fresh elections. When this question had been raised in June last, the Soviet Government had taken the view that the moment was not opportune for holding fresh elections in Persia, but it appeared that they might now be prepared to revise their opinion on this point.

2. I replied that the present Majlis had been very troublesome to the Soheily Government, and our latest information was that it had also been making difficulties for the present Prime Minister. We had at one time hoped that Qawam us Saltaneh would have been able to keep the Majlis in order, and in that case there would perhaps have been no need for a dissolution. But we now knew that Qawam himself would like to dissolve the Majlis, although certain other members of his Cabinet were opposed to this course. The Soviet Government might certainly take it that we had no objection in principle to the dissolution of the existing Majlis, whose members, instead of having been properly elected, were mostly nominees of the ex-Shah. Our main doubt was whether new elections, which according to the Persian Constitution would have to be held almost at once, would produce a new Majlis which would be any improvement on the present one.

3. M. Maisky replied that in countries like Persia the Government in power were often able to influence the elections. He thought therefore that, if Qawam us Saltaneh remained in power during the elections, the new Majlis would probably be found to give him more parliamentary support than he enjoyed at present.

4. We agreed that Sir R. Bullard and his Soviet colleague should be instructed to keep in close touch in regard to this matter.

5. In the course of the conversation M. Maisky also referred to a report that the Persian Government were thinking of establishing a Senate. I replied that this report had not reached me, and that we had therefore not as yet considered the advantages or disadvantages of such a measure.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

[E 6154/3655/34]

No. 29.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 22, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, notwithstanding the serious military situation in Russia, a certain change for the better has occurred here since I wrote my despatch No. 248 of the 28th July, mainly as a sequel of the replacement of M. Ali Soheily by Qawam es Saltaneh as Prime Minister and the latter's somewhat unexpected display of energy. During the last days of the Soheily Government things went from bad to worse. The Prime Minister seemed to have lost all control of the situation, and it was widely rumoured that he was engaging in various forms of corruption himself. There was no limit to the inefficiency of the Administration, the vacillation of the Government, or the irresponsibility of the Deputies. Indeed, Soheily had apparently lost all confidence in himself and was quite unable to take any decision. It was a real relief when he resigned on the 30th July and was replaced by Qawam es Saltaneh. Details of the development of the Cabinet crisis have been described separately in my telegrams and in my despatch No. 270.

2. The new Prime Minister, who belongs to the older generation of land-owners, is showing himself to be a vigorous, determined and sometimes obstinate old gentleman, but after an initial period in which, as will be described below, the

utmost difficulties have been experienced in securing even our essential desiderata, he now seems to be settling down well. On receiving your telegram No. 1070 of the 29th July, I informed the Shah that His Majesty's Government would accept any Government which the Persians might set up, provided that it would co-operate energetically with the Allies, and it is now justifiable to hope that the present Government will, for the time being at any rate, fulfil this requirement. Soon after taking office the Prime Minister made it clear to me that he did not intend to stand any nonsense from the Majlis, and he has also told the Soviet Ambassador that he proposed to remind them as often as might be necessary that their authority did not rest on popular approval. Qawam has been as good as his word, and his firmness has greatly increased his reputation, both among the public and among the Deputies themselves.

3. Generally speaking, we need a Prime Minister here in present circumstances who is either a respectable and influential person who is prepared and able to secure acceptance of our essential war requirements by his countrymen or, in the last resort, one who is open to other inducements. In view of the present unwillingness of various suitable personalities to take office (*e.g.*, M. Pirnia), Qawam es Saltaneh seems to be almost the only candidate of the first category. I am, however, anxious to have some alternative ready, and the oriental secretary is accordingly going to Palestine very shortly in order to see Said Zia ed din Tabatabai.

Security Questions.

4. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister has carried out his duties with some energy. One of the most difficult questions outstanding when Soheily resigned was undoubtedly our request for the handing over of eighteen Persians known to be engaged in Axis activities. Whilst Soheily delivered to us a few Germans and Persians already under detention, no action was taken by him in regard to the list of eighteen before he fell from office. In the early days of the Government a new list of over forty persons, who were believed by us to be definitely incriminated, was submitted to the Persian Government with a request for their arrest and delivery to the British military authorities. I explained in paragraphs 5-6 of my despatch No. 248 why it was considered essential for suspects to be guarded and interrogated by ourselves, although we well realised how difficult it was for the Persians to hand over their own nationals to the authorities of a foreign Power in their own country. Although Qawam proceeded to arrest the persons concerned, he obstinately refused to hand over the Persians, and it became clear that he was not strong enough to do this. Meanwhile, the question was handled by the police with an ineptitude and laxity typical of Persia. One of the principal suspects, Frau Bernstein, a German, known to be the link between the Axis agents in Fars and those in Tehran, was, after her arrest, allowed to return to her house, where she committed suicide. The house was still unguarded hours after her death and her papers were not seized. Another woman, supposed to have been arrested, was found making a complaint inside His Majesty's Legation; and one German arrested was found to have been hidden for six months in the house of a Persian police officer. While they were under detention a number of those arrested were known to be communicating with persons outside, and one prisoner was inexplicably found by us to have acquired a sum of money and some playing cards in the course of the night. It was all too obvious that, if serious action was to be taken against the fifth column in Persia, the guarding and interrogation must be done mainly by ourselves and that the prisoners must be confined somewhere in the British zone and not in Tehran, where their friends and relatives would be inconveniently near. We made it clear that, subject to this, we were willing to make every conceivable concession to save the Persian face, but Qawam es Saltaneh resolutely refused to hand over any Persians to us and stood out for detention in Tehran itself. In this the Prime Minister was doubtless encouraged probably by the fact that we received no help from the Soviet Embassy and none from the American Legation until it was too late, when a very mild *démarche* in our favour was made by Mr. Dreyfus. It is only now, after weeks of negotiation, after the Persian Government have (fruitlessly) appealed to the Foreign Office through the Persian Minister in London, and, finally, I must add, after a straight warning that we should judge the sincerity of the Persian Government in collaboration with us by its attitude over this question, that a reasonable agreement has at last been reached on this subject. I am reporting separately on this and will only record here for convenience and to make the story complete that the agreement provides for the detention of all Persian suspects at Sultanabad, where there are British troops, and for the association of Persian officials with the

British authorities in the supervision and interrogation of such suspects. In actual fact, we should have real control in both respects. It is hoped that this agreement will work smoothly, but the arrest and handing over of Persians is bound to be unpopular and we must expect to encounter difficulties if we have to present the Persian Government with further lists of Persian suspects.

Financial Situation.

5. Another question which has presented the greatest difficulties is the purchase of rial currency with sterling and dollars. The currency is essential to enable the British military authorities to pay the labour used on the roads and on the numerous other works of military importance which we are undertaking in this country. This question appeared to have been settled by the Financial Agreement of the 26th May, 1942.

6. By the middle of August 1942, however, it had become evident that a further increase in the Persian note-issue was inevitable to meet the growing demand for currency. The note-issue had last been increased by an Act of the 31st March, 1942, which added 700 million rials to the previous authorised maximum of 2,000 million rials, bringing the total of the legal issue to 2,700 million rials.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Financial Agreement of the 26th May, 1942 (in which the Persian Government undertakes, *inter alia*, to maintain an adequate supply of rials to meet the expenditure in Persia of His Majesty's Government), the Persian Government viewed with reluctance the prospect of going to the Majlis with a Bill to add to the note circulation. Considerable pressure from His Majesty's Legation was necessary before the Government could be induced to take the necessary steps.

8. At the request of the Government I gave an estimate of 1,000 million rials as the probable additional needs in local currency over the twelve months beginning the 1st September, 1942. I pointed out that this estimate was necessarily conjectural, that it was bound to be hedged about by provisos and reservations, and that it must not be regarded as in any sense an indication to the Persian Government of the maximum requirements of His Majesty's Government.

9. Meanwhile the new Prime Minister had set up an unofficial commission to study and report on a long-term policy in relation to the note-issue of the country, particularly with respect to the arrangements that might be made for its "cover." This commission had not concluded its deliberations (in fact, it is still studying the question) by the time that the currency situation had become so acute that immediate action by the Government and the Majlis was necessary if a crisis was to be averted.

10. Finally, as I reported in my telegram No. 1168, the Majlis passed a Bill on the 12th September, 1942, authorising an increase in the note-issue of a further 300 million rials, thus bringing the total authorised issue to a new maximum of 3,000 million rials. The additional issue is statutorily "backed" by the existing "coin."

11. This measure is in the nature of a stop-gap until the Government has decided its long-term policy. The additional issue should suffice for probable needs during seven or eight weeks at current rate of British expenditure.

12. Under pressure from the Prime Minister the Bill passed through the Majlis without much difficulty by 75 votes to 1, with 11 abstentions. In the course of the debate, however, there was much uninformed and a certain amount of hostile criticism. Fears were expressed lest the increase in the supply of money might raise the already high cost of living, and the general tone of the debate as published in the local press ascribed the whole responsibility for the increased cost of living to Persia's obligation to supply His Majesty's Government with their large requirements of local currency. The Government spokesman did little to dispel this.

13. I have pointed out to the Persian Government that efficacious remedies against inflation are at the disposal of the Government itself, and that only by introducing and, above all, enforcing additional taxation, legislation to prevent hoarding and cornering, price control, and the various other appropriate measures of the kind can the cost of living in present circumstances be kept within reasonable bounds. The Prime Minister has assured me that all these questions are now engaging the active attention of his colleagues and himself.

14. In view of the bias given to the subject by the press report of the debate, I am making arrangements for press articles and a radio broadcast on the subject, to place before the public the degree of responsibility for the present

situation that rests on the shoulders of the Persian Government itself, and the extent to which the remedies to improve it lie in the Government's own hands. And I am also suggesting to the Prime Minister that even if anti-Allied speeches are made in the Majlis, that is no reason why they should be published and create unnecessary difficulties for the Government and for ourselves.

The Food Supply.

15. The proposal for a Food Board mentioned in paragraph 19 of my despatch No. 248 of the 28th July did not materialise, but in accordance with our views the Prime Minister has established a separate Directorate of Food and the Minister, M. Ardalan, has worked in close co-operation with Mr. Squire, counsellor at this legation. The Prime Minister has sent telegraphic instructions to all governors in the provinces that the collection of wheat is their most important duty and that the severest measures, including the death penalty, are to be taken against hoarders.

16. One of the principal difficulties in dealing with the food problem in Persia is that local authorities are afraid to take action against powerful landowners. The consular liaison officer scheme has, for this reason, not altogether fulfilled our original hopes that it would frighten the landowners into ready delivery of their surplus grain, but it has given us a means of checking on the spot whether or not the orders of the Central Government are being carried out and has brought an increase of strength to our hard-worked consulates in coping with this most difficult problem. Landowners' declarations of their wheat surplus available for purchase at the official price were due to be in the hands of the authorities by the 22nd September, but it is already clear that provincial officials will make little effort to obtain more than local requirements and will leave Tehran and the deficit areas of the south to fend for themselves, although the harvest has, generally speaking and with the exception of some localities, been good. Disappointed in their request made in London for 120,000 tons of wheat, the Persian Government are now starting to take measures to buy wheat from the peasants at the free price in a number of areas and to pay the peasants for their surplus grain partly in cash and partly in much-needed piece-goods, sugar, &c. The areas at present affected are along the Iraqi frontier, and it was hoped that this procedure might stop smuggling which, owing to the great disparity between the official Persian price and the price of grain in Iraq, was denuding those districts of grain.

17. The Persian Government have asked for the co-operation of British consular liaison officers in arranging these purchases. Other concessions have also been made at our request to facilitate the procedure for the collection of grain in country districts.

Transport Question.

18. Another vital question is transport. Persia's economy now depends to a great extent on road transport, but hitherto there has been no attempt at strict control of the declining stock of tyres or the diversion of lorries from non-essential to essential purposes. The U.K.C.C. had for some months been negotiating with the Persian Government to obtain powers to carry out the much needed measures of rationalisation themselves, but the Americans, who supply the tyres and are in a position to make their views felt in this question, have shown themselves very sensitive to any suggestion that a monopoly might be created, and the negotiations with the U.K.C.C. were, therefore, not successful. The proposal for a transport board mentioned in paragraph 19 of my despatch No. 248 has, however, been approved by the Persian Government. A committee to control road transport has been set up with Persian, British and American representation. Mr. Birkle, formerly of the U.K.C.C., has been engaged by the Persian Government to advise and assist them in rationalising and controlling road transport, and Sir Arthur Parsons is to be the official British representative on the committee. Persian records of the registration of vehicles, which must form the basis for any rationalisation, are, however, found to be completely out of date, and as a first measure a census of all vehicles and tyres is to be made. This cannot be completed before the 5th November. However, Major Quinall, of the M.E.S.C., Jerusalem, is now in Tehran investigating the road transport position for the purpose of achieving a stricter control of all motor vehicles and the removal of non-essential vehicles from the roads. With this control it is hoped that adequate supplies for essential motor transport can be arranged. This, with the increased use of animal transport that is taking place, permits, so I am advised, a cautious optimism about the future.

Polish Refugees.

19. A second evacuation of military and civilian Poles from Russia occurred in August. 26,000 civilian Poles are for the moment in the Tehran area. Fortunately, arrangements have been made for the 10,000 previously here to go to East Africa and all will shortly have left Tehran. Meanwhile, in spite of the provision of special imports of wheat, tea and sugar by M.E.S.C., the addition of so many Europeans to the population of Tehran has given rise to some misgivings among Persians, and the Persian Government is most anxious to get rid of all Polish refugees. The British military authorities are equally anxious to eliminate this responsibility here, and it is hoped that the efforts now being made to find a destination overseas for them will shortly be successful.

20. This in no way exhausts the list of issues outstanding with the Persian Government. Little progress has been made with the complicated question of the payment for the arms already taken over by the British and Soviet Governments from the Persian authorities and the acquisition of certain other arms urgently needed by the British forces. Numerous points still await settlement in connexion with goods required by the British military authorities, and this question is bound to become more important now that the Allied forces in Persia are to be increased to meet the change in the war situation. Further, the Prime Minister has recently been requested to hand over to the R.A.F. all the accommodation at Mehrabad Aerodrome, which is the last training establishment in the possession of the Persian air force in the neighbourhood of Tehran. It will be necessary to tackle these problems one by one, and I am hopeful that it may be possible to reach satisfactory settlements.

Attitude of Persians towards the War.

21. Most of the difficulties which have arisen this summer in our relations with the Persian Government are fundamentally traceable to a lack of confidence on the part of the Persians that the Allies would be able to win the war, or even (to bring matters nearer home) to keep the Germans out of Persia. The most obvious sign of this was perhaps their recent suggestion in London and Moscow that Tehran should be declared an open city. It is highly satisfactory that this impracticable suggestion has been rejected, as the only real incentive to start some serious A.R.P. organisation would have disappeared, while our military plans would have been wrecked by the necessity to evacuate military establishments and aerodromes in Tehran. This lack of confidence shows itself, too, in less direct ways. Persian politicians and officials do not like to be associated with the arrest of Axis sympathisers and agents, presumably thinking that by some complacency towards Axis activities they will not be irretrievably compromised if the Germans reach this country. Similarly, the unwillingness of the Persian Government to hold the large quantities of sterling paid in return for the rials used by our military authorities may be traceable to a fear that they will not, in the end, be able to use the sterling to import goods. Difficulties over the food supply are largely due to the fact that landowners and peasants and even local officials are calculating to some extent on greater military and economic difficulties in the Middle East, and are holding out for famine prices. This lack of confidence has even found expression in the press. One or two Tehran newspapers have published commentaries on the war in Russia which could hardly have been bettered by German propagandists. Hostile articles on the subject of the arrests of suspects have also appeared. The Prime Minister has, I am glad to say, taken firm action by reminding the press of the powers which the Government holds under the Military Governorship Law of 1911, and by suppressing a number of newspapers which over-stepped the limit. He has stood up firmly to the Deputies, and he has told his colleagues that they can resign if they will not do what is necessary as regards the purchase of rials with sterling and the arrest of suspects. He has shown considerable courage in giving a lead to his countrymen, and the same can be said of the Shah.

Mr. Churchill's Visit.

22. The visit of Mr. Winston Churchill to Tehran, on his way to and from Russia, undoubtedly had a profound effect on the Persian Government in increasing confidence in the Allied cause. Mr. Churchill saw both the Shah and the Persian Prime Minister on the 12th August, and his personality had a tonic effect on all those to whom he talked. I cannot exaggerate the effect of such visits

from leading personalities from the Allied side in flattering and encouraging the Persians. Mr. Wendell Willkie has also recently passed through, and his visit, too, has been an unqualified success. His clear statement that it is time for the friends of the Allies to stand up and be counted and that, in effect, Persia could not go on hoping to get something for nothing, was a timely hint and has had a most useful reaction, however disappointing the results may have been for the Persian Government. It would have been difficult for a British statesman in present circumstances to say the same with equal effect.

Anglo-American Co-operation in Persia.

23. Qawam es Saltaneh has adopted as one of the planks of his policy closer co-operation with America. This is, I think, in every way an advantage from the Allied point of view. We are unable at the present time to produce a considerable number of first-class advisers ourselves, and, if we did, Russian suspicions might well be aroused. Persians are in many ways more open to approach from the American than from the British side. They are afraid of Powers who are neighbours of Persia and always suspect ulterior intentions. The Americans represent for them the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon nations without any of the disadvantages. From time to time I have detected a certain tendency on the part of the Persian Government to play us off against the Americans here, and it was curious that Qawam es Saltaneh showed himself genuinely surprised when I told him recently that we were in favour of an American military mission if it could be arranged and had so informed the State Department some months ago. Although the present American Minister sometimes, unwittingly I am sure, does not attempt to discourage such an idea in the Persian mind, the close relations between the British and American Legations and between the British authorities and the American advisers who are now beginning to arrive have so far prevented any misunderstandings. It is all-important to keep closely in step with the Americans, since an increase of American influence is taking place here as the American advisers arrive and take up their duties in the various ministries, and as more and more American technicians come to superintend and assist the transport of goods to Russia. So far as this legation is concerned every possible step will continue to be taken to work in the closest co-operation both with them and with the Soviet Embassy and authorities.

Internal Policy of the Government.

24. The Prime Minister certainly hopes that, with the aid of the American advisers, he will be able to achieve a far-reaching reform of the internal administration of the country. Only one or two have as yet arrived, but, meanwhile, the Prime Minister has shown considerable energy in tackling certain internal problems. In the first place he has set up a new inspectorate, the duties of which will be to examine all cases of complaints, especially of bribery and extortion made against Government servants throughout the country. This seems a step in the right direction, though it is as yet too early to say whether the new office will be able to check the wide-spread corruption which pervades the whole of the governmental machinery. The second reform is a series of changes in the Ministry of Health. The new Minister, Dr. Mareban, has drastically cut down the budgets of a number of hospitals in Tehran, and issued orders that a considerable number of official doctors in Tehran should leave the capital for provincial posts or else be dismissed. The doctors who are personally affected are, of course, indignant, and stories of one doctor being posted to Kerman while his wife, also a doctor, is sent to Hamadan lead one to suppose that the new scheme has not been efficiently worked out; but most people consider that the reform was badly needed and was a step in the right direction.

25. It is difficult to estimate the popular reactions to these innovations and to the new Cabinet in general. There has been some criticism of the engagement of American advisers and there is a certain amount of opposition to the presence of any foreigners in the Administration, but all sensible Persians deplore the existing state of affairs and recognise the need for reform. The general public is said to be pleased with the Prime Minister's strict instructions that Government servants are not to break the fast of Ramzan in public; this step, which is a definite break from the Pahlevi tradition, has, on the other hand, inevitably given rise to apprehensions lest the forces of reaction should gather strength and lead to the reintroduction of the veil for women and the renewal of the power of the mullas. The Prime Minister's broadcast on the anniversary of the

Shah's accession on the 16th September (see my telegram No. 1204 of the 20th September) has had a good effect on public confidence: he appealed to the public to keep out of politics and to have confidence that he would take all possible measures to ensure food supplies and security.

26. The result of the Mukhtari trial, i.e., a series of sentences of imprisonment on various dire charges, about which I shall address to you a separate report, has just been announced, but seems to have attracted little attention; those who think about it at all being divided into two classes: those who think that Mukhtari should have been executed, and those who think that the faults of the late Shah should not have been visited on any of his slavish subordinates. It is convenient that the public has lost interest; meanwhile, appeal proceedings are being started.

Conclusion.

27. To conclude this rather lengthy review, I venture to state that it is reasonable to hope for an improvement in the situation as compared with the confusion of the summer months, provided always that no serious deterioration in the military situation occurs. We have had very considerable difficulties with Qawam-es-Saltaneh, but we cannot hope for complete subservience from any man with sufficient character to govern this most intractable and venal country, and Qawam has at any rate now discovered that, where our essential military interests are concerned, we mean business and shall judge him by his attitude towards them.

28. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State, Cairo, to Headquarters, Iraq-Persia Forces, to Tenth Army, to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad and His Majesty's Embassy at Kuibyshev.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

[E 6157/122/34]

No. 30.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 321.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum and relating correspondence on suspect policy, Persia.

Tehran, September 28, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Memorandum.

IN December 1941 His Majesty's Legation informed the Foreign Office that, in view of the signature of the treaty, it was of the utmost importance to round up Persian fifth columnists and pro-Germans owing to their potential danger to British interests. The Foreign Office replied that they preferred to endeavour to secure collaboration with the Persians rather than to proceed to wholesale arrests immediately after the signature of the treaty. They were quite prepared to take action against a few Persians, whose numbers should be kept as low as possible, as a deterrent to others, provided that there was definite evidence against them subsequent to the signature of the treaty and that any such action was taken with the consent of the Persian Government. Large-scale arrests could not be countenanced unless the extension of hostilities to Persia was imminent and action was urgently required on military grounds. The foregoing considerations did not, of course, apply to German nationals.

2. At the end of February a list of seven prominent and active pro-Axis supporters, against whom sufficient evidence was forthcoming, was prepared by the competent departments of His Majesty's Legation. The names were Vaziri, Darugar, Darudi, Atabai, Zulfagmeri, Ghaffari and Daryush. The co-operation

of the Soviet Embassy was obtained and the list was submitted to the Persian Government, with the request that these suspects should be detained under Persian police supervision in Eastern Persia. After some delay, the Persian Government agreed and gave the necessary assurances to His Majesty's Legation that action would be taken. It was soon learned, however, that three of the suspects were still at large. In view of this clear demonstration of bad faith on the part of the Persian authorities, His Majesty's Legation demanded the immediate arrest of six of the suspects and their delivery to the British military authorities for safe-keeping. (It was considered desirable that Atabai, being the Shah's brother-in-law, should still be detained in East Persia under police supervision.) After considerable hesitation on legal and prestige grounds, five of the suspects were, at the end of April, handed over to the British military authorities for internment at Kermanshah under Anglo-Persian supervision. The sixth suspect, Vaziri, disappeared mysteriously under the eyes of the police and, despite constant representations by His Majesty's Legation, has not yet been traced. As a result of further discussions with the Persian authorities, some Germans and a few more Persian suspects, including Naser Munshi and Abbas Mazdah, were detained for examination by the Persian police, whilst one German was arrested by the British security authorities and sent to Bagdad under British military escort. It was not until the middle of July, when a fresh re-emergence of Axis activity broke out, that a further list of eighteen suspects was handed to the Prime Minister, with a request for their arrest and their delivery to the British military authorities. The Prime Minister asked for time for reflection, but raised no objection to any foreigners at present in the hands of the Persian Government being handed over straight away to His Majesty's Legation; the same applied to the small number of Persians also under detention on the understanding that they would first be sent to Kermanshah for preliminary interrogation. On the 19th July the three Germans were delivered to the British authorities. As a result of further pressure, the Prime Minister agreed on the 22nd July that by the 25th he would hand over eleven of the eighteen, but no action was taken, and Mr. Soheily fell from power soon afterwards.

3. During the period from the time of the occupation in August 1941 to the fall of Mr. Soheily in July 1942 there had been cases where Persians, living in areas occupied by British military forces, had been sent away into "unoccupied" territory on the charge of being hostile to the Allies. Thus about twenty persons were deported from Abadan to Tehran at the request of the A.I.O.C., and several were sent away from Hamadan by the Political Adviser, or at his request. It was an open question whether the best way to deal with such persons was to transfer them to some part of Persia where they were no longer under our observation, but it was always realised that the British military authorities could not permit dangerous persons to reside within their lines. These deportations caused much correspondence and discussion between the Persian Government and the legation. Another cause of dispute was the vagueness as to the place of detention of suspects handed over by the Persian Government; some were removed from Kermanshah to Ahwaz, which in summer is regarded rather as the French regard French Guiana, and the misunderstandings and protests were intensified when a very old official named Wabbizada, who had been arrested by the British military authorities in the south and removed to Ahwaz, died a few days later. When, therefore, Mr. Soheily was succeeded by Qawam-al-Saltana, it was decided to try to establish an agreed procedure to obviate our having to haggle for each suspect or group of suspects and to submit to constant complaints because men already under arrest had been moved to Ahwaz, had not been interrogated, and so on. To begin with, a new list (this list, which bore forty-five names, included a few of the persons named in the list of eighteen, and several Germans) was drawn up, consisting entirely of names of persons implicated in the evidence given by Germans or Persians already in British custody. His Majesty's Government and the British military authorities concerned agreed that suspects should be detained at Sultanabad, which is on the plateau, and not sent to Ahwaz or elsewhere, and His Majesty's Government also agreed that the Persians should participate both in the interrogation and in the supervision of the suspects. The Prime Minister was prompt to secure the arrest of nearly all the persons on the list, and he handed over the Germans, but he held out for the detention of the Persian suspects at Tehran, and appealed to the Foreign Office through the Persian Minister in London. Meanwhile, the press indulged in a violent campaign against the "Allies" on this question, and it was several days before the Government's proclamation about the powers of military governorship put a stop to it. The Prime Minister's appeal to London having failed, owing to the proved unreliability of the Persian

police, he agreed to Sultanabad as a place for detention. The procedure which should govern the detention and interrogation of all suspects was worked out and agreed to by the Persian Government and the legation. A copy of the conditions is attached.

4. The place of detention at Sultanabad has been got ready and the first batch of suspects was despatched thither from Tehran on the 24th September.

5. One of the difficulties against which we have had to fight has been the lack of support from our allies. The United States Minister was inclined at first to consider the original Persian proposals adequate, viz., that the suspects should be detained at Tehran and tried by Persian law. He was eventually persuaded to go so far as to assure the Persian Government that the fifth column was a real danger which they ought to eliminate, but by then the question of principle had, in fact, been settled. The Soviet Embassy has evidently received instructions not to do anything which might be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of Persia, and has quoted this principle on more than one occasion, so that it could not be expected that they would put pressure on the Persian Government in support of our suspect policy. This has, however, not prevented their trying to secure our help on various occasions. It was at Soviet instigation that we requested the Swiss Legation to repatriate two Swiss subjects hitherto resident at Meshed and alleged by the Russians to be anti-Ally. Similarly, in Tabriz, when the Russians wished to secure the arrest of a number of persons alleged to be indulging in anti-Ally propaganda, they tried to obtain the support of His Majesty's Consul-General, who wisely confined his support to giving the local authorities a list of the persons whom he believed to be engaged in such propaganda. It is our contention that in places in which they have troops the Russians must be responsible for securing the arrest of suspects; if they like to leave the suspects for the Persians to keep in detention, that is their affair. In places where there are British troops, we should not ask the Russians to intervene with us if we wished to eliminate dangerous elements.

6. To sum up: the agreement is inapplicable in areas where there are Russian troops because the Soviet Embassy were not a party to it, and we cannot accept the odium of participating in their requests for arrest and detention, especially when, as happened in Tehran recently, they want to secure the arrest of people against whom we have nothing at all. In areas where there are British troops, exceptional action may sometimes be necessary, e.g., it may prove essential to remove from Abadan considerable numbers of persons whose presence is considered dangerous but who cannot be sent to Sultanabad, because the evidence against them is embarrassingly weak for production before the Persians on the board of interrogation. In these cases it may be necessary to turn minor suspects loose in "unoccupied" territory, though it is assumed that this would be done through the intermediary of the Persian police, and not by any British authority direct.

7. The Persian Government recently arrested several persons on suspicion of having a share in some plot against the Government and applied to us to see whether we could supplement their evidence. This was encouraging, since our great difficulty has been that the Persian Government and people have hitherto paid little attention to our warnings about the fifth column, partly because they have had no direct experience of the danger, and partly, of course, because they thought that any danger there might be was directed only against the Allies. If the Persian Government would take action against some suspects, it would justify our suspect policy; moreover, the Persians could inflict heavy punishment, whereas all we can do is to detain suspects indefinitely at Sultanabad. Unfortunately, after a few days, all the persons arrested at the instigation of the Persian Government were released.

R. W. BULLARD.

Tehran, September 25, 1942.

Sub-Enclosure 1.

Sir R. Bullard to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, September 28, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to confirm that I accept the Imperial Government's text, dated the 20th Shahrivar, 1321 (17th September, 1942), of the conditions governing the detention and interrogation of Persian suspects arrested by the Persian authorities at the request of His Majesty's Legation.

2. I also confirm the oral agreement made between your Excellency and myself, viz., that these conditions refer not only to suspects already in detention on the 17th September, 1942, but to any other Persian suspects whom the Persian authorities may arrest in future at the request of His Majesty's Legation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

R. W. BULLARD.

Sub-Enclosure 2.

(Translation.)

Agreement concerning the Detention and Interrogation and Supervision of the Persian Suspects at Sultanabad (Arak).

THE Persian suspects are to be sent from the place where they are now under detention to Sultanabad (Arak), in which city a place of detention will be appointed for them.

2. In accordance with the legation note No. 1241 of the 5th Shahrivar, 1321 (27th August, 1942), the Persian suspects who are now in the hands of British officials, whether in Tehran, or in Ahwaz, or elsewhere, will be sent to Sultanabad (Arak).

3. In accordance with the legation's note No. 1231 of the 23rd Mordad, 1321 (14th August, 1942), Persian officials may co-operate with the British officials in guarding and in interrogating the suspects.

4. The Imperial Government will appoint a person as a commissioner to be present at the joint investigations.

5. In accordance with the legation's note No. 1231 of the 23rd Mordad, 1321 (14th August, 1942), the suspects who, after investigation, are found to be not guilty will be immediately released.

6. In accordance with the legation's note No. 1231 of the 23rd Mordad, 1321 (14th August, 1942), the suspects whose guilt is confirmed will be kept after the interrogation at Sultanabad (Arak), and not at Ahwaz, or any other place.

7. The same procedure as is being adopted with regard to the persons who are now being sent to Sultanabad (Arak) will be adopted with regard to all the other Persians who up to the present have been taken into detention.

8. The interrogation will be begun as soon as possible after the arrival of the suspects at Sultanabad (Arak), and a decision concerning their fate will be taken with the utmost despatch.

9. Steps will be taken to secure the comfort of the suspects. The suspects will be allowed to have contact with and to receive their families and other persons only in accordance with rules which will be drawn up by agreement between the Imperial Government's commissioner and the Commanding Officer of the British troops.

10. The commissioner of the Imperial Government and Persian guardian will reside at Sultanabad (Arak) until the completion of the interrogations. After the completion of the interrogations, the Persian interrogators will return, but the commissioner of the Imperial Government will stay at Sultanabad (Arak) so long as the suspects whose guilt is established are in detention.

Dated the 26th Shahrivar, 1321 (7th September, 1942).

[E 6200/144/34]

No. 31.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 231.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 23, 1942.

THE Persian Minister came to see me this morning to discuss his Government's economic difficulties, and in particular their need for wheat. Mr. Taqizadeh maintained that the Persian Government had done everything within their power to check hoarding. They had agreed to offer a greatly increased price for wheat and had also set up a Ministry of Food. Nevertheless, they had been unable to secure any appreciable quantity of wheat, and the public now feared that there would be a serious shortage during the coming year.

[25053]

2. In order to allay these anxieties, the Persian Government wished to establish a reserve of wheat in Tehran, which could be drawn upon in an emergency. They had therefore suggested that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government should make a joint Declaration, in which they would promise in certain circumstances to make up any deficiency in cereals which might arise in Persia. The Minister understood that you and your United States colleague had agreed to the text of this Declaration, except for the last clause, which provided that a reserve of 25,000 tons of wheat should be established in Tehran.

3. I told Mr. Taqizadeh that I really could not believe that Persia needed wheat at the present moment. The country was normally self-supporting in cereals and the harvest was only just over. There must be any amount of wheat in the country, and it was up to the Persian Government to make a really serious effort to secure this wheat. Mr. Taqizadeh explained that his Government were extremely anxious to establish a reserve at Tehran. I said that, before we could decide whether it was necessary to ship any wheat to Persia, we should have to have more information about the stocks now available in the country. I understood that Mr. Sheridan, the American Food Adviser, was investigating this question; if he found that it would be necessary to import some wheat into Persia before the next harvest, we should have to consider what we could do to help. But the Minister must realise that, in any case, it would be at least three months before any wheat could reach Persia from North America. For the immediate future, it was therefore up to the Persians to help themselves. Even if it should prove necessary to ship wheat to Persia, the Minister would realise that this entailed diverting ships from elsewhere and thus indirectly prolonging the war. We could not undertake to do this, unless it was absolutely essential.

4. Mr. Taqizadeh then turned to the question of our request for further supplies of rials. He explained that the note issue had already been greatly increased during the last year and his Government feared that any further increase would lead to inflation. I reminded the Minister that in the Financial Agreement his Government had undertaken to make available sufficient rials to meet our needs. As an instance of the way in which we had fulfilled our obligations under the agreement, I mentioned that we had only recently provided gold to the value of £2 million. It was now up to the Persian Government to do their part by providing the rials we needed. I did not consider that the Persian Government were entitled to link up the question of supplying rials with the entirely separate matter of wheat supplies. But I undertook to consider what could be done to help the Persian Government over wheat, if our information showed that imports would really be necessary.

5. Mr. Taqizadeh also mentioned his Government's need for lorries. I explained that we fully sympathised with the Persian Government's difficulty in this respect; unfortunately, we ourselves were also extremely short of lorries, but I would see what we could do to help. Finally, the Minister gave me an aide-mémoire covering the points which he had discussed with me.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 6470/122/34]

No. 32.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow).

(No. 346.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador came to see me on the 3rd November to discuss recent developments in Persia. I gave him a note on various outstanding questions, such as our need for local currency, the wheat situation, the possible dissolution of the Majlis and the need for Sir R. Bullard to receive stronger support from the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran.

2. On the subject of the present shortage of wheat, the Ambassador agreed that Persia should normally produce sufficient wheat for her own needs, and that the chief reasons for the present shortage were the Persian Government's failure to deal adequately with the problem of hoarding and the shortage of lorries, which hindered the transport of wheat from one area to another.

3. I suggested that much of the trouble was due to the refusal of the Russian authorities to allow wheat to be sent, as usual, to Tehran from

Azerbaijan and Khorassan. To this the Ambassador replied that, as food-stuffs used to be smuggled out of their zone, the Soviet authorities had set up a system of controls over all food-stuffs leaving the areas which they occupied. As a result of complaints from the Persian Government, the Soviet authorities had recently agreed that 35,000 tons of food-stuffs should be sent to Tehran from Azerbaijan. When I said that this was the first I had heard of this decision, M. Maisky admitted that he did not know if the 35,000 tons had actually been sent to Tehran.

4. M. Maisky added that, in his Government's view, there were also other contributory factors. Smuggling, for instance, had greatly increased, and considerable quantities of wheat were being sent over the border into Turkey and Iraq. The large numbers of British and Soviet troops in Persia inevitably increased the food shortage, while the presence of many thousands of Poles also had its effect, even though their needs were met to a great extent by imports.

5. As for smuggling, I said that our information confirmed what his Excellency had told me. We agreed that the British and Soviet authorities in Persia should be asked to do their utmost to check the smuggling of food-stuffs over these frontiers. I explained that we imported large quantities of food-stuffs both for our troops in Persia and for the Poles. Most of the Polish troops had already left Persia and we were doing our best to find accommodation elsewhere for the civilians. Here we were faced with the additional difficulty of finding shipping to transport them to their new homes. M. Maisky at one moment suggested that the food situation might be improved if we were both to reduce the number of our troops in Persia; ours he estimated at 150,000 men. I gave him no reason to think that we should do so, but undertook to let him know whether the number of our troops in Persia was as great as he had suggested, and told him I felt confident it was not. I emphasised that we had been particularly careful not to reinforce our troops in Persia more than was strictly necessary, since any such reinforcements would necessarily reduce the volume of supplies which could be sent to Russia across Persia. In reply to a question the Ambassador said Russian forces numbered between three and four divisions, he thought.

6. Having dealt with the reasons for the wheat shortage, the Ambassador asked what we proposed to do about it. I explained that the Allied Supplies Executive had just agreed that 5,000 tons of wheat should be programmed for shipment to Persia in November and another 5,000 tons in December. Further shipments would be urgently considered. We were also discussing with the United States Government the issue of a declaration whereby our two Governments would undertake to do their utmost to supply cereals to Persia in case of need, provided that the Persians had done their part by carrying out the recommendations of the American Food Adviser and the Road Transport Committee. While it would be some months before any wheat from North America could reach Persia, the Persian Government seemed to think that the proposed declaration would strengthen their position in the country and would make it easier for them to induce the Majlis to pass the legislation necessary for supplying the Allies with Persian currency.

7. The Ambassador thought his Government might wish to be associated with the proposed Anglo-American Declaration. I explained that we had not previously suggested this, as we assumed that the Soviet Government would not at present be able to undertake to supply wheat to Persia. But if they wished to participate in the declaration, and to assume their share of the obligations which it would impose on us, we should be very glad. The Ambassador also asked whether it was intended that his Government should be represented on the proposed Road Transport Committee. I replied that if the Soviet Government wished to be represented on this committee, their assistance would no doubt be welcome to the British authorities. M. Maisky undertook to consult his Government on both these points.

8. The Ambassador said that his Government agreed in principle that the Majlis should be dissolved, but thought that the time and manner of its dissolution should be settled locally. I suggested that this was one of the matters in which the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran should be instructed to concert action with Sir R. Bullard. The suggestion in the note I had given M. Maisky, that a greater degree of co-operation was needed between our representatives at Tehran had evidently struck home, as he maintained that the Ambassador had to consult his Government on certain points and M. Smirnov could not give Sir R. Bullard stronger support than he at present did. M. Maisky thought that what was needed was closer co-operation. I pointed out that Sir R. Bullard

was left to take the lead in pressing the Persian Government on all questions of common concern, such as our need for rials, and urged that M. Smirnov should be instructed to give him fuller support. At M. Maisky's request, I undertook to let him have some concrete suggestions as to how fuller co-operation between our representatives at Tehran could be achieved.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 6455/57/34]

No. 33.

Consul Cook to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 23.)

HIS Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of his monthly diary for September 1942.

Kermanshah, October 7, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Kermanshah Monthly Diary for September 1942.

Kurdistan.

THE general situation has been quieter of late, and no incidents have been reported since the holding up of an Anglo-Iranian Oil Company vehicle on the 5th September on the Paitak Pass. Some of the sub-tribes carry on the usual sniping of each other, and it is said that bullets crack most nights around the villages, marauders wishing to find out what defences can be offered. The gendarmerie are, of course, completely absent from most parts of the district. The authorities would like to disarm certain tribes, but realise that this would offer immediate temptation to their neighbours for looting and paying off old scores. All the same there is confidential talk of dealing thoroughly with the Kalkhanis shortly when they come down from summer pastures, and of distributing their chieftains in other parts of Persia on the Reza Shah model. If this means that people like the turbulent and mischief-making Shamseddin Haidari will be repressed, it is all to the good, but such intriguing and ambitious Kurdish personalities are generally "well in" with the Governor-General, Amir-i-Kull, so that little real action is taken. There has been some heart-burning among the Sinjabis, fifty of whose headmen came towards the end of the month to Kermanshah to complain of the excessive extortions of their bakshdar, Asker Khan, and to ask for his replacement. As usual, they also came to this consulate for sympathy and support, not forgetting to add that their oppressor was a well-known pro-German sympathiser (his father and uncles were, in fact, on the Turco-German side in 1916-17, and one uncle is in Germany now), and had been organising robberies of British camps and dumps in this district. Inner circles suggest, however, that Asker Khan has not been paying his proper "dues" to the Governor-General, and must therefore make room for someone more amenable.

2. It is surprising that conditions should be so quiet when official control is so exiguous. In some districts Kurdish headmen openly say that there is no Government these days, and certainly the authorities are flouted as far as smuggling and hoarding of wheat are concerned in many parts. Possibly the latter activities have kept them too busy for other mischief, which will come later.

3. There has been some robbing of British military camps, even radio-sets having been carried off, but sterner precautions have improved matters, and the presence of Assyrian guards (Iraq Levies) has no doubt had its effect, as they are known to tend to shoot first and challenge afterwards. At one time there was an idea of enrolling Kurdish guards on the system of setting a thief to catch a thief; setting a cat to guard bowls of cream would be an apter metaphor, and nothing has come of it.

Persian Administration.

4. The Governor-General, Amir-i-Kull, was ill during the greater part of the month, which was convenient for him in a way at a time when the Prime Minister in Tehran and the British Consulate at this end were worrying him to take strong measures against his profiteering and hoarding friends and

acquaintances, which he has obviously no intention of doing. Most of the local government devolved upon the weak shoulders of the Governor Mustashari, who continues to be well disposed towards us, but apparently incapable of carrying out any of our recommendations. General Shabbakti remains in the background and piously declines to intervene in the civil administration; it is hard to credit him with innocent motives, and possibly he has no wish to take any unpopular remedial action while he watches the said administration daily losing prestige and ordinary respect in town and country.

5. The unwanted Director of Finance, Majidzadeh, was very suddenly replaced at the beginning of the month by Mr. Shams Nakhai, who is reputed to be honest and intelligent, and who certainly has few illusions about the difficulties of his task at present, or about the characters of the local landowners and merchants who are out to thwart any attempts at proper efficient government. Towards the end of the month Kermanshah at last obtained a mayor in the person of Mr. Sharifi, an official from Tehran, who gives an impression of energy and certainly has dealt straightway a few strokes of a new broom in the Augean stables of the local municipality. He even ventured to confiscate some thousands of hoarded eggs, but the only result was a strike of egg-sellers for some days and higher prices than ever.

6. A finance official from Ahwaz, named Ghulam Ali Khan Zanganeh, managed to transfer himself here during the month and called on the consulate to declare his unbounded loyalty. In the consulate's opinion there are already too many of the Zanganeh family benefiting in this district from the elevated position of their obliging relative, the Amir-i-Kull, and as this new arrival brought with him an undesirable reputation for pro-Nazi leanings he was soon sent packing by our military authorities.

Food Supply.

7. The wheat question remains depressingly where it was a month ago, and the combination of unprincipled landowners and corrupt local officials may be said to have defeated the Tehran Government's attempts to secure the proper quota of grain at official prices. This consulate and its liaison officers have done their best to improve matters, but have rather found themselves in the position of a referee in a disreputable football match, with no whistle, no power to stop the play, and no authority to send anyone off the field. All appeals either to the local authorities or to the Persian authorities in Tehran to apply their own laws or to arrest even a handful of the known worst offenders have met with no response, except more exhortations and empty threats. The result is that at the end of September, with all the harvest gathered and threshed and largely hidden away, the official Kermanshah stocks of wheat were under 350 tons, or less than ten days' supply for the town. In the smaller country towns the position is worse, and in the midst of a wheat-growing district bread is either unobtainable at times, or sold at three times or more the official rate. Meanwhile, Tehran circles are insisting on their urgent need to take wheat for themselves from the areas a few miles east of Kermanshah, and the local officials are insisting equally strongly on their intention not to allow this to happen until local supplies for the winter have been first collected—a slow and difficult task in present conditions. The Tehran attitude is understandable, but would be more logical if they had done anything at all effective during the last three months to see that the quite good local harvest in other parts of the Kermanshah area had not been smuggled out or hidden away under the eyes of their police, gendarmerie and military forces.

8. Following a certain amount of exhortation and reprimand from Tehran, including a personal message from the Prime Minister, the local officials on the 15th September made a show of trying to force the recalcitrant landowners into signing the undertakings to deliver their fair surpluses of wheat which they should have signed in August. Amid much moaning and protest, the landlords signed for miserable quantities of between a tenth and a quarter of the amounts assessed for each by the Finance Department, which in turn were, of course, less than the real available amounts in proportion to the "inducements" proffered to the official assessors beforehand. The trick, however, was so evident and so unsatisfactory that even the Governor-General was forced to insist on larger undertakings, possibly because it was foreseen that otherwise the local needs of the town would not be met. No one, of course, pretends to care a rap whether the needs of the capital and other unproductive parts of Persia will be assisted in any way—unless these are willing later on to pay inflated black market rates for the grain now being held back and hidden away. The uncontrolled price has now risen so high (1,000 rials to 1,200 rials per kharwar) that it is repeatedly

reported that wheat is being smuggled back again into Persia over the Iraq border at 900 rials. There are many districts along the border from Qasr-i-Shirin southwards to Pusht-i-Kuh where the peasants have no wheat even for seed, and little prospect at present of being assisted by the Finance Department.

9. As a result of instructions received from Tehran, the arrangement at the end of the month was that, if landlords would not sign their proper undertakings, the Finance Department's statement of the quantity assessed in each individual case would carry full weight, just as if duly signed for. It remains to be seen, however, whether the obstinate landowners will deliver those amounts, as so far they have had no reason to fear any real official sanction or retribution.

10. They had plenty of inducement to resist, on the contrary, when the news leaked out of the Tehran authorities' intention to purchase as much wheat as possible on the open market through the Agricultural Bank. That scheme has been shelved, but the effect has been unfortunate, and in any case it is known that there is now a free market in Khuzistan, not far away. Besides this it is becoming known that the Royal Engineer authorities in charge of road-building and defence works in this area are arranging to buy wheat at uncontrolled prices for their Persian labourers. This should theoretically come from peasants' surpluses, leaving landlords' surplus to the Finance Department, but most small peasants' surpluses have been already sold to private hoarders, and it is the landlords who will benefit.

11. It is difficult to see what will be the outcome of all this, unless hunger and bread-riots in the winter and spring. Even now the caches of the hoarders could be discovered, but it will be difficult to find them once snow has fallen, and by then transport to the needy areas will be difficult, if not impossible.

Economic Situation.

12. While wholesale prices fluctuate from week to week in accordance with the desires or fears of the merchants, retail prices continue to rise. Wages, of course, are having to follow, and a day labourer now insists on 10 or 11 rials a day, against 7 or 8 a month or two ago. Artisans are putting up their prices, and a pair of ordinary locally-made boots is now 200 rials. The lower middle class, such as clerks and minor Government employees, are feeling the pinch, and the poorest classes must find it hard to live. Any day in the main street one may see children practically naked, and wretched begging women who are hardly decently covered by one ragged garment.

13. Hoarding, corruption and maldistribution are to blame for the high prices of many commodities, but the increasing needs of the British forces in the locality cannot but have their effect on the prices of fruit, vegetables, meat, eggs and firewood. Careful comparisons show that the cost of living has increased by over 90 per cent. since a year ago. Some articles, such as butter, rice, milk, potatoes, ghee, have risen in price by 150 per cent. or 200 per cent. during the last six months.

14. Peasants who have sold their surplus wheat to private hoarders at "black" rates are happy, but may be less so when they find that their money will purchase less and less. Peasants from the non-agricultural districts who relied on wool and gum tragacanth have heard of a welcome improvement in prices during the month. It is said that enquiries from Russian wool-buyers and better chances for the export of gum to New York and London are responsible for this change from recent inactivity.

15. As usual in the autumn buying period there has been a shortage of small currency in the town, but this year the position has become much more acute, owing to the spending of money by British troops. The Bank Mellie have done little or nothing to remedy matters.

Political.

16. The Soviet Consul, M. V. Chvetsov, was transferred from Kermanshah at very short notice in mid-September. He was instructed to report to his embassy in Tehran, without knowing to what new post he was appointed. No successor has arrived, but the senior vice-consul is acting for the time being.

17. It is fairly certain that pro-Nazi feeling here has recently declined, at least among the civilians. The more intelligent confess that they no longer trust German news and propaganda, and there are signs that the B.B.C. news in Persian every evening is being more widely listened to. It is already being taken for granted that the Germans have failed to advance far enough this summer to conquer the Caucasus before winter sets in, and on the whole people are relieved that Persia is spared from scenes of fighting for another spell. The news of the

German leaflet raid on Pahlevi soon arrived here, but caused no particular reaction. Although pro-Nazi feeling has declined for the moment, it would be a mistake to suppose that the inhabitants are becoming correspondingly more pro-Ally. On the other hand, there are signs that the younger generation are wanting to learn more English, both in school and private classes, and are less keen to learn French as a principal language.

Propaganda.

18. A shop has now been hired by the consulate in the main street for the display of posters and photographs and for the reading and distribution of pamphlets, &c. So far attendance has been gratifying, although composed chiefly of schoolboys and young men.

19. About 200 people come to listen to the B.B.C. news every evening in the consulate's broadcasting hall, but most of them slip away immediately afterwards instead of staying to hear the Baku, Tehran and Delhi news bulletins (the latter at 9 p.m. being somewhat too late for our purpose).

20. The Soviet Consulate has arranged with the police for a small hoarding at the side of our own in the town square. But whereas the British display is mostly of attractive coloured posters and large photographs with little or no letter-press, the Russian is rather like an illustrated newspaper and seems to attract much less attention.

General.

21. The main street of Kermanshah, which carries a great deal of our military traffic is falling into a bad state of repair. The mayor has asked for it to be asphalted by Kampsax or the British roadmaking authorities, but there is no chance whatever of this being done at present.

22. An interesting sidelight on the present state of Persian administration was given when the Governor-General recently asked His Majesty's Consul for his good offices in trying to obtain a Persian exit visa for an influential Persian friend of his who wished to make the pilgrimage to Kerbela in Iraq. The friend had duly applied through the local chief of police, who had had to refer the application to Tehran, and it was realised even by the Governor-General that the chances of a reply within a reasonable period were small, unless the consulate here and the British Legation in Tehran might be willing to intervene.

F. A. G. COOK, Consul.

Kermanshah, October 1, 1942.

[E 6811/122/34]

No. 34.

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow).

(No. 368.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 17, 1942.

THE Soviet Ambassador handed me this afternoon the attached letter to Sir A. Cadogan on the subject of the situation in Persia. I read through this document and told the Ambassador that the import by us of 20,000 tons of wheat into Persia was not intended to meet the increased demands created by Allied troops or the stay of Poles in the country. As I had explained to him before, both of these groups were being separately supplied.

2. As regards the last paragraph, I told the Ambassador that I did not fully understand his Government's comments. When we said that extra food could only be brought into Persia at the expense of Anglo-American supplies to Russia, this was not a statement of opinion but merely a statement of fact. We fully realised the Russian difficulties and the capacity of the railway was being developed as fast as possible in any event. If more food had to be carried on it, less goods of other kinds could be transported.

3. The Ambassador did not dispute this, but said he thought the important factor which emerged from his letter was that M. Smirnov had been instructed to work closely with Sir Reader Bullard and with the United States Minister. In his Excellency's view it should now be possible for most of the difficulties to be hammered out on the spot in Tehran.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 34.

M. Maisky to Sir A. Cadogan.

My dear Sir Alexander,

November 16, 1942.

IN reference to your letter of the 30th October, No. E 6314/928/G, on the instructions of my Government I have to reply as follows:—

(1) The Soviet Government fully shares the viewpoint of the British Government on the necessity of settling the question of satisfying the needs of local currency. It has accordingly given the necessary instructions to the Soviet Ambassador at Teheran to mutually co-operate with his British and American colleagues in order to secure the necessary local currency required to supply Allied troops in Iran and for the transportation of goods to the Soviet Union. It is hoped that the common efforts of the Allied representatives will secure the positive settlement of this question without having recourse to the forceful measures mentioned in the British note. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that rials needed to cover expenses connected with the transportation of goods to the U.S.S.R. cannot cause considerable difficulties, and still less cause a critical situation in supplying the Allies in Iran with local currency.

In settling the question of supplying Iranian currency to the Allies, it seems necessary to relieve, as far as possible, the apprehension of the Iranian Government which it voiced previously when a similar question was raised, lest the issue of rial notes in ever growing numbers without sufficient marketable commodities to cover it, would result in the deterioration of the rial with all the consequences it implies for the economic and political situation of the country.

With regard to the statement contained in your letter that the Soviet Ambassador previously did not inform the British Minister, Sir Reader Bullard, about the draft financial agreement proposed by the Soviet Government to Iran, this appears to have arisen from the fact that until lately the British side in Iran did not convey any advance information to the Soviet Ambassador there on similar steps it was taking. The Soviet Government fully shares the opinion of the British Government that it is desirable in future regularly to effect such a mutual exchange of information. The Soviet Government has already instructed its Ambassador in Iran to fully acquaint Sir Reader Bullard with the draft of the Soviet-Iranian proposal concerning payments on the basis of which negotiations are being conducted now in Teheran between the representatives of the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Iran.

(2) The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the unity of the two Governments on the fact that at present, after the harvesting of the crops, Iran has at her disposal a sufficient amount of wheat to satisfy the needs of the population. The difficulties which arose in the supply of cereals in some regions of Iran originated from defects in organising the collection of cereals and in the lack of sufficient transport facilities. With a view to overcoming the difficulties which now exist in the supply of foodstuffs to Teheran, the Soviet Government informed the Government of Iran of its willingness to export from Iran-Azerbaijan up to 35,000 tons of wheat for supply to Teheran from the surplus wheat now existing in that region, and which is assessed by the British Mission in Iran at 40,000 tons.

Taking into consideration the presence of surplus foodstuffs in Northern Iran, the Soviet Government, in order to secure foodstuffs and fodder required by Soviet troops in Iran, has requested the Iranian Government to supply: 5,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of barley and 30,000 tons of rice. According to information received the Iranian Government has no objection to meeting this request of the Soviet Government for the supply of wheat, barley and rice in the quantities stated above. Thus, it is not possible to accept as correct the information that the Iranian authorities are alleged to be apprehensive about the purchases of wheat, barley and rice by Soviet organisations in Iran resulting in worsening the deficiency of cereals available for the Iranian population. The intended purchase of 5,000 tons of wheat in the Iranian-Azerbaijan region for the supply to Soviet troops stationed there coincides simultaneously with the export to Khorasan province of Iran of 2-3,000 tons of Soviet wheat, in addition to more than 3,000 tons of wheat which were quite recently sent to Iran from the Soviet Union. The purchase of 15,000 tons of barley as fodder for Soviet troops in Iran does not belong to the category of foodstuffs required by the population, and this cannot therefore be considered as a measure which would aggravate the food situation in Iran.

With regard to the purchase of 30,000 tons of rice for export to the Soviet Union, it must be noted that this transaction does not go beyond the normal limits of goods turnover between the Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, in former years Iran exported quantities of rice to the Soviet Union considerably in excess of 30,000 tons.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction your statement that the British Government propose to import into Iran in the near future 20,000 tons of wheat. This importation will help, to a certain degree, in satisfying the increased needs of Iran for foodstuffs as a result of the increased number of Allied troops stationed there, and of the prolonged stay in Iran of a considerable number of Poles who were evacuated from the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government begs to note the information that the British Government, in consultation with the Government of the United States of America, is considering issuing a declaration in which these two Governments will undertake the responsibility of making up the real deficiency of cereals in Iran until the new crops are gathered. At the same time the Soviet Government cannot but express its surprise at the statement that if the Soviet military units in Northern Iran will in future be supplied from local resources, then the necessary importation of cereals in Iran will be made at the expense of a corresponding reduction in Anglo-American supplies to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that Great Britain and the United States of America are very well aware of the food difficulties of the U.S.S.R. caused by the temporary loss of the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine, and consequently thinks that British and American supplies of cereals to Iran should, under no circumstances, have an adverse effect on the amount and in the time of arrival of supplies to the U.S.S.R.

Yours sincerely,

J. MAISKY.

[E 6920/21/34]

No. 35.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 376.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 10, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to supplement my despatch No. 363, dated the 28th October, by transmitting to you herewith copies of two papers, viz., a note⁽¹⁾ dated the 26th October, in which His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz comments on the aide-mémoire from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 20th October, of which a copy was sent to you in my above-mentioned despatch, and secondly a despatch No. 15, dated the 22nd October, in which Mr. Urquhart diagnoses and prescribes for the Kurdish problem in Azerbaijan. The despatch, with which I am in full agreement, is exceptionally able, and I trust that its inevitable length will not prevent its receiving the attention it deserves. It contains too much material to be summarised easily, but the main points are brought out in paragraph 2 below.

2. Mr. Urquhart's examination on the spot supports the theory that the Russians first encouraged the Kurds but are now trying to keep them quiet, partly because the Kurds have got out of hand, and partly because the potential military value of the Kurds to them has diminished since relations with the Turks on the frontier improved. Seeing the withdrawal of the hoped-for Russian support, the Kurds begin to wonder whether when the war comes to an end they may not find themselves left to face the revengeful Persians alone, and to cast about for a policy to meet that situation. The Persians, having exploited very tactfully the relatively small incident at Rezaieh, have gained ground at the expense of the Russians. Suspicion of British policy in regard to the Kurds has been aroused in the minds of the Russians—a suspicion which the Kurds may well have tried to foster for their own ends—and it behoves us to endeavour to allay that suspicion. With an eye on the more distant future we must "do what may be possible to help the moderate men to evolve a *modus vivendi* which will not require drastic revision when the occupation comes to an end." Mr. Urquhart has advised Ghazi Muhammad and other leaders to lay their complaints before

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

the Persian Government. The Governor-General, after receiving some good advice from Mr. Urquhart, declared his intention to recommend to the Government that a new Kurdish Deputy should be elected (to replace a man who never comes to Tehran), and that certain responsible Kurds should be paid to keep order. Mr. Urquhart considers the moment unsuitable for seeking that Russian co-operation which might facilitate a solution of the Kurdish question, in view of the Russian suspicion aroused by the fact that Mr. Urquhart himself and Air Vice-Marshal de Crespigny and his party happened to be in the Mahabad area at the same time, and that the Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan allege (without any foundation) that Colonel Lyon and some other person from Iraq visited the Kurds in the Rezaieh area.

3. The two measures of appeasement proposed by the Governor-General of Tabriz may meet with practical difficulties; if we had our way, the Majlis would cease to exist and the election of another Kurdish Deputy would have to await the next general election; while the proposal to pay responsible Kurds to keep order is believed to be contrary to the plans for the gendarmerie, which are being evolved under the guidance of the American adviser, Colonel Schwarzkopf. Mr. Urquhart's own plan, to try to induce the Kurds to find and follow a policy which will continue to serve them well when there are no Russians and no British between them and the Persians, agrees with the policy which we have tried to follow in Southern Kurdistan, as both sound and honest. Moreover, it seems to be the policy towards which the Soviet authorities are turning, if they have not already adopted it implicitly.

4. Unfortunately the Soviet authorities have again been showing some suspicion of our intentions in Azerbaijan and perhaps in Persia generally. To forestall such suspicion I have always treated the Soviet Ambassador with great frankness and kept him fully informed of all our activities, so when the consul-general set off for Mahabad without mentioning the imminent arrival of the air vice-marshal (of which he did not then know) it may well have given an air of mystery to an innocent expedition. The presence of armed Assyrians, natives of the Rezaieh area, among the air vice-marshal's guard, will not have helped to allay Soviet suspicions. I have the impression, however, that the Soviet authorities may be nursing their suspicions with satisfaction. When Mr. Urquhart was in Tehran recently, I arranged for him to have a talk with the Soviet Ambassador. The ambassador said to me afterwards that the talk had been interesting, but that Mr. Urquhart's visit to Mahabad, and that of "other representatives," had "encouraged the Kurds." I assured him that there were no other representatives, but I do not think he wished his mind to be disabused of a belief so very convenient to a body of officials who are probably being called to account by the Kremlin for the Rezaieh incident and for other evidences that the Kurds of Azerbaijan are out of hand. Being unable to cram the jinnee back into the bottle, they find it convenient to say that it is the British who are encouraging him to be refractory. If there is such a will to believe that we have been intriguing among the Kurds of Azerbaijan, it is no ground for not trying to allay suspicion, but it is an illustration of the extreme difficulty of doing business with Soviet officials who, as Mr. Urquhart points out, are not normal. Evidence of their difficulty has come to hand during the writing of this despatch; the consul at Kermanshah reports that two representatives of the Soviet Consulate at Kermanshah are riding about from village to village in the Sinjahi area—a behaviour which we might well treat as suspicious if we wished.

5. I secured an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Mr. Urquhart, whose sane exposition of the Kurdish situation will, I hope, have done something towards dissipating the more foolish of Mr. Sa'ed's views on the subject. He learned with pleasure that the Persian Government propose to reunite the two provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan; this will eliminate friction between the chief officials at Tabriz and Rezaieh.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister of State at Cairo, to Minbranch, Bagdad, to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Kuibyshev, and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Consul-General Urquhart to Sir R. Bullard.

(No. 15. Secret.)

Sir,

Tabriz, October 22, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to send you herewith detailed notes on my visit to Mahabad between the 13th and the 15th instant, and for your convenience to set forth below certain conclusions which I have drawn.

2. *Russian Policy.*—I think we have flattered the Russians in so far as we attributed to them a positive or even consistent policy towards the Kurds. I suspect that the war and the occupation of Persia caught them unprepared in this respect, and that their attitude towards the Kurds has so far been improvised and subject to the push and pull of their current needs and emotions. Among these I detect military necessities, jealousy of the British, with perhaps some fear of offending American opinion, and, a poor and increasingly weak third, Communist missionary zeal.

3. I find it necessary to remember at all times that our Russian friends are not normal. They are not normal in that after twenty-five years in the wilderness they lack the background common to other civilised men; their brains work at the mercy of a jumbled deposit of propaganda, uncorrected by any fund of experience and observation. In the result they have made a mess of things in Azerbaijan, retaining respect only because they have some military strength here. Their main blunder originated in the belief that Turkey was preparing to stab them in the back, and that the Persians would join in if they could. It led them to nurse and pet the Kurds as potential allies against the Turks. When, most unfortunately, Serhang Hashimi began arming groups of peasants in the Rezaieh area as a defensive measure against Kurdish raiding in the spring, the Russians saw in this a further danger for themselves, and when the raiding of the peasantry began with the melting of the snow, as it did for centuries before Reza Shah, they stood aside. Indeed, I must believe that they countenanced and gave some shape to Kurdish action, although I do not admit it to any Persian. It is impossible to escape that deduction in view of the immunity of the Christians and Kara Sunnis, of the scrupulous direction of the attack on Ajam villagers, who alone had been selected as suitable to carry arms for the Persians, in view also of the fact that the Kurds always began operations by demanding the surrender of arms. In their inexperience the Russians did not allow for Ajam cowardice, for the traditional fear of the Kurdish raiders, a fear magnified into terror after some years of immunity. They were not prepared to see the panic-stricken villagers abandon their homes at the first shot. They must have been taken aback by the flood of Persian propaganda which exaggerated the disaster throughout Persia, an astute, well-timed, well-executed drive which, at least in Azerbaijan, united the peasantry and even the town workers with the landlords in detesting Russia and communism. In the last year the Persians have gained much ground from the Russians.

4. Since my visit to Mahabad I am persuaded that the Russians are almost equally confused and ill-inspired in their dealings with the Kurds. I commend as worthy of some consideration the theory that the Baku affair was the outcome of jealousy of ourselves, and of a fear lest we should acquire predominating influence by becoming the sponsors and protectors of a united Kurdistan. You may not be able to accept that theory as a complete explanation, but I would suggest that at least the Russians acted more precipitately, and went further, because of a surge of suspicion, than they would have in cold blood, and I believe they have since come to repent their suspicion both of us and of the Turks. At all events the Kurds have found the promise of Baku unfulfilled, and are correspondingly disappointed.

5. I think it probable that we have been mistaken in seeking always in Russian policy the explanation for Russian action; at all events, I confess that I have not reckoned on serious initiative from the Kurdish side. Having met Ghazi Mohammed, I believe him perfectly capable of deliberately using the visits of our military officers in order to influence the Russians to serve his own ends. Having reliable information about his jubilation after Baku and having witnessed his present state of disillusionment, I conclude that he succeeded unwisely well and that he has found the Russian reaction disagreeable. I think, too, that we have in Ghazi Mohammed and his friends the authors of the drive for Kurdish unity and preparedness against attack from any quarter. The Persian story that the Russians took the initiative to assemble the Kurdish leaders at Ushnu in early September in order to make them swear fidelity to the Russians, not to

loot any more, and to unite for mutual protection was unsatisfactory in many ways. I now believe the initiative came from men like Ghazi Mohammed, who still hope that by uniting and showing restraint the Kurds may emerge from the war in an improved position, but who are beginning to fear that at the end of the war Britain, America and Russia may be too preoccupied or too exhausted to bother about the Kurds, and that if still disunited the tribes will be easy victims of Persian revenge. Ghazi Mohammed himself told me that after inviting the Kurdish leaders to Ushnu the Russians tried at the last moment to countermand the invitations. The late Soviet Consul-General here begged me most earnestly to believe that the Russians had no hand in assembling that conference. If only he could have been frank I think he would have told me that the Kurds were trying to get the Russians to sponsor a movement towards Kurdish unity, that the Russians had acquiesced up to a point, and then drawn back.

6. Russian reaction from the Baku policy has developed into a pose of pointedly refraining from interference in Persian internal affairs while frowning at the Kurds behind the scenes for any disorderly conduct. They profess to be ready to let the Persians disarm the Kurds, and they are even now helping the Persians to re-establish the Azerbaijan division; but I question their sincerity. I think they still consider that armed and friendly Kurdish tribes may have some potential value, but that they are not prepared to pay the price either with bigger and better Baku trips or with support for the ambitions of men like Ghazi Mohammed. I expect them to use the presence of Persian troops as a lever for securing the friendship and better discipline of the Kurds, but that they will find ways of preventing the Persian troops from forcibly disarming them. The transfer of the consul-general, Mr. Koulagenkov, to Angora, his replacement by the first secretary from the embassy in Tehran, the departure of General Melnik and a recent summons to the consul in Rezaieh to visit Tehran, may perhaps be interpreted as an admission of dissatisfaction with results so far achieved.

7. The question now is whether the new men, having realised past mistakes and being freed from the interference of military political commissars, will behave more wisely than did their predecessors, whether Russia in the second year of occupation will cut a better figure in Azerbaijan than in the first. I cannot guess at the answer, but I am sure that the Russians will remain, as before, the easy victims of their morbid suspiciousness, and that we may be able to save them from folly if we can avoid cause for suspicion of our intentions. It should, I suggest, be clearly understood that incursions by British officers into the Russian zone without Russian permission are always ground for resentment and suspicion, and that the local information obtained is generally poor value for the wider damage which may be done. Further, it would be a wise precaution if officers whose duties bring them into contact with Kurds would refuse to listen to political talk, since even a sympathetic hearing may be wrongly constructed.

8. *Persian Policy* naturally aims at re-establishment of the authority of the Tehran Government as quickly and as completely as possible. Moderate men like the Governors-General of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan are prepared to move slowly and profess a desire to give Kurds better treatment than did Reza Shah; at the other extreme are the army officers like Serhang Hashimi, who would like to force the pace, who would ferociously mishandle the Kurds if they could do so with impunity. I think that, after Hashimi's fiasco at Rezaieh, the officers will be held in check as long as the Russians are here, and we must, I suggest, do what may be possible to help the moderate men to evolve a *modus vivendi* which will not require drastic revision when the occupation comes to an end. I have discussed the matter with the Governor-General here. I put it to him that there had been a great improvement in general conditions since the removal of Russo-Turkish misunderstandings on the north-west frontier, that the Russians were using their influence to promote order, that in a variety of ways the authority of the Persian Government was growing throughout Azerbaijan and that even the remotest Kurds were beginning to think, with considerable apprehension, of the day when Persian troops would again be in control. I told him that I advised Ghazi Mohammed, Kara Aini Agha and Ali Khan to get in touch with Tehran, to lay their complaints before the Government. I had also told them in severe terms that the Kurds must expect to suffer from the war like any other community, that I saw no prospect of easy prosperity, economic or political, and that their future depended on an understanding with the Persians. My advice to him was complementary. He must know perfectly well that Britain and Russia wanted order and security for their communications, that no one could honestly argue now that either was stirring the Kurds to rebellious action against the Government. The Governor-General said, quite explicitly, that he was now satisfied, and

would inform the Prime Minister, that neither Britain nor Russia were intriguing against the Government with the Kurds; he would also report to the Prime Minister that the time is ripe to bridge the gap between the Government and the Kurds by the election of a new Deputy. He would suggest that responsible Kurds be entrusted with the maintenance of order and be paid to do so, each man's pay being clearly stated so as to avoid disputes. If the Government agrees, he will invite the leaders to Tabriz and he says he is sure they will come and submit. He would then, he says, hold out the promise of equal opportunity with the other subjects of the Shah, and equal privileges in the way of schools, health services and so forth. He demurred when I suggested an amnesty; he thought that looted property ought to be restored, but later gave way, saying that, after all, much money had been paid out as indemnity for those whose property had been looted. Apart from the fact that the looting was much less extensive than it was reported to be, and that much of the thieving which took place was wrongly attributed to Kurds. It would be impossible to trace and recover stolen goods, and the attempt to do so would merely provide the Persian troops with a first-class opportunity for revenge.

9. It would be foolish to suppose that the Governor-General's proposals can be easily or quickly translated into action. Progress would be easier if Russian co-operation were assured, but I do not judge the moment suitable for approaching my new Russian colleague, and in any case I should not do so in a matter of this relative importance without your approval. As I have reported by telegram, the Russians here are a trifle aloof in consequence, I think, of Colonel Lyon's alleged secret meeting with Kurds in the Rezaieh district, the Air Vice-Marshal's passage through Mahabad, and my own visit there (all arranged independently), and it may take some time and effort to reassure them. Unless I am sure of Russian co-operation I propose to let the matter take its course without further intervention. That its course will be tortuous is certain. I detect sharp competition between the Governor of Mahabad and the Governor-General here for the handling of the 160,000 or 180,000 rials monthly subvention which they respectively suggest for the Kurds. When I recollect that Amir Assad incurred the keen hostility of the Governor-General by going to Tehran and settling there the terms of his appointment as Governor of Mahabad, I am inclined to believe that even Mr. Fahimy is more concerned to secure a rake-off than to pacify the Kurds. It is possible that his reception of my ideas was eager because he hoped that you might be moved by my report to press forward a scheme whereby a large sum of money would pass through his hands to the Kurds. Nevertheless, I think it useful that the Persians and the Kurds should begin to think of a reconciliation, despite the admixture of base motives.

10. During my visit I was careful to utter none but sentiments of loyalty and admiration for our Russian Allies.

I have, &c.

R. W. URQUHART.

P.S.—Since this despatch was written I have been informed by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad that the report of Colonel Lyon's visit to Rezaieh is a complete fabrication. I hope to turn this to good account.

R. W. U.

October 24, 1942.

[E 7042/2067/G]

No. 36.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggallay (Kuibyshev).

(No. 385.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 24, 1942.

I ASKED M. Maisky to call on me at the House of Commons on the 24th November, when I arranged with the Secretary of State for War for the attendance of two senior officers from the War Office (Major-General R. F. B. Naylor, Deputy Quartermaster-General, and Major-General D. J. McMullen, Director of Transportation). These experts were, as I told his Excellency, in a position to describe what His Majesty's Government had been doing in the development of the Persian Gulf ports and the trans-Persian road and rail routes, and to explain the difficulties which had been encountered in carrying out these tasks. As I was obliged to be in my place in Parliament, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State represented me for the greater part of the interview.

2. General Naylor gave the Ambassador a comprehensive account of the steps which have been taken from the beginning of September 1941 up to the present time to improve the very limited transportation facilities which then existed in Persia. I enclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of the note from which he spoke.

3. The Ambassador, who took copious notes throughout and displayed a keen interest in the figures given him by the War Office experts, raised a number of points of detail which showed that he was fully conversant with the problem. The following were the most important matters which were discussed:—

4. M. Maisky enquired how many trains each way were now being run on the Trans-Persian Railway, as compared with those which were formerly in operation. He was told that, with the 200 locomotives and 3,000 wagons now in service, it was possible to operate eight trains a day each way. This compared with two trains each way last year, when there were very many fewer engines and wagons available, but the trains now being run were much larger than those which had formerly been in use and three or more locomotives were now employed on each train. This was necessary because the rolling-stock were not fully provided with Westinghouse braking equipment, and the gradients on the railway were exceptionally stiff, even for what was essentially a mountain system.

5. The locomotives now in service included the 150 which had been provided from the United Kingdom (and these had had to be converted from coal-burners to oil-burners) and the engines of American construction, which were now beginning to arrive. Besides these, there are six German engines designed for the operation of the Kowloon Railway, which we had succeeded in diverting before the fall of Hong Kong, and which are now in India being converted to oil-burning prior to despatch to Persia.

6. In reply to a further question, General Naylor said that the total tonnage carried by the railway north of Andimeshk was in the neighbourhood of 73,000 tons a month. This figure included 24,000 tons of oil, and it would be of great assistance to the railway authorities if some of this large volume of fuel, which was at present taking up valuable space on the northbound trains, could be supplied instead from the Soviet oil-fields and thus set free capacity for the carriage of munitions and other supplies. Conversations had been opened in Tehran, where Soviet and British railway experts were working harmoniously together, with a view to the necessary arrangements being concluded, and a start had been made with sample consignments. His Majesty's Government very much hoped, however, that the Soviet authorities would agree to develop this practice, and the Ambassador undertook to report accordingly to his Government.

7. As regards new railway construction, a track 75 miles long had been laid between Khorramshahr and Ahwaz which has been in operation for about three months; the new line between Tanuma and Ahwaz, a distance of about 30 miles, would shortly be completed.

8. General McMullen mentioned the improvement in the operation of the railway which would result from the installation of modern telegraph communications which enabled a more efficient control to be established. Hitherto, the working had been hampered by the primitive methods in force under Persian management.

9. The Ambassador asked for figures showing the development of port capacity to supplement those given in paragraph 2 (b) of the enclosed statement. He was told that Bandar Shahpur had increased its capacity from about 750 tons a day to 1,500 tons a day; Khorramshahr, which had been virtually negligible as a port, now had a throughput of some 1,300 tons a day; and Ahwaz, the inland water port, could now deal with 900 tons a day as compared with 200 tons formerly.

10. Discussing the development of the road system of Persia (the total mileage of which General Naylor undertook to communicate to the Ambassador) his Excellency enquired what the total capacity of the roads was expected to reach, assuming that all requirements in respect of equipment and personnel were met. It was explained that the capacity of the roads north of Andimeshk was at present limited by the rail bottleneck up to that point, since there were no roads yet between there and the ports, although these were under construction. At present the total tonnage carried by road was approximately 23,000 tons a month, divided as follows:—

	Tons a month.
From Bushire	2,500
By roads north of Andimeshk	13,000
From Khanikin to Hamadan	7,500

The tonnage carried north of Hamadan includes the loads carried by American trucks now being assembled by the two assembly plants in operation at Andimeshk. General Naylor stated that the ultimate physical capacity of all available roads would be in the neighbourhood of 100,000 tons a month, but he promised to verify more exactly what this estimate would be, and to inform his Excellency.

11. The development of the route through Iraq via Rowandaz and Lake Urmia was under active consideration, with local Russian representatives at the present time. Its advantages were appreciated, but there were technical difficulties in the provision of barges on the lake, and its operation would be restricted to certain types of cargo. If these difficulties could be overcome and suitable cargo found, the capacity might reach 15,000 tons per month.

12. The Ambassador was also given some figures relating to the Zahidan-Meshed lorry route, the reopening of which was expected to take place very soon. The operation of this route depended upon the organisation by the U.K.C.C. of a service of lorries to be obtained from the pool of vehicles at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, India.

13. At the end of the interview M. Maisky expressed his gratification at the interesting account which had been given to him of the developments which had taken place on the Persian transport system, and asked to be supplied with a map of the area showing the various routes. General Naylor undertook to have this prepared and sent to the Ambassador at an early date.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to the Minister of State at Cairo and to the Minister of State's branch office at Bagdad.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Note for Interview with M. Maisky: November 24, 1942.

AT the beginning of September 1941, when the problem of passing supplies for Russia via Persia was first raised, the means of transportation through Persia were very limited. The capacity of the railway was about 12,000 tons a month; the roads varied in capacity from 300 to 600 tons per diem; the capacities of the ports of Bandar Shahpur (P.G.) and Ahwaz were low, and Khorramshahr was practically undeveloped.

The capacity for assembling vehicles was restricted to a small civil installation at Bushire, with a total capacity of about 1,000 vehicles a month.

Steps taken to improve the situation.

(a) Railway.

2. The immediate problem was to supplement the existing locos and rolling-stock—to improve the water supply for serving the locos—to increase marshalling yards, crossing places and loops—and to supplement the Persian railway staff.

These various problems were taken in hand as follows:—

(1) *Locos.*—149 locos were taken off home railways, at the expense of our already overtaxed railway system. Owing to lack of coal in Persia, these locos had to be converted into oil burners, but, so as to save time, the first forty-five were shipped as coal burners, together with 25,000 tons of coal, and equipment to convert them to oil burners was sent as soon as possible. It was realised that these locos were not ideal for the mountain portion of the railway, where steep gradients of 70 miles in length were encountered, whereas in this country steep gradients are rarely encountered, and then only for very short lengths. They were, however, the best we had in this country for the purpose. At the same time, enquiries were set on foot in America for suitable locos, but none were forthcoming.

(2) *Rolling-Stock.*—Unfortunately, our pattern of loose-link coupling wagons was quite unsuited for the work. Fortunately, there were some 850 French-pattern wagons, which had been allotted to Middle East. Some were actually at sea, on their way to that theatre, but the whole lot were reallotted to Persia. In addition, fifty war flats and fifty continental brake wagons were made available. Apart from the fifty continental brake wagons,

none of the wagons were Westinghouse-braked, and an immediate order for 1,000 Westinghouse-braked wagons was placed personally by Lord Beaverbrook in America. The placing of this order coincided with the introduction of lease-lend in America, and consequently a general hold-up in procurement was being experienced. This resulted, through no fault of ours, in delay in America placing the contract; this has materially retarded the development of capacity on the railway, as apart from the lifting capacity of the wagons, the lack of braked wagons has never enabled our supply of locos to be employed economically. In addition to this order for 1,000 wagons, further orders were placed, and a total of approximately 2,000, of varying capacity, have now been shipped ex United States, which, together with those from the United Kingdom, bring the total to 3,000, or a total of 5,700 units of 10 tons. We were very unfortunate in sinkings, particularly of the first shipments, and have lost up to date about 10 per cent.

In addition to 150 locos shipped from this country, we allotted a further ninety from an existing order on the United States; these were allotted at the expense of Middle East and other theatres, who were crying out for their provision. Of these ninety, fifty-six have sailed.

The British locos, which, as I have said, were not designed for this work, have found their job a difficult one, and have developed faults under the abnormal conditions which they encountered, which were unforeseen. Spare parts have been flown out direct to rectify the more serious of these troubles.

(3) *Water*.—A special technical adviser was flown out with the advance party, and special water-softening plant has been provided.

(4) *Track Development*.—Much work has been done in increasing loops, providing crossing places, and increasing the capacity of the marshalling yards. This has frequently entailed very heavy engineering work, owing to the mountain terrain.

(5) *Personnel*.—In spite of our acute shortage in railway technicians, some 125 officers and 3,500 O.Rs. have been provided. The intense heat during the summer adversely affected the Europeans, and a considerable amount of sickness occurred, with a consequent drop in efficiency.

In addition to improving the capacity of the existing track, a new railway was laid from Khorramshahr to Ahwaz (75 miles), and another from Ahwaz to Tamasa (30 miles) is just about completed.

(b) *Ports*.

Immediate steps were taken to develop Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr. The former task was given to a leading civil firm from India. Progress was disappointing, due, to a great extent, to Japan's entry into the war, and the consequent urgent needs on the Burma front. However, the capacity of Bandar Shahpur is going ahead fast, and that of Khorramshahr, with the assistance of the United States, has been raised from a negligible capacity to 1,500 tons per diem. The capacity of Ahwaz has also been raised, and very considerable additions have also been made to the inland water transport fleet available for work on the Karun River.

In addition to all this work and equipment, fifty cranes, varying in capacity from 45 to 3 tons, have been shipped. (Cranes are like gold dust.)

Up to date some 117,000 tons deadweight of transportation material has been shipped to Persian ports for the development of railroad and ports.

(c) *Roads*.

A very great deal has been done to improve road capacities in Persia. This work has involved widening, improving gradients, elimination of dangerous corners, surfacing, strengthening and reconstruction of bridges.

Capacities have been increased, in many cases sevenfold.

To do this, we have employed a considerable number of British officers and n.c.os. to supervise up to 70,000 local labour, at an average cost of £500,000 a month.

We are now bitumen surfacing 600 miles of road, in order to do which we are transporting 3,000 tons of bitumen a month, either from Abadan or back-loaded from Russia.

A very considerable quantity of mechanical equipment, such as excavators, rollers, crushing plant, concrete mixers, tractors and graders, has been shipped to Persia on this account. Again, all this material is in very short supply.

M.T. Vehicles.

The provision of M.T. vehicles, drivers and maintenance personnel was an acute problem.

We were ourselves woefully short of M.T. in Middle East, India and all overseas theatres, and of drivers, and it was realised that we must make the best use we could of existing vehicles and drivers in Persia. The organisation of this service was therefore entrusted to the U.K.C.C., and additional vehicles and tyres, &c., were ordered from the United States to reinforce the resources of this company.

For the same reason as in the case of railway rolling-stock, initial deliveries were slow, but up to date some 2,000 vehicles have arrived, and are in operation, with another 1,500 at sea.

Unfortunately, the innate dishonesty of the Persian drivers and contractors has proved a far more serious complication than had been appreciated. Steps have been taken to raise the efficiency of this service, and the coming arrival of United States truck units should immensely increase the road lifts.

In addition to providing these vehicles, we have diverted two badly-needed vehicle assembly plants from Middle East to Persia, and these are assembling up to 3,000 vehicles a month for delivery to Russia.

3. I must conclude by stressing that all this effort and material which has been supplied has not come from our surplus capacity, but by diverting supplies and personnel which were badly needed in our various overseas theatres, and for which various Commanders-in-chief were continually crying out.

November 24, 1942.

[E 6811/122/34]

No. 37.

Sir A. Cadogan to the Soviet Ambassador.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1942.

I WRITE to thank your Excellency for your letter of the 16th November about recent developments in Persia.

His Majesty's Government are very glad to hear that the Soviet Government have instructed their ambassador at Tehran to co-operate with his British and United States colleagues in order to secure the local currency needed for the Allied forces in Persia and for the transport of supplies to the Soviet Union. Sir Reader Bullard's latest reports pay tribute to the support he has received from M. Smirnov in his recent negotiations with the Persian Government, which have resulted in the decision of the Persian Parliament to vest authority for the issue of currency notes in the Note Reserve Control Committee. I am sure that this solution of our difficulties was greatly facilitated by the effective co-operation of the Allied representatives at Tehran.

I am glad to note that M. Smirnov has also been instructed to keep Sir Reader Bullard informed of his negotiations for a Soviet-Persian Financial Agreement. But I am somewhat surprised by the suggestion that until recently His Majesty's Legation had not kept the Soviet Embassy informed of similar negotiations with the Persian Government, which does not appear to be in accordance with the information available here. I am confident, however, that our two missions will keep each other fully informed on all such questions in the future.

As regards the food situation, I note that your Excellency confirms the statement which you originally made to Mr. Eden on the 3rd November, that your Government have agreed to the export of 35,000 tons of wheat from Persian Azerbaijan to Tehran. His Majesty's Government had assumed that this undertaking would by now have been put into effect, but our information shows that the Soviet authorities in Persia are still only allowing small quantities of wheat through to Tehran, with the result that the food shortage in the capital is still most acute. Had 35,000 tons of wheat been sent to Tehran, there would now be a reserve sufficient to last for three or four months. I would therefore urge that the Soviet authorities in Persia should be instructed to allow this quantity of wheat to be sent to Tehran without delay.

Your Excellency states that it is not possible to accept as correct the opinion that the Persian authorities are apprehensive about Soviet purchases of wheat,

[25053]

barley and rice. I can assure you that very real apprehensions exist on this score. The Persian Minister has already complained to me about these purchases by the Soviet authorities, including their recent demand for 30,000 tons of rice, 15,000 tons of barley, 5,000 tons of wheat and 20,000 tons of potatoes. He has also expressed the fear that the Soviet authorities will not allow the surplus produce of the northern provinces to be sent to other parts of the country. We have, of course, informed the Minister that these are matters which should be taken up by the Persian Ambassador at Moscow, and I understand that this has, in fact, been done.

I understand that Mr. Eden pointed out to you on the 17th November that the 20,000 tons of wheat which we are sending to Persia was not intended to meet the increased demand created by Allied troops or by the stay of Poles in the country, as both of these groups are being separately supplied. The object of this shipment is to replace the cereals purchased by the Soviet authorities for their forces in Persia.

As regards the last paragraph of your letter, I think Mr. Eden also explained that, when we said that extra food could only be brought into Persia at the expense of Anglo-United States supplies to the Soviet Union, this was not a statement of opinion, but merely a statement of fact. We fully realise the difficulties with which the Soviet Government are faced, and we have every sympathy with the food measures which the Soviet Government are obliged to take as a result of the temporary loss of the Northern Caucasus and the Ukraine. We merely wished to draw attention to the fact that any increase in the volume of food-stuffs sent over the Persian routes must occupy space which might have been allocated to other supplies. The capacity of the Persian routes is already being developed as fast as possible, but, if they are to carry more food, it is inevitable that less goods of other kinds can be transported.

Believe me, my dear Ambassador,

Yours sincerely,

ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

[E 7330/122/34]

No. 38.

(1)

Memorandum from the United States Embassy in London.

THE embassy has been asked urgently to bring to the attention of the Foreign Office the following observations of the State Department on recent developments in Persia:—

The Government of the United States has, in the course of the past year, felt that it had an increasingly direct interest in Persian conditions. It is primarily because of the importance of Persia in the United Nations' war effort, an importance which, it is felt, is given full recognition by the British Government, that the Government of the United States has been led to adopt this position. In common with all of the United Nations, the United States Government has a general interest in the successful conduct of the war in all theatres, but, in addition to this, it has, for the reasons given immediately below, felt a special responsibility so far as Persia is concerned:—

- (1) It is believed that American prestige in Persia is such that it makes it possible for the United States Government to bring considerable influence to bear on the interests of the United Nations, and it is felt that an asset of such importance ought to be conserved and used.
- (2) With a view to strengthening the internal administration of Persia, the Government of Persia has asked for a considerable number of American advisers. The Government of the United States naturally feels obliged to see to it that these advisers can begin and carry on their work under conditions favourable to the success of their efforts. The British Government, it is understood, has been whole-heartedly in favour of the sending of these advisory missions to Persia. As a matter of fact, the British Government has on several occasions been the first to urge that such missions be organised. Obviously, such advisers are in a position to exert on behalf of the common cause a most effective influence.

- (3) Heavy commitments in connexion with furnishing the Soviet Union with supplies have been made by the Government of the United States, and, consequently, the United States Government is concerned in a direct way in maintaining the route over which, necessarily, a large part of these supplies must be carried. Furthermore, an agreement was recently reached under which the military authorities of the United States undertake the physical operation of the ports, railroads and highways of Persia by which supplies for the Soviet Union are handled and transported across Persia.

On a number of occasions the Government of the United States has been given to understand that the interest in Persian affairs shown by the United States was welcomed by the British Government, and that it was desired that the United States actively co-operate in settling the questions arising from time to time. The Government of the United States feels certain that it is understood by the British Government that considerations of self-interest in no way motivate the policy of the United States, but that this policy is concerned only with the furtherance of the war effort of the United Nations and with the laying of the basis in Persia, as well as in the rest of the world, for satisfactory and lasting peace-time conditions.

The Government of the United States has, with this in mind, as the British Government is aware, since the middle of October taken an active part in the negotiations and exchanges of view on the acute economic and political situation that has prevailed in Persia. The State Department has consistently maintained that the problem could be satisfactorily solved only if, in one way or another, adequate provision were made for the minimum economic requirements for the people of Persia and Persian authority and responsibility in the internal affairs of Persia were maintained to the maximum possible extent. It has been the view of the State Department, quite apart from the obvious moral principles involved, principles to which the United Nations are pledged and to which the British Government subscribes without reservation, that considerations of a purely practical kind, in any event, would dictate that the civil responsibilities and the military forces of the Governments of the United Nations concerned ought to be held to a minimum in that country, so that the civilian personnel and these military forces could be employed in areas where, in the prosecution of the war, their services would be of the greatest immediate value.

The State Department accordingly, in communications to the British Government and to the American Minister at Tehran concerning the crisis which started in October, expressed its wish repeatedly that adequate early arrangements be made for transporting supplies of wheat to Persia, which would serve to prevent famine from arising in those areas which were deficient in stocks of grain. The State Department, in taking this position, has recognised that the Government of Persia might be at fault in part at failing to take the steps necessary to ensure the best use of the food supplies that were available within Persia. It was felt, however, that the matter was so urgent that there was no time for prolonged discussions or for a reorganisation of those Persian agencies which were concerned. Moreover, it was felt that resort to coercion on the authorities of Persia would not only lead to many undesirable repercussions but probably also to failure to achieve the desired objective. The State Department gathered, from the exchange of communications which has taken place between London and Washington, that the Foreign Office took substantially the same view.

It will be recalled by the Foreign Office that the State Department on more than one occasion expressed the view that the occupation of Tehran by military forces, or the setting up of a puppet Government, would be undesirable. The State Department believed, in the light of views expressed by the Foreign Office to the American Embassy in London, and to the Department by the British Embassy at Washington, that the British Government was in agreement with this. Likewise, on a number of occasions the fear of the State Department was expressed that, unless handled with great care, action by the British authorities in Persia against subjects of Persia alleged to be implicated in activities inimical to the United Nations, would have unfortunate and serious repercussions. The State Department urged particularly that such matters be handled by the Persian authorities themselves. The American Embassy at London, it appears, understood that the Foreign Office also felt that caution should be employed, and that, in fact, the British Minister at Tehran had been telegraphed to that effect. It appears also to have been the understanding of the embassy that the Foreign Office hoped that it would not be necessary to proceed in this matter against the wishes of the Government of Persia.

As the Foreign Office and the State Department were apparently in agreement with respect to the principal questions involved, the State Department notes regretfully that events which have taken place in recent weeks in Persia do not appear to have been entirely in keeping with the policies of the two Governments. The events in question, as reported to the State Department, are briefly:—

- (1) The signature and publication of the Anglo-American-Persian Agreement for Wheat for Persia, although recognised by all three Governments as urgent, was held up for a period of several weeks, largely, it appears, because the British authorities in Persia wanted successively to impose on the Government of Persia, before proceeding with the signing, more difficult conditions. It was only on the 4th December that the agreement, whatever the reason, was concluded, and by that time it failed to have the reassuring effect anticipated because popular dissatisfaction in Persia had become so great.
- (2) In spite of what was thought to be the view of the Foreign Office that caution should be exercised with reference to the contemplated arrests of prominent Persians, the Governor-General of Isfahan was interned by the British authorities in Persia on the 8th December. The State Department understands that this was done without first consulting the Government of Persia and that a most unfortunate effect was produced.
- (3) On the 9th December the British Minister at Tehran informed the American Minister that on that same afternoon a battalion of British troops would enter Tehran.
- (4) On the 9th December the American Minister at Tehran reported that for some reason the British authorities in Persia had failed to arrange the transportation to Tehran of the 1,500 tons of flour and 3,500 tons of barley earmarked at Basra for Persia. The British Minister, likewise on the 9th December, advised the Shah that, unless the Government of Persia were favourable to the Allies, the importation of wheat into Persia would not be viewed favourably. The same statement, it is understood, was made by the British Minister to the Prime Minister of Persia. This attitude, of course, conflicts with the action which it was understood was previously taken by the Foreign Office when it instructed the British Minister at Tehran and the Minister of State at Cairo to try to arrange the prompt shipment to Persia of wheat and barley from neighbouring sources, including Iraq. It is also in contrast with what was understood to be the view of the Foreign Office, that the extreme shortage of wheat, particularly in Tehran, was causing unrest and disorder.

The foregoing, the State Department points out, is placed before the Foreign Office solely for the purpose of effecting closer co-ordination of action between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States and in the hope that whatever is done in Persia will be entirely in keeping with the views maintained London, and Washington.

December 14, 1942.

(2)

Memorandum to the United States Embassy in London.

THE United States Embassy's memorandum of the 14th December, communicating the observations of the State Department on recent developments in Persia, has been considered in the Foreign Office with the greatest care and sympathy. It is believed that the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Persia corresponds very closely with that of the United States Government. At the same time, it is felt that a full and frank exchange of views on this subject will be of great value, lest misunderstanding should arise on points such as those enumerated in the latter part of the memorandum under reply.

2. In the first place, the Foreign Office wish to confirm their entire agreement with the views expressed in the embassy's memorandum as regards the increasing importance of the United States Government's interests in Persia. Indeed, the growing interest which the United States Government have shown in Persian affairs has been very welcome to His Majesty's Government, who, as the

State Department point out, took the lead in suggesting that United States advisers should be sent to Persia to strengthen the internal administration of the country. His Majesty's Government therefore fully understand and share the anxiety of the United States Government that these advisers should be enabled to carry out their work under favourable conditions, and are confident that their work will prove of the greatest value in reorganising the finances of Persia and in putting the administration on a sound and efficient basis. His Majesty's Government also recognise that the arrangement whereby the military authorities of the United States are to take over the operation of Persian ports, railways and roads greatly increases the interest of the United States Government in the maintenance of law and order throughout the country.

3. His Majesty's Government also confirm that it has for long been their desire that the United States Government and the United States authorities in Persia should co-operate more actively in settling the questions arising from time to time. Until recently the task of maintaining the interests of the United Nations at Tehran has fallen almost exclusively on the British Legation. It is hoped that it may henceforward be possible for the United States representative at Tehran to take an equally active part in helping to solve important problems of common concern to the Allied Governments; and it is believed that the task of the two legations may be greatly eased by the steadying influence which will be exercised on the Persian authorities through the United States advisers.

4. As the State Department are aware, it has been the policy of His Majesty's Government not to occupy Tehran by military forces, but to allow the Persian Government to continue to administer the country with as little interference as possible. In order to encourage a spirit of collaboration in the Persian authorities, His Majesty's Government took the initiative in the negotiations which culminated last January in the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance. By this treaty Persia acquired the status of a non-belligerent ally. This policy has on the whole been successful hitherto; the degree of collaboration afforded by the Persian authorities has in general proved sufficient; but on three problems of major importance it has been necessary, in the interests of the United Nations' war effort, to bring strong pressure to bear upon the Persian Government and to contemplate measures which have, as it appears, led the Persian Government to put forward complaints to the Government of the United States.

5. These three problems are:—

- (1) The provision of local currency for the United Nations' forces in Persia;
- (2) The wheat problem; and
- (3) Security measures against Axis agents in Persia.

6. In the United States Embassy's memorandum under reply, it is stated that considerations of self-interest in no way motivate the policy of the United States, but that this policy is concerned only with the furtherance of the war effort of the United Nations and with the laying of a basis for satisfactory and lasting peace-time conditions in Persia, as well as in the rest of the world. His Majesty's Government readily accept this assurance, and they must request the United States Government in return to accept a corresponding assurance on their behalf. In dealing with the three problems mentioned above, and in all their dealings with the Persian authorities, His Majesty's Government have not been moved in any way by considerations of self-interest, but have been concerned with the furtherance of the war effort of the United Nations.

7. The difficulties raised by the Persian Government in connexion with the supply of rials to the British forces in Persia were, in fact, difficulties which had to be surmounted by some means or other in the interests of the war effort. Without rials it would have been impossible for the Allied forces in Persia to pay for local purchases and local labour. It was absolutely essential that rials should be forthcoming. Otherwise, the Trans-Persian lines of communication for supplies of war material to the Soviet Union would have broken down. After difficult negotiations a solution appeared to have been reached through the conclusion of an Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement on the 26th May; and it was therefore all the more deplorable that the Persian authorities, despite the clear terms of this agreement, should again have sought only a few months later to withhold the necessary currency from the Allied forces. The State Department are aware how, mainly as the result of the common front displayed on this occasion by the Allied representatives at Tehran, it proved possible to solve these difficulties without having recourse to forcible measures; and it may be hoped that, with the forthcoming arrival at Tehran of the United States Financial

Mission, a further Persian threat to withhold the currency essential to the United Nations need no longer be apprehended.

8. Again, as regards the wheat problem, the policy of His Majesty's Government has been directed solely towards furthering the essential war interests of the United Nations, with due regard also to the minimum requirements of the Persian people. It has been based upon two governing considerations. The first is that, quite apart from the shortage of shipping, the clearance capacity of Persian ports and transport routes is strictly limited, so that every ton of wheat imported into Persia for Persian consumption involves a reduction in the quantity of vital war supplies sent to the Soviet Union by the Trans-Persian routes. The second point is that Persia in normal times grows sufficient cereals for her own use, and the 1942 harvest is believed to have fallen very little short of a normal harvest, so that there must exist in the country sufficient stocks of cereals to last nearly until the harvest of 1943. It will be recalled that, during the period between the military operations in August 1941 and the summer of 1942, some 50,000 tons of wheat were imported from British and United States sources to satisfy in the exceptional circumstances then existing the needs of the Persian civil population. But the Persian Government, almost immediately after the harvest of 1942, complained that there was already a serious shortage and requested that further wheat should be imported for their use. It was evident that they were reluctant to take drastic and unpopular measures against hoarders, speculators and profiteers, and thought it easier to appeal to the Allies to solve their difficulties for them by arranging further imports. This attitude was clearly inadmissible. It would have meant a reduction in the supplies sent across Persia to the Soviet Union, for reasons which could not have been justified to the Soviet Government. His Majesty's Government agree that it is in itself desirable that steps should be taken to save the Persian people from want, but it is clearly necessary to insist upon the Persian authorities making the best use of the food supplies available within Persia; and the only wheat imports to which His Majesty's Government have hitherto agreed during the present season are the 25,000 tons of wheat which are being imported to replace the Persian-grown cereals required by the Soviet occupying forces.

9. Security measures against Axis agents have also been the cause of serious difficulties with the Persian Government. For many years past German influence in Persia has been very extensive, and it was largely owing to the presence of Germans and German agents in key positions throughout the country that it became necessary for British and Soviet forces to undertake the military occupation of certain areas in August 1941. At the present moment there are still some Germans in hiding in the unoccupied districts of Persia, there are still German agents who are active throughout the country, and there is still a considerable amount of pro-German sympathy in influential Persian circles. His Majesty's Government regard it as absolutely essential to take such steps against German agents as may be required to safeguard the Allied troops and communications in Persia. Some Germans and some German agents have already been arrested; others have been allowed to escape by the Persian police or are said to be untraceable. But proof has been obtained of a widespread conspiracy organised by the Germans with the help of a number of influential Persians, involving definite plans for sabotage against Allied communications, and risings against the Allies in the event of a German invasion of Persia. It is clear that drastic action is justifiable and necessary against those implicated in such matters, though such action has hitherto been confined to a minimum.

10. The foregoing general observations are intended to cover the main aspects of British and United States policy in Persia, and although emphasis has naturally been laid upon these points which have caused most difficulty, and on which differences of outlook are most likely to arise, the Foreign Office believe that on the whole the views of the two Governments are very closely in agreement as regards the major issues. There remain the four questions referred to at the end of the United States Embassy's memorandum under reply.

(1) It is true that the signature of the Anglo-United States-Persian agreement for wheat was delayed because it was desired to ensure, in connexion with the Wheat Agreement, a satisfactory long-term settlement of the currency dispute. As stated above, rials are absolutely essential for the United Nations' forces in Persia. His Majesty's Government felt therefore that it was essential to insist on some new currency arrangement, whereby the Majlis would no longer create difficulties on every occasion when they were asked to provide the necessary rials. As soon as a satisfactory solution on these lines was reached there was, so

far as His Majesty's Government are aware, no further question of delaying the signature of the Wheat Agreement in order to impose on the Persian Government more difficult conditions. And, as distinct from the agreement, His Majesty's Government have at all times, and irrespective of their disputes with the Persian Government, sought to accelerate the despatch of the wheat which was urgently needed owing, primarily, to the Soviet requisitions in Northern Persia.

(2) General Zahidi, the Governor-General of Isfahan, was arrested because he was implicated in the serious conspiracy referred to above. Careful consideration was first given to the question whether the Persian Government should be consulted in advance, but it was decided that to adopt this course would involve the risk of leakage, and would, in addition, be most embarrassing to the Persian Government themselves. The information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government indicates that the effect locally of General Zahidi's arrest has been very salutary.

(3) The sole reason for the despatch of a battalion of British troops to Tehran during the recent rioting was to protect Allied property and military stores.

(4) The Foreign Office were surprised by these reports from the United States Minister at Tehran, which implied that the despatch of certain consignments of food-stuffs to Tehran was being delayed by the British authorities for political reasons. This, as in the case of the wheat shipments, would certainly have been opposed to the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government. They therefore telegraphed to Sir Reader Bullard, who has explained that there is, of course, no foundation whatever for any suggestion that the despatch of this flour and barley to Persia had been deliberately delayed in order to put pressure on the Persian Government. On the contrary, the British Legation had done everything possible to hasten its despatch. (Such delay as occurred seems, in fact, to have been due partly to an unexpected fall in the level of the Karun river while the barges conveying the grain were on their way to Ahwaz, but mainly to the physical difficulty of moving it from Shaiba to Margil, thence by water to Ahwaz, and thence by rail to Tehran.) Nor did Sir Reader Bullard speak to the Shah or the Persian Prime Minister on the lines mentioned, or threaten them in any way with the possibility that supplies already arranged might be withheld. It is hoped that it may be made clear to the United States Minister at Tehran that he has been misinformed on these points.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1943.

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 6153/19/34]

No. 39.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 313.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period the 16th to 22nd September, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, September 22, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 39.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the Period
September 16 to 22, 1942.*

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Prime Minister broadcast to the people of Persia on the anniversary of the Shah's accession. After some conventionally flattering references to the Shah, he took the opportunity to warn Government servants against corrupt practices; promised to give opportunities of service to educated youth; held out the prospect of an extensive programme of public works, and stated that the measures he was taking to ensure food supplies removed all causes for anxiety.

[25053]

G 4

2. The uncompromising statement of Mr. Wendel Willkie referred to in paragraph 19 below to the effect that only those who gave would get was something of a shock to those Persians who hoped to be able to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, to get the benefit of lease-lend without committing themselves to definite anti-Axis action. He had been greeted on his arrival by articles in the press begging him to ensure economic aid to relieve Persia's distress. Mr. Willkie's suggestion to the Shah and the Prime Minister that Persia should identify herself more openly with the Allied cause drew the reply that the people must first be prepared.

3. Colonel Mukhtari, head of the Tehran police in the later years of Reza Shah's reign, has been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment with hard labour for the instigation of the murder of various political prisoners (see also Summary No. 31/42, paragraph 6).

Economic.

4. The preamble to the Bill for an increase in the note issue mentioned in Summary No. 37/42, paragraph 5, contains the following information:—

	£
Sterling to the credit of the Persian Government on the 26th May, 1942	3,585,000
Purchases of sterling between the 26th May and the 7th September	2,827,188
Total	6,412,188
Sterling credits on the 7th September	2,757,812

The difference has been used to finance purchases of goods in the British Empire and the United States.

Importations have been:—

	Rials.
Commercial	19,696 tons to a value of 207,520,000
On Government account	19,482 tons to a value of 77,230,000
Totals	39,178 tons to a value of 284,750,000

5. The following statement regarding the note circulation has been published:—

	Rials.
Notes issued to National Bank	2,700,000,000
In the hands of the public	2,244,798,685
Balance with the bank	448,701,315

Postal Service.

6. The press announces that a weekly air postal service between Tehran and Bagdad is to be inaugurated as from Wednesday, the 23rd September.

Appointments—Civil.

7. Liesan Sepehr (Liesan ul Mulk), to be Civil Governor of Tehran.

Persian Forces.

8. General Greely (see Summary No. 31/42, paragraph 16), is not returning to Tehran. He is being replaced by General Ridley, who is said to be an able and well-qualified officer. The question of an American Mission for the reorganisation of the Persian Army will remain in suspense until he arrives in Persia and reports to the United States Government.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

9. An observer, who travelled in August through Eastern Azerbaijan, reports that the Persian forces have established a fair degree of order in that part of the province and have collected a number of rifles from the Shahsevan, Khalkhal and Qaradaghi tribes. Many tribal leaders have been arrested. The Russian military authorities have given their moral support to the Persian troops. There are Persian garrisons at Ardebil, Sarab, Khiev, Ahar and Herau.

10. In Western Azerbaijan His Majesty's Consul-General reports increasing lawlessness and arrogance on the part of the Kurds, including the raiding of two more villages by the Jalali. Intertribal feuds have led to incidents, notably at Mahabad and Miandoab.

Kurdistan.

11. His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah reports general insecurity and unrest in areas away from the main roads.

Fars.

12. The Governor-General (and G.O.C.) of Fars is now in Tehran to discuss with the Government the measures that should be taken to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in Fars. The Qashgai tribes will soon be on the move from their summer to their winter quarters, and if the submission of Nasir Qashgai has not been secured before the tribes reach their winter quarters he is likely to secure considerably more support, and a considerable military operation might then be required to establish Government authority over the tribes. Unless that authority is established security in Fars will be at the mercy of the tribes. Having regard to the numerous reports of German influence in the Qashgai this is not a happy situation.

Russian Affairs.

13. General Melnik has vacated the command of Russian forces in North-West Persia and is going to the Caucasus. He is succeeded by Colonel Volkevitch, but it is understood that a more senior officer might be sent later. Certain cavalry units, including a regiment from Kazvin, another from the Kinjan-Mianeh area, and one or more from areas further north, are moving towards the Caucasus.

14. An observer who travelled through Eastern Azerbaijan in August reports that there are Russian garrisons at Ardebil, Persian Astara, Khiev, Sarab and Ahar, and that there are landing grounds west of Khiev, south-west of Ardebil and south-east of Sarab, but that they have not recently been used, except the one at Ardebil.

15. The report in Summary No. 37/42, paragraph 16, that the Russians had warned the Kurds that they would take measures themselves to suppress disorder is not confirmed from Persian sources. Reports that have reached the Persian Government are to the effect that Kurdish leaders were asked to swear to support the Soviet authorities and to form a united organisation to stand together.

16. The Russians have asked the Persian authorities to supply 3,000 labourers for work, it is understood, in the Caucasian ports of the Caspian Sea. The Governor-General is taking the opportunity to return to Russia the refugees who have caused much trouble in the Azerbaijan since the occupation.

Polish Affairs.

17. Before the evacuation of Poles from Russia was completed the Soviet authorities closed the port of Krasnovodsk to all except their own military traffic. The remaining Poles, believed to be about 2,000, are being evacuated from Askhabad via Bajgiran and Meshed to Tehran. During the fortnight the 1st–15th September, 1,000 had been transported from Bajgiran in U.K.C.C. lorries.

18. Colonel Szymanski, commanding the Polish base in Tehran, has been appointed Polish Military Attaché in Persia.

American Affairs.

19. Mr. Wendel Willkie arrived in Tehran on the 15th September on his way to Russia. In a speech at a dinner given by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he said that the purpose of his journey was to discover who were the true friends of his country. As it had always been, and always would be in times of vital struggle, those who shared in the common sacrifices would gain the most. His country wished to know who fought with it, who wished to share in the sacrifices for the common cause.

20. Mr. Wendel Willkie took the Shah for the first flight he has made.

Tehran, September 22, 1942.

[E 6438/19/34]

No. 40.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 324.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period the 23rd to 29th September, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, September 29, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period September 23 to 29, 1942.

(Secret.)

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

CERTAIN happenings during the week have done some damage to the credit of the Prime Minister and his Government. In the first place he was obliged, under pressure by His Majesty's Legation, to issue a denial of a statement made in the preamble to the Bill for the increase of the note issue (see Summary No. 37, paragraph 5) to the effect that His Majesty's Government had promised to supply 120 tons of silver to the Persian Government. No such promise had been made, and the Prime Minister is now being accused of having deliberately deceived the Majlis with the object of obtaining their consent to the Bill. Public opinion had also been disturbed by certain appointments made by the Prime Minister savouring of partiality. Finally, a storm arose in the Majlis during the discussion of the Bill for the amendment of the Conscription Law. This Bill has been before the Majlis for more than two months (see Summary No. 27, paragraph 5) and, although it has passed its first reading, Deputies continue to propose amendments to every article. The Prime Minister showed impatience and said that if the Bill was not accepted without further discussion he would withdraw it and allow conscription to be applied in accordance with the existing law. Some of the Deputies professed to regard this as an ultimatum inconsistent with their responsibilities as the representatives of the people. The Prime Minister's supporters remained silent, and he talked of resigning. However, on the 27th September he reappeared in the House, made a conciliatory speech and withdrew the Bill, promising to substitute another that would be more in accordance with the sentiments of the Deputies.

2. It is believed that the Prime Minister would willingly dissolve the Majlis. Other members of the Cabinet, however, regard the Majlis as a useful shield behind which to shelter when the Allies make awkward demands. Its delaying tactics are remarkably effective.

3. At the request of the Shah the Prime Minister has accepted the portfolio of the Ministry of War.

4. A Ministry of Food has been formed. It will take over the work of the Department-General of Food Supply, whose formation was reported in Summary No. 33, paragraph 5.

5. An agreement has been made with the Persian Government regarding the conditions in which Persians suspected of pro-Axis activities, whose arrest is demanded by the British Security authorities, are to be interrogated and detained.

Economic.

6. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that the total undertakings by landowners for the delivery of grain to Government amount to 14,050 tons of wheat and 5,800 tons of barley. Of this there has already been delivered 6,200 tons of wheat and 2,100 tons of barley. 3,000 tons of barley have been sold to Russia.

7. In Khuzestan, where the price of wheat has been freed, it has now reached the fantastic figure of 8,600 rials per ton, and even at that price wheat is not obtainable. One of the largest landowners of the province, the Rais ut

Tujjar of Behbahan, who is believed to be hoarding on a large scale, has been arrested and is to be brought to Tehran. In the Kermanshah Province, where the harvest has been reasonably good, Government officials have failed to collect more than trivial quantities of grain.

Appointments—Civil.

8.—(i) Mehdi Farrukh (Motassem es Sultaneh) (F.O. 66, M.A. 85) to be Minister of Food. He was for a short time Minister of the Interior in Soheily's Cabinet.

(ii) Amanullah Ardalan (F.O. 27, M.A. 53) to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance. He was Director of the Department-General of Food Supply.

Persian Forces.

9. The press report of the annual passing-out ceremony of the Cadet School states that 501 officers were commissioned into the army and twenty-one into the air force. It is the custom in the Persian army to give a name to each batch of newly-commissioned officers. The present batch is to be named "Shihab" in memory of General Saifullah Shihab, who was murdered by an ex-cadet (see Summary No. 34, paragraph 10), and its motto is to be "Devoir."

Many of the officers now commissioned will serve only for a period of one year before passing to the reserve.

10. The Russian authorities have now agreed to the location of a brigade of Persian troops, limited in strength to 1,500, at Tabriz. There are already brigades in Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, so a divisional headquarters will be located at Tabriz to command this the 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division. The Persian General Staff has no brigade available to send to Tabriz and proposes to send staff and cadres and to fill up the ranks by recalling to the colours those conscripts who dispersed to their homes without completing their military service when the Russians invaded Azerbaijan. The Russians now profess a wish that Persian troops should reach Tabriz without delay and a battalion may be sent as a nucleus.

11. With Russian permission a battalion of Persian troops of the Rezaieh garrison has moved to Khoi to check Kurdish lawlessness.

*Internal Security.**South Persia.*

12. The military measures to be taken for the prevention of possible outbreaks of disorder in Fars, Kuh-i-Galu, Khuzestan and Lurestan are still being discussed by the General Staff and the Government. Lack of transport is the consideration most affecting any decisive action. Meanwhile the situation is outwardly fairly quiet. In Fars the Khamseh tribes and some sections of the Qashgai have begun their downward movement. The Boir Ahmadi are fighting amongst each other and have had a fight with a section of the Qashquli. Some of the Bakhtiari are looting villages. No effective action has yet been taken to punish the tribe responsible for the murder of Messrs. Harris and Griffiths, but it is understood that some intrigues are now going on with adjacent tribes to secure the surrender of the murderers. A military operation against the tribe would be quite a serious undertaking for the Persian army, having regard to its present condition and other commitments.

Azerbaijan.

13. The Soviet authorities have informed the Persian Government that they are no longer opposed to the disarmament of the Kurds of Western Azerbaijan provided it can be done without creating disturbance. The proviso nullifies the permission.

Russian Affairs.

14. The transfer of General Melnik to the Caucasus (see Summary No. 38, paragraph 13) has been cancelled and he remains in Tabriz in command of Russian troops.

15. A fracas occurred on the 23rd September between some Russian soldiers, whose lorry had knocked down and killed an old woman, and a Persian crowd that gathered round. A true report of what happened is not available, but for some reason the Russian soldiers opened fire, wounding six or seven people.

16. Generally, the reputation of the Russian army in Persia for good discipline stands high, so much so that the following story now current in

Tehran, which possibly has no foundation in fact, finds some belief. A Persian peasant complained to a Russian officer that one of his sheep had been carried off by a Russian soldier whom he could identify. One hundred Russian soldiers were paraded, and the peasant pointed to one of them. The officer drew his revolver and shot him, and as the corpse fell to the ground asked the peasant whether he was satisfied that justice had been done.

17. The sudden change in the Russian attitude from unwillingness to allow Persian troops in Tabriz to insistence on their early despatch (see paragraph 10 above), combined with the withdrawal of their objection to the disarmament of the Kurds (see paragraph 13 above), has created the impression in the Persian General Staff that the Russians are intending to withdraw from Persian Azerbaijan. Certain units have been withdrawn, as reported in Summary No. 38, paragraph 13.

American Interests.

18. Mr. Timmerman has arrived in Tehran as Adviser to the Persian Police Force (see Summary No. 33, paragraph 10).

Tehran, September 29, 1942.

[E 6453/19/34]

No. 41.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 332. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the period the 30th September to the 6th October, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, October 6, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 41.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the period September 30 to October 6, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government has not fully regained the ground lost last week. Critics are more outspoken. Rumours calculated to undermine public confidence in the Prime Minister are being circulated. Even his correct endeavours to gain the Shah's confidence are being interpreted as an indication that he has sold himself to the Court. The main problems before the Government are those of food and security, and, closely linked with these, that of transport. Measures initiated by the Government for the solution of these problems have not yet produced results visible to the public. Early results were not to be expected as corruption, disorder and indiscipline in the Administration had spread far during the régime of the previous Government. In spite of criticisms the Prime Minister does still command a good measure of popular support, and if he has as yet no great results to show there is evidence in the administrations of recognition that the Government has now a head and a directing hand.

2. In Tehran public opinion is generally calmer. There is less talk of the early arrival of the Germans, a greater readiness to get on with the work in hand rather than prepare for their arrival. Russian resistance may even have aroused doubts whether the Germans will get here at all. Pro-Axis propaganda is less in evidence. Reports from the provinces indicate in varying degrees the same tendency.

3. The full text of the counsel's speech for the defence in the trial of Mokhtari, ex-Chief of Police (see Summary No. 31/42, paragraph 6), has now been published in the press and a translation is attached as an appendix.⁽¹⁾ Unlike

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

the counsel defending the other accused, who took the popular line that Reza Shah's reign was a cruel tyranny, Mokhtari's counsel undertook a defence of the ex-Shah's régime, arguing that he did so much good for Persia that a few lives lost in the process were of little importance. The speech is a fair representation of one side of the picture, but of one side only.

Economic.

4. The Ministry of Finance has published a correction to the figures of sterling credits that were included in the preamble to the Bill for the increase of the note issue (see Summary No. 38/42, paragraph 4). The corrected figures are:—

Sterling to the credit of Persian Government on	£
the 26th May, 1942	5,585,000
Purchases, the 26th May to 7th September	2,757,812
Expended on purchase of goods	2,083,433
Sterling credits on the 7th September, 1942	6,239,377

Persian Forces.

5. The Persian Government, after a review of the situation in Khuzestan and of their responsibility for the protection of A.I.O.C. fields and installations, have asked to be allowed to increase their garrison in Khuzestan by one regiment of infantry and one 4-gun battery. The present garrison is limited by agreement with Tenth Army to one regiment of infantry, one regiment of cavalry and one battery. A regiment of infantry consists of three battalions, each of about 300 rifles, and in all Persian combatant units one-third of the strength consists of recruits with under six months' service. Experience has shown that the strength originally fixed is insufficient to ensure security, especially having regard to the immobility imposed by lack of transport on all Persian forces. Moreover, the gendarmerie, whose strength should be over 2,000, does not muster more than 700 owing to the impossibility of getting recruits, the conditions of casual labour employed by British and Americans being better than those in the gendarmerie.

6. The Chief of the General Staff appears to be loyally accepting the newly re-established authority of the Minister for War (the Prime Minister). As has been previously reported, during Reza Shah's reign and until a week ago the Chief of the General Staff took his orders direct from the Shah, and the Minister for War approved as a formality, if he was consulted at all. Both the present Shah and the Chief of the General Staff agreed very unwillingly to a return to the more constitutional position.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

7. Further reports have been received of the assembly of Kurdish leaders at Ushnu, referred in Summaries Nos. 37/42, paragraph 16, and 38/42, paragraph 13. Information obtained by His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz confirms the report made to the Persian Government that the Kurds had undertaken to be loyal friends of the Russians and to organise themselves for mutual assistance against an aggressor. His Majesty's Consul-General considers that the aim of the Russians in securing these undertakings, to which, according to his information, was added one to loot no more, was to curb Kurdish lawlessness and to bring about a truce among the endlessly warring tribes. But the Persian Government expects quite another result. Hama Rashid of Baneh, who has only recently made an uneasy peace with the Persian Government, visited the Kurdish town of Mahabad shortly after the assembly at Ushnu, and was, according to Persian official sources, royally received and hailed as the "Chief of the Kurdish tribes." Russian officers are said to have come to Mahabad to meet him and other Kurdish chiefs, notably Zara Aini Agha of the Mamish, and Bir Agha of the Masgur. All these chiefs are reported to have signed a document recognising Umar Khan of the Shekak as Supreme Chief of the United Kurds. Hama Rashid seems to have attempted to be the peacemaker between Amir Assad of the Dehbukri (see Summary No. 32/42, paragraph 10), Kara Aini Agha and Abdullah of the Mangur. The desire of the Russians to see all Kurds united in friendship to Russia is natural enough, but the Persian Government have good reason to fear that unity among Kurds believing in Russian support will not result in peace for their non-Kurdish neighbours. It is to be feared that there are few among Kurdish leaders of to-day with the sense to use the liberty they have gained to show that the tribes left to themselves can be law-abiding people.

Khuzestan.

8. Provided they can obtain the transport necessary for the movement and supply of their troops, the Persian Government seems determined to carry out, but perhaps in modified form, operations for the interception of the Boir Ahmadi on their downward migration (see Summary No. 37/42, paragraph 14). They propose to send two battalions of infantry from the Tehran divisions to Behbahan at an early date.

Fars.

9. Persian garrisons at Kamfiruz, Ardekan and Baiza, on routes usually followed by the tribes, were ordered to hold up the migration of any Qashgai tribes accompanied by armed men. The first clash occurred at Kamfiruz where Khosrow, Nasir Qashgai's brother, attacked Persian troops and was forced to withdraw. The G.O.C. the Fars division (who is now in Tehran) professes himself to be very pleased with the results of this encounter. He says he has already received an expression of regret from Nasir Qashgai for his brother's action and a promise that their mother will come to Shiraz to prove their loyalty to Government.

It would be unwise to build too much on this action, but it indicates that there may be no truth in the rumours of collusion between the G.O.C. the Fars division and the Qashgai. It also shows that some Persian troops are not afraid to block the path of the Qashgai and reminds the tribes of the existence of the Persian Government. But even if the normal routes are all successfully controlled it will not result in the disarmament of the tribes. The armed men will move further east via the Kuh-i-Galu country, where they may come into conflict with the Boir Ahmadi, a contingency hoped for by the Persian authorities.

10. The garrison of Fars is to be increased by one battalion of infantry, four tanks and one mountain battery. The battery will remain permanently, the infantry and tanks will return after the occupation of Firuzabad, which is to be undertaken shortly. The occupation of Firuzabad by Government forces may not eliminate Nasir Qashgai, but it will reduce his prestige and enhance that of the Government.

Bakhtiari.

11. The appointment of even the two minor Bakhtiari Khans to positions of influence in their own country which was reported, though incorrectly, in Summary No. 34/42, paragraph 7, has resulted in wails and complaints from the villagers of Chahar Mahel against their subjection again to the old régime of exaction and oppression that was customary in the days of the older khans. Authorised to confiscate on Government account certain stocks of grain, the two officially recognised khans appear to have done some confiscation on their own account and to have infected other khans with this acquisitive habit. Some of the latter, including the important Shihab es Sultaneh, have been arrested by the G.O.C., the Isfahan division.

In Summary No. 34/42 the two khans, Manuchir Assad and Abul Qashim, were incorrectly reported as having been appointed to governorships. These appointments were not sanctioned and the two khans have some indefinite position as agents of the Persian Government in Bakhtiari.

Russian Affairs.

12. General Melnik, commanding Soviet forces in North-West Persia, paid a brief visit to Tehran. He said that although he had been anxious about the situation some weeks ago he was now confident that the Russian forces in the Caucasus were adequate. He talked much of the "Second Front" and was obviously at a loss to understand why it had not already been opened. He was losing his cavalry from North-West Persia and was receiving some infantry in their place.

13. Supplies to Russia by the Zahedan-Meshed road are still interrupted by floods in Sind.

American Affairs.

14. Mr. Sheridan, the Adviser to the Ministry of Food, has arrived in Persia.

Tehran, October 6, 1942.

[E 6474/19/34]

No. 42.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 340.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the period of the 7th to 13th October, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, October 12, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the period October 7-13, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THERE is no development worthy of note in the political situation, for better or worse.

2. Hasan Isfandiari (Haji Muhtashim es Saltaneh) (F.O. 97, M.A. 125) has again been elected President of the Majlis. The Vice-Presidents are Murteza Quli Bayat (F.O. 50, M.A. 65) and Dr. Tahari.

Economic.

3. The problem of drawing the wheat from its hidden stores still remains unsolved. The simple solution of arresting some of the landlords does not commend itself to the Government. Mr. Sheridan, the American adviser to the Ministry of Food, is understood to favour a considerable increase in the official buying price.

4. Another currency crisis is not far ahead. The additional issue of 300 million rials, reported in Summary No. 37/42, paragraph 5, is nearly all absorbed. A further issue will very shortly be required, and the prospect of having to face the Majlis with a request for its authority fills the Government with fear and gloom. The demand for rials by Russians and Americans is increasing. The former have hitherto financed their rial transactions partly by a loan, which is now exhausted, and partly by the import and sale of goods, which they can no longer supply. They will now be obliged to abandon the disinterested attitude they have hitherto adopted towards British difficulties with the Persian Government over currency questions, and may be expected to assist in finding a solution that will obviate this recurring crisis, which is a serious embarrassment to the Persian Government.

5. Passenger fares and freight rates on the Persian railways are to be doubled from the 12th October.

Appointments—Civil.

6.—(i) Mohammad Varasteh, from Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior, to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.

(ii) Ali Nasir, from Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Industry and Mines, to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior.

(iii) Ahmad Ali Sepehr (Muvarokh ed Douleh), to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Industry and Mines.

Internal Security.

General.

7. Although in certain areas, notably in the Kermanshah Province, Lurestan, Khuzistan and Fars, there is much lawlessness and potential trouble—British interests have not been immediately affected to any serious extent during the past week. Prophecies of coming trouble are abundant, not without cause, as scarcity and high prices are producing an easily fomentable discontent.

Fars.

8. After their initial setback (reported in Summary No. 40/42, paragraph 9) the Qashgai tribes attempted to break through to their winter quarters by other routes. Held at several of these, they were eventually successful at a pass held by a small detachment of cavalry, which is said to have fought well until some

of its leaders were wounded, when it submitted to disarmament. The Qashgai—the section concerned is said to have been the Darashuri—carried off sixty rifles and three light machine guns. The course of subsequent operations is not yet known. The General Staff state that three columns have been ordered to act against the offending section. Meanwhile some of the Qashgai flocks and families are being held up by the troops; Nasir Qashgai, who with his brother Khosrow, is within 30 miles or so of Shiraz, has telegraphed to Tehran protesting against the action of the troops, and has requested the Governor of Shiraz to meet him.

9. Whatever the result, it is unlikely that it will be at best more than a token disarmament of the Qashgai. The method of attempting to disarm them seems to have been ill-judged and, desirable though their disarmament is in the interests of security, it was considered inadvisable to urge it on the Persian Government in present circumstances. It seems that something has not gone according to plan. In view of the Governor-General's repeated insistence that the forces at his command were insufficient to re-establish Government authority in the Firuzabad area, when the tribes were far away in their summer quarters, it seems rash of him to have provoked a conflict with the whole tribe. Until order is restored it is to be expected that the Shiraz-Bushire road will be unsafe. It may be closed altogether for a time.

Azerbaijan.

10. According to Persian official reports, Umar Khan of the Shekak, who as reported in Summary No. 40/42, paragraph 7, had been recognised by certain Kurdish chiefs as the Supreme Chief of the United Kurds, has been touring Kurdish areas with an escort of 150 armed Kurds and has given himself a standard, a red flag bearing crossed daggers and three stars, which is locally taken to be the national flag of Independent Kurdistan. The local Persian commander expressed fears that the situation might get out of hand, as the Kurds were apparently relying on Russian neutrality. The Soviet Ambassador has, however, assured the Persian Government that the Soviet authorities will co-operate to keep order.

Russian Affairs.

11. The Russian military authorities state that at the request of the Persians they are placing military posts on certain roads leading to the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers for the purpose of preventing the export of grain. Reports from Tabriz say that posts may be located at Khanah and Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh).

12. The Persian General Staff has information of the arrival of "large" forces of Russian infantry at Julfa from the Caucasus, and of the hiring of accommodation for officers at Khoi that would seem to indicate the intended location there of a headquarters staff.

Fighting French Affairs.

13. The French National Committee has offered six scholarships, each of 24,000 Syrian francs, for Persian students at medical, law and engineering schools in Beirut.

American Affairs.

14. Admiral Standley, the American Minister in Moscow, has arrived in Tehran on his way to Washington.

Polish Interests.

15. The number of Polish evacuees in Tehran on 12th October was as follows:—

(a) By Pahlevi route—			
Staff	1,116
Boy and girl soldiers	1,835
Sick	3,469
			6,420
Civilians	23,934
(b) By Askhabad route—			
Military personnel	450
Civilians	855

In addition to the above there are 1,268 military personnel and 1,307 civilians at Pahlevi.

Tehran, October 13, 1942.

[E 6480/19/34]

No. 43.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 348.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the period of the 14th to 20th October, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, October 20, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 43.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the Period October 14–20, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government is faced with difficulties that at the moment appear to be almost insurmountable. In the first place, Tehran has wheat for only a couple of days, and supplies that have been expected from North Persia for some days past have been stopped by the Russian military authorities. In the second place, the Bill it has laid before the Majlis for a further increase of the note issue has evoked much hostile criticism, and on both these questions public resentment is being aggravated by the enemies of the Government and the Allies. It is very probable that the Bill for the increased note issue would in its present form be rejected by the Majlis if it were put to the vote unless the Government could announce some compensating benefit to offset the inevitable inflation—a benefit that would have to be provided by the Allies. Feeling is already running high, and if the bread supply is not somehow assured riots may be expected. The position of the Government is undoubtedly very difficult.

2. Opposition to the Government is being worked up by interested persons and by that large irresponsible class always ready to criticise any Government. The Deputies are being particularly unruly; this may be due to their expectation that the present Majlis may be dissolved and to their desire to bring themselves to the notice of their constituents with a view to re-election. The Cabinet itself is by no means united, and there the Prime Minister finds opposition to the strong action which he might favour. He has already informed the Shah that he is too occupied with other problems to be able to devote the necessary time to the Ministry of War, and has asked the Shah to nominate someone else for that portfolio. This, however, is not the only reason why he wishes to be relieved of the Ministry for War. He has antagonised the Chief of the General Staff by rather offhand treatment; the latter offered his resignation to the Shah, who refused to accept it, and the Prime Minister is said to have interpreted this as an indication that the Shah would support the Chief of the General Staff. Relations between the Ministry for War and the General Staff are not happy.

Economic.

3. Previous issues of rial notes being practically exhausted, the Government has been obliged to lay before Parliament a Bill to authorise the progressive issue during the period up to the 23rd August, 1943, of notes to the value of 2 milliards of rials. In the preamble to the Bill the Government argued that, since the world price of gold was more than double that at which, according to a law of 1931, the gold reserves of the Persian Government were valued, a further issue of notes was fully justified. As further justification, it said that the Government of India was prepared to sell 120 tons of silver, that the Allies would, as far as was possible, import food-stuffs and other merchandise, and it recalled the fact that 40 per cent. of sterling credits were convertible to gold. The gilding has not made the Bill palatable to the Deputies or the public.

4. In the hope of persuading hoarders to market their stocks, the official price for the purchase of landowners' surpluses of wheat has been raised from the prevailing rates, which vary from 1,200 to 1,800 rials according to locality, to 3,500 rials per ton for the districts of Tehran, Western Azerbaijan, Lurestan,

Isfahan and Shiraz, and to 3,000 rials per ton for the rest of Persia. This price is to apply to past as well as to future deliveries made before the 22nd December. On that date the buying price will be reduced by 20 per cent., and it may be subject to further decreases at the discretion of the Government. The official price of bread, however, is to be maintained at 3.60 rials for 3 kilog.

5. It is too early yet to estimate what the effect will be in the provinces of this increase of price. It has not immediately produced supplies for Tehran, where the stocks for the feeding of the town are almost exhausted. Supplies expected from the Northern Provinces have been held up by the Russian military authorities in spite of assurances by the Soviet Embassy that there was no objection to its transfer to Tehran. The Persian Government was relying on the considerable surpluses available in Khorassan and Azerbaijan to feed Tehran and other deficit areas, and if these do not reach Tehran the situation will be very serious.

6. The consul-general at Meshed reports that the landlords of Khorassan have undertaken to deliver 15,671 tons of wheat to Government, of which 2,470 tons have already been delivered. At Kermanshah some landlords have been arrested for failing to declare their surpluses.

7. The increase of railway charges reported in Summary No. 41/42, paragraph 5, applies to passenger fares only, and not to freight rates.

Persian Forces.

8. Reinforcements for the Fars and Khuzestan garrisons have recently been despatched from the Tehran garrison. Two battalions and one mountain battery have been sent to each area. The battalions for Khuzestan will reinforce the garrisons in the Behbahan-Gach Saran area.

9. The half-yearly intake of recruits and discharge of time-expired conscripts is shortly due. There is, however, no transport available to bring the recruits from the centres in which they have been recruited to their units nor to convey discharged soldiers to their own districts. As the budget does not allow of the retention of the soldier due for discharge while the recruit travels from the recruiting centre to his unit on foot, it seems that units will be under strength for some weeks.

Appointments—Military.

10.—(i) Sartip Ibrahim Arfa (M.A. 36) to be Commander of the 2nd (Tehran) Division.

(ii) Sarhang Mansur Muzayyan to be Commander of the 8th (Khorassan) Division.

(iii) Sarhang Nadir Batmangheli to be Chief of Staff to the 2nd (Tehran) Division.

(iv) Sarlashkar Ali Asghar Naqdi (M.A. 196) to be head of Military Tribunals.

(v) Sarhang Salar Khosroddad, from Officer-in-Charge of the Ammunition Factory, to be Commander of Gendarmerie in the Province of Fars.

(vi) Sartip Mahmud Mirjalali to be Assistant Director of Ordnance Services.

Internal Security.

Fars.

11. There has been no further fighting in Fars. Nasir Qashgai has again assured the Government (through the Governor of Shiraz, with whom he had an interview) that he is not a rebel, that he desires only peace, that he is trying to restrain the tribes, that he will send his brother and mother to Shiraz, but that he will not come in himself. The Prime Minister states that he has written to Nasir telling him he must come in to Shiraz or Tehran, guaranteeing him security if he does, and also saying that the Qashgai tribes must surrender their arms. There is little hope of any firm action being taken to secure these terms, as the Government is too preoccupied with economic and currency questions and too uncertain of its own position; while the Governor-General (and General Officer Commanding) of Fars, unless pushed by the Government, will prefer compromise and indecision. The result will probably be a continuance of the uneasy truce that has prevailed for some months past, possibly with increased robbery on the road. The Farsimadan held up seven trucks between Shiraz and Bushire on the 15th October and robbed the drivers.

Azerbaijan.

12. Western Azerbaijan remains unsettled, the centre of disturbance being Mahabad (Sauj Bulagh), where the Kurds are quarrelling with each other. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that responsible Kurdish elements with Russian encouragement are trying to get control.

Khuzestan.

13. The arrival in Behbahan of reinforcements of two battalions from Tehran for the reinforcement of the Behbahan-Gach Saran area should help to allay anxiety regarding possible dangers to A.I.O.C. interests from the Kuh-i-Galu tribes when they move down to their winter quarters.

Russian Affairs.

14. General Melnik has again left Tabriz, it is said for a command at the front. Colonel Damberg is temporarily commanding troops in North-Western Persia.

15. Russian demands for Persian food supplies are increasing. They have already purchased 25,000 tons of barley and have recently demanded 11,000 tons of potatoes. In spite of the Soviet Ambassador's assurance that there was no restriction on the removal of wheat from the Soviet zone to other parts of Persia, there seems to be little doubt that the Russian military authorities are preventing the transport of food-stuffs produced in their zone. In view of the shortage in Russia, this is only to be expected.

16. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz has had reports that a number of young soldiers have recently arrived in Persia and that they are training in North-Western Azerbaijan.

17. It is reported from Persian official sources that the Russians appear to be preparing to make a considerable reduction in their garrison in Meshed, and that they are removing barbed-wire fences that they had erected around certain areas occupied by them. This report requires confirmation. A recent estimate of the number of aircraft in Meshed showed that it has been reduced to about forty-seven.

Polish Affairs.

18. All Poles have now been evacuated from Pahlevi with the exception of about sixty who are sick in hospital.

Tehran, October 20, 1942.

[E 6601/19/34]

No. 44.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 11).

(No. 358).

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the period the 21st to 27th October, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, October 27, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 44.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the period October 21 to 27, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

1. HOSTILITY to the Government and to the Allies is being very openly expressed, the Government being criticised for failure to protect Persia's interests and the Allies being blamed for all Persia's ills. High and still-rising prices are attributed to heavy buying by the Allies and to their recurring demands for increases in the currency issue. Shortage of food-stuffs is said to be aggravated

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by heavy consumption by the Allies, by their monopoly of much of the country's means of transport, and by their deliberate prevention of the removal of grain from the areas in their military occupation. Both the press and the Deputies have shown increasing boldness in scarcely-veiled expressions of hostility, knowing that for once they are really expressing the views of the people. The Majlis is in no mood to support the Government in any measure that favours Allied interests. Axis agents find good material for effective propaganda among an already irritated people.

Economic.

2. The Government has not dared to proceed with the Bill it laid before the Majlis for an increase of the note issue by 2,000 million rials owing to the violent opposition of the Majlis. It did, however, succeed in getting passed a Bill for an increased issue of 500 million rials, nominally to finance purchases of food-stuffs, in spite of its having found only two Deputies with courage enough to speak in its support.

3. Public feeling is greatly excited over the recurring increases of currency issues. Propaganda tells them that this is leading to a catastrophic depreciation of the rial, which will result in the financial ruin of Persia and, more immediately, to a rise in prices that will make the cost of living almost prohibitive for the poor man.

4. Tehran has managed to stave off a bread crisis, but it lives from day to day, and there is not even one day's reserve of wheat in the Government grain store. Kermanshah is in little better state, and local officials are refusing to send to Tehran the wheat on which this town is normally dependent. The Soviet authorities have promised to facilitate the transport of some quantity of grain from Azerbaijan and Khorassan. But they have also asked for 30,000 tons of rice, 5,000 tons of wheat, and 15,000 tons of barley to be delivered to them.

5. The increase in the official buying price has not yet brought much additional wheat on the market. Some hoarded stocks have been discovered, which temporarily relieved the situation in Tehran, but in spite of the critical situation and public anxiety, amounting almost to panic, regarding the possibility of famine, there is little indication of serious endeavours to force hoarders and speculators to produce their stocks.

Communications.

6. The Soviet Transportation Directorate has stated that the Pahlevi-Astara road is now open for all kinds of traffic.

Appointments—Civil.

7. Abdullah Adl Isfandiari to be Farmandar of Kashan.

Internal Security.

General.

8. As is usual when the Government is being criticised or challenged in Tehran security has deteriorated. The consul-general at Bushire reports increasing brigandage in Dashtestan and truculence on the parts of the chiefs of Dashti. In the Kermanshah Province villages are suffering from the depredations of robbers, and in Khorassan there has been an outbreak of highway robbery in the vicinity of Meshed. In one case the loot included 600,000 rials intended for the Soviet Consul-General.

Fars.

9. The Prime Minister's note offering terms to Nasir Qashgai (see Summary No. 42/42, paragraph 11) has been delivered, but it is not yet known what effect it had on Nasir. Meanwhile, the Government forces have made no further attempt to interfere with the tribal migration, which is being protected by armed tribesmen. The attempt to disarm the Qashgai has been abandoned, and the tribes are reaching their winter quarters unmolested. But the temptation to take advantage of the passivity of the Persian forces has been too much for some of the tribesmen. Russian lorries moving from Bushire to Shiraz were held up, the drivers robbed and one Russian soldier was carried off with his rifle. The soldier has been released, but his rifle remains with the tribe. Another hold-up occurred about 2 miles north of Shiraz, which resulted in a British officer, the engineer in charge of the maintenance of that section of the road, receiving a gunshot wound in the arm. Villages are also suffering.

10. There is considerable intrigue in political circles against any military action being taken against the Qashgai. This is being instigated by anti-British circles and is probably being encouraged by Axis agents. The influence of the former, for what it is worth, will probably be used to persuade the Qashgai to remain quiet for the present.

Khuzestan.

11. Two fairly serious robberies have recently occurred on the Behbahan-Gach Saran road. The first, when twenty cases of household goods belonging to a European member of the staff of the A.I.O.C. were carried off, appears to have been normal brigandage, the robbers being alleged to be Boir Ahmadi tribesmen. The second, where three European members of the A.I.O.C. were carried off into the hills by unidentified assailants, appears to have been a put-up job instigated possibly by the Rais ut Tujja, a local magnate who was recently arrested by order of the Central Government on a charge of hoarding grain. It would be to his interest to show that disorders occurred in the absence of his restraining influence.

12. These robberies occurred before the reinforcements of two battalions mentioned in Summary No. 42/42, paragraph 13, had reached Behbahan. Their special duty is to secure the Behbahan-Gach Saran area.

[E 6835/19/34]

No. 45.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 371.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 44, for the period of the 28th October to the 3rd November, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, November 3, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 45.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44 for the Period October 28 to November 3.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE political situation remains much as it was described in Summary No. 43/42, paragraph 1, with the Majlis still in critical mood and certain parties working for the overthrow of the Government. The Prime Minister is not, however, without support. There are many who consider that in present circumstances there is no better candidate, and others who are opposed to change because they believe that nothing can be achieved towards remedying the economic situation without some stability in the Government and some consistency in policy. Frequent changes of Government have increased the administrative chaos and strengthened the potential forces of disorder. The belief that no Cabinet, and consequently no policy, will last for long leads to delay and evasion by officials in the execution of its orders.

2. The Prime Minister has agreed to continue to hold the portfolio of the Ministry for War. His relations with the Chief of the General Staff have slightly improved (see Summary No. 42/42, paragraph 2).

3. A College of Theology has been opened in the University of Tehran.

Economic.

4. The increase in the official buying price of wheat has done little or nothing to improve the situation. Practically no wheat is being offered for sale at that price. Tehran still lives precariously from day to day, uncertain of to-morrow's bread. No wheat has yet been allowed to leave the Soviet-occupied zone, but promises of limited amounts are still being made by the Soviet authorities. The provision of food is now the main preoccupation of the Government.

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5. The official price of bread has been doubled and it is now 2 rials per kilog. Even this price is a temptation to villagers to flock into the towns to purchase bread and to hoard their own supplies of wheat or sell them at the high prices obtaining on the black market. In many towns in Persia the price of bread is, however, much higher than the official price.

6. Increases in the prices of certain commodities are stated by the press to have been as follows:—

	<i>In the past 12 months.</i>	<i>In the last 3 weeks.</i>
	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
Potatoes	500	85
Onions	600	150
Charcoal	300	...
Wood	300	...
Rice	270	45
Cheese	600	...
Beans	80
Lentils	44

7. The Majlis has sanctioned a loan by the National Bank to the Government of 500 million rials for the purchase of food-stuffs. In addition to cereals it is the intention of the Government to purchase stocks of potatoes, peas, beans and lentils to feed the poor in the event of bread shortage.

Currency.

8. The Soviet Ambassador has proposed to the Persian Government a financial agreement similar to that in force between the British and Persian Governments, that is, the provision by the Persian Government of rials against 40 per cent. in gold and 60 per cent. in dollars at the fixed rate of exchange of 32 rials to the dollar.

Persian Forces.

9. General Ridley, of the United States army, and two Staff officers have arrived in Tehran as advisers to the Ministry of War. The scope of the duty of these officers has not yet been defined.

Appointments—Military.

10.—(i) Sartip Ali Chadar, to be Military Governor of Tehran, *vice* Sarlashkar Muqaddam (resigned).

(ii) Sarhang Issa Ashtudakh, to be director of the ammunition factory.

Internal Security.

Fars.

11. The situation in Fars appears to be temporarily settling down, leaving the Government in a weaker position than before as regards Nasir Qashgai and the tribes. Nasir's reply to the Prime Minister's letter (see Summary No. 42/43, paragraph 11) is to the effect that he is a loyal Persian, that he agrees to hand back the arms and equipment recently captured from Persian forces (see Summary No. 41/42, paragraph 8), and that he will send his mother and brother to Shiraz, but he declines the invitation to come in himself. The tribes have meanwhile spread out over their winter quarters. It is probable that, provided the Qashgai remain quiet, the Government, absorbed in other problems, will be content to let things be. Various influences are at work to persuade the Qashgai not to create trouble at present that might provoke the British either to take action against them themselves or to force the Government into action. They are to wait and see what happens in the Caucasus. Meanwhile Nasir grows stronger. Certain sub-tribes, notably the Darashuri, who were little inclined to support him, have probably been driven into his camp by the ill-timed action of the Persian forces (see Summary No. 41/42, paragraphs 8 and 9), and the Qashgai are now a more united body than they have been for some time. There is little doubt that Nasir is under the influence of pro-Axis and anti-British parties.

Azerbaijan.

12. The situation in Western Azerbaijan is giving the Persian authorities much cause for anxiety. Although it is likely that the object of recent Russian dealings with the Kurds (see Summary No. 40/42, paragraph 7) was genuinely

to produce more settled conditions, there seems to be little doubt that it has been construed by the Kurds as encouragement, if not of Kurdish independence, at least of a degree of local autonomy in Persia. The intransigence of the Kurds appears to be growing to a degree that is embarrassing to the Russians, who, on the one hand, wish to avoid antagonising the Kurds, and, on the other, do not wish to see them challenge the shadow of Persian Government authority that remains in Western Azerbaijan. The Kurds, in the opinion of His Majesty's Consul-General in Tabriz, are disappointed with the present Russian attitude towards their aspirations.

13. According to Persian official reports, Umar Khan of the Shakak, who, as was reported in Summary No. 40/42, paragraph 7, was recognised by the chiefs who attended the Ushnu Conference as Supreme Chief of the United Kurds, has been collecting money from villages and exercising other rights of a ruler. He has put the districts of Saqqiz, Baneh, Sardasht and Gurk in the charge of Hama Rashid of Baneh, until recently in rebellion against the Persian Government. The Persian forces appear to be now fairly well established at Saqqiz, but there may be trouble at Sardasht, where the presence of Pishdar Kurds from Iraq is resented by Persian Kurds.

Russian Interests.

14. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that during the latter half of October the Russian forces in Meshed, with the exception of the air force, have been almost completely changed. The new troops are mostly European Russians, well armed with automatic rifles and tommy-guns. Some artillery has also arrived. The strength of the garrison is now about 2,000. The number of aircraft has been reduced to about twenty machines. Night flying, which had been in abeyance, is again much in evidence.

Tehran, November 3, 1942.

[E 6922/19/34]

No. 46.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 379.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 45, for the period the 4th to 10th November, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, November 10, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 46.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the Period November 4–10.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Government is still being heavily attacked, and anti-Ally, particularly anti-British, feeling grows worse. Press criticism of the Government has now affected its prestige in the provinces, where officials grow increasingly lax in their duties. Tehran seethes with political intrigue, and public opinion is excited over questions of food and currency.

2. There has not yet been time for events in North Africa to have made their full impression on the Persian public, which is at present more concerned with the internal situation than with the war. When, however, the full significance of these events is realised there should be a noticeable improvement in the attitude of the governing classes. The masses will, however, still be mainly affected by fears of famine.

Economic.

3. The bread situation in Tehran is still critical. In the absence of any effective action by the Government against hoarders, and they show no inclination

[25053]

to take forcible action, future bread supplies are dependent on wheat being allowed to leave the Russian occupied zone. It is understood that the Soviet authorities have agreed to allow the removal of 7,500 tons over the next month.

4. The increase in the official price of wheat has had only the effect of increasing the price on the black market. It has made no material difference to the amount of wheat being produced for sale. The press is now saying that there is no hoarding, and that consequently the only way to avoid famine is to import wheat from abroad.

5. An announcement in the press states that 2,000 tons of seed wheat purchased in India will be distributed as follows:—

	Tons.
Bushire, Shabankareh, Nayat Daud, Dashtistan ...	350
Larestan ...	30
Khuzestan ...	1,420
Bandar Abbas ...	50
Kerman ...	150

6. The press reports that during the month the 23rd August to the 22nd September, 46,596 goat- and sheep-skins were exported via Khuzestan; 480 cow-skins from Rezaieh; 4,000 kilog. of wool via Khuzestan; 3,073 kilog. of feathers via Resht.

The price of tobacco has been raised by 20 per cent.

Currency.

7. A further issue of rials will be required in the very near future and the Government will again have to go to the unco-operative Majlis for sanction. Proposals made jointly by the British and American Ministers for a permanent solution of this frequently recurring cause of crisis are now being considered by the Cabinet. The Cabinet may prefer to resign rather than accept them.

8. The Soviet Embassy has now proposed different terms for a financial agreement with the Persian Government from those reported in Summary No. 44/42, paragraph 8. They now propose that they should be supplied with their requirements in rials against a promise of goods, and that, if the value of the goods imported should be less than the rials acquired, the difference should be adjusted by the delivery of gold to Persian representatives in Moscow.

Internal Security.

Fars.

9. A Government commission is to proceed to Fars to negotiate with Nasir Qashgai. This tribute to his importance should greatly increase Nasir's prestige among the Qashgai and in Fars and make it eventually much more difficult for the Government to re-establish control over the tribes and order in Fars, which is now at the mercy of the Qashgai. It is clear that Nasir's political supporters in Tehran have been able to influence the Cabinet.

Khuzestan.

10. Reinforcements of one battalion of infantry, some cavalry and mountain guns have been sent to Dizful with a view to maintaining order among the Arab tribes who have been marauding in that area.

Russian Affairs.

11. The Soviet Embassy has presented to the Persian Government a draft contract for the supply of arms and ammunition to be manufactured in the Persian munition factories. The contract is for 60,000 rifles, 42 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and 30,000 machine pistols to be delivered in periodic quotas during the course of a year. The Soviet Government undertakes to supply the necessary raw materials and additional tools that may be necessary. Twenty-five thousand rifles are to be handed over from stock immediately on the signature of the contract. By agreement with His Majesty's Government, the Soviet Government has first claim on the products of the Persian munition factories.

12. The Soviet authorities have at last agreed that the Persian Government should be urged to take air-raid precautions in Tehran. Hitherto their attitude has been that the danger of air raid was too remote to warrant alarming the population, and the Persian Government were only too ready to accept this view rather than that of the British authorities.

American Affairs.

13. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis to authorise the employment of the American, Dr. Millspaugh, as Director-General of Finance. The Bill gives him considerable powers in the control of finance and of the officials of the Finance Department. Dr. Millspaugh was Adviser to the Persian Ministry of Finance from 1923 to 1927.

[E 6978/19/34]

No. 47.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 385.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for the period of the 11th to 17th November, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, November 17, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 47.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 46 for the Period
November 11-17, 1942.

(Secret.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE political situation remains very unstable. The proposals made a week ago for a permanent settlement of the currency question are still under discussion between the Government and representatives of Majlis parties. They involve ratification by the Majlis of the Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement and surrender by the Majlis to the Government of its authority to sanction increased note issues. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the British and American Governments will give no undertaking to supply Persia's requirements in wheat. If the Majlis rejects the proposals, either the Government must resign or the Prime Minister must close the Majlis. The issue is still in doubt, although it seems improbable that even the Persian Majlis could be so irresponsible as to deprive the country of wheat supplies. There is, unfortunately, little hope of the question being treated solely on its own merits by the Prime Minister's enemies.

2. The change brought about in the military situation by the operations in North Africa has had considerable effect on educated public opinion. Many are now trying to increase their insurances with the Allies.

Finance.

3. A Government Bill has been laid before the Majlis revising the existing income tax law. The Bill proposes to tax incomes as follows:—

Incomes up to 7,200 rials:	Exempt.
" of 7,201-20,000 rials:	1 per cent. on 7,200 rials; 3 per cent. on remainder.
" of 20,001-40,000 rials:	6 per cent. above 20,000 rials.
" of 40,001-100,000 rials:	10 per cent. above 40,000 rials.
" of 100,001-300,000 rials:	20 per cent. above 100,000 rials.
" of 300,001-500,000 rials:	30 per cent. above 300,000 rials.
" of 500,001-1,000,000 rials:	40 per cent. above 500,000 rials.
" of above 1,000,000 rials:	60 per cent.

4. The currency situation is officially stated to be as follows:—

	Rials.
Total notes issued ...	3,200,000,000
In hands of the public ...	2,641,936,000
With National Bank ...	538,063,800

5. The information given in Summary No. 45/42, paragraph 9, of the draft financial agreement proposed by the Soviet Government to the Persian Government was incorrect. The draft agreement states that the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. and the National Bank of Persia shall open accounts with each other in rials, without interest. These accounts to be settled half-yearly, the debtor bank placing at the disposal of the creditor bank gold to the extent of 40 per cent. of the balance due and 60 per cent. in dollar credits. The gold remains deposited with the debtor bank until the end of the war, unless the creditor bank wishes to remove it at its own risk and expense. In effect, the agreement means that the Soviet would obtain whatever Persian currency it needs and supply such goods as it can spare, the difference in value being eventually settled as to 40 per cent. in gold and 60 per cent. in dollar credits.

Economic.

6. The wheat situation has in no way improved. In the provinces, with the exception of those in the north, amounts collected in Government depots are still far short of what is required to feed the provincial towns. Provincial officials consequently are concerned to obstruct the removal of wheat from their own provinces to the capital or to other centres. Tehran still lives from day to day, depending on the arrival of supplies from the Russian-occupied zone.

7. As a result of the urgent representations of the American adviser to the Ministry of Food, purchases of certain food-stuffs for civilian Poles have been considerably reduced. Eggs, for example, which were previously purchased at the rate of 26,000 a day, have now been reduced to 2,400 a day. The high living of the Polish refugees was not only a constant irritation to hungry Persians, but was also a cause of shortage and high prices of certain commodities.

8. The following are the prices ruling in the Isfahan bazaar:—

	Per ton.
	Rials.
Wheat	5,400
Rice, first quality	10,500
Rice, second quality	6,000
Barley	3,750
Peas	7,500
Potatoes	3,600

Communications.

9. The Tehran-Tabriz railway has now been completed as far as Mianeh. Construction trains have been through, and traffic, which now stops at Zinjan, will shortly run through to Mianeh.

Appointments—Civil.

- 10.—(i) Suleiman Kalhur, to be Governor of Kazvin *vice* Qiami, resigned.
- (ii) Abul Hassan Ibtehaj (M.A. 116, F.O. 88), to be governor of the National Bank.
- (iii) Dr. Daftari, to be managing director of the Mortgage Bank.
- (iv) Sahamiddin Ghaffari (Zoka-ed-Douleh) (M.A. 97, F.O. 77), to be director of the Press and Propaganda Department.

Persian Forces.

Appointments—Military.

- 11.—(i) Sarhang Mohamed Ali Alavi, now director of the 4th Bureau of the General Staff, to be head of the secretariat of the General Staff.
- (ii) Colonel Ghulam Reza Shahin, to be director of the 4th Bureau of the General Staff.

Internal Security.

12. Evidence has been obtained that makes it quite clear that Nasir Qashgai is the centre of an anti-Ally and pro-German movement. Moreover, air reconnaissance has discovered a secret aerodrome close to Farrashband (3-inch sheet H. 39 W) in Fars, marked so as to indicate that an aircraft was shortly expected to land. The plot, of which he is a conspicuous figurehead as regards South Persia, has extensive ramifications. He is still in negotiation with the Government by telegraph. He has sent his mother and small son of 10 years to Shiraz as for his good behaviour and has promised that he will come

to Tehran when he has collected the arms of the Qashgai. As he is quite incapable of collecting the arms of the Qashgai, this promise means nothing. Wiser counsels having prevailed, the Government has decided not to increase his importance by sending the proposed commission to negotiate with him.

13. Meanwhile, possibly due to improved measures of protection, the Bushire-Shiraz road was relatively safe. A hold-up of four A.I.O.C. tank lorries and a commercial lorry occurred on the 12th November, resulting in the robbing of the drivers. But villages, particularly those of Nasir's enemies, have been suffering heavily from the depredations of the Qashgai. Several unconfirmed reports have been received that the Qashgai are receiving arms from some source in Isfahan and 303 ammunition of recent manufacture has been seen in their possession.

Persian Baluchistan.

14. The operations reported in Summary No. 36/42, paragraph 19, to be in progress in the Bashakird district have resulted in the surrender of the leader, Abdul Hussein, and the collection of some 40 rifles.

Khuzestan.

15. The British authorities in Khuzestan are anxious that the Persian forces, whose arrival at Dizful was reported in Summary No. 45/42, paragraph 10, should not undertake operations against the Arabs for fear that the result might be to disturb Arab labourers employed by the British forces and alter the present situation which, while unwelcome to the villagers and landowners who are suffering from Arab depredations, does not adversely affect British military interests. His Majesty's Consul-General at Ahwaz has been instructed to use his good offices to bring about a settlement that will ensure a cessation of Arab lawlessness with the minimum disturbance of the Arabs.

Azerbaijan.

16. General Agevli, the General Officer Commanding, Gendarmerie, is now in Azerbaijan and is said to be arranging with the Russians for the re-establishment of gendarmerie posts along the Perso-Turkish frontier.

Turkish Affairs.

17. The Turkish Government has proposed to the Soviet authorities the formation of a joint commission to deal with matters relating to the Turco-Persian frontier. The Russians have agreed, but have suggested that Persia should also be represented on this commission.

Tehran, November 17, 1942.

[E 7230/19/34]

No. 48.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 395.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 47, for the period of the 18th to the 24th November, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, November 24, 1942.

(Secret.)

Enclosure in No. 48.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 47 for the Period November 18-24, 1942.

Persian Affairs.

DURING the week the situation led to a serious crisis between the Prime Minister and the Deputies. It centred around the question of a further issue of currency, but was made the occasion for a serious attempt to overturn the

Government. After much lobbying the Prime Minister came to the conclusion that business could not be done by normal methods, and that he would challenge the Majlis by asking for full powers in certain matters. The Bill he presented to the Majlis asked for full powers to deal with questions of food, transport, security and the stabilisation of prices. At the same time he presented another Bill which would transfer the authority of the Majlis to sanction new issues of currency to the Currency Commission. The latter Bill was passed after a lengthy session. The approval of the Deputies was probably influenced by the belief that further delay would bring about some forcible action by the Allies, possibly the closing of the Majlis.

2. In his speech introducing the Bill asking for full powers (mentioned in paragraph 1 above), the Prime Minister mentioned the following points:—

- (a) The British had agreed to increase that proportion of the sterling balances of the Persian Government, as ascertained quarterly, which is convertible into gold from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent.
- (b) If the pound was later found to be over-valued in terms of rials, there was a hope of securing a readjustment of the rate of exchange.
- (c) The Allies had agreed to bring 25,000 tons of wheat to Tehran, and, in addition, to import as was found necessary sufficient wheat to make up the deficiency of local supplies until the next harvest.

There is likely to be strong opposition to the Bill, and it seems that a determined effort may be made to turn out the Government.

3. Recent Allied victories have greatly affected public opinion, and, while it cannot be said that anti-British feeling has greatly diminished, there is a noticeable increase of respect for the Allies. Perhaps from fear of dissolution, certain leaders of Majlis parties are now eager to assert their desire to co-operate with the Allies.

Currency.

4. The new Currency Bill, of which a translation is given in an appendix to this Summary, should remove the difficulties hitherto existent in obtaining sufficient rials for British expenditure in Persia and will avert a recurrence of the crisis that has arisen at intervals each time that Majlis sanction had to be demanded for further issues of currency—crises that have shaken the Government and aroused great public excitement. It will not, however, restore public confidence in the currency nor allay fears of continuing inflation.

Economic.

5. The wheat situation, particularly as regards the capital, has slightly improved. Supplies are now coming forward in small quantities from the Russian zone, and the Soviet authorities have stated that they now propose to take not more than 5,000 tons of wheat for themselves and that the remainder will be available for Persian consumption. They do insist, however, on having 30,000 tons of rice, but say that they will take rice from the province of Gilan only, the rice of Mazanderan being left for Persian Government needs.

Appointments—Civil.

- 6.—(i) Ismail Bahadur (M.A. 54), Governor of Kashan, to be Governor of Bushire.
- (ii) Morteza Sarmad, to be Director of the Anti-Hoarding Department.

Persian Forces.

7. The position of General Ridley (see Summary No. 44/42, paragraph 9) still remains indefinite. He has as yet no official position, but is being given facilities to investigate the conditions of the Persian army, and he has already outlined certain proposals for reform.

Appointments—Military.

- 8.—(i) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet, from Deputy Chief of the General Staff to be Commandant of the Cadets' School, *vice* Sartip Ansari.
- (ii) Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari (M.A. 28), to be attached to General Ridley.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

9. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that, owing to trouble between the townspeople and the Kurds who now rule the district, the Soviet authorities have agreed to the despatch to Mahabad (Sanj Bulagh) of a battalion of Persian troops and a force of gendarmerie. It is not yet known whether the Persian authorities have the troops available.

10. It is also reported that the Iraqi Pizhdar Kurds have agreed to leave the town of Sardasht on condition that it is not occupied by their enemies, the Mangurs (see Summary No. 44/42, paragraph 13).

Fars.

11. There is evidence that Nasir Qashgai and his brother Khosrow are in considerable perturbation. This is probably due partly to recent Axis defeats and partly to the knowledge of the discovery of the secret aerodrome in Nasir's territory (see Summary No. 46/42, paragraph 12). Khosrow has arrived in Shiraz, and he is reliably reported as having said that he intends to assure His Majesty's Consul of his intention to obey the orders of Government. One emissary states that he has quarrelled with Nasir and intends to attach himself to the British. This may be nothing more than a typical Qashgai ruse, but a general inclination to veer away from Nasir may now be expected to be evident among his supporters in Fars and Tehran. The Persian General Staff is still disinclined to undertake operations against him, arguing that it would be unwise to do so unless they had the transport to move reinforcements rapidly from Tehran should the forces in Fars prove insufficient for the task.

12. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that brigandage is becoming more prevalent in Dashtistan, four Persian caravans having recently been robbed near Borasjun and Shahbankareh. The Tangistan and Dashti chiefs are again growing truculent and are showing increasing opposition to the presence of gendarmerie garrisons in their ports.

Russian Affairs.

13. The Russian garrison in Meshed is now reported to be about 4,000 and to consist of the following units:—

- One battalion each of the 5th and 6th Infantry Regiments.
- 27th Infantry Regiment from Turkestan.
- One regiment of artillery.
- A few light tanks.
- 56th Air Squadron (twenty to twenty-two aircraft).

A detachment is reported to have been sent recently to Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam.

Tehran, November 24, 1942.

Appendix.

Translation of the Text of the Currency Law passed by the Majlis on November 19, 1942.

Article 1.

From the date of the passing of this law, authority for the issue of notes is vested in the Note Reserve Control Committee.

Article 2.

The Director-General of Finances, Dr. Millsaugh, will become a member of the Note Control Reserve Committee after his arrival.

Article 3.

The conditions for the issue of notes, authority for which is vested by this law in the Note Reserve Control Committee, will be fixed by a decree of the Council of Ministers, acting on proposals put forward by the Note Reserve Control Committee.

Article 4.

Notes which are issued by virtue of this law must possess the following backing:—

- (a) As to 60 per cent.: gold at the official rate ruling in the international market at the present and/or pounds and dollars convertible into gold.
- (b) As to 40 per cent.: pounds and dollars guaranteed against depreciation in terms of gold at to-day's rate.

Article 5.

The backing for the notes to the value of 3,500 million rials, authority for the issue of which has been given up till this date, will be on a basis of 60 per cent. gold and silver, valued at the international market rate, and the jewels which were handed over to the National Bank in accordance with the law of the 25th Aban, 1316.

[E 7393/19/34]

No. 49.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 405.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the period of the 25th November to the 1st December, 1942, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, December 1, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 49.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the Period
November 25–December 1, 1942.*

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE relations of the Cabinet with the Majlis remain very strained. The Bill asking for full powers for the Government has not yet entered on the first stage of Majlis procedure—examination by a commission of Deputies. The Majlis is hostile, but the fear of dissolution tempers its hostility with caution. The Shah hesitates to encourage any measures that would give unrestricted powers to the Prime Minister, in whose loyalty to the dynasty he still lacks confidence. In this he is encouraged by the military leaders, who, although they would welcome the silencing of the Majlis criticism of the army, fear an extension of the Prime Minister's control over the army. Considerable speculation has been caused by articles in the press, inspired by the Public Relations Bureau of the British Legation, which referred to British support of the Cabinet and disapproval of frequent changes of Cabinet. These have been wrongly interpreted to mean that Qavam-es-Sultaneh will be maintained in power by the British. It is probable that the Prime Minister's position has been strengthened, but some people hold the opinion that his personal prestige has been diminished.

2. Some attempt was made in political circles in the capital to arouse fears that the British intend to establish Qavam-es-Sultaneh as a dictator, and this has to some extent been successful in arousing strong feelings against him. Even the Shah appears to have been alarmed, and he is showing an increasing tendency to look for support and protection in the army rather than in the Government and the Majlis.

Economic.

3. Tehran and the provincial towns just manage to avert a bread crisis, and the Prime Minister's announcement that the Allies have undertaken to import 25,000 tons of wheat within the next few months and to ensure that proved deficiencies of local supply will be made good up to next harvest has done something to allay public fears of famine. There are hopes of an improvement in the flow of supplies into Government stores in most provinces.

4. The following figures relative to the rise in prices are believed to be reliable:—

Index of wholesale prices (1936 = 100)—

March 1942	283
July 1942	319

Cost-of-living index (1936 = 100)—

September 1941	242.6
March 1942	314
July 1942	368
October 1942	418

Notes in circulation—

March 1942	1,746,000,000
November 1942	nearly	3,000,000,000

5. The results of a census of population and animals in districts included in the jurisdiction of the Governor of Tehran are given in an appendix.

Currency.

6. A statement in Summary No. 47/42, paragraph 4, to the effect that the new Currency Law had not restored public confidence in the rial requires correction. The strength of the backing given to future issues of currency by article 4 of that law has been realised by the public. As a result, the price of gold in Tehran has dropped.

Persian Forces.

7. Much discussion is now going on in Persian military circles as to the duties and powers that should be given to an American Military Mission should America agree to send one. It has been accepted that the head of the mission would be assistant to the Minister for War and that orders regarding administration and organisation would be issued by the Ministry only with his approval. The Shah and the Chief of the General Staff wish to limit the activities of the mission to the Ministry for War, and in that they would have the support of all corrupt officers; but it is generally realised that no effective reforms would be achieved unless the American Mission had the right to investigate administration in units and formations and to insist on the dismissal of corrupt and inefficient officers. The Shah is anxious to preserve unimpaired his personal influence in, and his right of command over, the army. There is suspicion that he is at present more concerned to foster attachment to his person than to eliminate corruption.

Appointments—Military.

8. *Army.*—(i) Sarhang Muhammad Taqi Alp, formerly Chief of Staff to Sipahbod Shahbakhte, to be Commander of the 9th (Ardebil) Brigade, *vice* Sarhang Jahanpulad.

Gendarmerie.—(ii) Sarhang Muhammad Ghaffari to command No. 1 (Tehran) Gendarmerie District.

(iii) Sarhang Jawad Mir Fendereski to command No. 7 (Western) Gendarmerie District.

(iv) Sarhang Baqir Nikandesh to command No. 3 (Khorassan) Gendarmerie District.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

9. General Agevli, the head of the gendarmerie, has now returned from Western Azerbaijan. He went there with Russian approval to investigate the matter of placing gendarmerie posts along the frontier, mainly for the purpose of preventing the smuggling of wheat into Turkey and Iraq. The Russians were anxious to put an end to this traffic. General Agevli, however, considers that, in view of the number of hostile and well-armed Kurds along the frontier, small posts of gendarmerie would be not merely ineffective, but likely to be overcome by the Kurds, and that only a strong military force could cope with the situation. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan considers that the Russians are becoming less opposed to Persian military action against the Kurds, in whom, with the improved situation in the Caucasus, they appear to be losing interest. It is unlikely that the Persian army will venture on the serious operations that would be necessary for the disarmament of the Kurds.

Kermanshah.

10. General Shahbakhte says that he has given orders for the disarmament of the Kalkhani tribe living in the vicinity of Kasr-i-Shirin-Karind.

Lurestan.

11. Since the beginning of November there have been repeated attempts to ambush small parties of Indian troops patrolling the railway line between Dorud and Mazu. These have occurred almost daily of late. The motive may be nothing more than an attempt to get rifles. The assailants are reported to belong to the Papi tribe of Lurs. Strong representations have been made to the Persian Government.

Khuzestan.

12. Meetings have recently taken place between the Arab chiefs and the local commander of the Persian forces with a view to arranging a settlement that will put an end to Arab lawlessness. These meetings were, however, not attended by the more turbulent chiefs. One of these, Hussein, the head of the dissident Zaghaib section of the Cha'ab, with some sixty riflemen recently attacked the village of the head of the whole Cha'ab tribe and did appreciable damage. General Shahbakhte will shortly visit Khuzestan and will consult His Majesty's Consul-General before taking military action. He is of opinion that some of the Arab sections must be disarmed in the interests of the peace of the district. He appears confident of being able to bring this about without causing disturbance.

Fars.

13. Several individuals, who have until recently been engaged in pro-Axis intrigues, are now endeavouring to show that their sentiments are really pro-British. Nasir Qashgai's brother, Khosrow, has been in to Shiraz and has professed submission to Government to the Governor-General and friendly sentiments towards the British to His Majesty's Consul. He has now gone to see Nasir, professedly to advise him to come in and make his peace. Nasir would probably be more ready to do so if assured of the stability of Qavam-es-Sultaneh's premiership, and consequently of the value of his assurances. Other persons, including some tribal chiefs, who, although they have not hitherto ventured openly to support the British cause, have stood aloof from German intrigues, are now hoping for some encouragement to come into the open.

14. On the road there have been a few petty robberies, but during the last week no interference with British traffic. In Tangistan there has been some robbery of Persian caravans by local villagers.

Russian Affairs.

15. The purpose of the detachment of Russian troops, which was reported in Summary No. 47/42, paragraph 13, to have been sent to Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam, is, according to a statement of the Soviet military commander in Meshed, to prevent the smuggling into Afghanistan of Russian petrol imported to Persia.

16. M. Maximoff, until recently Soviet Consul-General in Khorassan, has been appointed counsellor to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran in place of M. Ivanov, who has returned to Russia.

Fighting French Affairs.

17. A mission of French air force personnel consisting of eighteen officers and forty other ranks has passed through Tehran on its way to Russia, where it is to fight for the Russians, flying aircraft provided by them.

Turkish Affairs.

18. The version of the Turkish proposal to the Russians for the regulation of affairs on the Perso-Turkish border given in Summary No. 46/42, paragraph 17, is incorrect. The proposal was merely that responsible officers should be deputed by Turkey and by Russia to clear up certain outstanding questions.

Tehran, December 1, 1942.

[E 7555/19/34]

No. 50.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 426.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 50 for the period the 9th to 15th December compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, December 15, 1942.

Enclosure in No. 50.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 50 for the Period
December 9-15, 1942.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

ON the 8th December a demonstration before the Majlis buildings, staged, there is little doubt, by the Prime Minister's political enemies, developed into rioting in the afternoon after some hours' inactivity on the part of the police and military, who had been called out in the morning. In its early stages it was confined largely to boys of the Government schools, but later in the day rougher elements joined in. Some damage was done to shops and restaurants, and the Prime Minister's private house was looted. Order was not restored until the police and military had opened fire on the mobs. The number of casualties is not yet known.

2. Attempts have been made to link up this demonstration with the shortage of bread, but there are good reasons for suspecting that it was organised from the Palace and that the police and troops had had orders from some high authority outside the Government not to interfere with the demonstrations. Looting, except perhaps of the Prime Minister's house, was not part of the programme of the originators of the demonstration, which was clearly directed against the Prime Minister and was meant to bring about his resignation. The Shah telephoned several times during the day to the Prime Minister advising, and even demanding, his resignation, but the Prime Minister, fortified by the advice of the British, Soviet and American representatives, declined to do so.

3. The Shah's distrust of the Prime Minister (see Summary No. 48/42, paragraphs 1 and 2) has undoubtedly been accentuated by malicious reports given to him by the Prime Minister's enemies. Among these must be counted the Chief of the General Staff, General Yazdan Panah, who has never made any secret of his opposition, which he bases on his not unjustifiable contempt for all Persian politicians, to an extension of Cabinet control of the army or any reduction in the Shah's powers as Commander-in-chief. The Prime Minister is credited with a desire to establish full control of the army by the Ministry for War. There is little doubt that both the Shah and the Chief of the General Staff would welcome the retirement of Qavam-es-Sultaneh and his replacement by a less forceful personality.

4. A complication has been introduced into the schemes of political intriguers by the return to a position of authority of Sipahbod Ahmadi (M.A. 23; F.O. 16). When the riot appeared to be out of control on the 8th December the Shah, who by that time had become very anxious, proposed that the Sipahbod should be appointed to restore order. This was approved by the Prime Minister after consultation with His Majesty's Legation, but is now believed to be regretted by the Shah, as the Sipahbod is not friendly to the Shah's most trusted adviser, the Chief of the General Staff. The Sipahbod is now Military Governor of Tehran and commander of all the forces in the capital. He has re-established order, closed the Majlis, suppressed all the press, and made over 100 arrests, including the Chief of Police, his predecessor in the Military Governorship, several editors of newspapers and schoolmasters, and he is showing his usual ruthless energy in dealing with anyone suspected of trying to disturb the peace. This cheerful scoundrel is much feared; he cares little for persons or laws and is suspected by his countrymen of designs of following in the footsteps of Reza Shah. He has a certain shrewdness, little education, no principles and considerable forcefulness.

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5. The blame for originating the disturbances is now being laid variously on the Prime Minister, the British and the Palace. Those interested in accusing the first-named are at present the most active. It is said that he instigated the disturbances rather than face the Majlis, as he was due to do on that day, and that he staged the pillaging of his own house to avert suspicion from himself.

6. The Government is publishing a Daily News Sheet, which is now the only paper appearing. It has published proclamations by the Military Governor and the Prime Minister in addition to home and foreign news. The Prime Minister promises a rigorous enquiry into the origin of the recent disturbances and compensation to those who have suffered loss.

7. It is understood that the Prime Minister will reconstitute his Cabinet, eliminating the more unpopular Ministers, and perhaps introducing some young blood. The Shah appears to favour experiments with the younger generation and may be thinking of posing as the leader of Young Persia. In his conception of Young Persia young army officers probably play a considerable part.

8. Allahyar Saleh, now delegate of the Persian Government in the United States for economic affairs, has been recalled with a view to his being appointed Minister of Finance.

Economic.

9. The Prime Minister has sent instructions to officials in the provinces to the effect that, since the Allies have agreed to make good any real deficiency of grain, there is no longer any necessity for provinces to retain more than a few months' reserves. The grain stocks of the country must be distributed with a view to the needs of the country as a whole in such a way that no district will suffer a present scarcity.

10. Tehran nearly ran out of wheat, but the situation was saved by the supply of 250 tons from British army stocks. A further 1,200 tons is now on its way from the same source. The Russians are also now allowing small quantities to come down from Northern Persia, having got the Persian Government's agreement to the supply to them of 18,000 tons of barley, 5,000 tons of wheat and 30,000 tons of rice. In Tehran, in order to eke out bread supplies, 20 tons of cooked potatoes are being distributed to the poor daily at 2 rials per kilogram.

11. The first 10,000 tons of the 25,000 tons of wheat promised by the Allies under the Food Agreement is being shipped from Canada, but cannot arrive before January. Meanwhile, possibly as a result of the announcement of these impending arrivals, the price on the black market has dropped.

12. The Council of Ministers has published a decree fixing the 18th December for the taking of the census preparatory to the issue of bread ration cards for Tehran.

Currency.

13. The Russians have asked for an immediate credit of 500 million rials. The Persian Government has not yet signed the financial agreement proposed by the Russians (see Summary No. 46/42, paragraph 5).

Appointments—Civil.

14.—(i) Sarlashkar Muqaddam (M.A. 182) to be Governor-General of Azerbaijan. The two existing Ustans of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan are to be united under his governorship.

(ii) Sardar Akram Qaragozlu to be Governor of Hamadan.

Persian Forces.

15. Sartip Zahidi, Commander of the Isfahan Division, was arrested on the 7th December by British troops. It had for long been known that he was in touch with German agents and that he was working against British policy. He had been encouraging Nasir Qashgai to maintain his position among the Qashgai, is strongly suspected of having assisted him with arms and ammunition, and was gradually creating a position for himself where he might have been dangerous if circumstances deteriorated. The disturbances in Tehran prevented his arrest from creating the stir it might otherwise have done. Official protests have been mild; some excitement and nervousness have been caused in the army, but Zahidi was so generally unpopular and so notorious as a dangerous intriguer that his arrest is a relief to many. The effect of his arrest on the situation in Fars is not yet apparent.

Appointments—Military.

16.—(i) Sipahbod Ahmadi (M.A. 23; F.O. 16) to be Military Governor of Tehran and commander of all forces in the capital.

(ii) Sartip Abdul Ali Etemad Muqaddam, from Deputy Chief of the Gendarmerie, to be Chief of Police.

(iii) Reza Quli Kerim Qovanlu is reinstated in the army with the rank of Sartip and is appointed to the gendarmerie.

(iv) Sarlashkar Muhammad Nakchevan (M.A. 194; F.O. 145), formerly Minister for War, has been awarded the Order of Humayun.

Internal Security.

Fars.

17. An additional battalion of infantry and four mountain guns have reached Shiraz from Tehran. The situation as regards Nasir Qashgai remains as it was. There were two hold-ups of lorries between Kazerun and Shiraz early in December. The robbers were pursued by the gendarmerie and the robbed goods recovered. More activity is being shown by the Persian forces on the road, but in Tangistan there is still lawlessness and insecurity.

Khorassan.

18. Villages south and east of Meshed are suffering much from the depredations of small armed bands who are too mobile to be dealt with effectively by the gendarmerie. After six weeks without incident, the main road between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari was raided early in December and 80,000 rials carried off from eight lorries. Further south, some 50 miles from Zahidan, raiders from Afghanistan carried off some twenty-five cases of tea from a convoy.

Russian Affairs.

19. The Soviet authorities in Tabriz have asked the local A.I.O.C. agent to provide them with 5,000 empty petrol tins for packing meat for despatch to the Caucasus.

20. The Russian garrison at Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam (see Summary No. 48/42, paragraph 15) is now reported to have been increased to a strength of 500.

21. Supplies for Russia are again reaching Zahidan from India.

Tehran, December 15, 1942.

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 5796/207/89]

No. 51.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 1.)
(No. 544.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, September 30, 1942.

POLITICAL activity is slight and there has been no significant change in the situation. There is a more confident outlook regarding the supply position, but the present rate for cereal collections is still behind what is necessary to produce adequate reserves for the coming months.

2. A tour which I made of the principal wheat-collecting centres has proved very useful. My reception was cordial throughout.

3. Ceremonies were held at Damascus and Aleppo on 27th September to celebrate the first anniversary of the declaration of independence. In Damascus the Syrian President made a speech thanking the Fighting French and Great Britain for their generosity towards their country, whose independence, he said, was already complete and effected subject only to limitations imposed by the war. It is reported he had intended to take this opportunity of countering General de Gaulle's recent declarations regarding the continuance of the mandate, but that he was eventually induced by the French authorities not to do so. General Catroux in his reply appealed for Syrian confidence in France.

4. The Syrian Prime Minister was absent from these celebrations because he objected to a censorship of the President's speech.

5. The Christian opposition to the Lebanese Prime Minister is increasing and his relations with the French are far from cordial.

6. Enemy parachutists caught in civilian clothing in Aleppo area have been shot after trial by French court.

7. General Moncoar, Fighting French Délégué in Alaouite territory, has been replaced by Colonel des Essars from Homs, who has always been most co-operative with the British authorities.

8. There is no change to report from tribal areas, which are outwardly calm, apart from insignificant inter-tribal bickerings. No frontier incidents are reported.

9. Press has confined itself mainly to reproducing official news items and communiqués. Local comment is very restricted, but reflects more optimism regarding the supply situation.

10. The enemy broadcasts have laid particular stress on the attack on British convoy to Russia, but have produced no new themes of general interest.

[E 6018/207/89]

No. 52.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 14.)
(No. 574.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, October 14, 1942.

THERE is no appreciable change in the situation, which is still sufficiently stable to enable those in office successfully to withstand the intrigues of their opponents.

2. Relations between the Syrian Prime Minister and the President have now somewhat improved, but his position continues to be insecure. This is giving me much concern, as his dismissal at the present time might jeopardise the success of the wheat scheme. In Lebanon, where the possibility of election is again being discussed freely, French desire to get rid of the too independent Samisoh is becoming increasingly plain.

3. The supply situation is, on the whole, satisfactory, although lack of proper control of distribution is giving rise to some anxiety as regards the future. The rate of cereal collections continues to show a downward trend as resistance to distribution cost of wheat scheme becomes increasingly stubborn. The arrest of and internment of prominent offenders has become a matter of most urgent necessity, and it is hoped that reluctance of Fighting French authorities to this is on the point of being overcome.

[E 5922/207/89]

No. 53.

Weekly Political Summary No. 27, Syria and the Lebanon, October 7, 1942.—
(Received in Foreign Office, October 20.)

1. General.

The political calm of the last few weeks continues, but there are signs of the imminence of Cabinet changes in both States. Reports indicate that in Syria as a whole the Independence Day celebrations aroused little interest. The war seems very remote, its only repercussions being the high prices ruling and the shortage of certain non-essential commodities.

There is a general admiration for the Russian resistance in the Caucasus and a more favourable feeling towards the Allies.

2. Syria.

Damascus.—Tension between the President and the Prime Minister is growing. The main reason for it is probably jealousy: Husni Bey is alleged to be making considerable sums out of his position on the Wheat Board by organised smuggling from his own district of Homs and Hama into the Lebanon. However that may be, it is a fact that the President is working up the other Ministers against Husni Bey. They and the President affect to be outraged at his corruption and shocked at his failure to extract wheat from his landowning friends. They also say that he is unable to run the Council of Ministers. This last charge is a matter of some surprise, for the British representatives on the Wheat Scheme describe him as an unusually good chairman.

The Prime Minister's ostentatious absence from the Independence Day ceremonies (see last week's Summary), which was a criticism of the French and a rebuke to the President, has naturally united them both against him. Both accuse him of having made this gesture to bolster up his position, which he recognises to be insecure, and save his face should he disappear from office.

The publication, over the signatures of thirty-nine ex-Deputies, of a declaration praising Sheikh Taj-ed-Din for his wise conduct of public affairs and his disinterested concern in the welfare of the people may strengthen the President's position. Husni Barazi was not one of the signatories. It is understood that an attempt may be made to get rid of him quite soon; and this possibility is being watched, as it might have some effect on the Wheat Scheme.

The recent improvement in the supply situation has been maintained, although complaints as to the quality of bread are again being voiced.

Wheat collections from the Damascus area are very low, but purchases from the Hauran remain satisfactory.

3. Aleppo.

Independence Day (the 27th September) was celebrated in Aleppo by a reception at the Sérail, during which His Majesty's Minister visited the Mohafez. This visit is understood to have been much appreciated even by those Nationalists and others who, in order to show their discontent with the present Government and their disappointment at its failure to achieve a fuller measure of independence, absented themselves from the ceremony. Other notable absentees were the Turkish and Iraqi Consuls.

The Mohafez, Abdul Latif Bey Chanti, has been injured in a car accident while on his way to Damascus, and is likely to be away from duty for some time to come. This is unfortunate as he has proved himself very sound and has been most co-operative with both British and French officials.

The prompt execution of five enemy parachutists on the 26th September (reported in last week's Summary) has made a good impression. In the past many death sentences here have been subsequently reduced to imprisonment, and this show of speedy retribution was specially useful.

On the 1st October the bakeries tried to refuse the sale of bread to those without ration cards. This reminder of the necessity for cards was overdue, but it was not possible to enforce it fully as large crowds collected and at least one fatal casualty occurred. The system is, however, necessary in order to check duplication and other waste.

4. Homs and Hama.

In the absence of the Political Officer no detailed reports have been received from this area.

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5. *Jebel Druze.*

The first anniversary of Independence Day was celebrated in Soneida by a parade on the racecourse and speeches by the Délégué, the Emir Hassan and the Political Officer at the Sérail. Little interest was taken in the proceedings, a crowd of only some 300 assembling.

It is reported that on the 28th September over eighty camels were seized from the Messaid tribe by soldiers of the Trans-Jordan frontier post of Umm el Kotein. The incident is almost certainly a reprisal for raids made in the past by inhabitants of the Jebel, though possibly not by the Messaid. The incident has caused some excitement, and much sympathy is being expressed for the Messaid by the Druzes.

Following a short visit of the Emira to Soneida there has been a fresh outburst of complaints, none of them new, from the Atrash family against the French. It is reported that the Halabi family has lately been showing more political activity—this possibly because it sees its opportunity in the internal disputes of the Turshan, which have recently been so much in evidence.

The wheat position is satisfactory, and purchases would be even better were the transport facilities greater.

6. *Alaouite Territory.*

A letter from the head of the American Mission in Lattakia confirms the many previous reports which have been received here concerning conditions in the Alaouite territory, and makes it clear that Suleiman Murshid has long been a potential menace to security in this area. Cases of pillage and robbery are cited, and the writer asks for action to protect persons who have been expelled from their villages and seem likely to become a burden to the American Red Cross.

It has been arranged, in agreement with General Catroux, that the Political Officer at Homs shall be transferred to Lattakia, where Colonel des Essars, recently Délégué at Homs, has already been posted. It is hoped that this combination, which has worked so well at Homs, will be able to settle the many difficulties that have arisen in this area, principally in connexion with the activities of Suleiman Murshid. This notable has recently been reprimanded by the Syrian President and forced to return some of the lands he had stolen, and he is therefore in a chastened and more amenable mood.

7. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

There are indications that, as a result of His Majesty's Minister's recent visit to this province, local grain-holders are beginning to feel uneasy. His Majesty's representative's emphasis upon Anglo-French determination to take drastic action against the opponents of the wheat scheme has not been lost upon the population, and the French Délégué Adjoint has referred to the visit in his bulletin as a political event of real importance.

The Free French Délégué reports that fifty-one rifles and twenty-five rounds of ammunition for each rifle are on their way to Hassetché for distribution to the Assyrian villages on the Khabour. Thirty-nine unserviceable weapons are to be collected and exchanged. Distribution will be made under British supervision.

8. *Tribal.*

The Ramadan lull in tribal affairs continues, and most of the incidents of which reports have come in date from before the last new moon.

From the Jezireh come reports of minor raids and counter-raids between the nomads and semi-sedentary tribes, which are likely to continue until the nomads leave on their winter migration.

Daham el Hadi continues his efforts to collect the equivalent of "Khawa" or tax on road work in his area. An R.E. officer from Mosul has reported that work has been stopped for several days on the Tell Kotchek-Kamishlie road owing to a dispute between Daham and the contractor Daoud Hanna. The Délégué Adjoint, Deir ez Zor, reports that Daham has claimed the right to impose his own guards and fix the sites for tents, and further demands a tax of 25 piastres per workman and 100 piastres per cubic metre of stone quarried. The Délégué has summoned Daham to Deir ez Zor and has warned him that, if he insists upon his demands, he will lose the price that it had been agreed to pay him for stone from his quarries.

Considerable anxiety and alarm is reported among the semi-sedentary tribes near Abu Kemal at the concentration of Iraqi Shammar on the other side of the

frontier. No incident is yet reported, but news of a raiding party of Shammar in the neighbourhood of Umm Ghreiba caused the Agaidat nearby to round up their flocks and bring them into their villages.

9. *Frontier.*

East.—On the 1st October the Turkish Vali of Aintab, Burhanettin Teker, came over to Azaz to discuss certain incidents with the French Délégué. The most important one was the continued retention in Turkey of a Syrian garde mobile, who, it is claimed, was actually seized by the Turks when inside his own frontier. The Azaz-Killis road, which has been closed for three weeks on this side, was reopened before the meeting as a friendly gesture. The Vali, who seemed to the Free French Délégué to be an able and sincere man, could only hold out hopes that the garde mobile would be released very shortly, claiming that it was beyond his powers to promise this release because the case had been passed to the Ministry of Justice.

Other grievances that have occurred in the turbulent Jebel Akrad were ventilated by both parties, and it was arranged to hold meetings every month or so. This was the first one of its kind for four and a half years, though direct contact with the neighbouring Vali of Antioch was re-established this summer (see Summary No. 15 of the 15th July).

West.—Nothing to report.

10. *The Lebanon.*

General Catroux is understood to have informed President Naccache in writing that he is not prepared at this stage to accede to Sami Bey Solh's demand for the handing over of the Funds of Common Interest to the Lebanese Government. He bases his refusal on the arguments (a) that not all nations have recognised the Lebanon as an independent State, and (b) that the 1936 Franco-Lebanese Treaty envisaged a three-year period of transition, during which the various services would have gradually been handed over by the mandatory authorities to the States' Governments, and that, in the case of the Lebanon, this period should be considered as running from the proclamation of Lebanese independence on the 26th November, 1941.

Sami Bey Solh has continued to act rapidly and impulsively in various branches of the Administration, and has annoyed each of his colleagues in turn by failing to consult them in matters concerning their departments before taking decisions. He is surrounded by a clique of Moslems on whose advice he acts and to whom he grants privileges. By this negation of ordinary departmental routine he is naturally playing into the hands of the French, Christian and Moslem elements, who are awaiting their chance to unseat him. The conviction is growing that, unless he radically changes his methods, he will not last long in his present position.

The Lebanese supply services are intending to reorganise the system of distribution of flour to the population, which is most unsatisfactory, but have now postponed the initiation of this measure until the 1st November. There is much discontent at the working of the present system, but no serious agitation, as it is generally felt that the supply position is for the present satisfactory. The more far-sighted elements have, however, the uneasy conviction that the supply services are squandering the wheat received from the O.C.P. at too great a rate, and that these supplies will therefore come to an end some months before next harvest. A distribution of 1 kilog. of sugar and 1 kilog. of rice is being made for the month of October. A Family Allowances Bill is also reported by the press to have been promulgated with effect from the 1st October.

Another camp for Greek refugees has had to be established near Tripoli, consequent on the temporary closing of the Aleppo camp on account of a small outbreak of smallpox. It is hoped shortly to move 500 of the refugees from Souk el Gharb to Egypt. By this means a regular flow of refugees from Turkey will be maintained. The discipline and hygiene of the Souk el Gharb camp have of late left much to be desired, and it has been necessary to arrest and intern seventeen Greeks thought to be responsible for promoting disorder.

[E 6175/207/89]

No. 54.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 596.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, October 21, 1942.

WEEKLY summary.

The political situation remains outwardly calm. The position of the Syrian Prime Minister has slightly improved, but that of the Lebanese Prime Minister continues to deteriorate, and he is reported to be on the verge of resignation. Shukri Kuwatli remains in the background, and Jamil Mardam will shortly be allowed to return to Damascus by agreement between General Catroux and myself.

2. The Fighting French have now at last agreed to arrest certain wheat hoarders, but none of these is of any real importance, with the exception of Sheikh Daham el Hadi, head of Syrian Shammar.

3. See my telegram No. 583 to Foreign Office, repeated to Minister of State, telegram No. 410.

4. Three important sheikhs have resigned the leadership of their tribes owing to disputes with the authorities over wheat.

5. Commandant Blondel, hitherto Deputy Inspector of S.S. at Beirut, has been appointed Fighting French Delegate at Homs in place of Colonel des Boltse, recently transferred to Lattakia.

6. Press continues a bitter campaign against the food hoarders and reflects widespread dissatisfaction with present organisation of *ravitaillement* services.

7. Axis wireless propaganda has been especially violent against Syrian Minister of Youth and Propaganda.

[E 6344/207/89]

No. 55.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 610.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, October 28, 1942.

WEEKLY summary.

There has been some improvement in the position of Lebanon Prime Minister, whose resignation is now considered less likely. There is also less expectation in Syrian circles of early dismissal of Husni Barhza, and on this account Government seems reluctant to assume responsibility while so many delicate problems remain to be solved.

2. Number of cases of smallpox recently reported has caused some local anxiety. Supplies of vaccine have been made available by British authorities and vaccination has been declared compulsory.

3. A decree has been published restricting the use of private cars as from 23rd November.

4. Operations of Cereals Commission continue to be hampered owing to the delay in implementing policy of arrests. Five traders and merchants in Aleppo and Jezireh areas have been arrested, but the most important offenders are still unaffected. The arrest of Daham-el-Hada is still in doubt despite definite promise given to me by General Catroux that it would be carried out. I hope, however, shortly to obtain arrest of this sheikh and other important offenders.

5. There has been recrudescence of minor tribal incidents, which have, however, remained localised and in most cases have already been settled.

[E 6493/207/89]

No. 56.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 622.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, November 4, 1942.

WEEKLY summary.

The implementation of policy of arrests for obstructing wheat plan is a major event which has ousted all other political activity from the public mind. The widest possible publicity has been given to these arrests, which have demonstrated to the population that the authorities are now determined to deal effectively with those who have hitherto been able to flout the law. Nine persons in all have been deported, including Sheikh Daham-el-Hadi, and further arrests

are imminent (see my telegram No. 433 to Minister of State, Cairo, repeated as telegram No. 611 to Foreign Office). Position is not, however, yet completely satisfactory, as certain of the individuals arrested were not included in the original list of offenders agreed between British and Fighting French authorities and none, with the exception of Daham-el-Hadi, is of first-rate importance.

2. Tours of wheat-growing areas which have been carried out by Syrian Prime Minister and General Catroux have further strengthened the impression that the authorities are determined to enforce the wheat scheme.

[E 6823/207/89]

No. 57.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 655.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, November 18, 1942.

WEEKLY summary.

The excitement aroused by events in Egypt and North Africa has somewhat subsided and the markets have recovered. Wholesale prices have rallied approximately 10 per cent, and the gold pound is now, after some fluctuation, steady at Syrian pounds 38.50.

2. Enthusiasm of the Fighting French, at first whole-hearted, has been greatly damped by the news of the position accorded to Darlan.

3. Continual rise in already high cost of living, due to unchecked speculation, is giving rise to some anxiety and Governments of both States are being urged to increase taxation in order to restrict the effect of the present abundance of capital on prices of commodities.

4. An apparent reconciliation has taken place between Maronite Patriarch and Lebanese President and the Government, but it is not expected to be of long duration owing to excessive demands, including the appointment of a second Maronite Minister, put forward by the Patriarch as price of his support of the Government.

5. The cereal collections show a slight upward trend, and it is clear that recent arrests have had a considerable effect.

[E 6632/207/89]

No. 58.

Weekly Political Summary No. 32, Syria and the Lebanon, November 11.—(Received in Foreign Office November 23, 1942.)

General.

The successes of the Eighth Army and the operations in French North Africa have revolutionised public opinion concerning the course of the war, and have aroused an optimism as exaggerated as the pessimism which followed our reverses in June of this year.

There has already been a marked change in the sentiments of those elements, mainly Moslem, which still admired the Nazis for their military strength; and the prospect of freeing the Mediterranean for convoys has immediately raised hopes of an improvement in the local economic situation.

This changed outlook has had a very noticeable effect on the markets in all the main centres; in Beirut, wholesale prices have fallen 20 per cent., and the gold pound, which was quoted at £S. 44 on the 22nd October, is now being offered at £S. 36.

In certain Nationalist circles the new situation is seen to have political as well as military and economic implications; and it is hoped that, if the bulk of the French fleet and the whole of French North Africa fall into Allied hands (preferably after sufficient resistance to cause irritation), British policy towards the French in this country may become less conciliatory.

The Presidents of both States have made declarations to the press congratulating the Eighth Army on its victory; the Syrian President expressing the hope that all Arab and Moslem countries at present under Axis domination might soon be freed and achieve the calm and prosperity enjoyed by the Levant States, thanks to Free France and Great Britain.

Wheat.

Although two further arrests have been made, it is difficult to say with accuracy whether the recent slight improvement in collections of cereals is due to these arrests or merely to an improvement of the weather and, consequently, of road and transport conditions, enabling deliveries hitherto held up to be made.

It is intended to make further arrests of wheat hoarders, and news that this is the agreed Anglo-French policy will doubtless have a certain stimulating effect on these people.

A Technical Committee has been inaugurated by the O.C.P. to study the seed-wheat problem, and at a recent meeting requirements of 3,000 tons for the Lebanon and 14,000 tons for Syria and the Alaouite Territory were approved and recommended for purchase and distribution by the O.C.P., either against exchange or cash. In nearly all cases these purchases will be for local sales, and will involve little transport, except for the seed required by the Lebanon, which is to come from the Hauran and from Homs and Hama. The allowance is generous, but it is better to err on the safe side than to risk a reduction in the cultivated area next year.

In the Lebanon, where definite and approved lists are available of growers needing seed, and fairly good machinery for distributing it (the Office des Semences), distribution is reported to have begun. In Syria precise lists are lacking and the machinery for distribution is unsatisfactory. The attention of the O.C.P. and the Syrian Department of Agriculture has been drawn to this urgent and important matter.

Syria: Damascus.

The general political situation remains calm, local affairs arousing but little interest in view of the news from Egypt and North Africa.

Aleppo.

Political activity is practically at a standstill, as it has become apparent that the late breach between the Syrian Prime Minister and the President has been at least temporarily healed, and that there is therefore little likelihood at present of local politicians being called upon to take office.

Homs and Hama.

Despite the effect produced on the minds of the population by the events of the last few days, there is still considerable pre-occupation with the wheat question. In Hama a short strike has occurred owing to the reduction by the municipality of the monthly wheat ration from 12 to 10 kilog. per head, and much discontent has also been caused by the despatch of wheat to the Lebanon.

Wheat collections in this area have increased following the recent arrest of hoarders in the Jezireh and of two members of a well-known Hama family.

An arms raid carried out in the village of Fairouze revealed a house equipped for the repair and construction of small arms and ammunition. The occupier was arrested.

Jebel Druze.

A general feeling of instability continues, although the impression made by events in Egypt has had the salutary effect of distracting attention from the local squabbles of the Atrash and their rivals. An official letter of congratulation on the success of the Eighth Army has been received by the political officer from Hamid Bek Jerbua, the chief religious judge of Soueida.

Alaouite Territory.

Following a tour of the area, the new Fighting French délégué has recommended a number of excellent administrative changes, including the replacement of all the kaïmakams in the territory. In addition, six S.S.Os. are either to be moved to other districts or replaced altogether. The president of the Municipality of Lattakia is to go, and Colonel Tombe, the head of the gendarmerie, has already been dismissed. This latter change, which is the only one so far made public, has made a profound impression, since the colonel was a close friend and supporter of Suleiman Murshid. When the latter complained to the délégué about Colonel Tombe's removal he was told that his complaint should be addressed to the Syrian Government, as he (Murshid) held no official position in the Administration.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

There is no political activity to report, and local reactions to recent events are not yet known. The strenuous efforts made to obtain wheat from this area, described in last week's summary, have had gratifying results in the Euphrates Province, where purchases are mounting steadily, but the Jezireh is still well behind.

Tribal.

A start towards winter quarters has now been made by the Muwali, Hadidiyin, Feda'an, Sba'a Ebeida, Sba'a Bteinat, Amarat and Ruwallah, but no great distances have yet been covered. Precautions are being taken to shepherd those tribes who are likely to quarrel with one another, and so far no incidents have been reported.

The Lebanon.

Lebanese politics, already quiescent, have been relegated to the background of public interest by the Eighth Army's victory and the news of the operations in French North Africa. The far-reaching implications of these events are fully realised, but their practical, as opposed to their psychological, repercussions have not yet made themselves felt in political activity.

The Lebanese Prime Minister, in conversation with the Political Officer on the 5th November, expressed considerable optimism and self-satisfaction as regards his own position, as he felt that he had successfully handled both the French and the Christians and that local feelings towards him, as well as towards the Allies, were now very much better than when he took office. It is certainly true that Sami Bey Solh has succeeded in patching up relations with his Ministers and with the President, and has gone some way towards conciliating the French by making a show of co-operation with them. There is, however, a danger that he will fall into the opposite error of alienating the Moslems, who are his chief supporters, by failing to display a sufficiently "independent" spirit. His surrender to unjustified French exigencies in certain matters of purely internal concern, though admittedly dictated merely by a desire to appease them, has already been criticised in local circles.

After many months of discussion, a decree imposing a war profits tax was finally signed and published on the 7th November. By British standards it is an extremely lenient measure, but will nevertheless be fought tooth and nail by local profiteers, and the tax will probably prove extremely difficult to collect in a country where so many merchants do not keep regular books.

The smallpox epidemic appears to have been mastered in the Lebanon, thanks to the energetic measures taken by the Minister of Health, which have resulted in a large portion of the population being vaccinated and reported cases being promptly isolated. The Minister has expressed gratitude for the co-operation he has received from the British military authorities in regard to the supply of vaccine from Palestine and elsewhere.

Shortage of shipping is likely to restrict the number of pilgrims leaving the Levant States for Mecca, but the assistance given by the Allied authorities has been appreciated in Moslem circles, and the number of applications received shows a satisfactory confidence in the capacity of the Allies to ensure a safe passage, particularly in the Red Sea between Suez and Jeddah.

Wheat collections have now virtually ceased in the Lebanon, and interest centres rather on the capacity of the Lebanese Supplies Department to ensure an equitable distribution amongst the population of the grain received from the O.C.P.

Press and Propaganda.

Leaflets announcing Allied successes in North Africa were dropped over Syrian and Lebanese towns during the week. On the first occasion 120,000 leaflets containing news of the break-through of the Eighth Army and giving lists of enemy casualties were dropped over Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Damascus, Aleppo, Lattakia, Homs and Hama. Later 250,000 leaflets giving further news of operations in French North Africa were dropped over the same towns.

These events in North Africa also dwarfed all other news in the papers. The arrest of the wheat hoarders gave rise to several articles praising this firm action on the part of the Allied authorities and asking that similar severe measures might be imposed on other delinquents.

Enemy wireless propaganda has been very subdued on the subject of operations in Egypt, and, although the Germans came out with a few ingenious explanations for Rommel's retreat, the enemy on the whole has fallen back on his favourite topic of calling down curses on the heads of the Jews.

Anglo-French Relations in the Levant States.

DURING the course of General de Gaulle's visit to the Levant States last summer a number of difficulties arose which proved impossible of solution on the spot, and the Prime Minister consequently asked him to return to London for discussion. A meeting between General de Gaulle, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary took place on the evening of the 30th September, at which General de Gaulle showed himself to be in one of his most unreasonable moods, and the conversation finished on the note that he had no suggestions to make for the settlement of outstanding questions in the Levant. At this point an effort was made by M. Dejean, the Commissaire for Foreign Affairs of the French National Committee, to find a way out of the *impasse*, and on the 5th October he forwarded to Sir M. Peterson an aide-mémoire (see enclosure 1) putting forward the following concrete proposals as a basis of negotiation:—

- (1) The Fighting French would agree to a declaration being made before the end of the year that elections would be held in Syria and the Lebanon by the spring.
- (2) The Fighting French would abandon their claim to assume command of the Allied troops in the Levant. Any further point they might raise under this head would refer to their desire to group local French forces under an unified local command.
- (3) A joint Franco-British committee should be formed in London to consider difficulties for which no solution could be found locally.

These proposals were accepted in a letter of the 8th October from Sir M. Peterson (see enclosure 2), who in a subsequent letter of the 17th October indicated the appropriate British membership of the Franco-British military committee charged with the task of pronouncing on the feasibility of elections being held in the Levant States.

To round off the arrangement it was at first proposed that there should be an agreed definition of the basis upon which Anglo-French collaboration should be carried out in the Levant States. The formula was to be interpretative of existing agreements and would in practice form the terms of reference of the joint Franco-British committee to be formed in London. The draft of such an interpretative document (see enclosure 3) had been agreed between M. Dejean and Sir M. Peterson, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government and the French National Committee, when on the 17th October General de Gaulle dismissed M. Dejean. Thereafter it appeared that General de Gaulle wished to make some radical changes in the interpretative formula, and after some discussion M. Helleu, who had been designated as the head of the French delegation to the proposed London committee, on the 4th November put forward a counter-draft (see enclosure 4). On the 12th November M. Helleu was informed that the new document was unacceptable and that it seemed to us preferable to abandon the attempt to negotiate an interpretative agreement and to fall back on the letters exchanged between Sir M. Peterson and M. Dejean on the 5th and 8th October (see enclosures 1 and 2).

In a letter of the 26th November the French National Committee accepted this suggestion, and the London Joint Committee will meet henceforward as and when occasion may arise.

Foreign Office,
November 26, 1942.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

*Aide-mémoire.*1. *Elections en Syrie et au Liban.*

Le Comité National Français envisage que les élections soient annoncées avant la fin de l'année pour le printemps prochain.

Le Comité National comprend tout l'intérêt politique qui s'attache à ce que cette annonce ne soit accompagnée de l'énonciation d'aucune condition, et traduise une décision bien arrêtée.

Dans l'accord intervenu au mois de juillet entre Mr. Casey et le Général Catroux, les élections avaient été envisagées à la double condition:

- (a) que soit assuré le ravitaillement en blé de la Syrie et du Liban;
- (b) que la menace militaire sur le Levant soit écartée.

D'après les renseignements parvenus au Comité National, la première condition est aujourd'hui remplie.

Pour ce qui est de la seconde, il va de soi que la situation militaire demeure un facteur dont Britanniques et Français ont un égal intérêt à tenir compte.

Un Comité militaire, composé du Général Catroux, du Général commandant la IX^e Armée et du Général commandant la VIII^e Armée, pourrait être invité à constater, le moment venu, que la situation militaire permet une période de calme suffisamment longue pour qu'une campagne électorale ne puisse compromettre la sécurité des États du Levant et des Forces alliées qui y sont stationnées.

2. *Commandement.*

En ce qui concerne la question du Commandement au Levant, le Commandant en Chef des Forces Françaises Libres désirerait surtout voir rassembler sous un même commandement français les unités françaises stationnées au Levant et qui, à l'heure actuelle, seraient quelque peu dispersées.

Ce point ferait actuellement l'objet d'un échange de vues entre le Général Alexander et le Général Catroux. La question du Commandement, telle qu'elle avait été soulevée par le télégramme du Général Catroux à Mr. Casey, en date du 1^{er} septembre 1942, ne se pose donc plus.

3. *Commission mixte.*

Les autres questions litigieuses pourraient être confiées à la Commission mixte mentionnée dans le projet d'accord (2^e ébauche) remis à Mr. Peake le 5 octobre pour communication au Foreign Office, si toutefois le Gouvernement britannique se rangeait à l'idée de constituer une pareille commission.

Dans ce cas, la délégation française comprendrait: M. Helleu, ancien Ambassadeur à Ankara, autrefois Secrétaire général du Haut-Commissariat de la République française au Levant; M. Grandin de l'Eprevier et M. Bonneau.

La commission pourrait s'adjoindre, selon les besoins, des collaborateurs appartenant aux divers départements techniques.

Londres, le 5 octobre 1942.

Sir M. Peterson to M. Dejean.

THANK you for your letter of the 5th October, enclosing an aide-mémoire setting out the three points concerning elections, command and the joint committee, which you had raised with Sir Orme Sargent and myself during the course of our talks on the subject of the Middle East.

In taking note of the attitude of the French National Committee on these three questions, as set out in the aide-mémoire, I should like to take this opportunity of confirming, so far as the question of elections is concerned, the agreement reached between Mr. Casey and General Catroux during their discussions last summer. According to this agreement, General Catroux would issue a preliminary statement in general terms announcing a return to democratic institutions. This would be followed by an announcement by the heads of the two States that elections would be held by a definite date. Thereafter the Governments would prepare electoral rolls. Provided that the military situation allowed, the date of the elections would then be announced and the elections would be held after the statutory period had elapsed, *i.e.*, after twenty-one days in the case of Syria and after fifteen days in the case of the Lebanon. Finally, once the date of elections has been announced, reconstruction of the Governments in the two States would probably have to take place. The actual dates for these various steps which had been agreed last summer between Mr. Casey and General Catroux

will, of course, have to be modified, it being understood that the announcement of elections will now be made before the end of the year and the whole programme completed by the spring. Such questions and any other modifications of detail can, we presume, be safely left for arrangement between the British and French authorities on the spot.

MAURICE PETERSON.

October 8, 1942.

Enclosure 3 in No. 59.

THE Government of the United Kingdom and the French National Committee, being determined to win the war side by side and to subordinate all other considerations to this end, and resolving to confirm for the present and to safeguard for the future the ties of friendship between the British and French peoples, have decided to maintain the closest collaboration in all the spheres of common interest in the Middle East.

In order to dispel certain misunderstandings which have arisen between them in that area, the two parties are agreed on the subjoined definition of the basis upon which their collaboration is to be carried on. This definition is not to be regarded as superseding the various agreements existing between the two parties, but as an interpretation designed to render unnecessary the revision of these existing agreements.

1. The Government of the United Kingdom confirm that they do not dispute the predominant and privileged position of France in the Levant States, on the understanding that due regard is paid to the development of the independence of these States, which is contemplated in the mandate and is in conformity with the spirit of the mandate.

2. In view of the identical military interests of the two parties in the Middle East during the war, and of the imperative need for harmonising their respective policies in that area, the French National Committee, being anxious to promote the growth of the Syrian and Lebanese States on the basis of the Proclamations of Independence of 27th September and 26th November, 1941, declare, for their part, that they appreciate the interest which the Government of the United Kingdom have in the development of the independent Levant States in the conditions which are specified in paragraph 1 of the present agreement, and also in so far as this development has a bearing upon the position and the general interests of the Government of the United Kingdom in the Middle East.

3. The Government of the United Kingdom recognise that the situation in the Middle East area as a whole is of interest to the French National Committee to the extent that it may affect the situation in the Levant States and in view of the general interest of France in this area.

4. The French National Committee recognise the necessity, for the purpose of the prosecution of the war, of treating the Middle East area as a whole, not only in military matters, but also in economic and financial matters, including questions of supply and man-power. Having regard to the predominant rôle of the United Kingdom in the prosecution of the war in the Middle East area, the competent authorities of Fighting France will keep the British authorities informed in advance of all developments in these various spheres, which, together with the maintenance of security and public order, are of importance for the prosecution of the war. Further, they will pay the fullest attention and attach the greatest weight to requests which the competent British authorities may make to them in matters of this kind.

5. On their side the competent British authorities are ready to furnish information of the same nature as well as to receive and to treat in the same manner requests which the competent authorities of Fighting France may make to the British authorities relating to the participation of the Levant States and of Fighting France in the war effort in the Middle East.

6. With a view to facilitating good relations and full collaboration between their local authorities, the Government of the United Kingdom and the French National Committee agree to entrust a mixed Franco-British Commission sitting in London with the task of examining problems of mutual interest concerning the Middle East area, which both parties consider suitable for such examination,

more especially such problems as affect the Levant States and have led to difficulties between the local authorities of the two parties. The constitution of this commission shall not be regarded as preventing the creation of similar mixed committees in the Middle East where the parties concerned think this procedure convenient.

Enclosure 4 in No. 59.

Projet d'Accord au sujet de la Syrie.

LE Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et le Comité National Français, animés de la volonté de gagner la guerre en commun, résolus à affirmer pour le présent et à sauvegarder pour l'avenir les liens d'amitié entre les nations britannique et française, sont décidés à maintenir la collaboration la plus étroite dans la zone du Proche-Orient.

En vue de dissiper certains malentendus qui se sont élevés entre elles dans cette région, les deux parties ont convenu de définir comme suit la base sur laquelle la collaboration sera poursuivie.

Cette définition ne doit pas être considérée comme se substituant aux divers accords existant entre les deux parties, mais comme une interprétation destinée à rendre inutile la révision des accords existants.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni confirme qu'il ne conteste pas la position prédominante et privilégiée de la France dans les Etats du Levant, compte tenu du développement de l'indépendance de ces Etats prévu par le Mandat et conforme à l'esprit du Mandat dont le Comité National Français continue à assumer les obligations au nom de la France.

En considération du rôle prédominant que la Grande-Bretagne exerce dans la conduite de la guerre dans l'ensemble du Proche-Orient, les autorités compétentes de la France Combattante sont disposées à tenir les autorités britanniques informées en temps utile des développements d'ordre militaire, économique, financier ou concernant le maintien de la sécurité et de l'ordre publics dans les Etats du Levant, qui présenteraient de l'importance pour la conduite de la guerre. En outre, elles considéreront avec le plus grand soin les demandes qui viendraient à leur être soumises par les autorités britanniques en corrélation avec les concours nécessaires apportés par ces autorités dans les mêmes domaines aux pays du Levant dans l'intérêt de la guerre.

De leur côté, les autorités britanniques compétentes sont prêtes à fournir des informations de même nature ainsi qu'à accueillir et à traiter dans le même esprit les demandes que les autorités de la France Combattante pourront présenter aux autorités britanniques concernant la participation de la France Combattante et des Etats du Levant à l'effort de guerre dans le Proche-Orient.

En vue de faciliter les bons rapports et la collaboration complète entre leurs autorités, le Comité National Français et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sont d'accord pour confier à une Commission mixte franco-britannique, siégeant à Londres, l'examen des problèmes d'intérêt commun concernant le Proche-Orient que les deux parties considéreront devoir faire l'objet d'un tel examen, notamment ceux qui n'auraient pas pu être réglés directement sur place.

4 novembre 1942.

[E 6971/207/89]

No. 60.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 674.)

(Telegraphic.)

WEEKLY summary.

Beirut, November 25, 1942.

Local enthusiasm for victories in Africa has somewhat abated and, despite President Roosevelt's explanations, Fighting French remain despondent at Darlan's emergence as titular head of French North and West Africa.

2. Mr. George Wadsworth, newly appointed Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General of United States, has presented his letters credentials to Lebanese President.

3. First contingent of Assyrian and Lebanese pilgrims has left for Suez and efforts are being made to arrange for a further sailing early in December.

4. There has been no marked increase in collection of wheat owing to bad weather. No further arrests have yet been made.

[E 7206/207/89]

No. 61.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 691.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, December 9, 1942.

WEEK'S summary.

There is little of political importance to report, though there is renewed talk of elections in Lebanon and in Syria resentment at the Government's failure to check continuation of rise in the cost of living is increasing. In the absence of sensational news, the former apathy of the population towards the war is returning.

2. Scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon has been used with effect as propaganda by the Fighting French. The Presidents of both States have sent telegrams of sympathy to General de Gaulle.

3. With a view to check extravagant *ravitaillement*, the O.C.P. is taking a census in Syria. The result for Damascus was highly satisfactory. The population was found to be 260,000 instead of 345,100 as alleged. Cereal supplies were immediately cut in consequence, and by the 1st January will be reduced by 120 tons to 80 tons daily. A similar census will be taken in the Lebanon in the near future.

4. Fighting French press and wireless campaign against Darlan has increased in bitterness.

[E 7378/207/89]

No. 62.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 704.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, December 16, 1942.

WEEKLY summary.

Anxiety over unsatisfactory economic situation continues and is reflected in minor strikes and threatened demonstrations in Damascus and Aleppo, but there are as yet no signs of any general movement of dissatisfaction likely to endanger public security.

2. Cost of living is expected to increase still further following the issue of a decree permitting rents to be increased from 30 to 60 per cent.

3. Syrian Prime Minister has apologised to the President for his recent speech and the two are again outwardly reconciled.

4. A further 450 pilgrims have left Damascus for Mecca.

5. Figures for cereal collection still remain low but steady.

[E 7099/207/89]

No. 63.

Weekly Political Summary No. 35, Syria and the Lebanon, December 2, 1942.—(Received December 18.)

General.

THE Minister of State, accompanied by Mrs. Casey and Mr. Hopkinson, visited the Levant States during the week-end of 27th–30th November. After two nights as guests of His Majesty's Minister in Beirut, where he met the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and General de Larminat, he flew via Aleppo and Deir-az-Zor to Damascus, where he met the Syrian President, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and General Collet. This visit gave great pleasure to the two Governments.

French opinion is still thoroughly resentful at political events in North Africa. The press continues to attack Darlan, while paying tribute to the fleet's action at Toulon. The first reaction of Syrian and Lebanese opinion was to hope that differences between Darlan and de Gaulle would result in a weakening of French influence in the Levant States, but this appears to have faded out.

The steady rise of the cost of living in both Syria and the Lebanon is a perpetual source of discussion. The various palliatives proposed by the Lebanese Administration have so far had no effect, as was to be expected of the present inefficient executive.

Wheat.

Cereal collection continues, but the rate of inflow remains disappointingly low. Transport has become a pressing problem, and is hampering the collection of grain to a great extent. Every effort is being made to find a solution in the near future. The supply from abroad of a number of motor lorries is being expedited by the Middle East Supply Centre, with the express instruction that for the first two months they are to be used for cereal collection only, and this will be a considerable help.

The arrests foreshadowed in last week's Summary are under discussion and several names have been selected.

Syria: Damascus.

The chief event of the week has been a speech made by the Prime Minister, Husni Bey Barazi, on the 23rd November at a concert organised by the journalists, in which he criticised the Allies for not implementing their promises towards Syria. The speech, which is interpreted by the public as a futile bid for Nationalist goodwill, has naturally perturbed the Free French; they do not, however, apparently propose to use it for the moment to get rid of Husni Bey, who is conscious of the blunder he has committed. When next day the *Echos de Syrie* published an attack on Husni Bey and criticised his speech, General Collet ordered the withdrawal of the edition and the paper was subsequently suspended for ten days.

Mr. Wadsworth, the United States diplomatic agent, presented his letters of credence on the 1st December. As stated in last week's Summary, there had been a back-stage hitch when it was learned that the letters of credence for the Lebanon specified "with residence at Beirut." The difficulty was finally overcome by the insertion of a reference to the United States Government's intention to open a legation in "this illustrious capital."

At a joint meeting of the Chambers of Commerce of Aleppo and Damascus agreement was reached that in principle an income tax law should be applied. It was also agreed that Syrian merchants should contribute £S. 1,500,000 in respect of the present year.

Jebel Druze.

Meetings which were held at the end of October by the opponents of the Atrash clan to protest against their mal-administration of the country and their nepotism caused great excitement in Atrash circles; Soltan Pasha was persuaded to abandon his policy of non-intervention, and recently convoked a counter-meeting of Atrash supporters. This was, however, a failure; the opposition has again been active, and arranged a meeting on the 23rd November at which the same grievances were aired. The Political Officer reports that these meetings have caused more unrest than the Jebel Druze has known for some months.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

No successor has yet been appointed in the place of Daham-el-Hadi, head of the Syrian Shammar.

A British officer resident for some months in the Jezireh is informed that deaths in this area from smallpox have been exceptionally heavy, and figures vary from 6,000 to 12,000.

The Lebanon.

The first anniversary of the Declaration of Lebanese Independence was celebrated in Beirut on the 26th November by a well arranged and unexpectedly smart review of Lebanese troops and gendarmerie, and a reception by the President which was notable for the absence of all prominent political leaders. The population evinced little interest, and the anniversary passed practically unnoticed in other parts of the Lebanon.

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The reconciliation between the President and the Maronite Patriarch has already come to an end. The internal relations between the members of the Lebanese Government themselves have also deteriorated, and the Prime Minister is hardly on speaking terms with the President and Minister of the Interior, with the result that there is little effective administration.

Agitation against the War Profits Tax has temporarily died down, though the Prime Minister professes to fear that the big merchants may shortly organise strikes and other disorders by the Phalange and Najjadé parties, and is pressing for the complete suppression of these illegal parties by the British authorities, as he says he is powerless to take such action himself. The proposal that the Merchants' Association should compound for arrears by a voluntary lump sum has been dropped owing to the inability of the members of the association to settle amongst themselves the amount to be contributed.

[E 7817/207/89]

No. 64.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 717.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, December 24, 1942.

WEEKLY summary.

Feast of Bairam has been celebrated in an atmosphere of optimism stimulated by news from North Africa and Soviet Union. Owing to the feast, however, wheat purchases dropped by nearly 1,000 tons compared with last week.

2. Failure of Syrian Prime Minister to attend the ceremonies in Damascus has apparently reopened the breach between him and the President, and belief that a change of Government is imminent is again widespread.

3. General Catroux's return to the Levant has been followed by renewed talk of election and consequent political activity. In French circles the general's satisfaction at his reception in London and announcement regarding Madagascar have made an excellent impression.

4. Haifa-Tripoli Railway was formally opened on the 20th December by Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, in the presence of the Lebanese President, several ministers and Catroux.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 5191/4699/G]

No. 65.

(1)

*Aide-Mémoire Communicated by the United States Ambassador.—
(Received August 31.)*

THE Embassy has received from the Secretary of State a telegram concerning a plan regarding the situation in the Near East which has been discussed with the President and has received his general approval. The substance of that telegram is as follows:—

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for some time have been giving special consideration to the situation in the Near East, and have discussed with the Department of State the serious consequences for the United Nations of possible Axis success in this area. They feel that every possible effort, both political and military, must be made to hold this vital region.

2. The United States still holds a fortunate position in the Near East, and its prestige and influence are high. The people of that area seem to realise that the United States has no territorial or political interest there, and, due largely to a century of American missionary, educational and philanthropic efforts, there is widespread goodwill toward the United States.

3. Although large American military forces are not at the present time available for the protection of the Near East, in view of the aforesaid goodwill it is the feeling of the Department of State that in the field of political action and propaganda the United States is in a position to make an important contribution to help the United Nations hold that area.

4. In an effort to be of help in the political field, in the face of the existing situation, the Department of State has under contemplation the following two specific steps:—

(a) The insurance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East along the lines of the attached draft;

(b) The appointment of a diplomatic agent to Syria and the Lebanon.

5. A further step is under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They fully realise that the Near East is primarily a British theatre of military responsibility, but they feel that an American mission, part military and part economic, might, in the light of the American position in the Near East, contribute to the United Nations' success in that area, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, in mind the sending of such an American mission to the Near East as soon as possible.

6. An initial activity of such a mission would be to make an economic survey of the area. In addition, two sections of the mission would, upon arrival in the Near East, start setting up S.I. and S.O. organisations respectively, which can continue to supply information and harass the enemy should the area be invaded by the Axis. In line with arrangements which it is understood have already been agreed upon in London in regard to S.O. operations, the S.O. section of this mission would work in closest collaboration with the British S.O.E. of the Middle East Command. While it would build its own local organisations, as regards actual operations while this area remains a British theatre of military responsibility the section would, of course, function only with the approval and under the direction of the aforesaid British authorities.

7. A major function of another section of such an American mission would be to endeavour to make the most of existing goodwill toward the United States, in order to gain more active support of the peoples of this area for a United Nations' victory. The main efforts of this section of the mission, which would be quite separate from the S.I. and S.O. sections, would be in the field of political warfare and of propaganda. This would require the closest collaboration, on the one hand, with the American consular and diplomatic representatives in this area and, on the other hand, with the local representatives of the Office of War Information, who would actually do the propaganda work. Personal contact with influential leaders in the various areas of the Near East would necessarily be an important function of the head of this mission.

8. It is intended that American propaganda throughout the Near East will be greatly and rapidly increased, both in volume and effectiveness, over what has been done to date. The need to make available in the shortest possible time an

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increased amount of American news for Arabic newspapers and efficient photo. newspaper service, pamphlets, gadgets, &c., as are being offered in other parts of the world, has been discussed with the Office of War Information.

9. For effective co-ordination, the activities of the mission must, of course, be subject to the general control of the American Theatre Commander, and full co-operation with all other American Government agencies operative in the Near East is being arranged prior to the departure of the proposed mission.

10. In its work in the Near East the American mission must operate in closest collaboration with the British and Fighting French, though as an independent American organisation. Its principal arguments will be:—

- (a) The military power and potentialities of the United Nations.
- (b) The inevitable fate of the peoples of the Near East in case of Axis victory—political and economic enslavement as in all occupied countries.
- (c) The self-interest of the Near East peoples and their better prospects for political and economic development as a result of a United Nations victory.
- (d) The assurance of the support of the United States for their aspirations to independence after the war if, in line with American and British foreign policy and the Atlantic Charter, these peoples actively assist in winning it.

11. Such an American mission will naturally cover the same theatre as the Middle East Command, but its prime efforts will be aimed at the Arabic-speaking world of the near East—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Arabia, Iraq; because of physical location, Turkey and Iran. The official headquarters will be situated in the same place as the British Middle East Command, while operating headquarters probably will be established in Beirut, Lebanon, with subsidiary headquarters in each of the foregoing political areas.

12. The proposed head of the mission is Lieut-Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, United States army, for the past year and a half in the State Department and from now on on indefinite leave of absence. Colonel Hoskins, who was born in Beirut of American missionary parents, speaks Arabic, French, German and Spanish. During the last war he was a captain in the Fifth Regiment of Marines, Second United States Division, wounded and decorated. Since then he has been in the cotton goods business in the United States, but has continued to travel widely in Southern Europe and the Near East. He is also vice-president of the Board of Trustees of the American University at Beirut.

13. In order to avoid competition with existing British organisations and reduce duplication to a minimum, the American mission will aim wherever possible at enlisting the support of students and graduates of American schools and colleges in the Near East as the background of its efforts. Students of these institutions are among the mental and physical élite of the countries of that area, and many of the older graduates are political and business leaders of their countries.

14. The Department of State feels that the effort involved in the sending of the mission is well worth while and that its results can be substantiated, especially as it will enjoy the full support of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, and it is hoped, therefore, that it can proceed with the prior agreement as to its American character and activities of the British political and military authorities.

The embassy has been requested, therefore, to discuss the project with His Majesty's Government with a view to its concurrence in:—

- (1) The issuance of the attached proposed declaration of United States Government policy for the Near East. (The statement could be issued by American diplomatic representatives in the Near East if His Majesty's Government so desires, though it is felt that for maximum effect it should be issued in Washington by the President or the Secretary of State.)
- (2) The operation of the American mission along the lines outlined above.

In view of the urgency which the Secretary of State attaches to this matter, an early expression of His Majesty's Government's views would be greatly appreciated. The question is likewise being discussed with the Fighting French in view of their interest in certain regions of the Near East.

London, August 31, 1942.

Enclosure in (1).

Proposed Statement of the United States Government with respect to the Near East.

QUESTIONS have been asked as to the attitude of the Government of the United States towards the peoples of the Near East, with particular reference to their future. It is therefore desirable to make known this Government's attitude, which is as follows:—

The war objectives of this Government, as stated in the Atlantic Charter, include the "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," and respect for "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

An elaboration is given in the basic statement of policy made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on the 23rd July, 1942, as follows:—

"We have always believed—and we believe to-day—that all peoples, without distinction of race, colour, or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment.

"We have always sought—and we seek to-day—to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations.

"It has been our purpose in the past—and will remain our purpose in the future—to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy."

This Government is, of course, dedicated to the fulfilment of these objectives in the Near East as in other parts of the world.

The record shows that the Axis Powers have repeatedly and cynically dishonoured their promises and engagements. Therefore, it is inconceivable that any Near Eastern peoples place either faith or credence in them. The Axis aggressors threaten the maintenance and extension of freedom in the Near East; consequently, increased participation in the war effort by all Near Eastern peoples would be in their own interest and, naturally, would be welcomed by the United States Government.

[E 5491/4699/G]

(2)

Mr. Eden to Viscount Halifax (Washington).

(No. 731.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 15, 1942.

WHEN the United States Ambassador came to see me this morning I gave him a copy of the attached document, setting out our views on the United States aide-mémoire about the Middle East situation and American intentions. I told the Ambassador that while I understood that this reply would not entirely meet the wishes of his Government, we had thought it better thus to set out our position frankly and we would be glad if the United States Government would allow us to see the terms of any declaration that they might ultimately decide to make. It was most important that in this Middle Eastern area we should follow the same policies and as far as possible the same practices.

2. I then told Mr. Winant that I would like to describe to him the means by which we had sought to strengthen our diplomacy in those lands during the last two years. First and foremost, of course, came military strength. Next, the giving of practical help in finance and armaments as far as possible in forms generally understood by the mass of the people. As an example of this I cited the grant of half a million we had recently made towards A.R.P. in Iraq, and the transfer of a certain number of armoured cars to the Iraqi Army. Thirdly, the rounding up of Axis agents. Considerable progress had been made with this task during the last eighteen months, and though it could not be described as completed, the position had undoubtedly greatly improved in Persia and Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.

3. Finally, there was the question of propaganda, in which sphere it was all important that the Americans should say the same things as ourselves. We had proceeded on the broad basis of "better the devil you know than the devil you don't." Our past record in the Middle East was one of which we had no reason to be ashamed. As a result of our treaty with Iraq we had withdrawn from that

country and set up an independent State. In due course after the victory was won, we should do so again. These were things which the Arabs remembered. They could fairly be contrasted with the German doctrine of *Herrenvolk* and the Italian practice in Tripoli. The simpler we kept our propaganda lessons, the more effective were they likely to be. The Ambassador would understand from the brief description I had given him how essential we thought it was that in any work that the Americans undertook for the Allied cause in the Middle Eastern theatre of war they should co-operate closely with us. This was after all a theatre in which we had had some experience, and despite the varying fortunes of war we did feel that we could show a steady record of progress. Indeed, it might be said that it was remarkable that the Middle Eastern countries had remained so stable during the last year when we had suffered many set-backs in the field.

4. The Ambassador agreed, and I think understood that his Government had much to learn about this part of the world. He undertook to report what I had said to his Government, together with the memorandum. I think that he will do his best to put our point of view in a favourable light.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in (2).

Aide-Mémoire.

HIS Majesty's Government have not failed to give most careful attention to the aide-mémoire received from the American Embassy under date the 31st August, in which the opinion of His Majesty's Government is invited on certain political action contemplated by the United States Government in the Middle East, and on the proposed despatch of a special American Mission to those regions.

2. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the wish of the United States Government to utilise for the purposes of the war all the great reserves of goodwill which the United States has undoubtedly built up in the Middle East by decades of philanthropic and cultural enterprise. They agree that it is highly desirable to make the most effective use possible of these reserves, and of the great influence which the United States enjoy, for other reasons, in those territories as elsewhere, and they cordially welcome the intention of the United States Government to appoint a Diplomatic Agent in Syria and the Lebanon. As regards the proposed public declaration, His Majesty's Government recognise the value of any step that would stimulate the Middle Eastern peoples to increase the degree of their participation in the resistance to the Axis aggressors, and if the United States Government are of the opinion that this object can satisfactorily be advanced by the issue of a declaration, His Majesty's Government would not wish to raise objection. At the same time, they must in all frankness say that they see very considerable dangers in addressing a statement in the form proposed to the regions in question, and should the United States Government be prepared, as His Majesty's Government sincerely hope, to reconsider the wording of the draft statement, His Majesty's Government would greatly appreciate an opportunity to consider any revised formula.

3. In the first place, the stress laid in the draft declaration on the promotion of "liberty" and "freedom" appears inappropriate when applied to a region in which all the countries specified, with the exceptions of Palestine and Transjordan and the possible further exception of the Levant States, already enjoy independence qualified only by the exigencies of the war situation and the requirements of the Allied forces operating within their boundaries.

4. Such a declaration followed by the announcement on the American side of the intention to despatch a Special Mission would, in the view of His Majesty's Government, incur the precise risk of strengthening that Axis influence and that Axis propaganda which it is the express intention of the proposal to combat. The meaning of the draft declaration would infallibly be taken in the countries to which it is intended to apply as containing both an implication that "liberty" is being withheld and an assurance that it is the intention of the United States Government to hasten its achievement. No implications could be more welcome to Axis propaganda, could be more readily turned against the occupying forces or could be more calculated to increase the tension of the existing situation and to threaten the security of the Allied Command.

5. On the other hand, and as regards the areas covered by the proposed mission which do enjoy full independence, His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that the suggested mission and the draft declaration are liable to be misinterpreted as regards Palestine both by Jews and Arabs in a sense which could hardly fail to have dangerous repercussions. As regards Syria and the Lebanon, as the United States Government are aware, the situation is complicated in so far as the fulfilment of the Anglo-French recognition of independence is impeded by the obstruction of the Fighting French administration, while the tense military situation in Egypt renders it difficult for His Majesty's Government on their side to apply the pressure which they would otherwise wish to bring. American help in securing this fulfilment, afforded at the right time and in the right manner, will be heartily welcomed by His Majesty's Government. But the proposals now advanced, in so far as they refer to these areas, seem to His Majesty's Government calculated to provoke a state of popular agitation and excitement which, at the present time, it would be very difficult to meet.

6. A special word must be said about Turkey. Although His Majesty's Government feel that the proposed declaration is hardly appropriate to that country, they are anxious to make clear that the arrangements which the United States Government may wish to make for the utilisation, and the increase, in the interest of the United Nations' war effort, of their undoubted influence in Turkey are, in the view of His Majesty's Government, essentially a question between the United States and the Turkish Governments. His Majesty's Government, for their part, if only in view of their treaty of alliance with Turkey and the delicate political situation in regard to that country, welcome the evident readiness of the United States Government to keep them acquainted with the action which they may propose to take.

7. As regards the Special Mission, the United States Government will be aware from enquiries made a few weeks ago, both through His Majesty's Embassy in Washington and through Mr. Phillips in London, that His Majesty's Government knew that such a mission was under discussion in Washington. Since then the implications of the proposal, even without the full details which the United States Government have now been so good as to supply, have naturally been the subject of careful and mature study in London. While fully recognising that a valuable part might be played by an emissary with local and specialised knowledge and other qualifications, His Majesty's Government feel bound, in existing circumstances and in an area the greater part of which is at present included in a British military zone, strongly to deprecate the despatch of a mission with activities which are both political and diplomatic, propagandist and subversive (post-occupational). As to these last, they would urge that the *modus vivendi* arrived at by the two departments concerned should be adhered to, since experience has shown that work of this nature, when conducted in areas which have not yet fallen under enemy occupation, carries grave risks which can only be met by the acceptance of full control over such work by the military command within the area.

8. In respect of the other activities mentioned in the Embassy's memorandum, His Majesty's Government would welcome the appointment of specialised American personnel to work with the appropriate British authorities on all these matters. In general, they welcome the intention of the United States Government that American propaganda should be greatly and rapidly increased in the interest of the United Nations' war effort throughout the Middle East, where the soil, for the reasons pointed out in the American Embassy memorandum, should be peculiarly fertile.

Foreign Office,
September 15, 1942.